Journal of European Integration History 2/2011

Home , Arved Deringer, Eelco van Kleffens, Ernst van der Beugel, Heinrich Aigner, James Marjoribanks, Sicco Mansholt

Journal of European Integration History /2011 Revue d’Histoire de l’Intégration Européenne 2Volume 17 Zeitschrift für Geschichte der europäischen Integration Pages 167-380

Editors: Published twice a year by the Groupe de liaison des professeurs d’histoire contemporaine auprès de la Commission européenne. This publication is part of the Network EU-History based at the Kulturwissenschaftliches Institut Essen. It is financed by the Ministère d’Etat, Présidence du gouvernement of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. Editorial Board: Wilfried LOTH (chairman), Universität Essen (Jean Monnet Chair) | Gérard BOSSUAT, Université de Cergy-Pontoise (Jean Monnet Chair) | Elena CALANDRI, Università degli Studi di Padova | Anne DEIGHTON, Wolfson College, Oxford (Jean Monnet Chair) | Michel DUMOULIN, Université catholique de Louvain (Jean Monnet Chair) | Michael GEHLER, Universität Hildesheim (Jean Monnet Chair) | Fernando GUIRAO, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona (Jean Monnet Chair) | Johnny LAURSEN, University of Aarhus | N. Piers LUDLOW, London School of Economics | Kiran Klaus PATEL, European University Institute, Florence | Nicolae PĂUN, University of Cluj-Napoca | Sylvain SCHIRMANN, Institut d'études politiques, Strasbourg | Klaus SCHWABE, Rheinisch-Westfälische Technische Hochschule Aachen (Jean Monnet Chair) | Gilbert TRAUSCH, Centre Robert Schuman, Université de Liège | Jan VAN der HARST, University of Groningen (Jean Monnet Chair) | Antonio VARSORI, Università di Padova (Jean Monnet Chair) www.eu-historians.eu Editorial Secretariat: Charles Barthel, director, Centre d’études et de recherches européennes, Robert Schuman, 4 Rue Jules Wilhelm, L-2728 Luxembourg, Tel.: (00 352) 24 78 22 90, Fax.: (00 352) 42 27 97

Contents / Table des matières / Inhalt

Introduction ...... 171 Guido THIEMEYER, Isabel TÖLLE Supranationalität im 19. Jahrhundert? Die Beispiele der Zentralkommission für die Rheinschifffahrt und des Octroivertrages 1804-1851 ...... 177 Jieskje HOLLANDER The Dutch Intellectual Debate on European Integration (1948-present). On Teachings and Life ...... 197 Andrea BENVENUTI Australia and Western European Integration in the 1950s ...... 219 Sibylle HAMBLOCH EEC Competition Policy in the Early Phase of European Integration ...... 237 Philip BAJON De Gaulle finds his “Master”. Gerhard Schröder’s “Fairly Audacious Politics” in the European Crisis of 1965–66 ...... 253 Marijn MOLEMA European Integration from below: the Construction of the Ems-Dollart Region, 1964-1978 ...... 271 Valentina VARDABASSO La cendrillon de l'histoire: la Cour des comptes européenne et la démocratisation des institutions européennes (1970-1976) ...... 285 Andreas PUDLAT Der lange Weg zum Schengen-Raum: Ein Prozess im Vier-Phasen-Modell ...... 303 Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen ...... 327 Research Reports – Rapports de recherche – Forschungsberichte The international history of European integration in the long 1970s.A round-table discussion on research issues, methodologies, and directions ...... 333 PHD Theses – Thèses de doctorat – Doktorarbeiten ...... 361 Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen ...... 367 Contributors – Auteurs – Autoren ...... 377 Books received – Livres reçus – Eingegangene Bücher ...... 379

Impressum Editorial Secretariat: Charles Barthel, director | Centre d’études et de recherches européennes | Robert Schuman | 4 Rue Jules Wilhelm | L-2728 Luxembourg | Tel.: (00 352) 24 78 22 90 | Fax.: (00 352) 42 27 97 Published twice a year by the Groupe de liaison des professeurs d’histoire contemporaine auprès de la Commission européenne. Annual subscription: 72,– €, postage and packing extra | Single issues: 38,– € Payments can be made – by cheques payable to Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft – by bank transfers to Stadtsparkasse Baden-Baden, account no 5 002 266, bank clearing number (Bank- leitzahl 66 250 030) in the name of Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft. Please ensure you quote the Journal of European Integration History when instructing your bank and enclose a copy of your instructions to the bank with your order – by credit card (VISA, Masters, Eurocard). Subscriptions and orders should be sent to: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, D-76520 Baden-Baden, Ger- many. Inquiries concerning advertisements should be sent to the Editorial Secretariat, Centre d’études et de recherches européennes Robert Schuman, 4 rue Jules Wilhelm, L-2728 Luxembourg. Print: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, Postfach 100 310, 76484 Baden-Baden, Telefon 0 72 21 / 21 04-0, Telefax 0 72 21 / 21 04 43. Anzeigen: sales_friendly, Bettina Roos, Siegburger Straße 123, 53229 Bonn, Telefon 02 28 / 9 78 98-0, Fax 02 28 / 9 78 98-20, [email protected]. ISSN 0947-9511 The Liaison Committee of Historians came into being in 1982 as a result of an important international symposium that the Commission had organized in Luxembourg to launch historical research on Euro- pean integration. The committee is composed of historians of the European Union member countries who work on contemporary history. The Liaison Committee: – gathers and conveys information about work on European history after the Second World War; – advises the European Union on research projects concerning contemporary European history. Thus, the Liaison Committee was commissioned to make publicly available the archives of the Community institutions; – enables researchers to make better use of the archival sources; – promotes research meetings to get an update of work in progress and to stimulate new research: seven research conferences have been organized and their proceedings published. The Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'intégration européenne – Zeitschrift für Geschichte der europäischen Integration is in line with the preoccupations of the Liaison Committee. Being the first history journal to deal exclusively with the history of European Integration, the Journal offers the increasing number of young historians devoting their research to contemporary Europe, a permanent forum. The Liaison Committee works completely independently and according to historians' critical method.

Le Groupe de liaison des professeurs d'histoire contemporaine auprès de la Commission des Commu- nautés européennes s'est constitué en 1982 à la suite d'un grand colloque que la Commission avait organisé à Luxembourg pour lancer la recherche historique sur la construction européenne. Il regroupe des professeurs d'université des pays membres de l'Union européenne, spécialistes d'histoire contemporaine. Le Groupe de liaison a pour mission: – de diffuser l'information sur les travaux portant sur l'histoire de l'Europe après la Seconde Guerre mondiale; – de conseiller l'Union européenne sur les actions scientifiques à entreprendre avec son appui; ainsi le Groupe de liaison a assuré une mission concernant la mise à la disposition du public des archives des institutions communautaires; – d'aider à une meilleure utilisation par les chercheurs des moyens de recherche mis à leur disposition (archives, cources orales...); – d'encourager des rencontres scientifiques afin de faire le point sur les connaissances acquises et de susciter de nouvelles recherches: sept grands colloques ont été organisés et leur actes publiés. L'édition du Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'intégration européenne – Zeitschrift für Geschichte der europäischen Integration se situe dans le droit fil des préoccupations du Groupe de liaison. Première revue d'histoire à se consacrer exclusivement à l'histoire de la construction européenne, le Journal se propose de fournir un forum permanent au nombre croissant de jeunes historiens vouant leurs recherches à l'Europe contemporaine. Le Groupe de liaison organise ses colloques et publications en toute indépendance et conformément à la méthode critique qui est celle des historiens. Editorial notice

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Citation

The Journal of European Integration History may be cited as follows: JEIH, (Year)/(Number), (Page).

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior permission of the publishers. 171

Introduction

An ‘open volume’ within the framework of the Journal of European Integration His- tory (JEIH) holds both advantages and disadvantages. It releases the coordinator who is also responsible for the introduction from obligations that are too conceptional and from turgid methodical considerations, because in view of a colourful checkerboard of individual articles, a stringent systematology is only barely possible. On one hand, the different formulations of questions regarding content cannot be squeezed into the Procrustean bed of a theory. On the other hand, they reflect the variety of the thematic approaches and the wealth of the current historical research into Europe and integration. After a decision by the editors, this volume of the JEIH also features a new section with debating articles and reports on research, including the round table directed by Federico Romero of the European University Institute (EUI) in Florence. This will provide a great deal of new material on the methods and trends of recent international research on the history of European integration during the ‘long 1970s’. But this introduction is to be dedicated to the individual articles. Guido Thiemeyer and Isabel Tölle have taken on the relationship between supranationality and the integration of Europe in the nineteenth century through the example of the ‘Central Commission for Navigation on the Rhine’. It was Thiemeyer himself who had at first confirmed the usual opinion of the literature by having des- ignated supranationality – understood as the delegating of parts of national sovereignty to a new institution standing over the nation-states – for the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) as a Novum [‘something new’], according to which this realized the supranational principle for the first time.1 In his article with Tölle, though, Thiemeyer then goes on to show that comparable considerations and implementations already existed in the nineteenth century. The ‘Central Commission for Navigation on the Rhine’, which was brought to life in 1815 at the Congress of Vienna, and its predecessor, the Octroi Treaty between France and the Holy Roman Empire, already had supranational competencies in clearly delimited areas and under precisely defined conditions which, however, did not range as far as those of the ECSC of the 1950s. The article by Thiemeyer and Tölle makes clear the historical dimension and international law dimension of supranationality. Historical documents lead to the conclusion that economic and technical reasons were decisive for that kind of supranationality. The two authors argue that there are continuities between the economic and technical integration of the early nineteenth century and supranational organisations of the post-World War II period. Systematic notion-related research about ‘supranationality’ still remains to be carried out. The history of ideas and intellectuals can no longer be neglected, especially with regard to Europe’s integration dynamics after 1945. Documentation and research on

1. G. THIEMEYER, Supranationalität als Novum in der Geschichte der internationalen Politik der fünfziger Jahre, in: JEIH, 2(1998), pp.5-21. 172 Introduction the history of ideas began in the 1960s with, for example, Hellmut Foerster, Heinz Gollwitzer, Walter Lipgens, and John Pinder.2 It lost ground in the 1980s and 1990s, but it survived and demonstrated its importance during the last decade. Jieskje Hol- lander focuses on the Dutch intellectual debates on Europe’s integration from the times of the Hague Congress of 1948 up to the present. Concepts, ideas, and thoughts of intellectuals became more and more relevant because of growing disputes and controversies about the content and goals of integration, such as the deepening and widening or present limitations and future perspectives, comprising the entire political agenda connected with Europe’s unification and its deeper significance. Hollan- der describes the intellectual background behind the integration policy decisions by the Netherlands – a study which has hitherto not been carried out, and one which should also be done for other EU countries. Her article fills a gap in Dutch and Euro- pean historiography and shows that from a historical point of view, there was an ongoing intellectual debate with everlasting pro and cons. Hollander’s analysis also demonstrates that since the origins of these debates, there already existed a gap between political decision makers and elites on one hand and the broader public and the man in the street on the other. This dilemma came up very clearly during the Dutch referendum on June 1st, 2005 concerning the so called “Constitutional Treaty”, when a majority of voters in this founding member state voted against that important document. Hollander shows how important the historical perspective of intellectual and political debates can be. Politicians could not ignore them. They also had to convince intellectuals as an important part of the society. Intellectual and political communication went hand in hand. Both were necessary in order to be politically legitimized. Andrea Benvenuti analyses Australia’s attitude toward early Western European integration. The author examines the perceptions and reactions of Australia’s government during the setting up of the ECSC (1952), the defeat of the European Army project (1954), and the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC – 1958). Australia’s government officially welcomed the formation of institutionalized co-operation in Western Europe in principle, but behind the scenes it took an ambivalent stance vis-à-vis that new kind of integration process. Canberra realized the growing relevance of political cohesion for creating a working economy with growing prosperity in the western part of the continent. But this new regionalism forced Australian foreign policy decision makers to think about their own perspectives more than before. On one hand, the Liberal-Country Party coalition government headed by Robert Menzies recognized the new dimensions of supranational structures in Western Europe, but on the other hand, it also had to think about the negative consequences for Australia’s economic and security interests. There were doubts as to whether this new Western European regionalism could be compatible with Aus-

2. R.H. FOERSTER, Die Idee Europa 1300-1946. Quellen zur Geschichte der politischen Einigung, DTV, Munich, 1963; H. GOLLWITZER, Europabild und Europagedanke. Beiträge zur deutschen Geistesgeschichte des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts, C.H. Beck, Munich, 1964; W. LIPGENS (ed.), Europa-Föderationspläne der Widerstandsbewegungen 1940-1945, Oldenbourg, Munich, 1968; J. PINDER, Europe against De Gaulle, Pall Mall Press, London/Dunmow, 1963; idem, European Community. The building of a union, Oxford University Press, Oxford/New York, 1991. Introduction 173 tralian policy goals. One key question was raised: namely, whether the United King- dom would stay outside or join the EEC. The challenge of European integration became more serious and even dangerous for Australia when the British government of Harold Macmillan applied for full EEC membership in August 1961. A possible entry would have seemed to undermine the UK’s historical, economic, and political ties not only with Australia, but with the entire Commonwealth. Benvenuti clearly demonstrates that perception history and the role of the ‘outside perspective’ of the European communities still has its value for historical integration research. When looking at the very beginnings of Western European market integration, the issue of competition policy was one of the functioning common policies of the early EEC. This was closely connected with the first commissioner of that field, Hans von der Groeben, one of the forgotten German Europeans of the 1950s in the first EEC commission also headed by a German, the former Undersecretary of the German Foreign Ministry and EEC Commission President Walter Hallstein (term in office: 1958-67). Sibylle Hambloch analyses the conditions for this success story. Common European laws such as directives and regulations contributed to this supranational competition policy. The author presents two examples which resulted in common legislation. In that way, she also indicates the limitations of that new common policy. On one hand, EEC Regulation 17/62 paved the way for a European cartel law, while on the other hand a European company law failed. With her article, Hambloch demonstrates very convincingly that far more case studies in different fields of integration policy have to be done in order to properly judge the progress and stagnation of historical developments in integration. Philip Bajon is one of the top experts on the empty chair crisis of 1965-66. In his article, he argues that the French President Charles de Gaulle met his match in German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder. Bajon’s article throws new light on the interactions between these two key players of Western European policy in the middle of the 1960s. The author makes clear why French-German cooperation – which seems to be the better word than ‘conciliation’ – did not work, why France at first could not be stopped from provoking one of the most serious political crises of the Communi- ties, and why, ultimately, Schröder managed to hold Germany’s line in maintaining the monopoly of that country’s definition of European policy. Bajon emphasizes the tug of war between these two statesmen. Schröder was able to hold on and demonstrated Germany’s role as the new leader of the group of France’s partners within the EEC. His policy was courageous and risky when forcing de Gaulle back to the Mi- nister’s Council. Thanks to Bajon, we now know that West Germany still played a central role in the mid-1960s in solving one of the most severe constitutional crises of the EEC. Cross-border cooperation became more and more important in the Europe of the 1980s and 1990s. Marijn Molema presents us the construction of the ‘Ems-Dollart Region’, connecting the Northern Netherlands with northern parts of West Germany. The author makes it clear that the process of cross-border institutionalization was the result of social practices and discourses involving four types of actors: politicians at 174 Introduction the regional and sub-national level playing only a modest role, and regional actors in civil society pushing the concept of cross-border cooperation. Policy makers from state ministries of economic affairs more or less agreed with these initiatives. What is remarkable is the fact that the European Commission’s attempts at creating a Euro- pean regional policy encouraged the aforementioned players. Molema elaborates and tells us that they constituted a multi-layered development, although this case study shows that cross-border cooperation from the middle of the 1960s to the end of the 1970s had its roots in different players from several societal backgrounds acting in a dynamic multilevel system.3 The article written by Valentina Vardabasso has an impressive metaphoric title. She calls the EC Court of Auditors and the question of the democratization of Euro- pean institutions in the first half of the 1970s the ‘Cinderella of History’. It was the decision of April 21st, 1970 on the Community’s own resources which marked the starting point of long-lasting negotiations between EC member states and representatives of the European Parliament, supported by the German Christian Democrat Heinrich Aigner and also involving the French socialist Georges Spénale and the French diplomat Raymond Offroy. A great deal of effort was put into strengthening the Parliament’s financial competences and setting up a monitoring system through the creation of the Court of Auditors. The intention behind that initiative was to combine the direct elections of the European Parliament’s members with real competences for that newly elected body. But French President Georges Pompidou was against this procedure. He wanted to limit the EC’s financial autonomy to only administrative purposes. The conflict was to be overcome by giving the European Parliament the right of veto over the Community’s budget and by offering the member states the choice of their own Court of Auditors members who then had to formulate the basis of the common budget. The different attempts at democratizing the European Com- munities still remain one of the major tasks of historical research into integration. Andreas Pudlat is one of the rare experts focusing on the historical process of the Schengen system. Protection of borders with strict controls and measures of mediation had different functions: defence against external threats, income as a result of customs duties, environmental protection, and last but not least the fight against crime and the control of immigration within the context of the so-called ‘Eastern Enlarge- ment’ of the European Union. Dealing with border issues in Europe was and still is an indicator of the strength of the sovreignty of the states. Before 1945, border issues often led to conflicts and wars. Therefore, the European movement after the Second World War propagated negative images of borders. Today, borders still exist within and outside the European Union. Thus it took a substantial amount of time to create a Europe without border controls. With the Schengen regulations becoming part of the acquis communautaire since the entering into force of the Amsterdam Treaty (1999), border controls had been systematically removed between more and more

3. In this regard, also see M. GEHLER, Zeitgeschichte im dynamischen Mehrebenensystem. Zwischen Regionalisierung, Nationalstaat, Europäisierung, internationaler Arena und Globalisierung, Dieter Winkler, Bochum, 2001. Introduction 175 participating members. Pudlat describes the long and rocky road to the new Schengen region of Europe. Four decisive steps had to been taken to reach this goal. Despite of some recent backslashes – the Danish government decided in 2011 to reinstitute the old border controls – the author relates to us a success story of one of the most important developments in Europe after the end of the Cold War: free movement between different countries without passport controls. This is one of the strongest feel- ings of the united Europe of today. Michael Gehler Hildesheim, Germany, October 2011 Zielführend.

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Supranationalität im 19. Jahrhundert? Die Beispiele der Zentralkommission für die Rheinschifffahrt und des Octroivertrages 1804-1851

Guido THIEMEYER, Isabel TÖLLE

Die Geschichtsschreibung der Europäischen Integration setzt üblicherweise nach 1945 an. Zwar vergisst kaum eine der klassischen Einführungen in die Europäische Integrationsgeschichte die geistigen Vorläufer in der Zwischenkriegszeit, bisweilen auch schon im 19. Jahrhundert oder gar früher zu erwähnen, die eigentliche Europä- ische Integration, so scheint es, begann aber erst nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg.1 Diese klassische Perspektive ist in den vergangen Jahren in Frage gestellt worden. Von verschiedener Seite ist darauf hingewiesen worden, dass es insbesondere schon im 19. Jahrhundert eine starke Tendenz zu europäischer Integration gab, auf dem Sektor der Politik ebenso wie in jenen der Gesellschaft und Wirtschaft.2 Die Forschung ist sich allerdings keineswegs einig darüber, wie diese Phänomene zu interpretieren sind. Handelt es sich um einen Prozess der Amerikanisierung, der Globalisierung oder sollte der Internationalismus des 19. Jahrhunderts vielmehr als Vorstufe zur Europä- ischen Integration interpretiert werden? Die Debatte über diese Frage ist noch nicht abgeschlossen.3 Einig hingegen ist sich die Forschung bislang darüber, dass das Phänomen der Supranationalität ein Produkt des 20. Jahrhunderts ist. Die Europäische Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl, die am 18. April 1951 durch den Vertrag von Paris gegründet wurde, wird allgemein als erste supranationale internationale Organisation betrachtet. In diesem Beitrag soll die These vertreten werden, dass es – auch wenn es den Begriff noch nicht gab – schon im 19. Jahrhundert das Phänomen der Supranationalität gab,

1. Vgl. beispielsweise J. GILLINGHAM, European Integration 1950-2003. Superstate or New Market Economy?, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003; J. MITTAG, Kleine Geschichte der Europäischen Union. Von der Europaidee bis zur Gegenwart, Aschendorff, Münster, 2008; G. BOS- SUAT, Histoire de l’Union européenne. Fondations, élargissements, avenir, Belin, Paris, 2009. 2. P. KRÜGER, Das unberechenbare Europa. Epochen des Integrationsprozesses vom späten 18. Jahr- hundert bis zur Europäischen Union, Kohlhammer Verlag, Stuttgart, 2006; G. THIEMEYER, Eu- ropäische Integration. Motive, Prozesse, Strukturen, UTB, Köln, 2009; H. KAELBLE, Europäer über Europa. Die Entstehung des europäischen Selbstverständnisses im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, Campus, Frankfurt, 2001; G. AMBROSIUS, Liberale vs. Institutionelle Integration von Wirtschafts- politiken in Europa. Das 19. Jahrhundert und 20. Jahrhundert im systematischen und historischen Vergleich, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2009. 3. H.G. SCHRÖTER, Americanization of the European Economy. A compact Survey of American economic Influence in Europe since the 1880s, Kluwer Academic, Dortrecht, 2005; J.A. SCHOLTE, Globalization. A Critical Introduction, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2000; J. OSTERHAMMEL, N.P. PETERSSON, Geschichte der Globalisierung. Dimensionen, Prozesse, Epochen, CH. Beck, Mün- chen, 2003; C. MURPHY, International Organisation and Industrial Change. Global Governance since 1850, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1994; C. HENRICH-FRANKE, C. NEUTSCH, G. THIEMEY- ER (Hrsg.), Internationalismus und Europäische Integration im Vergleich. Fallstudien zu Währun- gen, Landwirtschaft, Verkehrs- und Nachrichtenwesen, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2007. 178 Guido THIEMEYER, Isabel TÖLLE wenn auch in sehr eng umgrenzten Bereichen. Im Fokus steht hier die Zentralkom- mission für die Rheinschifffahrt, die auf dem Wiener Kongress gegründet wurde und am 15. August 1816 unter diesem Namen ihre Arbeit aufnahm. Sie existiert bis heute und ist die älteste internationale Organisation überhaupt. An zwei Fallbeispielen soll im Folgenden gezeigt werden, was Supranationalität in Bezug auf die Rheinschiff- fahrt des frühen 19. Jahrhunderts bedeutete und warum die Zeitgenossen sich für dieses Konzept entschieden. Im Schlusskapitel wird die Supranationalität des frühen 19. Jahrhunderts mit den Diskussionen um dieses Phänomen in der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts verglichen.

Der Begriff der Supranationalität

Der Begriff der Supranationalität ist im Rahmen der Wissenschaft keineswegs klar, sondern wird in verschiedenen Bedeutungen verwendet. Insbesondere in der Politik- wissenschaft wird der Begriff in vielen verschiedenen Versionen verwandt. Biswei- len steht er einfach als Synonym für „international“. Supranational sind in diesem Sinne alle Organisationen, die über den Nationalstaaten stehende Strukturen entwi- ckeln.4 Zweitens wird in den Politikwissenschaften auch ein theoretischer For- schungsansatz, der sich vor allem mit den europäischen Institutionen als politischen Akteuren beschäftigt, als „Supranationalismus“ bezeichnet.5 Schließlich ziehen andere Autoren den Begriff heran, um die Besonderheit des EU-Systems zu beschreiben und dieses von anderen internationalen Organisationen abzugrenzen.6 Das ist bislang auch der Ansatz der Geschichtswissenschaft, die sich allerdings erstaunlich wenig mit diesem Phänomen beschäftigt hat. Auch hier dominiert die These, dass der Begriff der Supranationalität ausschließlich zur Beschreibung des Systems der Europäischen Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl und ihrer Folgeorganisationen zu benutzen ist. Die EGKS sei die erste supranationale Organisation gewesen.7 Man stützt sich hierbei vor allem auf die Aussagen der Initiatoren der EGKS, Jean Monnet und Robert Schu- man, die vielfach selbst darauf hinwiesen, dass, auch wenn es intellektuelle Vorläufer gab, die Konstruktion der EGKS einmalig und neu sei. Neu sei aber, so Schuman in einer Rede an der Universität Mainz am 21. Mai 1953, nicht das Phänomen, sondern lediglich die völkerrechtliche Form der Supranationalität:

4. E. BOMBERG, J. PETERSON, A. STUBB, The European Union. How does it work?, Oxford Uni- versity Press, Oxford, 2008, S.10. 5. K. HOLZINER, C. KNILL, D. PETERS, u.a., Die Europäische Union. Theorien und Analysekon- zepte, UTB, Paderborn u.a., 2005, S.31-40. 6. K. KILJUNEN, The European Constitution in the Making, Brussels, 2004. 7. W. LOTH (Hrsg.), La Gouvernance supranationale dans la construction européenne, Peter Lang, Bruxelles, 2005; J. GILLINGHAM, op.cit., S.27; G. THIEMEYER, Supranationalität als Novum in der Geschichte der internationalen Beziehungen der fünfziger Jahre, in: Journal of European Inte- gration History, 4(1999), S.5-21. Supranationalität im 19. Jahrhundert? 179

„Aber diese überstaatliche Ordnung schafft nicht die Abhängigkeit der Staaten; sie trägt der tatsächlich bestehenden Abhängigkeit Rechnung. Sie normalisiert sie, sie bringt sie in rechtliche Bahnen und bewahrt sie vor Missbräuchen, vor egoistischer Ausbeutung des Schwachen durch den Stärkeren“.8 Supranationalität war aus dieser Sicht also primär die Verrechtlichung bereits beste- hender inter- und transnationaler Strukturen. Sie sei notwendig, so erklärte Schuman weiter, um die Entscheidungsfähigkeit internationaler Organisationen zu erhöhen. Das trifft sich mit der Argumentation des niederländischen Landwirtschaftsministers Sicco Mansholt, für den ebenfalls die Effizienz politischer Entscheidungen im Mit- telpunkt seines Engagements für die supranationale Europäische Integration stand. Nur so, so Mansholt weiter, könnten Entscheidungen getroffen werden, die vom wirtschaftlichen und politischen Standpunkt aus notwendig, gleichwohl aber unpo- pulär seien.9 Eine Eingrenzung des Begriffes oder eine Definition war auf dieser bislang schmalen Basis kaum möglich. Etwas weiter ist in dieser Hinsicht die Rechtswissenschaft, die sich wohl am aus- führlichsten mit dem Phänomen der Supranationalität auseinandergesetzt hat, selbst wenn es auch hier keine unumstrittene Definition des Begriffes gibt. Allerdings hat die Rechtswissenschaft Kategorien entwickelt, mit deren Hilfe supranationale Orga- nisationen beschrieben werden können. Auch wenn die Gewichtung der Kategorien umstritten ist, können sie doch helfen, den Begriff genauer zu fassen.10 Erstes Kri- terium ist hier, dass supranationale Organisationen rechtsverbindliche Mehrheitsbe- schlüsse fassen können. Klassische intergouvernementale Organisationen, wie zum Beispiel der Europarat, können nur einstimmig Beschlüsse fassen, das heißt jedes Mitgliedsland verfügt über ein Veto-Recht. Die nationale Souveränität der Mitglied- staaten wird uneingeschränkt gewahrt. Beschlüsse der supranationalen Organisation sind dagegen selbst dann bindend, wenn ein Mitgliedstaat ihnen nicht zugestimmt hat. Ein zweites Kriterium für Supranationalität ist, dass die von der Organisation gefassten Beschlüsse unmittelbare Wirkung in den Mitgliedstaaten haben und für jedermann verbindlich sind. Eine Umsetzung in nationales Recht oder ein Beschluss des nationalen Parlamentes ist nicht notwendig. Das dritte Kriterium ist, dass supranationale Organisationen bestimmte staatliche Aufgaben, wie Rechtssetzung, Ver- waltung und Rechtsprechung, übernehmen, so dass eine gemeinschaftlich integrierte statt einzelstaatlich verantwortete Politik betrieben wird. Diese Definition ist innerhalb der Rechtswissenschaft nicht unumstritten, soll hier gleichwohl als Begriffsbe- stimmung zur Beurteilung der Zentralkommission für die Rheinschifffahrt genutzt werden. Während die meisten Rechtswissenschaftler davon ausgehen, dass Supranationa- lität im eben genannten Sinne ein Phänomen des 20. Jahrhunderts ist, gibt es durchaus

8. R. SCHUMAN, Die Grundlinien der europäischen Integrationspolitik, in: M.-T. BITSCH, Robert Schuman. Apôtre de l'Europe 1953-1963, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2010, S.54. 9. G. THIEMEYER, Sicco Mansholt and European Supranationalism, in: W LOTH (Hrsg.), op.cit., S.39-54. 10. H.-P. IPSEN, Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 1972; U. FASTEN- RATH, M. MÜLLER-GERBES, Europarecht, Boorberg, Stuttgart u.a., 2004, S.37. 180 Guido THIEMEYER, Isabel TÖLLE bereits rechtswissenschaftliche Untersuchungen, die diese Fragen für das 19. Jahr- hundert untersuchen.11 Im Zentrum des Interesses steht auch hier die Zentralkom- mission für die Rheinschifffahrt, die auf dem Wiener Kongress 1815 eingerichtet wurde und ihrerseits wieder mit dem so genannten Octroi-Vertrag von 1804 einen Vorläufer hatte. Erst 1831 erhielt sie eine rechtliche Grundlage mit der so genannten Mainzer Akte, die, nachdem technische Innovationen, insbesondere die Dampf- schifffahrt, den Verkehr grundlegend verändert hatten, mit der so genannten Mann- heimer Akte von 1868 novelliert wurde. Gründungsstaaten der Zentralkommission auf dem Wiener Kongress waren seinerzeit Frankreich, Preußen, Österreich, England, die Niederlande, die Großherzogtümer Baden und Darmstadt, Nassau und Bayern. Hauptaufgabe der Zentralkommission ist es bis heute, gemeinsame Regeln für die Schifffahrt auf dem Rhein zu erarbeiten und ihre Einhaltung zu überwachen. Das Grundprinzip war die Freiheit und Gleichbehandlung der Binnenschifffahrt, das bedeutete, dass die Schiffe aller Nationen den Rhein und seine schiffbaren Nebenflüsse benutzen durften, allerdings die von der Zentralkommission festgelegten Regeln zu beachten waren. Konkret beinhalteten die Rheinschifffahrtsabkommen Regeln über die Abgabenfreiheit der Rheinschifffahrt, einheitliche Sicherheitsvorschriften für Schiffe sowie für die Instandhaltung des Verkehrsweges Rhein.

Supranationalität in der Rheinschifffahrt

a) Gerichtsbarkeit

Schon vor dem Wiener Kongress war am 15. August 1804 ein so genannter Octroi- Vertrag zwischen Frankreich und dem Heiligen Römischen Reich Deutscher Nation unterzeichnet worden, der die Regeln für den Schiffsverkehr auf dem Rhein festleg- te.12 Bemerkenswert ist an diesem Octroi-Vertrag, dass er den Rhein und die Rhein- schifffahrt als übernationalen Gegenstand betrachtete, der folglich auch einer über- nationalen Rechtsprechung unterlag. Artikel II des Vertrags definierte: „En conséquence, quoique le Thalweg du Rhin forme, quant à la souveraineté, la limite entre la France et l'Allemagne, le Rhin sera toujours considéré sous le rapport de la navigation et du commerce, comme un fleuve commun entre les deux empires […] et la navigation en sera soumise à des règles communes“.

11. H. FUHRMANN, Die völkerrechtlichen Grundlagen der Rheinschiffahrt, [unveröffentlichte Dis- sertation], Köln, 1954; E. GOTHEIN, Geschichtliche Entwicklung der Rheinschiffahrt im 19. Jahr- hundert, Verlag für Sozialpolitik, Leipzig, 1903. 12. Projet de Convention sur l'octroi de navigation du Rhin. En exécution de l'article 39 du Recès de l'Empire Germanique ratifié par Sa Majesté Impériale l'Empereur des Romains le 27 avril 1803, in: ZENTRALKOMMISSION für die Rheinschiffahrt (Hrsg.), Rheinurkunden, Bd.I, München/Leip- zig, 1918, S.6. Supranationalität im 19. Jahrhundert? 181

Der Rhein wurde also in Bezug auf die Schifffahrt als gemeinsamer Fluss Frankreichs und Deutschlands betrachtet, und hieraus abgeleitet, dass der Schiffsverkehr auf dem Rhein deswegen auch nach gemeinsamen Regeln ablaufen sollte. Im so genannten Octroi-Vertrag ging es um die Neuordnung der Zölle auf der Wasserstraße, allgemeine Grundsätze in Bezug auf den Handel und die Schifffahrt sowie die Verpflich- tungen zur Instandhaltung der Leinpfade.13 Mit dem Vertrag wurde eine Organisation geschaffen, deren Aufgabe einerseits darin bestand, die Octroi-Abgaben von den Schiffern zu kassieren, andererseits die Bestimmungen zu überwachen und bei Ver- stoß zuvor definierte Strafzahlungen einzubehalten. Ein Generaldirektor mit Sitz in Mainz leitete gemeinsam mit vier Direktoren die so genannte Generaldirektion, der wiederum 12 Octroibüros unterstanden. Im Falle von Konflikten war in Artikel 122-127 des Octroi-Vertrages eine besondere Gerichtsbarkeit vorgesehen, die aus drei Instanzen bestand. Die Rechtsprechungsbefugnis in der ersten Instanz lag aus Gründen der Praktikabilität in den Händen des Octroi-Personals. Wurde ein Schiffer eines Verstoßes gegen die Octroi-Bestimmungen überführt, so war das Personal vor Ort berechtigt, die festgesetzte Geldstrafe einzufordern. Der Octroi-Einnehmer übte daher die Funktion des Richters aus. Legte der Schiffer Widerspruch gegen das Urteil des lokalen Octroi-Einnehmers ein, wurde der Vorfall an ein aus der Generaldirektion bestehendes Tribunal in Mainz weitergeleitet. Es bestand aus dem Generaldirektor und zwei Inspektoren der Octroi- Organisation. Diese zweite Instanz entschied auf der Basis der vorliegenden Akten mit einfacher Mehrheit, eine mündliche Verhandlung war nicht vorgesehen. Auch gegen die Entscheidungen der zweiten Instanz war ein Einspruch möglich. In diesem Fall musste sich die einmal jährlich in Mainz tagende dritte Instanz mit dem Fall beschäftigen. Sie bestand aus dem Präfekten des französischen Departements Don- nersberg als Kommissar der französischen Regierung, einem Kommissar des Kur- erzkanzlers von Mainz sowie einem deutschen oder französischen Rechtsgelehrten, der von den beiden Kommissaren einvernehmlich bestellt wurde. Diese Instanz entschied ebenfalls nach Aktenlage allerdings endgültig, d.h. eine Berufung war nicht mehr möglich. Die Rechtswissenschaft ist sich darüber einig, dass es sich bei dem hier knapp skizzierten Verfahren um eine „für Deutschland und Frankreich gemeinsam geltende Straf- bzw. Fiskalgerichtsbarkeit bezüglich der Zuwiderhandlungen gegen die Oktroikonvention handelte“.14 Mehr noch, legt man die eingangs vorge- stellte völkerrechtlich fundierte Definition von Supranationalität zu Grunde, kann von einer supranationalen Gerichtsbarkeit im Rahmen des Oktroi-Vertrags gesprochen werden. Das Gericht entschied in der zweiten und dritten Instanz mit einfacher Mehrheit, es gab also kein Veto-Recht für die Vertreter der Regierungen. Die Richter waren nicht mehr Vertreter der nationalen Rechtssysteme, sondern waren von zwei Staaten gemeinschaftlich bestellte Repräsentanten eines internationalen Gerichts. Sie

13. D. KISCHEL, Die Geschichte der Rheinschiffahrtsgerichtsbarkeit von 1804 bis in die Gegenwart. Unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der rheinpreußischen Verhältnisse, Josef Eul Verlag, Bergisch- Gladbach/Köln, 1990, S.7; W.J. VAN EYSINGA, Die Zentralkommission für die Rheinschiffahrt, A.W. Sijthoff, Leiden, 1936, S.3-17. 14. D. KISCHEL, op.cit., S.19. 182 Guido THIEMEYER, Isabel TÖLLE waren von der Rechtsprechung der Staaten unabhängig und übten ihre Tätigkeit im Namen der Gesamtheit aus. Das internationale Gericht unterstand also nicht der Jus- tizhoheit der Einzelstaaten, in deren Gebiet sie fungierten, sondern einem dem Staat übergeordneten Staatenverband.15 Zweitens war das durch das Gericht geschaffene Recht unmittelbar für alle Akteure der Rheinschifffahrt gültig, unabhängig von ihrer nationalen Zugehörigkeit. Das heißt, dass die Strafgerichtsbarkeit für Rheinschiffer sich ausschließlich nach dem Octroivertrag richtete und nicht nach einzelstaatlichem Recht. Schließlich übernahmen die Rechtsprechungsorgane der Oktroi-Kommission staatliche Aufgaben, indem sie einerseits die Rheinschifffahrt kontrollierten, Ver- stöße gegen den Octroi-Vertrag ahndeten und gleichzeitig Recht sprachen. Nimmt man dies als Maßstab, so kann also bereits im frühen 19. Jahrhundert im Rahmen der Rheinschifffahrt von einer supranationalen Organisation der Gerichtsbarkeit gesprochen werden. Gewiss sind Einschränkungen zu berücksichtigen. Zum einen handelt es sich um eine bilaterale Vereinbarung zwischen Frankreich und dem Heiligen Römischen Reich Deutscher Nation. In einem bilateralen Rahmen ist ein Souveränitätsverzicht leichter zu kontrollieren als in einem multilateralen Abkommen. Zweitens betraf der Vertrag ausschließlich die Schifffahrt auf dem Rhein, ein wichtiger, aber doch eng begrenzter Zweig der Wirtschaft und auch der staatlichen Souveränität. Zudem galt der Vertrag auch nur für den Teil des Flusses, der die deutsch-französische Grenze bildete, also von der niederländischen Grenze bis zur Schweiz. Es stellt sich die Frage, warum dieser Vertrag in dieser Form geschlossen wurde, warum sich die beiden Regierungen für eine supranationale Rechtsprechung entschieden. Van Eysinga erklärt die Entstehung des Vertrags durch die Notwendigkeit, die deutschen Fürsten nach dem Verlust der linksrheinischen Gebiete, die nun von Frankreich beansprucht wurden, zu entschädigen. Frankreich sei nicht bereit gewesen, Entschädigungszahlungen zu leisten, daher habe man sich darauf geeinigt, dass die Einkünfte aus dem Octroi für die Rheinschifffahrt den deutschen Fürsten als Ent- schädigung für den Verlust der linksrheinischen Gebiete zur Verfügung stehen sollten. Diese Interpretation jedoch ist wenig stichhaltig. Schon der Reichsdeputations- hauptschluss vom 25. Februar 1803, dessen § 39 die Rheinzölle aufhob, sah gleichzeitig vor, dass an ihrer Stelle ein Octroi erhoben werden sollte, dessen Ertrag „est specialement affecté aux frais de perception, administration et police“. Der entste- hende Überschuss sollte zwischen beiden Parteien zu gleichen Teilen geteilt werden und auch dieser sollte zur Erhaltung der Leinpfade, der für die Schifffahrt erforderlichen Arbeiten und allfälliger Uferarbeiten verwandt werden. Von einer Entschädi- gung für die deutschen Fürsten war hier keine Rede, die Einkünfte aus dem Vertrag sollten vielmehr vor allem der Erhaltung des Rheines als Wasserweg dienen. Zudem erklärt dieser Ansatz nicht, warum man eine neue, zentralisierte Organisation für die Rheinschifffahrt mit supranationaler Rechtsprechung entwarf. In diesem Zusammenhang allerdings fällt auf, dass bei den Begründungen für die einzelnen Vereinbarungen des Vertrags oft ökonomische Motive im Vordergrund

15. A. LEDERLE, Das Recht der internationalen Gewässer, Bensheimer, Mannheim u.a., 1920, S.258. Supranationalität im 19. Jahrhundert? 183 standen. Die Präambel des Oktroivertrags hielt fest, dass es das Ziel der Vereinbarung sei, „à donner une nouvelle activité à la navigation d'un fleuve commun entre les deux puissances“. In Art.VIII hieß es, das Ziel des Vertrags sei «l'utilité du commerce auquel il importe que les expéditions de marchandises se fassent avec régularité, célérité et sûreté».16 Auch für die Rechtsprechung war vorgesehen, dass strittige Fra- gen in erster Instanz vom Octroipersonal vor Ort geklärt werden sollten, um die Schiffer möglichst nicht unnötig lange auf ihrer Fahrt festzuhalten. Eine supranationale Verwaltung der Rheinschifffahrt, insbesondere im Gebiet der Rechtsprechung wurde also aus Effizienzgründen angestrebt, die Akteure vor Ort konnten erheblich schneller und damit angemessener auf die Bedürfnisse der Rheinschifffahrt eingehen. Hier, in der mangelnden Effizienz zwischenstaatlicher Verhandlungen bei der gemeinsamen Verwaltung des Flusses, ist also ein wichtiges Argument für die supranationale Struktur des Octroi-Vertrags zu finden. Obwohl der Octroi-Vertrag ausdrücklich auch im Falle eines Krieges zwischen den Vertragspartnern weiter gelten sollte, endete seine faktische Gültigkeit im Herbst 1813 als die Truppen der gegen Napoleon verbündeten Mächte den Rhein erreichten. Auf dem Wiener Kongress sollte daher eine neue Rechtsordnung für die Rhein- schifffahrt beschlossen werden und zu diesem Zweck wurde Ende 1814 eine Kom- mission gebildet, die sich mit den Binnenschifffahrtsfragen beschäftigen sollte. Ihr gehörten je ein Vertreter Frankreichs, Englands, Österreichs und Preußens an, später wurden auch Delegierte der kleineren Rheinanliegerstaaten Baden, Bayern, Hessen- Darmstadt, Nassau und der Vereinigten Niederlande aufgenommen. Die zentrale Frage der anschließenden Diskussionen war, ob und inwieweit die Rechtsordnung des Octroi-Vertrages für die Rheinschifffahrt erhalten bleiben sollte. Die Vertreter Frankreichs, der Herzog von Dalberg, und Preußens, Wilhelm von Humboldt, plä- dierten im Kern für die Erhaltung des Octroi-Vertrages, der jedoch den neuen Gege- benheiten des europäischen Staatensystems angepasst werden sollte. Dem wider- sprachen die Vertreter der kleineren Staaten, insbesondere der Vertreter Badens, von Berckheim, lehnte eine starke „autorité centrale“ ab. Diese sei in der Situation des Jahres 1804, unter der starken Dominanz Frankreichs, das das Rheinufer von Basel bis zur Grenze der Niederlande besessen habe, entstanden und habe den französischen Interessen gedient. Nun aber sei die Situation anders. „Toutes ces considérations réunies s'accordent à faire entrevoir que l'existence prolongée d'une administration centrale permanente […] ne serait plus d'un avantage réel, mais bien au contraire d'un entretien coûteux, en donnant lieu à des collisions souvent désagréables avec les autorités constituées des différens [sic] états riverains“.17

16. Rheinurkunden, op.cit., Doc.1, Reichs-Deputationshauptschluss, S.5; Oktroivertrag zwischen dem Deutschen Reich und Frankreich, Präambel, S.6 und Art.VIII, S.7. 17. Ibid., Remarques concernant la convention à conclure d'un traité de commerce et de navigation sur le Rhin, par M. le Baron de Berckheim, plénipotentiaire de Bade, 10.02.1815, S.72. Siehe auch Wilhelm von Humboldt, Application des principes généraux au Rhin et à l'Escaut, 03.02.1815, S. 62-63. 184 Guido THIEMEYER, Isabel TÖLLE

Aus diesem Grund lehnte Baden die Forderung Frankreichs und Preußens nach einer starken übernationalen Autorität für die Rheinschifffahrt ab. Insgesamt wurden daher die Kompetenzen der Zentralbehörde gegenüber der Re- gelung von 1804 erheblich eingeschränkt. Das betraf auch die Gerichtsbarkeit in der Rheinschifffahrt. Die aus dem Octroi-Vertrag stammende Regelung, dass die Octroi- Eintreiber als Vertreter der Zentralbehörde gleichzeitig auch als Gericht in erster Instanz fungieren sollten, wurde fallengelassen, obwohl der ehemalige Generaldi- rektor der Octroi-Verwaltung, Eichhoff, der in Wien als Sachverständiger gehört wurde, dafür plädierte diese Regelung beizubehalten, weil sie sich als sehr effizient herausgestellt hatte. Die Delegierten einigten sich darauf, an jedem Zollerhebungs- büro ein eigenes Schifffahrtstribunal einzurichten, das in Streitfällen vor Ort ent- scheiden würde. Sie sollten auf Kosten des Uferstaates unterhalten werden, in dem sie sich befanden und ihre Urteile im Namen des jeweiligen Souveräns fällen. Aller- dings wurden die Mitglieder der Tribunale auf die Regeln, die die Freiheit der Bin- nenschifffahrt gewährten, vereidigt, so dass das mit dem Octroi-Vertrag angestrebte Ziel einer einheitlichen Verwaltung der Rheinschifffahrt im Grundprinzip erhalten blieb. Demgegenüber befürwortete die Mehrheit der Delegierten in Wien, dass die Zentralkommission eine wichtige Rolle in der zweiten Instanz der Binnenschiff- fahrts-Rechtsordnung beibehalten sollte. Dies diente vor allem dazu, die Einheitlich- keit der Rechtsprechung am Rhein zu garantieren: „Pour établir un contrôle exact sur l'observation des règlements communs, et pour former une autorité qui pourra servir de moyen de communication non interrompu entre les états riverains, sur tout ce qui regarde la navigation de la rivière, il sera créé une commission centrale.“18 Allerdings fungierte die Zentralkommission auch hier nicht als alleinige zweite In- stanz. In der fünften Sitzung der Kommission einigten sich die Delegierten auf einen besonderen Berufungsweg: Man ließ dem Kläger die Wahl, ob er sich nach dem erstinstanzlichen Entscheid auf nationaler Ebene an ein höheres nationales Gericht wenden wollte oder an die Zentralkommission als übernationales Gericht. Das war in der Tat ein Novum in der internationalen Rechtsprechung, dessen Motive in der Rechtswissenschaft umstritten sind.19 Für die hier interessierende Frage nach dem supranationalen Charakter der Rheinschifffahrtsgerichtsbarkeit lassen sich zwei Fest- stellungen machen: Zum einen war die in Wien vereinbarte Regelung eine Ein- schränkung des supranationalen Charakters der Rechtsprechung im Vergleich zur Regelung im Octroi-Vertrag von 1804, der – wie gezeigt – eine rein supranationale zweite Instanz etabliert hatte. Aber auch wenn die einzelstaatliche Souveränität wieder an Bedeutung gewonnen hatte, gab es parallel zu dieser weiterhin die supranationale Rechtsprechung in der Rheinschifffahrt. Mit der Wiener Vereinbarung waren die Grundzüge einer Rechtsordnung für die Rheinschifffahrt entworfen, die dann in

18. Ibid., Proposition des M. le baron de Humboldt, plénipotentiaire de la Prusse, undatiert, S.94. 19. Mit unterschiedlichen Einschätzungen: H.d. RANITZ, De Rhinvaart-Acte, Leiden, 1889; D. KI- SCHEL, op.cit., S.36 f. Supranationalität im 19. Jahrhundert? 185 den Details von der künftigen Zentralkommission für die Rheinschifffahrt ausgearbeitet wurden. Handelte es sich bei der in Wien 1815 geschaffenen Rechtsordnung für die Rhein- schifffahrt um eine supranationale Institution? Die Frage ist nicht mehr so eindeutig zu beantworten wie für den Octroi-Vertrag. Beginnt man mit dem dritten Kriterium, dass die internationale Organisation staatliche Aufgaben übernehmen müsse, so kann man von einer supranationalen Rechtsordnung sprechen, wenn auch in eingeschränk- ter Weise. Die Zentralkommission sprach Recht in zweiter Instanz. Zudem wurden die nationalen Vertreter der Rechtsordnung am Rhein per Eid verpflichtet, die Freiheit und Einheitlichkeit der Rheinschifffahrt als wichtigste Kategorie der Rechtsprechung in der Rheinschifffahrt zu akzeptieren. So gesehen übernahmen also auch die nationalen Gerichte supranationale Aufgaben, auch wenn sie formal Repräsentanten der einzelstaatlichen Rechtsordnungen waren. Nimmt man das zweite Kriterium, die unmittelbare Geltung des überstaatlichen Rechts auf dem Rhein, so ist dieses uneinge- schränkt erfüllt. Die von den Rheinschifffahrtsgerichten gefällten Urteile, seien sie in erster Instanz einzelstaatlich mit supranationaler Verpflichtung oder in zweiter und dritter Instanz direkt supranational, waren unmittelbar für alle Schifffahrtstreibenden auf dem Rhein gültig. Schließlich sollten die Entscheidungen der Kommission mit Mehrheitsbeschlüssen gefällt werden, so dass auch hier das Kriterium der Suprana- tionalität in Bezug auf die Rechtsprechung erfüllt ist, wenn auch mit der Einschrän- kung der Wahlfreiheit des Klägers, ob er die nationale oder die supranationale höhere Instanz anrufen wollte. Insgesamt kann also – nimmt man die moderne Definition von Supranationalität als Maßstab – von einer eingeschränkten Supranationalität der Rechtsprechung in der Rheinschifffahrt nach 1815 gesprochen werden. Die Frage bleibt, warum man sich 1815 während des Wiener Kongresses für dieses Prinzip der eingeschränkten Supranationalität entschied. Aufschlussreich ist hier zum einen eine von Wilhelm von Humboldt am 3. Februar 1815 vorgelegte Aufzeichnung, in der eben diese Frage angesprochen wird: „Pour concilier l'intérêt du commerce avec celui des états riverains, il est nécessaire que d'un coté tout ce qui est indispensable à la liberté de la navigation […] soit fixé d'un commun accord par une convention à laquelle rien ne puisse être changé sans le consen- tement de tous ceux qui y ont pris part; mais que, de l'autre, aucun état riverain ne soit gêné dans l'exercice de ses droits de souveraineté, par rapport au commerce et à la navigation au-delà des engagements renfermés dans cette convention, et qu'en même temps il jouisse de sa part des droits levés sur la navigation en proportion de l'étendue de la rive qui lui appartient“.20 Nach den Überlegungen von Humboldts standen sich also in der Frage der Fluss- schifffahrt in Wien zwei Prinzipien gegenüber: Zum einen die Notwendigkeit einer gemeinsamen Verwaltung der Rheinschifffahrt im Sinne der Schifffahrtstreibenden, d.h. der wirtschaftlichen Interessen, andererseits die staatliche Souveränität der Ufer- staaten, d.h. der staatlichen Interessen. Eine rein supranationale Regelung für die

20. Rheinurkunden, op.cit., Wilhelm von Humboldt, Mémoire préparatoire sur le travail de la commission de navigation, 03.02.1815, S.61. 186 Guido THIEMEYER, Isabel TÖLLE

Rheinschifffahrt hätte die nationale Souveränität der Anrainerstaaten verletzt, eine die einzelstaatliche Souveränität respektierende Regelung die wirtschaftlichen Inter- essen der Schifffahrt beeinträchtigt. Die in Bezug auf die Rechtsprechung gefundene Lösung war daher ein Kompromiss. Das zentrale Argument für die Einschränkung der einzelstaatlichen Souveränität war daher das allgemeine wirtschaftliche Interesse an einer freien Rheinschifffahrt. Dieses Argument hatte schon den supranationalen Charakter des Octroi-Vertrages bestimmt, es spielte auch für die Überlegungen der Schifffahrtskommission auf dem Wiener Kongress die zentrale Rolle.

b) Die Rheinschifffahrtspolizeiverordnung

Die durch den Wiener Kongress geschaffene Zentralkommission für die Rheinschiff- fahrt beschäftigte sich ab 1816 mit der Aushandlung einer Rheinschifffahrtsakte. Die Uferstaaten des damals schiffbaren Rheins, namentlich Frankreich, Baden, Bayern, Hessen, Nassau, Preußen und die Niederlande, entsandten je einen diplomatischen Bevollmächtigten, auch Kommissar genannt, in die Zentralkommission nach Mainz. Die Verhandlungen zogen sich über fünfzehn Jahr in die Länge: Es gab einige Un- einigkeiten, u.a. zwischen Preußen und den Niederlanden bzgl. der Zugehörigkeit der Mündungsarme des Rheins zum Meer, was für die Niederlande erhebliche Zollein- nahmeunterschiede bedeutete. 1831 wurde schließlich die Mainzer Akte verabschiedet. Neben den sieben diplomatischen Bevollmächtigten hatte die Mainzer Akte noch andere Personen zur Vollziehung der Ordnung vorgesehen. Es gab je einen Aufseher für die vier Rheinbezirke, die jeweils von Frankreich und Baden, von Bayern, Hessen und Nassau bzw. Preußen und schließlich den Niederlanden ernannt wurden. Zu- sätzlich ernannten die Staaten die Beamten für ihre Zollstellen. Gemeinsam von der Zentralkommission wurde der Oberaufseher der Rheinschifffahrt ernannt. Er war, ebenso wie die Bezirksaufseher, der Zentralkommission unterstellt und auf Lebens- zeit ernannt. Zu seinen Aufgaben gehörte es, Beschwerden von Handelsleuten, Schiffseignern usw. nachzugehen, die für die Versammlungen der Zentralkommis- sion nötigen Materialien bereit zu halten und die Kommission zu beraten. Der Ober- aufseher von Auer jr. hatte die preußische Staatsangehörigkeit, fungierte jedoch als kommissionseigener Beamter, der in Mainz wohnte und der Rheinschifffahrt als ganzes verpflichtet war. Ab 1831 war ein Sitzungsmonat der Zentralkommission pro Jahr vorgesehen und nur bei dringendem Bedarf sollten Sondersessionen einberufen werden. Der Präsident wurde jedes Jahr neu durch das Los bestimmt. Entscheidungen wurden grundsätzlich per Mehrheitsbeschluss getroffen. Allerdings war der Be- schluss nur für die Staaten bindend, die diesem ihre Genehmigung erteilt hatten, da die Kommissare „nur als Agenten der Uferstaaten“21 betrachtet wurden.

21. Ibid., Doc.80, Rheinschiffahrtsakte zwischen Baden, Bayern, Frankreich, Hessen, Nassau, Nieder- land und Preussen, 31.03.1831, S.263 u. 264 ff. Supranationalität im 19. Jahrhundert? 187

Die Zentralkommission hatte sich bereits in den Jahren 182922 und 1830 mit der Frage einer Rheinschifffahrtspolizeiverordnung beschäftigt. Die 1831 unterzeichnete Mainzer Akte enthielt keine polizeilichen Vorschriften über das Befahren des Rheins wie die zwanzig Jahre später in Kraft getretene Rheinschifffahrtspolizeiverordnung. Die Mainzer Akte beschäftigte sich zwar in den Artikeln 53 bis 70 mit „polizeilichen Vorschriften zur Sicherheit der Rheinschifffahrt und des Handels“,23 jedoch deckten sich die achtzehn Artikel nicht mit dem Inhalt der späteren Rheinschifffahrtspolizei- verordnung. Die Mainzer Akte regelte u.a. den Nachweis der Tauglichkeit eines Schiffes (Art. 53 und 54) und das pflichtmäßige Anbordnehmen von Lotsen oder Steuerleuten an bestimmten Stromstellen (Art. 58 und 60). Die Regeln zum Verhalten während der Fahrt, dem Ausweichen oder der Beleuchtung der Schiffe waren nicht enthalten. 1832 und 1833 kam die Zentralkommission erneut auf das Thema zu sprechen,24 als der preußische Bevollmächtigte seinen Kollegen das 1828 für den preu- ßischen Stromteil verordnete Reglement vorlegte. Preußen kam so zusammen mit den Niederlanden, welche bereits 1824 und 1826 Reglements mit polizeilichen Vor- schriften erlassen hatten, eine Vorreiterfunktion zu. Die Verordnungen waren u.a. deshalb erlassen worden, da die Dampfschifffahrt zunahm und daher andere Regeln für die Rheinschifffahrt nötig wurden. Deshalb ist es nicht verwunderlich, dass gerade Preußen und die Niederlande die ersten Staaten mit einer Polizeiverordnung waren, sie waren nämlich auch die Staaten, in denen die Dampfschifffahrt zuerst aufkam. Die beiden Bevollmächtigten der Niederlande und Preußens vertraten 1833 in der Zentralkommission die Ansicht, dass ihre Reglements den anderen fünf Uferstaaten als Vorlage überlassen werden könnten und diese dann auf dieser Basis eigene Re- glements für ihre Stromstrecken erstellen könnten, anstatt eine neue einzige, für den ganzen Rhein geltende Verordnung auszuarbeiten. In Folge dessen beschloss die Zentralkommission, polizeiliche Vorschriften als „Partikulier-Sache der respectiven Uferstaaten“ zu betrachten. Die einzelnen Staaten sollten eine eigene Verordnung u.a. auf der Grundlage des 1829 erstellten Entwurfs ausarbeiten können und der Zen- tralkommission zur Kenntnis vorlegen. Nationale Initiativen wurden als ausreichend angesehen; eine internationale oder gar supranationale Lösung wurde noch nicht in Betracht gezogen, schien noch nicht angebracht bzw. nötig. Dazu kam, dass die Zen- tralkommission, d.h. die sieben Bevollmächtigten der Uferstaaten, nach Art. 94 der Mainzer Akte „nicht in ihrem Namen Gesetze oder neue allgemeine Verordnungen erlassen“ konnte.25 1838 erklärten Bayern, Hessen und Nassau gemeinsam ein Reglement auf Basis der preußischen Verordnung ausgearbeitet zu haben und nun dabei zu sein, dieses in

22. Nationaal Archief der Niederlande, 2.05.01 Nr. 3667, 458, Protocole des Séances de la Commission Centrale instituée par le Congrès des Vienne pour l’organisation et l’administration de la Navigation du Rhin, 25.03.1829, und Anlage zum Protokoll. 23. Rheinurkunden, op.cit., Doc.80, Rheinschiffahrtsakte, S.212-283. 24. BayHStA MA 9001, Protocoll der Central-Rhein-Schifffahrts-Commission, 27.07.1833, Polizeyli- che Maassregeln über das Vorbeyfahren der Dampf- und Segelschiffe. 25. Rheinurkunden, op.cit., Doc.77, Preussische Verordnung betr. das an einander Vorbeifahren von Dampfschiffen und Segelschiffen sowie Flössen, 09.05.1828, S.212; Doc.65, Niederländischer Kö- niglicher Beschluss […], 04.09.1824 und 15.04.1826, S.180; Doc.80, Rheinschiffahrtsakte, S.262 f. 188 Guido THIEMEYER, Isabel TÖLLE

Kraft zu setzen. Auch Frankreich und Baden hatten Verordnungen ausgearbeitet, welche sich ebenfalls an der preußischen Verordnung orientierten.26 Es bestand also bereits eine gewisse Ähnlichkeit der einzelnen Reglements, ohne dass die Zentral- kommission ein gemeinsames erarbeitet hatte. Als der französische Kommissar 1841 die französische Verordnung seinen Kol- legen in der Zentralkommission vorlegte, machte er zwei Anmerkungen, die für die Entstehung der gemeinsamen Rheinschifffahrtspolizeiverordnung entscheidend waren: Erstens schlug er vor, dass alle Dampfschiffe gewisse Rettungsgeräte an Bord mitführen sollten und zweitens regte er an, dass die Beleuchtung der Schiffe verändert werde. Der französische Bevollmächtigte kommentierte, dass „alle diese Maßnahmen nur dann ausführbar [wären], wenn dieselben, als gemeinschaftliche Maasregeln, auf dem ganzen Rheinstrome angeordnet und ausgeführt werden“. Damit war die Dis- kussion um eine gemeinsame Rheinschifffahrtspolizeiverordnung angestoßen. Die Zentralkommission beschloss, dass die einzelnen Bevollmächtigten den französi- schen Vorschlag ihren jeweiligen Regierungen vorlegen sollten. Des Weiteren beauftragte sie den Oberaufseher, wesentliche Abweichungen bzgl. der Signale und dem Aneinandervorbeifahren in den verschiedenen Verordnungen herauszuarbeiten und ein Gutachten zur Einführung einer Gleichförmigkeit der Vorschriften zu erstellen. Bereits drei Wochen später, am 28. September 1841, lag der Zentralkommission die vom Oberaufseher erstellte Übersicht vor. Der Oberaufseher stellte zu Anfang seines Berichts fest, dass das Bedürfnis nach Vorschriften und Reglements mit Zu- nahme der Dampfschifffahrt gewachsen sei. Da das Erlassen solcher Reglements jedoch jedem Uferstaate überlassen gewesen war, existierten 1841 sieben einzelne Verordnungen. Der größte Unterschied zwischen den Verordnungen war der der Seite des Ausweichens. In den Niederlanden wichen Schiffe links aus, auf allen anderen Rheinstrecken rechts. Der Oberaufseher beschloss seinen Bericht mit der provokan- ten Frage: „Ist es jetzt nicht wirklich etwas viel verlangt, dass jeder Rheinschiffer diese verschiedenen Verordnungen sich anschaffen, studieren, vergleichen und unterschieden soll“?27

26. Ibid., Doc.165, Hessische Verordnung betr. das Vorbeifahren der Dampf- und Segelschiffe […], 09.05.1840, S.391-396; Doc.168, Nassauische Verordnung […], 05.08.1840, S.400-404; Doc.181, Bayrische Verordnung […], 13.08.1841, S.422-425; Doc.180, Französisches Reglement de Police pour la navigation des bateaux à vapeur du Rhin, et mesures de précaution à observer […], 15.05.1841, S.417-421; Doc.177, Badische Verordnung […], 14.04.1841, S.411-415; BayHStA MA 9007 und 9008, Protocoll der Central-Rhein-Schifffahrts-Commission, No.XV, 16.07.1839; Poli- zeyliche Maassregeln […]; Protocoll der Central-Commission für die Rheinschifffahrt, No.VI, 28.08.1840; BayHStA MA 25567, Von Kettner an von Nau, 26.04.1841; Von Nau an das Königliche Ministerium des Königlichen Hauses und des Äußeren, 21.05.1841. 27. BayHStA MA 9009, Protocoll der Central-Commission für die Rheinschifffahrt, No.III, Polizeyli- che Maassregeln […], 07.09.1841; Protocoll der Central-Commission für die Rheinschifffahrt, No.XVIII, 28.09.1841; Anlage zu dem Protocoll No.XVIII der September-Session 1841. Supranationalität im 19. Jahrhundert? 189

In den Verhandlungen 1842 äußerte sich der preußische Bevollmächtigten wegwei- send: „Preussen haelt es für wünschenswerth: dass ein übereinstimmendes allgemeines Regle- ment über das Anhalten und Vorbeifahren der Dampf- und Segelschiffe auf dem Rhein in den einzelnen Uferstaaten erlassen werde“. Daher bat er seine Kollegen, sich bei den jeweiligen Regierungen dafür auszuspre- chen. Da dieser Wunsch mit der im Vorjahr vom Oberaufseher geäußerten Meinung übereinstimmte, beauftragte die Zentralkommission diesen, einen Entwurf für eine solche allgemeine Verordnung zu erstellen und eine Übersicht der für die einzelnen Stromstrecken geltenden Sonderbestimmungen anzufertigen. Der Oberaufseher legte diesen Entwurf einen Monat später vor. Vor der Diskussion wies der badische Be- vollmächtigte darauf hin, dass derzeit noch kein „förmlicher Auftrag der Uferstaaten“ vorliege „und es sich daher auch für jetzt nur darum handeln könne, eine vorberei- tende Arbeit für den Fall zu liefern, wenn überhaupt die obgedachte Ansicht die Bil- ligung der hohen Regierungen erhalten sollte“. In dieser Aussage zeigte sich die Si- tuation der Zentralkommission: Die Versammlung diplomatischer Delegierter sollte die Einhaltung der Mainzer Akte überwachen und ggf. Änderungen im Sinne der Rheinschifffahrt vornehmen. Der Erlass einer gemeinsamen Rheinschifffahrtspoli- zeiverordnung überstieg jedoch ihre Kompetenz, sie benötigte dazu den Auftrag der Regierungen. Die Zentralkommission erstellte dennoch einen Entwurf mit zwanzig Artikeln für eine polizeiliche Verordnung und beschloss, dass sich jeder Bevoll- mächtigte bis zur nächsten Sitzung diesbezüglich mit Instruktionen versehen lassen sollte. Die Delegierten handelten also in einem gewissen Sinne eigenmächtig und ohne die offizielle Beauftragung seitens der Regierungen.28 Zu Beginn der nächsten Sitzung ein Jahr später (1843) erklärte der niederländische Bevollmächtigte, dass sein Land die Seite des Ausweichens nicht ändern wolle. Als unterstützendes Argument führte er die große Anzahl an Schiffen auf dem nieder- ländischen Rhein an, weshalb eine Veränderung der Regeln dort Gefahren verursa- chen würde. Diese Position verhinderte die Möglichkeit einer gemeinsamen Polizei- verordnung für den gesamten Rhein. Laut Art. 94 der Mainzer Akte fasste die Zen- tralkommission Beschlüsse zwar nach absoluter Stimmenmehrheit, der Beschluss war dann jedoch nur in den Staaten gültig, deren Regierung ihn genehmigt hatte. Daher wurde in der Praxis meist solange verhandelt, bis Einstimmigkeit erreicht war. Die Zentralkommission setzte die Diskussion über das Thema polizeiliches Regle- ment aus und beauftragte den Oberaufseher, ein Gutachten zur Situation der Dampf- schleppschifffahrt anzufertigen, die ebenfalls in der Verordnung berücksichtigt werden musste.29

28. BayHStA MA 9010, Protocoll der Central-Commission für die Rheinschifffahrt, No.II, Polizeyliche Maassregeln […], 03.09.1842; Protocoll der Central-Commission […], No.XXIV, 01.10.1842; An- lage zum Protocoll No.XXIV, 01.10.1842, Reglements-Entwurf. 29. BayHStA MA 9011, Protokoll der Central-Commission […], No.XXIII, Polizeiliche Maasregelen […], 18.09.1843. 190 Guido THIEMEYER, Isabel TÖLLE

Dem Oberaufseher kam bei der Frage nach einer gemeinsamen Rheinschifffahrts- polizeiverordnung eine wichtige Funktion zu, er arbeitete die Entwürfe und Diskus- sionsvorlagen aus und fungierte zudem als Gutachter und Konfliktlöser. An den Ent- scheidungen und Verhandlungen war er jedoch nicht beteiligt. Am Oberaufseher lässt sich die zunehmende Bedeutung externer und supranationaler Experten und Akteure ablesen: Ihnen kam als Detailkennern und/oder Unparteiischen eine Berater- und Gutachterfunktion zu, da sie Wissen besaßen, das die Kenntnis diplomatischer Ge- sandter überstieg. Gerade in den 1820er bis 1850er Jahren durchlief die Rheinschiff- fahrt eine rasante technische Entwicklung, so stellte das Aufkommen und die Ver- breitung der Dampfschifffahrt die Zentralkommission vor komplexe Fragestellun- gen. Im September 1846 überreichte der niederländische Kommissar seinen Kollegen in der Zentralkommission die neue niederländische Verordnung, in der nun das Rechts-Ausweichen vorgeschrieben war. Dadurch wurde in diesem Punkt Überein- stimmung auf dem ganzen Rhein erreicht und der Weg für eine Verordnung für den ganzen Rhein war wieder frei. Der Oberaufseher hatte in der Zeit seit dem letzten Treffen einen Bericht und einen neuen Entwurf erstellt. Dieser wurde nun für den Rhein von Basel bis zum Meer diskutiert und nicht mehr nur wie angedacht von Basel bis zur niederländischen Grenze. Um in der Sache Fortschritte zu machen, ernannte die Zentralkommission den preußischen Bevollmächtigten zum „gemeinschaftlichen Berichterstatter“, d.h. bei ihm sollten alle Meinungen zusammenkommen. Alle Be- vollmächtigten sollten dem preußischen bis zum 1. Januar 1847 ihre Bemerkungen zum Reglement schicken. Dieser Zeitpunkt lag deutlich vor dem der nächsten Sit- zungssession, die immer im Sommer stattfand. Auch dieser Schritt machte eine Flexibilisierung des Prozesses und eine gewisse Selbstständigkeit und Eigenmäch- tigkeit der Zentralkommission deutlich.30 Im Sommer 1848 berichtete der preußische Bevollmächtigte in der Zentralkom- mission von einer Besprechung der Vertreter der Dampf- und Segelschifffahrt in Preußen mit dem Oberpräsidenten der preußischen Rheinprovinz über den Polizei- verordnungsentwurf: Diese Beratung sei sehr nützlich gewesen und es sei der Wunsch geäußert worden, dass eine Anhörung aller Gewerbetreibenden in Mainz stattfände. Die Zentralkommission beschloss „nach näherer Erwägung“ den Oberaufseher mit der Einberufung und Durchführung einer solchen Besprechung zu beauftragen. Als Basis dieser Besprechung sollten der Entwurf von 1847 sowie die Bemerkungen der Bevollmächtigten dienen. Die Teilnehmer an dieser Besprechung sollten alle Ge- werbezweige, also Dampf, und Segelschiffer sowie Unternehmer, beinhalten und die Zahl der Abgeordneten sollte sich an der Stromlänge des Staates orientieren.31 Eine solche Versammlung war die erste Beteiligung des Gewerbes an einer Rheinschiff-

30. BayHStA MA 9014, Protokoll der Central-Commisison […], No.XXI, Allgemeines Polizei-Regle- ment und Sicherheitsmaasregeln […], 11.09.1846. 31. BayHStA MA 9016, Protocoll der Central-Commission […], No.XVII, Polizeiliche Verordnung über das Befahren des Rheins, 03.08.1848. Supranationalität im 19. Jahrhundert? 191 fahrtsverordnung.32 Die Versammlung mit den Vertretern des Rheinschifffahrtsge- werbes fand im September 1848 unter dem Vorsitz des Oberaufsehers von Auer in Mainz statt. Die Rheinschifffahrtsinspektoren der vier Rheinbezirke waren zugegen und Abgeordnete von Handelskammern, Dampfschifffahrtsgesellschaften sowie Vertreter von Dampfschleppschifffahrtgesellschaften und Segelschiffern.33 Die Be- ratung des Entwurfs einer Polizeiverordnung erfolgte Artikel für Artikel. Geredet wurde besonders über das Ausweichen der fliegenden Brücken sowie ein einge- schränktes Fahrverbot für Dampfschiffe, welches als Eingriff in Privatrechte gesehen wurde, und zusätzliche Wahrschauen. Im Anschluss an die Beratung verfasste der Oberaufseher einen Bericht, in dem er der Zentralkommission die Kommentare der Schifffahrtstreibenden übermittelte und bereits vorwegnahm: „Der vorliegende Entwurf hat in Folge dessen sehr wesentliche Abänderungen und Mo- dificationen erlitten, und es ist darum nöthig geworden, […] nach Massgabe der ange- nommenen Vorschläge einen anderweitigen Entwurf im Sinne der Versammlung anzufertigen“. Die Zentralkommission beriet im Dezember 1848 über diesen neuen Entwurf. Die Rheinschifffahrtsgewerbevertreter wünschten eine Neugestaltung des Gerichtswe- sens, da sie es für bedenklich hielten, „dass dem Einzelrichter die Erkennung einer so bedeutenden Geldstrafe und selbst Entziehung des Patentes allein überlassen sei“. Die Zentralkommission erstellte einen neuen Entwurf, der, sollte er von den Regie- rungen genehmigt werden, zum 1. Juli 1849 in Kraft treten sollte.34 1848 kam es zu massiven Protesten der Segelschiffer, die sich von den Dampf- schiffen bedroht fühlten. Ihre Beschwerden wurden von den Uferanwohnern, deren Eigentum durch den von den Dampfern verursachten Wellenschlag beschädigt wurde, unterstützt. Gemäß der Mainzer Akte erstellte der Oberaufseher dazu einen Be- richt, in dem er die Schwierigkeiten der Segelschifffahrt bestätigte, aber keine Mög- lichkeit zur Abhilfe sah. Am Ende seines Berichts wies der Oberaufseher auf polizeiliche Vorschriften hin, die Beschädigungen des Ufers durch Dampfschiffe ver- hindern sollten.35 Einige Regierungen, nämlich die von Frankreich, Hessen, Bayern und den Nie- derlanden, hatten Bedenken gegen den im Herbst 1848 erstellten Entwurf, der daher nicht in Kraft trat. Stattdessen verhandelte die Zentralkommission 1849 erneut. In der Diskussion über die Bestrafung von Verstößen gegen die polizeilichen Vor- schriften kam die Sprache auf einen Supplementarartikel zur Mainzer Akte. Solche

32. V. ORLOVIUS, 155 Jahre internationale Vorschriften der Zentralkommission für die Rheinschif- fahrt, in: Zeitschrift für Binnenschiffahrt, 20(1993), S.10. 33. BayHStA MA 8956, Verhandelt Mainz den 25. September 1848; Entwurf einer Polizeiverordnung, die Befahrung des Rhein betreff., 01.10.1848. 34. BayHStA MA 8956, Verhandelt Mainz den 25. September 1848; Entwurf einer Polizeiverordnung, die Befahrung des Rhein betreff., 01.10.1848; BayHStA MA 9016, Protocoll der Central-Commis- sion […], No. XXXV, 16.12.1848. 35. Nationaal Archief, 2.05.01 Nr. 3709, Die Störungen der Dampfschleppschifffahrt und die Klagen der Segelschiffer, Schiffsvoranzieher, Schiffshalter und Uferanwohner betreffend vom Oberaufse- her der Rheinschifffahrt v. Auer, 14.07.1848. 192 Guido THIEMEYER, Isabel TÖLLE

Zusatzartikel mussten immer nach dem Beschluss der Zentralkommission von den Regierungen ratifiziert werden. Dieser Supplementar-Artikel „Bestrafung der Con- traventionen gegen allgemeine polizeiliche Vorschriften über das Befahren des Rhei- nes“ bestand im Entwurf aus 11 Punkten, die u.a. festlegten, dass für Übertretung der Regeln eine Geldstraße zu zahlen war, das Patent entzogen werden konnte, die Ver- urteilung durch die Rheinzollgerichte stattfand, wenn der zu Verurteilende nicht frei- willig das Urteil des Rheinzollamtes annahm. Die Zentralkommission war sich einig, die Verabschiedung des Reglements, das von allen Seiten, auch der der Schiffer, gewünscht wurde, nicht vom Supplementarartikel abhängig zu machen.36 Der Entwurf des Polizeireglements, den die Bevollmächtigten zur Entscheidung bringen wollten, bestand aus 21 Artikeln. Thematisch waren fünf Kategorien enthalten: die allgemeine Verbindlichkeit zur Verhütung von Beschädigungen, das Ver- halten während der Fahrt und während des Stilliegens sowie die Bestimmungen in Betreff der fliegenden Brücken, Gierponten und sonstigen Anlagen und besondere Bestimmungen bspw. für einzelne Stromstrecken. Da 1850 jedoch die meisten Ge- nehmigungen der Regierungen noch nicht vorlagen, wurde erneut verhandelt. Ein Wunsch Nassaus bzgl. der Pegel, gegen den nur Preußen sich ausgesprochen hatte, wurde zur Klärung ausgelagert, d.h. Nassau und Preußen sollten sich bilateral beraten und der nassauische Wunsch wurde derweil provisorisch in das Reglement aufgenommen. Bzgl. der Strafbestimmungen wurde festgestellt, dass dem hessischen Wunsch nach einem diesbezüglichen Supplementarartikel wohl nicht entsprochen werden könne, da man sich nicht einigen konnte.37 Daher einigte man sich lediglich auf eine neue Fassung des Art. 21 im Entwurf der Polizeiverordnung, der die Straf- bestimmungen enthielt. Am Ende fasste die Zentralkommission folgenden Beschluss: „Nachdem sämmtliche [sic] im Verlaufe der gegenwärtigen Verhandlungen zur Sprache gebrachten Bemerkungen laut Vorstehendem ihre Erledigung gefunden haben, sieht sich die Central-Commission in den Stand gesetzt, in der Anlage die definitive Fassung der von sämmtlichen [sic] Uferstaaten genehmigten polizeilichen Verordnung über das Befahren des Rheins unter dem Beschlusse beizufügen, dass dieselbe nach ihrem gegenwärtigen Inhalte auf dem ganzen konventionellen Rhein mit Eintritt des 1. Jänners 1851 in Vollzug gesetzt werde“.38 Dieser endgültige Entwurf enthielt wie der Vorjahresentwurf 21 Artikel. Die Mit- gliedstaaten der Zentralkommission setzten in den Jahren 1850 und 1851 nach fast

36. BayHStA MA 9017, Anlage II. zu Protokoll No.XI von 1849, Entwurf zu einem Supplementar- Artikel in Betreff der Bestrafung der Contraventionen gegen allgemeine polizeiliche Vorschriften […]; Protocoll der Central-Commission […], No.XI, Polizeiliche Verordnung über das Befahren des Rheins, 10.10.1849. 37. Das Thema eines Supplementarartikels wurde 1851 erneut besprochen: Nationaal Archief der Nie- derlande, 2.05.01 Nr. 3712, Protocole No.VIII de la Commission Centrale de la Navigation du Rhin, Règlement général de police, 06.09.1851. 38. BayHStA MA 9017, Anlage III. zu Protokoll No.XI. von 1849; BayHStA MA 9018, Protocoll der Central-Commission […], No.VIII, Polizeiliche Verordnung […], 27.09-08.10.1850. Supranationalität im 19. Jahrhundert? 193 zehnjähriger Verhandlungszeit ihre jeweiligen Polizeiverordnungen außer Kraft und die gemeinsame in Vollzug.39 Bei dem Beispiel der Polizeiverordnung sind einige Dinge bemerkenswert. Ers- tens sticht die Rolle des Oberaufsehers ins Auge. Ihm kam die Funktion des Gutach- ters, Konfliktlösers, Diskussionsführers und Agendasetters mit großer inhaltlicher Definitionsmacht zu. Daran wird die Bedeutung externer Experten bzw. supranationaler Akteure deutlich, die den Prozess begleiten und an einigen Punkten durch ihr Wissen oder ihre Neutralität entscheidend voran bringen. Zweitens wird eine Flexi- bilisierung des Verfahrens deutlich. Die Diskussion wurde durch die Weigerung eines einzelnen Landes nicht aufgehoben – es war laut Mainzer Akte ja auch der Mehr- heitsbeschluss möglich -, sondern fand ohne dessen Vertreter statt, der jedoch jederzeit wieder dazustoßen konnte. Des Weiteren wurden kleinere Partikularfragen auf die bilaterale Ebene verlegt, was die Gesamtverhandlungen ebenfalls erleichterte. Bei fortgeschrittenen Verhandlungsstatus ernannte die Zentralkommission einen gemeinsamen Berichterstatter, d.h. die Informationen flossen bei einem Bevollmächtigten zusammen. Drittens fand zum ersten Mal die Befragung des Schifffahrtsgewerbes Eingang in die Diskussion: Schiffer wurden befragt und konnten auf den Verhand- lungsinhalt Einfluss nehmen. Das Thema war überhaupt erst wegen Gründen aus der Praxis auf die Tagesordnung gekommen: Das Aufkommen und die Zunahme der Dampfschifffahrt hatten die Schifffahrt verändert. Viertens ist die Art des Entschlus- ses hervorzuheben: Bei der Rheinschifffahrtspolizeiverordnung handelt es sich um eine gemeinsam erlassene Verordnung. Sie ist kein Supplementarartikel und kein Teil der Mainzer Akte. Bei ihrer Erstellung handelte die Zentralkommission zuerst ohne explizite Instruktion seitens der Regierungen. Betrachtet man nun die eingangs genannten drei Kriterien für Supranationalität, entsteht folgendes Bild. Die Zentralkommission erfüllte, so bestimmte es die Mainzer Akte, die erste Bedingung, nämlich, dass supranationale Organisationen rechtsverbindliche Mehrheitsbeschlüsse fassen können. Einschränkend muss hier jedoch ge- sagt werden, dass Art. 94 zwar den Mehrheitsbeschluss vorgab, dieser jedoch erst für die Rheinuferstaaten verbindlich wurde, wenn diese mittels ihres diplomatischen Gesandten dafür gestimmt hatten. Daher kam es in der Praxis meist zu einstimmig getroffenen Entscheidungen, wie im Beispiel der Rheinschifffahrtspolizeiverord- nung, da so lange diskutiert wurde, bis alle Staaten zustimmten. Das zweite Kriterium ist hier erfüllt: Die Zentralkommissionsbeschlüsse galten meist unmittelbar, so wie in diesem Beispiel, in den einzelnen Mitgliedstaaten. Bei Zusatzartikeln zur Mainzer Akte hingegen mussten die Beschlüsse von den Regierungen ratifiziert werden. Al- lerdings konnte die Zentralkommission keine Gesetze in eigenem Namen erlassen und die Entscheidungen waren nur für die Staaten bindend, die diesen zugestimmt hatten. Auch das dritte Kriterium, dass supranationale Organisationen bestimmte

39. GStAPK I. HA 120 C XV 10b Nr. 21 Bd. 4, Anlage zu Protocoll No.VIII von 1850; Rheinurkun- den, op.cit., Doc.247, Polizeiverordnung der Zentral-Kommission […], S.496-516; Nationaal Ar- chief der Niederlande, 2.05.01 Nr. 3712, Protocole No.VIII de la Commission Centrale de la Navi- gation du Rhin, Règlement général de police, 06.09.1851. 194 Guido THIEMEYER, Isabel TÖLLE staatliche Aufgaben übernehmen, ist in Teilen auf die Zentralkommission anwend- bar: Sie war für die Rheinschifffahrt zuständig, die einzelnen Staaten hatten, da es sich um einen internationalen Fluss handelte, die Verwaltung desselben auf die Zen- tralkommission übertragen. Diese übernahm in Teilen staatliche Aufgaben, so z.B. die Ausarbeitung einer Polizeiverordnung.

Schluss

Die Fallbeispiele zeigen zweierlei: Zum einen lässt sich festhalten, dass es bereits in der ersten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts europäische Integrationsprozesse mit supra- nationalem Charakter gab. Supranationalität im eingangs definierten Sinne ist also kein Novum des 20. Jahrhunderts, wie die bisherige Forschung annahm, sondern existierte schon zuvor. Gerade der unterschiedliche Charakter der Supranationalität in beiden Beispielen zeigt aber auch, dass das Phänomen der Supranationalität jenseits der hier zu Grunde liegenden sehr allgemeinen, aus den Rechtswissenschaften übernommenen Definition viel komplexer ist. Eine analytische Klassifizierung der Supranationalität kann auf der Basis der hier untersuchten Fallbeispiele nicht unternommen werden, diese ist ein Forschungsdesiderat. Welche Formen konnte die Su- pranationalität zu welchem Zeitpunkt annehmen? War sie im 19. Jahrhundert auf die Rheinschifffahrt begrenzt oder gab es auch andere Sektoren, in denen sich dieses Phänomen in vielleicht veränderter Form zeigte? Zum anderen zeigen die beiden Beispiele, dass der Grad der Supranationalität – gemessen an der eingangs gelieferten Definition – zurückging. Während die Recht- sprechung in der Rheinschifffahrt in zweiter und dritter Instanz im Octroi-Vertrag noch eindeutig alle drei Kriterien der Supranationalität erfüllte, galt dies für die auf dem Wiener Kongress vereinbarten Rechtswege nicht mehr so eindeutig. Ob dies eine Ausnahme oder ein genereller Trend für die Integration im 19. Jahrhundert ist, kann hier ebenfalls nicht auf der Basis zweier Beispiele entschieden werden. Allerdings liefern beide Fallbeispiele Hinweise auf die Entstehungsgründe von Supranationalität. In diesem Kontext spielen wirtschaftliche und technische Prozesse eine Schlüsselrolle. Drei Aspekte lassen sich auf der hier gewählten Quellenbasis unterscheiden: Zum einen spielte das Argument wirtschaftlicher Effizienz eine wichtige Rolle. So begründete der preußische Delegierte Wilhelm von Humboldt die Wahl der supranationalen Rechtsprechung (in zweiter Instanz) mit ökonomischen Erfor- dernissen. Die auf Marktprozessen beruhende moderne Wirtschaft erfordere schnel- les und effizientes Handeln, weil ein Zeitverlust durch internationale Rechtsstreitig- keiten für die Schifffahrt auf dem Rhein nicht zumutbar sei. Dieser Gedanke wurde auch in dem vom Wiener Kongress verabschiedeten Schlussdokument über die Re- gelung der Rheinschifffahrt aufgenommen. Es ist bemerkenswert, dass Robert Schu- man den supranationalen Charakter der Montangemeinschaft in den frühen 1950er Jahren mit ähnlichen Argumenten rechtfertigte: „Nur so sind diese Organe fähig, Supranationalität im 19. Jahrhundert? 195 rasch und wirksam zu handeln; sie verfallen nicht der Ohnmacht, an der die meisten internationalen Organisationen bisher gescheitert sind“.40 Ganz ähnlich war auch die Argumentation der niederländischen Landwirtschaftsministers und späteren EG- Kommissars für Landwirtschaft, Sicco Mansholt, der verschiedentlich auf die In- effizienz zwischenstaatlicher Verhandlungen vor allem in Bezug auf Wirtschafts- verhandlungen hinwies.41 Der Kerngedanke bei Wilhelm von Humboldt war wie bei Robert Schuman und Sicco Mansholt, dass sich staatliches politisches Handeln ebenso wie wirtschaftliche Aktivitäten am Effizienzprinzip orientieren muss. Das zweite Argument für die Supranationalität betraf die Internationalisierung und Technisierung der Rheinschifffahrt. Mit dem Octroi-Vertrag wurde die Freiheit der Rheinschifffahrt festgelegt und diese erforderte eben auch eine technische Stan- dardisierung des Verkehrs. Besonders deutlich wurde dies in der Frage der Recht- sprechung für die Rheinschifffahrt. Um die inhaltliche und formale Gleichheit der Rechtsprechung zu garantieren, wurde im Octroi-Vertrag eine supranationale Recht- sprechung für die Rheinschifffahrt vereinbart. Diese wurde in den Verhandlungen des Wiener Kongresses zwar eingeschränkt, aber doch in ihren Grundzügen beibehalten. Angesichts der zunehmenden Internationalisierung von Handel und Verkehr erwies sich die nationale Rechtsprechung als unzureichend und wurde durch eine supranationale ersetzt. Auch dieses Argument wurde, wie bereits eingangs erläutert, im 20. Jahrhundert von Schuman zur Rechtfertigung der supranationalen EGKS genutzt: „Diese überstaatliche Ordnung schafft nicht die Abhängigkeit der Staaten; sie trägt der tatsächlichen bestehenden Abhängigkeit und Verbundenheit Rechnung. Sie normalisiert sie, sie bringt sie in rechtliche Bahnen und bewahrt sie vor Missbräuchen, vor egoistischer Ausbeutung des Schwachen durch den Stärkeren“.42 Aus dieser Perspektive hatte die Internationalisierung der Wirtschaft bereits jene Strukturen geschaffen, die von der Politik im Rahmen supranationaler Organisatio- nen nur nachvollzogen wurde. Eng hiermit verbunden ist das dritte Argument. Hier ging es vor allem darum, dass die hohe technische Komplexität der Schifffahrt Expertenwissen erforderte. Das betraf nicht alleine die technische Entwicklung im engeren (Dampfschifffahrt), sondern auch im weiteren Sinne. Der im Kontext der im frühen 19. Jahrhundert in West- europa einsetzenden Industriellen Revolution rasant steigende grenzüberschreitende Verkehr erforderte bald Experten für internationales Verkehrsrecht (Rechtsprechung) oder auch international standardisierte Verkehrsregeln. Klassische Diplomaten waren mit diesen Dingen überfordert, weil sie nicht über das notwendige Detailwissen ver- fügten. In diesem Kontext spielten Technokraten eine zunehmend wichtige Rolle in den zwischenstaatlichen Beziehungen, vor allem weil sie Probleme formulierten, Lösungsmöglichkeiten anboten und auch als Vermittler dienten. Eben dies war die

40. R. SCHUMAN, Die Grundlinien der europäischen Integrationspolitik. Conférence devant les étu- diants de l'université de Mayence, 21 mai 1953, in: M.-T. BITSCH, op.cit., S.54. 41. G. THIEMEYER, Sicco Mansholt …, op.cit., S.39-54. 42. R. SCHUMAN, Die Grundlinien …, op.cit., S.54. 196 Guido THIEMEYER, Isabel TÖLLE

Rolle des Oberaufsehers in der Genese der Polizeiverordnung auf dem Rhein. Auch dies lässt sich in der Argumentation über die Supranationalität im 20. Jahrhundert finden. Sicco Mansholt rechtfertigte die supranationale Konstruktion der von ihm 1953 vorgeschlagenen Agrar-Gemeinschaft eben auch mit dem Argument, dass eine von den nationalen Regierungen unabhängige Behörde notfalls unpopuläre, aber aus wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher Sicht richtige Entscheidungen treffen könne.43 Supranationalität spielte also schon in der Europäischen Integration des frühen 19. Jahrhunderts eine Rolle und es ist bemerkenswert, dass sie mit ähnlichen Argu- menten gerechtfertigt wurde wie in den 1950er Jahren. Die genauere Bedeutung dieses Phänomens und seiner Entwicklung ist ein Forschungsdesiderat.

43. G. THIEMEYER, Die Debatten um die Versammlungen: Parlamentarismus und Demokratie in der Frühphase der europäischen Integration, in: J. MITTAG (Hrsg.), 30 Jahre Direktwahlen zum Europäischen Parlament (1979-2009), Nomos, Baden-Baden 2011, S.81-92, hier S.88. 197

The Dutch Intellectual Debate on European Integration (1948- present). On Teachings and Life

Jieskje HOLLANDER

Since the beginning of the new millennium, in the Netherlands dissension has grown about Europe’s integration.1 When on 1 June 2005 the Dutch voted with a considerable majority (61.6%) against the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe this dissension turned into a crisis. What had happened to this Europe-loving country? In the Dutch debate on European integration, the call for answers to fundamental questions arose. What exactly was Europe? Was the European Union (EU) a super state in the making or was the basis of European unity still to be found in the national sovereignty of the member states?2 And in line with this: what was Europe to become and what would that imply for the Netherlands?3 Now that the road to a European constitution had been cut off, the ultimate political aim had become more muddled than ever.4 From a historical perspective it is remarkable that these essential questions began to get their grip on the Netherlands only then. How was it possible that, after sixty years of progressive European integration, this country started to get ever more divided on what political form European cooperation should have and the purpose of this cooperation? What had we been talking about in the Netherlands since our first steps on the European path some sixty years ago? In recent debates on the political foundations of Europe little or no attention has been paid to the historical development that Dutch thinking on the subject went through. Journalists, jurists, sociologists and students of politics come up with questions as if they were brand-new, but also the

1. The study on which this article is based is part of the NWO financed project Contested Constitutions: Exploring the Foundations of Modern Democracies. I am indebted to Prof. Dr. Laurence W. Gormley, Dr. Peter A.J. van den Berg and Dr. Rik G.P. Peters without whom this article would not have been written and I would also like to thank Prof. Dr. Jan van der Harst for his helpful suggestions. 2. See among others: L.J. BRINKHORST, De EU wordt nooit een superstaat; Europa Lidstaten hebben EU nodig om zich te handhaven in nieuwe wereldorde, in: NRC Handelsblad, 08.04.2008, p.7; C.J.C.F. FIJNAUT, Een Copernicaanse Revolutie in de Europese Unie, in: Nederlandsch Juristen- blad : weekblad behoorende bĳ de Nederlandsche jurisprudentie, 6(2008), pp.335-336. 3. L.J. BRINKHORST, Europese unie en nationale soevereiniteit, Universiteit Leiden, Leiden, 2008. See: http://www.nieuws.leidenuniv.nl/content_docs/080408/oratie_brinkhorst.pdf; B. LIMONARD, Het verdrag van Lissabon: eerherstel voor de natiestaat?, in: Jason Magazine, 1(2008), pp.3-6, here p.6. 4. On 12 May 2000, in his famous Humboldt speech, Joschka Fischer introduced the question concerning the ‘ultimate aim’ of European integration. Although this finalité concept was immediately rejected by the Dutch government, the question that Fischer posed was subsequently heard in various contributions to the Dutch debate on European integration. 198 Jieskje HOLLANDER few historians who enter into the debate, omit to give it a more historical dimension.5 In this respect the Dutch debate is in contrast with the countries surrounding the Netherlands.6 Considering the interesting results of the historiography on European integration abroad, it is high time to reconstruct and analyse the debate on Europe in the Netherlands. This article then seeks to map out that history of Dutch thinking on Europe on the basis of an analysis of the Europe-debate among public intellectuals. These persons are situated between politics and the wider society. Although the exact influence is difficult to measure, it is clear that in their role as public experts they translate political action into public opinion on it. The opposite holds true as well: politicians and policy makers are influenced by opinion makers. In the article the debate on European integration is reconstructed by the way it was held outside the political arena – government and parliament – but within public organisations, the world of scholars and debating clubs, by analysing it on the basis of publications. All sorts of people of diverse backgrounds had their part in it. Not only jurists, economists, journalists, sociologists, political scientists and a few historians but also (ex-)politicians in different capacities gave their opinion. They expressed their ideas as idealists, as political advisers, as scholars, independent publicists or orators, reacting to developments in politics or to each other’s contributions. What binds them is their active reflection on the Dutch political debate on the identity of Europe. By doing so they became its fellow designers and one of the driving forces behind this debate as it was held over the past sixty years. The contributions appeared in the form of monographs, pamphlets, lectures and orations (in print) but also as articles in journals like the Internationale Spectator and the Nederlands Juristenblad,7 in reports of the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR)8 and the Advisory Council on International Affairs, in reports of the scientific institutes of the major political parties in the Netherlands and as opinion

5. Historical overviews concerning the Dutch attitude towards European integration are largely confined to: A.G. HARRYVAN, De historiografie van de Europese integratie, in: W.A. CAMPHUIS, C.G. WILDEBOER SCHUT (eds.), Europese eenwording in historisch perspectief. Factoren van integratie en desintegratie, Europese Bibliotheek, Zaltbommel, 1991, pp.22-45; W.H. ROOBOL, De geschiedschrijving over de Europese integratie, in: Internationale Spectator, 12(1993), pp.681-684. These studies were never particularly aimed at analysing Dutch thinking on Europe. 6. In several European countries various studies on the thinking about Europe appeared in previous years. See a.o. T. HÖRBER, The foundations of Europe: European integration ideas in France, Germany and Britain in the 1950s, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden, 2006; J.D. ME- DRANO, Framing Europe: attitudes to European integration in Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2003; I. PAVLOVAITE, Paradise regained: the conceptualisation of Europe in the Lithuanian debate, Copenhagen Research Institute, Copenhagen, 2000. 7. The choice for the Internationale Spectator and the Nederlands Juristenblad is based on the consideration that these are the most prominent journals that reflected, in a scientific manner and in broad context, on the process of European integration during the full period (1948-2005). 8. The reports of the Dutch Advisory Council of International Affairs that was established in 1997 have also been examined. However, the content of these reports appeared not to be of great relevance for this article. The Dutch Intellectual Debate on European Integration (1948-present) 199 making articles in newspapers. As far as the selection of the sources referred to is concerned, it is important to state that a well-balanced, but of necessity, restricted choice had to be made from the vast amount of material available. All the reports of the scientific institutes of the three major political parties, published between 1948 and 2005, have been examined. Especially the B.M. Teldersstichting, – the Dutch think-thank of the Liberal People’s party for Freedom and Democracry (VVD) – turned out to have published many essays on the subject. Publications of the scientific institutes of the Christian-democratic People’s Party (CDA) and its forerunners also served a useful purpose. Remarkable was the discovery that, in the period covered by this article, the Wiardi Beckman Stichting, the research agency of the Dutch Labour Party (PvdA), put forward only little on Europe’s design. Consequently, contributions from that side will not be found here. However, certain groups and intellectuals at- tached to the PvdA did have a considerable influence. Examples are the political sub- movement Nieuw Links (New Left) in the 1970s and the influential PvdA ideologist Paul Scheffer in more recent years.9 From the analysis of the debate it will turn out that many of the present questions on the political identity of a uniting Europe have been asked since the end of the 1950s. It will also become clear that from the 1980s onwards a gap developed between public intellectuals who increasingly declared themselves in favour of an intergovernmental European identity and Dutch government policies which remained aimed at a further supranationalisation of Europe. Against this background I argue that an explanation for the fact that the present debate is determined by fundamental questions of political identity, is found in the opposite views of, on the one hand, public intellectuals who, as time went by, increasingly had doubts about the direction that the European project was taking and, on the other, the politicians who forced through the integration. It is also here that we find important indications for an explanation of the debacle of the Dutch 2005 referendum. However, the trends described in this article are never absolute. The article can be no more than an attempt to get an insight into the history of a complex debate that was of influence in the course of Dutch European history. The analysis comprises the debate as defined above from its start shortly after the Second World War until the aftermath of the Dutch referendum on European integration of 1 June 2005; the moment when the confusion and discontent with regard to the political shaping of Europe became clear to its full extent. Negative as well as positive developments left their mark on the discussion on the European project as it was taking place in the Netherlands.10 In that way the debate reacted to new stages in the integration process. That is why it is examined in four phases. It is of importance

9. Also in the party journal of the PvdA, Socialisme en Democratie, the theme of European integration has been much debated. These contributions to the debate, however, were often characterised by a strong party-political undertone and are therefore not involved in this study of the intellectual debate. The same holds true for the party journals of the VVD and CDA. 10. The relation between actual developments in the integration process and Dutch thinking on Europe was not always predictable or unequivocal. Successes on the way to a unified Europe did not necessarily lead to an optimistic tendency in thinking on Europe. 200 Jieskje HOLLANDER to mention that the natural dividing lines in this phasing are formed by key moments in the integration process. They are the Congress of Europe (1948); the Treaties of Rome (1957); the Summit in The Hague (1969); the signing of the Single European Act (1986); and, lastly, the Dutch Referendum on the European Constitution (2005).

Deliverance by federalisation (1948-1957)

After the horrors of World War II it was clear to the West European national states that Europe could not go on the old way. Besides, new political realities had come into being. There was the Soviet threat from the East, Germany had been divided into two, the European economies were extremely enfeebled and the Netherlands lost its colonies. According to a growing body of thinkers in- and outside parliament, far- reaching European integration was the road to take.11 It was under these circumstances that at the end of the 1940s two pro-European integration groups were founded: the Dutch Movement for European Federalists, the BEF, the Dutch branch of the Union des Fédéralistes Européens founded in 1947, and the Europese Beweging (European Movement) founded in that same year. The BEF was a post-war initiative of intellectual individuals dedicated to establishing a united Europe. The European Movement was supported by social organisations and strove after similar ideals.12 It was these movements, led by the famous Hendrik Brugmans (1906-1957) and Hans Nord (1919-1996), that dominated the field of publications on the theme of Europe in this first phase.13 This vanguard of thinkers, going by the self-proclaimed name of ‘Europeans’, was reinforced by some lesser known authors who advocated Europe on a personal title. Examples are the theologian Thijs Booij (1923-2003) and the specialist in international law Jonkheer Haro van Panhuys (1916-1976).14 What their writings had in common, was the passionate character of their pleas in favour of a unified Europe, based on federal principles. Only the realisation of this ideal could save the nations of Western Europe from their ruin. It is on this note that the pamphlet entitled Het uur van de Europese Federatie (The Hour of the European

11. Prominent Dutch parliamentarians with a strong belief in the need of European integration were, for instance, Marinus van der Goes van Naters (PvdA) and Jos Serrarens (KVP). They stimulated a strong preference for European integration within their respective parties. 12. In 1958 both organisations merged into the European Movement of the Netherlands. See also H. ABEN, Van 1947 naar 1992 en verder, Europese Beweging Nederland, Den Haag, 1988. 13. Hendrik Brugmans was co-founder of the Union des Fédéralistes Européens and was for a long time considered to be the intellectual leader of the European Movement. The lawyer Hans Nord developed his enthusiasm for European unity during World War II as a member of the resistance movement. After the war he propagated this ideal as a member of the general board of the BEF and, afterwards, as chairman of the EBN. 14. Although it must be noted that Thijs Booij was for a long time chairman of the Dutch European Youth Council (1949-1960), the work referred to in this study was written on a personal title. Booij is better known as the personal secretary of Queen Wilhelmina. The Dutch Intellectual Debate on European Integration (1948-present) 201

Federation), published by the BEF in 1952, began: ‘European civilisation, which is founded on the pursuit of liberty, justice and prosperity, finds itself in deadly danger’. Two world wars had overthrown all existing relationships with the result that subsequent ‘post-war periods brought us the confusion of totalitarian adventures and of preparation for aggression’. For the peoples of Europe who regained their freedom after World War II or had ‘still kept it’ it was now, according to the BEF, a question of realising the ideal of European unification as soon as possible. Referring to the Soviet threat, unification was no longer a more or less desirable thing in a future more or less far, but ‘a question of life or death, of a choice between liberty and slavery. And it is exceedingly urgent to make this choice now’.15 This kind of disaster-and-rescue argument is characteristic of publications of the BEF and EB in this early period.16 Specific metaphors were often used to express the urgency of the situation. The choice between unifying Europe in a federation or remaining an order of nation states was a choice between life and death, or freedom and slavery. The same holds true for the contributions of ‘Europeans’ that entered the public arena on a personal title. In an essay from 1953, bearing the metaphorical title Ons groter vaderland (Our Greater Fatherland) Booij stated: ‘Europe is not only politically in distress, economically in distress, in desperate military circumstances, it is mentally ill besides’. The theologian predicted disaster if Europe did not continue on the path of unification: ‘If Europe remains fragmented we will stay gagged, we will be impoverished more and more […], then more and more minds will get ripe for communism, then defeatism will become an ever stronger power, then …,then …, only horrible things’.17 Also Haro van Panhuys, the legal adviser of the Foreign Ministry, deemed a United Europe essential for a better future of mankind. He welcomed the initiatives of the Dutch government to open up the constitution for the harmonisation of international and Dutch constitutional law. In order to create a new international legal order it was essential to partly give up national sovereignty, for nothing less than ‘the progress of humanity’.18 Throughout all of the fifties the Europe-idealists of the first hour kept preaching their gospel of the benefit and necessity of a united Europe in such terms. The success of the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and plans of the six ‘founding fathers’ of Europe to achieve further political and economic

15. NN., Het uur van de Europese Federatie, Beweging van Europese Federalisten, Geneva, 1952, p. 3. 16. See a.o. A. MOZER, Waar blĳft Europa?, Nederlandse Raad der Europese Beweging (NREB), The Hague 1951; J. LINTHORST HOMAN, Europa's landbouw, NREB, The Hague, 1951; J.C. BRO- EKHUIZEN, Crisis in Europa, NREB, 1951. 17. T. BOOIJ, Ons groter vaderland Europa, Ten Have, Amsterdam, 1953, pp.8 and 17. 18. H.F. VAN PANHUYS, The Netherlands Constitution and International Law, in: The American journal of international law, 47(1953), pp.537-558, here p.558. 202 Jieskje HOLLANDER cooperation, supported the idealists in their strivings.19 Actual disappointments half- way the fifties did not extinguish the idealistic flame within the Dutch discussion on Europe. Their only effect was a fanning of the idealists’ fiery pleas. When in 1954 the creation of the European Defence Community (EDC) foundered, the BEF published a pamphlet with the revealing title Toch … Europa! (Europe … nevertheless!) It opened with the militant words ‘European federalism has suffered its first big defeat; the battle, however, goes on’.20 Setbacks were considered to be parts of ‘an inter- mezzo in the history of European integration’;21 expressions of conservatism which would not be able to stop the unification of Europe. Characteristic of the idealists was that they did not only cherish uniform ideas on the necessity of a united Europe to meet the dangers of the times, but also on what form this Europe was to have. They emphasised supranational integration and the establishment of a European federal union. Stopping the fall of Europe implied a final breach with the system of sovereign states. Intergovernmental cooperation on the basis of traditional treaty law no longer sufficed. Putting an end to rivalry between the nations needed the transfer of sovereignty to a federal European government which should be equipped with institutional and legal powers. To develop a flourishing European economy it was necessary to create one market with one currency. And for protection from dangers from outside the union, a common foreign policy had to be formulated and a common European army brought about. The legal basis for this federation was not to be restricted to national constitutions with an open character with regard to treaty law. Ultimately a constitution – American model – was necessary.22 What is striking about the argumentation of the idealists is the lack of doubt about the feasibility of their great objective. No words about obstacles, such as the refusal of nations to transfer sovereignty, or what to do if popular support was lacking. The question whether economic integration without political integration was possible at all, was not raised. There was no mention of Europe’s future final borders. The reason for their silence on this is difficult to ascertain. It is hardly imaginable that the idealists did not occupy themselves with the problems and borders of a united Europe. It seems plausible that they were aware of these problems but preferred not to speak about them, leaving that to people not belonging to the group of Europe-devotees. One of the first to start the offensive was the historian Pieter Geyl who in his Studies en Strijdschriften (Studies and Polemics) among other things also gave his comments on contemporary European developments. Although he deemed a Euro-

19. The striving for political integration reflected in plans for establishing a European Political Com- munity (1953) and the Assemblée Ad Hoc. Also initiatives for a relance européenne in which the Dutch Minister Johan Willem Beyen was closely involved, raised trust in the feasibility of the integration process. 20. H. BRUGMANS, Toch … Europa!, Beweging van Europese Federalisten, The Hague, 1954, p.2. 21. A. VOISIN, Tien jaren, 1947-1957, Beweging van Europese Federalisten, The Hague, 1957, p.5 and 28. 22. NN., Het uur van de Europese Federatie, op.cit., pp.18-27. The Dutch Intellectual Debate on European Integration (1948-present) 203 pean federation economically and militarily necessary, he criticised the way in which the union seemed to come into being: ‘What then are those objections, which have to be looked into and discussed before one is overawed by the overbearing tone of the shouts of the pro-Europeans? To begin with, the Europe they are talking about all the time is not Europe […] the Europe of the six, that “little Europe”, […] has nothing to do with a true European ideal. Why exclude England and Scandinavia?’23 Another point of contention was the form this federal Europe was to assume. In 1954 a few legal experts in the Nederlands Juristenblad (Dutch Lawyers’ Journal) entered into the question of the most suitable form of (con)federal integration for Europe (a federation along the lines of the United States of America, the Soviet Union or the Swiss Confederation?) and which form would be in the best interest of the Nether- lands.24 It was also argued that the plans for the creation of a political European federation were premature and ill-considered, since a united Europe was lacking in political traditions which had taken shape in a common history: ‘Time and habit are at least as necessary to fix the true character of governments as of other human institutions’.25 Notwithstanding this critique on the uniform ideas of advocates of a European federation, in this first stage even critics were in favour of the movement towards a United Europe. Although the practical elaborations of the ideal led to discussions, there was no difference of opinion about the great end in view. Classical nationalist positions were largely absent in the debate.26 On the whole it can be said that the debate in the years 1948-1957 was characterised by great faith in a supranational and, ultimately, federal future.

From federal to supranational or intergovernmental (1957-1969)

Although in the period following the conclusion of the Treaties of Rome the European integration process led to visible successes, the Dutch debate during the second phase

23. P. GEYL, Studies en strĳdschriften: bundel aangeboden aan de schrĳver bĳ zĳn aftreden als hoog- leraar aan de Rĳksuniversiteit te Utrecht, Wolters, Groningen, 1958, pp.469-478, here p.470. See also C.H. TELDERS, De Europese Defensie Gemeenschap in de Eerste Kamer, in: Nederlands Juristenblad, 3(1954), pp.49-56. 24. F. DOELEMAN, West-Europese eenheid, in: Nederlands Juristenblad, 13(1954), pp.270-272; J.L.F. VAN ESSEN, Welke vorm voor de Europese samenwerking, in: Nederlands Juristenblad, 17(1954), pp.357-359; W. KOOPS, Federalisme: de Canadese variëteit, Nijhoff, The Hague, 1955, p. ix and 127. 25. Words of George Washington cited by J.G. VAN PUTTEN, De verdeling van bevoegdheden in de Europese politieke gemeenschap, in: Internationale Spectator, 3(1953), pp.6-12, here p.12. 26. Political antagonists of an integrated Europe are found in these years among the Dutch Communists of the Communist Party of the Netherlands (CPN) and in Christian-conservative circles. However, in the public debate they were not very visible. An explanation for their silence in the public debate might have been an underestimation of the feasibility of the European idea; as long as European integration seemed a fiction instead of reality, fierce criticism seemed unnecessary. 204 Jieskje HOLLANDER was especially coloured by what was not achieved: geographical and political extension of the European undertaking. The United Kingdom tried to get into a closer relationship with the Six twice in this period of time. France, however, by means of Charles De Gaulle’s veto, prevented this on both occasions. De Gaulle wanted a Europe des États and not the ideal of a United Europe in which the nation state was no longer the regulating principle. No longer did he attend meetings when England’s admission or further political development were on the agenda. Whatever was tried, political integration did not get off the ground, that much was clear. It was this theme that began to be the main subject of the Dutch discussion. The vanguard of European federalists of the first phase, remained dominant in the field of publishing on European integration, although they got frustrated by the lack of practical progress in the realisation of the federal objective. Their doubts on this found its expression via the platform of the Leiden Europa Institute. This branch of the Faculty of Law of Leiden University, established in 1957, was the first academic institution in the Netherlands where the European integration process as such was discussed. The former Minister of Justice, Ivo Samkalden, led this department as Professor of International Organisations. The lectures, published under the titles Vier maal Europa (Four Times Europe, 1959) and Europa. Eenheid en verscheidenheid (Europe. Unity and Diversity, 1964), are the first substantial and critical Dutch works on European integration. This academic criticism heralded a new phase in the Europe- debate. Although the members of the BEF and the European movement – merged by then into the Europese Beweging Nederland (EBN, European Movement of the Netherlands) – still made themselves heard at this stage as preachers of the federal ideal, their unbridled optimism was over.27 The problems and delays of the process could not be ignored. In the first volume of the Europa Institute, Geyl elaborated glowingly on the ‘little- Europe’ criticism which he had uttered before. That small continental Europe, which had named itself European Community by means of the Treaties of Rome, did not correspond to historical reality. According to Geyl, in every concept of Europe, Eng- land was essential: ‘If we want to find unity in Europe in freedom, then it is absurd to leave out England that three times- the last time most gloriously- threw itself into the breach for the freedom of Europe’.28 The jurist and former Minister of Foreign Affairs Eelco Van Kleffens summarised the essence of Geyl’s criticism in a direct reaction to his lecture:

27. See for instance NN. Naar de Verenigde Staten van Europa: program van de Europese beweging in Nederland, Europese Beweging Nederland, s.l., 1967. 28. P. GEYL, Historische achtergrond van de Europese eenheidsgedachte, in: P. GEYL (ed.), Vier maal Europa; acht colleges in het kader van het Studium generale der Rijksuniversiteit te Leiden, Sam- som, Alphen aan de Rijn, 1959, p.23. The Dutch Intellectual Debate on European Integration (1948-present) 205

‘We get here to what, from a political point of view, we might call the fundamental paradox of Europe. It is found in the opposition between what Geyl has shown to be the unity of European culture on the one hand and Europe’s political fragmentation on the other’.29 Both references to the need for expansion of Europe with, in any case, the United Kingdom must be interpreted in the light of Atlantic preferences; a long tradition in the history of Dutch foreign policy.30 This was the first time in the debate that attention was paid to the problematic nature of the realisation of the object in view. Until then, only an incoherent and fragmented whole not corresponding to the initial federal ideal had been realised. According to Van Kleffens a clear and unambiguous system, working by unequivocal principles, was lacking. He was not alone in this. The economist and former Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs Ernst Van der Beugel also worried about the political relations within the Europe of the Six. However, where Van Kleffens thought it necessary to choose between an intergovernmental or a supranational union in which crucial political powers were transferred to supranational organs, Van der Beugel had already made his choice. Although he confessed that it was ‘one of the worst heresies in today’s Europe’, he was against the Netherlands giving up its sovereignty as long as its national interests had not been safeguarded.31 This was a clear break with the undivided optimism in the intellectual debate on creating a European federation; not only as far as its feasibility was concerned but also regarding its consequences for the Netherlands. In the 1960s the debate got a new impulse. Disagreement on British entry and De Gaulle’s attitude towards Europe made clear that an answer had to be found to the question of Europe’s political identity. From that perspective the discussion in the volume of the Europa Institute in 1964, was a continuation of the debate started in 1959. ‘What is Europe-and who speaks for it?’, was the question which the secretary- general of the Action Committee for the United States of Europe, Max Kohnstamm, asked himself. He clarified: ‘What is Europe and what form will it take? Will it be a Europe on the basis of States, a Europe des États, or is it going to be a Europe based on common laws and common institutions, entrusted with the laying down of laws and upholding them, a Europe in which citizens remain citizens of their state but in which they become citizens of Europe at the same time’?32 This second suggestion, referred to a union based on federal principles.

29. E.N. VAN KLEFFENS, De politieke aspecten, in: P. GEYL (ed.), Vier maal Europa, op.cit., p.28. 30. For more on the history and traditions of Dutch foreign policy see a.o. D. HELLEMA, Neutraliteit & vrĳhandel: de geschiedenis van de Nederlandse buitenlandse betrekkingen, Het Spectrum, Utrecht, 2001. 31. E.H. VAN DER BEUGEL, Economische aspecten, in: P. GEYL (ed.), Vier maal Europa, op.cit., p.72. 32. M. KOHNSTAMM, Europese staatkundige geschiedenis sinds 1945, in: B.W. SCHAPER (ed.), Europa: eenheid en verscheidenheid, Sijthoff, Leiden, 1964. 206 Jieskje HOLLANDER

Legal experts as well had doubts about the direction and feasibility of the integration process. In the Nederlands Juristenblad of 5 December 1964 we read that a merging of Community law and the laws of the member states would give legal problems: ‘More and more numerous are the cases in which Community law and national law are possibly held in contradiction with each other’.33 These contradictions made an answer to the question of priority imperative. Although the European Court of Justice, in the Van Gend en Loos and Costa-ENEL cases, had decided on priority in favour of European law, this did not result in clarity and harmony.34 These decisions made national law subsidiary to community law. Was this desirable? What role would be left then for the national state? In a publication of Leiden University in 1966 with the title Le juge national et le droit communautaire the legal scholar André Donner, observed: ‘On veut demeurer le maître de son propre ordre juridique, qui est le fruit d’une évolution séculaire’.35 Other lawyers such as Ivo Samkalden and Haro van Panhuys welcomed the developments in international and European law, but Donner’s observation makes clear that legal doubts were cropping up about the legal feasibility and desirability of the federal ideal.36 Besides criticism on Europe’s size and political form, the contributions to the debate in the years 1957-1969 were characterised by a growing paradox. Many refused a final farewell to the ideal of a truly United Europe without the old rivalries between the nation states. But disappointments on the path to this ideal led to a sceptical attitude leading to a growing tendency towards the safeguarding of self-interest. Not seldom did these contradictions lead to a schizophrenic frame of mind among Dutch thinkers, many of whom argued both for a new European order that subordi- nated the nation states and for the prevailing of Dutch interests. These two things did not always coincide.37 All Dutch European-thinkers struggled with this paradox in this period. In practice the choice was either to fight for an ‘intergovernmental Europe’ or preach the inevi- tability of ‘supranational’ integration. The intergovernmental school wanted integration in certain (functional) domains (customs, internal market, etc.) but with much independence for the national member states. Those with a supranational inclination

33. L. ERADES, Het recht van de Europese Gemeenschappen in opmars, in: Nederlands Juristen- blad, 42(1964), pp.1105- 1114, here p.1105. 34. Costa-ENEL, ECJ, case no.6-64, 15.07.1964; Van Gend en Loos, ECJ, case no. 26-62, 05.02.1963. 35. A.M. DONNER, Droit national et droit communautaire: points de rencontre, in: A.M. DONNER, Le juge national et le droit communautaire, Sijthoff/Larcier, Leiden/Brussels, 1966, p.12. André Donner was a Judge with the European Court of Justice between 1958-1979. 36. See M.J. EMDE BOAS, Jonkheer Haro F. van Panhuys 1916-1976, T.M.C Asser Instituut, The Hague, 1987. 37. B.W. SCHAPER (ed.), op.cit., pp.10-11 and pp.20-21. The view that supranationalism should only be strived after in case it benefitted the Dutch interests has been termed ‘instrumental supranationalism’. See for instance M. VAN KEULEN, Going Europe or going Dutch: how the Dutch government shapes European Union policy, Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam, 2006, p.248; A.G. HARRYVAN, In pursuit of influence: The Netherlands' European policy during the formative years of the European Union (1952-1973), Peter Lang, Brussels, 2009, p.174. The Dutch Intellectual Debate on European Integration (1948-present) 207 had in mind a united Europe, autonomous in many fields.38 Then there was the discussion, in both camps, as to federalise or not to federalise Europe. In this period, the term ‘federalists’ was often used to denote the true believers of the EBN. In the disquisitions of the critics at the time an anti-federalist attitude could often be observed, although not necessarily coupled to a rejection of a supranational Europe. To describe the state of the process of integration in this period – a mixture of intergovernmental and supranational cooperation – the terms ‘pre-federal’ and ‘sui generis’ came to be used. But irrespective of the terms used, the dilemma between a further and true political integration on the one hand and protecting national interests on the other hand, was not solved.39

How life grew beyond the teachings (1969-1987)

After De Gaulle’s resignation in 1969 and his death in 1970 the frosty relationship between France and the other five member-states began to thaw. The Dutch government and parliament still wanted the United Kingdom in the integration process and saw new chances for this objective to be reached. In December 1969 the Dutch chairmanship organised a summit in The Hague. Establishing a joint budget and setting up a monetary union were discussed, and, most important for the Netherlands, expansion, completion and broadening of the Union was agreed on. The door was opened for British entry. During the 1972 summit in Paris agreement was reached on a communal environmental and social action plan and on energy and industry policies. Furthermore it was decided a Union was to have been accomplished by 1980, in which the European Communities would be merged. These summits on expansion, where the word ‘union’ denoting Europe emerged, mark the beginning of a new stage in the integration process. Searching for new and more intensive cooperation, they were attempts to restore the tarnished idea of ‘European integration’ to its old lustre. Examples are plans in 1978 for a European Monetary System, together with the setting up of direct elections for the European Parliament in 1979 and the coming into force of the Single European Act in 1987. Meanwhile Europe was expanding. Little mainland Europe, scorned by Pieter Geyl, came to an end. In 1973 the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark joined the European Communities, followed by Greece (1981), Spain and Portugal (1986). The new member-states submitted to European law, which together with the effects of increasing cooperation caused an increase of Europe’s legal authority. The European

38. Van der Beugel is an example of an intergovernmentalist author. For more supranationalist arguments see a.o. B.V.A. RÖLING (ed.), Europese Toenadering: een bundel opstellen betreffende de Europese integratie door J.H. Beyen e.a., Bohn, Haarlem, 1959, pp.104-128. 39. See e.g. J.W. BEYEN, United Europe: Federal or Supranational, in: Internationale Spectator, 7(1965), pp.457-471; J. LINTHORST HOMAN, De problematiek van het supranationale en het intergouvernementele, in: Internationale Spectator, 1(1967), pp.27-50, here pp.42-43. 208 Jieskje HOLLANDER flag, introduced in 1986, can be seen as the symbol reflecting this growing and increasingly visible role of Europe. Despite Europe’s efforts to institutionalise it, political cooperation remained a source of anxiety in the Netherlands.40 The oil crises of the seventies and the following economic recession had shown again that in hard times nations tended to withdraw behind the safe fence of the nation state. True, far-reaching political integration did not materialise and the debate in the Netherlands kept concentrating on its absence. In his much read commentaries in the NRC Handelsblad, the columnist Jerôme Hel- dring emphasised systematically the persistence of the nation state.41 The central point of the second phase remained the most important question in the third: to supranationalise or not to supranationalise? The tone, however, changed. Concentrated on the paradox of Europe, it had been critical, without being pessimistic on the feasibility of the federal ideal. In the third phase doubts began to creep in. The social- democratic sub-movement Nieuw Links (New Left)regarded Europe as a capitalist innovation working in the interest of multinationals.42 Its adherents argued that Eu- ropean integration should only be strived after if the process would lead to a socialist Europe.43 The federalists of the European movement saw their great expectations frustrated as their original ideal was disappearing into the background. On the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the EBN in 1987, Hans Nord, co-founder of the BEF and one of the faithful of the first hour, expressed his disillusionment: ‘European unification has not become what we, in 1947, hoped it was going to be […] European integration has become bureaucratic. It is done because it has to be done. But enthusiasm, no, nobody is enthusiastic anymore’.44 As a result the European Movement did not publish any political pamphlet aimed at the federalisation of Europe anymore. The organisation remained active in the margin but its role of important stimulator of the European ideal was over.45 The debate was

40. New plans for European Political Cooperation were presented during the European summit in Lu- xembourg (1970). However, not until the European Single act entered into force in 1987, did this form of cooperation become official and concrete. 41. See also J.L. HELDRING, Dezer jaren: buitenlands beleid & internationale werkelĳkheid, In den Toren, Baarn, 1982, p.16; J.L. HELDRING, Het verschil met anderen, Van Oorschot, Amsterdam, 1975. 42. Nieuw Links arose in the 1970s as a consequence of the process of the breaking down of traditional religious and socio-political barriers that occurred in the Netherlands between 1945-1970 (‘ontzu- iling’). It resulted in a larger diversity of currents and sub-currents in the Dutch political landscape and, by consequence, also in a larger diversity in views on the process of European integration. 43. See D.F. BOSSCHER, De Partij van de Arbeid en het buitenlands beleid (1945-1974), in: H.W.VON DER DUNK e.a., Wederopbouw, welvaart en onrust: Nederland in de jaren vijftig en zestig, De Haan, Houten, 1986, pp.63-83; G. VOERMAN, De Nederlandse politieke partijen en de Europese integratie, in: K. AARTS, H. VAN DER KOLK (eds.), Nederlanders en Europa : het referendum over de Europese grondwet, Bakker, Amsterdam, 2005, pp.44-63. 44. P. VAN NUIJSENBURG, Europarlementariër Hans Nord over jubileum Europese Bewe- ging: “Niemand loopt meer warm voor ideaal van Europese eenwording”, in: Leeuwarder Cou- rant, 01.10.1987, p.13. 45. From the 1970s onwards this change was reflected by a strong decrease in the membership numbers of the movement. The Dutch Intellectual Debate on European Integration (1948-present) 209 increasingly held in the academic world and especially in the world of political science. However, a change was also taking place there: a spirit of intergovernmen- talism seemed to be abroad.46 A new group of intellectuals in favour of European integration on an intergovernmental basis appeared in the debate. It reacted against the original federal ideal because it had reached the conclusion that the political will in the member-states was lacking. Self-interest came first.47 Laurens Jan Brinkhorst’s contribution to the volume Nederland en de Europese eenwording (The Netherlands and European Unification) is a good example of this. He stated clearly that the Netherlands and the supranational ideal did not go together. According to Brinkhorst – ironically, an ardent advocate of the supranational ideal – the Netherlands had never had in mind a United States of Europe: ‘Only a few ever warmed to the idea of a policy with an identity of its own. For many it [Europe] is only a geographical notion. […] We simply do not see European unity with the emotions of someone who gets a new country of adoption’.48 The discussion between the dwindling group of the ‘supranationals’ and those of the ‘intergovernmentalists’ got going by a continuing vagueness on the level of the European Communities. Because of the behaviour of the member states, many could in fact do nothing else but conclude that Europe still worked the intergovernmental way. European leaders and high-ranking European officials, however, did not take leave of supranational or even federal ideals.49 The introduction of the term ‘Union’ (Paris 1972) was meant to suggest and bring about closer unity.50 In essence, however, nothing changed. The name could work as a neutral concept corresponding with and legitimising an ever closer cooperation, without polarising the various political camps (intergovernmental versus supranational) of a Europe deeply divided on this.51 That way European integration could make progress where fundamental political choices were avoided. Some public intellectuals, however, began to realise that the continuing discre- pancy between the European ideal and its reality and the attendant vagueness on how Europe was to cooperate politically, would cause problems. This realisation led to a

46. F.H. ANDRIESSEN, Eurosclerose: economische crisis werpt regeringen terug op nationale stel- lingen, in: Christen Democratische Verkenningen, January 1982, pp.2-11. 47. See P.A. BLAISSE, De EEG in perspectief, in: Internationale spectator, 28(1974), pp.569-574, here p.570; R. VAN ELSLANDE, Europa's toekomst, De Nederlansche Boekhandel, Antwerpen, 1975, p.23. 48. L.J. BRINKHORST, Nederland in de Europese Gemeenschap: terugblik en vooruitzicht, in: P.M. HOMMES, Nederland en de Europese eenwording, Nijhoff, Den Haag, 1980, pp.200-218, here p. 205. 49. K.H. BEYEN, Internationale ontwikkelingen en buitenlands beleid, B.M. Teldersstichting, Den Haag, 1979, pp.6 and 12. 50. D.P. SPIERENBURG, Rapport van de adviescommissie Europese Unie, Staatsuitgeverij, Den Haag, 1975, p.7. 51. In an article of a scientific staff member of the Europe Institute of the University of Utrecht it was stated in this context that: ‘It is not to be wondered at […] that this term is guardedly used. There is over-anxiety of starting a quarrel with the consequent foundering of a plan’. H.A. AUDRETSCH, De Europese Unie, in: Nederlands juristenblad, 51(1976), pp.949-973, here p.949. 210 Jieskje HOLLANDER greater distance and abstraction in their thinking about Europe’s political identity. For the first time several thinkers put themselves no longer in the federal, supranational or intergovernmental camp. They managed to show on a more abstract level what further intertwining of Europe and the member-state of the Netherlands, apart from political choices, implied. An example of this is Professor Jan Winter’s contribution in 1988. In his book Doordringend Recht (Penetrating Law) he pointed at the paradox of a politically vague future of Europe and the far-reaching effects and ine- vitability of the European undertaking in the realm of economy and legislation: ‘It has […] become clear that effects of Community law in the national jurisdiction have institutional consequences: the authority of the judge as spokesman of Community law is greater and the authority of the national [legislator] has been curtailed. Further completion of the internal market will undoubtedly narrow the margins within which our constitutional bodies can still operate lawfully and functionally. All in all reason enough to subscribe to the correctness of the statement of Lord Denning, former Master of the Rolls: “The treaty is like an incoming tide. It flows into the estuaries and up the rivers. It cannot be held back”’.52 An even more striking example is the statement of the Scientific Council for Go- vernment Policy of 1986: ‘While here in the Netherlands we are deliberating upon the desirability of a fourth layer of government, this layer has come into being above us almost unnoticed. Its effects are spreading steadily and make themselves felt, sometimes by surprise, in policy areas at first sight considered far away from the economic integration process’.53 The quotations show a growing awareness in this phase of the debate that in real life the economic and legal practice of European integration had far outgrown its political- theoretical design.

Entrenching behind the borders of the nation state (1987-2005)

After the coming into force of the Single European Act (1987) the transition from the eighties to the nineties was marked by major developments in international politics. The fall of the Berlin Wall (1989) and the Soviet threat gone, stripped the European integration process of one of its raison d’être and implied the knocking at the door of potential new member states. These developments undermined the foundations of European cooperation and as a consequence the leaders of the European project felt the need to take new important steps to strengthen European unity.

52. J.A. WINTER, Doordringend recht: de invloed van het Gemeenschapsrecht op de nationale rechts- orde, Tjeenk Willink, Zwolle, 1988, p. 7. See Lord Denning in his judgment on the case H.P. Bulmer Ltd. et. al. v J. Bollinger SA et.al. [1974]1 Ch 401, 418-419. 53. WETENSCHAPPELIJKE RAAD VOOR HET REGERINGSBELEID, De onvoltooide Europese integratie, Staatsuitgeverij, The Hague, 1986, p.169. The Dutch Intellectual Debate on European Integration (1948-present) 211

At the end of 1992 the internal market was completed. Subsequently, a considerable institutional integrationist success was scored by the ratification of the Maas- tricht Treaty: making the European Union a fact. Long cherished plans of the Twelve for the creation of an economic and monetary union with a common currency were developed. New forms of cooperation in the field of defence and justice were specified and the concept of Union-citizenship was introduced. Citizens of the member-states were to have their national citizenship alongside a European one, giving them additional rights, among which the right to travel, work and live wherever they wanted in the EU. Developing and attuning political cooperation still remained difficult. When in 1991 the then chairmanship of the Council of the European Union, the Netherlands, tried to expand its list of achievements with the founding of the European Union, this led to what has been referred to in Dutch diplomatic circles as ‘Black Monday’.54 The rest of Europe, except Belgium, turned out not to be ready for the far-reaching, supranational political cooperation as proposed by the Dutch government. In the Maastricht Treaty, concluded soon after Black Monday, little was left of the earlier Dutch draft. The position of power of the individual states remained more firmly embedded in the new treaty than the Dutch government had had in mind. In spite of continual political-ideological bickering, Europe managed to keep the integration process going. In 1997 the Treaty of Amsterdam and in 2001 the Treaty of Nice were signed. From January 2002 the citizens of the Euro-zone had a new currency and from 1992 to 2005 the number of member-states increased to twenty- five. In 2004 the leaders of the member-states agreed on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. The giant step from fundamental disagreement on the foundations of political cooperation to a constitution supported by the government was, to say the least, remarkable. Meanwhile, the discussion between the supranationalists and the intergovernmentalists went on,55 and got new participants. After the academic world made its presence in the debate more and more felt, the media increasingly joined in. Televi- sion, newspapers, periodicals and the internet became ever more important for public intellectuals to put forward their views, making the debate public in a much wider sense. As a consequence, the intellectual debate and the world of politics became more intertwined as opinion makers and politicians appeared side by side in newspapers and television shows. As regards contents, a more general dislike of the federal ideal – until then not so explicitly present – tended to appear. Although in the previous phases, in particular in the second and third, the flaws of political integration and the desirability of the ultimate federal goal had been the subject of discussion, there were

54. On Monday 30 September 1991 the other EC member-states rejected a Dutch show-piece proposal for political integration. See for backgrounds and an analysis B. VAN DEN BOS, Mirakel en debacle: de Nederlandse besluitvorming over de Politieke Unie in het Verdrag van Maastricht, Ko- ninklijke van Gorcum, Assen, 2008. 55. In these years the debate was dominated by the intergovernmentalists. F.H. ANDRIESSEN, De integratie van Europa: nu of nooit!?, Universiteit Utrecht, Utrecht, 1991, p.26. Frans Andriessen was a supranationalist. 212 Jieskje HOLLANDER always idealists fervently arguing in favour of a renewed European élan and progress on the path to the goal of political cooperation on a federal basis. In this respect the fourth phase was different. As early as 1992, the year following Black Monday and the year in which the Maastricht Treaty was ratified, a report of the B.M. Teldersstichting was published in which the authors abandoned the federal ideal. It was a remarkable move following and in line with the, at the time, even more remarkable public rejection of the federal ideal by the leading liberal politician Frits Bolkestein.56 According to the scientific institute of the VVD only unnecessary confusion and emotions were aroused by the long-lasting discussion on the desirability of a confederal or federal ideal and, what was more, the terms were frequently misunderstood and used wrongly. It would be more fruitful to look at what was going on in practice and not to go deeply into the theoretical aspect: ‘We do not feel the need to work on the basis of some theoretical concept. The EU is a construction sui generis and that is how it should stay. The manner of decision-making depends on the subject under discussion’.57 In a working document published by the Scientific Council for Government Policy it was also argued that ‘federal idealism’ on Europe needed revision.58 Such an explicit and unambiguous dislike of the federal ideal in the domain of politics – possibly related to the reality check of Black Monday – had not been present in the discussion before in the Dutch debate on Europe. Political scientists were not alone in their anti-federalist stand. The boundless objectives of the EU action plan ‘Europe 92’and growing concerns on the consequences of globalisation and immigration policies caused numerous publications in which the need of reassessment was urged of the characteristics, culture and identity of the Netherlands and its role as an independent nation in the world. This at a time when Europe’s authority was growing due to the effects of the Maastricht Treaty. One such publication concentrating on the unique Dutch character and identity, was Paul Scheffer’s Een tevreden natie. Nederland en het wederkerend geloof in de Eu- ropese status-quo (A Contented Nation. The Netherlands and the Recurring Belief in the European Status Quo, 1988). National patterns had to be the starting point of Europe’s political identity, Scheffer claimed.59 The idea of a borderless society, a

56. In 1992 the VVD coryphaeus Frits Bolkenstein rejected the federal ideal publicly. The Telders- stichting ranged itself on his side with the report Europa: een volgende akte. G.M. VAN AAR- DENNE, Europa: een volgende akte: een verkenning van de grondslagen en de toekomst van de Gemeenschap en de positie van Nederland daarin, B.M. Teldersstichting, Den Haag, 1992. 57. G.M. VAN AARDENNE, op.cit., pp.219-220. 58. P. SCHEFFER, Machtsverschil en rechtsgelĳkheid in de Europese Unie: drie amendementen op de Europese politiek van Nederland, Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid, Den Haag 1995. 59. Paul Scheffer is a well-known Dutch publicist and a prominent PvdA-ideologist. P. SCHEFFER, Een tevreden natie: Nederland en het wederkerend geloof in de Europese status quo, Bakker, Am- sterdam, 1988, p.22. See also H. RIGHART, Het einde van Nederland? kenteringen in politiek, cultuur en milieu, Kosmos, Utrecht, 1992. The Dutch Intellectual Debate on European Integration (1948-present) 213 thing very much in sight with the completion of the internal market and the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, was a ‘contradiction in itself, for every nation exists because of contrast, kinship and protection. The thought that the disappearance of borders creates trust, is a liberal misconception’.60 In 1996 he gave his opinion on the state of the European political integration. He denounced the lack of democratisation and the attendant absence of development of European citizenship. Organising these things on a national basis would be better. ‘A reassessment of the national state as the carrier in the European Union of parliamentary democracy, social protection and constitutional principles’ was needed. ‘The picture of a Europe of federal states has been a naïve projection of German federalism on Europe as a whole. Classical thinking about integration fails to appreciate the tenacity of political and cultural loyalties’.61 Pim Fortuyn, sociologist and columnist, who was to play an important part in Dutch politics in the new millennium, shared Scheffer’s views. He stated more than once, that the European order had to remain founded on independent nation-states.62 The political scientist Koen Koch and the sociologist Nico Wilterdink agreed with the objections against the political modelling of Europe, but they did not support Scheffer’s and Fortuyn’s ideas. European integration had caused a permanent change in the relationships and had irreversibly dismantled the Dutch state. A ‘melancholic nostalgia for a lost golden age’ could not change that. Could there be a full return to an order of national states now that Europe was so powerful in so many fields? Transfer of sovereignty to European institutions had put pressure on the right of the nations to exist.63 This discussion on the return to an order with the nation state at the centre versus the view that for that too much power had gone to Europe, made very clear the fundamental political problem of the integration process. Progressive Eu- ropean integration was causing the loss of the well-defined political identity of the nation when a clear-cut political identity for European cooperation had not yet been developed. This theme determined the Dutch debate on Europe during the whole of the fourth phase. In this context criticism arose of the conceptual confusion seeming to dominate the integration process. Until then attempts had been constantly made to catch the political form of Europe in terms grafted onto the traditional state system. Two extreme options in the process of integration had always been started from. In the first, European cooperation kept its intergovernmental character. The binding element was the collective execution of those tasks meant to protect and strengthen the sovereign

60. P. SCHEFFER, Nederland als open deur, in: NRC Handelsblad, 07.01.1995, p.11. 61. P. SCHEFFER, Over de politieke cultuur in Nederland, in: K. KOCH (ed.), Het nut van Nederland: opstellen over soevereiniteit en identiteit, Bakker, Amsterdam, 1996, p.14. 62. See the many columns of Fortuyn published in the 1990s in the weekly Elsevier and also: W.S. FORTUYN, Zielloos Europa: tegen een Europa van technocraten, bureaucratie, subsidies en on- vermĳdelĳke fraude, Bruna, Utrecht, 1997, pp.98-108. 63. K. KOCH, ‘Denk nationaal dan bereiken we ons aller ideaal’: de natiestaat als lapmiddel, in: NRC Handelsblad, 31.01.1995, p.11; N. WILTERDINK, Het vraagstuk Nederland, in: K. KOCH (ed.), op.cit., pp.205-222, here p.216-217. 214 Jieskje HOLLANDER autonomy of the member-states. In the second, cooperation would develop into a supranational state-like entity, which would take over those tasks. This option implied a major transfer of sovereignty from the member-states to the European level. Jan Rood, head of the Clingendael European Studies Programme observed that both mo- dels in the discussion were rooted in Max Weber’s concept of the state. The European integration project, however, was not like the classic processes of the creation of states in which power was one of the most important motives. The opposite was true. Its true character was pacification aimed at the removal of the power-political attributes of the state. ‘What is the meaning of the preceding, seen from the classic dichotomy supranational-intergovernmental?,’ Rood wondered. ‘In fact that these concepts fail in judging the state of the integration process’.64 Although the concept sui generis was still useful to denote the political reality of the European integration, a growing need was felt for new concepts or paradigms to cover its reality. This became urgent when in the new millennium there came an increase in discussions on a constitution for Europe which was going to be developed. Europe was not a state. Why a constitution then? The jurist Van der Tang wondered if concepts such as constitution and constitutionalism were applicable to Europe, as they were used only in connection with classic nations.65 The former judge of the European Court of Justice Jos Kapteyn thought a solution for the conceptual confusion on the identity of Europe necessary before thinking of writing a constitution because ‘the political community must already understand itself in a certain way for the project of constitution writing and popular ratification to make sense’.66 This disinclination towards defining Europe in terms of a ‘state’ gave rise to a remarkable situation. The majority of the Dutch thinking elite turned away from ideas of a federal state-like Europe and most of them kept preferring a nation-based organisation of Europe. Meanwhile Europe was moving into an opposite direction. By providing itself with state-like symbols as a flag, a currency and a constitution it increasingly assumed a state-like form. The realisation of the federal dream had never

64. J. ROOD, De politieke finaliteit van het Europese integratieproces, in: Vrede en veiligheid, 4 (2000), pp.554-574, here p.566. See also: K. KOCH, Misbaar over de staat. Het proces van ‘ontstatelijking’ in Europa, in: A. VAN STADEN (ed.), De nationale staat: onhoudbaar maar onmisbaar?, Van Gorcum/Instituut Clingendael, Assen/Den Haag, 1996, pp.17-30, here p.24-25. 65. G.F. VAN DER TANG, Grondwetsbegrip en grondwetsidee, Gouda Quint, Arnhem, 1998, pp. 368-369; F. AMTENBRINK, S.B. VAN BAALEN (ed.), Europa; eenheid in verscheidenheid?: Groningse beschouwingen over de Europese Grondwet, Boom juridische uitgevers, Den Haag, 2005; J. PELKMANS, Nederland en de Europese grondwet, Amsterdam University Press, Am- sterdam, 2003. 66. Kapteyn quoted here the words of American lawyer Paul W. Kahn. Kahn teaches in the field of constitutional law and theory, international law and cultural theory and philosophy at Yale Law School. P.J.G. KAPTEYN, Een Europese grondwet: retoriek en realiteit, Vossiuspers UvA, Am- sterdam, 2002, p.26. The Dutch Intellectual Debate on European Integration (1948-present) 215 been so close. However, the lives of many federalists had ended. And as far as the Dutch debate on Europe was concerned, their ideals had died with them.67

After the referendum: continuing introspection in the post-2005 era

In the running up to the referendum on the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, unsettling political events had taken place in the Netherlands. The rise and murder in 2002 of the decidedly ‘un-Dutch’ politician Pim Fortuyn was one of them. An assault on the Dutch tradition of ethnic and religious tolerance followed in 2004 when the Dutch publicist Theo van Gogh was assassinated. Adding to the confusion were the discussions on the demise of the Dutch ‘Poldermodel’.68 And then, when on 1 June 2005 the results of the Dutch referendum trickled in, another shock went through the political centre of the Netherlands. The ship of the Netherlands had sailed a consistent pro-European course and now all of a sudden its passengers mutinied. Although many political advocates of the Treaty had already feared that the constitutional novelty of approving a Treaty by way of a referendum might turn out differently from what had been hoped for, the actual statistics exceeded their worst nightmares.69 Not surprisingly, the Dutch public intellectuals focused immediately on explana- tions of the outcome of the referendum. In the first years after 2005 there was an immense rise in the number of publications on European integration.70 The government’s unconvincing handling of the promotion campaign in the run up to the referendum and the media coverage of arguments in favour or against the Treaty were closely scrutinized and criticised.71 Much attention was paid to fundamental flaws in the way the Dutch political elite had dealt with the theme of European integration in the preceding years. Criticisms were uttered on the clinical, ‘depoliticised’ manner in which successive Dutch governments and the established Dutch political parties had dealt with the theme of European integration in previous decennia.72 It had resulted in decision making on the European level far away from the national political

67. Although the EBN still exists, the role and mission of the movement have changed drastically. J.L. HELDRING, De nieuwe nuchterheid, in: NRC Handelsblad, 10.10.1997, p.9. 68. The term Poldermodel has become a synonym for the typical form of the corporative economy that developed in the Netherlands after World War II. 69. Interview with the former Minister of Foreign Affairs Ben Bot, 24.04.2009. 70. A simple Picarta-search on the search terms Europe and the Netherlands is illustrative here. 71. P. LUCARDIE, De campagne: David tegen Goliath, in: K. AARTS, H. VAN DER KOLK (eds.), Nederlanders en Europa: het referendum over de Europese grondwet, Bakker, Amsterdam, 2005, pp.104-122; W.H. VAN ATTEVELDT, Toen Europa de dagbladen ging vullen, in: Ibid., pp. 123-144. 72. P. VAN GRINSVEN, M. VAN KEULEN, J. ROOD, Over verkiezingen, politisering en het Neder- lands Europa-beleid, Nederlands Instituut voor Internationale Betrekkingen Clingendael, Den Haag, 2006; R. LUBBERS (ed.), "Een oorverdovende stilte...": over de plaats van Europa in de Nederlandse politiek, Vereniging Democratisch Europa, Amsterdam, 2007. 216 Jieskje HOLLANDER arena, let alone the Dutch public at large. In that way the process of European integration had lost much of its political legitimacy on the national level. Internationally much debated themes such as reducing the ‘democratic deficit’ and interpreting ‘European citizenship’ received much attention in the post-referendum era.73 However, instead of searching for solutions for these problems on the European level, in the Netherlands the focus remained on the national domain. This is best shown by the continuation of a trend that had already set in the fourth phase: introspection and a focus on national identity. Soon after the referendum, various opinion polls were held in order to map out the motives of the Dutch people in the referendum.74 The conclusion was that the Dutch had not turned their backs on Europe in general and that negative votes mainly stemmed from the fear of losing the national identity in a united Europe in which (in time) even Turkey might have a place. A united Europe, governed on the basis of a state-like constitution, resulted in continual attention for national identity within a European context. Many post-referendum contributions to the intellectual debate discussed this Dutch fear of the loss of identity and analysed what kind of identity was exactly to be lost. Even the Dutch constitution became subject of the identity-discussion when voices arose that this document should henceforth, more explicitly, function as an expression and protection of the Dutch legal and political identity. To this end, it was argued, Dutch constitutional values and Dutch national symbols such as the Dutch language and the national flag should be recorded in the Dutch constitution. Also the relation between the constitution of the Netherlands and the European legal order was examined and the call for an explicit recording in the constitution of the Netherlands of the Dutch membership of the European Union got louder.75 This discussion got an extra impulse when the Balkenende IV government in July 2009 established a Royal Commission to investigate whether the, by tradition, simple Dutch constitution should be altered in this regard. Thus the Dutch debate among public intellectuals concerning European integration developed further into a debate on the political, cultural and legal identity of the Dutch people in the post-2005 era. No longer was the debate determined by questions on the future of European integration. Instead questions on how this process should be dealt with within the Netherlands received attention. It could be argued that this debate is the mirror-opposite of the debate in the early post-war years in which the federalist intellectuals mainly worried on the future design of Europe while disre-

73. M. BECKER (ed.), Na het referendum over Europa : een weg uit de impasse, Damon, Budel, 2006; F. BECKER, M. HURENKAMP, M.S. DHIAN HO, Het ongemak over Europa, Wiardi Beckman Stichting, Amsterdam, 2008. 74. An overview of the result of these various polls can be found in the contribution of J. THOMASSEN, Nederlanders en Europa. Een bekoelde liefde?, in: K. AARTS, H. VAN DER KOLK (eds.), op.cit. 75. See a.o. H.L. WESSELING, Een vredelievend volk: opstellen over geschiedenis, Bakker, Amster- dam 2009; W. NOORT, R. WICHE, Nederland als voorbeeldige natie, Verloren, Hilversum, 2006; H R. HOEKSTRA, Hart voor de publieke zaak: aanbevelingen van de Nationale conventie voor de 21e eeuw, Nationale Conventie, Den Haag, 2006; J.W. SAP, Een Nederlandse Ontwerp-Grond- wet, EON pers, Amstelveen, 2006; D.J. ELZINGA (ed.), The Dutch Constitutional Monarchy in Changing Europe, Kluwer, Alphen aan de Rijn, 2007. The Dutch Intellectual Debate on European Integration (1948-present) 217 garding the question on how a unified Europe should be embedded in the national constitutional order. While the Dutch intellectuals tried to make sense of the unexpected and catastro- phic upshot of the referendum and gazed at the Dutch identity and constitution, the process of European integration was not laid idle. In the summer of 2008 the Dutch parliament approved the Treaty of Lisbon. On 1 December 2009 it entered into force. By various public intellectuals the treaty was seen as a resurrection of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe; only stripped of its constitutional appear- ance.76 Remarkably, this fundamental step was, apart from its technical legalities, not subjected to any significant intellectual debate in the Netherlands regarding its political desirability.

Conclusion

When on 1 June 2005 61.6% of the Dutch voters voted against the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, many, both nationally and internationally, were shocked. What had happened to the Europe loving Dutch? In the history of the Dutch intellectual debate on European integration of the last sixty years a few outlines can be identified. The first thing to be observed is that it underwent a big institutional shift. In the early years, from 1948 to 1957, it was dominated by the idealists of the BEF and the European Movement but as time went on another picture appeared. The debate was ‘academised’ in the years 1957-1987. From then on, between 1987 and the present, it was characterised by politicisation and a public discussion in a much wider sense. This development is mirrored by the nature of the sources of reference. In the first period the debate was held in the form of pamphlets. In the second and third phases, volumes with lectures on Europe and reports by institutes of political science were published. The fourth and fifth phase of the debate were characterized by a growing number of academic and opinion leading contributions in the media. The shift in the institutional frame of the debate was accompanied by a shift with respect to content: boundless optimism changed into growing doubts on the feasibility and form of political integration on the European level. Was a united Europe going to be governed supranationally or intergovernmentally? Between 1969 and 1987 these doubts made room for questions concerning the desirability of political integration. The following years were dominated by a determined aversion to the federal ideal, the demand for new concepts and, above all, by the focus on national identity. Thus the ideal picture of a European federation which had dominated the discussions in the earliest phase of integration raised a spectre in the last. It is remarkable that two

76. P.J. KAPTEYN, In de spagaat: tussen Europa en Nederland: tien jaar Europa-debat Vereniging Democratisch Europa, EON pers, Amstelveen, 2009, p.9. 218 Jieskje HOLLANDER developments in opposite directions can be noted. While the Netherlands were becoming an integral part of a federalizing system, the Dutch posture on the integration process turned more multiform, critical and dismissive.77 Seen from a historical perspective it is especially striking that the questions of the past decennium as put in the introduction are far from new. For sixty years Dutch public intellectuals had been debating on the whys and wherefores of European integration. Six decennia in which doubts about the feasibility and desirability of a European federation grew until this idea was definitely taken leave of in the nineties. Not only by the studied intellectuals, but also by their public: the Dutch people. Me- anwhile, in the hands of communitarian-thinking government leaders and diplomats, Europe developed into a reality that did not bother about objections of public intellectuals. Federalisation came closer than ever when in 2005 a Constitution for Europe was presented. But by agreeing to hold a referendum on its introduction the Dutch government overplayed its hand. While government had turned a deaf ear to the criticisms of opinion makers, Dutch voters proved to have heard them indeed. As far as they were concerned the image of a state-like Europe had served its turn. Despite the shock, however, little changed effectively. While the public intellectuals of the Netherlands were busy explaining the result of the 2005 referendum and the role of the Dutch administration in it, the political elite was again one step ahead. With the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon, a new step in constitutionalising Europe was a fact.

77. A. PIJPERS, Kanonnen en boter: beschouwingen over oorlog en integratie in Europa, Mets, Am- sterdam, 1996, p.135. 219

Australia and Western European Integration in the 1950s

Andrea BENVENUTI

This article examines Australia’s attitude towards the process of Western European integration in the 1950s. In particular, it focuses on the responses of Robert Menzies’ Liberal-Country Party Coalition government to the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951-1952, the ill-fated experiment of the European Defence Community (EDC) in 1952-1954 and the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957-1958. The article argues that while superfici- ally supportive of steps towards greater Western European integration, the Australian authorities adopted an ambivalent attitude towards it. Policymakers in Canberra recognized the importance of an economically prosperous and politically cohesive Western Europe. At an economic level, an affluent Western Europe could offer greater trading opportunities to Australian exporters. At a political level, a strong Western European bloc could not only help consolidate the Western camp amidst growing Cold War tensions, but it could also provide a valuable bulwark against Soviet communism. What is more, it could play an important part in buttressing British power in world affairs. The Australian view was that unless Britain’s ‘continental backdoor’ was secured, London’s ability to play a major defence role outside Europe would be curtailed. Australian policymakers were mindful of Britain’s wartime ‘beat-Hitler- first’ strategy and knew that in the event of an acute crisis in Europe, the British government would inevitably concentrate its efforts on the defence of the British Isles at the expense of Commonwealth commitments in the Far East. Yet, the formation of a strong Continental grouping also posed a number of major challenges to the makers of post-war Australian foreign policy. As this article aims to show, the Menzies government soon began to wonder whether attempts to create supranational bodies in Continental Europe accorded with Australian political, economic and security interests. Australian concerns were specifically centred on the possibility of Britain becoming too closely associated with the nations of the ‘Little Europe’ (France, Italy, the Benelux and West Germany) and the implications that such a move would have on Commonwealth cohesion and on London’s capacity to continue to play a major role in Asia, upon which Australia’s security relied. A further concern was the economic damage that Australia was expected to suffer should Bri- tain decide to join the EEC: Britain’s membership of the EEC would not only wreck the imperial preferential system that had regulated Commonwealth commerce since 1932, but it would also introduce new impediments to Australian trade with Britain. Australia’s attitude towards the EEC and its successor, the European Union (EU), has received extensive treatment from the historians of Australia’s foreign relations. There is now a large body of literature on the EEC/EU-Australian relationship. Stu- dies in this area have generally dealt with two distinct phases of the relationship: the first phase centres on Australian policy towards the British efforts to join the Com- munity in 1961-72 as well as on the likely impact of Britain’s entry on the traditionally 220 Andrea BENVENUTI intimate Anglo-Australian ties. Here the EEC constitutes the background, rather than the focus, which remains firmly set on Canberra’s responses to London’s European policy.1 The second phase has as a starting point Britain’s accession to the EEC in 1973, but concentrates on Australian attempts to develop a constructive relationship with the EEC/EU despite significant differences on trade and agricultural issues. The focus here is no longer on Anglo-Australian diplomacy over the EEC question, but Canberra’s policy towards the EEC/EU itself.2 The period from the 1960s onward is now well-documented, while very little has been said about Australian responses to the incipient process of Western European integration in the 1950s. The only notable exception has been John O’Brien’s work on the attitude of the Australian Department of Trade towards the EEC between 1956 and 1961.3 This article builds on O’Brien’s work, but it casts its net wider to include Australian responses to the ECSC and EDC. In so doing, it not only focuses on Canberra’s perceptions of the likely economic impact of Western European moves towards greater Continental integration on Aus- tralia, but it also deals with the broader political and strategic questions that such moves raised for the Australian government.

1. See S. WARD, Australia and the British Embrace: The Demise of the Imperial Ideal, Oxford Uni- versity Press, Melbourne, 2001; H.G. GELBER, Australia, Britain and the EEC, 1961 to 1963, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1966; A. BENVENUTI, Australia and the ‘Turn to Europe’, 1961-72, Boydell & Brewer, New York, 2008; N.P. LUDLOW, Too Far Away, Too Rich and Too Stable: The EEC and Trade with Australia during the 1960s, in: Australian Economic History Re- view, 3(2001), pp.267–286; D. GOLDSWORTHY, Menzies, Macmillan and Europe, in: Australian Journal of International Affairs, 2(1997), pp.157–169; J. O’BRIEN, The British Commonwealth and the European Economic Community, 1960–1963: The Australian and Canadian Experiences, in: Round Table, 340(1996), pp.479–491; P. ROBERTSON, J. SINGLETON, Britain, the Dominions and the EEC, 1961–1963, in: A. DEIGHTON, A.S. MILWARD (eds.), Widening, Deepening and Acceleration: The European Economic Community 1957–1963, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1999, pp. 107–122. 2. See A. BENVENUTI, Australia’s Battle Against the Common Agricultural Policy: The Fraser Go- vernment’s Trade Diplomacy and the European Community, in: Australian Journal of Politics and History, 2(1999), pp.181–196; A. BENVENUTI, Australian–European Negotiations on Agriculture: A Study in Economic Diplomacy 1983–1993, Monash University, MA Thesis, 1997; A. BENVE- NUTI, The Howard Government’s Diplomacy towards the European Union on Agriculture: An Early Assessment, in: Political Expressions, 1(1998); A. BURNETT, Australia and the European Com- munities in the 1980s, Australian National University, Canberra, 1983; A. ELIJAH, P. MURRAY, C. O’BRIAN, Divergence and Convergence: The Development of European Union-Australia Rela- tions, in: CERC Working Papers Series, 3(2000), pp.1-49; P. MURRAY, Australia and the European Union, in J. COTTON, J. RAVENHILL (eds.), Seeking Asian Engagement, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1997, pp.230-247; P. MURRAY, Australian and the European Superpower: Engaging with the European Union, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2005. 3. J. O’BRIEN, Australian Department of Trade and the EEC, 1956-61, in: A. MAY (ed.), Britain, the Commonwealth and Europe: The Commonwealth and Britain’s Application to Join the European Communities, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2001, pp.39–52. Australia and Western European Integration in the 1950s 221

Australia and the ECSC

On 26 June 1950, in his Roy Milne memorial lecture to the Australian Institute of International Affairs in Adelaide, Australia’s newly-elected Liberal Prime Minister, Robert Menzies, articulated his vision for the British Commonwealth in the world of the 1950s.4 A strong and tightly-knit Commonwealth, he said, had the potential to play an important role in international affairs: not only would it strengthen the voice of its members within the emerging Western alliance, but it would also bolster the latter in its efforts to contain the Soviet threat. In so doing, it would make a significant contribution to Western and Australian security. But for the Commonwealth to achieve these objectives and pull its proper weight in international affairs, greater foreign policy coordination among its members was needed. For Menzies, Western Europe was a good case in point. ‘If the British Commonwealth is to be regarded merely as a series of separate even if respectable fragments’, he argued, ‘then inevitably the settlement of Europe will tend to become a contest between the Soviet Union on the one hand and the United States on the other, with the European powers little more than pawns in the game, and with Great Britain acting more or less precariously as an intermediary’. On the contrary, ‘if the Commonwealth countries co-operate’, he added, ‘then they can not only alter the character of the contest, but can make an immense contribution to European peace’. As he explained, ‘It is, I believe, essential to the welfare of Europe and therefore of mankind that the British voice in the European Settlement should be both strong and clear. For if the United King- dom is to speak only for itself […] it will suffer inevitably from what Kipling called the ‘webbed and inward-turning eye’, and what should be a settlement will tend to become an old-fashioned bilateral contest between the Communist autocracy of Russia and the democratic Capitalism of the United States’.5 For Menzies, it was ‘unlikely that there will be a good and lasting European settlement without a vital and powerful contribution from her’. Hence, Britain, in collaboration with its Commonwealth partners, should not shy away from ‘accept[ing] direct and primary European responsibilities’. Menzies appeared unconcerned that, by seeking a greater European role, London could become increasingly drawn into a European orbit and thus be forced to make an unwelcome choice between the British Com- monwealth and a Western European union. This, he said, was a false problem for ‘it seems to assume that the British Dominions have no vital concern with Europe’. Quite the contrary, he argued, Australia had every interest in seeing the emergence of a strong and resilient Western Europe, which he regarded as ‘the frontier in any crucial

4. R. MENZIES, The British Commonwealth of National in International Affairs, Roy Milne Memorial Lecture, 26.06.1950 available at http://www.menziesvirtualmuseum.org.au/ transcripts/ Speech_is_of_Time/ print/101_BritCwlthInt.pdf [accessed on 24 July 2009]. See also A. WATT, The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy, 1938-1965, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1967, pp.275-276. 5. R. MENZIES, op.cit. 222 Andrea BENVENUTI fight’ in the emerging Cold War. ‘We of the King’s Dominions’, as he put it, ‘have an interest in Europe, out of which the two great wars of our history have come’.6 Menzies’ goal of a strong and prosperous Western Europe, founded on a close political and economic partnership between Britain and its Continental allies, was clearly premised on the assumption that any future Anglo-European collaboration would not come at the expense of Commonwealth unity, but that it would rather take place with Commonwealth concurrence. What Menzies envisaged was essentially greater inter-governmental co-operation between Britain and its European partners. He had no wish for greater Western European political and economic integration. In late December 1949 the Department of Commerce and Agriculture (DCA) set limits beyond which no Australian government should go in supporting Western European co-operation. In a paper drafted immediately after Menzies’ victory in the 1949 federal election, officials in the DCA made it clear that while Australia had taken an active interest in attempts to further Continental collaboration as embodied by the Brussels Pact (1948), the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (1948) and the Council of Europe (1949), the chief aim of its European policy was ‘to ensure as far as possible that [its] interests in the UK market are maintained and safeguarded’. Australian efforts, therefore, were to be directed to monitor closely ‘actual and anticipated developments in Europe’ and influence as far as possible such developments ‘in a direction consonant with Australia’s interests’. According to the DCA, ‘full scale economic integration among even some of the countries of Western Europe’ could be safely ruled out in the short and medium term. At any rate, British attitude towards European co-operation was described as ‘reassuring’ from the view- point of Australia’s economic interests. In spite of this, it was nonetheless worthwhile to seek, from time to time, a ‘re-statement of her attitude by the United Kingdom in British Commonwealth discussions’. Australian policy, officials in the DCA concluded, was not to ‘question the United Kingdom’s participation in moves towards closer economic partnerships among the countries of Western Europe’. Rather, it was to remind London that there were reciprocal obligations among Commonwealth partners and that ‘any proposal in the field of Western European “integration” which affect the United Kingdom’s trade might also affect Australia experts of particular commodities to the Unit- ed Kingdom’.7 In this, the policy of the new Liberal-Country Party Coalition administration did not differ appreciably from that of its Labor predecessor. In 1948 Ben Chifley’s Labor government had rejected a British proposal for the creation of a Western Union, which Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin had unveiled in an address to the House of Commons on 22 January 1948. Although it was couched in idealistic language and carefully avoided any specific detail, Bevin’s ‘Western Union’ concept represented an ambitious plan for the political, economic and military reorganisation of post-war Western

6. Ibid. 7. The National Archives of Australia, Canberra (henceforth NAA), A1838, 81/3, Notes on Moves towards European Economic Integration in relation to Australia’s Export Interests, 29.12.1949. Australia and Western European Integration in the 1950s 223

Europe.8 For the Australian Labor government, however, the British plan had serious shortcomings and, unsurprisingly, Canberra viewed it with concern. Labor’s anxiety derived principally from the fact that, with its anti-Soviet overtones, Bevin’s initiative not only risked putting paid to any remaining hope of a continuing collaboration among the victors of the Second World War. It also threatened to undermine the United Nations and entrench East-West divisions across Europe. What is more, Be- vin’s emphasis on Western European security implied a British preference for a ‘Europe-first’ strategy at the expense of Asian commitments, and this could hardly please Chifley and his vocal Minister of External Affairs, Herbert Evatt. As if this was not already enough, Bevin’s ‘grand design’ had also the potential to affect Australian exports to the British market since it seemed to indicate London’s growing interest in the creation of a European customs union.9 The Chifley government worried that a British participation in a Continental customs union would either undercut the Commonwealth preference system or impose new tariffs on Common- wealth agricultural produce.10 In 1947-48 the British market still absorbed 38% of Australia’s total exports and policymakers in Canberra had no wish to see access to Australia’s largest market curtailed.11 In the end, Bevin’s ambitious initiative produced only limited results. In March 1948 London successfully negotiated the Brus- sels Treaty with France and the Benelux countries, but this Western European defence scheme was soon superseded by the Atlantic Pact in April 1949.12 In the economic field, talks on a European customs union petered out in 1948 but, in any case, the British government had already given a pledge to its Commonwealth partners that it would consider joining such a scheme only if terms were satisfactory to the Com- monwealth.13 It is doubtful that the Menzies government, troubled as it was by the threat posed by international communism, would have come out so strongly against Bevin’s ‘Wes- tern Union’ concept. After all, Bevin’s plan was no blueprint for a federal Western Europe or for the establishment of supranational Western European institutions; and,

8. In Bevin’s intentions, the Western Union was expected to include France, the Benelux, the nations of Scandinavia, Portugal, Italy and Greece. See G. WARNER, The Labour Governments and the Unity of Western Europe, 1945-51, in: R. OVENDALE (ed.), The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Governments, 1945-51, Leicester University Press, Leicester, 1984, pp.66-67. For the Aus- tralian Labor government’s rejection of the Western Union concept see C. WATERS, The Empire Fractures: Anglo-Australian Conflict in the 1940s, Australian Scholarly Publishing, Melbourne, 1995, pp.110-111. 9. Ibid.; J. SINGLETON, P. ROBERTSON, Economic Relations between Britain and Australasia, 1945-1970, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke,2002, pp.148-149; G. WARNER, The Labour Go- vernments …, op.cit., pp.66-67. 10. J. SINGLETON, P. ROBERTSON, Britain and Australasia, op.cit., p.149. 11. NAA, A1838, 81/3, Notes on Moves towards European Economic Integration in relation to Aus- tralia’s Export Interests, 29.12.1949. 12. For the establishment of the Brussels Treaty see A. VARSORI, Il Patto di Bruxelles (1948) tra Integrazione Europea e Alleanza Atlantica, Bonacci, Rome, 1988; see also A. BULLOCK, E. Bevin, Foreign Secretary 1945-51, W. Heinemann, London, 1983, pp.529-531, 536-537, 554-555 and 567-568. 13. J. SINGLETON, P. ROBERTSON, Britain and Australasia, op.cit., p.150. 224 Andrea BENVENUTI as his Milne lecture in June 1950 indicated, Menzies was not opposed to diplomatic initiatives that would strengthen Western Europe political, economic and military cooperation on intergovernmental basis in spite of the DCA’s hard-nosed approach to Continental economic developments. Yet, the proposal unveiled by French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman on 9 May 1950 for the integration of Western Europe’s coal and steel industries, and the setting up of a supranational high authority tasked with overseeing the whole process, signalled a new approach to European co-operation and contained supranational elements that the Australian authorities would find in future hard to countenance. In the spring of 1950, however, the supranational character of the Schuman initiative did not seem to worry Canberra. On the contrary, the Menzies government welcomed it wholeheartedly. In an interview to Agence France Presse in mid-May, Minister of External Affairs Percy Spender described the Schu- man Plan as ‘one of the most constructive and hopeful steps taken since the initiation of the Marshall Plan by the United States’. According to Spender, it was not only ‘a step which gives reality to the concept of European economic co-operation’, but it was also ‘a statesmanlike gesture towards Germany’. In remarking that economic cooperation within the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) had only ‘made a very slow progress’, Spender congratulated the French government for taking ‘such important initiative in the right direction’. In Spender’s view, French leadership ‘will give great encouragement to all those who have been striving to secure a greater degree of co-operation in Europe both in the economic and political fields, and should therefore be of assistance to the Council of Europe and to the OEEC’.14 Spender’s positive response to the Schuman Plan and its supranational character could be in part attributed to the fact that the Menzies government had nothing to fear from it. Integration of Western Europe’s coal and steel industries posed no threat to Australia’s commercial interests. Nor did it jeopardise Commonwealth ties. Canberra was well aware of the Attlee government’s opposition to a British participation in supranational schemes. In early June 1950 the Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) reiterated Britain’s position in a despatch to the Australian and other Com- monwealth governments. In it, the CRO informed its partners that although it welcomed the Schuman initiative, the British Cabinet found it impossible to associate itself with it on the terms proposed by the French government.15 Ministers and officials in London felt that no British government could subscribe to the supranational

14. NAA, A1838, 81/3/3 part 1, J.L. Mulroney (Australian High Commission Dublin) to Secretary of the Department of External Affairs (henceforth DEA), 16.05.1950. 15. Ibid., Commonwealth Relations Office to DEA, telegram A 72, 03.06.1950. Australia and Western European Integration in the 1950s 225 aspects of the Schuman proposal nor commit itself to such an ambitious plan without being able to assess its political and economic implications.16 Negotiations among six Western European nations began in earnest. In late June 1950 the representatives of France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg gathered in Paris to trash out a compromise. By mid-December 1950, a first draft accord was completed and the final treaty establishing the ECSC was signed on 18 April 1951.17 Throughout and after the negotiations, the Australian attitude remained supportive. However, as the ratification process progressed slowly between 1951 and 1952, the Australian authorities became increasingly sceptical about the likelihood of the ECSC treaty being implemented. In January 1952 officials within the Western European sub-section of the Department of External Affairs (DEA) argued that ‘it is not easy to be optimistic about the prospects for European integration’. The DEA could not fail to notice that ‘the attitude of self-interest and scepticism is typical of the European States participating in these plans. France is interested in European integration as a means of offsetting Ger- many supremacy; Germany because both the Schuman and the Pleven Plans are stepping stones on the way back to what she considers her rightful position as the leading Power in Europe; Italy because she hopes that the Schuman Plan will help to support her backward industries and Belgium and Luxembourg, who are the least enthusiastic of the 6 members countries, still remain to be completely convinced of the advantages to be gained for themselves’. The fact that, in the meantime, the Six had embarked upon another ambitious initiative —that of establishing a European Defence Community—did not seem to reassure External Affairs. DEA officials felt that ‘even if ratification does take place it is extremely doubtful whether either of these plans will ever progress as far as the federal or semi-federal state. Once German divisions have been formed the “raison d’être” for the European army will have disappeared and once the Schuman Plan has brought about a lowering of tariffs within the community one of its main objectives will have been achieved’.18 They concluded that ‘except in face of an extreme emergency European integration appears as chimerical as ever’.19 The judgment was somewhat harsh. By mid-1952 the ratification process had been completed and the ECSC had come into force in July 1952. While it may not have been startling, progress towards greater Western Euro-

16. See the National Archives, Kew, (henceforth UKNA), CAB 195/8, CM34(50), Integration of French and German Coal and Steel Industries, 02.06.1950 and CAB 128/17, CM(50)34th conclusions, 02.06.1950; see also A. A. BULLOCK, op.cit., p.780; W. KAISER, Using Europe, Abusing the Europeans: Britain and European Integration, 1945–1963, Macmillan, London, 1996, p.21. For the British attitude towards the ECSC see J. YOUNG, The Schuman Plan and British Association, in: J. YOUNG (ed.), The Foreign Policy of Churchill’s Peacetime Administration, 1951-1955, Leicester University Press, Leicester, 1988, pp.109-131. 17. W. KAISER, op.cit., p.21 18. NAA, A1838, 81/3/3 part 4, The Schuman Plan and the European Army: Note by the European Sub- section, 25.01.1952. 19. Ibid. 226 Andrea BENVENUTI pean co-operation was real. Yet, it was also painstakingly slow and it was clear that in the early 1950s the Australian government expected no sudden acceleration in the European integration process. This factor, coupled with continuing British scepticism towards supranational schemes, ensured that European affairs remained of secondary importance in Australian eyes. With the deepening of the Cold War following the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, Canberra’s attention became increasingly focused on East and Southeast Asian issues.

Australia and the EDC

Following the successful negotiation of the Treaty of Paris, the six members of the ‘Little Europe’ embarked on an even bolder plan — the creation of a supranational Western European defence scheme. This scheme had originated from a proposal put forward by French Prime Minister René Pleven on 23 October 1950. It sought to integrate the newly-created West German state into Western defence structures.20 In doing so, the French authorities aimed to control and slow down what they saw as the inevitable rearmament of West Germany. The idea of rearming France’s former enemy was rather unappealing to the leaders of the French IV Republic. Yet, with the Truman Administration insisting on the full rehabilitation of West Germany on grounds that a permanently weak West German state was not in the West’s interests, the Pleven government felt it had little choice. It knew that if France insisted on being unhelpful, Washington could not only hold back much-needed American financial support to France, but it could also override French opposition by integrating German units into those American forces deployed on German soil. Hence, policymakers in Paris soon came to the conclusion that it was in France’s interest to come up with a plan that, while allaying French fears of a German rearmament, would meet American demands.21 Talks on the French plan began in 1951 between France and its five Continental partners and were successfully concluded in Paris in May 1952 with a treaty establishing the European Defence Community. However, the ink was barely dry on the EDC treaty that the scheme began to run into trouble. While the Benelux countries ratified the treaty expeditiously, the French and Italian authorities delayed ratification. Growing opposition in France to the treaty and domestic distractions in

20. See for instance M. TRACHTENBERG, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Sett- lement, 1945-1963, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1999, pp.110-111. See also E. FURD- SON, The European Defence Community: A History, Macmillan, London, 1980. 21. On French attitudes towards West German rearmament see for instance J.-C. ALLAIN, P. GUIL- LEN, G.-H. SOUTOU, e.a., Histoire de la Diplomatie Française, vol.II: De 1915 à Nos Jours, Perrin, Paris, 2007, pp.389-393; see also W. HITCHCOCK, France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944-1954, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1998, pp.142-147 Australia and Western European Integration in the 1950s 227

Italy made it politically difficult for the two Latin governments to push it through their national parliaments.22 Australian responses to the creation of the EDC and its increasingly problematic ratification process remained muted. Australian posts in Western Europe duly reported back to Canberra on EDC developments, but ministers and official took little notice of them.23 In an appreciation of Australia’s defence policy, Australian defence planners noted how the strengthening of NATO in the early 1950s and the signing of the EDC treaty had ‘resulted in Russia being confronted with a very real obstacle to further territorial expansion in Western Europe, without recourse to global war’. Yet, as they hastened to add, it was NATO ‘the only existing effective organisation for co-ordinating the efforts of the non-communist nations’.24 But apart from this, Aus- tralian records reveal very little on the Menzies government’s approach to the EDC. This is not at all surprising if one considers that the British Conservative government led by Winston Churchill had shown no interest in joining the EDC, and that the ratification process remained stalled in the French and Italian parliaments.25 In relation to British policy towards the EDC, unless London joined this revolutionary defence scheme, there was no cause for Australian concern. While aware that Europe remained Britain’s main security perimeter, Australian authorities were reassured that London had made no long-term troop commitments to Western European security.26 As for the ratification issue, Australian officials wondered whether the EDC

22. On growing French opposition to the EDC see ibid., pp.170-185. For the Italian responses to the EDC initiative see A. VARSORI, L’Italia nelle Relationi Internazionali dal 1943 and 1992, Laterza, Bari, 1998, pp.105-111; S. ROMANO, Guida alla Politica Estera Italiana: Da Badoglio a Berlus- coni, Rizzoli, Milan 2004, pp.85-88; G. MAMMARELLA, P. CACACE, La Politica Estera dell’ Italia: Dallo Stato Unitario ai Giorni Nostri, Laterza, Bari, 2006, pp.190-199; etc. There are, however, significant differences between the Italian and French responses to the EDC. In a nutshell, while French opposition to the EDC was principally motivated by fear of West German rearmament as well as of loss of sovereignty in the strategically important defence field, Italian reluctance to ratify the EDC treaty was attributable to the convergence of a number of domestic political developments. 23. For diplomatic despatches on the EDC question see the following files: NAA, A816, 14/301/701; A816, 19/301/1242; A1838, 67/1/1 part 4; A1838, 78/6 part 1, A1838, 78/6 part 4. 24. NAA, A1209, 1957/4152, Defence Committee Report: A Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy. Attachment to Defence Committee Minute 368/1952, 08.01.1953. 25. On the Churchill government’s approach to the EDC question see J. YOUNG, Churchill’s “No” to Europe: The “Rejection” of European Union by Churchill’s Post-War Government, 1951-1952, in: The Historical Journal, 4(1985), pp.923-937; see also A. DEIGHTON, The Last Piece of the Jigsaw: Britain and the Creation of the Western European Union, in: Contemporary European History, 2(1998), pp.181-196; S. DOCKRILL, Britain’s Policy for West German Rearmament, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991, pp.140-150; K. RUANE, Agonising Reappraisals: Anthony Eden, John Foster Dulles and the Crisis of European Defence, 1953-1954, in: Diplomacy and Sta- tecraft, 4(2002), pp.151-185 26. According to Saki Dockrill, the decision taken by the Attlee government in March 1950 to raise the strength of the British Army on the Rhine (BAOR) by two (infantry) divisions signalled a ‘clear shift in Britain’s global strategy from the Middle East to Western Europe’. By 1952 Britain deployed four divisions in West Germany. S. DOCKRILL, Retreat from the Continent? Britain’s Motives for Troop Reductions in West Germany, 1955-58, in: Journal of Strategic Studies, 3(1997), p.49. 228 Andrea BENVENUTI would ever come into existence. ‘It is not yet known’, a DEA note pointed out in October 1952, ‘when [the ratification process] is likely to be completed’.27 The EDC debate in France, they observed a few months later, was bound to be ‘prolonged and bitter’, and divisions were ‘more marked than ever’. It remained, therefore, to be seen whether the supporters of the treaty would be able to secure the necessary parliamentary majority of 314 votes to see it through the French Assembly. As for Italy, officials noted that there would ‘be considerable opposition from the left’ once the government brought the EDC bill to parliament; yet, this ‘should have a successful passage’.28 In mid-1954, however, the EDC’s fate appeared doomed. In his first address to the French National Assembly on 17 June 1954, Prime Minister Pierre Mendès France urged political parties to overcome their divisions and find a solution to the EDC impasse that could be supported by a parliamentary majority.29 Despite Mendès France’s efforts, no such solution could be found. On 30 August 1954, the National Assembly rejected the EDC treaty with a procedural motion by 319 votes to 264.30 The EDC fiasco plunged the question of West German rearmament into chaos and threatened to open a serious rift within the Atlantic alliance. A solution was eventually found in October 1954 when the Eisenhower Administration and its Western Euro- pean allies agreed to accept West Germany as a full member of both NATO and the Brussels Pact (now renamed Western European Union). Agreement was made possible by the Churchill government’s pledge to maintain four British divisions on the Continent.31 British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden described his government’s decision as ‘a very formidable step to take’ for a country that had so far avoided making long-term commitments to Continental defence.32

27. NAA, A1838, 78/6 part 1, Western European Integration, October 1952. 28. Ibid., Note for the Minister: Ratification of European Defence Community, 1953. 29. V. GAVIN, Power through Europe? The Case of the European Defence Community in France (1950-1954), in: French History, 1(2009), p.83; W. HITCHCOCK, France Restored …, op.cit., pp. 190-197. 30. K. RUANE, op.cit., p.164; V. GAVIN, op.cit., p.87. 31. More precisely, Britain promised to retain its existing level of defence forces on the Continent and agreed not to withdraw them against the wishes of the majority of the Western European Union members. See NAA, A816, 19/301/701, London Conference on Germany: Note by the Office of the British High Commissioner in Canberra, 30.09.1954; see also K. RUANE, op.cit., p.176; S. DOCKRILL, Retreat from the Continent …, op.cit., pp.49 and 52. London also pledged to continue to have its tactical air force assigned to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). See NAA, A816, 19/301/701, Extract from Eden’s Statement to the Nine Power Conference on 29 Sep- tember 1954. See also NAA, A816, 19/301/701, Holmes to Menzies, 30.09.1954. 32. For Eden’s comments see NAA, A816, 19/301/701, Decision to Keep Four Divisions and Air Forces on the Continent of Europe, 30.09.1954. For the historical implications of the British decision to make a long-term commitment to Continental security see A. DEIGHTON, Arming the Key Batt- leground: German Rearmament, 1950-1955, in: Diplomacy & Statecraft, 2(1992), pp.348-349; S. DOCKRILL, Britain’s Policy for West German Rearmament, op.cit.; S. DOCKRILL, Retreat from the Continent…, op.cit., p.49. Deighton has argued that the British decision ‘was a radical shift for Britain’s European strategy’. According to Dockrill, it had the effect of reorienting Britain further towards Europe. Australia and Western European Integration in the 1950s 229

The collapse of the EDC came as no surprise to the Australian authorities and enticed no reaction from them. Yet, it is important to note that the whole EDC affair was not without potential consequences for Australia. The British pledge to maintain a long-term military presence on the Continent as a reassurance to France against Western German rearmament posed an awkward problem to Australian policymakers for it foreshadowed the possibility of Britain’s growing involvement in Continental defence at the expense of its extra-European commitments.33 Although the Churchill government had been careful to stress that British troops in Continental Europe could be temporarily redeployed in other theatres in case of an emergency, Canberra was nonetheless concerned that this would be easier said than done once the commitment to European security had been made.34 In early October 1954, the Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, Arthur Tange, advised Foreign Minister Richard Casey to show caution on the European defence issue. ‘If you have to say anything publicly’, Tange told Casey, ‘it would seem best to refer to great importance of security in Western Europe and earlier risk of disintegration rather than to say specifically whether we approve of Eden’s commitment’. ‘We have’, he added, ‘been concerned about whether this long-term commitment might prejudice the United King- dom’s military capacity in regions closer to Australia’. Tange regarded London’s assurances that the long-term stationing of British defence forces on the Continent would neither affect British plans for the establishment of a Commonwealth strategic reserve in Malaya nor prevent the rapid redeployment of these forces outside Europe, as hardly adequate.35 From an Australian point of view, the problem was not that Eden’s commitment amounted to greater British troop deployments on the Continent. The problem was rather that it could potentially tie down existing British forces in Europe at the expense of other theatres.36 Tange immediately approached the Department of Defence to see whether it ‘was doing any sort of an appreciation of the implication of the United Kingdom decision’ and even considered bringing the issue up with Menzies himself.37 In the end, Australian concerns over the aftermath of the EDC crisis subsided. Yet, the EDC affair highlighted how closely the security of the British Isles was bound to that of the Continent and how Britain’s closer engagement with this region could

33. Britain’s pledge responded to other foreign policy considerations too. On this point see A. DEIGH- TON, Last Piece of the Jigsaw …, op.cit., p.192. 34. British troops on the Continent could also be reduced if the cost of their deployment ‘were to throw at any time too heavy a strain on the external finances of the United Kingdom’. NAA, A816, 19/301/701, London Conference on Germany: Note by the Office of the British High Commissioner in Canberra, 30.09.1954. 35. NAA, A816, 19/301/701, Australian High Commission (henceforth AHC) Ottawa to DEA, cablegram 181, 08.10.1954. For the British assurance see NAA, A816, 19/301/701, Holmes to Menzies, 30.09.1954; Department of External Affairs to Department of Defence, 07.10.1954. On the establishment of a Commonwealth Strategic Reserve in Malaya see P. EDWARDS, G. PEMBERTON, Crises and Commitments: The Politics and Diplomacy of Australia’s Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts, 1948–1965, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1992, pp.162-168. 36. NAA, A816, 19/301/701, Decision to Keep Four Divisions and Air Forces on the Continent of Europe, 30.09.1954. 37. NAA, A816, 19/301/701, Telephone Call from Tange. Note by Frederick Shedden, 06.10.1954. 230 Andrea BENVENUTI upset Australian defence calculations in the Far East. Of course, the question here was not of a British direct participation in a European supranational defence scheme, which, in any case, had proved unattainable; it was rather a question of a growing British involvement in the security of Western Europe—in other words, of a ‘pull factor’ that risked drawing Britain closer to its Continental partners.

Australia and the EEC

The EDC fiasco did not put a stop to new proposals for further Western European integration. In mid-May 1955 the Benelux governments produced a memorandum calling for the creation of an economic common market among the Six in the shape of a customs union.38 In June 1955 the Foreign Ministers of the ‘Little Europe’ gathered at Messina in Sicily to discuss the next steps in European integration. They agreed that while political integration remained the Six’s long-term goal, priority be given to greater integration in the economic domain. An intergovernmental committee under the chairmanship of Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak was set up. In April 1956, it produced a report recommending the creation of Euratom and a common market. The Spaak report was endorsed at the Venice conference in May 1956 and adopted as a starting point for the negotiation of two new European communities. Protracted consultations among the Six between May 1956 and March 1957 culminated in Rome with the signing of the treaty establishing the EEC and Euratom on 25 March 1957. Australia’s response to the Messina powers’ common market initiative took time to develop. Canberra’s initial attitude was to wait and see. After the EDC’s collapse, the Menzies government was not only aware of the arduous task facing the Six as they attempted to re-launch the integration process, but it was also sceptical of the feasibility of grandiose integrationist Continental schemes. The fact that London remained opposed to joining supranational Western European bodies, provided further reassurance that political and economic developments on the Continent posed no immediate threat to Australian interests. Ministers, therefore, began to examine the Messina powers’ initiative only in late October 1956. The opportunity was provided by a British proposal aimed at creating a European free trade area in industrial pro- ducts which would be open to all OEEC members, including the Six.39 The prospect of British association with the Six in the economic and trade field naturally drew ministerial attention in Canberra. While expressing caution about the economic implications of a free trade area for Australia, Menzies and his ministers were supportive of British plans to discuss this project with the Six on condition that agricultural

38. W. KAISER, op.cit., p.23; see also W. HITCHCOCK, The Struggle for Europe: The Turbulent History of a Divided Continent, 1945 to the Present, Anchor House, New York, 2003, pp.154-155. 39. For the origins of the Plan G see M. SCHAAD, Plan G: A “Counterblast”? British Policy towards the Messina Countries, 1956, in: Contemporary European History, 1(1998), pp.39-60. It should be mentioned that the free trade area project excluded farm produce. Australia and Western European Integration in the 1950s 231 produce would not be part of the equation. As farm commodities constituted the great bulk of Australia’s exports to Britain under the imperial preference system, Canberra had no interest in seeing Australian access to the British market curtailed as a result of an Anglo-European free trade area. As for the Six’s common market initiative, ministers took a benevolent view of it and said that they were ‘conscious of the important political and economic advantages which could flow from a strong and united Europe’.40 It is true that Acting Minister for Trade William McMahon warned his ministerial colleagues of the potential risks arising from the customs union proposal — namely the introduction of a common external tariff, which could ‘conform to the highest rather than the lowest level of existing tariffs’, and the adoption of restrictive trade regulations in the agricultural sector. Yet, in late 1956, even the Department of Trade (DT), which was destined in the years to come to become a vocal critic of the EEC’s trade practices in the agricultural field, approved of the Six’s efforts to achieve closer political and economic co-operation in Western Europe, arguing that their initiative would not only boost their international stature, but would also settle the German question once and for all.41 It was nonetheless clear that ministerial support for both the British and Euro- pean initiatives was conditional upon London’s pledge not to become too closely involved in the Six’s ambitious designs. As long as Britain remained opposed to supranational schemes, the Menzies government could afford to take a rather magn- animous approach towards greater Continental integration. But, as events were soon to show, Australian support for Western European integration was to be highly qualified. In early 1957, as the Six moved closer to a final agreement, the Menzies government became alarmed at reports that under French pressure the Six were canvassing treaty arrangements for the creation of a protected internal market for agricultural commodities.42 All of sudden, the Australian attitude hardened and departments in Canberra began to take a closer look at developments on the Continent. On 2 February 1957 Minister for Trade John McEwen handed a stern note to the Six registering Australian concern at their proposed arrangements on agriculture.43 In it, McEwen made it clear that while appreciating the economic and political case for closer European co-operation, Canberra remained uneasy about the introduction of protectionist agricultural provisions in the final customs union treaty. He warned the Six that ‘Australia would be bound to oppose within GATT any proposal for the extension to the Customs Union as a whole of any system of agricultural marketing or price support involving non-tariff regulation of competing imports now maintained on a national basis in any one country of the Messina group’.44

40. NAA, A4906, vol.18, Cabinet decision 546, 30.10.1955. 41. Ibid., Cabinet submission 444, 30.10.1956. 42. NAA, A1838, 971/4/11 part 1, DEA to AHC London, 22.01.1957; DEA to Paris, 22.01.1957; AHC Ottawa to DEA, 17.01.1957. 43. See NAA, A1209, 1957/4595 part 1, European Common Market: note by Brennan, 04.02.1957. 44. NAA, A1209, 1957/4595 part 1, Aide Memoire, 02.02.1957. 232 Andrea BENVENUTI

Following the signing of the Treaty of Rome on 25 March 1957 and the inclusion of potentially protectionist agricultural provisions in the treaty itself, McEwen reiterated his criticism.45 In early April, he recommended to Cabinet the following course of action: first, the government should seek ‘maximum action in GATT prior to ratification (as distinct from signature) of the Treaty and subsequently’; second, it should exert significant pressure on the Six to ensure that they took the interests of non-EEC agricultural producers into account; third, it should try ‘to enlist as much support as possible for our position from USA, Canada and the UK in GATT and by other means for modification or adjustment of them’.46 Australia’s aim was not only to safeguard its existing agricultural trade with the Six, which McEwen put at about A£ 18.5 million a year, but also to open up additional trade opportunities.47 McEwen’s diplomatic approach soon ran into difficulties. Despite Australian attempts to seek an early examination of the Treaty of Rome within GATT, the GATT Intersessional Committee decided at the end of April 1957 that further preparatory work was needed before an effective examination of the Treaty could be made. The United States and Canada argued that any special session of the GATT on the Treaty of Rome should be deferred until the ratification process was completed in the parliaments of the Six. The American and Canadian view was that ‘intensive discussion of the Treaty in GATT could embarrass the Messina Governments, and hinder the ratification procedures’.48 The Eisenhower Administration, in particular, was strongly supportive of the Messina initiative.49 Despite sharing some of Australia’s economic concerns, the Administration was inclined to brush them aside on the altar of greater Western European cohesion. Political motives clearly overrode American anxieties about the Six’s protectionist tendencies in agriculture. And, in any case, the reality was that while the promise of an integrated agricultural policy was indeed a concern for the Americans, the actual legal stipulations on agriculture contained in Treaty of Rome were rather weak and sketchy. Hence, there would still be plenty of scope, the American Administration believed, for the United States and other inte-

45. For a detailed discussion of the articles (38-47) of the Treaty of Rome relating to agriculture see R. FENNELL, The Common Agricultural Policy of the European Community: Its Institutional and Administrative Organisation, BSP Professional Books, Oxford, 1987, pp.7-10. 46. NAA, A571, 1959/2383 part 2, Cabinet submission 577, 21.03.1957. 47. Ibid., Treasury’s note on Cabinet submission 577, European Common Market, 26.03.1957. 48. NAA, A1838, 791/4/11 part 4, Maris King to Arthur Tange, 13.05.1957; NAA, A1838, 791/4/11 part 2, AHC Ottawa to DEA, cablegram 72, 15.03.1957. 49. P. WINAND, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the United States of Europe, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1993, chapter 5; see also G. WARNER, Eisenhower, Dulles and the Unity of Western Europe, 1955-1957, in: International Affairs, 2(1993), pp.320-324. Australia and Western European Integration in the 1950s 233 rested nations to influence the Six’s policymaking on agriculture in the years to come.50 Hence, despite McEwen’s repeated attempts in 1958 to bring the Treaty of Rome to the attention of the GATT, his strategy paid no dividends. The GATT was unwilling to challenge the EEC and ‘took refuge behind procedural and technical barriers’.51 Representations to EEC governments also brought McEwen little joy. While some European governments such as West Germany were not unsympathetic towards Aus- tralian agricultural concerns, they were unwilling to endanger EEC’s cohesion to accommodate Australian claims. What is more, the Six found McEwen’s criticism of the agricultural aspects of the Treaty of Rome a little hypocritical given that, with the exception of agriculture, Australia was at the time one of the most protectionist countries in the Western world.52 As for Britain, the Macmillan government advised Canberra to seek protection through the GATT.53 John O’Brien has argued that McEwen’s diplomatic strategy, at least initially, ‘was to have it [the EEC] dismantled’.54 This is an exaggeration not supported by archival evidence. In September 1957 McEwen made it clear to Cabinet that it was not the Australian government’s intention to ‘wreck’ the EEC.55 But while this is no doubt the case, it is also clear that the Menzies government was not prepared to go as far as the Americans in supporting the creation of a strong economic Western European entity, especially if this meant incurring some trade losses.56 One reason for Australia’s conditional support was that whereas the Americans had a significant stake in the security and prosperity of the Continent, and saw the strengthening of Western Europe as a political imperative in the containment of the Soviet Union, Australian interests in Western Europe were more tenuous and, thus,

50. On the question of the agricultural regime envisaged by the Treaty of Rome see N.P. LUDLOW, The Making of the CAP: Towards a Historical Analysis of the EU’s First Major Policy, in: Con- temporary European History, 3(2005), pp.349-350. It is worth noting that a further factor contributed to the Administration’s soft attitude towards the Messina powers: the Americans themselves were not alien to agricultural protectionism and had hitherto prevented any meaningful discussion of it within the GATT with the result that agriculture remained outside the GATT system. On this point see D. KENYON, D. LEE, The Struggle for Trade Liberalisation in Agriculture: Australia and the Cairns Group in the Uruguay Round, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, 2006, pp.9-10. 51. J. O’BRIEN, Australian Department of Trade …, op.cit., p.41. 52. According to A. Woodland, Australia ‘entered the 1950s with a half-century history of increased protection of its manufacturing sector […]. The basis for the protection policy was provided by the United Kingdom-Australia Trade Agreement of 1932, which firmly established the principle that tariffs would be set to compensate for cost disadvantages suffered by domestic Australian manu- facturers relative to their British competitors’. A. WOODLAND, Trade policies in Australia, in: S. DOMINICK (ed.), National Trade Policies: Handbook of Comparative Economic Policies, Green- wood Press, Westport, 1992, p.239. 53. D. GOLDSWORTHY, op.cit., p.158. 54. J. O’BRIEN, Australian Department of Trade …, op.cit., p.41. 55. NAA, A4926, Cabinet submission 862, 17.09.1957. 56. On the Eisenhower Administration’s pro-integration stance see P. WINAND, op.cit.; see also G. WARNER, Eisenhower, …, op.cit., pp. 319-329. 234 Andrea BENVENUTI harder to define. Throughout 1957 and afterwards, Australian ministers and officials would repeatedly stress the political and economic importance of closer Continental co-operation, yet they would continue to find it difficult to spell out how exactly Australia would benefit from it. Thus, it was no surprise that while somewhat vague about the supposed benefits of Western European integration for Australia, they were under no doubt that the broad political merits of the common market project should be weighed against its commercial demerits. The other, and perhaps more important, reason for this ambivalent attitude was the tight grip exerted by the Department of Trade (DT) over governmental policy with regard to European integration. Under the leadership of the influential and powerful McEwen, the DT tended to monopolise official thinking on this issue and hijack the policymaking process. In this Trade was supported by the Department of Primary Industry, who was also worried about the Six’s attempts to establish a protectionist trade regime. As for the Treasury, this influential department, while critical of the DT, was not prepared to challenge the latter’s ascendancy. Nor were Canberra’s political departments —External Affairs and the Prime Minister’s Department (PMD). Of the two, the PMD was the greatest critic of Trade’s increasing hard-line stance towards the EEC. The PMD argued that European integration, while undoubtedly presenting some costs for Australia, needed not be, on the whole, harmful to Australian economic interests.57 In fact, trade losses deriving from the introduction of a common external tariff and a regulated domestic agricultural market would be minimal. The PMD was concerned that Trade’s line ‘was too narrow’ and that if Australia ‘continued to be wholly preoccupied with the particular considerations for our export trade, events would likely to pass us by’.58 But the PMD’s efforts to bring some balance into Australian policy over Europe were hampered by the Prime Mi- nister himself. In 1957 Menzies appeared closer to McEwen’s thinking than that of his departmental officials.59 As for External Affairs, it was still a small department with limited expertise on economic affairs.60 His minister, Richard Casey, carried little influence in Cabinet and DEA officials, unlike their counterparts in the PMD, appeared to take a somewhat less sanguine attitude towards Western European integration.

57. NAA, A1209, 1957/5119 part 2, Lawler to Bunting, 13.06.1957; see also The European Economic and the Proposed Free Trade Area – Considerations for Australia, PMD note, June 1957. 58. NAA, A1209, 1957/5119 part 1, Lawler to Bunting, 02.07.1957. 59. NAA, A1838, 791/4/11 part 6, Statement by Menzies to the Liberal Party Federal Council, Canberra, 21.10.1957 60. On this point see Maris King and Michael Wilson, Interview with Maris King, http://nla.gov.au/ nla.oh-vn569002. Australia and Western European Integration in the 1950s 235

Conclusion

Throughout the 1950s the Menzies government maintained an ambivalent attitude towards Western European political and economic integration. In general, it supported its political objectives. Yet it remained apprehensive of the economic implications of greater European integration for Australian trade despite the fact that, in the late 1950s, Australia did not stand to lose too much from it. In 1955-56 the value of Canberra’s exports likely to be affected by the creation of a Western European customs union was only A£ 18.5 million, that is approximately 2.3 per cent of Australia’s overall exports worth A£ 770 million.61 Canberra’s focus on the economic, rather than political, aspects of Western European integration was attributable not only to the priority given by the Six themselves to economic integration, but also to the DT’s increasing hold on Australia’s Europe policy. With McEwen in charge of Australia’s diplomacy towards the Messina powers, it was inevitable that the Australian approach to Western European integration would be less sympathetic than it could have otherwise been. Canberra’s concerns, however, were not solely economic. Australian policymakers were also nervous about the possibility of closer British political collaboration with the Six. As mentioned above, Britain’s long-term commitment to Wes- tern European security following the collapse of the EDC raised concerns in Canberra as it seemed to indicate—despite British assurances to the contrary—a diminished capacity on Britain’s part to intervene militarily outside Europe. The Australian attitude, of course, would become more negative in August 1961 when the Conservative government of Harold Macmillan announced its intention to negotiate Britain’s entry into the EEC. The British decision, which came as a shock to Menzies and his ministers, would be seen as a serious blow to Australia’s political, economic and strategic interests and would negatively colour Australian perceptions of the EEC. At a political level, British entry was thought likely to undermine Britain’s historical ties with Australia and the Commonwealth. As External Affairs would put it in a June 1961 submission to Cabinet, London’s membership of the EEC was bound to disturb ‘the whole complex of relationships, including the Commonwealth, on which Australia’s traditional outlook and politics rests’.62 At an economic level, entry would have significant repercussions for Australia’s trade with Britain. McEwen would waste no time to highlight the fact that some A£ 140–150 million, or 55–60 per cent of Australia’s exports to the British market, could be affected depending on the nature of Anglo-European agreement.63 At a strategic level, British entry was expected to curtail London’s freedom of action as a world power and weaken its resolve to play a politico-military role in the Far East where Australia’s main strategic interests lay.64 All of sudden, Western European integration appeared to be an un- mitigated disaster for the Menzies government. Long gone were the government’s

61. NAA, A571, 1959/2383 part 2, Treasury’s note on Cabinet submission 577, European Common Market, 26.03.1957. 62. NAA, A1838/269, TS899/1/4 part 2, Cabinet submission 1183, 26.06.1961. 63. NAA, A1838/283, 727/4/2 part 1, Cabinet submission 1108, 05.05.1961. 64. NAA, A1838/269, TS899/1/4 part 2, Cabinet submission 1183, 26.06.1961. 236 Andrea BENVENUTI support for the ECSC and its timidly benevolent attitude towards the recently established EEC. The stage was now set for three long decades of Australian-European misunderstandings. 237

EEC Competition Policy in the Early Phase of European Integration

Sibylle HAMBLOCH

Besides the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), competition policy was an area of major importance for the European Economic Community (EEC) as it was there that first successes in the European integration process were achieved. With the creation of the EEC in 1958, the Directorate General for Competition (DG IV)1 was not only put in charge of competition policy in a narrower sense, i.e. restrictive practices and monopoly policy, but it was also responsible for state aids and the ensuing discrim- ination between states, and the harmonisation of laws and taxation (EEC Treaty, articles 85-99). In the 1960s the EEC’s first Commissioner for competition policy, Hans von der Groeben, drafted a firmly focused conception. This was crucial as it enabled the supranational authorities to agree on common regulations, or at least approaches, at a high level despite the differences in national competition policies. Cartel and tax harmonisation policies in particular are examples of successful competition policy integration. The aim of this paper is to analyse the circumstances under which EEC competition policy was successful, success being measured by whether common European laws, i.e. regulations and directives,2 were passed. For this purpose we will use the hypothesis that law was passed at a high level if the following requirements were met: (i) a clear conception of competition policy had been established by the DG in charge within the European Commission; (ii) the supranational actors – the European Commission and the European Parliament – in general and the European Commission as the process leader in particular used their influence in the decision-making process; (iii) the opinions of different stakeholders in the European industry and trade unions as well as (iv) the recommendations of technical experts with a mostly academic or administrative background were included into the decision-making process; and (v) a compromise between different legislative and economic conceptions (legislative eclecticism) and ideas could be reached.

1. After 1968 the EC was restructured and new directorates general were formed such as the DG for Regional Policy (DG XVI). Issues relating to taxes, the Societas Europaea and intellectual property rights were integrated into the Directorate General XIV for Internal Market and Legal Harmonisation. Von der Groeben was commissioner for competition policy – DG IV – (1958-1967), DG XIV and DG XVI (1967-1970). 2. Regulative policies are to be understood as “those which enable a political organization to exert a continuous and specific control on activities generally considered beneficial for the society as a whole”. C. LEQUESNE, The European Commission: A Balancing Act between Autonomy and De- pendence, in: K. NEUNREITHER, A. WIENER, European Integration After Amsterdam. Institu- tional Dynamics and Prospects for Democracy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000, pp.36-51, here p.43. 238 Sibylle HAMBLOCH

It should be noted that this article makes a conscious effort to include both case studies of examples which resulted in a common legislative act during the period under consideration, and those which did not. An example for a successful outcome was EEC Regulation 17/62 enforcing European cartel law. A case study where a legislative act failed to materialise was European company law: the attempt of creating a Societas Europaea. These case studies are also relevant because they can be differentiated by their respective agenda-setting. While cartel law had explicitly been put on the political agenda by the EEC Treaty, the European Commission, although not specifically charged with drafting a European company law, was keen to bring the issue of a Societas Europaea onto its agenda and to find solutions on a supranational level. In the last years a number of publications have focused on European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and EEC competition policies.3 This is partly due to the fact that the archival materials from the early phase of the European integration were recently made accessible. This article is largely based on the author’s postdoctoral thesis.4

The philosophy of a “practical workable competition” in the DG IV

What was the decisive factor for the conception of the Directorate General for Com- petition in the early years of the EEC?5 The theoretical basis of a practical workable competition was established by Hans von der Groeben in his capacity as Commis- sioner for competition policy and by Walter Hallstein, the European Commission’s first President. Von der Groeben, a former senior civil servant in Ludwig Erhard’s Ministry of Economics, was influenced by the framework of this German ministry: it was built on the principles of social market economy, a term shaped by Erhard’s secretary of state Alfred Müller-Armack, and the ordoliberalism of the Freiburg

3. See among others L. WARLOUZET, La France et la mise en place de la politique de la concurrence communautaire (1957-1964), in: E. BUSSIÈRE, M. DUMOULIN, S. SCHIRMANN (eds.), Euro- pean Integration After Amsterdam. Institutional Dynamics and Prospects for Democracy, Oxford University Press, Oxford/Bruxelles et al. 2006, pp.175-201; T. WITSCKE, Gefahr für den Wettbe- werb? Die Fusionskontrolle der Europäischen Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl und die „Rekon- zentration“ der Ruhrstahlindustrie 1950-1963, Oldenbourg, Berlin, 2009; F. PITZER, Interessen im Wettbewerb: Grundlagen und frühe Entwicklung der europäischen Wettbewerbspolitik 1955-66, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 2009; K.SEIDEL, The Process of Politics in Europe. The Rise of European Elites and Supranational Institutions, Tauris Academic Studies, London, 2010; COL- LECTIF, La politique de la concurrence communautaire: origines et développements (années 1930- années 1990), n° spécial de la revue Histoire, Economie & Société, 1(2008). 4. S. HAMBLOCH, Europäische Wettbewerbspolitik. Die Frühphase der EWG, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2009. 5. For this chapter see ibid., pp.62 f. EEC Competition Policy in the Early Phase of European Integration 239

School,6 in particular by the theory of Walter Eucken. The same applied to the Com- mission’s external advisor, Professor Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker, an expert for economic and competition matters. The Freiburg School was founded by academics at the German University of Freiburg in the early 1930s, and after the Second World War it aimed at creating a new society. Competition was considered as the basis for economic prosperity and political stability. When von der Groeben was appointed Commissioner for competition policy, he represented this “German” school of economic thinking and transferred it to the DG IV. Consequently, while collaborating in the DG IV, civil servants, colleagues in von der Groeben’s personal cabinet and special advisors of the European Commission became familiar with these ideas. Most of them even supported this particular German conception of competition policy, which was in general entirely different from the more intervening character of the French economic policy and in particular from the more dirigiste French competition law in the case of monopolies at that time.7 What were the special characteristics of the DG IV’s conception? Built upon the experiences of the ECSC, it focused on an ordoliberal approach. In contrast to Amer- ican antitrust law with its sole emphasis on cartels,8 the European approach intended the development of regulating principles. These principles were seen as the basis for the economic and legal policy as a whole. Alongside the provisions of the EEC Treaty, fair and effective competition was considered as a key requirement for the creation and maintenance of a common market with a single-market character. Von der Groeben shared the neoliberal scholars’ view of the EEC Treaty’s provisions regarding the free movement of industrial goods and competition policy. For them, they represented a binding legal framework

6. W. MUSSLER, Die Wirtschaftsverfassung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft im Wandel. Von Rom nach Maastricht, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1998, p.39. 7. L. WARLOUZET, op.cit., pp.183 f.; idem: Europe de la concurrence et politique industrielle communautaire. La naissance d’une opposition au sein de la CEE dans les années 1960, in: La politique de la concurrence communautaire: origines et développements (années 1930-années 1990), n° spé- cial de la revue Histoire, Économie et Société, 1(2008), pp.47-62, 57 f. 8. The ECSC failed to implement an effective competition policy. Nevertheless this experience shaped competition policy in the EEC as there was a continuity of some of the key actors: Hans von der Groeben was head of the department for the Schuman-Plan within the German Ministry of Economics, or Ernst Albrecht, the head of von der Groeben’s cabinet in the EEC, was the German attaché in the ECSC. Many key actors of European competition policy were influenced by US antitrust law and policy such as Walter Hallstein who had been a prisoner of war in the US after the Second World War and later cultivated his contacts to American universities. B. LEUCHT, K. SEIDEL, Du Traité de Paris au règlement 17/1962, in: La politique de la concurrence communautaire: origines et déve- loppements (années 1930-années 1990), in: Histoire, Economie & Société, 1(2008), op.cit., pp.35-46, here p.43 f.). 240 Sibylle HAMBLOCH

“in which single economical plannings are coordinated by the markets, prices are determined by supply and demand and the freedom of profession and the free access to the markets are guaranteed”.9 Thus, it was von der Groeben’s aim to create a holistic European competition regime (“Wettbewerbsordnung”) or economic constitution (“Wirtschaftsordnung”) in accordance with the relevant ordoliberal concepts. At the time, jurisprudential circles also supported the view that the constitution of the EEC should be founded on market and competition economy.10 Provisions were intended to prevent the restriction or dis- tortion of competition because the abolition of trade barriers only had a short-term horizon. For the European Commission, competition was not an end in itself, but an instrument which could be used to achieve specific goals: faster growth, better use of the factors of production and faster progress towards the national economies’ integration in the EEC. Competition would provide the basis for “a distribution of in- comes and assets, to be amended by an effective social and income policy which matches the requirements of social justice”.11 In addition to these economic and social reasons, the political meaning of competition as a guarantor for a high degree of personal freedom for all market participants was a major motif. The aim of the EEC Commission’s competition policy was not to put a certain economic model into practice – for example one of “perfect competition” – but to achieve a pragmatically-oriented workable competition.12 Hans von der Groeben defined the term “practical workable competition” in line with the Commission’s conception as the possibility to reflect changes of supply and demand by means of price changes. Workable competition on an individual basis also implied the opportunity of free market access. Members of von der Groeben’s cabinet argued that the EEC Treaty largely complied with neoliberal thoughts, in particular articles 85 and 86 which contained the antitrust provisions and the prohibition of the misuse of a market dominating position. The ambition of the common competition policy was not to

9. English translation by S. HAMBLOCH, H.v.d. GROEBEN, Deutschland und Europa in einem unruhigen Jahrhundert. Erlebnisse und Betrachtungen von Hans von der Groeben, Nomos, Baden- Baden, 1995, p.343. 10. The question has yet to be answered whether the assumption that the EEC was based on a market economy order had the effect of a quiet constitutional change, i.e. competition and market economy as an order system gradually became constitutional law. M. SEIDEL, Die Europäische Union und Wettbewerb, in: N. HORN, J.F. BAUR, K. STERN (eds.), 40 Jahre Römische Verträge – Von der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft zur Europäischen Union, Gruyter-Verlag, Berlin, 1998, pp. 287-305, here pp.289 f. 11. English translation by S. HAMBLOCH, H.v.d. GROEBEN, Die Wettbewerbspolitik als Teil der Wirtschaftspolitik im Gemeinsamen Markt, in: Idem., Europa. Plan und Wirklichkeit. Reden – Be- richte – Aufsätze zur europäischen Politik, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1967, pp.193-213, here p.210. 12. At a conference of the List Gesellschaft on 7th June 1963, Hans Constantin Boden stated that “ideal competition” only existed in theory which since has become known by the term “workable competition”. A monistic market economy system and complete freedom of trade had never existed. E. SALIN, I. Einführung. Planung – Der Begriff, seine Bedeutung, seine Geschichte, in: A. PLITZKO (ed.), Planung ohne Planwirtschaft. Frankfurter Gespräch der List Gesellschaft. 7.-9. Juni 1963, Kyklos Verlag, Tübingen, 1964, pp.2-11, here p.9. EEC Competition Policy in the Early Phase of European Integration 241 unleash a “bellum omnium contra omnes” but to set legal norms and put them into practice, thus allowing a workable competition and establishing preventative measures against unfair competition. Conceived as an option and freedom of choice, competition ensured – dialectically, as it were – the principle of equal opportunity. Consequently, it had a societal and socially integrative effect because these rules and regulations on competition ensured both an economic and a social order.13 In summary, the DG IV based its decisions on an elaborate theoretical conception. The European “Wettbewerbsordnung” served as a leitmotif for von der Groeben’s staff at the DG IV and his personal cabinet. On this basis, the DG IV developed a distinct administrative culture and elite within the EEC bureaucracy.14 This was a stark contrast to the High Authority of the ECSC, which was oriented towards Ger- many and France’s national interests. These interests virtually served as the High Authority’s informal mandate, and no attempt was made to fix and follow a conception with defined rules and criteria designed to execute its antitrust competences.15 Moreover, until the creation of the EEC most European countries lacked experience with competition legislation.

EEC competition policy – decisions during the 1960s

1. Cartel law

Based on the aforementioned theoretical conception and on the provisions of the EEC Treaty (articles 85-89), the DG IV sought to shape cartel law in accordance with article 87. It put the Council of Ministers in charge of enacting rules concerning the misuse of cartels and market dominating positions.16 Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty forbade all agreements between companies as well as mergers affecting the trade between member states, which aimed at or would lead to a hindrance, constraint or falsification of competition within the common market.17 Until the Council of Ministers passed a regulation, the national cartel offices were responsible for policing the application of the EEC Treaty’s anti-cartel clauses by the member states. In the late 1950s, there were considerable differences between national cartel laws and institutions. At the time Italy, Belgium and Luxembourg did not even have national cartel offices. In France, competition policy was only of secondary importance within a whole array of economic instruments. The French au-

13. H.v.d. GROEBEN, Die Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft als Motor der gesellschaftlichen und politischen Integration, Kyklos Verlag, Tübingen, 1970, p.12. 14. For the emergence of European elites using the example of competition and agricultural policy within the EEC see: The Process of Politics in Europe …, op.cit., pp.162 f. 15. T. WITSCHKE, op.cit., pp.339 f. 16. For this chapter see S. HAMBLOCH, Europäische Wettbewerbspolitik …, op.cit., pp.79 f. 17. See Article 85 and 86, Treaty establishing the European Economic Community and connected documents, Publishing Services of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1957. 242 Sibylle HAMBLOCH thorities entrusted with the execution of anti-cartel clauses were lacking staff resources and competences. In the Netherlands, cartels were seen as having the benefit of creating a certain order. They had to be applied for, but were only forbidden in case of a misuse of market power (principle of misuse). By contrast, in Germany the activities of the Federal Cartel Office were regulated by the Act Against Restraints of Competition (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen GWB) since 1958. From the outset, the DG IV assumed the leadership role envisaged by the Treaties of Rome in elaborating an EEC competition policy, and involved technical and professional experts in the decision-making process. To optimise the process, the DG IV collaborated closely with the competent officials in the member states’ authorities. As early as October 1958, the Commission wrote to the governments of Belgium, Italy and Luxembourg to put the issue on the member states’ agenda, with the intention to accelerate the enactment of procedural provisions and the creation of competent authorities. The EEC countries with existing cartel authorities invoked the principles of equal treatment and reciprocity in imposing bans. They were reluctant to take action against cartels and market dominating positions in accordance with articles 85 and 86 as long as there was no guarantee all other EEC member states would follow suit. While drafting a proposal for the Council of Ministers, the Commission discussed the relevant issues with representatives of the national administrations, academic institutions, trade unions and employer associations. As early as 1958 the European Commission established cartel conferences to ensure all member states pursued a consistent cartel policy. These conferences were attended by cartel experts sent by the member states’ governments, with Hans von der Groeben as their president. Ad- ditionally, specific subject areas were covered by work groups. These measures were important as they provided a forum for both national cartel experts and European institutions to communicate and coordinate their activities. They were supposed to help prevent unequal treatment of cartels and market dominating positions which covered several member states. The German representatives in particular, namely the President of the Federal Cartel Office, advocated the use of standardised administrative procedures by all national competition bodies in accordance with articles 85 and 86 as well as the harmonisation of national competition laws. He also called for the reconciliation of competition policies in the broader sense, i.e. fiscal and social policies, trade and company law and economic stabilisation policies. During the policy formulation process the cartel conferences also played a crucial role in helping the Commission and the member states’ cartel experts elaborate Regulation 17/62. Fun- damentally different opinions became apparent, resulting primarily from the member states’ different national legislations and traditions. The following questions were controversial: did the articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty have the character of a program, of authorisation norms or immediately applicable legal provisions? Should the cartel ban be applied by legal exemption, i.e. companies could act at their own risk without prior authorisation, or by a centralised authorisation system which would have to grant exemption from the general cartel EEC Competition Policy in the Early Phase of European Integration 243 ban in advance via an agency? Should the European Commission have the monopoly of granting exceptions from the general cartel ban? The Commission proposed a centralised monitoring system which provided that, in order to qualify for an exemption of the general cartel ban, any agreement liable to restrict and affect trade between member states would have to be notified to the European Commission. This concept was supported by the President of the German Federal Cartel Office and the European Parliament’s Internal Market Committee with its German rapporteur Arved Deringer who actively tried to win over the reluctant governments. However, France was not willing to give up the power to authorise exemptions from the general cartel ban to a European supranational institution. The two positions reflected different national traditions and systems: even though both Germany and France’s cartel policies were based on the “general cartel ban” model, there were major differences in their respective legal provisions and their execution. In Germany, exemptions from the cartel ban had to be authorised by the Bundeskar- tellamt (prior authorisation for exemption system). In France, only certain types of mergers had to be notified (legal exemption system). The Bundeskartellamt’s decisions were legally binding, whereas the “bilan économique” of the French Commis- sion Technique des Ententes served as a recommendation for the Minister of Eco- nomic Affairs. The decisive factor for the French government’s reluctance to accept the German concept was the fear to irrevocably lose national sovereignty to a supranational institution. The European Commission intended to complete the draft provisions relating to articles 85 and 86 by 1st January 1961, the deadline by which a unanimous vote in the Council of Ministers was required in accordance with article 87 of the EEC Treaty. A unanimous vote promised to gain wider acceptance for the European competition order in the member states. If the provisions were not adopted within this time, a qualified majority vote would be sufficient. In the early days of the EEC, no routines had yet been established for agenda- setting in the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee. Instead, the EEC Treaty’s theoretical conception had to be put into practice first. The proposal was forwarded to the Council of Ministers on 31st October 1960 by Walter Hallstein, the Commission’s President. It included the explicit request to be presented to the European Parliament for consultation before the Council of Ministers formed its own opinion. The President of the Economic and Social Com- mittee had also asked to be consulted by the Council before a decision was made, although the Treaty did not explicitly require the committee’s opinion in matters of competition policy. However, during the Council of Ministers’ first exchange of views on 29th November 1960, the members did not only debate the contents of Regulation 17/62. They also argued whether the Council should draft its own opinion on the matter before the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee were consulted. In early December the Commission prevailed, and the proposal was sent directly to the European Parliament without the Council’s opinion. For von der 244 Sibylle HAMBLOCH

Groeben, this was a “significant success for the development of the integration”18 as the Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee’s opinions were supposed to contribute to the opinion-making process in the Council of Ministers. Had the procedure preferred by the Council been followed, it would have significantly im- paired the Commission’s role as the Parliament’s partner. The policy formulation process took place in the European Parliament’s Internal Market Committee. The committee took the lead in debating the regulation proposal during eight sessions between 8th February and 11th July 1961.19 The differences of opinion within the Council and amongst the member states’ experts were known to the European Parliament before the consultation began. Therefore the Internal Market Committee’s rapporteur for competition regulation was asked to contact the competent bodies of the six member states and establish their opinions to enable the committee to compare them and find a compromise. The committee’s baseline was to establish the Commission’s competence and procedural rules. The first regulation was never intended to be a “final polished solution”, but “initial principles or initial rules”. It was supposed to get competition law “off the ground” as the common market increasingly opened up, cartel law in the six member states evolved in different directions and the legal uncertainty negatively impacted the attractiveness of the common market.20 The Internal Market Committee’s report on the First Implementing Regulation of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty was debated on 19th October 1961 and the regulation was passed by the European Parliament. The decisive sessions of the Council of Ministers took place in November and December 1961. In the end, France was ready to make concessions, after some of the French requirements for Regulation 17/62, for the common market regulations and the funding of the CAP had been met. Council Regulation 17/62 established that the Commission and the European Court of Justice had the final and binding authority on interpreting the regulation. An advisory committee of national experts for cartel and monopoly issues was established. This committee had to be consulted prior to each decision of the European Commission and was a concession to the French who wished to implement an intergovernmental voice within the supranational system. In addition, block exemptions for certain groups of contracts were introduced in order to help process the large number of applications for negative clearance, a certificate stating that a contract was compatible with article 85 paragraph 3 of the EEC Treaty. In the Council of Ministers’ meetings on 29th and 30th December 1961 and on 6th February 1962 the implementing regulation in accordance with article 87 of the EEC Treaty (the so-called “cartel regulation” or Regulation 17)21 was passed unanimously, although a qualified majority would have been sufficient. The regulation was a com-

18. H.v.d. GROEBEN, Aufbaujahre der Europäischen Gemeinschaft. Das Ringen um den Gemeinsa- men Markt und die Politische Union (1958-1966), Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1982, p.158. 19. The Committees for Energy Policy, Transport and Agriculture as well as the Social Committee provided their opinions. 20. R. SCHULZE, T. HOEREN (Hrsg.), Dokumente zum Europäischen Recht, Bd.3: Kartellrecht (bis 1957), Springer, Berlin/Heidelberg, 2000, p.499. 21. Amtsblatt 13, 21.02.1962, p.204. EEC Competition Policy in the Early Phase of European Integration 245 promise between different legal and economic concepts which paved the way for the transition to the second phase of the common market at the end of 1961. The result of this decision-making process largely represented the ideas of the German Commissioner for competition policy and was supported by the legislation of the European Court of Justice in the following years. Based on some precedents, the Court’s decisions confirmed the Commission’s previous interpretations and thus created secondary community law. An example is the Court’s judgment in the Con- tinental Can case (case 6-72) in 1972, which confirmed the Commission’s opinion that a company holding a market dominating position may unduly confine the con- sumer’s choice.22 Thus the Court created the basis for merger control, laid down by an EC regulation in 1989.23 In the Walt Wilhelm case (case 14-68),24 the European Court of Justice gave community law precedence over national legislation, i.e. national law was inapplicable if it contravened community law. The decision in this competition case set a precedent for the general supremacy of community law over national law. The provisions of the EEC Treaty on common transport policy did not include explicit regulations on the application of competition rules. This led to differences of opinion between the European Commission on the one hand and the representatives of the national transport ministries and administrations on the other hand.25 In article 75 of the EEC Treaty the Council was charged with laying down all appropriate rules for the implementation of a common transport policy. In 1962, the Council declared that, on the basis of article 87, Regulation 17/62 was not applicable to transport companies until 30th June 1968.26 Although several regulations had been passed to ensure the application of EEC competition rules to the agricultural and transport sectors, they did not cover all areas and, in the case of agriculture, allowed for extensive exceptions. In summary, Regulation 17/62 represented a regulation at a high level on the basis of the DG IV’s “Wettbewerbsordnung”. It could only be established because the European Commission assumed a leadership role and the European Parliament had a strong impact on the decision-making process. Through the cartel conferences, experts in national and supranational cartels were involved, as were different stakeholders. The process resulted in a compromise consisting of a European supranational cartel law in accordance with the German paradigm (legislative eclecticism) and the

22. European Court, Case 6-72, Continental Can (Euroemballage Corporation und Continental Can Company Inc. versus European Commission), Judgement dated 21st February 1973, European Court Reports 1973, p.215. 23. Regulation 4064/89, 21.12.1989, in: Amtsblatt L 395, 30.12.1989, p.13. 24. European Court, Case 14-68, (Walt Wilhelm versus inter alia Bundeskartellamt), Judgement dated 13th February 1969, European Court Reports 1969, p1. 25. G. AMBROSIUS, C. HENRICH-FRANKE, Alte Pfade und neue Wege der Integration – das Bei- spiel der Infrastrukturen in Europa, in: Historische Sozialforschung, 4(2007), pp.275-304, here p. 295 f. 26. Amtsblatt 124, 28.11.1962, p.2751, supplemented by: Regulation 165/65, 9.12.1965, Amtsblatt 210, 11.12.1965, p.3141 and Regulation 1002/67, 14.12.1967, Amtsblatt 306, 16.12.1967, p.1. 246 Sibylle HAMBLOCH

French request for an intergovernmental consultation procedure among the member states (advisory committee of national experts for cartel and monopoly issues). Hence the initial hypothesis of this article has been verified. However, it is open to speculation whether the same result would have been possible without the successful prior implementation of the CAP.

2. European Company Law (Societas Europaea)

The EEC Treaty intended to achieve freedom of establishment for companies and to create an internal market by means of a uniform company law in all member states.27 The elimination of the barriers and distortions of competition caused by different national protection clauses was not sufficient in the case of a merger between companies from different member states. Such a merger was only possible in the form of a national company, and in practice it was often infeasible. At the time, there were no mergers, participations and subsidiaries under international or European law, but only under national law. The EEC Treaty did not explicitly make provisions for a European company law superposing national law and the creation of a Societas Eu- ropaea (SE). Therefore it was necessary to harmonise national law and/or to create intergovernmental conventions. After the inception of the EEC a discussion arose, in particular in jurisprudential circles, about the benefits of a European company, following the creation of several multinational companies in Europe such as the Scandinavian Airline System (SAS) in 1951. The six EEC member states had established different and some very complex national stock corporation laws, which were used as the starting point for developing the concept of a Societas Europaea. The member states’ national legislation and their reform projects in the 1960s had many parallels. In all of the countries, public companies were capital companies, with their capital divided into shares. They had a different status if national legislation made a distinction between commercial companies and non-commercial partnerships which impacted jurisdiction, material law and the legitimacy of bankruptcy. Besides, the specific provisions of the national laws differed, e.g. in terms of company establishment and entities, invoicing and group law. However, a Societas Europaea would have to meet the economic requirements at a European level if a European company was to be a viable alternative to the different national legal statuses. The regulations regarding the Societas Europaea were therefore not supposed to be a compromise or a list of all the solutions available in the national legislations, but a new sui generis legal status. It was the French government who submitted the proposal to the Council of Min- isters to establish a European company law by an intergovernmental convention between the EEC member states. In 1965, an intergovernmental study group put in charge by the Council of Ministers and a group of academics appointed by the Euro-

27. For this chapter see S. HAMBLOCH, Europäische Wettbewerbspolitik …, op.cit., pp.272 f. EEC Competition Policy in the Early Phase of European Integration 247 pean Commission started to discuss the pertinent issues. The following questions were controversial: is there a need for an SE at all, and what would be the benefits? Should the decision-making process have a supranational (EEC regulation or directive) or an intergovernmental character (intergovernmental convention)? How would specifics such as employee representation and participation or tax treatment be organised? In the first years, the negotiations focused on the question who should be in charge of the SE statute’s technical preparation. During the problem definition phase, it was not clear what the European Commission’s competences were in drafting an agreement between the EEC member states. In 1965, the Commission used its right of initiative and addressed a proposal to the Council to prepare a draft statute for a SE. This draft was designed to be used as a basis for the negotiation with the governments. The DG IV was to coordinate between the services and experts involved. Thus the issue appeared on the European Commission’s agenda. Based on the study groups’ research, the Commission and the experts came to the following conclusion: the instruments provided in the EEC Treaty were not sufficient to eliminate the artificial barriers to international mergers caused by the territorial limitations of national company law. The Commission recognised that both governmental and industrial entities in the six member states had a need for a European partnership. The transformation into European partnerships and their re-establishment were to promote the freedom of establishment for companies and thus free trade, and to facilitate access to capital markets. The aim was “to contribute to a better use and distribution of the factors of production in the common market and to improve the competitiveness of European industry”.28 Based on this information, the DG IV tried to convince supranational and national industry associations such as the Union des Industries de la Communauté Européen- ne (UNICE) and the German Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie e.V. (BDI), and thus individual companies, that a European company would be beneficial. The negotiations at the time also focused on the question whether the Commission or the member states should be responsible for elaborating a statute. Ultimately, the question was whether the decision-making process should be supranational or intergovernmental. The answer to this question would anticipate the form of the statute: either community law in the form of a regulation or directive, or an intergovernmental convention in the form of an agreement. As early as 1965, the DG IV developed the idea of drafting a statute for a Societas Europaea based on directly applicable community law. Their aim in doing so was for the European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee to be consulted, and to establish a direct remit for the Com- mission and the European Court of Justice. The Directorate General for Competition

28. I. SCHWARTZ, Die europäische Handelsgesellschaft (unpublished manuscript), January 1967, p. 5. 248 Sibylle HAMBLOCH based its line of argument on article 235 of the EEC Treaty.29 The idea originated from Ivo Schwartz, a member of von der Groeben’s cabinet at the time, and became the Commissioner’s prevalent opinion. In April 1966, the Commission forwarded a memorandum to the Council, and a year later a draft statute of a SE followed, including 200 articles forming the basis for discussion and information. All member states were to be bound by a treaty to incorporate a uniform law (“loi uniforme”) regarding the Societas Europaea in their domestic legislation. The Commission’s preferred type of SE was modelled on the legal status of a public company which was known in all EEC member states. Among others it had the following benefits: (i) it was likely to be chosen by companies with an international scope; (ii) it was well- suited to safeguard the interest of third parties, and (iii) the disclosure requirement in national stock corporation laws had evolved furthest. As the discussions about which work group should be in charge of drafting the statute had come to a halt in the Council of Ministers’ Permanent Representatives Committee, the Commissioner in charge, Hans von der Groeben, chose to contact the competent Ministers in the member states in person. He asked for support in the Council, in order to put the Commission officially in charge of drafting a statute for a Societas Europaea. Germany and Luxembourg assured him of their support, and Italy promised further collaboration on technical matters, but expressed reservations regarding several unresolved preliminary questions primarily relating to the Italian regulation on issuing registered shares. France, Belgium and the Netherlands shifted the discussion to the national level. Employee representation within an SE was among the most controversial items, and the different treatment of this matter in the national legislations was the primary reason for the lengthy negotiation process. In the hearings of employers’ associations and trade unions only a small number of people voted against the Commission’s proposal of establishing a central European Works Council. The controversy arose because in Germany and France different employment law cultures were already in place, while Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands did not have any legislation. Workers’ representation was nevertheless a contentious issue in these countries. The German regime was the most sophisticated: most of the limited companies had been subject to legislation since the 1950s, containing a strong employee representation in particular for mining, iron and steel processing companies. There were efforts towards establishing employee participation regimes in French companies, converging on the German legislation, and also in the Netherlands and Belgium. However, the Permanent Representatives Committee failed to come to an agreement. This was primarily due to the obstructive stance of the Netherlands which wanted to involve the countries willing to join the EEC in equal measure in the in-

29. Article 235, EEC Treaty (1957): If any action by the Community appears necessary to achieve, in the functioning of the Common Market, one of the aims of the Community in cases where this Treaty has not provided for the requisite powers of action, the Council, acting by means of a unanimous vote on a proposal of the Commission and after the Assembly has been consulted, shall enact the appropriate provisions. See: Treaty establishing the European Economic Community …, op.cit. EEC Competition Policy in the Early Phase of European Integration 249 tergovernmental work on a European partnership outside of the EEC-Treaty. As a result, in 1969 the Commission decided to draft a statute itself. Some member states tried to delay a supranational solution by their continuing opposition. In 1970 the new DG for Internal Market and Legal Harmonisation (DG XIV), led by Commissioner Hans von der Groeben, submitted a proposal including a complete SE statute in accordance with article 235 of the EEC Treaty and an expert opinion to the Council of Ministers. It provided a European Works Council for all employees of the SE as an immediate representation of their interests. The Economic and Social Committee responded favourably to the proposal in principle, while the European Parliament’s Legal Committee thought the regulation not attractive enough for companies to opt for a Societas Europaea. The proposal included the dualistic German system, separating the management into a board of managers and a supervisory board led by a European Works Council. Directly elected by all employees of the SE, the latter was to have tiered rights with regard to involvement in economic and social matters relating to employees, while the works councils elected in accordance with national legislations were to remain in place.30 The legislation concerning employee representation in an SE caused heated debates both among the employees and employers’ associations. All trade unions responded positively to the Commission’s proposal of establishing a European Works Council, including the Confédération Générale du Travail (CGT) in France and the Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL) in Italy. Employee participation in the supervisory board was discussed controversially: the CGIL was against any form of employee participation in the corporate bodies because it disapproved of joint responsibility. It was feared that if the trade unions assumed joint responsibility with the management of a company it would neglect its original remit to improve employees’ living and working conditions. The European Trade Union Confederation and the Christian Trade Unions in the European countries generally advocated employee participation in the supervisory board. The Christian Trade Unions voted for participation in equal parts, and the European Trade Union Confederation for a tri- partite division into representatives of shareholders, employees and “representatives of general interest”, because the activities of an SE would have a strong impact on the whole economy. By contrast, the employers fought against employee participation in the management, as they feared for their autonomy in decision-making. They argued that employee participation would lead to dispossession and was not compatible with a liberal economy. It would distort the policy of negotiated wages and entrust individuals with competences they were not qualified for. The employers feared the interference of the trade unions. On this account the employers’ interest groups did not want to link social issues with the SE statute. The relationship between employers and employees was not an issue of company law but of employment law. The Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe and the International Chamber of Com-

30. Vorschlag einer Verordnung (EWG) des Rates über das Statut für europäische Aktiengesellschaften (Schriftstück KOM (70) 150 endg.), in: Amtsblatt C 124/1, 10.10.1970, pp.1 f. 250 Sibylle HAMBLOCH merce concluded that the employees’ interests had to be subject to special provisions and should not be included in the SE statute, with the option to adopt them simultaneously. The German and Dutch employers rejected any employee participation beyond one third. The ambitions of the European Commission to harmonise company law in accordance with the sophisticated German prototype failed in the period under consideration. Due to a large number of comments and modification proposals by the different interest groups, in 1975 the Commission submitted a completely revised proposal to the Council of Ministers, who nevertheless failed to come to a decision on the unresolved items.31 A regulation at a high level was not achieved since only four of the five above- mentioned preconditions were met: (i) a clear competition conception by the DG IV existed and was applied to European company law; (ii) the supranational actors (European Commission and European Parliament) in general and the European Com- mission as a process leader in particular used their influence on the decision-making process. The latter proactively assumed leadership without an official mandate from the EEC Treaty and tried to influence the decision-making process in favour of a supranational conception. However, its efforts remained unsuccessful in terms of a supranational regulation and/or directive in the period under consideration. (iii) The recommendations of different stakeholders within the European industry and trade unions as well as (iv) expert opinions were integrated into the decision-making process. European company law failed because the member states were not willing to accept employee participation in accordance with the German model. The differences between the stakeholders, trade unions and employers’ associations could not be reconciled. Therefore (v) a compromise between different legislative and economic conceptions (legislative eclecticism) and ideas could not be reached. This case illustrates that national and international pressure groups had a considerable influence. Once involved in the debate about the SE, they were ambitious not only to retain their power on a national level, but also to increase their influence on the European level. Thus in the period under consideration the Commission did not succeed in reaching a compromise on the basis of national legislations and traditions. Finally, the idea of establishing a European company law based on the “general authorisation article of the EEC” (235), was not enforced until a regulation was passed thirty years later on 8th October 2004.32

31. Bulletin der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, Nr. 4, Brüssel 1975; Kommission der Europäischen Ge- meinschaften, Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer und Struktur der Gesellschaften, in: Bulletin der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, Nr. 8, Brüssel 1975, also in: ACDP, 1-659, 020. 32. Regulation 2157/2001 for the statute of a Societas Europaea, and Directive 2001/86 EG as a sup- plement to the statute of a Societas Europaea, in: Amtsblatt L 294, 10.11.2001, pp.1 and 22; G. MANZ, B. MAYER, A. SCHRÖDER (ed.), Europäische Aktiengesellschaft SE, Nomos, Baden- Baden, 2005, pp.23 f. EEC Competition Policy in the Early Phase of European Integration 251

EEC competition policy – an example of successful European integration?

In summary, Regulation 17/62 and the decision in the Continental Can case, by way of which the Commission, supported by the European Court of Justice, applied article 86 of the EEC Treaty to companies in a market dominating position, were regulations at a high level. With Regulation 17, principles of the primary European community law were applied and implemented. The list of reasons for the success or failure of regulations at a high level given in this paper is far from exhaustive, all reasons having the character of theses relating to the two cases discussed. The decisions were based on multiple factors, and the decision procedures are therefore nondeterministic. First a concept was developed of how the European competition order should operate and then political decisions were made. Regulation 17/62 was passed because the supranational actors, i.e. the Euro- pean Commission and the European Parliament, used their influence on decision- making procedures. The European Commission in particular strategically deployed its leadership in the policy formulation process in order to enforce regulations on a European level. Interpreting article 86 as merger control, the European Court of Jus- tice supported the Commission in advancing a centralised control of mergers in the EC. Organised stakeholder groups such as representatives of the European industry and trade unions were involved in the formulation process, and the elaboration of proposals was monitored and shaped by academic advisors and experts. Finally, Regulation 17/62 embodied a compromise of different legislative and economic conceptions. The approaches and philosophies of different member states could be integrated (legislative eclecticism).33 The European Commission did not complete or even pass legislative acts in the area of European company law. A successful outcome in the period of consideration was prevented by different governmental traditions and opinions, various stakeholder groups and the Council of Ministers. Nevertheless the Commission’s efforts to create European law in these areas in the 1960s paved the way towards a deeper integration in the decades to follow. As for competition policy, the Commission made use of its right of initiative, powers of draft legislation and arbitration in the legislative process – and yet, the final decisions were made during the Council of Ministers’ intergovernmental meetings.34

33. In order to achieve valid test results on the probability of a regulation being passed on a high level, a large number of cases should be reviewed on the basis of hypotheses correlating the dependent with the independent variables. For further determinants of a regulation see: V. EICHENER, Das Entscheidungssystem der Europäischen Union. Institutionelle Analyse und demokratietheoretische Bewertung, Leske & Budrich, Opladen, 2000, pp.323 f. 34. Analysing EEC competition policy and the genesis of Regulation 17/62 from an intergovernmental perspective, Frank Pitzer came to a similar conclusion. F. PITZER, op.cit., 2009, pp.444 f. EU Kommissare

Albrecht Rothacher

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De Gaulle finds his “Master”. Gerhard Schröder’s “Fairly Audacious Politics” in the European Crisis of 1965–66

Philip BAJON

This article discusses the European politics of the Federal Republic of Germany in the context of the empty chair crisis of 1965-66. The global financial crisis since 2007 and the dramatic financial situation of member states such as Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain have strained solidarity and aggravated existing tensions within the Euro- pean Union (EU). In these times of crisis, the sovereignty of member states is up to debate again and member state governments show an increasing national reflex. The crisis thus crystallises the conflict between communitarian and re-nationalisation trends in EU and member state politics. In a contemporary historical perspective, we observe the same basic conflict when analysing the major constitutional crisis in the history of the European Communities (EC).1 The so-called empty chair crisis of the European Economic Community (EEC) occurred after a serious disagreement between the European Commission, France and its EEC partners over the financing of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) during 1965–70. In its spectacular proposals of March 1965, the Commission had linked a CAP financing to a strengthening of EEC supranationality. It had proposed to create a European budget and to give the European Parliament (EP) a crucial role in the budgetary procedure. France’s EEC partners supported these proposals partly by heart, partly for tactical reasons. Provoked by the Commission, annoyed by the partners’ quid pro quo politics and encouraged by his geopolitical vision of an intergovernmental European cooperation, Charles de Gaulle started a boycott of the EEC at the beginning of July 1965. During his press conference of 9 September 1965, the general made clear that the ambitious Commission had to be disciplined and that a veto-right had to be established in the Council of Ministers to underline the sovereignty of member-states. France’s partners resisted the French politics of the empty chair, refused any modification of the EEC institutions or procedures and invited the French government to an extraordinary Council session to discuss these political matters. It was only after de Gaulle’s re-election as President of the French Republic in De- cember 1965 that the French government accepted this invitation. At the Luxembourg conferences in January 1966, France unilaterally declared that unanimous decisions were obligatory when “very important national interests” were concerned, whereas its partners maintained that voting was possible. After France’s return to the EEC in February 1966, Community work was resumed and a package deal over agricultural financing negotiated. However, “Luxembourg” became the lock-in point of a combined consensus/veto-culture, which characterised the decision-making of the EC for

1. This article is based on my PhD/postdoc research and was written during my Jean Monnet Fellowship at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies of the European University Institute in San Domenico di Fiesole. I am grateful to Professor Stefano Bartolini and Professor Kiran Klaus Patel for their advice and support. 254 Philip BAJON almost two decades. Nevertheless, the empty chair crisis is widely acknowledged as an experience of catharsis, consolidating the EC and preparing them for the institutional reforms of the 1990s.2 This article focuses on the French-German power struggle inherent in this major constitutional crisis of European integration. More specifically, it analyses the Euro- pean politics of the Federal Republic and in particular the role of Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder. Taking into account the complexity and interactions between national and supranational diplomacy in the “hybrid system of the EEC” (N. Piers Lud- low), the article explains why the Federal Republic could not prevent France from provoking the crisis, why Schröder was predestined to become de Gaulle’s rival in terms of power politics and how the Foreign Minister dominated the crisis management and outcome of the struggle. Without denying the importance of other EEC members like Italy and Belgium or the complexity and contradictions of Federal European policy, Schröder can be identified as the focal point of resistance against de Gaulle’s empty chair campaign. The empty chair crisis was meticulously researched and controversially evaluated. The same applies to the Federal Republic’s European policy and the political biography of Gerhard Schröder.3 However, Schröder’s bargaining in Brussels was mainly analysed in a national and biographical context without sufficiently highlighting his importance for the evolution of the empty chair crisis. As a result, Schröder’s Euro- pean policy and the French-German power struggle as part of the empty chair episode were widely underestimated. Based on new national and supranational archival evidence, the empirical analysis of this article addresses these deficiencies and demonstrates how the Federal Republic assumed the leadership role in the management and overcoming of the crisis.4 Therefore, this article does not serve as a biographical approach to the empty chair crisis or as a “men making history” perspective on supranational diplomacy. Rather, it underlines that the European strategies of indi-

2. J.-M. PALAYRET, H. WALLACE, P. WINAND (eds.), Visions, Votes and Vetoes. The Empty Chair Crisis and the Luxembourg Compromise Forty Years On, Peter Lang, Brussels, 2006; N.P. LUD- LOW, The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s. Negotiating the Gaullist challenge, Routledge, London, 2006; W. LOTH, Crises and Compromises. The European Project 1963-1969, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2001; J. NEWHOUSE, Collision in Brussels: the Common Market Crisis of 30 June 1965, Norton, New York, 1967; M. CAMPS, European Unification in the Sixties. From the Veto to the Crisis, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1966. 3. H. TÜRK, „To Face de Gaulle as a Community”: The Role of the Federal Republic of Germany during the Empty Chair Crisis, in: J.-M. PALAYRET, H. WALLACE, P. WINAND (eds.), Visions, Votes and Vetoes …, op.cit., pp.113-127; T. OPPELLAND, Gerhard Schröder (1910-1989). Politik zwischen Staat, Partei und Konfession, Droste, Düsseldorf, 2002; T. OPPELLAND, “Entangling Alliances With None” – Neither de Gaulle Nor Hallstein. The European Politics of Gerhard Schröder in the 1965/66 Crisis, in: W.LOTH, Crises and Compromises …, op.cit., pp. 227-243; U. LAPPEN- KÜPER, Ein Europa der Freien und der Gleichen. La politique européenne de Ludwig Erhard (1963-1966), in: W. LOTH, Crises and Compromises …, op.cit., pp.65-91. 4. Sources mainly come from the Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Berlin (PAAA), Archiv des Deutschen Bundestages, Berlin (ADBT), Archiv für Christlich-Demokratische Politik der Konrad Adenauer Stiftung Sankt Augustin (ACDP) and the French Archives Nationales (AN) and Archives Diplomatiques des Affaires étrangères, Paris (MAE). Gerhard Schröder's "Fairly Audacious Politics" in the European Crisis of 1965-66 255 vidual actors like Schröder were embedded in a broad political context and demonstrates how the ideological preferences that Schröder shared with de Gaulle decisively influenced his negotiating style and objectives. Thus, this article advocates a revised and more nuanced understanding of the “checks and balances” of the empty chair power play and in particular of the mechanisms of French-German rivalry and cooperation.

1. Framework Conditions: The Burdens of Federal European Policy in 1965

Four closely interconnected and complex problems dominated Federal European policy in 1965 and strictly limited the manoeuvring scope of German diplomats and politicians on the European level rather than allowing for a flexible and pragmatic negotiating style. These problems were a crucial part of the power struggle between France and Germany and explain why the Federal Republic was unable to prevent the French government from provoking the major constitutional crisis in the history of the EEC. Thus, they are the Federal Republic’s responsibility in the outbreak of the crisis. First, the German philosophy of “synchronised progress” within the EEC had become the leitmotif of Germany’s European policy and the central element of its negotiating tactics. When the common price for cereals – widely acknowledged as the cornerstone of the CAP – was agreed upon in December 1964, this crucial decision accentuated the one-sided (agricultural) progress of the EEC during the preceding years, the poor economic benefit of member-states like Italy and Germany, as well as the overall lack of a European Political Union. Since the agricultural marathon negotiations of December 1961 and January 1962, the CAP had made very good progress, while non-agricultural fields of integration had threatened to stagnate. France in particular had benefitted enormously from the CAP and had been able to dominate the agenda of the EEC. However, when de Gaulle had provoked his partners by unilaterally refusing British entry into the EEC at the beginning of 1963, Schröder had countered by presenting an EEC “work program”, which strictly demanded “synchronised progress” in non-agricultural fields such as the customs union, the fusion of the executive institutions, the EP strengthening and the GATT negotiations for tariff reduction. The Federal government’s insistence on parallel progress, its rejection of anticipated concessions and its expectation that German concessions of the past were reciprocated added an element of extreme distrust and rigidity to the EEC negotiations of 1964-1965. Schröder refused an “isolated” agricultural financing, as wished for by France, and would only allow for a global arrangement securing parallel progress. This clash of incompatible French-German interests played a major role in 256 Philip BAJON the outbreak, management and solution of the empty chair crisis, as will be demonstrated below.5 Second, the year 1965 was a year of parliamentary elections in the Federal Re- public. Long before the voting actually took place, the strategies of state- and non- state political actors were dominated by electoral considerations. Schröder in particular was attacked for his atlanticist foreign policy by former Chancellor Konrad Ade- nauer and by political rivals both within the government and in the opposition parties, demanding his replacement after the following elections. Schröder reacted tactically: Though being naturally critical of EEC supranationality and of European Political Union, he adopted a Europeanist stance to thwart the arguments of his political ad- versaries and to secure his reappointment as Foreign Minister. He cultivated a “fervent European” image by defending the EEC against de Gaulle’s nationalism, un- derlining German sacrifices to France, welcoming the supranational Commission proposals of March 1965, demanding renewed efforts for a European Political Union and supporting the EP strengthening. However, this artificial European label prevented him from negotiating flexibly with the French, who strictly opposed EEC supranationality. Thus, crucial misunderstandings over the EP strengthening occurred in the French-German negotiations prior to the outbreak of the crisis and were central to the eventual breakdown of the negotiations. Schröder’s tactical approach to EEC supranationality remained a characteristic of his policy throughout the crisis, as will be demonstrated below.6 Third, closely connected with “synchronised progress” and electoral considerations were German plans for a revival of the European Political Union, as suggested by the Federal government in its proposals of 4 November 1964. What the EP strengthening meant for Schröder, the Political Union signified for Chancellor Lud- wig Erhard: a prestigious political project that Erhard wanted to have his name at- tached to in order to strengthen his pro-European profile well before the elections. He ignored the fact that no EEC partner had a serious interest in renewed efforts for Political Union and that the project was thus dead long before any attempt for revival. Schröder even warned Erhard that the project stood no chance. What followed was a series of French-German “insults and injuries”: After Erhard was convinced to have received de Gaulle’s “oui” at the Rambouillet conference in January 1965, the general cancelled the envisaged Venice conference and made Political Union dependent on an agricultural agreement. Even Paul-Henri Spaak now believed that de Gaulle “was fooling Erhard”. Though having been humiliated by the general, Erhard acted against any political rationality and maintained the idea of Political Union in the French-

5. For the imbalance of the EEC development see K.K. PATEL, Europäisierung wider Willen. Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland in der Agrarintegration der EWG 1955-1973, Oldenbourg, Munich, 2009, p.291; N.P. LUDLOW, Challenging French Leadership in Europe: Germany, Italy and the Netherlands and the Outbreak of the Empty Chair Crisis of 1965-1966, in: Contemporary European History, 2(1999), pp.233-244; for Schröder’s program of “synchronised progress”, see T. OPPEL- LAND, Gerhard Schröder …, op.cit., pp.548-550. 6. For Schröder’s artificial European label see T. OPPELLAND, Gerhard Schröder …, op.cit., pp. 627-633; T. OPPELLAND, “Entangling Alliances …”, op.cit., pp.237-238. Gerhard Schröder's "Fairly Audacious Politics" in the European Crisis of 1965-66 257

German negotiations prior to the crisis. The Political Union quarrel appears as yet another symptom of the overall weakness of Chancellor Erhard who, despite of his “Richtlinienkompetenz”, was unable to formulate a clear European policy line and hardly managed to control the Agricultural Ministry and the Christian-Democrats’ coalition partner, the Liberal Democrats. As a result, the German European policy suffered from a “ministerial sectionalism”. This was the main reason why Schröder could seize almost full control of the Federal Republic’s European policy during the empty chair crisis, bypassing the Chancellor, competing ministries and cabinet colleagues.7 Fourth, the collapse of the “proven and tested” mechanisms of French-German compromise and accommodation was central to the outbreak of the empty chair crisis. On the part of the Federal government, this was mainly due to Schröder’s insistence on “synchronicity”, Erhard’s wishful thinking that a revival of Political Union was still feasible and the above-mentioned “sectionalism” within the Federal government. Throughout the first half of 1965, French-German expert consultations had suggested that a compromise over technical and political questions was possible between Paris and Bonn. When it came to official consultations on 11 and 12 June 1965 near Bonn, the promising negotiations suddenly ended in a disaster because the experts had overseen fundamental incompatibilities. The foreign policy officials Rolf Lahr and Olivier Wormser tried to undo the statesmen’s failure ten days later in Paris, but failed as well because they misunderstood each other and reported incorrectly to their governments.8 In the Council of Ministers in Brussels at the end of June 1965, the above preferences and constellations were added to an already explosive negotiating situation. While France insisted on an isolated agricultural financing and strongly opposed any consolidation of the supranational structures, its partners desired a larger arrangement and wanted to force the French government into a quid pro quo. The Commission on its part tried to play the game of supranational diplomacy and exploited the deadlock for tactical reasons. However, the overall evidence suggests that the general had wanted the EEC crisis “sooner or later” for geopolitical reasons and had instructed Maurice Couve de Murville to provoke the failure of the negotiations. Few days after the breakdown of the negotiations, the French representative retreated from the EEC and France declared the beginning of a boycott. However, only after the summer pause did de Gaulle and Couve spectacularly escalate the crisis by demanding the

7. For the Political Union plan see C. GERMOND, Les projets d’Union politique de l’année 1964, in: W. LOTH, Crises and Compromises …, op.cit., pp.109-130; H.v.d. GROEBEN, Aufbaujahre der Europäischen Gemeinschaft. Das Ringen um den Gemeinsamen Markt und die Politische Union (1958-1966), Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1982, p.242; for Schröder’s warning see Bundesarchiv Koblenz [BAK], B136 6408, Schröder to Erhard, 09.03.1965; for Spaak’s comment see Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1965, Oldenbourg, Munich, 1996, Doc.183, Telex Siegfried (Brussels) to Foreign Office (Bonn), 14.04.1965; for the “ministerial sectionalism” see K.K. PATEL, op.cit., pp.285-286 and 513. 8. P. BAJON, Europapolitik “am Abgrund”. Die Krise des “leeren Stuhls” 1965-66, Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, forthcoming 2012, pp.102-105. 258 Philip BAJON downgrading of the ambitious Commission and the abolition of voting when “vital interests” were concerned.9

2. “Why We Fight”: Schröder’s Mental Map

During the empty chair crisis, German Foreign Minister Schröder became the general’s principal opponent, building a coalition against France and decisively shaping the outcome of the crisis. This does not serve to deny Schröder’s obvious affinity to the political conception of general de Gaulle. On the contrary, the argument here is that this peculiar affinity was the critical element, which made Schröder particularly suitable for the role of de Gaulle’s rival in terms of power politics. The following paragraph thus discusses Schröder’s driving forces, hidden convictions and underlying preferences, as well as the framework conditions of his European policy during the crisis; in short: his mental map. First, the Foreign Minister and his collaborators understood the empty chair campaign as a fundamental challenge to the political status quo of West Europe, which they actively responded to. Generally, the German political establishment including Erhard and Schröder was eager to trivialise the situation. In their comments designed for public consumption, they repudiated a political or French-German crisis and pointed out that only an agenda-problem had slowed down the EEC negotiations. For Erhard, the crisis was “a little [technical] mishap”10 and he reassured Giuseppe Sara- gat “that de Gaulle’s daring venture should not be taken seriously, because already in 1964 the general has given up his plan of a Fouchet-styled “French Europe”.11 According to his “fervent European” label, Schröder rhetorically deescalated and displayed himself as a pragmatic and optimistic statesman and crisis-manager. His notes for interviews during those days clearly summed up his tactics: “No fuss, no drama, no threat, no counter-threat”.12 However, what was happening behind the stoic facade? Actually, there was confusion in the Federal government as to whether de Gaulle really sought a crisis over European integration or simply wanted to force his partners into an agricultural deal profitable for France. With an eye to the parliamentary elections, the Chancellery in particular wanted to avoid any talk about crisis and any controversy over European matters before the voting. In contrast, it was mainly

9. For the Council deadlock see N.P. LUDLOW, De-Commissioning the Empty Chair Crisis: The Community Institutions and the Crisis of 1965-66, in: J.-M. PALAYRET, H. WALLACE, P. WI- NAND (eds.), Visions, Votes and Vetoes …, op.cit., pp.86-89; for de Gaulle’s geopolitical considerations see e.g. A. PEYREFITTE, C’était de Gaulle, Gallimard, Paris, 2002; M. COUVE DE MUR- VILLE, Une politique étrangère, Plon, Paris, 1971; for the escalation by de Gaulle see C. DE GAULLE, Pour l’effort 1962-1965 (Discours et Messages IV), Plon, Paris, 1970, pp.372-392. 10. MAE, CE-DE, 1111, Telex 4171/75 Seydoux (Bonn) to MAE, 05.07.1965. 11. AAPD 1965, Doc.269, Meeting Erhard-Saragat, 07.07.1965, p.1124. 12. ACDP, Deposit Schröder, 01-483-142/1, notes for interview with Norddeutscher Rundfunk, without date. Gerhard Schröder's "Fairly Audacious Politics" in the European Crisis of 1965-66 259 in the Foreign Office that analysts understood as early as July 1965 that de Gaulle was not simply playing games and that a fierce confrontation over constitutional questions lay ahead. With this interpretation, the Foreign Office prepared for the struggle and underlined its leading position in formulating the Federal European policy.13 Second, Schröder’s understanding of European integration was close to the general’s European conception. He shared the Gaullist preferences in terms of sovereignty of the nation-states and agreed with de Gaulle that the governments remained the “Masters of the Treaty” controlling European integration. As a result, EEC supranationality and Commission ambitions had to be limited, and unanimity had to be the natural mode of EEC decision-making. Like de Gaulle, he rejected an evolution of the EEC towards more supranationalism as wished for by Walter Hallstein and stressed the need to “interpret” the Treaty provisions regarding majority voting pragmatically.14 Talking to US-Ambassador George McGhee about majority voting, Schröder’s language reflected his notion of sovereignty: “He could imagine a gentlemen’s agreement interpreting the relevant Treaty provisions in a politically reasonable way, because this is the only realistic proceeding not to bind sovereign nation-states by Brussels decisions against their will”.15 Despite of his “European” polish, he thus remained committed to a classical notion of state sovereignty. Thus, he was obliged to do a balancing act between his pre- election profile and his true political convictions. For example, while he pointed out to the German radio that “[t]he EEC is a creature, a creature which in many regards is independent of member-states […] and unfolds his own action and living and obliges member-states to act in a communitarian way”,16 he openly admitted before German MPs that “[t]he Community […] has no consistency going beyond the will of the member-states. This insight might surprise the one or the other”.17 In addition, from Schröder’s view, Gaullist policy was “much ado about nothing”. Though he generally acknowledged that de Gaulle’s foreign and European policy were grosso modo based on geopolitical considerations, he was convinced that the general’s impulsive and dramatic campaigns were carried out without a concrete

13. For the Federal government’s confusion see e.g. BAK, B136 2591, note by Praß: Vermerk für die Kabinettssitzung, 06.07.1965, p.3; R. LAHR, Zeuge von Fall und Aufstieg. Private Briefe 1934-1981, Knaus, Hamburg, 1981, p.428; for the Chancellery’s pre-election policy see in particular the analyses and correspondence of August 1965 in BAK, B136 2592 and H. OSTERHELD, Au- ßenpolitik unter Bundeskanzler Ludwig Erhard 1963-1966. Ein dokumentarischer Bericht aus dem Bundeskanzleramt, Droste, Düsseldorf, 1992, p.216; for the more stringent Foreign Office line see P.BAJON, op.cit., pp.246-249. 14. For Schröder’s overall European conception see T.OPPELLAND, Gerhard Schröder …, op.cit., pp. 635-636 and the below mentioned talks with US Ambassador George McGhee on 13 September and 9 December 1965. 15. AADP 1965, Doc.348, Meeting Schröder-McGhee, 13.09.1965, pp.1429-1430. 16. ACDP, Deposit Schröder, 01-483-142/1, Schröder on Deutsche Welle, 27.07.1965. 17. ADBT, 3104, 5th Legislative Period, Prot.2, p.9 [Foreign Affairs Committee of 8 December 1965, Schröder]. 260 Philip BAJON program of how to proceed and what precisely to achieve. From his perspective, all the eccentricity and caprice of Gaullist European politics could not disguise the fact that it was conventional power politics aiming at “less integration” and “French grandeur”. He was also convinced that de Gaulle tried to copy the “Kremlinology”, an astrological speculation about the aims and objectives of the Kremlin officials, and encourage a similar phenomenon in France, which Schröder sarcastically labelled the “Élyséeologie”.18 However, Schröder’s affinity with and pragmatic approach to Gaullist politics did not make him a friend of general de Gaulle but predestined him for the role of de Gaulle’s rival in terms of power politics. Because the French politics of the empty chair appeared to Schröder as “much ado about nothing”, as conventional “power struggle” and cold-blooded “war of nerves”, he was prepared to pursue a more ag- gressive policy towards France than Paul-Henri Spaak, Amintore Fanfani, Joseph Luns and Pierre Werner: Spaak, as “Père de l’Europe”, was too much personally “involved” and dependent on his Walloon electorate; Emilio Colombo could hardly compensate the confusion of Fanfani’s European policy as will be shown below; and Luns’ and Werner’s countries were too small to play the role of arbiter. In contrast, Schröder was prepared to crystallise standpoints, provoke controversies, unmask the French politics and take maximum advantage out of the legal situation, highly un- favourable to France. What de Gaulle and Couve regarded as their legitimate and long overdue attack on the malignant excrescences of a degenerated European Union process was an attack on the “soul” of the Community from Schröder’s view. He not only turned to European integration for electoral reasons, as demonstrated above, but he also defended the integrity of the EEC Treaty to “rescue the nation-state”,19 namely the Federal Republic. Schröder feared that the general’s victory in this power struggle would destroy EEC and NATO integration and establish a French hegemony in Western Europe. This interpretation of the empty chair politics was also shared by the German Commission president Hallstein and by the foreign policy experts of the Lyndon B. Johnson administration, who clearly signalled Schröder that the struggle with de Gaulle had crucial importance for the Federal Republic’s future. To hold the line against de Gaulle, the institutions and procedures of the EEC had to be defended and parallel progress had to be secured. Although a reinforcement of EEC supranationality did not seem opportune to Schröder during the 1960s, he acknowledged that the sheer possibility of such a reinforcement was an integral element of the EEC Treaty. This was why Schröder, though sympathising with de Gaulle’s highly critical attitude towards EEC supranationality, eventually stood by the Treaties, institutions, procedures and also the “human resources” of EEC integration.20

18. AADP 1965, Doc.348, Meeting Schröder-McGhee, 13.09.1965, p.1429; AADP 1965, Doc.452, Meeting Schröder-McGhee, 09.12.1965, p.1867. 19. In allusion to A.S. MILWARD, The European rescue of the nation-state, Routledge, London/New York, 2000. 20. For Schröder’s interpretation of the empty chair as a power struggle see P. BAJON, op.cit., pp. 260-267; for the attitude of the US elite see e.g. the analysis of General Director for External Re- lations Axel Herbst in PAAA, B1 214, Vermerk für Herrn Minister Rey […], 30.09.1965. Gerhard Schröder's "Fairly Audacious Politics" in the European Crisis of 1965-66 261

Third, Schröder has to be seen as a “Statesman of Interdependence”.21 No de Gaulle-like myth shall be supported here of a “detached” statesman taking lonely decisions. Schröder’s policy line evolved from a close interaction with foreign governments – both foe and friend –, with colleagues, political rivals, MPs of the opposition, experts, lobbies and public opinion. Only the most important foreign and domestic influences on his policy line shall be mentioned here: Schröder’s pragmatic understanding of Gaullist foreign policy was mainly bolstered by German Ambas- sador to France Manfred Klaiber, who explained the policy of the empty chair – bluntly spoken – as part of the general’s election campaign, designed to strengthen de Gaulle’s foreign policy profile. Klaiber in particular underlined de Gaulle’s un- official but reassuring signals to the EEC partners that France would not leave the EEC and had no interest in the destruction of the Community. Furthermore, French deputy Ambassador to the EEC, Maurice Ulrich, told the Federal Foreign Office in private that de Gaulle was domestically isolated and that the French high administration was extremely critical of the policy of the empty chair. All this was grist to Schröder’s mill. The US-administration on its part was for the first time unwilling to forgive France’s eccentricity and made clear that it would not allow a political dam bursting because it feared any attack on what it regarded as the political foundations of the “Free World”. Thus, the US representatives told the (West) Germans that they would be the first victims of such a development. The US foreign policy establishment and the European Commission were also the first who insisted that Germany accept the leadership role against France and a trustee responsibility for the EEC-5 during France’s absence. Hallstein was eager to exploit his excellent contacts to Federal government circles to secure that his institution was not the big loser of the empty chair campaign. At the same time, he feared that Schröder might embark on a “cru- sade” against de Gaulle and that defeating the general was more important for him than saving the EEC and its institutions. Hallstein was supported by the (West) Ger- man industry, which was critical of EEC supranationality but pointed out to Schröder on numerous occasions that the Commission was nevertheless the “engine” of Euro- pean economic integration and had to be safeguarded against any Gaullist attack if German interests were to be secured. Within the provisional EEC-5, Schröder closely interacted with his Foreign Minister colleagues. Generally, Schröder’s policy line was hardened by Luns, who announced that he would negotiate “adamant[ly]” and not allow any revision to the institutional status quo.22 On the other side, Spaak mod- erated Schröder’s élan on a number of occasions and remained in close contact with the French government in order to calm the emotions.23

21. In allusion to F. DUCHÊNE, Jean Monnet. The First Statesman Of Interdependence, Norton, New York, 1994. 22. BAK, Deposit Hallstein, 1119, Note by Narjes: Gespräch mit Botschafter Tuthill, 15.07.1965. 23. For Klaiber’s reports see PAAA, B20 1322 and 1323; for Ulrich’s indiscretions see e.g. BAK, Deposit Hallstein, 1187, Gespräch mit Herrn Ulrich, 21.09.1965; for the attitude of the German industry see e.g. the documents about the conference of the Deutscher Industrie- und Handelstag on 19 October 1965 in Karlsruhe in PAAA, B20 1323, 1324 and 1325; for the US policy line see the documents in PAAA, B1 214 and BAK, Deposit Hallstein, 1187; for the Commission’s fear see J. NEWHOUSE, op.cit., pp.134-138. 262 Philip BAJON

Fourth, Schröder was aware that his scope for manoeuvre was extremely limited. A number of legal expertises by the Federal government and by the Commission had revealed that from a legal perspective, the situation was highly advantageous for France’s partners: France was clearly breaching EEC law and since France’s action was legally qualified as “volitional obstruction”, France’s absence was no obstacle to voting and not even to unanimous decisions within the EEC-5. Schröder did not hesitate to spread this analysis within the Community to gain a psychological asset in the struggle with de Gaulle. However, not only judicial expertises were taken into consideration but also political analyses. The latter clearly indicated that there was no alternative to an EEC-6 including France. Thus, the only pressure instrument left to Schröder was to threaten France to pursue a “European policy without France” until the point where the Community broke apart and France would appear as sole responsible for this political disaster. This was what Schröder implicitly or explicitly did, as will be demonstrated in the following analytical chapter.24

3. The Power Struggle: De Gaulle finds his “Master”

The argument of this article is that Schröder and the Federal Republic progressively assumed the leadership role, thus shifting the balance of power within the coalition of the five countries resisting the French politics of the empty chair. This shift of power and the Federal leadership role have not been clearly identified by historiography. In the following, the major steps of this process shall be discussed in more detail. First, the Federal Foreign Office played a leading role in thwarting the French “war of nerves” tactics of July 1965. The French government had started its boycott without presenting any concrete demands. De Gaulle wanted to test his partners and provoke initiatives for mediation favourable to France. Alain Peyrefitte openly admitted that the French aim was “to dramatize the situation while our partners were trying to de-dramatize the situation”.25 This was a highly promising tactics since Belgium and Luxembourg were extremely worried by the European situation and would try to reach a settlement with de Gaulle at almost any price. The small Benelux countries generally worried that the Federal Republic was not sufficiently counter- balanced in an EEC-5 and also feared that de Gaulle’s nationalism could easily spread to West Germany. The choice was thus between paralysis and capitulation on the one hand and some sort of Community routine on the other hand (although a normal EEC functioning was in any case impossible). Though maintaining his European label in public, Schröder organised a classical diplomatic concert in cooperation with Italy

24. For the judicial and political expertises see PAAA, B20 1322, Expertise by Ophüls: Fragen der Beschlußfähigkeit […], 16.09.1965 and PAAA, B20 1323, Expertise by Ophüls: Mögliche Lösun- gen der EWG-Krise, September 1965. 25. A.PEYREFITTE, CdG, 2002, p.886, Peyrefitte on 01.07.1965. Gerhard Schröder's "Fairly Audacious Politics" in the European Crisis of 1965-66 263 and the Netherlands to counteract the French tactics. Against the preferences of Bel- gium and Luxembourg, they secured the integrity of the Community method and institutions in July 1965 thus preventing an easy victory of Gaullist politics: the Council routine formally continued and the revised Commission proposals of 22 July 1965 remained the basis for discussion. De Gaulle was upset, stating “[t]hese meetings, that’s enough now. Our partners need to understand that it is unaccommodating that their secret gatherings take place in our absence”.26 Second and central to the argument of this article, the Federal Republic clearly replaced the Italian EEC presidency as lead-nation of the so-called bloc des cinq. Schröder’s Foreign Office seized the initiative and issued foreign policy instructions, called “Runderlass”, to all EEC partners on 29 September 1965.27 The claims and instructions of the Runderlass were all but new. However, the Federal Republic confronted the partners and France with a concrete German position and obliged them to define their position and consult with each other. The momentum of initiative was important, and both the Commission and the US government were fairly happy with Schröder’s step. Indeed, the four partners of the bloc reacted instantly and affirma- tively and also let it be known that they would appreciate a leading role of the Federal Republic.28 At the same time, the Italian EEC presidency had tried to organise a first and semi-official gathering of France’s partners and French representatives on the occasion of the UN General Assembly in New York. However, when Fanfani and Italian EEC-Ambassador Antonio Venturini met Couve on 29 September, the distrust was such that the path of conciliation seemed to be blocked. The Italian crisis management was seriously suffering from Fanfani’s eccentric and egomaniac handling of Italian foreign affairs and thus lacked the essential solidity required in the confrontation with de Gaulle.29 Fanfani seemed to be aware of this, because a few days later he sent Venturini on a secret mission to Bonn, where the latter told Erhard that the Federal Republic should now seize the “Führerstellung” and confront France playing the role of “the spokesman of the Five”.30 Although Erhard was clearly reluctant, the casting in the empty chair tragedy (or comedy) was clear from now on. However, the Federal Republic soon exploited its leadership role in a way, which was all but appreciated by the partners and which is controversially evaluated by historiography. This happened in the forefront of and on the EEC-5 Council meeting

26. Ibid., p.891, de Gaulle on 28.07.1965; for Schröder’s diplomatic concert see H. TÜRK, „To Face de Gaulle …”, op.cit., pp.116-117; J. NEWHOUSE, op.cit., p.133. 27. PAAA, B20 1323, Circular Telegram: Deutsche Haltung zur Lösung der EWG-Krise, 27.09.1965. 28. For the partners’ reaction see the telegrams collection in PAAA, B20 1323 and the PAAA, B20 1165, Protocol of State Secretaries’ Committee for European Affairs of 8 October 1965, 11.10.1965. 29. For the Italian EEC presidency’s initiative see MAE, CE-DE, 1112, Telex 2389-96 Couve (New York) to MAE, 30.09.1965; MAE, CE-DE, 1112, Brunet to Wormser, 05.10.1965. 30. BAK, B136 2592, Note by Geberth: Besuch von Botschafter Venturini […], 04.10.1965; PAAA, B20 1323, Note by Lahr: Besuch des Ständigen Vertreters Italiens [...], 08.10.1965; AAPD 1965, Doc.379, Meeting Erhard-Venturini, 04.10.1965, pp.1572-1575; H. TÜRK, „To Face de Gaulle …”, op.cit., p.121; A. VARSORI, “The Economy First”? Italy and the Empty Chair Crisis (1965-66), in: J.-M. PALAYRET, H. WALLACE, P. WINAND (eds.), Visions, Votes and Vetoes …, op.cit., p.106. 264 Philip BAJON of 25 and 26 October 1965, on which the Five should have agreed on a common negotiating position regarding both agricultural financing and political questions. In their Council communiqué, the Five insisted on the integrity of the Community institutions and procedures and they invited France to a special Council session in the absence of the Commission to discuss these political controversies. This proceeding had been proposed in the famous “Spaak Plan”. However, no agreement on agricultural financing was found and presented to the French government because Schröder was reluctant to give up the German demand for parallel progress. The overall impression was that of an egoist and obstructionist Federal policy, weakening the coalition of the Five and seriously limiting the Federal Republic’s leadership capacity. This image was adopted by the historiography. Certainly, the parliamentary elections, the struggle over competencies of the Federal ministries and the pressure exerted by agricultural and industrial lobbies played a role when Schröder maintained the demands. However, the argument here is that quite another motive, completely neglected by historiography, was Schröder’s driving force: The German Foreign Mi- nister wanted the Council debate to be centred on political questions and avoid any in-depth technical discussion on agricultural financing with all its dangers of disagreement, confusion and tactical disadvantages. Be it obstructionist or not, Schröder succeeded and made the most important EEC-5 Council a political event. After the Council, he explained to German MPs: “This […] was one of the most difficult conferences I ever participated in, although from an outside perspective it seemed to be a child’s play. The situation was far from being a child’s play. The problem was that our four partners wanted to elaborate an offer for agricultural financing to accommodate France while our interest was to bring the political controversy on the negotiating table”.31 Counterfactual speculation may be allowed here what would have happened in case that the agricultural financing had been the central topic: the Council would have been completely dominated by complex technical debates and would have lost its political character. Furthermore, in case that the Federal Republic had given up its demand for “synchronisation”, it would have lost its face in a domestic and foreign policy perspective, thus unable to assume any leadership role.32 Between October 1965 and January 1966, no solution to the crisis could be found because of the formation of the new Federal government and the French presidential elections. However, France exploited its bilateral contacts to divide the coalition of the Five by telling different things to different governments. This psychological warfare brought the Five to a dangerous point on the NATO session of December 1965 in Paris, when Fanfani and Colombo tried to organise an ad hoc informal meeting of the EEC-5 Foreign Ministers excluding the Commission, in short: an intergovern-

31. ADBT, 3104, 5th Legislative Period, Prot. 2, p.33 [Foreign Affairs Committee of 8 December 1965, Schröder]. 32. For the October Council see P. BAJON, op.cit., pp.281-286; K.K. PATEL, op.cit., p.304; H. TÜRK, „To Face de Gaulle …”, op.cit., pp.121-122; N.P. LUDLOW, The European Community and the Crises …, op.cit., p.81. Gerhard Schröder's "Fairly Audacious Politics" in the European Crisis of 1965-66 265 mental EEC-5 Council in the capital of the boycotting member state. Schröder stopped this and thus secured the integrity of the Community procedure.33 On Christ- mas 1965, the French government then accepted the invitation to the extraordinary Council session in Luxembourg in January 1966. However, to raise the price for French concessions, the French government refused to participate in the budgetary procedure of the Communities for 1966 and thus threatened to paralyse the functioning of the EEC. This quarrel over the Community budget was presumably the most dangerous moment of the empty chair crisis because preparations began for a special budgetary Council, which would decide a 1966 budget in France’s absence, thus definitively excluding France in the most vital question of the Community.34 In this situation, Schröder pursued a policy of brinkmanship à la de Gaulle. Supported by the Dutch, he let the French government know that his patience had come to an end and that he was prepared to force France out of the Treaty framework in case of continued obstruction. No doubt, there would be no survivors after the sinking of the HMS “EEC”. The Elysée papers clearly stated: “[…] our Ambassador in Bonn believes that Schröder will insist that a solution to the political problems will be found on short notice so that the Council can without delay decide on urgent questions like the budget 1966, the agricultural financing and the Kennedy-Round negotiations. In case we were not prepared to participate in these delib- erations, these would take place among the Five. The Federal government is fully aware of the severeness of this process once triggered. However, it would be easy, one says in Bonn, to make France appear as the sole responsible of the disaster”.35 Prior to the second Luxembourg conference at the end of January 1966, Schröder was virtually “built up” for the showdown with de Gaulle. After the French press had attacked Schröder, the foreign minister sought the backing of the German parliament for a more robust negotiating style in Brussels. A parliamentary debate in support of Schröder was highly controversial and particularly disliked by a number of Schröder’s Christian-Democratic cabinet colleagues. In contrast, crucial support for this debate came from the political opponent: the Social-Democratic MPs. Behind the scenes, they enforced this debate thus overcoming the resistance of the Christian- Democrats.36 On 27 January, Schröder went to the speaker’s desk and explained that the Federal government wished “to share with the Honourable House its concerns and to receive its advice and as far as possible its support”. With a good portion of sarcasm, foreign policy specialist Herbert Wehner replied in the name of the Social- Democrats:

33. For the NATO meeting see documents in PAAA, B20 1326 and in particular ACDP, Deposit Schröder, 01-483-274, Note for Schröder, 15.12.1965; BAK, Deposit Hallstein, 1119, Note Klaus Meyer: Ratssitzung am Montag, 17.12.1965. 34. For the quarrel over the budget see N. P. LUDLOW, The European Community and the Crises …, op.cit., pp.95-96; P. BAJON, op.cit., pp.226-233. 35. AN, 1AG5, 248, Note on diplomatic situation by the Presidency of the French Republic, 14.01.1965. 36. For the intervention of the Social-Democrats see C. FRANZ (Ed.), Die CDU/CSU-Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag. Sitzungsprotokolle 1961-1966 (Vol.11/IV/2), Droste, Düsseldorf, 2004, Doc. 329, p.1706 [Rainer Barzel before Parliamentary Group on 25 January 1966]. 266 Philip BAJON

“We want the members of the Federal government to proceed in Luxembourg with the backing – in case there is a back which can be reinforced – with the backing of the German parliament, we are prepared for this backing”.37 Schröder made allusion to this peculiar political constellation some months later, when he praised his “fairly audacious politics” before German MPs and explained: “In the last moment of the negotiations, the German parliament acted more statesmanlike than the Federal government itself. […] This enabled us to adopt an attitude in Luxem- bourg, which brought us the appropriate result”.38 Crucial support came also from Washington. Until that day, the French government had blocked any EEC position that the Commission would defend in the Kennedy Round negotiations for tax reduction, thus using the Kennedy Round as a pressure instrument vis-à-vis Bonn. A day after the parliamentary debate, a secret paper of the US government was passed to the Federal government, stating: “The United States is negotiating in the Kennedy Round with the Commission acting on behalf of the Community. Whether the Commission’s instructions come from six member states or from five acting for the Community is an internal matter for determination by the EEC members involved. If the five members should decide to give the Commission instructions enabling it to resume effective participation in the Kennedy Round, the United States would be prepared to proceed with negotiations on that basis”.39 A Commission mandate by an EEC-5 would have created a complex and precarious situation. However, the US paper primarily had a symbolic value since de Gaulle lost his pressure instrument.40 Thus, Schröder appeared to be extremely self-assured before the second Luxembourg conference. An ancient close collaborator of Adenauer and a critic of Schröder, Heinrich Krone, noted: “We [the Federal cabinet members] had to talk to Schröder and keep him in check so that he would not carry those negotiations in Luxembourg with France and the other Four to extremes. […] Schröder doesn’t like the French. Schröder’s thinking and acting is nationalist and protestant”.41 Not only Krone but the French government as well feared Schröder’s incalculability and potential extremism. Thus, before the second Luxembourg conference, Couve sent Ulrich on a highly conspirative mission to tell the Federal government that France wanted to avoid “at all costs 'war of religion' over Treaty doctrine” and was extremely

37. Federal Republic of Germany Parliamentary Debates, 5th Legislative Period, Stenographic Report, 17th Session of 27 January 1966, pp.673-695. 38. ADBT, 3104, 5th Legislative Period, Prot.17, p.63 [Foreign Affairs Committee of 25 January 1966, Schröder] 39. PAAA, B1 214, Secret Paper of US-Embassy for State Secretary Neef, 28.01.1966. 40. For the Kennedy-Round see L. COPPOLARO, The Empty Chair Crisis and the Kennedy Round of GATT Negotiations (1962-67), in: J.-M. PALAYRET, H. WALLACE, P. WINAND (eds.), Visions, Votes and Vetoes …, op.cit., pp.219-239. 41. H. KRONE, Tagebücher Volume II: 1961-1966, Droste, Düsseldorf, 2003, p.451. Gerhard Schröder's "Fairly Audacious Politics" in the European Crisis of 1965-66 267 interested in a pragmatic solution to the crisis. Schröder’s show of force had its desired effect.42 In the end, France and its partners negotiated a Luxembourg arrangement which was closer to Schröder’s preferences than to de Gaulle’s conception, especially given the French “investments” during a half-year period of diplomatic warfare: Schröder could live conveniently with the French unilateral declaration that unanimity was obligatory in “vital interests”, while France’s partners counter-declared that unanimity was desirable yet facultative. This meant that voting was possible and the Treaties’ integrity secured. Nothing was left of the French plans to have the ambitious Commission downgraded to an EEC secretariat. Schröder was even able to implement a “stopping of the clock” for the agricultural decisions of 1965, in short: an agricultural veto to secure German interests. The resumption of Community work in 1966 took place according to the conception of “synchronisation” – which was called “drawer theory” in this case – and led to a package deal agreement à la Schröder in summer 1966.43 Could all this not have been achieved a year earlier and without an empty chair campaign? To put it bluntly, Schröder seems to be the principal profiteer of the general’s campaign, while the latter had invested too much and gained too little. Not surprisingly, Schröder was extremely self-confident after the Luxembourg conference. His crisis management was praised, in particular in the United Kingdom and the US. The UK Ambassador to the EEC, James Marjoribanks, reported to Lon- don: “The success of the meeting is almost entirely due to the German Foreign Mi- nister. Dr. Schröder dominated the whole scene. He gave a masterly performance”.44 However, Schröder’s hubris, so bitterly noted by Krone, was also why the Foreign Minister’s star was waning soon. After France’s announcement of March 1966 to withdraw from NATO integration, a fierce conflict occurred over the deployment of French forces on German territory, in which Schröder acted without political instinct and isolated himself.45 In the quarrel over the EEC Commission presidency from spring 1966 onwards, Schröder insisted that Hallstein remain Com- mission president even when the Commission presidency began to rotate. As a result of Schröder’s inflexibility, the fusion of the Treaties and executive institutions did not take place, thus seriously paralysing the EEC.46 Finally, the Grand Coalition replaced the Erhard government in December 1966 and Schröder had to hand over the Foreign Office to Willy Brandt. The empty chair crisis was thus one of the highlights of his political career and at the same time the beginning of its end.

42. For Ulrich’s secret mission see PAAA, B20 1331, Telex Tuthill (EEC) to US State Department, no date. 43. A discussion of the negotiating results in P. BAJON, op.cit., pp.346-350. 44. PAAA, B1 214, Ambassador Blankenhorn (London) to Schröder, 02.02.1966. 45. T.OPPELLAND, Gerhard Schröder …, op.cit., pp.663-673. 46. H. TÜRK, Die Europapolitik der Großen Koalition 1966-1969, Oldenbourg, Munich, 2006, pp. 36-38 and 44. 268 Philip BAJON

Conclusion

This article pursues a triple objective. First, it reviews the framework conditions of the Federal Republic’s European policy in 1965 and its consequences on the level of supranational diplomacy: the inflexible conception of “synchronised progress”, the fatal trend towards an exaggerated “Europeanness” encouraged by electoral considerations, the political weakness of Chancellor Erhard maintaining his project of Po- litical Union. These factors explain why the “proven and tested” mechanisms of French-German conciliation collapsed, why Federal European policy failed to prevent France from provoking the major constitutional crisis of the EEC and why, consequently, Foreign Minister Schröder was able to seize almost exclusive control over the definition of the Federal European policy line. Second, before this background of framework conditions, this article focuses on the importance of Foreign Minister Schröder who became the focal point of resistance against de Gaulle’s empty chair campaign. The discussion of his “mental map” and of his ideological preferences serves to explain why Schröder was almost ideally suited to become the general’s principal rival in terms of power politics. The empirical analysis underlines that de Gaulle found his “Master” in Schröder, who secured a German leadership role within the coalition of France’s partners and pursued a policy of brinkmanship à la de Gaulle to force France back to the negotiating table. In the light of these findings, the arrangement at the very end of the empty chair crisis came closer to Schröder’s preferences than to de Gaulle’s conception. Third, this in-depth empirical analysis leads to a re-evaluation of the Federal Re- public’s role both with regard to the empty chair crisis and to the history of post- World War II relations between France and the Federal Republic. Generally, the analysis underlines the evolution of the empty chair confrontation from a geopolitical conflict over European integration towards a highly tactical powerplay. Whereas historical accounts describe the coalition of the Five resisting the French politics as either well balanced or even as dominated by Belgium or Italy, this analysis suggests that the Federal Republic actually played the central role in managing and overcoming the crisis of the empty chair. The concrete political duel was more between de Gaulle and Schröder than between de Gaulle and Hallstein.47 This leads to a more nuanced understanding of the empty chair crisis as possibly the most serious confrontation between the reconciled “hereditary enemies” France and (West)Germany in the post- war era. Ironically, a contemporary observer of the 1965—1966 clash between Paris and Bonn remarked: “In that sense the war would appear to be over”.48 However, the empty chair confrontation also deserves more attention as an experience of catharsis within the French-German relations, since the overall settlement of the crisis during 1966—1967, in the long run, cleared the way for a revival of French-German coop-

47. W. LOTH, Hallstein und de Gaulle: Die verhängnisvolle Konfrontation, in: W. LOTH, W. WAL- LACE and W. WESSELS (eds.), Walter Hallstein. Der vergessene Europäer?, Europa Union, Bonn, 1995, pp.171-188. 48. J. NEWHOUSE, op.cit., p.184. Gerhard Schröder's "Fairly Audacious Politics" in the European Crisis of 1965-66 269 eration under Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger and the successive Federal governments. Zukunft der Parlamente im europäischen Mehrebenensystem

Parlamente galten lange Zeit als Verlierer natio nale aber auch subnationale Parla- der europäischen Integration. Aktuell ist mente. Die Entwicklung eines „Mehr- eine (Re-)Parlamentarisierung des EU- ebenenparlamentarismus“ wird in den Systems zu beobachten, die alle Ebenen Beiträgen aus unterschiedlichen Per- umfasst: das Europäische Parlament, spektiven analysiert.

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European Integration from below: the Construction of the Ems- Dollart Region, 1964-1978

Marijn MOLEMA

For many years, the European Union has pursued policies that are designed to increase cooperation in the border regions that cut across its member states. The origins of this policy can be traced back to the early 1960s. It was not until the launch of the IN- TERREG programmes in the 1990s, however, that support for the social, cultural and economic development of cross-border regions became firmly rooted. A wide-ranging collection of projects and plans were carried out within the INTERREG programme framework, from infrastructural investment to the improvement of tourist facilities. European subsidies for interregional cooperation also had a positive impact on the foundation of cross-border organizations. By 1990, only 34 cross-border organizations had been founded, a number that had risen to 151 by 2006.1 It seems that the role played by this aspect of European politics is increasing and may become even more important in the next cycle of European regional policy.2 The phenomenon of cross-border cooperation is made all the more interesting by the fact that historically, it has developed in a unique way. People and organizations operating at the European or national levels were not the only important agents in this process. On the contrary, regional actors were very active in matters of cross-border cooperation from the very beginning. In this way, cross-border cooperation has been a bottom-up process within the broader history of European integration. Cross-border cooperation can be defined as ‘more or less institutionalized collaboration between contiguous subnational authorities across national borders’.3 To date, academic reflection on the historical dimensions of this phenomenon has been limited. Introductions to the themes, theories and methodologies of European history have paid little attention to the regional dimensions of the integration process.4 There are some encouraging indications of a burgeoning research tradition, however, in the form of studies that address the move towards mutual interventions in border regions

1. ARBEITSGEMEINSCHAFT EUROPÄISCHER GRENZREGIONEN (Hrsg.), Zusammenarbeit Europäischer Grenzregionen. Bilanz und Perspektiven, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2008, pp.46-50. 2. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Investing in Europe’s future. Fifth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion, Publications office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2010, pp.221-222. 3. M. PERKMANN, Cross-border regions in Europe. Significance and drivers of regional cross-border co-operation, in: European Urban and Regional Studies, 2(2003), pp.153-171, here p.156. 4. R. WAKEMAN (ed.), Themes in modern European history since 1945, Routledge, London/New York, 2003; W. LOTH, Explaining European integration: the contribution from historians, in: Jour- nal of European Integration History, 1(2008), pp.9-26; I.T. BEREND, Europe since 1980, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010. 272 Marijn MOLEMA across Europe.5 I wish to contribute to this emerging field by concentrating on the institutional history of the so-called ‘Euregion’, an institutional form of cross-border organization that can be traced back to 1958, as I will later explain. The Finnish geographer Anssi Paasi describes Euregions as entities that are actively shaped by various actors in order to organize social and political life.6 According to Paasi, regions are complex constructions that result from social relations and discourses. A ‘thick description’ of the underlying social processes and discourses is required to understand this complexity, and this article can be read as such a description. In addressing the institutional history of cross-border cooperation, a number of scholars limit their attention to the role played by local and regional governments in the construction of Euregions.7 Quite a few actors from other domains in regional society have also played decisive roles in the institutionalization process, however. Several organizations and associations belonging to civil society, the intermediate sphere between the state and individual citizens, have had a considerable impact on the construction of organizational bodies. In order to investigate the role played by civil society actors, among others, this article will concentrate on the Ems-Dollart Region. This Euregion in the Northern Netherlands and North West Germany was founded in 1977. The fact that its founding fathers consisted of Chambers of Com- merce and pro-European movements makes the Ems-Dollart Region a special case, and an appropriate subject for an investigation of the interaction between actors operating in several domains of society, at the regional, national and European levels. I will trace the construction of the Ems-Dollart Region from the first initiatives at the beginning of the 1960s, with the help of policy documents, (annual) reports, maga- zines, archival investigations and interviews with some of the key actors. The analysis ends with the official founding of the cross-border institution, supported by national policymakers, at the end of the 1970s. In this multi-layered historical process, the research questions focus on the leading agents, their motives and the interaction between them. Were the actors involved driven by idealistic, pragmatic of activist ideas?

5. B. WASSENBERG, Vivre et penser la coopération transfrontalière, vol.1: Les régions frontalières françaises, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 2010; M. RIEDER, Von Wandlungen von Territorialität: Transnationalisierung im Alpenwirtschaftsraum seit der EWG, in: Geschichte und Region/Storia e Regione, 2(2007), pp.147-179; S. BOUWENS, Over de streep. Grensarbeid vanuit Zuid-Limburg naar Duitsland, 1958-2001, Verloren, Hilversum, 2008. 6. A. PAASI, The resurgence of the ‘Region’ and ‘Regional Identity’: theoretical perspectives and empirical observations on regional dyamics in Europe, in: Review of International Studies, 35(2009), pp.121-146. 7. H. KNIPPENBERG, The Maas-Rhine Euregion: A Laboratory for European Integration?, in: Geo- politics, 3(2004), pp.608-626; T. PIKNER, Reorganizing cross-border governance capacity: the case of the Helsinki-Tallinn Euregio, in: European Urban and Regional Studies, 3(2008), pp.211-227. The Construction of the Ems-Dollart Region, 1964-1978 273

Cross-border cooperation among politicians and policymakers

At the beginning of the 1960s, cross-border cooperation was still in its infancy. The Second World War and its aftermath left resentments on both sides. The Dutch in the Northern Netherlands and the Germans in North West Germany took a relatively long time to overcome their mutual animosities. The Dutch could not forget the humiliation of the German occupation. The people of North West Germany, in turn, were suspi- cious of the Dutch, because the latter had claimed their land as compensation for war damage. Gradually, however, the two sides’ negative opinions were replaced by a more cooperative approach, a process that was encouraged by the actions of some extraordinary pioneers. Horst Gerlach (1919-1990) was one these pioneers. Gerlach lived in Leer, a small city in the border region of Ostfriesland in North West Germany. After heading the employment service in Ostfriesland, Gerlach went on to become a member of the German federal parliament for the Social Democratic Party. He did not limit his political activities to the Bonn political arena, however, and retained links with his own region. In the first half of the 1960s, he launched a plan to found a cross-border organization, in which the regional administrations of three Dutch provinces (Gronin- gen, Drenthe and Friesland) and the administrative districts of Aurich, Oldenburg and Osnabrück would cooperate.8 Gerlach’s ideas did not provoke much enthusiasm among the officials of the Federal State of Lower Saxony, however. At the end of 1964, policymakers rejected Gerlach’s proposal during a special meeting of the Fed- eral Ministry of Home Affairs in Hanover.9 German policymakers intuitively felt that the Dutch would profit more from the proposed cross-border cooperation, and that the Northern Netherlands would have a head start over North West Germany in regional economic development. Although some participants agreed with Gerlach’s basic ideas, the meeting concluded that it was too early for real cooperation. North West Germany should first narrow the development gap between the two regions. Moreover, it was expected that the European Commission would shortly present its plans on regional policy, and the participants agreed that it would be better to wait and see what these entailed. In the meantime, cross-border contact with Dutch regional planning authorities could be extended. One such extension of contact occurred in the German-Dutch Commission for Spatial Planning’s Northern sub-commission. After spatial planning had taken root in the 1950s, Dutch and German spatial planners strived to achieve a European-wide vision of spatial development. Many spatial processes were not limited to national boundaries. Dutch planners had some experience with cross-border cooperation within the sphere of spatial planning, as a Benelux Commission for Spatial Planning had existed since 1952. In the course of the 1960s, Dutch and German planners began to work more closely together, leading in 1967 to the founding of the German-Dutch

8. Haupstaatsarchiv Hannover (HStAHAN), Nds.50 (Niedersächische Staatskanzlei) Acc.204/97, No. 57, Gerlach an den Ministerpräsidenten, 09.09.1964. 9. Ibid., Niederschrift, 17.12.1964. 274 Marijn MOLEMA

Commission for Spatial Planning.10 Each country could delegate nine people to the commission, and the Dutch and German governments, as well as the government of Lower Saxony, sent senior officials. The commission’s business was limited to matters of national importance. To give more attention to regional issues, two sub-commissions were created, one for the southern cross-border area and the other for the Northern cross-border area. Delegations from several levels of the regional and national administrations were represented at the annual meetings of the sub-commissions North.11 It soon became apparent that spatial planning was dominated by national customs and traditions. During the first meeting, the members of the Northern sub-commission entered into a long discussion about the comparability of the Dutch concept of ‘core municipalities’ (kerngemeenten) and the German concept of ‘central places’ (Zen- trale Orte).12 One of the sub-commission’s first conclusions was that it would be essential to harmonize these concepts. After three or four years, however, some members had the frustrating feeling that the Northern sub-commission had made little progress in developing mutual understanding. In 1972, T. Puister, head of the Province of Groningen’s provincial planning agency, argued that the time was now ripe for formulating a cross-border development plan, which would help to resolve problems common to the regional economies on both sides of the border.13 While the other members agreed, no progress was made with the proposed cross-border plan in the years that followed.14 The two countries’ traditions of spatial planning appeared intractable. No one took the lead in developing the ambitious cross-border plan, and the Northern sub-commission instead concentrated on practical issues. At the regional level, pressure was being exerted to strengthen cooperation between the Northern Netherlands and North West Germany. Not everyone went as far as the progressive Gerlach, who wanted a new institution. As will be explained further below, however, the passive stance taken by national and regional administrations in matters of cross-border cooperation was criticized. Officials rejected these criticisms by pointing to the German-Dutch Commission for Spatial Planning and its regional Northern sub-commission. These organizations did indeed function as ‘lightning conductors’ for regional development, but not for long.

10. NIEDERSÄCHSISCHES INNENMINISTERIUM, Deutsch-Niederländische Raumordnungskom- mission 1967/1977. Dokumentation, Schriften der Landesplanung Niedersachsen, Hannover, 1978, p.58. 11. The heads of the planning agencies of the Dutch Provinces of Groningen, Drenthe, Overijssel and Gelderland were represented. On the German side, the heads of the planning agencies of the State Districts (Regierungsbezirke) of Aurich, Osnabrück and Münster, were represented, as was an official from the German government and the States of Lower Saxony and North Rhine-Westphalia. 12. Staatsarchiv Osnabrück (StAOS), Regierungsbezirk Osnabrück, Rep.430, Dez.108, Akz.2005/022, No.193, 1. Sitzung, 19.06.1968. 13. Ibid., Notiz, 22.08.1972. 14. Ibid., 6. Sitzung, 11.09.1972. The Construction of the Ems-Dollart Region, 1964-1978 275

Economic initiatives

Economic organizations were among those to encourage the development of cross- border ambitions. The Chamber of Commerce in Veendam was particularly active in this area. The Veendam Chamber of Commerce had jurisdiction over the Eastern part of the Province of Groningen that bordered North West Germany. In his annual speech of 1968, the Chamber of Commerce’s chairman, J.E. Duintjer, criticized the Dutch government on the grounds that its regional economic development policy was too one-sided and only focused on Dutch interests.15 According to Duintjer, opportunities for cross-border cooperation and the development of a European perspective on regional development were being overlooked. In order to give a constructive impulse to regional initiatives, the Chamber of Commerce embarked on an explorative research project to investigate possibilities for cross-border cooperation. The Chamber was assisted by an economics student, and his supervisor, Jan Postma, and their report was published at the end of 1968.16 The report emphasized the similarities between the two regions’ economic problems. Potential fields of cooperation were suggested, such as the construction of ports on the estuary of the River Ems, improvement of road traffic, and the modification of various existing development plans. The report concluded by focusing on European regional policy, laying particular stress on Euro- pean Commission subsidies that were aimed at setting up cross-border structure plans. The first European-sponsored structure plan with a cross-border focus had been implemented in 1963. The plan investigated the potential for cooperation between Northern France and the Belgian Province of Luxembourg.17 At the time, the plan’s explicit promotion of cross-border regional development and its lack of concern with national borders were unique. Economic problems and opportunities affecting the whole cross-border region were shown to be at stake, and the plan’s approach opened up new perspectives and opportunities for regional development. European policymakers and politicians embraced this new form of cross-border research, because they were keen to extend European policy domains to the regional level. With the exception of Italy, however, the member states of the European Community considered regional policy to be a national responsibility.18 Research projects that created opportunities for cross-border research were seen as a harmless step on the way to achieving European actors’ higher ambitions. The report produced by the Veendam Chamber of Commerce also recommended that an extensive, cross-border research project be undertaken, but officials and politicians from the Province of Groningen were unenthusiastic. They did not support

15. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, Annual report, Veendam, 1968, p.88. 16. J.D. BOER, J.K.T. POSTMA, Over de mogelijkheden van samenwerking tussen Noord-Nederland en Noordwest-Duitsland, Chamber of Commerce, Veendam, 1968. 17. L.J. BRINKHORST, De gemeenten en de Europese gemeenschappen: een analyse van de verdragen van Parijs en Rome, Vereniging Nederlandse Gemeenten, The Hague, 1965, p.11. 18. A. VARSORI, European regional policy: the foundation of solidarity, in: M. DUMOULIN, M.-T. BITCH (ed.), The European Commission, 1958-72: History and memories, Publications office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2007, pp.411-425. 276 Marijn MOLEMA the Chamber’s proposals and argued that, as the Chamber had proposed the project, it should take responsibility for implementing it.19 The Chamber failed to persuade regional politicians to pursue European subsidies to finance a cross-border research project similar to that undertaken in Northern France and the Belgian Province of Luxembourg. The Chamber’s officials subsequently contacted neighbouring Cham- bers in Groningen, Emden (responsible for the North West German region of Ost- friesland), Osnabrück (responsible for the German border region of Emsland) and Meppel (responsible for the Dutch Province of Drenthe). The Chambers of Commerce in Groningen, Veendam, Meppel, Emden and Osnabrück had been meeting regularly since the 1950s. They tended to discuss typical border problems, such as limited border opening times, the lack of adequate border passages and signposting, and the fact that national train schedules took no account of cross-border traffic. Duintjer and his Secretary, H.F. van der Laan, failed to persuade their colleagues of the necessity of drawing up a cross-border structure plan.20 Their colleagues ob- jected to the cost of the research project. Although the European Commission would subsidize the cross-border development plan, the Chambers of Commerce would also be obliged to pay their share of the costs. Moreover, the whole notion of undertaking a cross-border research project was a new one. This caused the officials to hesitate, and a definitive decision was postponed. After a conference on cross-border cooperation had been held by the Northern Netherlands and North West Germany (a significant event that will be further discussed below), the time appeared to be ripe. In April 1971, the Presidents and Secretaries of the five Chambers of Commerce agreed to the initiative.21 Every Chamber contributed 5,000 Dutch guilders to fund a preliminary study, which would be carried out by the University of Groningen. Once the preliminary study was complete, the Chambers would submit an official application for a cross-border development study to be conducted by the national governments involved and the European Commission. The regional momentum was lost, however, due to a simple, trivial chain of events. One of the researchers who had been responsible for conducting the preliminary study left the University of Groningen. Work on the study stopped, and in July 1972, the Chambers decided to complete the study themselves. After this, the project stagnated. In 1973, the researchers seemed to be encountering problems with delivering and comparing some of the necessary statistical data. There were fundamental differences in systems of data collection in the Northern Netherlands and in North West Germany. The lack of priority given to the cross-border study meant that the research activities lost further momentum, and after 1975, nothing more was heard of the preliminary study.

19. Interview with Jan Postma, formerly an economist at the University of Groningen, 23.04.2010. 20. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, Annual report, Veendam, 1970, p.70. 21. These and the following facts are based on the annual reports of the Chambers of Commerce in Veendam and Emden (Industrie- und Handelskammer für Ostfriesland und Papenburg) and the magazine of the Chamber of Commerce responsible for the Emsland, Mitteilungen der Industrie- und Handelskammer zu Osnabrück. The Construction of the Ems-Dollart Region, 1964-1978 277

The European Movement as a catalyst

Against this rather passive and hesitant backdrop, one pronounced advocate of cross- border cooperation did play the role of catalyst: the European Movement. The Euro- pean Movement was an idealistic, pro-European non-governmental organization that had been founded in 1948. It took the form of a federation consisting of National Boards, which functioned as umbrella organizations for several pro-European associations. One of the Dutch sections of the European Movement was based in Gronin- gen. Students mainly took the lead, and Erik Bussink and Henk Sol were particularly active in this respect.22 Bussink and Sol organized a conference entitled ‘A future without borders’. Over two days in March 1971, politicians, policymakers, academics, representatives of the Chambers of Commerce and others met in the City of Groningen. During the conference, the necessity of cross-border cooperation was once more underlined. Several speakers stressed the shared nature of the regions’ economic dilemmas, arguing that working together to solve these would lead to new opportunities. The conference stoked the ambitions of the Veendam Chamber of Commerce, whose President and Secretary had been striving for cross-border cooperation for some years. Just like Duintjer and van der Laan from the Veendam Chamber of Commerce, the young and enthusiastic students were inspired by events within the European Economic Com- munity (EEC). In May 1965, the European Commission had published a report entitled Première communication de la Commission sur la politique régionale dans la communauté économique européenne (First communication from the Commission on regional policy in the European Economic Community).23 The report’s aims were moderate: while it provided an overview of regional policies implemented by national governments and some opportunities for further European cooperation, no single concrete measure was proposed. Three years after this Communication, a new Directorate- General for Regional Policy was added to the European administrative system. Hans von der Groeben, a German Commissioner who had been a member of the European Commission since its inception in 1958, was made responsible for European regional policy. In October 1969, Von der Groeben published a second and more influential report, A regional policy for the Community.24 This report recommended that a Euro- pean regional development fund be founded. The development fund would provide the European Commission with an instrument for extending its own version of regional policy. It would take some years before the Council of Ministers would agree

22. The information of this and the next paragraph is derived from the magazine of the Dutch branch of the European Movement, Nieuw Europa, volumes 22, 23 and 24(1969-1971). 23. Communauté économique européenne – Commission, Première communication de la Commission sur la politique régionale dans sa communauté économique européenne, Brussels, 11 May 1965, no. II/sec(65) 1170 final. 24. Commission of the European Communities, A regional policy for the community, Brussels, 15 October 1969, COM(69) 950. 278 Marijn MOLEMA to Von der Groeben’s proposal for a European regional development fund, however.25 Nevertheless, the issue had become important enough to be noticed. Although it is likely that many of the details escaped the attention of actors who were involved in the process of European integration, these actors became very interested in the Communities’ initiatives. Along with others, the European Movement in Groningen was a spur to progress in European regional policy, creating enough interest and momentum to organize the conference. Moreover, the students looked to the example of the ‘Euregio’, a cross-border organization that dated back to 1958.26 In the Euregio, local administrations from the German regions of Westmünsterland and Grafschaft Bentheim, and the Dutch regions of Twente and the Achterhoek, cooperated on economic, social and cultural matters. The students organized the conference in Groningen against the background of these two wider developments, and it turned out to be a great success. The positive, energetic conference atmosphere inspired several of the participants to act. We have already seen how the Chambers of Commerce decided to embark on a preliminary study in April 1971. The students from the European Movement also continued with their activities. A working group was founded in the wake of the conference, chaired by Henk Sol.27 Representatives from the Chambers of Commerce in Veendam and Emden were invited to participate. The Director of the Emden Chamber of Com- merce, Eckart Krömer, involved his colleagues from the Chamber in Osnabrück. At the local administrative level, the most senior official from the German District of Leer, Peter Elster, became an important member. Elster also belonged to the Europa Union, a German organization under the umbrella of the European Movement. On the Dutch side, the local administrative level was represented by the Streekraad Oost- Groningen, a collaboration involving seventeen municipalities. In 1972, the working group received subsidies from the European Movement (500 guilders) and the District of Leer (250 guilders).

From working group to the Ems Dollart Region

The working group was initially known as ‘Euregio North’, but in November 1974, the decision was taken to change the name to ‘Euregio Ems Dollart’.28 The first Euregio in the Southern border region of Twente, the Achterhoek, Bentheim and Westmünsterland had protested against the use of the name Euregio North, on the grounds that it would allow the working group to capitalize on its existing reputation.

25. A. VARSORI, op.cit., pp.416-424; I. BACHE, S. GEORGE, Politics in the European Union, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006, pp.457-463. 26. Interview with Henk Sol, founder of the Working Party Euregion North, 30.09.2008. 27. Ems-Dollart Region, archive of Alfred Spanjer, Report of meeting, 27.04.1971. 28. Kreisarchiv Emsland (KrAEL), Emsland GmbH, inv. no.1583, Report of meeting, 18.11.1974. The Construction of the Ems-Dollart Region, 1964-1978 279

A good alternative was provided by the more neutral topographical entities of the River Ems and Dollart Bay, and in the course of time, the working group became known as the Ems-Dollart Region. The question of what to call the working group was not the most difficult problem that had to be tackled. In the first years of its existence, the working group’s discussions revolved around one key question: did the young process of cross-border cooperation need its own institution? Would it be necessary to create a new organization, and if so, how should it be structured? Some of the members had declared themselves supporters of institutionalization. The students and Elster, as strong advocates of European integration, were keen to create a new organization. The Chambers of Commerce were less enthusiastic, however. Krömer, the Director of the Emden Chamber of Commerce, was a leading sceptical, if constructive, voice in the working group’s discussions.29 In his opinion, neither the Dutch nor the German border regions needed new plans or organizations. There were already enough initiatives for regional development. Instead of new activities, time and energy should be spent on attuning national and regional policies to one another. The representative of the Veendam Chamber of Commerce, Henk Rubingh, who was responsible for the Chamber’s secretariat, was less enterprising than his President, Duintjer, and the Director, Van der Laan. Rubingh did not contradict his colleague Krömer and gave the impression that he too was no supporter of a new institute.30 The other members of the working group had more or less neutral opinions. In a crucial meeting of the German group members in April 1974, Krömer sided carefully with the proponents of a cross-border organization.31 His colleague from the Osnabrück Chamber of Commerce, Günther Stücke, did the same. The representatives from German economic organizations gave their support to the founding of the Ems-Dollart Region. Their change of opinion was influenced by Gerlach, who had informed the group’s German members about recent developments in Brussels. According to Gerlach, the European Commission was prepared to spend approximately 140,000 Deutschmarks on setting up a cross-border structure plan. Moreover, Gerlach reported on recent progress in the creation of a European Fund for Regional Development. During the Paris European Summit in October 1972, the Council of Ministers had approved the establishment of a development fund.32 Gerlach informed the group’s members about progress in the technical discussions concerning the preconditions for this new and – for the time – ground-breaking instrument. These events at the European level had the effect of stimulating regional actors in North West Germany.

29. Ibid., Notiz Krömer, 06.01.1972. 30. Ibid., Report of meeting, 18.11.1974. 31. Ibid., Report of meeting, 18.04.1974. 32. Europese Commissie, Door de Commissie van de Europese Gemeenschappen ingediend voorstel voor een verordening van de Raad tot oprichting van een Europees regionaal ontwikkelingsfonds, Brussels, 25.07.1973, COM(73) 1170 def. 280 Marijn MOLEMA

In 1975, probably on 24 February, the Dutch and German working group members decided to found an official cross-border organization.33 While it took two years to settle the juridical details, in 1977, the first official general meeting was organized by the board, which was made up of five Dutch and five German representatives from the founding organizations. After 1977, the Ems-Dollart Region attracted increasing numbers of members. Local administrations that had waited to see how the new organization would fare, became convinced of the importance of the cross-border cooperation process.34

A national impetus

As we have seen, progress at the regional level was stimulated by events at the Euro- pean level. What role was left to actors at the national level? National policymakers from both countries’ Ministries of Economic Affairs were also very interested in the cross-border cooperation process. First, their interest was motivated by their conviction that the Ministries should not lose the initiative in matters of regional policy. Second, cross-border cooperation offered an opportunity to do something new in an established policy field.35 National policymakers were eager to experiment with new perspectives on regional development. These motives led national officials to return to the old idea of setting up a cross-border structure plan. For one of the governmental deliberative bodies, the German-Dutch Consultative Body for Regional Policy, cross-border cooperation was a permanent concern. The Consultative Body had been founded in 1966, and was tasked with attuning national regional development policies to one another.36 Moreover, meetings between senior officials from the Dutch and German Ministries of Economic Affairs, as well as officials from the German States of Lower Saxony and North Rhine-Westphalia, functioned as preliminary talks on European regional policy issues. The officials debated the most recent developments in European politics, thereby allowing the Germans and the Dutch to explore one another’s views on the European Commission’s new ideas. In any case, the officials were well-informed about the ambitions of European politicians and policymakers. In 1975, the delegation from the German Ministry of Economic Affairs proposed a research project for the Northern cross-border area,

33. A search of several archives failed to reveal a record of this meeting, and it is probable that one was never made. Based on a reconstruction of other meetings, it is likely that the crucial decision was made in February 1974. 34. H. HOOGAKKER, Land zonder grenzen. Eems Dollard Regio – een kroniek. Land ohne Grenzen. Ems Dollart Region – eine Chronik, Ems Dollart Region, Nieuweschans, 2005, p.51. 35. M. MOLEMA, Regionale kracht. Economisch beleid in Noord-Nederland en Noordwest-Duitsland, 1945-2000, Koninklijke Van Gorcum, Assen, 2011. 36. Nationaal Archief Den Haag (NA), Ministry of Economic Affairs, no.2.06.099, inv. No.148, Notitie aan minister, 17.02.1966. The Construction of the Ems-Dollart Region, 1964-1978 281 which would result in a Regional Action Programme.37 The concept of a Regional Action Programme had been derived from the German national approach to regional policy. From 1968 onwards, regional policy had been systematized in 21 Regional Action Programmes that were dispersed over the whole of the Federal Republic.38 This national system was then transferred to the cross-border approach. Dutch officials agreed with the German proposal to focus the plan on the Northern border area. Policymakers from the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs had already gained significant experience in the Northern Netherlands, due to the fact that a so-called In- tegral Structure Plan had been set up for the Northern Netherlands in 1973. The cross- border project would thus benefit from this expertise.39 The research project was implemented in 1976 and 1977, with assistance and guidance being offered from two sides. First, the European Commission provided the structure for the report that resulted from the cross-border research project. Shortly after the Regional Development Fund had been established in 1975, European policymakers created a scheme for regional development programmes.40 Those regions and member states that profited from the Fund were required to list the existing problems faced by economies in particular regions. In addition, they were required to present an overview of the regional policy measures already being implemented in particular areas. National policymakers in Bonn and The Hague used this framework to set up the proposed development plan. Second, the cross-border research project for the Dutch-German Northern border area profited from expertise in the region. In order to acquire the necessary statistical information, the Ministries of Economic Affairs used their contacts at lower levels of the administrative system. The head of the economics department of the Province of Groningen, for example, was made responsible for collecting statistical data from the Dutch Provinces of Groningen and Drenthe. On the German side, Gerhard Hugenberg played a key role. Hugenberg was the Director of Emsland GmbH, a state-subsidized organization responsible for im- proving the infrastructure of Emsland, a region in North West Germany that borders the Dutch Provinces of Groningen and Drenthe.41 Hugenberg coordinated the data collection and led a survey of regional organizations involved in economic development, which investigated these organizations’ existing cross-border cooperation activities. Hugenberg processed the survey results in a draft version of the report. Dutch and German officials in The Hague and Bonn

37. Bundesarchiv Koblenz (BAK), Ministry of Economic Affairs, inv. no.218683, Vermerk 18. Ge- spräch, 11.11.1975. 38. H. KARL, Entwicklung und Ergebnisse regionaler Wirtschaftspoitik in Deutschland, in: H.H. EBERSTEIN, H. KARL (ed.), Handbuch der regionalen Wirtschaftsförderung, OVS Verlag, Co- logne, 2008, section A2. 39. BAK, Ministry of Economic Affairs, inv. no.218683, Eysink Smeets to Albert, 16.03.1976. 40. Schema van de programma’s voor regionale ontwikkeling, Publicatieblad van de Europese Geme- enschappen, 24.03.1976, No.C 69/2. 41. C. HAVERKAMP, Die Erschließung des Emslandes im 20. Jahrhundert als Beispiel staatlicher regionaler Wirtschaftsförderung, Emsländische Landschaft, Sögel, 1991. 282 Marijn MOLEMA wrote the final version of the report, which was presented in 1978.42 The report’s cover proclaimed a new concept: the Ems-Dollart Region. This concept had been adopted from the regional founders of the recently-established cross-border institution, which covered the Northern Netherlands and North West Germany. National policymakers embraced the new regional initiative, which continued to grow in importance over the subsequent decade. In the 1980s, with the unfolding of a European policy for the development of border areas, the two countries’ Ministries of Economic Affairs assisted the Ems-Dollart Region’s attempts to profit from cross-border funding instruments.

Conclusion

In the introduction, we asked whether idealistic, activist or pragmatic motives lay behind the creation of the Ems-Dollart Region. Having explored how, why and by whom this early cross-border regional institution was founded, we must conclude that all three motives simultaneously played a role. These motives were combined in a multi-layered process, in which several actors took the lead. Young idealists – members of the European Movement and students at the University of Groningen – acted as catalysts. By organizing a conference in 1971 and heading a working group for cross-border cooperation in the wake of this successful event, they gave a crucial impulse to the formation of cross-border networks. Several Chambers of Commerce were key actors in these networks. They had not previously aimed to create a cross- border institution, but they decided to support the young students’ idea on pragmatic grounds. We can describe the attitude of national policymakers from the Ministries of Economic Affairs as ‘activist’. First, these policymakers did not want to lose the initiative in regional policy. Second, the notion of extending national experience with regional economic policy to the field of cross-border cooperation structures proved attractive to them. It gave them an opportunity to do something new and challenging in an old policy domain. All of these actors – the students, the Chambers of Commerce and the national policymakers – were influenced by the European Commission. The Commission’s attempts to found a European Fund for Regional Development, which succeeded in 1975, stimulated idealists to support the creation of a new policy domain. It was thought that cross-border cooperation would become one of the key institutions of European regional policy and a spur to increasing integration between the member states. In the opinion of the Chambers of Commerce, however, the added value of the cross-border institute lay in the utilization of the European Fund. National policymakers, in turn, were inspired by the idea of creating a European dimension in a

42. MINISTERIE VAN ECONOMISCHE ZAKEN, BUNDESMINISTERIUM FÜR WIRTSCHAFT, NIEDERSÄCHSISCHES MINISTERIUM FÜR WIRTSCHAFT UND VERKEHR, Grensover- schrijdend programma – Grenzüberschreitendes Programm, The Hague/Bonn/Hannover, 1978. The Construction of the Ems-Dollart Region, 1964-1978 283 traditional policy domain. Moreover, their interest was driven by bureaucratic considerations: they did not want to lose the initiative in regional development matters, and were keen that contact between the region and the European Commission should be mediated by national Ministries of Economic Affairs. The Ems-Dollart Region was thus created in a process of dynamic interaction involving regional, national and European actors, which operated within different social domains. Further research into cross-border cooperation should take this multi-level perspective as its starting point, in order to reveal the many detailed interactions and significant forces that have influenced one another. Jean Monnet’s Right-Hand Man

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La cendrillon de l'histoire: la Cour des comptes européenne et la démocratisation des institutions européennes (1970-1976)

Valentina VARDABASSO

Placée au centre de la réflexion des juristes, la Cour des comptes européenne est en revanche souvent ignorée des historiens.1 De ce fait elle est restée la cendrillon de l’histoire de la construction européenne: tout le monde sait qu’elle existe, mais les historiens n’ont jamais dépouillé ses archives.2 Récemment versées à Florence aux archives de l’Union européenne (AHUE), celles-ci suggèrent d’amples réflexions sur un organisme né pendant les années soixante-dix, mais devenu une institution à part entière seulement après Maastricht. Il convient par exemple de voir les rapports an- nuels transmis aux autres institutions communautaires et publiés au Journal Offi- ciel sur les activités relevant du budget général et des fonds européens de dévelop- pement, ou son rapport sur l’efficacité de la gestion de l’Institut monétaire européen et de la Banque centrale européenne, ou ses rapports sur les comptes des écoles eu- ropéennes. Il est clair que la Cour ne limite plus ses activités au contrôle exercé sur les fonds publics européens afin qu’ils soient dépensés correctement, mais qu’elle participe aussi indirectement à l’amélioration des instruments et des programmes politiques de la Communauté européenne.3 Par ailleurs sa création se situe au milieu des années soixante–dix, soit au carrefour de trois événements clé de la construction européenne: le traité du 21 avril 1970 qui dotait la Communauté de ressources propres, l’institutionnalisation du contrôle externe dont relève la Cour des comptes euro-

1. Par le Traité du 21 avril 1970 sur les ressources propres, les contributions financières des Etats membres sont remplacées par des ressources traditionnelles des Communautés, notamment les prélève- ments agricoles, les droits de douane avec les pays tiers, et la TVA. Le 21 juillet 1975 est créée la Cour des Comptes européenne qui se substitue au Commissaire aux Comptes de la CECA et à la Commission de contrôle de la CEE. Son établissement devient définitif en décembre 1976 après la clôture des procédures de ratification dans les différents Etats membres de la CEE. Les sources sur lesquelles s’appuie cette recherche concernent surtout les fonds de la Cour des comptes européennes et du Parlement européen déposés aux archives de l’Union européenne à Florence et le fond George Pompidou, déposé aux Archives Nationales à Paris. 2. La Cour des comptes est traitée par des historiens dans des ouvrages encyclopédiques comme Y. BERTONCINI, T. CHOPIN, A. DULPHY, S. KAHN, C. MANIGAND (eds.), Dictionnaire critique de l’Union européenne, Armand Colin, Paris, 2008, pp.96-97; P. GERBET, G. BOSSUAT, T. GROSBOIS (eds.), Dictionnaire historique de l’Europe unie, André Versaille, Bruxelles, 2009, pp. 337-338. Plus riches en informations sont les travaux des juristes. Cf. C.-D. EHLERMANN, Der Europäische Rechnungshof: Haushaltskontrolle in der Gemeinschaft, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1976; I.d. CROUY-CHANEL, C. PERRON, La Cour des Comptes européenne, PUF, Paris, 1998; G. DES- MOULIN, La Cour des Comptes, Juris Classeur, Paris, 2010. 3. Citons par exemple les interventions «fortes» de la Cour des comptes européenne dans la politique agricole commune (PAC), quand elle inflige un camouflet à Bruxelles en dénonçant la libéralisation de l'agriculture dans l'UE qui comporte des risques jugés «majeurs». Rapport du 15.10.2009 publié sur le site www.l’expansion.com. Voir aussi C.-D. EHLERMANN, Der Europäische Rechnungshof: Haushaltskontrolle in der Gemeinschaft, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1976; I. DE CROUY-CHANEL, C. PERRON, La Cour des comptes européenne, PUF, Paris, 1998. 286 Valentina VARDABASSO péenne (CCE) par le traité d’avril 1975 et enfin l’élection au suffrage universel direct du Parlement européen (PE). La coïncidence de ces trois événements n’est pas le seul point d’intérêt pour l’historien. Dans les débats sur la CCE se confrontent les diffé- rentes cultures politiques en matière budgétaire des pays européens. De fait, par la comparaison des deux modèles de contrôle externe, anglo-saxon d'un côté et latin de l'autre côté, un espace commun de décision s’esquisse, destiné à jouer un rôle dans la démocratisation des institutions européennes. L’idée de créer une Cour des comptes européenne n’est pas allée vraiment de pair avec le Traité du 21 avril 1970 concernant l’autonomie financière de la Communau- té.4 Ce traité établit l’autonomie financière des Communautés, dotées jusqu’alors de contributions étatiques, et invite la Commission à étudier la façon d’élargir les pouvoirs budgétaires du Parlement européen, sans mentionner la création d’une Cour des comptes européenne. Elle se dégage néanmoins peu à peu des discussions sur l’élar- gissement des pouvoirs budgétaires du PE, que ce traité a eu le mérite de prévoir, et elle se présente à la fois comme une garantie d’équilibre et d’impartialité dans l’architecture institutionnelle, et en tant que compromis avec les gouvernements dans la mesure où les membres de la Cour sont nommés par les gouvernements des pays membres.5 Une cendrillon pour les historiens, la Cour l'est aussi pour ses acteurs. Paul Gaudy, membre de la Cour de 1977 à 1987, en parlant de sa création, admet qu’au début, la CCE ne rentre pas dans les projets de la Commission budgétaire du Parlement euro- péen. Il y a déjà un commissaire aux comptes dans le cadre de la CECA et une commission de contrôle prévue par les traités de Rome (1957). «Si l’on a choisi de rompre avec le passé c’est évidemment plus pour montrer une volonté de repartir à zéro que par nécessité juridique ou technique, car le statut des anciens organes ne sont pas limités par les traités à un point tel qu’ils n’auraient pas pu être adaptés».6 De ce fait Gaudy justifie «le retard au bal» de cette Cendrillon, dont l’existence n’est pas prévue par les traités de ressources propres, mais en même temps explique aussi la raison de sa création comme un compromis nécessaire entre les différentes courantes politiques en vue de l’élargissement des pouvoirs du Parlement européen, et surtout une transaction pour éluder la méfiance de Pompidou.

4. L’idée de créer une Cour des comptes pour les finances de la Communauté avait été lancée en 1964 déjà, lors de la première tentative de créer des ressources propres pour la Communauté européenne (Résolution du PE, 24.09.1964, in: Journal officiel, 06.10.1964, §.15. 5. Dans le sens que la Cour des Comptes européenne n’est pas la priorité du Traité du 21 avril 1970. Dans l’exposé des motifs du projet de budget pour 1970, la déclaration du Conseil «S’agissant de la Commission de contrôle, il est à souligner que le Conseil est convenu à revoir le statut actuel de cette Commission en vue notamment de mettre celle-ci mieux en mesure de s’acquitter des tâches importantes qui lui sont imparties par les traités et par les règlements». Voir à ce propos, H. AIGNER, Pour une Cour des Comptes européenne. Recueil de documents, Secrétariat Général du PE, DG de la recherche et documentation, 1973, p.69. 6. P. GAUDY, La Cour des Comptes européenne, in: L’Europe en formation, 219(juin 1978), pp.3-4. La Cour des comptes européenne (1970-1976) 287

Cette recherche tente de répondre à quatre questions:-La politique budgétaire a- t-elle été un moyen de démocratisation des institutions communautaires? -La pratique du contrôle favorisant l’adoption de décisions faisant l’objet d’un large consensus a –t- elle eu des répercussions sur l’espace public européen? -La question de la repré- sentation politique étant le problème fondamental des années soixante-dix, existe – t-il un lien entre l’accroissement des pouvoirs budgétaires du PE et son élection au suffrage universel direct? -Quelle a été la stratégie de la diplomatie parlementaire?7

«Qui veut voyager loin ménage sa monture». Le problème de la représentation politique dans l’Europe des années soixante-dix.

La création de la CCE, qui avait initialement suscité l’ancienne opposition entre unionistes et fédéralistes, est un produit de la diplomatie parlementaire qui, comme diplomatie transnationale, en regroupant les acteurs dans des réseaux, a brisé la rigi- dité de cette opposition. De ce fait, autour de l’idée de créer la Cour des comptes se sont retrouvés des parlementaires de familles politiques différentes. De plus la finalité politique de la construction européenne est un objectif largement partagé par les acteurs. La mise en place de l’union monétaire de même que les discussions sur l’amé- lioration du processus décisionnel sont allés dans cette direction en dépit de toutes les professions de foi théoriques. Désormais c’est plutôt la question du temps qui s’impose dans les débats, comme ligne de démarcation entre les différentes positions et comme variable à partir de laquelle se déroulent les multiples stratégies politiques. C’est le temps qui départage les partisans du renforcement des pouvoirs du Conseil et les partisans du processus communautaire, favorables à l’attribution immédiate des pouvoirs législatifs au Parlement européen. De ce fait le traité sur les ressources propres donne un nouvel élan aux débats sur les questions institutionnelles et sur la répartition des compétences. Convient-il de renforcer le processus décisionnel ou plutôt la fonction parlementaire? Quels pouvoirs doivent être transférés des Etats vers les institutions? Comment partager l’autorité et quel rôle réserver aux parlements nationaux, tels sont les thèmes d’un vaste débat au cours duquel se sont impliqués avec la même ardeur des parlementaires et des chefs de gouvernement, mais qui, dans le cas de la CCE, a exclu la société civile. Si le temps a été la ligne de partage entre les multiples courants, le réalisme a constitué en revanche le point de convergence entre les différentes forces politiques, l’efficacité des institutions étant une préoccu- pation prioritaire aussi bien pour les parlementaires que pour les chefs de gouvernement.

7. Cette recherche a été effectuée grâce à une bourse accordée par la Cour des comptes européenne et les archives historiques de l’UE à Florence. Je remercie beaucoup le Pr.Robert Frank, le Directeur des Archives de l’UE de Florence, Jean-Marie Palayret et le Directeur du Service de documentation de la Cour des comptes européenne, Gilberto Moggia. 288 Valentina VARDABASSO

Lors de la session de Bonn du Comité Jean Monnet en février 1971, le chancelier Willy Brandt fait observer que selon lui, la question prioritaire devant figurer sur l’agenda européen est celle de l’efficacité des institutions européennes afin de les rendre davantage «aptes au travail» alors que le débat entre fédération et confédéra- tion est demeuré stérile.8 Le grand dessein d’un gouvernement européen fort, contrôlé par le PE implique «la sagesse dans l’exécution». Tel est l’avertissement lancé par le président de la République française Georges Pompidou qui, dans ses prises de positions publiques, envisage l’Europe comme une confédération d’Etats renonçant volontairement à des prérogatives au profit d’instances européennes, en fonction des progrès réalisés par la Communauté.9 Pour lui, il s’agit de maintenir à l’intérieur de l’unification progressive la richesse des diversités nationales, sans brimer personne, en évitant les heurts violents et les risques d’éclatement inhérents à une précipitation imprudente. «Qui veut voyager loin ménage sa monture. L’impatience active dans l’exécution traduit la limitation des ambitions».10 Sur la prudence et la sauvegarde des identités nationales il y a le consensus entre les négociateurs. Le conservateur britannique Edward Heath déclare dans une interview à André Fontaine, qu’à l’intérieur de la Communauté chacun doit rester attaché à son identité nationale et à ses traditions, sans méconnaître l’existence d’un héritage culturel commun.11 Lors de son voyage à Paris le 20 mai 1971, il s’est bien entendu avec Pompidou sur les structures européennes, mais Heath, en raison même de la tradition politique anglaise, se montre plus favorable à un accroissement du pouvoir de contrôle de l’Assemblée. Gaston Thorn, le ministre des Affaires étran- gères du Luxembourg, le plus fédéraliste des Six déclare en janvier 1972: Alors, le tout n’étant pas possible, et devant le rien, je préfère une solution partielle. Si nous ne pouvons pas nous marier tout de suite, commençons par nous fiancer, mais n’at- tendons pas des années en chiens de faïence».12 Il est évident que le climat des accords de Luxembourg a imprégné l’atmosphère. Maurice Schumann s’en aperçoit bientôt en faisant remarquer que l’Europe esquissée par Pompidou n’est pas différente de l’Europe souhaitée par Charles de Gaulle. Les Etats survivent à l’intégration des économies en vue de la coopération sur le plan politique.13 Comme le général, Pompidou emploie également le terme d’«Assemblée

8. AHUE, Fonds Franco Maria Malfatti (désormais FMM) dossier 9, Discours à la session du Comité Monnet à Bonn, 23.-24.02.1971. 9. AHUE, FMM dossier 9, Le Soir, 20.05.1972. 10. Sur la position de Pompidou par rapport à la question de la supranationalité voir ses déclarations à l’hebdomadaire italien Epoca, 13.02.1972: «Je n’emploierais pas le mot intégration. […] Que nos Etats coopèrent concrètement en jetant peu à peu les bases d’une confédération, approfondissons le contenu de cette coopération au lieu d’envisager d’éternelles discussions théoriques sur la supra- nationalité, ce qui est, ainsi que les faits l’ont prouvé, un prétexte pour ne pas agir». 11. AHUE, FMM dossier 9, Déclarations de Heath à André Fontaine, in: Le Monde, 18.02.1972 12. Ibid., Déclarations de Gaston Thorn, in: La Métropole, janvier 1972. 13. AHUE, FMM dossier 9, L’Agence Europe, Compte rendu de la conférence de presse auprès l’Union de la presse étrangère à Bruxelles, mars 1971. La Cour des comptes européenne (1970-1976) 289 parlementaire» en dépit du mot Parlement européen en vogue dès 1962,14 et il s’oppose à l’extension de ses pouvoirs, et à son élection au suffrage universel direct.15 Il reste fidèle à la conception gaullienne de l’Europe des Etats, et il ne croit pas à une conscience européenne fondée sur le sentiment populaire. A la différence de De Gaulle qui ne voyait dans l’Europe qu'un instrument de la puissance française, il reste ouvert à l’intégration, mais non dans l’immédiat, pour la simple raison de la nécessité d’un marché européen pour l’économie française. À la thèse de Pompidou pour une Europe confédérale, aucun chef d’Etat ou de gouvernement n’a opposé une doctrine différente: tous savent bien que l’entrée de la Grande-Bretagne ne peut se faire que dans une Europe confédérale. Telle est la position des gouvernements à la veille du sommet de Paris, en octobre 1972. Ils s’orientent vers une Europe confédérale, et l’activité de contrôle des activités communautaires reste confiée aux Etats, ou dans certains cas aux parlements nationaux. Sic stantibus res, l’idée de l’élection au suffrage direct du Parlement européen n’avait pas de chance de s’affirmer. Dans cette même période se pose le problème de l’ad- hésion de la Grande-Bretagne aux Communautés européennes. Simultanément le dé- puté Michael Stewart propose d’élire une trentaine de députés destinés à l’Assemblée de Strasbourg dans un cadre régional, au suffrage universel direct, tenant compte du fait que selon la loi anglaise, les parlementaires britanniques, devant aller également à Strasbourg, ne peuvent pas déléguer leur droit de vote à la Chambre des Communes. La réaction de Pompidou à cette occasion est très vive, les députés britanniques se- raient les premiers à être élus au suffrage universel direct, ce qui pourrait déclencher un effet de contagion.16 Le problème essentiel, au cours des années soixante-dix, est donc celui de la représentation politique déjà posé au cours des débats qui ont précédé l’adoption de la première Constitution écrite française de 1791 et intimement lié au problème du contrôle budgétaire.17 Concernant l’organisation des pouvoirs publics, la question était de savoir si le Roi aurait eu le droit de veto sur les lois votées par le pouvoir législatif, lui donnant ainsi la possibilité de paralyser les décisions des re- présentants du peuple.18 Deux siècles plus tard la question de la prééminence de la fonction de la prise de décision sur la fonction parlementaire est posée par Georges

14. Archives nationales du CARAN (AN), Fonds Pompidou, 5AG (2) 1073, Pompidou sur l’emploi de la langue française dans la CEE, 28.07.1970. 15. P. GERBET, Pompidou et les institutions européennes, in: M. VAISSE, M. WOIMANT, Pompidou et l’Europe, Éd. Complexe, Bruxelles, 1997, pp.56-57. Voir aussi G.-H. SOUTOU, Les présidents Charles De Gaulle et Georges Pompidou et les débuts de la coopération politique européenne: du Plan Fouchet au Plan Fouchet light, in: Relations internationales, 140(2009), pp.3-17; G. BOS- SUAT, Faire l’Europe sans défaire la France, Peter Lang, Bruxelles, 2006, pp.118-140. 16. AN, Fonds Pompidou, 5 AG(2) 89, dossier 4, Note du Secrétariat Général, Comité interministériel pour les questions de coopération économique européenne au Ministère des Affaires étrangères, 15.05. 1972. L'objet de la note est consacré aux compétences de l’Assemblée parlementaire. A cette occasion la proposition de Stewart a été étudiée. 17. Archives parlementaires, t.29, Séance du 10 août 1791, p.331. Référence à la célèbre querelle entre Antoine Barnave, pour lequel la qualité de la représentativité politique n’était pas nécessairement liée à l’élection directe, et Maximilien Robespierre qui soutenait le contraire. 18. D. MICHEL, 1815-1848. Que faire de la Révolution française? in: J.-F. SIRINELLI (dir.), Les droites françaises de la Révolution à nos jours, Gallimard, Paris, 1992, p.62. 290 Valentina VARDABASSO

Pompidou. Précédemment dans la constitution de 1958, la primauté était est reconnue au président de la République. La prééminence de ce dernier s’était vue renforcée au terme de la loi du 6 novembre 1962, relative à l’élection du président de la République au suffrage universel, où il apparaît comme un représentant du peuple à côté du Par- lement. Dans la Constitution de 1958, la prépondérance de l’exécutif est clairement affirmée. La procédure et le vote de la loi expriment également la volonté du consti- tuant de conférer au gouvernement la maîtrise du processus législatif.19 Les démo- craties contemporaines, à l’exemple de la France, ont en effet privilégié l’efficacité de l’exécutif aux dépens de l’Assemblée parlementaire. Or, représentation et démo- cratie coexistent et sont complémentaires, tout en pouvant également se présenter désunies. Ceci explique l’attitude dilatoire adoptée par Pompidou envers l’élection des membres du Parlement européen au suffrage universel direct, bien qu’il ait re- connu la Communauté européenne en tant que communauté politique.20 Le Parlement européen doit ainsi retrouver son rôle de représentation, car il est le lieu par excellence des tensions démocratiques. Toute analyse de la représentation en tant qu’expression de la volonté populaire a pour point de départ le principe de la souveraineté populaire, ou celui du suffrage direct. Mais comment faire renaître les circuits de la participation populaire? Comment démocratiser les institutions? En un mot, comment passer d’une démocratie gouvernée à une démocratie gouvernante?

Le Traité du 21 avril 1970: une brèche pour la diplomatie parlementaire?

Le traité des ressources propres relance le thème de la démocratisation des institutions communautaires sans pour autant mentionner la CCE. Sans doute le traité sur les ressources propres signé à Luxembourg, le 21 avril 1970, tient une place plus importante dans les débats parlementaires après sa signature, en raison des perspectives qu’il ouvre, que lors de son élaboration. Clair dans son contenu, précis dans le ca- lendrier et dans les finalités, il demeure toutefois évasif sur les moyens d’y parvenir. Tout en reconnaissant au Parlement européen des pouvoirs accrus dans le domaine budgétaire, ce traité ne précise pas si le Parlement européen doit intervenir sur les dépenses obligatoires ou sur celles non obligatoires, et à quel moment le Parlement doit intervenir dans le processus d’approbation du budget. De ce fait la question qui, dans un contexte national peut sembler une lourde question technique, à Bruxelles est à l’origine d’un passionnant débat politique, sur les fondements de la démocratie en Europe et sur son fonctionnement. Jean Rey, le président de la Commission, avance avec prudence. Il comprend que ce traité représente une belle opportunité pour démocratiser les institutions européennes, mais il peut aussi constituer une arme aux mains des gaul-

19. C. DEBBACH, J.-M. PONTIER, Les Constitutions de la France, Dalloz, Paris, 1989, pp.265-277. 20. AHUE, FMM, dossier 9, Thorn à Schumann, janvier 1972. La correspondance analyse la position française qui est partagée dans ses grandes lignes par le ministre luxembourgeois. La Cour des comptes européenne (1970-1976) 291 listes capables de démolir l’architecture institutionnelle esquissée par les traités de Rome. Ceci explique sa prudence dans ses négociations avec le Conseil, au cours desquelles, pas à pas, grâce à l’habileté des députés Heinrich Aigner,21 Georges Spé- nale22 et Raymond Offroy,23 le Parlement se voit donner du moins en principe de nouvelles prérogatives. Les questions secondaires dans le cadre de ce traité concernent la définition d’une TVA commune, l’assiette du bilan communautaire, le fait de considérer ou non comme ressources propres les intérêts perçus pour des retards de paiements.24 Mais c’est à propos du droit réclamé par le Parlement de rejeter globalement le budget que la tension s’accroît. La question n’est pas nouvelle. Depuis l’adoption des résolutions des 10 décembre 1969 et 11 mars 1970, le Parlement réclame à maintes reprises cette prérogative.25 L’objectif est de contraindre le Conseil à prendre en considération le point de vue du Parlement notamment sur la préparation de l’état prévisionnel des recettes et des dépenses et de provoquer des discussions au cas où le Conseil n’ac- cepterait pas la requête du Parlement. Et c’est sur ce dernier point que le Parlement commença son bras de fer avec le Conseil.26 Rey prend le parti de l’Assemblée. Les dernières hésitations tombent pendant la réunion au Palais des Congrès à Bruxelles, le 24 avril 1970, sous la présidence de Spénale, deux jours après la signature du traité, alors que les déclarations de Rey font apparaître «que la Commission avait estimé que le Parlement avait le droit de rejeter globalement le budget et que pourtant elle ne pouvait pas non plus s’associer au Conseil car ses dernières délibérations ne répondaient pas aux attentes du Parlement».27 Les faits n’ont pas trahi les bonnes intentions. Emile Noël, le secrétaire général de la Commission, envoie une lettre à la Commission budgétaire du PE, sollicitant avant

21. Heinrich Aigner, membre du Parlement européen de 1961 à 1988 pour le groupe démocrate-chrétien, a été chargé en 1975, en tant que vice-président de la commission des finances et du budget du PE, de la rédaction du rapport sur la partie du projet du Traité de 1975 qui porte sur la création de la Cour des Comptes européenne. Sur l’engagement des démocrates-chrétiens pour la cause européen- ne, voir P. FONTAINE, Voyage au cœur de l’Europe 1953-2009, Histoire du groupe démocrate- chrétien et du Parti populaire européen, Racine, Bruxelles, 2009, pp.93-97 22. Georges Spénale, socialiste français, président du PE 1975-1977. 23. Raymond Offroy, diplomate français et député de la Ve République (UDR) pour la période 1967-1978. 24. AHUE, Commission des finances et du budget, 1970-0717 (doc.PE 25.239), PV de la réunion du 17.07.1970. 25. Pendant la réunion du 17 avril 1970, Spénale rappelle à maintes reprises que le PE dans ses réso- lutions du 10 décembre 1969 et du 11 mars 1971 avait demandé l’appui de la Commission de la CEE pour avoir le droit de rejet sur le budget global. Cf. AHUE, Commission des finances et du budget, 1970-0717 (doc.PE.24.562), PV de la réunion du 17.04.1970. 26. Dans la même réunion, Aigner intervient contre l’attitude du Conseil: «Si la lettre du Conseil laisse présager une amélioration formelle de la procédure budgétaire, elle ne constitue pas une amélioration substantielle de celle-ci. En effet, le Conseil n’avait pas tenu compte des suggestions du Parlement ni motivé ses décisions à la matière». 27. AHUE, Commission des finances et du budget, 1970-0424 (doc.PE 24.776), PV de la réunion du 24.04.1970. 292 Valentina VARDABASSO le 1er juin 1970 son avis sur l’état prévisionnel de la Communauté.28 L’effet immédiat de ce traité est la nécessité d’établir le budget prévisionnel sur le long terme. L’ambition du Parlement européen — occuper une place plus importante dans la vie communautaire –, ne se limite pas simplement au contrôle du budget, mais doit s’étendre à son intervention dans la phase préliminaire d’établissement du budget, et surtout à son implication dans des programmes pluriannuels avec un rayon d’action plus vaste que le projet prévisionnel annuel. Il va sans dire que, selon Spénale, ce traité privant les Etats des prérogatives budgétaires donne un nouvel élan à la solidarité communautaire, car il détourne, tout au moins dans ses intentions, les Etats du chantage au juste retour.29 Mais d’un point de vue institutionnel quel a été l’effet de ce traité? Sur la base de la documentation disponible, en replaçant les résultats dans la perspective des évé- nements des années suivantes, a-t-il opéré une révolution «copernicienne» au niveau des institutions européennes? La limitation des pouvoirs budgétaires réservés au Par- lement suggère la prudence dans l’analyse. Ce traité a été plutôt dans la pratique la référence juridique de la diplomatie parlementaire, qui a ainsi ouvert une brèche, dans le but de démocratiser les institutions. Dans les faits, il a tout d’abord suscité des débats sur l’évolution des institutions européennes, confinées dans le cadre étroit des Traités de Rome(1957), et enfermées dans le compromis gaullien de Luxembourg. Jusqu’à l’élargissement de l'Europe des Six à l'Europe des Neuf (1972/73), l’évolution institutionnelle de la Communauté est limitée à la fusion des exécutifs, résultant du Traité du 8 avril 1965, complétée en juillet 1967 par la fusion de la Haute Autorité (CECA) et des Commissions de la CEE et d’Euratom. En outre, c’est au moyen des ouvertures de ce traité que la Communauté s’émancipe de l’impasse institutionnelle des Traités de Rome comme du statut im- personnel et indifférencié d’organisation internationale pour acquérir avec l’autonomie financière le rang d’institution, malgré ses contradictions et ses faiblesses toujours plus évidentes. Mais ce traité, et c’est son aspect le plus neuf, en accordant au Parlement européen un pouvoir budgétaire, donne l’impulsion à un processus de dé- mocratisation des institutions européennes. Et c’est là l’intuition la plus importante des acteurs de la diplomatie parlementaire. La fonction budgétaire en tant que facteur de démocratisation des institutions, était la question, la plus souvent posée pendant les débats des années soixante-dix à la différence de ceux des années précédentes.30 De cette façon, la fonction budgétaire se retrouve théoriquement associée à la fonction parlementaire dans la pratique des prévisions annuelles et pluriannuelles, prérogative réservée aux Parlements nationaux, mais le Conseil jusque là seul détenteur de cette fonction refuse dans la pratique que celle-ci soit également accordée au PE. C’est le point crucial de l’exercice de la fonction parlementaire qui implique la participation de l’Assemblée à l’orientation et au contrôle de l’ensemble de la politique communautaire. Autrement dit, aux termes de ce traité, le Parlement européen

28. Ibid., Noël à Commission budgétaire du PE, 24.04.1970. 29. Ibid., Spénale au président du PE, 24.04.1970. 30. P. GERBET, La construction de l’Europe, Armand Colin, Paris, 2007, pp.258-262. La Cour des comptes européenne (1970-1976) 293 se réapproprie sa fonction essentielle: l’attribution des recettes et le contrôle des dé- penses, mais de façon encore très limitée. L’importance de ce moment historique n’a pas échappé à une poignée de parlementaires européens, réunis à la commission des finances et des budgets du PE. Les priorités politiques sont fixées au cours de ces réunions et la stratégie parlementaire est alors déterminée en fonction de ces objectifs. Parmi ces députés, Spénale est le plus enthousiaste. A plusieurs reprises il intervient à l’Assemblée, dans le but de lever l’équivoque sur l’essence institutionnelle du Conseil des ministres, qu’il n’hésite pas à définir comme une institution «un peu cumularde» ayant à la fois les attributions d’un Parlement, les responsabilités d’un gouvernement, les méthodes propres à la négociation internationale, et des procédures collégiales, anonymes et secrètes. Spénale voit l’autonomie financière des Commu- nautés comme un acte d’émancipation, «la fin de la dépendance parentale des Etats membres», et surtout la fin du cumul des pouvoirs gouvernementaux et parlementaires qui avait caractérisé jusqu’alors le Conseil.31 Au sein de cette commission parlementaire on se persuade bientôt que le pouvoir budgétaire en soi est vide. Le pouvoir d’établir le budget ne coïncide pas avec le pouvoir de prendre des décisions de politique économique et sociale. Celles qui concernent les dépenses et les recettes ré- sultent de mesures adoptées automatiquement dans le système communautaire. Sur- tout dans le vaste domaine des dépenses obligatoires, il est évident que le pouvoir budgétaire est subordonné au pouvoir législatif. Sur la base de ces considérations et des études entreprises après la signature du traité.32 La commission parlementaire acquiert la conviction qu’il n’est pas possible de renforcer les pouvoirs budgétaires du Parlement européen sans augmenter parallèlement ses pouvoirs législatifs. La ré- appropriation par l’Assemblée parlementaire des seules fonctions budgétaires ne ga- rantit pas automatiquement la participation du PE à la politique communautaire. C’est très clair pour Spénale qui, pendant ses entretiens à Bruxelles avec Sicco Mansholt, fixe deux priorités pour la nouvelle stratégie parlementaire: participation du PE au pouvoir législatif, et possibilité pour le PE de rejeter en bloc le budget. Les propositions de Spénale pour consolider les pouvoirs budgétaires en amont visent clairement à l’accroissement des pouvoirs législatifs en aval. Malgré la grande ambition largement partagée par les acteurs de démocratiser les institutions communautaires, le débat demeure essentiellement interinstitutionnel, limité aux représentants des gouvernements et de la Commission ainsi qu’aux parlementaires de la commission des finances et des budgets du PE. Les mouvements d’inspiration fédéraliste, qui partagent pourtant la même préoccupation sur le déficit démocratique de la Com-

31. «L’entrée dans le système des ressources propres constituera pour les Communautés une mutation fondamentale, la plus importante depuis le traité de Rome. […] Selon une loi d’évolution biologique chez les êtres primitifs, un seul organe peut remplir les fonctions qui sont dévolues à plusieurs organes dans les êtres plus évolués. Nous pensons que cette Communauté doit devenir un être évo- lué». Séance du PE, Intervention de Spénale, 04.10.1973. 32. Nous avons concentré notre attention surtout sur ces rapports, notes, ou censures, qui ont été à la base de l’action de la Commission des finances et du budget du PE. AHUE, FMM dossier 51, Note de Spinelli sur l’héritage des traités de Rome dans la structure institutionnelle, 05.07.1971; AHUE, Fonds Emile Noël 72, Motion de censure déposée par Spénale, 16.11.1972. Cf. Rapport de Hans Furler sur l’élargissement des pouvoirs du PE, 27.03.1972. 294 Valentina VARDABASSO munauté, ne voient pas se profiler l’opportunité concrète qui se présente.33 Aigner et Spénale au contraire sentent le vent qui souffle dans la direction favorable à leur projet. Le Traité de Luxembourg du 21 avril 1970 n’est en effet pas limité aux ressources propres de la Communauté, il ouvre de larges perspectives d’action pour le Parlement européen, notamment la démocratisation des institutions par l’élargisse- ment des pouvoirs budgétaires de ce dernier.34 En bref, il s’agit de passer de la démocratie gouvernée à la démocratie gouvernante en se réappropriant la prérogative législative au moyen de la fonction budgétaire, et dans ce cas d’espèce du contrôle de cette dernière. Toutefois si un certain accord règne au sein de cette commission, il existe à l’intérieur du PE une opposition sur les questions institutionnelles entre le groupe socialiste et le démocrates chrétiens d’une part, et d’autre part l’Union démocratique européenne (UDE) plus proche de la position des gouvernements. Le chemin menant à la définition d’une position commune s’annonçait plutôt long, mais dans les débats il n’a encore l’idée d’instituer une Cour des comptes au niveau européen.

3. Les positions à l’intérieur du Parlement européen

Celles-ci se déterminèrent sur trois thèmes: l’élargissement des pouvoirs du Parle- ment européen; l’élection de celui-ci au suffrage universel; la relation entre l’élection directe du PE et l’élargissement de ses pouvoirs. Sur le premier point l’Union démo- cratique européenne, s’oppose aux deux groupes socialistes et démocrates-chrétiens, en dépit des suggestions précises et convaincantes qui furent formulées par ce dernier. Mario Scelba, un député démocrate-chrétien italien et président du PE de 1969 à 1972, estime par exemple que l’élargissement des pouvoirs de l’Assemblée doit précéder la formation du gouvernement européen. A ce propos il a élaboré un plan qui dans sa version de janvier 1972 prévoit l’extension immédiate des pouvoirs du PE à toutes les mesures ayant une incidence financière. Par ailleurs suivant l’exemple des Etats Unis pour la nomination aux hautes charges de l’Etat, il est envisagé dans ce plan, un bureau élargi destiné à nommer les membres de la Commission et à contrôler son activité. Le Groupe socialiste du PE, qui a relancé à maintes reprises le Rapport Spi- nelli approuvé à Pérouse le 9 septembre 1971, va plus loin encore. Sur la ligne du fédéraliste italien, les socialistes souhaitent mettre fin au pouvoir exclusif du Conseil en matière budgétaire et législative, et ils vont jusqu’à proposer pour le PE le droit de refuser le budget globalement. L'Union démocratique européenne au contraire conserve une ligne différente, qui apparaît clairement lors de la réunion de Venise

33. AHUE, CIFE 259, Congrès de Londres, 06 et 07.10.1972, «Quelle Europe voulons-nous?». Plus de 150 personnes participent à ce colloque, dont Alexandre Marc, Duncan Sandys, Sicco Mansholt, Jean Rey, et aussi des membres de la Commission des finances et du budget, qui ne soufflèrent mot de leur plan. 34. AHUE, Commission des Finances et du budget 1970-0615, doc.PE 25.035, Spénale à Scelba, 16.06.1970. La Cour des comptes européenne (1970-1976) 295

(1er octobre 1971) quand le groupe prend position contre le rapport de Spénale sur l’accroissement des pouvoirs du PE tout en se démarquant également de la position de Spinelli.35 Le député gaulliste Raymond Triboulet rappelle à ce propos que la France n’a que trop souffert de la confusion des pouvoirs qui peut naître dans une République parlementaire. Le souvenir de l’épilogue tragique de la IV République est encore trop proche pour les députés de l’UDE. Le problème de l’élection directe a-t-il ainsi contribué à éloigner l’UDE des socialistes et des chrétiens-démocrates? Pour ces derniers, l’élection directe du PE, loin d’être un cadeau des gouvernements, est la priorité de l’action européenne. C’est pourquoi ils demandent au prochain Sommet des chefs d’Etat et de Gouvernement un engagement formel en faveur de la participation immédiate du PE à la réforme des institutions et de son élection directe. L’UDE se limite par contre seulement à mettre à l’étude ces mêmes objectifs. Le débat sur la relation entre l’élection du Parlement européen au suffrage universel direct et le renforcement de ses pouvoirs, admis par Pompidou simplement dans le but de renforcer le gouvernement européen et en tout cas pas dans l’immédiat a fait l’objet de controverses encore plus vives. Sur ce lien il est possible de déceler deux tendances. La première est inspirée par le Conseil qui demeure très prudent au sujet surtout de la nature de la relation entre l’élargissement des pouvoirs du PE et l’élection directe de celui-ci. Une délégation du Conseil observe qu’en effet un lien existait déjà entre ces deux questions et qu’il ne convenait pas de modifier l’équilibre actuel ni de considérer l’accroissement des pouvoirs comme un préalable au suffrage universel. Pour les autres, au contraire, il existe une corrélation inséparable entre le renforcement des compétences du PE et son élection par les citoyens. Le groupe socialiste demande des avancées sur les deux volets, car les élections peuvent être tenues seulement par un Parlement doté de pouvoirs réels. De ce point de vue, il faut sortir du cercle vicieux engendré par la séparation entre l’élection et l’élargissement des compétences du PE. L’élection au suffrage universel direct lui est réfusée car il n’a pas assez de compé- tences, et on ne lui accorde pas des pouvoirs concrets car il paraît dépourvu de légi- timité démocratique. La réunion du Comité des représentants permanents du 2 juin 1970 consacrée à l’élargissement des pouvoirs budgétaires du PE et au droit du même de rejeter globalement le projet de budget représente le point de départ des tractations de la Com- mission de contrôle budgétaire du PE. Elle est révélatrice dans son contenu, car son objet, c’est à dire l’extension des pouvoirs du PE, traverse tous les débats des années soixante-dix. Le Quai d’Orsay, notamment par la voix de Maurice Schumann prend l’initiative de cette réunion. L’interprétation de l’article 203 du traité CEE inquiète beaucoup les esprits. Selon Maurice Schumann cette interprétation signifie en pratique la suppression de la distinction entre dépenses obligatoires et dépenses non obligatoires, étant ces dernières les seules selon le Conseil sur lesquelles l’Assemblée peut avoir le dernier mot. Pour lui le texte de cet article est clair et ne peut pas être

35. AHUE, FMM dossier 9, Relevé des différentes positions sur les problèmes institutionnels, 25.02.1972.Ibid. 296 Valentina VARDABASSO interprété comme reconnaissant à l’Assemblée parlementaire «le pouvoir d’arrêter le budget aux fins de provoquer de nouvelles propositions budgétaires». La Commission européenne est également présente à cette réunion. Dans un premier temps, elle semble partager les inquiétudes du Conseil, plus tard elle donne le dernier mot au PE sur l’ensemble du budget.36 Deux années plus tard, le 15 mai 1972, à l’ occasion de la réunion du Comité interministériel français consacrée aux questions européennes, Michel Debré se montre provocateur en évoquant une boutade du Gé- néral De Gaulle après l’échec du plan Fouchet: «les Hollandais qui soupçonnaient ce plan comme une tentative de domination de la France en nous empêchant d’aboutir nous ont rendu un grand service»37 Dans la lettre qu’il envoie le même jour à Pom- pidou il exprime sa crainte d’être entrainé dans une politique extérieure supranatio- nale38 et s’il accepte le Marché Commun comme «une réalité», il repousse l’ idée d’Europe en tant qu’union politique, qui est selon lui «un mensonge». L’approfon- dissement dans la coopération entre Etats souverains doit être pour lui la ligne de démarcation de la politique étrangère française, et il insiste sur le fait que la coopé- ration est une fin politique en soi et non un prélude à l’intégration. Il resta fidèle à l’idée européenne comme union d’Etats. La position de Debré reflète celle du gouvernement français, qui repousse les propositions d’Heinrich Aigner, aussi bien celles concernant le pouvoir d’initiative de l’Assemblée parlementaire, que celles portant sur les prérogatives du contrôle budgétaire. Sur le premier point l’objection des Français porte sur le risque que une décision adoptée à une large majorité par le PE pourrait avoir un poids tel qu’il serait difficile pour le Conseil de ne pas en tenir en compte. En ce qui concerne le pouvoir de contrôle réclamé par l’Assemblée, la deuxième lecture envisagée pour cette der- nière aurait ralenti le processus de décision du Conseil. Ainsi à la fin de l’année 1972, la cause de l’Europe semble s’enliser dans des questions apparemment techniques, mais en fait de grande importance politique. En- tretemps la commission des finances et des budgets du PE voit la fissure ouverte par le traité sur les ressources propres, s’embourber surtout sur les positions de Pompidou. Ce rapide survol sur les positions bien connues des Etats et de l’Assemblée était nécessaire car c’est par la confrontation avec les représentants des gouvernements que la diplomatie parlementaire s’est émancipée du cadre étroit des traités de Rome. Quel a été le poids de ces considérations sur la commission budgétaire du Parlement européen, quelle a été sa réaction?

36. Ibid., Note du secrétaire général adjoint, 03.06.1970. 37. AN CARAN, Fonds Pompidou, 5 AG(2), dossier 7, Debré à Pompidou, 15.05.1972. Michel Debré écrit à propos de l’intégration politique européenne: «Derrière les idées que certains développent aujourd’hui on retrouverait aisément une tradition, que l’opinion populaire a traduit selon les siècles à la manière suivante: la France soldat du roi de Prusse, la France soldat de la reine d’Angleterre». 38. Dans sa lettre précitée du 15 mai 1975 à Pompidou, Debré écrit: «le Marché commun une réalité, l’Europe politique un mensonge». La Cour des comptes européenne (1970-1976) 297

4. La création de la Cour des comptes européenne: une action en synergie entre la commission budgétaire du Parlement européen et le Comité permanent des Cours des comptes nationales.

En ce qui concerne la genèse de la CCE, les deux clefs de lecture offertes par les archives sont complémentaires. La perspective logique bien expliquée par Aigner dans son introduction au livre sur les origines de la Cour renvoie aux difficultés évidentes et bien connues de la Commission de contrôle destinées à augmenter avec l’élargissement du nombre des membres de la Communauté parallèlement à l’accroissement des compétences du PE.39 Sous l’angle diplomatique l’attention se concentre sur la commission budgétaire du PE, sur son ambition et sur sa stratégie. Son ambition est, en se fondant sur les principes démocratiques de la société occidentale, de donner un nouvel élan à la représentativité politique, conçue comme une large participation; en bref démocratiser les institutions par l’élargissement des pouvoirs du PE. Sa stratégie vise le passage de la théorie à la pratique, ce qui implique non seulement la participation du Parlement européen au contrôle du budget mais aussi à l’établissement de ce dernier. La mutation du budget de simple document comptable en instrument politique est la clef de voûte de l’action de la commission budgétaire du Parlement européen. La réaction des gouvernements et notamment l’attitude du Quai d’Orsay à l’égard des initiatives de la commission budgétaire risquent de réduire à néant tous ses efforts. La dépêche de Maurice Schumann est révélatrice: Paris confirme son hostilité à l’octroi du droit de veto sur la totalité du budget au PE, et son opposition aux tentatives d’élargir les pouvoirs de l’Assemblée. Les avancées du Parlement, jugées trop supranationales par les décideurs français, ne s’intègrent pas pour le moment dans la politique européenne de Pompidou. Et surtout les Français ne manifestent aucune volonté de modifier l’article 203 du traité CEE. De ce fait tous les efforts de la commission budgétaire pour élargir les compétences du PE par le renforcement de ses compétences budgétaires, risquent de cette façon de s’enliser. De surcroît l’attitude de Paris, son interprétation très étroite du Traité du 21 avril 1970, sa prise en compte des seules dépenses non obligatoires, risquait de banaliser les compétences budgé- taires du PE en les limitant à des dépenses courantes et en réduisant ainsi la portée de ce même traité sur les ressources propres. Afin d’endormir la méfiance de certains gouvernements, la commission politique du PE présente différents projets pendant la réunion du 22 et 23 juin 1972, en dehors du projet du démocrate-chrétien allemand Hans Furler ayant servi de base au rapport de Joseph Muller et à celui du groupe socialiste.40 Il y a au centre de ces projets, l’idée de doter le PE de la prérogative du contrôle externe sur les activités communautaires, en lui accordant le droit de veto dans la procédure d’approbation du budget communautaire. Selon le compte rendu du PE, la

39. H. AIGNER, Pour une Cour des Comptes européenne, op.cit., p.69. 40. AHUE, Fonds EN 72, PE28.266/def., Rapport Furler approuvé le 27 mars 1972; FMM9, PE30.200/ rev., Rapport Muller approuvé le 13 juin 1972. 298 Valentina VARDABASSO discussion bruxelloise faillit tourner au pugilat, tant la réaction fut violente. Le député UDE Habib Deloncle «s’est livré à une attaque virulente tant du projet socialiste que du projet Muller, et contre toutes les constructions futuristes en matière institutionnelle». Les modifications institutionnelles ne sont pas inscrites selon lui dans les traités de Rome. Tant que les options fondamentales concernant l’avenir de l’Europe ne sont pas réglées, le gouvernement français ne peut pas accepter que des institutions européennes se substituent à des institutions nationales. D’autres membres de la Commission politique, notamment W.J.Schujt au nom du groupe chrétien-démocrate et Broeksz pour le groupe socialiste, déplorent le monolithisme de cette position et reprochent à la France de constituer un frein au développement de la construction européenne.41 A peu près à la même époque, Spénale adresse une motion de censure à la Com- mission européenne, soupçonnée en dépit de ses ouvertures envers le PE, de ne pas avoir accompli les démarches dont le traité du 21 avril 1970 l’avait chargée.42 Le droit de veto, et par là, la fonction du contrôle externe dévolue au PE divise les parlementaires à Bruxelles, comme au sein des parlements nationaux.43 Les communistes italiens livrent aussi bataille. Leur opposition au traité du 21 avril 1970 est motivée par le caractère antidémocratique de l’ensemble de l’architecture communautaire. Selon eux, l’élargissement des pouvoirs parlementaires est une façon de donner une couverture démocratique à des choix faits exclusivement par le Conseil. Aucun vote de l’Assemblée ne peut affecter le Conseil seul responsable de son action. Seuls les parlements nationaux sont dotés de pouvoirs réels sur leurs gouvernements respectifs. Or ce traité réduise les prérogatives du Parlement national. Dans les autres capitales la situation n’est guère plus encourageante. Les discussions approfondies n’aboutissent à aucunes conclusions: l’opposition des communistes en Italie, au Luxembourg, et en Belgique, le silence de l’Allemagne, et surtout la forte opposition des gauches en France ne manquent pas d’inquiéter. Ces échanges de vue ont eu le mérite de démontrer qu’il est nécessaire de conclure au plus tôt un compromis avec les gouvernements en dehors du cadre institutionnel proprement dit.44 C’est à ce moment qu’une convergence de vues s’opère entre les membres de la Commission budgétaire et ceux du Comité permanent de contact des institutions de contrôle externe des pays membres de la CEE: la première cherche des éléments pour s’entendre avec les gouvernements, l’autre une légitimité au niveau européen. Ce Comité permanent des représentants des Cours des comptes nationales s’est formé dans le cadre de l’Organisation internationale des institutions supérieures de contrôle externe (INTOSAI) à La Haye en 1960 et il est un exemple, le premier en Europe, de

41. AHUE EN 72, CR de la réunion de la Commission politique du PE, 22 et 23.06.1972.Ibid 42. AHUE EN 72, Motion de Spénale, 16.11.1972. 43. En ce qui concerne les différentes positions des partis politiques en Europe sur le Traité du 21 avril 1970 ou mieux sur l’élargissement des pouvoirs du PE, voir AHUE, fonds Carlo Scarascia Mugnozza dossier 27, microfiches, Etude présentée à l’ occasion de la séance de la Chambre des députés, 03.12.1970. 44. AHUE, CCO-03, PV de la réunion de la Commission de contrôle, 11.09.1972. Etaient présents pour la Commission de contrôle MM. Bernard, Duhr, Gaudy, Hartig, Simons. La Cour des comptes européenne (1970-1976) 299 contrôle externe au niveau régional. Il est formé par les représentants des Cours des comptes nationaux des pays de la CEE.45 Sur le plan général, le problème du contrôle externe de la gestion financière a déjà été posé à propos des organisations internationales. Il faut attendre le premier Congrès international des institutions supérieures de contrôle externe de La Havane en 1953 pour que la délégation italienne parvienne à faire mettre en priorité à l’ordre du jour la question du contrôle de la gestion financière des organisations internationales financées avec l’argent des Etats ainsi que le pro- blème de l’indépendance des commissaires au contrôle. Les contacts entre les Cours des comptes des pays de la CEE s’intensifient seulement au lendemain du congrès de La Haye en 1960 et se poursuivent tout au long des années soixante dans les différentes capitales européennes. La nécessité de créer un organisme unique de contrôle s’impose lors de l’apparition dans le budget communautaire de ressources transférées venant progressivement se substituer aux anciennes contributions nationales.46 Cette évolution a rendu effectivement plus difficile le contrôle des recettes et surtout celui des dépenses qui transitaient dans les pays de la Communauté. En septembre 1972 se déroule à Bruxelles à l’initiative de la commission budgétaire du PE une réunion entre les membres de cette commission et les représentants des pays membres. Elle avait pour objet de fixer «l’organisation, le rôle et le statut d’une éventuelle institution de contrôle européenne». C’est à ce moment que les représentants de la Cour des comptes italienne parviennent à faire passer l’idée de la participation du Comité permanent des Cours nationales des Six à toutes les réunions et actions concernant le contrôle externe au niveau communautaire. Le Comité permanent se réunit en octobre 1972, à l’initiative des cours des comptes nationales: l’idée de créer un organisme de contrôle externe, défendue depuis longtemps se trouve finalement réalisée. La prise de contact relève d’une initiative de la commission budgétaire, qui sous la présidence du député démocrate-chrétien allemand Aigner organise la première réunion commune le 18 juin 1973. Le but est de trouver entre les différentes conceptions de contrôle externe national une solution capable de s’adapter au niveau communautaire.47 Pendant cette réunion il apparaît clairement que le contrôle externe des finances publiques prend des formes multiples dans les différents Etats d’Europe, il est donc difficile de trouver un seul modèle type. Ainsi le contrôle peut être centralisé ou au contraire décentralisé, tout en sachant que la décentralisation ou la centralisation ne recoupent pas nécessairement la nature fé- dérale ou centralisée de l’Etat. Dans la France jacobine la centralisation n’avait pas

45. A. DE STEFANO, Il contruto della Corte dei conti italiana e delle corte dei conti nazionali alla istituzione della Corte dei conti europea, in: Interventi comunitari nelle aree depresse e nel Mez- zogiorno d’Italia, Jovene, Napoli, 1982, pp.79-106. 46. AHUE, CCO, 03, PV de la réunion de la Commission de contrôle, 16.10.1972. 47. A. DE STEFANO, op.cit, p.85. 300 Valentina VARDABASSO empêché la création de chambres de contrôle régionales.48 Le moment du contrôle diffère également d’un pays à l’autre. Si les institutions supérieures de contrôle belge et italienne pratiquent un contrôle a priori, la Cour des comptes française pratique un contrôle a posteriori. Or si les formes institutionnelles et l’organisation des institutions supérieures de contrôle paraissent très diverses, la conception d’un contrôle externe semble largement partagée dans l’Europe démocratique. La création de l’Etat moderne s’est accompagnée de la nécessité de rendre compte de l’utilisation des moyens financiers au souverain. Plus tard la mise en place des régimes parlementaires s’est traduite par la création de liens très étroits entre les institutions supérieures de contrôle et le pouvoir législatif. Si les formes de contrôle et les modèles d’organisation du contrôle, comme les pratiques, sont très différentes d’un pays à l’autre, la nécessité d’un contrôle externe sur les finances publiques est largement partagée et considérée comme un des piliers de la démocratie. Deux modèles s’imposent lors de cette réunion: l’institution supérieure de contrôle de type latin comme par exemple les Cours des comptes française ou italienne, organisées sous la forme de collège de magistrats, et l’institution de contrôle de type anglais qui est un organisme mono- cratique, tel le National Audit Office britannique, qui est rattaché au Parlement national. Finalement ce nouvel organisme européen est baptisé d’un nom latin, celui de Cour des comptes, et doté d’un profil anglais. Il ne constitue pas une juridiction, et a un caractère collégial et centralisé; il entretient des relations particulières avec la Commission et le Parlement européen et il est doté de certaines attributions spéci- fiques. Avec beaucoup de surprise on découvre le 10 décembre 1976 que le traité de Bruxelles du 22 juillet 1975 établissant la Cour des Comptes européenne, qui attribue le pouvoir de décharge exclusive au PE avec d’importantes prérogatives budgétaires, a été voté par l’Assemblée nationale française sans difficultés (399 voix contre 75). La majorité a été quasi unanime, à l’exception de Michel Debré, pour voter en faveur de ce traité et les socialistes approuvent également. Seuls les communistes expriment un vote négatif. Les gaullistes restent sagement à l’intérieur de la majorité, obéissant aux consignes du Premier ministre Jacques Chirac. Sur le renforcement des pouvoirs budgétaires du PE la rupture entre socialistes et communistes à propos de l’Europe apparaît encore plus profonde. François Mitterrand expliqua dans une interview le 10 décembre 1976 aux Dernières nouvelles d’Alsace: «L’intérêt de la France est d’exercer sa capacité internationale et de respecter sa parole. L’intérêt de la démocratie est de faire assurer le contrôle des masses financières qui échappent aux parlements nationaux par l’Assemblée communautaire plutôt que par le Conseil des ministres».

48. Cette simplification est contestée par S. FLIZOT, Les relations entre les institutions supérieures de contrôle et les pouvoirs publics dans l’UE, LGDJ, Paris, 2003; J.-F. BERNICOT, Quelle diversité de conception de contrôle en Europe, in Réforme des finances publiques: la conduite du change- ment, Actes Université de printemps des finances publiques, Paris, 2007, pp.143-157. La Cour des comptes européenne (1970-1976) 301

Sans doute l’élection de Valery Giscard d’Estaing a facilité les choses et changé le climat politique.49 Cela dit, le traité de Bruxelles du 22 juillet 1975 établissant la CCE est une assurance pour les conservateurs. Le PE se voit confier la compétence exclusive de donner décharge à la Commission ainsi que d’importants pouvoirs en matière budgétaire, mais il doit fonder ses analyses sur les rapports de la Cour, dont les membres sont nommés par le Conseil. Ce compromis de la diplomatie parlementaire facilite la pro- cédure de ratification par les Etats du traité du 22 juillet 1975. Autrement dit, les Neuf pays de la Communauté donnent finalement des pouvoirs accrus au PE.

Conclusion «No taxation without representation». La Cour des comptes européenne, une victoire de la diplomatie parlementaire

Cet article n’a pas la prétention d’être exhaustif. Il entend simplement présenter quelques pistes de réflexion, sur la fonction du contrôle externe, méconnue à ce jour par les historiens, et sur l’action d’Heinrich Aigner et de Georges Spénale, considérés jusqu’ici comme des acteurs mineurs, alors qu’ils ont joué dans cette affaire un rôle majeur. Ils ont eu l’intuition que la fonction du contrôle externe serait un facteur de démocratisation. Institutionnalisé dans la Cour des comptes européenne, ce contrôle externe a ouvert des marges de manœuvre au début très étroites, destinées à s’élargir, par la suite, dans des négociations complexes au PE, qui parvient à partager la fonction législative avec le Conseil grâce au contrôle de la fonction budgétaire. Le Traité sur les ressources propres pose le problème du contrôle externe des masses financières communautaires, qui doit être confié à une assemblée élue directement par les citoyens. Il est à l’origine d’une longue controverse entre les tenants de la supranatio- nalité, qui souhaitent confier le contrôle sur le budget dans sa totalité au Parlement, et les «conservateurs» qui au contraire limitent le contrôle externe du PE aux seules dépenses administratives. La CCE a représenté un compromis, qui a permis au Par- lement d’obtenir un droit de veto sur le budget ainsi que le pouvoir exclusif de donner décharge à la Commission. Il se fonde sur les rapports de la Cour, dont les membres sont choisis en premier lieu par le Conseil, c’est-à-dire par les représentants des Etats en accord avec le PE.50 Aigner, qui joue le rôle principal dans la création de la CCE, est conscient des concessions faites par la commission budgétaire, sur lesquelles il ferme les yeux. Il est cependant de ceux qui agissent ainsi: fermer un œil pour mieux viser la mire afin de mieux réaliser l’objectif. Il a probablement frayé de cette façon la voie à Spinelli,

49. G. BOSSUAT, op.cit. p.146. 50. En ce qui concerne la définition de la diplomatie parlementaire comme pratique transnationale et transversale du pouvoir législatif, voir V. VARDABASSO, Diplomazia parlamentare, in: P. CRA- VERI, U. MORELLI, G. QUAGLIARIELLO (dir.), Dizionario dell’integrazione europea, LUISS University Press, Rome, à paraître. 302 Valentina VARDABASSO membre et vice-président de la commission budgétaire à partir de 1976, aussi bien dans la perspective de l’élection du Parlement européen au suffrage universel direct que plus tard dans les années 1980 dans l’élargissement des pouvoirs du PE, par l’Acte unique(1986) et le Traité de Maastricht(1992). L’Allemand offre ainsi au fédéraliste italien l’outil nécessaire pour transformer le budget d'un simple document comptable en un moyen d’action politique. 303

Der lange Weg zum Schengen-Raum: Ein Prozess im Vier- Phasen-Modell

Andreas PUDLAT

„Euroland und Schengen-Europa schaffen polit-ökonomische und psychologische Bedingungen, welche sich von den noch in den siebziger und achtziger Jahren herr- schenden Gegebenheiten unterscheiden“, hat Hans-Peter Schwarz 2003 zutreffend festgestellt.1 Heute wissen wir, dass Schengen – Synonym für die Abschaffung re- gulärer Binnengrenzkontrollen – die Europäische Union in der Tat, wie beabsichtigt, verändern kann: Durch die gesteigerte Freizügigkeit kommt diese dem näher, was von Beginn der europäischen Integration an intendiert war: einem „Europa der Bür- ger“.2 Seit Dezember 2008 zählt selbst die Schweiz als Nicht-EU-Mitglied zu den mittlerweile 25 Vollanwenderstaaten, zu denen in absehbarer Zeit mit Liechtenstein, Bulgarien und Rumänien weitere hinzukommen werden. Schengen – eine Erfolgs- geschichte, die aber zugleich auch für ein „Europa von oben“ steht: Bevölkerungen und Experten an der Basis wurden vor vollendete Tatsachen gestellt. Diese fehlende bzw. späte Einbindung kommt einem eklatanten Widerspruch zum „Europa der Bür- ger“ gleich, der freilich auch sein Gutes hatte: Das Projekt einer Erleichterung des Grenzübertritts, das erstmals in den 1970er Jahren konkret in Angriff genommen wurde, wäre sonst wohl nicht oder nicht so zeitnah verwirklicht worden. Der institutionalisierte Grenzschutz verfolgt mit seinen Kontroll- und Überwa- chungsmaßnahmen, die sich unter anderem als Grenzkontrollen manifestieren kön- nen, bestimmte Zwecke. Es geht um Gefahrenabwehr sowie mit der „Überwachung der Ein- und Ausfuhr von Waren“ auch um fiskalische und Umweltschutzaspekte.3 Die wohl wichtigsten und am häufigsten assoziierten Ziele sind aber ohne Frage in den Bereichen Migrationskontrolle und Kriminalitätsbekämpfung zu finden. Neben den genannten Wirkrichtungen können Grenzkontrollen auch als Ausdruck staatlicher Souveränität und damit gleichsam als Visitenkarte verstanden werden. Der Staat demonstriert seinen Machtanspruch bzw. seine Hoheitsgewalt und signalisiert gleichzeitig, dass er in ihm obliegenden zentralen Bereichen – z.B. im Feld der inneren Sicherheit – tätig ist und seinen Aufgaben gerecht wird.

1. H.-P. SCHWARZ, Neueste Zeitgeschichte, in: Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 1(2003), S.5-28, hier S.8. 2. Hierzu vorzüglich J. NIELSEN-SIKORA, Europa der Bürger? Anspruch und Wirklichkeit der europäischen Einigung – eine Spurensuche, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 2009, der zu Recht davon ausgeht, dass ein „Europa der Bürger“ als Projekt auf die Anfänge der europäischen Integration nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg zurückgeht. Im Widerspruch zwischen Anspruch und Wirklichkeit ist ihm das „Europa der Bürger“ ein mittlerweile rechtlich fixiertes Ziel, welches möglich und sinnvoll, gleichwohl aber eben „ein nicht abgeschlossenes, doch in seiner Bedeutung kaum zu überschätzendes Projekt“ (S.34) ist. 3. R. BRANDEL, Grenzkontrollen, in: H.J. LANGE (Hrsg.), Wörterbuch zur Inneren Sicherheit, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden, 2006, S.113-116, hier S.113. 304 Andreas PUDLAT

Und genau hier änderten „Euroland“ und „Schengen-Europa“ die Situation nach- haltig. Mit dem Abbau der regulären stationären Grenzkontrollen wurde die Mani- festation der Grenze als Trennlinie und Ausdruck von Souveränität, juristischen, fiskalischen und Machtansprüchen wie auch Identitätsstiftung qua In- und Exklusion deutlich geschwächt – die europäische Integration ist voran geschritten. Gleichwohl ist die Geschichte des Schengen-Prozesses trotz vielversprechender Perspektiven von Seiten der Geschichtswissenschaft nicht geschrieben, obschon es erste hervorragende Studien gibt, auf die sich dieser Beitrag stützt, auch wenn sie in Teilen zu kurz greifen, weil sie im Wesentlichen erst in den 1970er Jahren ansetzen.4 Es soll daher, neben einer Perspektivenerweiterung um die Zeit der Anfänge der europäischen Integration, versucht werden, den Schengen-Prozess in einem Vier-Phasen-Modell darzustellen und in die Phase der Vorspiele, die Initialzündungsphase, die Durchbruchsphase sowie die Integrationsphase zu unterscheiden, bevor die Zusammenfassung den Beitrag abrundet.5

Der lange Weg zum Schengen-Raum: Vorspiele

Die europäische Integrationspolitik bedurfte und bedarf als Politik „von oben“ der Begleitung durch eine intensive Aufklärungs- und Öffentlichkeitsarbeit, oder mit anderen Worten Propaganda. Diese, verstanden als „das Ensemble der Strategien zur politischen Sinnstiftung, Meinungs- und Wahrnehmungslenkung“, ist per se – ent- gegen der mittlerweile verbreiteten negativen Konnotation – kein auf nicht demo- kratisch verfasste Staaten beschränktes Phänomen und nimmt gerade in Krisenzeiten mit entsprechend hohem Legitimationsbedarf einen besonderen Stellenwert für die politische Führung ein.6 Der Legitimation ist dabei häufig ein Identifikationsangebot immanent, das unter anderem über Negativbilder vermittelt wird. Insofern stellen die so genannten Europafilme, die in den ausgehenden 1940er und den 1950er Jahren produziert wurden, um den anvisierten Prozess einer europä- ischen – bzw. treffender einer westeuropäischen – Integration durch eine flankierende

4. H.C. TASCHNER, Schengen: Die Übereinkommen zum Abbau der Personenkontrollen an den Bin- nengrenzen von EU-Staaten, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1997; H.C. TASCHNER, Schengen oder die Abschaffung der Personenkontrollen an den Binnengrenzen der EG, Saarbrücken, 1990; M. BAU- MANN, Der deutsche Fingerabdruck. Die Rolle der deutschen Bundesregierung bei der Europäi- sierung der Grenzpolitik, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2006; M. BAUMANN, Der Einfluss des Bundes- kanzleramts und des Bundesministeriums des Innern auf die Entwicklung einer europäischen Grenz- politik, in: U. HUNGER, C.M. AYBEK, A. ETTE, I. MICHALOWSKI (Hrsg.), Migrations- und Integrationsprozesse in Europa. Vergemeinschaftung oder nationalstaatliche Lösungswege, VS Ver- lag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden, 2008, S.17-33. 5. Der vorliegende Beitrag basiert auf (teilweise leicht modifizierten) Kapiteln aus der im Erscheinen begriffenen Monographie des Autors: A. PUDLAT, Schengen. Zur Manifestation von Grenze und Grenzschutz in Europa, Olms Verlag, Hildesheim/Zürich/New York, 2012. 6. T. BUSSEMER, Propaganda. Konzepte und Theorien, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wies- baden, 2005, S.14. Der lange Weg zum Schengen-Raum 305

Öffentlichkeitsarbeit zu stärken und der Bevölkerung nahe zu bringen,7 eine vielver- sprechende Quelle dar. Denn auch mit Blick auf die Wahrnehmung und Sinnstiftung von Grenzen und deren Darstellung durch die Integrationspolitik kann man den Fil- men Spannendes entnehmen: „Die Grenzziehung bzw. Abschließung der Nationalstaaten im Laufe der Jahrhunderte gilt als der Sündenfall der europäischen Geschichte. Sie hat aus dem einst blühenden Europa einen von Kriegsverheerungen und Zerstörungen gezeichneten Kontinent gemacht. Und der Krieg ist, so lautet die Kernaussage dieser Filme, lediglich die Konsequenz aus der Aufteilung Europas in Nationalstaaten“.8 Die dergestalt, und bei Ausblendung ihrer positiven Aspekte, negativ gedeuteten Grenzen boten so eine interdependente Angriffsfläche für die Propaganda einerseits, aber eben auch für die real- und wirtschaftspolitisch ausgerichtete Integrationspolitik andererseits. Ihre Überwindung bzw. die Abmilderung ihrer Manifestation, wie sie im Zuge des Schengen-Prozesses der 1980er und 1990er Jahre vollzogen wurde, geht damit als europapolitisches Integrationsziel bereits auf die Anfänge der europäischen Integration zurück. Die Idee eines neuen, friedfertigen und modernen, die Grenzen überwindenden Europas wurde gleichsam ex negativo entworfen: „Ein in den Filmen immer wiederkehrendes Bild, das sozusagen als Symbol für das alte, enge, zu überwindende Europa steht, ist der Schlagbaum, der nach jedem Durchgang be- drohlich niederfällt. Auch die Zöllner verkörpern negative Symbolfiguren. Dadurch, dass die Kamera die Zöllner meistens aus der Froschperspektive, d.h. von unten nach oben, aufnimmt, erscheinen sie als übermächtige und bedrohliche Personen. Besonders ein- dringlich geschieht die negative Skizzierung der Zöllner in dem Spielfilm Das Bankett der Schmuggler, in dem die Zollbeamten durchweg als einfältige, rückständige und böse Fi- guren gezeichnet werden, die keine Zukunft mehr in Europa haben“.9 Dennoch sollte die Realisierung dieser Idee Jahrzehnte in Anspruch nehmen – gleichsam zu einem langen Weg werden –, obwohl bereits seit den 1950er Jahren völker- rechtlich basierte bilaterale Abkommen existierten, in denen etwa die Bundesrepublik und ihre Anrainerstaaten zur Erleichterung der Grenzabfertigung ihre Souveränität kontrolliert und in engen Grenzen aufgaben. So war ein Tätigwerden von Beamten einer Vertragspartei auf dem Gebiet des Nachbarstaates in einer „Zone“ möglich und erfolgte auch. Allerdings dienten diese Maßnahmen der Durchführung jener Kon- trollmaßnahmen, die erst im Zuge der Schengener Übereinkommen abgeschafft bzw. verlagert wurden. Darüber hinaus existierten seit dem 19. Jahrhundert Kooperationen zur Kriminalitätsbekämpfung, die den Strafverfolgungsbehörden eine grenzüber- schreitende Arbeit erlaubten und, wie etwa Interpol, durchaus auch institutionellen

7. G. CLEMENS, Europa – nur ein gemeinsamer Markt? Die Öffentlichkeitsarbeit für den europäischen Integrationsprozess am Beispiel der Europafilme zwischen Marshallplan und Römischen Verträgen 1947–1957, in: M. GEHLER unter Mitarbeit von A. PUDLAT (Hrsg.), Vom Gemeinsamen Markt zur Europäischen Unionsbildung. 50 Jahre Römische Verträge 1957–2007, Böhlau, Wien/Köln/ Weimar, 2008, S.45-61, hier S.45 f. 8. G. CLEMENS, op.cit., S.55, weist auch darauf hin, dass mit über 70% der analysierten Filme ein Großteil den Krieg und seine Folgen thematisiert. 9. Ibid. 306 Andreas PUDLAT

Charakter hatten. Zudem waren Passunionen kein Novum, wie der Blick auf die Common Travel Area bzw. die Benelux-Passunion zeigt. Von integrationspolitischer Relevanz wurde ein vergleichbares Projekt auf EWG/EG-Ebene aber erst in den 1970er Jahren. Am 9. und 10. Dezember 1974 trafen sich die Staats- und Regierungschefs der neun Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft in Paris. Von dieser Zusammenkunft ging das klare Signal aus, die Zusammenarbeit in Europa und damit die europäische Integration nicht länger nur mit jenen ökonomischen Wurzeln weiter gedeihen zu lassen, mit der sie in den 1950er Jahren durch die Römischen Verträge begann. „Ziel war ein ‚Europa für die Bürger’, das über Industrie und Handel, über Landwirtschaft und Verkehr hinausging“.10 Die Europäische Wirtschaftsgemein- schaft (EWG) wurde zur Europäischen Gemeinschaft (EG). Damit diese Namensän- derung nicht nur bloßer Ausdruck einer Willensbekundung blieb, wurde unter anderem der Einsatz einer Arbeitsgruppe beschlossen, „die die Möglichkeiten zur Schaffung einer Paßunion und – im Vorgriff – die Einführung eines einheitlichen Passes untersuchen soll. Ein entsprechender Entwurf sollte den Regie- rungen der Mitgliedstaaten möglichst vor dem 31. Dezember 1976 vorgelegt werden“.11 Doch schon ein halbes Jahr nach der Pariser Konferenz legte die Kommission am 3. Juli 1975 einen Bericht vor, der dem Rat die mit einer Passunion verbundenen Schwierigkeiten aufzeigte. Denn eine Abschaffung der Grenzkontrollen für die Bür- ger der Mitgliedstaaten ließ sich nicht ohne weiteres bewerkstelligen, war (und ist) doch deren Unterscheidung von Drittstaatsangehörigen nach deren bloßem Aussehen nicht möglich. Die dergestalt aufgeworfene Frage nach den Profiteuren einer Pass- union ist noch immer aktuell und als „Zentralfrage des freien Personenverkehrs in der Europäischen Union bis heute ungelöst, da […] Großbritannien, unterstützt von Irland, […] die Freizügigkeit auf Gemeinschaftsangehörige, jetzt Unionsbürger, be- schränken will“.12 In der Praxis ist dies aber ohne jene Kontrolle, die eigentlich abgeschafft werden soll, unmöglich. Als wichtige Voraussetzung für die Schaffung der Passunion wurden von Seiten der Kommission überdies die Harmonisierung des Ausländerrechts und ein Einheits- pass genannt. Darüber hinaus sah sie zur Schaffung der notwendigen Rechtsgrund- lage für die Passunion zwei Möglichkeiten: die Änderung des EWG-Vertrages bzw. einen neuen Vertrag auf Basis des Völkerrechts. Denn aus dem EWG-Vertrag in seiner damaligen Form ergab sich keine Möglichkeit, die Passunion rechtlich zu ver- ankern: Zwar stelle eine solche Union „eine natürliche Folge der Grundsätze des freien Verkehrs als einer der Grundlagen der Gemeinschaft dar“, doch sei sie „nicht unbedingt zur Erreichung der unmittelbaren Ziele des EWG-Vertrages erforderlich und kann sich folglich [auch] nicht auf Artikel 235 EWG-Vertrag stützen“. Auf diesen Bericht hin wurde die Kommission vom Rat beauftragt, sich mit der Entwicklung des

10. H.C. TASCHNER, Schengen. Die Übereinkommen …, op.cit., S.15. 11. Kommuniqué der Konferenz der Regierungschefs vom 9. und 10. Dezember 1974 in Paris, in: Bulletin der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, 12(1974), S.8 f. 12. H.C. TASCHNER, Schengen. Die Übereinkommen …, op.cit., S.15. Der lange Weg zum Schengen-Raum 307 einheitlichen Europäischen Passes als wichtiger Voraussetzung zu befassen. Im Rah- men seiner Tagung vom 16. und 17. Juli 1975 in Brüssel „beauftragte der Europäische Rat [zudem] den Ministerrat (Außenminister), die Arbeiten im Zusammenhang mit der Schaffung einer Paßunion voranzubringen und möglichst vor Jahresende einen Bericht darüber zu erarbeiten. Unter Bezugnahme auf Punkt 11 des Pa- riser Kommuniqués vom 9./10. Dezember 1974 beauftragte er den Rat (Außenminister), die Frage der Zuerkennung besonderer Rechte für die Angehörigen der neun Mitglied- staaten als Mitglieder der Gemeinschaft eingehend zu prüfen“.13 Die Fortschritte indes ließen auf sich warten. Von Seiten der Kommission wurden zwar auch in der Tat erste entsprechende Schritte hinsichtlich eines einheitlichen Passes unternommen, doch dann ruhten die Arbeiten der Kommission bis 1981, also ausgerechnet bis in eine Zeit, in der alle EG-Staaten das Ziel von Asylsuchenden waren. Erst am 23. Juni 1981 wurde der Europapass beschlossen.14 Der entsprechenden Entschließung waren im Anhang ein Muster des Einheitspasses und auch dessen Anwendungsbereich beigefügt. Der Pass soll demnach einen bordeaux-violettfarbe- nen Einband und blaue Seiten haben und über Merkmale zur Fälschungssicherheit verfügen.15 Knapp ein Jahr später, am 9. Juli 1982 wurde dem Rat von der Kommission der „Entwurf einer Entschließung des Rates vom 2. Juli 1982 über die Erleichterungen der Bedingungen, unter denen die Kontrolle der Bürger der Mitgliedstaaten an den Binnengrenzen der Gemeinschaft erfolgt“, vorgelegt.16 Dabei handelte es sich allerdings nicht um ein rechtlich bindendes Instrument; vielmehr sollte die Möglichkeit geschaffen werden, Bürger der Mitgliedstaaten – und nur diese – bevorzugt zu be- handeln. „Dies war, da es sich nicht um die Errichtung einer Paßunion handelte, systemgerecht und entsprach der Idee der Schaffung besonderer Rechte für europäische Bürger. Dieses Sys- tem bedingte die Kontrolle der Reisenden an getrennten Abfertigungsschaltern. […] Der Nachweis für die Zugehörigkeit zu einem Mitgliedstaat sollte durch das Vorzeigen des geschlossenen Europapasses geführt werden“.17 Die Entschließung fußte auf „dem Bewußtsein, daß die auf dem einheitlichen Paß beruhende Paßunion schrittweise verwirklicht werden muß und dadurch allen Bür-

13. Paßunion – Sonderrechte, in: Bulletin der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, 7/8(1975), S.127-128. 14. Entschließung der im Rat vereinigten Vertreter der Regierungen der Mitgliedstaaten der Europä- ischen Gemeinschaften vom 23. Juni 1981, in: Amtsblatt der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, 19.09.1981, S.1-7. 15. Ergänzende Entschließung zu der Entschließung vom 23. Juni 1981 über die Einführung eines nach einheitlichem Muster gestalteten Passes der im Rat vereinigten Vertreter der Regierungen der Mit- gliedstaaten der Europäischen Gemeinschaften vom 30. Juni 1982, Anhang, in: Amtsblatt der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, 16.07.1982, S.2. 16. Entwurf einer Entschließung des Rates vom 2. Juli 1982 über die Erleichterungen der Bedingungen, unter denen die Kontrolle der Bürger der Mitgliedstaaten an den Binnengrenzen der Gemeinschaft erfolgt (Von der Kommission dem Rat vorgelegt am 9. Juli 1982, in: Amtsblatt der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, 31.07.1982, S.6-7. 17. H.C. TASCHNER, Schengen. Die Übereinkommen …, op.cit., S.17. 308 Andreas PUDLAT gern der Mitgliedstaaten das Gefühl der Zugehörigkeit zu dieser Gemeinschaft gegeben wird“, und „der Überzeugung, daß die Gemeinschaft für den Bürger mehr Bedeutung gewinnen muß, damit er im Alltagsleben tatsächlich ihre positiven Wir- kungen spürt“. Daher sah der Entwurf vor, dass die Mitgliedstaaten bis zum 31. Dezember 1984 „sowohl die Strenge als auch die Dauer der Kontrollen der Bürger der Mitgliedstaaten […] verringern“ sollten, „und zwar bei gleichzeitiger Aufrecht- erhaltung der an den Außengrenzen der Gemeinschaft geltenden Kontrollen“. Le- diglich stichprobenartig bzw. bei Verdachtsmomenten sollten die Kontrollen inten- siver vorgenommen werden, gleich um welchen Verkehrsweg es sich handelt. Diese Möglichkeit der Erleichterung sollte uneingeschränkt gelten, und in Erfahrungsbe- richten im Zweijahresrhythmus reflektiert werden, um eine Entscheidung über die endgültige Aufhebung der Kontrollen treffen zu können. Die Reisenden sollten den Nachweis, dass sie zur Gruppe der Berechtigten gehören, grundsätzlich „durch Vor- lage des einheitlichen Passes, dessen äußere Aufmachung sofort auf die Zugehörig- keit schließen läßt, oder durch Vorlage eines Personalausweises“ erbringen.18 Am 9. Juni 1983 befürwortete das Europäische Parlament diesen Vorstoß. In den Beratungen im Rat jedoch offenbarten sich massive Bedenken: Allein Belgien, die Niederlande und Luxemburg sahen keine Gefahren für die nationale Sicherheit, was möglicherweise mit den langjährigen positiven Erfahrungen mit der eigenen Pass- union zusammenhing. Entsprechend schwierig und langwierig gestalteten sich die Verhandlungen, die erst am 7. Juni 1984 zu einem Ergebnis in Form einer Entschlie- ßung führten, die Wartezeiten und Kontrolldauer, insbesondere durch getrennte Kon- trollstellen für Staatsangehörige der Mitgliedstaaten und Stichprobenkontrollen, zu minimieren.19 Doch auch die war nicht unumstritten, denn wie bereits ausgeführt bot der EWG- Vertrag keine Handhabe. Die Erleichterung bzw. Abschaffung von Grenzkontrollen war zwar nahe liegend und eine gleichsam „natürliche Folge“ des freien Personen- verkehrs, nicht aber Bedingung für diesen. Insofern bestritten auch einige Mitglied- staaten die Zuständigkeit der EG für entsprechende Entschließungen und ein Kom- promiss war nötig: Sowohl der Rat als auch die Mitgliedstaaten wurden als Träger der Entschließung genannt, die inhaltlich nicht mehr in allen Punkten dem Kommis- sionsvorschlag entsprach: „Nach Belieben eines jeden Mitgliedstaates sollte ohne Spezifizierung nach Art der Grenze versucht werden, an besonderen Kontrollstellen für EG-Angehörige ‚die Wartezeit’ (vor der Kontrolle)‚ und die Dauer der Kontrolle auf ein Mindestmaß zu reduzieren’, wobei Stichproben vorgenommen werden könnten, ‚sofern dem keine Gründe der öffentlichen Sicherheit entgegenstehen’“.20

18. Entwurf einer Entschließung des Rates vom 2. Juli 1982 über die Erleichterungen der Bedingungen, unter denen die Kontrolle der Bürger der Mitgliedstaaten an den Binnengrenzen der Gemeinschaft erfolgt (Von der Kommission dem Rat vorgelegt am 9. Juli 1982, in: Amtsblatt der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, 31.07.1982, S.6.). 19. Rat, Entschließung 84/C 159/01, in: Amtsblatt der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, 19.06.1984, S. 1-2. 20. H.C. TASCHNER, Schengen. Die Übereinkommen …, op.cit., S.17. Der lange Weg zum Schengen-Raum 309

Initialzündung: Das Saarbrücker Abkommen vom 13. Juli 1984

Motive und Signalwirkung

Mit bilateralen Verhandlungen im französischen Rambouillet am 28. und 29. Mai 1984 preschten indes Frankreich und die Bundesrepublik Deutschland vor und for- cierten den bislang langwierigen Prozess,21 gleichsam mit einer Initialzündung, entscheidend: Die Regierungschefs François Mitterrand und Helmut Kohl vereinbarten den sukzessiven Abbau der Grenzkontrollen zwischen ihren beiden Staaten, und zwar in Übereinstimmung mit dem, was die Kommission ursprünglich vorgeschlagen hatte. Folgt man Hans Claudius Taschner stehen als agens movens hinter diesen Vor- bereitungen des Saarbrücker Abkommens die zweiten Direktwahlen zum Europä- ischen Parlament im Juli 1984 und die damit verbundenen Wahlkämpfe. Ihre wissenschaftliche Untermauerung wie auch eine Perspektivenerweiterung erfährt diese These durch die Politologin Mechthild Baumann. Sie verweist ebenfalls auf die Wahlen, betont aber auch, dass die europäische Einigung neben der deutschen Einheit und der Sicherung des Friedens zu den Leitlinien der Kohl’schen Politik Mitte der 1980er Jahre zählte: „Die 1980er Jahre waren durch die Blockkonfrontation und eine EU-Verdrossenheit in der Bevölkerung bestimmt, die vielfach auch als Eurosklerose bezeichnet wurde. In dieser deprimierten Stimmung wollte Kohl ein Zeichen für Europa setzen“.22 Aber auch handfeste wirtschaftliche Interessen standen, so hat Baumann in ihrer vor- züglichen Studie mit Recht herausgestellt, hinter dieser Europapolitik: Grenzkon- trollen sind ein Kostenfaktor – für den Staat ebenso wie für Unternehmen. Der Staat als Träger des Gewaltmonopols muss die Grenzkontrollen finanzieren, die Personal und dessen Ausstattung mit Führungs- und Einsatzmitteln (inklusive Einsatzfahr- zeugen), die Instandhaltung und Erneuerung derselben sowie auch den Bau und die Unterhaltung von Grenzübergangsstellen erforderlich machen. In diesem Zusam- menhang schlagen auch Folgekosten zu Buche, die aus dem Einsatz von Zoll und Grenzpolizei resultieren – etwa wenn polizeirechtlich Dritte in Anspruch genommen und entschädigt werden müssen oder aufgedeckte Straftaten in Ermittlungs- und Ge- richtsverfahren münden. Selbst im Falle eines Schuldspruches, der im Strafrecht in der Regel damit einhergeht, dass der Verurteilte, die Kosten des Verfahrens zu tragen hat, dürfte die Staatskasse, und damit der Steuerzahler, einen nicht unerheblichen Teil

21. G. KUNNERT, Touristen aus EU-Drittstaaten als potenzielle Terroristen? Ein kritischer Blick auf Ursprünge, Entwicklung und aktuelle Tendenzen der EU-Außengrenzpolitik, in: M. GEHLER, A. PUDLAT (Hrsg.), Grenzen in Europa, Hildesheim, 2009, S.211-268, hier S.218, spricht mit Recht davon, dass „die europäischen Bemühungen als Reflex auf die bilaterale deutsch-französische In- itiative vom Mai 1984“ eine „[n]eue Dynamik“ erhielten. 22. M. BAUMANN, Der Einfluss des Bundeskanzleramts …, op.cit., S.19. 310 Andreas PUDLAT der Verfahrens- und Folgekosten tragen.23 Der Italiener Paolo Cecchini, der mit seinem Bericht „The Cost of Non-Europe“ für Aufmerksamkeit sorgen sollte, hat jedenfalls nach Angaben aus Belgien, Deutschland, Frankreich, Italien, den Nieder- landen und Großbritannien die staatlichen Ausgaben für Grenzkontrollen innerhalb der Europäischen Gemeinschaft 1986 mit 500 bis 1.000 Mio. Ecu errechnet. Auch der Verkehr von Waren, der mit dem Projekt des Binnenmarktes über Staatsgrenzen hinweg schon zoll- und handelsrechtlich erleichtert worden war, wurde durch Grenzkontrollen erheblich verteuert, die damit ein beträchtlicher Kostenfaktor für die exportorientierten Unternehmen waren: interner Verwaltungsaufwand (7,5 Mrd. Ecu), Wartezeiten (415-830 Mio. Ecu), entgangene Umsätze (4,5-15 Mrd. Ecu) – all das erhöhte die Transportpreise, so dass es auch nicht verwundert, dass die „Verwaltungs- und Grenzformalitäten zusammen mit einzelstaatlichen Normen und Vorschriften als gravierendste[r] Hemmschuh“24 bzw. als „größte Behinderung“ und „Dorn im Auge“ gesehen wurden,25 als die EG-Kommission eine entsprechende Umfrage unter 11.000 Unternehmen aus unterschiedlichen Industriezweigen durch- führte. Dabei fällt auf, dass gerade in der französischen und deutschen Wirtschaft der Aspekt der Grenzformalitäten – möglicherweise in Folge des Abkommens von Saar- brücken – erst auf Rang vier eingeordnet wurde. Cecchini deutete dabei die Grenzen hauptsächlich wegen der Kontrollen als Bar- rieren, die infolge von unterschiedlichen Gesetzgebungen und Steuern vollzogen werden: Kontrollen wegen unterschiedlicher Mehrwertsteuersätze und sonstiger Ab- gaben, wegen Währungsausgleichsbeträgen zwecks Preisanpassungen im grenzüber- schreitenden Agrarhandel, im Veterinärwesen, nach den Straßenverkehrsvorschrif- ten, zur Erfassung von statistischen Angaben sowie wegen Lieferquoten und Han- delsbeschränkungen im Handelsverkehr mit Nichtmitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Gemeinschaft. Die Deutung ist damit eine rein wirtschaftliche bzw. ordnungspoliti- sche, die angesichts des Schwerpunkts des Cecchini-Berichtes nicht verwundert.26 Trotzdem fällt auf, dass die Funktion der Grenze als Barriere zum Schutz vor dem Zugriff fremder Hoheitsgewalten, vor unerwünschter Migration oder Kriminalität keine Erwähnung findet. Dieser primär zollrechtliche – bzw. am Rande verkehrspo- lizeiliche – Zugriff, der Grenzkontrollen als Kostenfaktor und Wirtschaftshemmnis entlarvt, vernachlässigt damit unter Umständen jene Kosten, die einer nationalen Wirtschaft aus nicht erkannter bzw. nicht verhinderter Kriminalität sowie ungesteu- erter Migration erwachsen. Da grenzüberschreitend aktive Unternehmen der Mit- gliedstaaten im Fokus der Betrachtung stehen, ist diese Darstellung der Grenze zwar berechtigt. Das entscheidende Argument für einen Abbau der Kontrollen lieferte er dennoch nicht.

23. Zu den Kosten des Strafverfahrens vgl. §§ 464 ff., StPO. Auch wenn etwa die Kosten der Vollstre- ckung einer Rechtsfolge hier inbegriffen sind, kostet u.a. jeder Haftplatz den Steuerzahler. Auch die tatsächlichen Aufwendungen, die z.B. noch durch die Führung von Statistiken oder von Registern, Fahndungshilfsmitteln und sonstigen Datenbanken anfallen, wären zu berücksichtigen. 24. P. CECCHINI, Europa ´92. Der Vorteil des Binnenmarkts, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1988, S.23 u. 28. 25. M. BAUMANN, Der Einfluss des Bundeskanzleramts …, op.cit., S.20. 26. P. CECCHINI, op.cit., S.29. Der lange Weg zum Schengen-Raum 311

Grenzkontrollen als Wirtschaftshemmnis – hier hat die Propagandamaschinerie in Gestalt der Europafilme nicht gelogen, die eben auch aus wirtschaftlicher Per- spektive die Grenzkontrollen und -formalitäten negativ darstellte. Zwar ist eine funk- tionierende Wirtschaft immer auch Ausdruck einer erfolgreichen Politik. Die Er- leichterung bzw. Abschaffung der Grenzkontrollen war damit wirtschaftspolitisch aber allenfalls ebenso erstrebenswert wie aus Helmut Kohls politischer Proeuropa- Leitlinie per se. Gepaart mit der damit verbundenen Verheißung auf Wählerstimmen kam es in Rambouillet zu jener folgenschweren deutsch-französischen Absprache, die einer Initialzündung gleichkam. An europaweiter Signalwirkung jedenfalls mangelte es nicht, denn der Verein- barung bzw. dem kurz darauf in Saarbrücken-Forbach an der Grenzübergangsstelle Goldene Bremm/Autobahn geschlossenen „Abkommen zwischen der Regierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Regierung der Französischen Republik über den schrittweisen Abbau der Kontrollen an der deutsch-französischen Grenze“ vom 13. Juli 198427 waren einerseits Formulierungen immanent, die Rückschlüsse darauf zulassen, dass sich die Staaten in einer Vorbildrolle sahen, andererseits entfaltete das Vorhaben realpolitisch und administrativ Wirkmacht: Als sich der Europäische Rat am 25. und 26. Juni 1984 in Fontainebleau zu Verhandlungen traf und einmal mehr versuchte, ein „Europa der Bürger“ voranzutreiben – unter anderem indem er einen später nach seinem italienischen Vorsitzenden Pietro Adonnino benannten Ausschuss einsetzte – forcierte die in Rambouillet getroffene Absprache zwischen dem franzö- sischen Staatspräsidenten und dem deutschen Bundeskanzler entsprechende Bestre- bungen für den gesamten Binnenraum der EG-Staaten. Die Staats- und Regierungs- chefs jedenfalls ersuchten „den Rat und die Mitgliedstaaten, sehr rasch die Maßnahmen zu prüfen, durch die innerhalb kurzer Zeit, auf jeden Fall aber vor Ende des 1. Halbjahres 1985, erreicht werden kann, daß alle Polizei- und Zollformalitäten an den innergemeinschaftlichen Grenzen im Per- sonenverkehr entfallen“.28 Zwar zeigte sich der Rat wie auch die Mehrzahl der Mitgliedstaaten unbeeindruckt, doch belegt allein das Ersuchen der Staats- und Regierungschefs selbst einen deutli- chen Fortschritt zu den im Vergleich bis dato mit Blick auf die innere Sicherheit sehr ablehnenden Positionen innerhalb der Europäischen Gemeinschaften.

27. Bekanntmachung des Abkommens zwischen der Regierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Französischen Republik über den schrittweisen Abbau der Kontrollen an der deutsch-französi- schen Grenze durch den Bundesminister für Verkehr vom 30. Juli 1984, in: Bundesgesetzblatt, 28.08.1984, S.767. Die Bekanntmachung nennt als Datum der Unterzeichnung fälschlicherweise den 18. Juli 1984. 28. Beilage 7/85 zum BullEG „Das Europa der Bürger“, S.5. 312 Andreas PUDLAT

Bestimmungen

Weit wichtiger aber als diese der Absprache von Rambouillet nachfolgende Bewe- gung im Europäischen Rat dürfte das Saarbrücker Abkommen selbst gewesen sein, das nach seiner Unterzeichnung noch am selben Tag in Kraft trat, wenn auch nur für die Grenzübergänge an Straßen. Es sah im Wesentlichen drei Phasen vor, die sich auch in den Abschnitten des Vertragstextes widerspiegeln. Zunächst waren Sofort- maßnahmen festgeschrieben: einfache Sichtkontrolle bei Aufrechterhaltung des Ver- kehrsflusses anstelle eingehender Kontrollen; ggf. stichprobenartig eingehende Kon- trollen außerhalb der Fahrspur; grüne Scheibe („Europa-E“) als Erkennungszeichen an der Windschutzscheibe von Angehörigen der Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Gemeinschaften und als grenzpolizeiliche sowie zoll- und devisenrechtliche Erklä- rung; entschiedene Bekämpfung der allgemeinen und der Betäubungsmittelkrimina- lität sowie der illegalen Einreise; Einrichtung gemeinsamer Kontrollstellen.29 Diesen „unverzüglich anwendbare[n] Maßnahmen“ schlossen sich solche des so- genannten „zweite[n] Schritt[es]“ an, die bis zu den im Oktober 1984 stattfindenden nächsten Gipfelkonsultationen zwischen der Bundesrepublik und Frankreich vorbereitet werden sollten: Prüfung der Verlagerung der Grenzkontrollen an die Außen- grenzen der Vertragsstaaten sowie – von den Zollkontrollen im Güterverkehr abge- sehen – des völligen Abbaus derselben; Vorbereitung der Angleichung der Sichtver- merkserteilung gegenüber Angehörigen von Drittstaaten; verstärkte Zusammenarbeit zwischen den Polizeien und Zollbehörden beider Staaten, vor allem bezogen auf illegale Einreise und fiskalische Aspekte wie Zollhinterziehung und illegale Kapital- bewegungen; Erleichterung der Zollkontrollen und -formalitäten im Güterverkehr durch ein einheitliches Dokument; gemeinsame EG-weite steuerpolitische Initiativen in Bezug auf Reisefreigrenzen, die Umsatzsteuer für touristische Beförderungsleis- tungen, die Dieselbesteuerung und Besitzbeschränkungen.30 Gleichsam in einem dritten Schritt waren schließlich „[b]is zum 31. Dezember 1986 zu ergreifende Maßnahmen“ festgeschrieben: Vor allem eine Harmonisierung der Mehrwert- und Verbrauchssteuersätze bzw. innerhalb der EG ein entsprechendes Streben danach und eine Harmonisierung der Vorschriften im Ausländer-, Betäu- bungsmittel- und Waffenrecht waren vorgesehen – Begleitmaßnahmen, die „zum ersten Mal […] mit der Aufhebung der Personenkontrollen in Verbindung gebracht“ werden. Zutreffend betont Taschner die Besonderheit, dass alle Staatsbürger von EG- Mitgliedstaaten vom Saarbrücker Übereinkommen profitierten, und stellt dabei einmal mehr Bezüge zur Vorreiterrolle her, die sich die Vertragsparteien selbst zugeschrieben haben: „Da es sich hier um eine Kontrollerleichterung, nicht um die Schaffung einer Paßunion zwischen Frankreich und Deutschland handelt, ist dies nicht selbstverständlich. Die Er-

29. Saarbrücker Abkommen, Art. 2 bis 5. 30. Ibid., Art. 8 bis 14. Der lange Weg zum Schengen-Raum 313

streckung auf alle EG-Bürger zeigt das Verständnis der beiden Staaten, wie es in der Prä- ambel zum Ausdruck kommt, vorgreifend für die Gemeinschaft zu handeln“.31 Vorgreifend war das Abkommen indes nicht nur für die Gemeinschaft. Auch wenn dem Bundesministerium für Verkehr unter Werner Dollinger (CDU) die Bekannt- machung des Abkommens im Bundesgesetzblatt oblag, war er doch genauso wenig informiert wie das Auswärtige Amt unter Hans-Dietrich Genscher (FDP), das Bun- desministerium des Innern unter Friedrich Zimmermann (CSU) oder das Bundesmi- nisterium für Finanzen unter Gerhard Stoltenberg (CDU). In ihrer wegweisenden Studie hat Baumann vom „politischen Alleingang“ des Bundeskanzlers und später von „eigenmächtige[m] Handeln und eine[r] Missachtung der für Grenzkontrollen zuständigen Ressorts“ gesprochen, da dieser den politischen Widerstand vorhersah, der aus den Ministerien zu erwarten gewesen war. Nicht einmal seine eigenen Mit- arbeiter waren einbezogen. Der von Baumann interviewte Ministerialdirigent a.D. Horst Eisel spricht gar von „einer Art Geheimabsprache“: „Die beiderseitigen Ver- waltungen waren vorher überhaupt nicht beteiligt“.32 Das war formal in Ordnung – Kohl verfügte immerhin als Bundeskanzler über die Richtlinienkompetenz – konfliktträchtig war es indes aber allemal. Das war nicht nur Kanzlerdemokratie in Reinform und belastete die weiteren Verhandlungen, bei denen die Ministerien und Behörden um Einfluss kämpften, es ist genau jener abgehobene Ausdruck eines EU-Europas „von oben“, dass geeignet ist, Verdrossenheit und Eu- rosklerose eher zu fördern als zu beheben.

Folgen

Obwohl noch kein EG-Mitglied war Österreich schnell auf den Geschmack gekommen. Bundeskanzler Fred Sinowatz, der das Land von 1983 bis 1986 mit einer SPÖ- FPÖ-Koalition regierte, richtete sich am 20. August 1984 an seine Kollegen in Deutschland und Italien und regte erfolgreich ebenfalls Erleichterungen bei den Kon- trollen an den gemeinsamen Grenzen an. Diese wurden beschlossen, galten allerdings nicht für alle EG-Bürger, sondern nur für die jeweiligen Staatsangehörigen. Fortan gab es auch in Österreich die „grüne Scheibe“ und an den Grenzübergängen auf Au- tobahnen sogar eine „Europaspur“. Die Kommission wiederum nahm, wie Taschner feststellt, das Saarbrücker Ab- kommen als die gleichsam „wegweisende Initiative der beiden wichtigsten Mitglied- staaten der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, die damit guthießen, was die Kommission mit ihrem Entschließungsentwurf [von 1982] vorgeschlagen hatte“ zum Anlass, dem Rat am 23. Januar 1985 einen „Vorschlag für eine Richtlinie des Rates zur Erleich- terung der für die Staatsangehörigen der Mitgliedstaaten geltenden Kontrollen und

31. H.C. TASCHNER, Schengen. Die Übereinkommen …, op.cit., S.19-20. 32. M. BAUMANN, Der deutsche Fingerabdruck …, op.cit., S.77, sowie M. BAUMANN, Der Einfluss des Bundeskanzleramts …, op.cit., 2008, S.21. 314 Andreas PUDLAT

Förmlichkeiten an den innergemeinschaftlichen Grenzen“, also zur Ausdehnung der Kontrollerleichterungen auf alle Mitgliedstaaten, zu unterbreiten.33 Im Gegensatz zu 1982 war diesmal die Rechtsverbindlichkeit vorgesehen, denn unter Bezug auf frühere Stellungnahmen des Europäischen Rates34 wurde eine bis zum 1. Juli 1985 umzusetzende „Richtlinie“ vorgeschlagen. Die Grenzkontrollen wurden dabei ausdrücklich als Hemmnisse für den freien Personenverkehr aufgefasst, wie sie nach Artikel 3 c des E(W)G-Vertrages abgebaut werden sollten: „In Artikel 3 Buchstabe c) des Vertrages heißt es, daß die Tätigkeit der Gemeinschaft die Be- seitigung der Hindernisse für den freien Personen-, Dienstleistungs- und Kapitalver- kehr zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten umfaßt“. Die Präambel führt dabei als Begrün- dung neben den bisherigen Entwicklungen unter anderem an, dass es unerlässlich sei, „daß die Gemeinschaft die Erwartungen der Völker Europas erfüllt, indem sie Maßnahmen trifft, durch die der Gedanke der europäischen Einigung und das Prestige der Gemeinschaft bei ihren Bürgern gestärkt und gefördert werden“.35 Vorgesehen waren zunächst also Kontrollerleichterungen für die Staatsangehörigen von EG-Mitgliedern. Diese sollten die Grenzen frei übertreten können, wobei die zuständigen Behörden an der Grenze und den Grenzübergängen sowie innerhalb eines 15-Kilometer-Radius weiter Kontrollbefugnisse hatten. Die Kontrollen sollten einerseits stichprobenartig, andererseits hingegen bei besonderen Sicherheitslagen verstärkt durchgeführt werden können. „Mit dieser Umkehrung von Grundsatz und Ausnahme sollte auch psychologisch ein wesentlicher Schritt auf die vollständige Aufhebung der Personenkontrollen hin gemacht werden“, interpretiert Taschner überzeugend. Während das Übereinkommen von Saarbrücken aber auf die Land- und im engeren Sinne auf die Straßengrenzen beschränkt blieb, sah der Kommissionsvorschlag neben dem Straßenverkehr auch Regelungen für Flug- und Seehäfen sowie grenz- überschreitende Zug- und Busverbindungen vor. Dabei orientierten sich die ange- dachten Vorgaben für den Straßenverkehr am Saarbrücker Verfahren und ent- wickelten diese für die anderen Bereiche weiter: So waren analog zur „Straße“ ein- gehendere Kontrollen auf besonderen Wegen vorgesehen, um den Fluss der Passa- giere nicht zu behindern. Daher sollten besonders gekennzeichnete Durchgänge mit grünen und roten Schildern eingerichtet werden, wobei die Nutzung des grünen We- ges bzw. das Vorzeigen des geschlossenen Reisepasses bzw. Personalausweises der Erklärung entsprach, die ein Fahrzeugführer mit dem Führen der grünen Scheibe abgab: Die grenzpolizeilichen, zoll- und devisenrechtlichen Vorgaben wurden erfüllt.

33. Vorschlag für eine Richtlinie des Rates zur Erleichterung der für die Staatsangehörigen der Mit- gliedstaaten geltenden Kontrollen und Förmlichkeiten an den innergemeinschaftlichen Grenzen, in: Amtsblatt der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, 19.02.1985, S.5-7. Nachfolgend zitiert als Vorschlag für eine Richtlinie des Rates. 34. Gemeint sind die Entschließung vom 7. Juni 1984 sowie die Beschlüsse von 25./26. Juni 1985 (Fontainebleau). 35. Vorschlag für eine Richtlinie des Rates, Präambel. Der lange Weg zum Schengen-Raum 315

Mit der einfachen Sichtkontrolle der Identitätspapiere wurde zugleich eine Möglich- keit vorgesehen, die Kontrollen von Zug- und Busreisenden zu erleichtern. Anders als bisher waren die Mitgliedstaaten viel aufgeschlossener. „Die Vorstel- lung der Erleichterung der Grenzkontrollen hatte an Boden gewonnen“, so Taschner. Dabei dürfte – auch wenn sich Taschner bei seiner Darstellung grundsätzlich auf (europa-)politischer Ebene bewegt – hervorzuheben sein, dass dieser Gewinn sich zunächst auf die Ebene der politisch verantwortlichen Eliten beschränkte. Auch diese sahen dabei wohl weiterhin Risiken. Denn sie beschränkten „den Vorschlag sogleich auf die Landgrenzen und verlangten, gleichzeitig mit der Kontrollerleichterung alle erforderlichen ‚Ersatzmaßnahmen’ durchzuführen“.36 Damit war vieles gemeint, was später im Zuge des Schengener (Durchführungs-)Übereinkommens unter dem Be- griff „Ausgleichsmaßnahmen“ subsumiert wurde. Letztlich ist der Vorschlag der Kommission vom Rat jedoch nie verabschiedet worden. Vielmehr war das Saarbrücker Abkommen Anlass für die passunionser- probten BENELUX-Staaten der deutschen und französischen Staatsführung in einem Memorandum vorzuschlagen, die Anwendung der Regelungen von Saarbrücken auf die gemeinsamen Grenzen auszudehnen. Es kam in der Folge „noch 1984 zu [einem] intensivem Briefwechsel zwischen den nunmehr bald als Schengen-Gruppe bekann- ten Staaten“.37

Durchbruch: Die Schengener Übereinkommen

Das Schengener Übereinkommen von 1985

Die daraufhin aufgenommenen Verhandlungen mündeten am 14. Juli 1985 im „Über- einkommen zwischen den Regierungen der Staaten der Benelux-Wirtschaftsunion, der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Französischen Republik betreffend den schrittweisen Abbau der Kontrollen an den gemeinsamen Grenzen“. Bemerkenswer- ter Weise begünstigte dieses Schengener Übereinkommen nicht nur die Angehörigen jener Staaten, die der Passunion angehörten. Vielmehr profitierten eben alle „Ange- hörige[n] der Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Gemeinschaften“ von dem Vertrags- werk.38 Taschner folgert daher überzeugend, „daß sich die fünf Staaten des Schen- gener Übereinkommens von Anfang an als Motor der europäischen Integration der Zwölf verstanden haben und nur hierin den Sinn und die Rechtfertigung ihrer Be-

36. H.C. TASCHNER, Schengen. Die Übereinkommen …, op.cit., S.21 f. 37. J. STURM, Das Schengener Durchführungsübereinkommen – SDÜ –. Grundsätzliche Aspekte über einen europäischen Raum ohne Binnengrenzen, in: Kriminalistik, 3(1995), S.162-168, hier S.162. 38. Übereinkommen zwischen den Regierungen der Staaten der Benelux-Wirtschaftsunion, der Bun- desrepublik Deutschland und der Französischen Republik betreffend den schrittweisen Abbau der Kontrollen an den gemeinsamen Grenzen – Bek. d. BMI vom 29.01.1986, S.79-81. 316 Andreas PUDLAT mühungen s[a]hen“.39 Die Parallelen zum Saarbrücker Abkommen sind offenkundig: Abermals waren die beteiligten Staaten in einer selbst auferlegten Vorreiter- bzw. Vorbildrolle und abermals hatte ein Übereinkommen weit reichende Folgen – auf integrationspolitischer Ebene wie auch im administrativen Alltag an den jeweiligen Staatsgrenzen. Auch die Bestimmungen waren ähnlich: Sichtkontrolle des fließenden Verkehrs, Stichproben außerhalb der Fahrspur, Sichtkontrollerleichterung durch die „grüne Scheibe“ als Erklärung des Fahrzeugsführers zu den grenzpolizeilichen, Zoll- und Devisenvorschriften, nach Maßgabe der örtlichen Bedingungen gemeinsame Kontrollstellen. Neu war indes die in Artikel 6 formulierte Vorgabe, auch einen Grenzübertritt „außerhalb der zugelassenen Grenzübergangsstellen und außerhalb der Öffnungszeiten“ zu ermöglichen. Bedingung war freilich die Einhaltung der Zoll- und Devisenbestimmungen. Bis dahin stellte das Überqueren der Grenze jenseits der offiziellen Grenzübergänge eine Ordnungswidrigkeit dar, nun sollte die Grenze also allerorts und jederzeit passiert werden können.

Das Schengener Durchführungsübereinkommen (SDÜ) von 1990

Während das Übereinkommen von 1985 dergestalt lediglich Vorgaben „bis zur völ- ligen Abschaffung aller Kontrollen“ machte (Art. 1), bedurfte es für die Realisierung der kontrollfreien Grenzübertritte zwischen den Staaten entsprechender Konsulta- tionen, die in einem weiteren Übereinkommen mündeten. Zu dessen Ausarbeitung trat unter wechselndem Vorsitz alle sechs Monate ein Ministerausschuss zusammen, in dem alle Vertragsparteien vertreten waren. Seine Entscheidungen wurden von der Zentralen Verhandlungsgruppe (ZVG), die selbst vier nachgeordnete Arbeitsgruppen hatte, vorbereitet.40 Personell entsprachen die Vertreter im Ausschuss dabei jenen, die auch im EG- Ministerrat auftraten. Nur die BRD wich hier ab und wurde durch das Bundeskanz- leramt vertreten. Die Hintergründe für dieses Vorgehen hat Baumann überzeugend aufgehellt. Nachdem Kohls Alleingang 1984 die Ministerien brüskiert hatte, ver- suchten diese über ihre Sachkompetenz wieder an Einfluss zu gewinnen. In diesem Zusammenhang brachten sie auch Argumente vor, die einer Abschaffung der Grenz- kontrollen entgegenstanden. Der Widerstand aus den Ressorts ist damit die Ursache für Kohls Entscheidung, das Bundeskanzleramt zu den Verhandlungen zu entsenden. Die Kommission konnte an den Sitzungen der Minister wie auch – ab 1988 – an denen der Verhandlungsgruppe und ihrer Arbeits- und deren Untergruppen beratend

39. H.C. TASCHNER, Schengen. Die Übereinkommen …, op.cit., S.16. 40. Der Vorsitz wechselte dabei halbjährig zwischen einem der BENELUX-Länder, die sich abwech- selten, Frankreich und Deutschland. Die Gruppen waren: Polizei und innere Sicherheit, Freier Per- sonenverkehr, Transport sowie Freier Warenverkehr. Ihnen wiederum waren Untergruppen nach- geordnet. Der lange Weg zum Schengen-Raum 317 teilnehmen. Auf allen Ebenen nahm sie diese Möglichkeit regelmäßig wahr und hatte durchaus Einfluss: Es „entwickelte sich eine enge, fruchtbare Zusammenarbeit, die zu einer Verfestigung der Beziehungen zwischen der Kommission und den Schengener Arbeitsgruppen führte, insbesondere von dem Zeitpunkt an, als die Haltung gewisser Mitgliedstaaten im Rat die Hoffnung auf eine Annahme des Richtlinienvorschlags mehr und mehr schwinden ließ“.41 Der Richtlinienvorschlag war es auch, der die Kommission trotz des bahnbrechenden Schengener Übereinkommens recht ambivalent auftreten ließ. Sie betonte in einem Schreiben an den Ministerausschuss den positiven Aspekt der durch das Überein- kommen fortschreitenden Integration, warb aber auch um Unterstützung für den Richtlinienvorschlag. Dabei mögen neben rechtlichen Aspekten hinsichtlich mögli- cher Vertragsverletzungen,42 vor allem Prestigegründe bedeutsam gewesen sein. Nachdem nun aber die Erfolgschancen für eine Annahme des Kommissionsvor- schlags im Rat sanken, blieben die Weichen vorerst nur für die Gruppe der Schengen- Staaten gestellt. Den zuständigen Ministerien lag im Herbst 1989 ein Textentwurf für das Durch- führungsübereinkommen zur Unterschrift vor – also in jener für die Welt bewegenden Zeit des Falls des Eisernen Vorhangs. Obgleich für die Unterzeichnung schon kon- krete Pläne vorlagen, zog sich daher die Bundesrepublik vorerst zurück: „Es ist hervorzuheben, daß es nicht die Partnerstaaten waren, die von der Zeichnung abzusehen wünschten, obwohl für diese die veränderten Umstände, insbesondere die Unsicher- heit der Kontrollen an der deutsch-polnischen Grenze, Anlaß hierfür gewesen wären“, betont Taschner.43 Er unterstreicht damit ex post die Frühzeitigkeit der weit verbreiteten Deutung der bundesdeutschen Ostgrenze als Problemgrenze, die es besonders zu kontrollieren galt und gilt. Dass am 9. November 1989 eine Grenzsicherung – die „Mauer“ – und knapp ein Jahr später die deutsch-deutsche Grenze selbst fielen, hat die Beachtung für das Schengener Durchführungsübereinkommen, das gleich mehrere Grenzen öffnete, möglicherweise ungebührlich geschmälert. Dabei kann dieses Übereinkommen als „Modell und Motor der Verwirklichung eines Raums ohne Binnengrenzen im Rah- men der Europäischen Union […], so wie es Art. 7a des EG-Vertrages entspricht“, verstanden werden.44 Es wurde schließlich am 19. Juni 1990 als „Übereinkommen

41. H.C. TASCHNER, Schengen. Die Übereinkommen …, op.cit., S.25. 42. Dadurch, dass nur einige, nicht aber alle Mitgliedstaaten gemeinsam den Weg des Abbaus der Grenzkontrollen gingen, stellte sich rechtlich die Frage, „ob das Verhalten der fünf Mitgliedstaaten einen Verstoß gegen Artikel 5 Absatz 2 EG-Vertrag darstellte, der die Mitgliedstaaten verpflichtet, alle Maßnahmen zu unterlassen, die die Vertragsziele gefährden. Von interessierter Seite wurde der Kommission nahegelegt, die Möglichkeit eines Vertragsverletzungsverfahrens zu untersuchen“ (H.C. TASCHNER, Schengen. Die Übereinkommen …, op.cit., S.24). 43. H.C. TASCHNER, Schengen. Die Übereinkommen …, op.cit., S.26. 44. J. STURM, op.cit., S.162. Der angesprochene Art. 7a ist mittlerweile Art. 14 des EG-Vertrags und besagt unter anderem, dass der Binnenmarkt „einen Raum ohne Binnengrenzen [umfaßt], in dem der freie Verkehr von Waren, Personen, Dienstleistungen und Kapital […] gewährleistet ist“. 318 Andreas PUDLAT zur Durchführung des Übereinkommens von Schengen vom 14. Juli 1985 zwischen den Regierungen der Staaten der Benelux-Wirtschaftsunion, der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Französischen Republik betreffend den schrittweisen Abbau der Kontrollen an den gemeinsamen Grenzen“ unterzeichnet – abermals symbolträchtig in Schengen.45

Ausgleichsmaßnahmen

Im verbesserten polizeilichen Informationsfluss, insbesondere aber einer gemeinsamen Sichtvermerks- und Aufenthaltspolitik sahen die Vertragsparteien eine wesentliche Voraussetzung für das Funktionieren des Schengen-Raumes bei gleichzeitiger Aufrechterhaltung der öffentlichen Sicherheit. Daher trugen sie dem im Schengener Durchführungsübereinkommen auch ausdrücklich Rechnung, indem sie die Schaf- fung einer Informationsbasis für die Kommunikation der Polizei-, Zoll- und Auslän- derbehörden festschrieben: das Schengener Informationssystem (SIS). Es zählt zu den so genannten Ausgleichsmaßnahmen, die im SDÜ zur Kompensation des Weg- falls regelmäßiger stationärer Grenzkontrollen implementiert wurden. Dem Schen- gener Informationssystem wird in den Quellen bzw. der Literatur in der Regel ein immenser Wert zugeschrieben: Es gilt unter anderem als „das erklärte Herz- stück“,46 „wesentliche Grundlage“,47 „Kernpunkt“48 oder „Kernelement der ‚Aus- gleichsmaßnahmen’“,49 bzw. „Kernstück der informationellen polizeilichen Zusam- menarbeit“,50 „bedeutendes Fahndungshilfsmittel“51 oder auch „wichtige Maßnahme

45. Übereinkommen zur Durchführung des Übereinkommens von Schengen vom 14. Juli 1985 zwischen den Regierungen der Staaten der Benelux-Wirtschaftsunion, der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Französischen Republik betreffend den schrittweisen Abbau der Kontrollen an den gemeinsamen Grenzen, in: Bundesgesetzblatt, 23.07.1993, S.1013-1093. Nachfolgend zitiert als SDÜ. 46. W. HEMESATH, Das Schengener Informationssystem – SIS –. Ausschreibungskategorien und Ausschreibungsmodalitäten, in: Kriminalistik, 3(1995), S.169-171, hier S.169. In diesem Sinne auch M. TUFFNER, Das Schengener Informationssystem (SIS). Ein Quantensprung der polizeilichen Fahndung in Europa, in: Kriminalistik, 1(2000), S.39-43, hier S.39, sowie U. ROMMELFANGER, Verbrechensbekämpfung im deutsch-polnischen Grenzgebiet – Analyse und Bekämpfungsstrate- gie, in: G. WOLF (Hrsg.), Kriminalität im Grenzgebiet, Bd.2, Springer, Berlin/Heidelberg, 1999, S.9-28, hier S.22. 47. L. SCHUSTER, Europäisierung der Polizeiarbeit. Ein ebenso schwieriges wie schicksalhaftes Pro- blem, in: Kriminalistik, 1(2000), S.74-82, hier S.79. 48. T. KATTAU, Strafverfolgung nach Wegfall der europäischen Grenzkontrollen. Eine Untersuchung der Schengener Abkommen, Centaurus, Pfaffenweiler, 1993, S.88; H. NICOLAUS, Schengen und Europol – ein europäisches Laboratorium? Europäische Polizeikooperation in deutsch-französi- scher Sicht, in: Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht, 1(1996), S.40-43, hier S.41, der vom „Kern- stück der Schengener Abkommen“ spricht, bzw. ein Kurzbericht: o.A., Schengen-Abkommen. Pan- nen auf dem Wege nach Europa, in: Kriminalistik, 1(1994), S.46. 49. G. KUNNERT, op.cit., S.235. 50. L. HARINGS, Grenzüberschreitende Zusammenarbeit der Polizei- und Zollverwaltungen und Rechtsschutz in Deutschland, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1998, S.71. 51. A. PUDLAT, Grenzen ohne Polizei …, op.cit., S.303. Der lange Weg zum Schengen-Raum 319 zum Ausgleich von Kontrolldefiziten nach Abbau der Grenzkontrollen an den Bin- nengrenzen der Vertragsstaaten“.52 Bezogen auf die tatsächliche, vom System entfaltete Wirkung ist von einem „Erfolgsprojekt“ die Rede. Mit Martin Tuffner spricht ein führender und zugleich promovierter BKA-Beamter gar von einem „Quanten- sprung der polizeilichen Fahndung in Europa“ und sein Kollege Leo Schuster sieht im SIS ein „weltweit einmaliges Fahndungssystem“.53 Dergleichen Wertzuschrei- bungen sind keine unangemessenen Überhöhungen. Vielmehr widerspiegeln sie die Bedeutung dieses Computersystems, das der Erfassung und der Abfrage von Fahn- dungsausschreibungen dient und aus polizeilicher Sicht zu den Fahndungshilfsmit- teln zählt. Hinsichtlich der staatlichen Souveränität wesentlich weitreichender waren die Regelungen des SDÜ, die es Polizeibeamten eines Schengen-Staates erlaubten, auf dem Hoheitsgebiet einer anderen Vertragspartei tätig zu werden. Vorgesehen waren bei Vorliegen bestimmter Voraussetzungen die grenzüberschreitende Observation (Art. 40) und auch die Nacheile (Art. 41). Entsprechende völkerrechtliche Regelun- gen gab es bis dato nicht,54 so dass gerade hierin eine Besonderheit zu sehen ist, die vom SIS zu Unrecht in den Schatten gestellt wird. Denn gerade hier wurde die juristische Schutzfunktion von Grenze entscheidend ausgehöhlt. Dieser Tatsache waren sich die Vertragsparteien sehr wohl bewusst, sonst hätten sie kaum ein derart um- fangreiches und detailliertes Regelwerk für die beiden Maßnahmen formuliert. Zudem enthält das SDÜ Bestimmungen hinsichtlich der anlassbezogenen Mög- lichkeit der Wiedereinführung von Grenzkontrollen (Art. 2), der Außengrenzkon- trollen, der Stärkung der polizeilichen Zusammenarbeit, der Harmonisierung des Vi- sa- und Ausländerrechts und sieht unter anderem in Beherbergungsbetrieben eine Ausweis- und Meldescheinpflicht für Ausländer (Art. 45), eine Harmonisierung des Waffenrechtes (Art. 77 bis 91) sowie eine Intensivierung des Kampfes gegen die Betäubungsmittelkriminalität (Art. 70 bis 76) vor.

Ratifikation, Inkrafttreten und Inkraftsetzung

Nach dem Völkerrecht bedurfte das SDÜ nach Artikel 139 der Ratifikation. „Die Ratifikations-, Annahme- oder Genehmigungsurkunden werden bei der Regierung

52. H. CLAGES, Polizeiliche Fahndung, in: R. ACKERMANN, H. CLAGES, H. ROLL (Hrsg.), Handbuch der Kriminalistik. Kriminaltaktik für Praxis und Ausbildung, Boorberg, Stuttgart u.a., 20073, S.357-404, hier S.368 f.; J. STURM, op.cit, S.162, der von der „wichtigste[n] Ausgleichs- maßnahme“ spricht. Ähnlich J. WOLTERS, Verbrechensbekämpfung – Eine europäische Sache? Aspekte der internationalen polizeilichen Zusammenarbeit in Europa, in: Kriminalistik, 2(1997), S. 86-91, hier S.89, der wiederum das SIS „als eine wesentliche und erfolgreiche Maßnahme der grenzüberschreitenden Verbrechensbekämpfung“ beurteilt. 53. U. ROMMELFANGER, op.cit., S.22; M. TUFFNER, op.cit., S.39; L. SCHUSTER, op.cit., S.79. 54. K. WÜRZ, Das Schengener Durchführungsübereinkommen, Einführung – Erläuterungen – Vor- schriften, Boorberg, Stuttgart, 1997, S.69. 320 Andreas PUDLAT des Großherzogtums Luxemburg hinterlegt, diese notifiziert die Hinterlegung allen Vertragsparteien“. Die hierzu im Vorfeld national notwendigen Verfahren wurden in den Gründerstaaten zwischen Juli 1991 und Juli 1993 durchgeführt: Frankreich (30. Juli 1991), Luxemburg (3. Juli 1992), Niederlande (24. Februar 1993), Belgien (18. März 1993) und Deutschland (23. Juli 1993). Schon am 31. März 1993 hinter- legten Belgien und Luxemburg ihre Ratifikationsurkunden, Deutschland, Frankreich und die Niederlande folgten am 30. Juli desselben Jahres. Damit war auch das In- krafttreten am 1. September 1993 – und damit vor dem Vertrag von Maastricht (1. November 1993) – entschieden, das vertraglich an eine Monatsfrist gebunden war (Art. 139). Dieses Inkrafttreten war indes nicht gleichbedeutend mit der Inkraftsetzung, also dem, was für die Bürger und Grenzbehörden zur veränderten alltäglichen Grenzer- fahrung werden sollte. Zwar regelte das SDÜ, dass die Bestimmungen „vom ersten Tag des dritten Monats nach Inkrafttreten des Übereinkommens an Anwendung“ finden, doch besagte eine gemeinsame Erklärung der Signatarstaaten in der Schluss- akte, dass die Partner sich gegenseitig über Relevantes in Bezug auf das Überein- kommen informieren, dieses vor allem aber erst bei Durchführung der Außengrenz- kontrollen und Ausgleichsmaßnahmen in Kraft setzen. Mit dieser wichtigen Klausel wurden Sicherheitsdefizite durch nicht oder ungenügend umsetzbare Ausgleichs- maßnahmen ausgeschlossen. Der Exekutivausschuss der mit Inkrafttreten eingerichtet und mit allen Befugnissen tätig wurde, terminierte dann auch erst nach Behebung der Probleme mit dem Schengener Informationssystem – einer der wichtigsten im SDÜ vorgesehenen Ausgleichsmaßnahmen – die Inkraftsetzung auf den 26. März 1995. Das Datum war dabei nach rein pragmatischen Gesichtspunkten entschieden worden: „Der wenig spektakuläre Termin wurde gewählt, weil an diesem Tag der Sommerflugplan 1995 der Luftverkehrsgesellschaften in Kraft trat, was für die Flughäfen und die hier durchzuführende Aufhebung der Personenkontrollen von großer Bedeutung war“.55 Im Exekutivausschuss musste einstimmig entschieden werden, was im Vorfeld trotz der Ratifikation durch alle Vertragsparteien zu einer von der Funktionsfähigkeit des SIS unabhängigen Verzögerung führte. Denn Frankreich forderte „einen Aufschub für die Anwendung des Abkommens aus verfassungsrechtlichen Gründen“, da am 13. August 1993 der französische Verfassungsrat Teile des neuen Einwanderungs- gesetzes für verfassungswidrig erklärt hatte. Im September erklärte der französische Staatsrat die Notwendigkeit einer Verfassungsänderung zur Anwendung der Schen- gen-Bestimmungen. Knackpunkt war das Asylrecht: Ohne Änderung der Verfassung, die dann im November desselben Jahres stattfand, „bestünde […] weiterhin die Verpflichtung der französischen Behörden, Asylanträge zu prüfen, die in anderen Staaten des Schengener Abkommens bereits abgelehnt worden sind.

55. H.C. TASCHNER, Schengen. Die Übereinkommen …, op.cit., S.31. Der lange Weg zum Schengen-Raum 321

Dies aber stünde im Widerspruch zu Art. 29 II Schengen II, der die Prüfung von Asylan- trägen einem Staat mit Wirkung für alle Staaten überträgt“.56 Nach den Startschwierigkeiten wird das SDÜ seit März 1995 an den Grenzen zwischen den Staaten der Schengen-Gruppe, Spanien und Portugal angewendet. Die letzteren beiden Staaten sind nach ersten Kontakten im Frühjahr 1991 am 25. Juni desselben Jahres dem Durchführungsübereinkommen beigetreten. Sie haben es am 26. Februar 1992 (Spanien) bzw. 25. November 1993 (Portugal) ratifiziert. Der An- schluss Spaniens und Portugals an das Übereinkommen war dabei nur ein Vorbote des Erfolgs. Während Österreich seit 1985 und Italien seit 1988 einen Beitritt venti- lierten, bekundete 1991 auch Griechenland überraschend ein entsprechendes Inter- esse. Gespräche mit Dänemark (Herbst 1994) sowie Finnland und Schweden (Früh- jahr 1995) folgten. Während Italien am 27. November 1990 und – obwohl ohne Landgrenzen zu anderen Schengenstaaten – Griechenland am 6. November 1992 ohne Probleme dem SDÜ beitraten, war das österreichische Begehren diffiziler. Denn der Vertragstext des SDÜ sah nur vor, dass „[j]eder Mitgliedstaat der Europäischen Gemeinschaften […] diesem Übereinkommen beitreten“ kann.57 Der Weg war der Alpenrepublik damit zunächst versperrt bis die EU-Beitrittsverhandlungen ihren Abschluss gefunden hatten. Erst am 26. Juni 1994 erhielt Österreich den Beobachterstatus, am 28. April 1995 trat es dem SDÜ bei.

Integration

Neue Mitglieder

Mit Blick auf eine nördliche Erweiterung des Schengen-Raumes stellten sich andere Herausforderungen als im Falle Österreichs: Hinsichtlich eines Beitrittes von Däne- mark, Finnland und Schweden war die Nordische Passunion von 1957, die nicht zur Disposition stand, ein Hemmnis, denn deren Mitglieder Norwegen und Island waren keine EU-Mitglieder. Allerdings gehörten beide dem Europäischen Wirtschaftsraum (EWR) an. Eine Hintertür war damit aufgetan, auf deren Basis ein Kooperationsver- trag angestrebt wurde. Entsprechende Verhandlungen begannen im Herbst 1995 und führten am 19. Dezember 1996 zu einer Vertragsunterzeichnung in Luxemburg. Fast exakt ein Jahr zuvor wurde Dänemark, Schweden und Finnland (20. Dezember 1995) der Beobachterstatus zuerkannt. Für Norwegen und Island folgte dies am 1. Mai 1996.

56. R. BIEBER, Die Abkommen von Schengen über den Abbau der Grenzkontrollen, in: NJW. Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, 5(1994), S.294-297, hier S.295. Bieber erörtert in seiner Überblicksdar- stellung „Probleme der neuen Rechtslage im Spannungsfeld von traditionellem staatlichen Recht und [dem] Recht im Rahmen der Europäischen Union“ (S.294). 57. SDÜ, Art. 140. 322 Andreas PUDLAT

So erfreulich diese Entwicklung war, sie brachte doch auch einige offene Fragen mit sich. Problematisch stellte sich unter anderem dar, dass beide Staaten mangels EU-Mitgliedschaft ohne Mitwirkungsrechte im Exekutivausschuss, jedoch an dessen Beschlüsse gebunden waren. Hier schienen das Einstimmigkeitsprinzip für Entschei- dungen des Ausschusses und die nordische Verbundenheit die Lösung. Denn Däne- mark, Schweden und Finnland waren im Exekutivausschuss vertreten. Daher „wird es in der Praxis kaum zu für Norwegen und Island nicht akzeptablen Entscheidungen kommen, da die drei […] Staaten aufgrund der traditionellen nordischen Zusammenarbeit nicht gegen die Interessen Norwegens oder Islands stimmen werden“. Auch die Fragen eines Austritts, der im Ergebnis letztlich nur auf Grund „ernsthafter Meinungsverschiedenheiten“ möglich war, und des Inkrafttretens ohne Komplika- tionen für und durch die Nordische Passunion galt es zu klären. Hier wurde entschieden, dass zunächst der Exekutivausschuss Voraussetzungen für ein Inkrafttreten als gegeben evaluieren und erst dann eine Hinterlegung der Ratifikationsurkunden er- folgen sollte.58

Osterweiterung und Schweiz

Am 1. Mai 2004 traten Estland, Lettland, Litauen, Malta, Polen, die Slowakei, Slo- wenien, Tschechien und Ungarn der EU bei und übernahmen damit automatisch auch den Schengen-Besitzstand, bestehend aus den Übereinkommen und allen diesbezüg- lichen Regelungen. Denn dieser war mit dem Vertrag von Amsterdam vom 2. Ok- tober 1997 ins Recht und in weiten Teilen in die Kompetenz der EU überführt worden. Nachdem alle erforderlichen Standards von diesen Staaten erfüllt worden waren, erfolgte zum 21. Dezember 2007 die vollständige Inkraftsetzung von Schengen: die Grenzkontrollen an den Binnengrenzen entfielen. Bei den am 1. Januar 2007 der EU beigetretenen Staaten Rumänien und Bulgarien ist dieser Schritt nach den derzeitigen Planungen bald vorgesehen, sofern die erforderliche Evaluation positiv ausfällt.59 Die Schweiz, die nicht zur EU gehört, hat mit dieser am 11. Juli 2002 Verhand- lungen über eine Assoziierung aufgenommen, die nach positivem Abschluss zu einem Assoziierungsabkommen führten, das am 26. Oktober 2004 in Luxemburg geschlossen wurde. Über dieses mussten die Schweizer in einem Referendum am 5. Juni 2005 abstimmen und ermöglichten damit die Ratifikation, die am 20. März 2006 erfolgte. Das Abkommen ist am 1. März 2008 in Kraft getreten und wurde neun Monate später,

58. H.C. TASCHNER, Schengen. Die Übereinkommen …, op.cit., S.27 f. 59. o.A., One for all" oder SIS II?, in: Behördenspiegel Newsletter Netzwerk Sicherheit, 25.05.2010, S. 3. Der lange Weg zum Schengen-Raum 323 am 12. Dezember 2008, mit dem Wegfall der Kontrollen an den Landgrenzen in Kraft gesetzt.60 An den Flughäfen wird seit dem 29. März 2009 nicht mehr kontrolliert.

Im Rechtsrahmen der EU

Mit der Überführung in das EU-Recht (Vertrag von Amsterdam) wurde die Mög- lichkeit geschaffen, den Schengen-Besitzstand entscheidend weiterzuentwickeln. Am 26. Mai 2004 schlug die Kommission eine „Verordnung des Rates über den Gemeinschaftskodex für das Überschreiten der Grenzen durch Personen“ vor.61 Da- hinter stand das Ziel, ein „rechtliches Fundament der operativen Durchführung der Außengrenzkontrolle“ zu schaffen und alle relevanten Bestimmungen zur Grenz- kontrolle und zum Grenzübertritt „zusammen[zu]fassen und [zu] konsolidieren“.62 Knapp zwei Jahre später, am 15. März 2006, erging dann eine entsprechende Ver- ordnung: der so genannte Schengener Grenzkodex.63 Dieser „weist einen sehr hohen Grad an Detailliertheit auf und regelt sämtliche Aspekte der Grenzkontrolle, von der Anbringung von Einreisestempeln in Reisedokumenten bis hin zu den zu überprüfenden Voraussetzungen für die Einreise als solche. Ergänzt wurde der Schengener Grenzkodex um eine spezifische Regelung für den sog. „kleinen Grenzver- kehr“, welcher diverse Erleichterungen für Drittstaatsangehörige mit Wohnsitz im unmittelbaren Nahebereich der EU-Außengrenze bei Überschreiten derselben festlegt“.64 Auch die mit dem Schengen-Acquis verbundene grenzübergreifende Vernetzung von Polizeien ist mittlerweile entscheidend weiterentwickelt und zum Teil als „Schengen III“ diskutiert worden. Am 27. Mai 2005 unterzeichneten die Benelux-Staaten, Frankreich, die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Spanien und Österreich den „Vertrag über die Vertiefung der grenzüberschreitenden Zusammenarbeit, insbesondere zur Bekämpfung des Terrorismus, der grenzüberschreitenden Kriminalität und der ille-

60. B. SCHERER, Das Schengener Informationssystem. Entwicklung und Umsetzung in der Schweiz, in: Kriminalistik, 3(2009), S.176-182, hier S.176, sowie o.A., Reisefreiheit ja – Zollfreiheit nein, in: Zoll aktuell, 1(2009), S.6-7. 61. Vorschlag KOM (2004) 391 endg. der Kommission vom 26.05.2004 für eine Verordnung des Rates über den Gemeinschaftskodex für das Überschreiten der Grenzen durch Personen. 62. G. KUNNERT, op.cit., S.246. 63. Vgl. Verordnung (EG) Nr. 562/2006 des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 15.03.2006, ABl. Nr. L 105, S.1, über einen Gemeinschaftskodex für das Überschreiten der Grenzen durch Per- sonen (Schengener Grenzkodex). 64. G. KUNNERT, op.cit., S.247. 324 Andreas PUDLAT galen Migration“ – kurz: Vertrag von Prüm.65 Folgt man Martin David, ist dieser „aus heutiger Sicht das EU-Zukunftsprojekt im Bereich der inneren Sicherheit“ und man kann „von der weltweit engsten multilateralen Vernetzung im Bereich der inneren Sicherheit“ sprechen.66 Den beteiligten Staaten ist der automatisierte Abgleich elek- tronisch gespeicherter Daten auch aus Datenbanksystemen der Partnerstaaten mög- lich – datenschutzrechtlich bedingt bislang allerdings nur im hit-/no hit-Verfahren. So ist der zeitnahe Rückgriff auf Fahrzeug- und DNA- sowie daktyloskopische Daten gewährleistet. Weiterhin wurden Vereinbarungen hinsichtlich der Prüfung von Do- kumentenechtheit, der Zusammenarbeit in den Bereichen Terrorismusbekämpfung, Luftsicherheit und Abschiebung sowie auf Ersuchen und gefahrenabwehrender Maß- nahmen bei Großereignissen getroffen. Politik und Polizei überwinden so sukzessive (Staats-)Grenzen, insbesondere, da – dem Art. 1 des Vertrages entsprechend – eine Überführung in EU-Recht angestrebt wird67 bzw. am 23. Juni 2008 durch formellen Ratsbeschluss bereits für wesentliche Teile umgesetzt wurde. Insofern leistet der Schengen-Prozess einen maßgeblichen Beitrag zur europäischen Integration im si- cherpolitischen Bereich der Strafverfolgung und Gefahrenabwehr – und damit in einem Feld, in dem lange Zeit die nun durch Schengen zum Teil erheblich modifizierten Formen des institutionalisierten Grenzschutzes bedeutsam waren.

Fazit

Die Gegenwart in Kerneuropa kennt die Manifestation von Grenze durch ihren evi- denten Schutz nicht mehr in dem Maße wie es vor einigen Jahrzehnten noch der Fall war. Seit Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges lassen sich vier Phasen erkennen, in denen die Erleichterung bzw. die Abschaffung von Grenzkontrollen zunächst angedacht, dann von Frankreich und Deutschland initiiert und schließlich von beiden Staaten gemeinsam mit den Benelux-Ländern durchgesetzt wurde. Schon diese Durchbruchs- phase war vom Interesse bzw. Beitritt weiterer Anrainer gekennzeichnet. Mit Auf- nahme der Übereinkommen und damit verbundener Regelungen in den Rechtsbe-

65. Die ursprüngliche Einladung zum Eintritt in die Verhandlungen über einen Schengen III genannten Vertrag erging nach den Terroranschlägen vom 11. März 2003 in Madrid vom damaligen bundesdeutschen Innenminister Otto Schily primär an die „Gründernationen“ des Schengenraumes, jedoch konnte sich Frankreich verhandlungstechnisch aus rechtlichen Gründen nicht beteiligen. Daher wurde Österreich eine Beteiligung angeboten. Nach vier Expertentreffen, neun Verhandlungsrunden in Berlin und drei Ministertreffen war der Vertrag ausgehandelt. Im Mai 2005 erklärten dann Spanien und Frankreich ihre Absicht, diesem Vertrag beizutreten. Vgl. W. HUMMER, Der Vertrag von Prüm – „Schengen III“?, in: Europarecht, 4(2007), S.517-530, insb. S.517-520. 66. M. DAVID, Die Zusammenarbeit im Bereich der inneren Sicherheit, in: M. GEHLER, I. BÖHLER (Hrsg.), Verschiedene europäische Wege im Vergleich. Österreich und die Bundesrepublik Deutsch- land 1945/49 bis zur Gegenwart, Studienverlag, Innsbruck, 2007, S.569-576, hier S.569 u. 573. 67. Vgl. auch Rat der Europäischen Union, Mitteilung an die Presse, 12./13.06.2007, S.2 u. 11-12, [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/de/jha/94711.pdf], 26.03.2009. Der lange Weg zum Schengen-Raum 325 stand der EU und der Erweiterung des Schengenraumes auf derzeit 25 Vollanwen- derstaaten hat die Integrationsphase begonnen, die andauert. Zum einen, weil in absehbarer Zeit weitere Vollanwender hinzukommen werden. Zum anderen – dieser Ausblick sei gestattet –, weil die bislang geschriebene Erfolgsgeschichte nicht zwangsläufig für Konfliktfreiheit steht. Die aktuelle Migrationssituation – insbesondere unter dem Eindruck der Ereignisse in Libyen ein drängendes Problem – hat in Dänemark zur zeitweiligen Wiedereinführung der Grenzkontrollen, in anderen Staa- ten zumindest zu entsprechenden Diskussionen geführt. So legitim und Schengen- konform das ist, die erhitzten Gemüter zeigen beides: die Sorge um den Verlust des Errungenen und die Sorge um die daraus möglicherweise erwachsenden Gefahren. Der Bestseller im Europarecht

Die Fallsammlung enthält die wichtigsten Dem Praktiker dient der Band als wertvolle Entscheidungen des EuGH und des EuG, Informationsquelle für die tägliche Arbeit. deutscher und österreichischer Obergerich- Neben dem Lissabon-Urteil wurde auch die te sowie des EGMR. Studenten und Referen- neue Entscheidung des BVerfG zum Euro- dare erhalten so auf anschauliche Weise ein Rettungsschirm in das aktualisierte Fallbuch profundes Verständnis des Europarechts. aufgenommen.

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Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen

Christopher S. CHIVVIS, The Monetary Conservative. Jacques Rueff and Twentieth-century Free Market Thought, Northern Illinois University Press, Chicago, 2010, xiv+234 p. – ISBN 978-0-87580-417-0 – 24,58 €.

Jacques Rueff (1896-1978) was one of the most prominent and articulate French economists of the 20th century. He is especially famous for his criticism of the dominant position of the United States dollar in the international monetary system, the so-called "exorbitant privilege", and his advocacy of a return to gold. The author of this biography, Christopher Chivvis, is a political scientist at the Rand Corporation and teaches International History at the John Hopkins University. For his research, the Rueff family has given him access to Rueff's personal papers. For Rueff, inflation was the great scourge of modern society and the central problem of economic policy. He wrote that, "Inflation is the work of the devil, because it respects appearances without destroying anything but the realities" (p.5). Rueff was so fascinated with the phenomenon of inflation that he spent his holiday in 1924 travelling to Austria and Hungary to "witness its effects". Inflation became the central preoccupation of his life's work. The hyperinflation that had destabilised Central Eu- rope in the interwar period, and the inflation and currency depreciation that had threatened France and its partners in that period, greatly influenced Rueff’s understanding of the problems of European political economy. In the 1960s, Rueff looked back on the period since World War I as the "Age of Inflation". Rueff had a very clear vision of the "foundational role" of monetary institutions in modern market societies. Stable money was essential for a market economy to function, but needed a strong institutional anchor, in the gold standard. That vision sprang not only from a lifetime devoted to the theory and practice of economic policy (during which he witnessed the collapse of liberal capitalism in the Great Depression, the successful reconstruction of Western European democracy in the aftermath of World War II, and the inflation of the 1970s), but also from a deep interest in philosophy. Chivvis therefore focuses not only on Rueff's work as an economist, but also on his work in philosophy. Chivvis observes that there have been no English language studies of Rueff's broader philosophical work, and important parts of Rueff's work were never translated into English. In particular, his magnum opus, L'Ordre Social, which was written during World War II when Rueff was ostracised from policy circles on account of his Jewish ancestry, has received scant attention. For Chivvis, "The real Rueff was at once more profound, more reasonable, and more interesting than the extant literature would suggest. In large part this is because of his combination of free market beliefs with an appreciation of the role of the state in modern economic systems – a central feature of his thought that was itself linked with his French background and worldview" (p.4). The purpose of Chivvis's book is then to offer the 328 Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen

English-speaking reader an introduction to Rueff's perspective on political economy and the historical forces that shaped that perspective. His work is thus not a biography in the traditional sense but an intellectual biography whose focus is on Rueff's thought, and which draws only modestly on the details of his private life. Chivvis clearly characterises the crucial difference between Keynes and Rueff on the functioning of a modern economy, "In crude terms, one of Keynes's core insights was that long-term social changes, accelerated by the Great War, had made price adjustment inherently sticky – that is, sluggish, especially when it came to downward pressure on wages – and thus rendered market mechanisms ineffective, a fact that necessitated government intervention. On the most basic level, Keynes took price stickiness to be an unavoidable consequence of the rise of mass democracy and the horror of the Great War. He thought European economic policy would have to adjust to the new social realities of the 1920s. By contrast, Rueff insisted throughout his life that price stickiness was not fated or exogenous but, rather, the result of conscious policy choices and the willingness of European elites to abandon market mechanisms and monetary stability" (p.11). One might be tempted to agree with Keynes here, certainly for the European economies. However, Chivvis argues that non-inflationary economic growth might also have been possible. He observes that, "Rueff, after all, always had the example of Germany to point to. His ordoliberal friends had managed to create a system there that combined social spending with monetary stability. Why could the same not have happened in France? Rueff's critique of the postwar consensus was, in this regard, much stronger than it may have seemed on the surface" (p.148). The German example clearly illustrates the importance of sound monetary institutions for the functioning of the market economy and a successful economic performance. However, while a few ordoliberals favoured the gold standard, Ger- many was characterised by a different type of monetary institution, an independent central bank. Germany, for a combination of reasons, did not favour a return to the gold standard in the post-war period. Rueff is certainly most famous for his analysis of the Bretton Woods system and his advocacy of a return to the gold standard. Chivvis pays ample attention to these issues. He underlines that, "Rueff's perspective bore the indelible mark of his experience during the 1920s and early 1930s. As he watched inflation in France and other European countries continue, along with the US balance of payments deficits and an accumulation of US dollars as reserve currencies, the memory of the collapse of the British pound in 1931 was in the forefront of Rueff's mind. He feared the dollar could succumb to a similar crisis – a crisis that would in turn encourage a resort to the nationalist economic policies of the Depression and a fragmentation of the Western liberal bloc already challenged by the Soviet Union" (p.160). Rueff considered that some mechanism was necessary to constrain the world's great powers. For this, he looked to the gold standard. I am very much in agreement with the idea that Rueff’s concept of "exorbitant privilege" pointed to one of the most important – if not the most important – defects in the world economy. Rueff's critique of Bretton Woods identified a major structural Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen 329 weakness in the world economy. The dollar's special role contributed to a number of fundamental global imbalances. As observed by Chivvis, "As Rueff predicted, the dollar standard has encouraged earnings on exports to the United States to be recycled back into the US economy from around the world, notably from China. That re- investment could not but have contributed to low interest rates and an artificial sti- mulation of demand in US markets, which, when they collapsed, contributed to a global financial crisis not altogether different from the crisis that Rueff warned against in the 1960s, and that he lived through the 1930s" (p.12). In my opinion, Chivvis could have given even more attention to this issue. Also, Chivvis does not really go into the issue of the continuance of the dollar dominance after the breakdown of Bretton Woods and the new system of floating exchange rates. Moreover, several times, as in the Great Recession, the increase in liquidity did not really lead to strong inflation (Rueff's main preoccupation) but to "irrational exuberance" on the financial markets, followed by a crash. In general, in my opinion, Chivvis is rather too supportive of Rueff. An example is his defence of Rueff's return to gold, "Likewise, the failure of Rueff's campaign for a return to the gold standard was not at all the result of the superior rationality of a dollarized global economy. True, there were problems of a technical nature with Rueff's proposal, including the fact that the future supply of gold would probably not have increased at a sufficient rate to meet the needs of the global economy" (p.186, not exactly a minor point). He further quotes De Gaulle in support, "As de Gaulle pointed out, however, gold has held an eternal value throughout human history" (p. 187). However, looking at the gold price during the last decades, this "eternal value" has fluctuated significantly. I was also surprised at the way Chivvis refutes the role of the gold standard in the Great Depression: "Moreover, the argument that the gold standard was the cause of the depression – which is now the orthodox view of many academic economic historians – is weak from the French perspective. For the French, as Rueff's story makes clear, it was the abandonment of gold by other countries that led to the disintegration of the international economy, the collapse of world trade, and the hyper-agitation of speculative capital, all of which were central problems for France, a country that largely imported the Depression from abroad" (p.68). However, this observation does not in any way refute the idea that the gold standard might have been a major cause of the Great Depression. Moreover, as observed by Douglas Irwin (Vox, 20 Septem- ber 2010), the French share of world gold reserves rose from 7% in 1926 to 27% in 1932. According to his calculations, France's policies accounted for about half of the 30% deflation experienced in 1930 and 1931. It is rather a pity that Chivvis does not discuss these issues. On the whole, this is a very well written book. An important merit is that it places Rueff's work in a broader philosophical and historical context. It is a pity that the book is weaker on the economics dimension and that the author is rather defensive of Rueff. 330 Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen

Ivo Maes National Bank of Belgium and Robert Triffin Chair, Université catholique de Louvain

Dimitri GRYGOWSKI, Les États-Unis et l'unification monétaire de l'Europe, Peter Lang, Bruxelles, 2009, 474 p. – ISBN 978-90-5201-489-0 – 50,50 €.

Les États-Unis et l'unification monétaire de l'Europe is an important book on how the US dealt with European monetary unification in most of the second half of the twentieth century. The author has used an impressive range of secondary material, and, most importantly, primary sources. Dimitri Grygowski has analysed many archival documents, from the State Department, the National Security Council and the various presidential archives (Johnson, Nixon, Carter and Reagan), and made good use of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The book is organised in a chronological fashion, covering four main periods (the 1960s and early 1970s; the mid- to late 1970s; the EMS; and finally the road to the euro), the whole book being divided into nine more specific chapters. The result is a convincing analysis of the influence of the US on European monetary cooperation, the functioning of the US administration, and also the evolution of the international monetary system. It uncovers divergences of views within the US administration as well as its position, far from being monolithic, on the European story. It reflects well the two central motivations of European monetary unification, internal (protecting the acquis communautaire) and most obviously given the book's topic, external (reacting to international events, in particular US actions). A first obvious important dimension of the book is that it places European integration in wider international developments. European integration seems sometimes confined to an internal European story, deprived of external influences. In the case of monetary affairs as in others however, monetary relations do not stop at Europe's borders. Washington-Bonn is for instance a central axis of the European monetary story. European monetary developments were (are) affected by international ones – and vice-versa. Focusing on the US influence on European monetary unification leads Grygoswki to analyse European monetary developments in a changing world monetary system (and from the early 1970s onwards, non-system): the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, or the numerous disagreements between EEC members on the strategy to adopt are obvious cases in point. The discussion about the creation of the Special Drawing Rights (SDR), in 1967, also interestingly constituted the first encounter between European monetary union and the resistance to an American position, as Grygowski convincingly argues (p.47 and pp.67-69). Yet this should not lead to conclude that the US necessarily played a major role in all European monetary developments. A second significant aspect of the book indeed concerns the actual role of the US in European monetary affairs. On closer inspection, the role of the US is in fact of unequal importance: 1978 witnessed for Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen 331 instance "l'apathie de l'Amérique", caught between a desire to influence (if not control the perimeter of) the negotiations over the new European monetary scheme, and a declared stance in favour of European integration (p.232). A final important quality of the book is the long-term perspective it offers. It could conversely be seen as an inconvenient, in that the author could have delved into more details for each chapter. Yet clearly the advantages outweigh the drawbacks. All too often, historical works are confined to very narrow topics and very specific time- periods. Here the analysis covers thirty years, from 1968 until 1998. And the analysis of specific events, though certainly not as detailed as it would have been in a book more narrowly focused, is very rich and precise. Crucially therefore, Grygowski's book offers a sufficiently long time-span to make an informed judgement about how the US attitude has changed over three decades. Les États-Unis et l'unification monétaire de l'Europe is therefore a welcome addition to the literature, shedding new light on an important aspect of postwar European history – and very helpful to understand today's situation. Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol University of Glasgow Wohin steuert die europäische Integration?

Schriftenreihe des EUROPA-KOLLEGS HAMBURG zur Integrationsforschung

Wolf Schäfer/Andreas Graf Wass von Czege (Hrsg.) Aktuelle Probleme der europäischen Integration

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Der Band dokumentiert die Hauptreferate, von Wissenschaft, Politik und Wirtschaft die anlässlich der traditionellen Deutsch- teil. Schwerpunkte bildeten die Themen Ungarischen Gespräche in der Andrássy Währungsunion und Rettungsschirme, Universität Budapest gehalten worden sind. Kohäsion, Konvergenz, Integration sowie EU An diesen Gesprächen nahmen Vertreter und Weltwirtschaft.

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Aktuelle Probleme der europäischen Integration Herausgegeben von Wolf Schäfer | Andreas Graf Wass von Czege , S., brosch., ,– €, ISBN ---- (Schriftenreihe des EUROPA-KOLLEGS HAMBURG zur Integrationsforschung, Bd. ) 333

The international history of European integration in the long 1970s. A round-table discussion on research issues, methodologies, and directions

Research Reports – Rapports de recherche – Forschungsberichte

Introduction

On 17 December 2010 an unusually heavy snowfall blanketed but did not disrupt a workshop hosted by the History Department of the European University Institute. We had gathered to discuss the international dimensions of European integration. Orga- nizers and participants started out from the obvious consideration that the history of European integration in the 1970s intersects with multiple, too often separated and fragmented threads of ongoing historical research on the Cold War, post-colonialism, globalization, and other international and transnational history subfields. Should European integration be framed and contextualized in this large, unwieldy and rapidly evolving cluster of research fields? And how can we best go about it? Of course, there are very good reasons simply to advance integration history per se, but should we not also contextualize it, and possibly re-conceptualize it, in view of the rapidly changing international environment, the challenges it raised, and the responses it elicited? New intellectual approaches might be helpful, perhaps even necessary, in order to address the increasingly relevant external dimension of Euro- pean integration. It obviously affected many, if not most of the crucial policy options, and came to bear from all sides on the new thrust towards the fashioning of a European identity and model. For those working at EUI, the workshop rounded up a semester-long seminar on the recent historiography of European integration during which students – not necessarily integration specialists – had occasionally questioned the extent to which EC institutions, policies and culture really mattered in the larger scheme of things. The question can be uncomfortable for integration scholars, but it is not an unfamiliar one. It is often voiced – or at least politely implied – in many adjacent fields of international and transnational history, and we might as well face up to it openly and squarely. It is often lamented that European integration hardly appears in narratives of the Cold War, and just marginally in historical accounts of the waning of Communism, the rise and fall of the Third World project, or the restructuring of international economic flows and policy regimes over the last third of the 20th century. Nor do we directly affect ongoing investigations on the post-imperial redefinition of European societies and polities, with its complex, controversial reorganization of public culture 334 Research Reports – Rapports de recherche – Forschungsberichte in multi-racial terms. We deal, of course, with the genealogy of the “civilian power” notion, but how do we relate it to the long-term, culturally deeper and socially wider shift away from the warfare authority of the European state to its welfare-centred allegiance? These and several other possible examples illustrate the conundrum highlighted by many recent efforts to reflect on the state of the field, its intellectual make-up, methodological range, and potential developments.1 That is to say, how can European integration and its historiography sustain and expand a mutually enriching dialogue with contiguous disciplines, and with the various historical fields and subfields that insist on the same time-period and conceptual territory, from modern European history to international and transnational history of the late 20th century? One of the paths potentially conducive to such a broader contextualization of European integration’s history (certainly not the only relevant one, but a rich option nonetheless) resides in the many aspects of its international relations, transnational associations, and global correlations. Not the least because many integration history’s practitioners habitually interrogate and explore the inverse relationship. That is to say, how global or even more geographically and conceptually limited transformations – whether in the security, economic, technological or political and cultural realm – affected the pace, nature, geometry and self-perception of integrative processes. The discussion at the EUI workshop was kicked off by four of these practitioners, each one having just authored or being about to publish works addressing the main areas of Western Europe’s relations with the larger world in the era of détente. Their assigned task was to sum up the most recent scholarly acquisitions, point out the unsolved or controversial conceptual and historiographical issues, and sketch out new promising research directions as well as their inherent dilemmas. The papers they submitted are now presented here as a succinct roundtable debate, after revisions that profited from the insights and comments received by the audience and especially by discussants Mark Gilbert, Wilfried Loth, Piers Ludlow, Kiran Patel and Antonio Varsori. We thank them for their intellectual contribution. Each of the presenters is advancing useful suggestions specifically related to her/ his distinct angle and terrain. Fellow specialists will no doubt consider them in their own rights. When taken together and read against each other, however, these four voices coalesce around a few assumptions, if not yet a set of common themes, that cut across the various areas of enquiry. They sketch out a shared methodological language and bring forth a comprehensive, albeit still embryonic, analytical framework.

1. See W. KAISER, A. VARSORI (eds.), European Union History: Themes and Debates, Palgrave Macmillan, Houndsmill, 2010; W. Loth (ed.), Experiencing Europe: 50 Years of European Con- struction 1957-2007, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2009; M. RASMUSSEN, A.-C. KNUDSEN (eds.), The Road to a United Europe: Interpretations of the Process of European Integration, P.I.E. Peter Lang, Bruxelles, 2009. The international history of European integration in the long 1970s 335

To begin with, none of the four areas can be truly assessed in isolation. They interfere with each other in an extremely dense, intricate compact. It’s a reflection of the broad, systemic changes that defined the 1970s as an era of transition between the waning postwar order and the new solutions that consolidated thereafter. Chal- lenges were constantly reassessed; options frenetically compared, interwoven, revised; solutions reached by the unpredictable interactions between multiple, interconnected negotiating tables. There is a resemblance here with the formative era of the integration process, whose emerging shape had to be studied within the foundational stream (and the cross-feeding strands) of reconstruction, pacification, trans- Atlantic relations, the building of the Cold War architecture, the refashioning of the European nation-state, and the interplay among political cultures. The 1970s too were a creational moment, with (almost) everything in play at the same time, and a fluid morphing of established categories into as yet undetermined possibilities, paradigms, and priorities. But of course there were anchors too, the well- trodden paths and institutions already in operation, to be preserved and adapted rather than revolutionized. Thus, the scenarios were numerous but not infinite. Yet, many different combinations could have emerged. It follows that we are called to focus not so much on linear reconstructions of the policies eventually adopted (with the inherent risk of teleology) as on the moments when options – conceptual no less than operational – were confronted, combined, and sifted; on the crucibles where possibilities were dissected and reassembled; on the give and take among different tables, fields and actors. It is certainly no coinci- dence that, faced with flow and indeterminacy, the four authors prioritize a dialogue with the inclusive narratives of a broad range of historians upon methodologies geared to the modelling of social scientists. Apparently undaunted by the scale of the ambitious prospect they are charting, they are inviting us to consider the history of European integration as one and all with the history of Europe, and of its shifting place in a changing world. Federico Romero (European University Institute)

Integrating an international political economy dimension into European integration history: the challenges of the 1970s

For anyone interested in international political economy (IPE), the fact that European integration is embedded in global influences is, arguably, a given. Economic and monetary phenomena do not really know borders – or at least not in the same way as other fields of foreign policy and cooperation do. As a consequence, taking into account the global context in the study of European developments largely goes without saying. Talking of European monetary cooperation without mentioning the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, explaining various European monetary policies 336 Research Reports – Rapports de recherche – Forschungsberichte without mentioning the influence of Milton Friedman and the Chicago school, or the US administration’s “neglect” of the dollar in the late 1970s, would be fairly pointless. To put it the other way around: had the US been more amenable to aligning its economic and monetary policy with the German one, the European Monetary System (EMS) would probably not have been created. Keeping this in mind, this article will briefly set out the state of the field, outline some of the problems/methodological challenges to historical research on the 1970s and finally sketch some potential research directions. Monetary cooperation in general and the breakdown of Bretton Woods, the Wern- er Plan and the EMS in particular, are now well covered. Many studies have been devoted to the early part, 1969-74, as well as on the EMS.2 In a wider chronological perspective, Dimitri Grygowski (who studied the US attitude towards European monetary cooperation), David Marsh (who investigated the birth of the euro) or the work led by Frédéric Clavert on central bankers have also brought significant addi- tions to our knowledge.3 The backdrop of increasing globalisation was studied by Harold James, and more recently discussed in Niall Ferguson’s edited volume.4 And the question of globalisation is indeed a fundamental one since it increased precisely at a time when it was feared that it would stop again, just like in the 1930s – this parallel will be dealt with in some more detail below. A lot still has to be done on the purely economic history side of the 1970s, however: what was the impact of the oil shock on Western European economies? How can we explain that Germany, France, Britain and Italy performed so differently?

Problems and methodological challenges

In studying those issues, at least five problems/methodological challenges face historians of IPE in the 1970s. A first one is linked to the teleological take of European integration analysis. The ’teleological issue’ has recently been raised by Mark

2. See for instance A. BOTTEX, La mise en place des institutions monétaires européennes (1957-1964), in: Histoire, économie et sociétés, 4(1999), pp.753-774; P. LUDLOW, The Making of the EMS. A case study of the politics of the European Community, Butterworth Scientific, London, 1982, E. MOURLON-DRUOL, The Emergence of the European Monetary System, Cornell Univer- sity Press, Ithaca, 2012. 3. D. GRYGOWSKI, Les États-Unis et l’unification monétaire de l’Europe, Peter Lang, Brussels, 2009; D. MARSH, The Euro. The Politics of the New Global Currency, Yale University Press, New Haven; 2009, F. CLAVERT (ed.), Banquiers centraux et construction européenne, special issue of Histoire, économie et sociétés, forthcoming fall 2011 (see also www.ena.lu for more details on the project). 4. H. JAMES, Rambouillet, 15. November 1975. Die Globalisierung der Wirtschaft, DTV, Munich 1997; N. FERGUSON et al. (eds), The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2010. The international history of European integration in the long 1970s 337

Gilbert.5 A teleological approach to IPE in the 1970s is both problematic and challenging. It is problematic because European integration is not a self-evident “good”. It is not obvious, for instance, that the EMS was an advance or a progress. When hearing people talking about the British decision not to join the EMS, I still have the impression that the underlying assumption is that the British were wrong in doing so: once again, they would have “missed the bus”. At the very least this is debatable. Would it really have been good for the British economy to join the EMS in 1979? Was not the British government genuinely having a different vision of economic and monetary policy at the time, more focused on the necessity to have actual economic convergence prior to monetary unification? The teleological issue is also challenging because it forces to go back to more technical economic and monetary debates. One example, taken from contemporary discussions, can help clarify this point. Analysing the discourse of those against the euro today (or even those against the Maastricht Treaty in the early 1990s), one can observe that they do not necessarily want to leave the euro altogether – or that they did not want any kind of European monetary unification. What they often do not want is the euro to be the single currency in circulation. They instead want the euro to become a common or parallel currency, and reintroduce the use of national currencies. And this discussion actually echoes not only what happened in the 1970s but also in the 1980s and early 1990s: there was a very fascinating debate about the inception of a parallel currency. Yet this debate is usually largely overlooked, because it is technical, because it went nowhere, because of the EMS success story, and finally because it was largely confined to academic economists while the traditional view of the period is that the stars were Valéry Gis- card d’Estaing and Helmut Schmidt. But it does matter to study it. We need to get away from a linear success-story going from the EMS to the single currency. And we need to do this because the 1970s was a decade where this range of options did exist. It is hence important to think of the 1970s not only in terms of what was achieved – the EMS – but also in terms of what was not achieved, and why. It would also help to go back to a slightly more intellectual history of European cooperation – what it should be doing, or put it differently: what different people think it should be doing, and why they think so. Another potential difficulty for this period is the perennial question of the difference between what is actually happening and the perception we have of it. To be sure the same problem holds true for other periods of history. But with the 1970s it is particularly salient, with the rise of unemployment and double-digit inflation. It is indeed quite impressive to read the discourses of the time. One could easily find back declarations of Schmidt or Giscard saying that unemployment has reached unacceptable levels, and that they really feared a social explosion etc. In 1975, the level of unemployment in France is 4%, roughly the same in Germany, 5% in Britain, 6% in Italy, 8% in the US and 2% in Japan. Of course what matters was the overall evolution: for instance in 1973, unemployment in the UK was at 3% and three years later

5. M. GILBERT, Narrating the Process: Questioning the Progressive Story of European Integration, in: Journal of Common Market Studies, 3(2008), pp.641-662. See also A.S. MILWARD, États-nations et Communauté: le paradoxe de l’Europe?, in: Revue de Synthèse, 3(1990), pp.253-270. 338 Research Reports – Rapports de recherche – Forschungsberichte around 6%, so it had roughly doubled. But this remains figures one would love to have today. Conversely, after having known years of low inflation, I am not entirely sure that we all grasp what 24% of inflation in 1975 in the UK really meant – nor the extent to which it explains the current obsession of many policy-makers with inflation. Overall, there is thus a very important “psychological” dimension to the study of IPE in this period, since this time was dominated by many fears (unemployment, inflation). Linked to this is the parallel with the 1930s. The crux of the interwar period was the “dual crisis”: the simultaneous collapse of the international economic system and the international political system.6 Be they mistaken or not, many leaders in the 1970s feared that just the same would happen again. As a consequence, another aspect which has also in many respects sociological or psychological undertones was the rise of summitry. To a large extent, the inception of the G7 and the European Council was aimed at creating/maintaining/fostering trust among Western/EEC leaders. This is why summitry was institutionalised: to ease and improve cooperation in times of turmoil. Of course it did not go far sometimes, and it just appeared as claptrap. But at least there was some attempt at cooperating in an international forum to discuss political economy – which did not really exist in the 1930s. A fourth major challenge, derived from the previous one, is that economic and monetary problems lie at the heart of the 1970s. Of course these issues mattered before, and they still matter after. But the shocks of the 1970s were very peculiar. Set aside the fact that the slowdown of Western economies in the 1970s was to certain extent bound to happen, a series of crucial adaptations happened at that time: the eventual collapse of the Bretton Woods system; the oil shock; the resultant macroe- conomic problems (unemployment and inflation exploded) and the feeling of political insecurity associated with it. A critical problem for any historian working on the 1970s is therefore to engage with these economic and financial issues. Yet, the discipline of economic history, in some European countries, particularly France and Britain, is in manifest decline in comparison with the rise of social science analyses or cultural, gender and post-colonial histories. But I truly don’t think that one can do any decent history of the decade without having a grasp of its economics. As Lawrence Black and Hugh Pemberton put it “historians of all stripes must necessarily engage with the decade’s economics if they are to provide the necessary context for their research”.7 It was in the 1970s – partly thanks to the emergence of summitry – that political economy became part of “high politics”: as Schmidt himself famously put it, “monetary policy is foreign policy”. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, one of the great challenges of the study of the 1970s lies in reaching the right balance between the various dimensions of Euro- pean governance – that is its transnational, supranational and intergovernmental as-

6. R. BOYCE, The Great Interwar Crisis and the Collapse of Globalization, Palgrave, MacMillan, Basingstoke, 2009. 7. L. BLACK, H. PEMBERTON, Reassessing the seventies: the benighted decade, in: British Academy Review, November(2009), p.17. The international history of European integration in the long 1970s 339 pects. It seems to me particularly problematic because, sometimes (like in the case of the landmark of the period, the EMS), the influence of purely non governmental actors (business, trade unions) is very tiny not to say inexistent. For the EMS, there was no such thing as the roundtable of industrialists of the Single European Act and we cannot invent it. At the same time the 1970s witnessed a true increase in the organisation and power of such transnational, non-governmental actors. Crucially, the 1970s witnessed the rise of multinational corporations and capital markets. The challenge and difficulty is to reach a balanced assessment of these influences. An explanation based exclusively on either transnational or supranational or intergovernmental approaches does not satisfactorily work. And it particularly does not work in the 1970s with the concomitant 1) rise of summitry, 2) rise of transnational non- governmental actors, and 3) affirmation of supranational ones. It is their interaction which matters in understanding why a given policy outcome has been decided upon. I do not think, however, that we need a brand new intellectual approach to do this. Quite the contrary, I would rather argue that we need to come back to some of the basics of the discipline of international history. The historiography is currently very Anglophone-centred and it would do no harm to bring in more the contributions of the Franco-Italian school of history of international relations. Many of the ‘new’ approaches brought to the niche of European integration history had actually been developed for quite a while elsewhere. In short, European integration historiography, while duly looking at the debates of other disciplines (not only political science, but also sociology, economics, anthropology), should also very simply look at international history debates and historiography. Breaking from the “state-centric approach” is absolutely fine and needed.8 Yet historians should not forget the history of their own discipline: breaking form the state-centric approach is not something new, and to understand this, we must look at the field of international history as such – and to place European integration history as one sub-field of it. Going beyond a mere diplomatic history was indeed at the heart of the emergence of the school of l’histoire des relations internationales in France and then Italy. The need for cooperation between historians and political scientists, sociologists, economists, anthropologists, has equally not been invented in the last decade. The École des Annales suggested and did it from the 1920s and 1930s onwards.9 And importantly for IPE, the original title of the publication was Annales d’histoire économique et sociale. Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, Pierre Renouvin and many others then brought it to what was then “diplomatic history”, which as a consequence became “international history”. René Girault and Robert Frank’s Turbulente Europe et nouveaux mondes or Ennio Di Nolfo’s Storia delle relazioni internazionali then bottle-fed generations of French and Italian

8. W. KAISER, B. LEUCHT, M. RASMUSSEN (eds.), The History of the European Union. Origins of a trans- and supranational polity, 1950-72, Routledge, London, 2009. 9. See for instance L. FEBVRE, Vivre l’histoire, Robert Laffont, Paris, 2009. 340 Research Reports – Rapports de recherche – Forschungsberichte historians.10 These are international history books which already took into account transnational phenomena and non governmental actors. The various volumes published by Éric Bussière and Sylvain Schirmann over the past decade, entitled Les milieux économiques et l’intégration européenne, also applied such a methodology.11 It would arguably be wise for future works on European integration history to engage first with the historical literature of this school of international history, and thus start reading more French and Italian.

Potential new directions

Some of the new directions I suggest below are just informed guesses, and of course largely influenced by my research interests and my own current work. For what they are worth, here are three big issues that I thought might be the focus of future research. The first area is certainly the widest but I think also the most important, and concerns the relationship between ideas and policy change. The 1970s were indeed the pivotal decade in the evolution of the postwar economic and monetary consensus. The late 1970s/early 1980s witnessed the apparition of two radical policy courses, with, to simplify, neo-liberalism on the one hand (implemented in the UK and the US under Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan) and socialism on the other (in France under François Mitterrand). In order to understand how both developed we need very obviously to understand where they come from – and their roots date back from the 1970s and even late 1960s. One of these areas of investigation, and one which seems to me considerably misunderstood and misrepresented, is monetarism. “Monetarism” has become a catchword synonym of “deregulation”, “free market”, “neo-liberalism” supported by Reagan and Thatcher. But monetarism originated as an academic economists’ investigation into the causes of inflation in the late 1960s. It then moved on to some gen- eralisations, some re-interpretation, but is certainly not as monolithic as is often suggested. Jeffrey Chwieroth has thus recently shown that the IMF’s staff thinking about capital controls was not monolithic.12 It is fascinating to see the discussions of Euro- pean central bankers (both in national, European and global settings) and how they react/interpret and consider applying (or not) these ideas. It would thus be crucial to try to trace the evolution of this thinking, how it was received in Western Europe – by central bankers, economists, finance ministers, treasuries, … – and applied (or

10. R. GIRAULT, R. FRANK, Turbulente Europe et nouveaux mondes, 1914-1941, Petite Bibliothèque Payot, Paris, 2004; P. RENOUVIN, J.-B. DUROSELLE, Introduction à l’histoire des relations internationales, Pocket, Paris, 2007; E. DI NOLFO, Storia delle relazioni internazionali, 1918-1999, Editori Laterza, Roma, 2000. 11. É. BUSSIÈRE, M. DUMOULIN, S. SCHIRMANN (eds.), Milieux économiques et intégration eu- ropéenne au XXe siècle. La crise des années 1970, Peter Lang, Brussels, 2006. 12. J. CHWIEROTH, Capital ideas: The IMF and the rise of financial liberalization, Princeton Uni- versity Press, Princeton, 2010. The international history of European integration in the long 1970s 341 not). It is particularly crucial because the centrepiece of the 1970s, the EMS, does not fall into these clear-cut categories. As Schmidt used to say, a consequent monetarist would have opted out of the EMS – and a consequent Keynesian would have done just the same.13 Other theoretical discussions of academic economists are also important and should be kept in mind, like the so-called “holy trinity” (fixed exchange rates/circulation of capital/autonomy of monetary policy) set out by Robert Mundell in the 1960s, and still of Mundell (but extensively detailed afterwards by others) the “op- timum currency area” debate. It is not only crucial to understand these debates per se, but also to see how they evolved and how they moved from academic economists to policy-makers. Just to take one example, it seems to me important to better detail the sequence of events going from Mundell’s triangle of incompatibilities in the 1960s, to Tommaso Padoa Schioppa’s thoughts as head of the DGII from 1979 to 1983, until the creation of the euro. How did these ideas circulate? Were all these steps consciously interconnected? Did the DGII recruit academic economists who had previously worked in the US? Did European central bankers read academic journals or were they simply influenced by informal discussions with academics? Or were they former academics themselves? A final important issue is the question of how the various EEC policies of the period fit together. Social policy, regional policy, competition policy, etc. are so far largely studied in isolation. This is of course very useful because we know relatively little about them. But it would be important to see the wider picture, how they relate to each other. A good hint at this question was given by the so-called “concurrent studies” which ran in parallel to the EMS negotiations, and were meant to help the participation of the “less prosperous” EEC member states (Britain, Ireland and Italy). This was very interesting because it showed the interaction of economic policies (meant to improve economic convergence between member states) and monetary policy (a semi-fixed exchange rate system shared by the same member states). Was there, more generally, any conscious linkage between the two? It is fairly clear that the Commission was willing to find ways to replicate at the European level the mechanisms of fiscal/financial/regional redistribution which existed in other integrated economies. But how did it intend to do it? What was the opinion of the member states? Attempting to answer these various questions would certainly help having a better sense of the political economy of the decade – and certainly shed light on today’s predicament. Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol (University of Glasgow)

13. H. SCHMIDT, Die Deutschen und ihre Nachbarn, Siedler, Berlin, 1990, p.265. 342 Research Reports – Rapports de recherche – Forschungsberichte

Facing the Global South

The European Community (EC) and Global South are both elusive entities in international history. The European Community and the Global South are in fact rarely, if at all, recognized as actors with some degree of autonomy in international relations after the Second World War. Here I would like to expand on some of the reasons why, increasingly so in the 1970s, this two entities and their interaction are important in understanding both the evolution of the global economy and the role the EC had within it. The simple consideration that the EC and the Global South emerged more or less at the same time should have raised more than one question about the nature of the link between the two. In fact there are at least two important links: both would hardly have existed without decolonization, and both have gained momentum and relevance some time in the middle of the 1950s. In the case of the Global South, although certainly the Cold War was instrumental in generating the need for a coalition able to promote peace against nuclear Mutually Assured Destruction, it is quite obvious that only the end of European colonial empires allowed for the possibility of autonomous action by newly independent countries in the international arena. On the other hand, in the case of European integration, the link with decolonization is possibly less straightforward but hardly less stringent. We now know that even well into the 1950s European colonial powers had no clear intention of renouncing the strategic importance of their empires from a cultural, political and even from an economic point of view. This is well demonstrated by the most recent historical literature that takes very seriously the effort to revive European colonial empires in the 1950s; an effort mainly undertaken by France and Great Britain and defined by scholars as “post-imperial reflex”.14 The very same Jean Monnet recalled how Louis Armand – one of the “three wise men” charged, after the failure of the European Defence Com- munity in 1954, with re-launching a common European initiative through a joint atomic energy project – provocatively proposed the creation of a statue honouring Nasser as “the federator of Europe”.15 Having dealt a mortal blow to the imperial dreams of France and the United Kingdom in 1956, the Egyptian leader had also cleared the path for a new French commitment in Europe. The Global South has only recently attracted wide attention by historians. The term Global South has a more nuanced meaning than Third World, although here they will be used interchangeably. While in fact the origins of the term Third World is well-known, for it being used for the first time in 1954 to differentiate a group of “poor” countries from the industrialized Capitalist and Communist worlds; the term Global South is used even today to refer to all those countries and governments, but even social movements, that in one way or the other are opposed to or simply want

14. F. COOPER, Reconstructing Empire in British and French Africa, in: M. MAZOWER, J. REINISCH, D. FELDMAN (eds.), Post-War Reconstruction in Western Europe. International Per- spectives, 1945-1949, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011. 15. J. MONNET, Mémoires, trans. Richard Mayne, London, Collins, 1978, p.422. The international history of European integration in the long 1970s 343 to exert a greater influence on the management of globalization. The Global South has been defined by scholars such as Vijay Prashad as a political and cultural project potentially capable of generating a new form of internationalism in competition both with Communist and Liberal-democratic internationalism.16 This interpretation has been heavily criticized by Odd Arne Westad for being over-romantic because the story of the Third World, itself the product of European ideology and of the Cold War, should in fact be regarded as a story of errors to be avoided in the future. Westad argues that: “what is needed is a hard-nosed understanding of the Third World idea in order to avoid repeating its mistakes”.17 Whatever the interpretation of the phenomenon, the most recent historiography on the Third World has confirmed that developing nations often struggled, both individually and collectively, to advance their own visions of modernization, more often than not characterized by high levels of State intervention and aspirations of fast-track industrialization,18 just as they fought to promote their own priorities in the realm of human rights and international law.19 Some historians have preferred to focus next to exclusively on the economic aspect of relations among the countries of the Global South taking into account the rise of “structuralism”, eventually to become the driving ideological force of United Nations Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and of the creation of the G77 within it. This economic struggle of the Global South eventually peaked in the 1970s with the debate over a New International Economic Order to reform the Bretton Woods institutions created during WWII.20 Up to the beginning of the 1980s both historians and political scientists seemed to share a widespread confidence on the emerging role and the enduring relevance of the Global South. Hedley Bull and Adam Watson of British Committee on the Theory of International Politics, in the monumental The Expansion of International Society published in 1984, still considered the role of the Third World and its rebellion as crucial to adapting international institutions to the new international equilibrium.21 In fact the majority of historians that employ this definition now consider the cooperation within the Global South and its very same existence to have weakened –

16. V. PRASHAD, The Darker Nations. A Peoples History of the Third World, The New press, New York, 2008. See also: C.J. LEE (ed.), Making a World After Empire. The Bandung Moment and Its Political Afterlives, Ohio University Press, Athns, 2010. 17. O.A. WESTAD, The Project, in: London Review of Books, 2(2008). 18. D. ENGERAN, C. UNGER, Introduction: Towards a Global History of Modernization, in: Diplo- matic History, 3(2009). 19. S.L. HOFFMANN, Genealogies of Human Rights, in: S.L. HOFFMANN (ed.), Human Rights in the Twentieth Century, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2011. 20. One of the best examples of such historiography is the biography of the founder of “structuralism”, the Argentinean economist and first head of UNCTAD Raul Prebisch: E.J. DOSMAN, The Life and Times of Raul Prebisch, McGill-Queen’s University Press, Montreal, 2009. 21. H. BULL, A. WATSON (eds.), The Expansion of an International Society, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984. 344 Research Reports – Rapports de recherche – Forschungsberichte possibly to the point of rendering the concept unacceptable for the later period – at the end of the 1970s.22 Historians of post-WWII international history have concentrated for a long time on the Cold War and on its impact on Europe as well as, more recently, on its role in shaping the conflicts and the outcomes in the Third World. There is nothing to be surprised if the same is true for the growing literature on the external dimension of the EC. This has prevailingly been focused on the study of transatlantic relations, on the pressure exercised by transatlantic elite networks, on the undeniable influence of Americanization and consumerism, or on the role of the EC within European Cold War diplomacy, for example during the negotiations for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).23 In as a much as this literature on European integration has focused on relations with Third World countries, scholars have been mainly been attracted by the issue of development aid and of association agreements with Francophone and Anglophone countries, previously included within European colonial empires. More often than not researchers have concentrated on the technical details and on the procedures of the DG of the Commission in charge of development aid, on the different approaches and the mechanisms of national and European aid bureaucracy, and have described cooperation and development as a one-way process with influence and money moving from Brussels, or from one or the other different European capitals, to the less developed countries, mainly – but not exclusively – in Africa.24 Probably the main reason why in very recent times there started to be a growing interest in the EC as part of a more complex and truly global web of international networks and of cultural and economic relations, derives from the changes in the perception and reality of the contemporary world. Issues such as the emergence of globalization and the questioning of its “dark side”, the rise of a more multilateral world and the shrinking role of the US and of the Atlantic Community in cultural, political and economic terms confirmed by the recent passage from the G7 to the G20, are starting to redirect in many ways the attention from the West to the Rest. This present international environment has been conducive to reconsidering the importance of the Global South in its two “glorious decades” of the 1960s and 1970s as a phenomenon that might have influenced the European Community in its evolution – as opposed to a coalition that has simply been influenced by former colonial empires or be the two superpowers. The question of the loss of empires and of its impact from the 1960s trough the 1970s has been reconsidered in different ways. Gérard Bossuat has edited in 2006 a book that lists a convincing number of relevant aspects, ranging from trade to association agreements, in which the EC has been

22. The distinction among periodizations depends if the emphasis is centered on the cultural and political element of cooperation that certainly weakened with the failure of the Trilateral Conference in 1966, or on the economic aspect of cooperation which weakened with the second oil crisis in 1979 and with the war between two Third World and key oil-producing countries: Iran and Iraq. 23. Some of this issues in: W. KAISER, A. VARSORI (eds.), European Union History …, op.cit. 24. A recent and useful study along this lines: E. CALANDRI (ed.), Il primato sfuggente. L’Europa e l’intervento per lo sviluppo (1957-2007), FrancoAngeli, Milano, 2009. The international history of European integration in the long 1970s 345 active in facing the emerging Third World.25 My own study Dopo gli imperi (After Empires) has focused more on the interaction between the Common Market and the emergence of developing countries as autonomous economic but also political actors in the international arena.26 I consider the 1973 “oil shock” as the high point of this phase of “discovery of interdependence”. Even at the very end of the 1960s some of the most acute political scientists had made it quite clear that the future of the EC after 1968, with the profound turmoil generated by students and workers revolts at home and Third World radicalization abroad, could not but be profoundly linked with some kind of new relationship established with former colonies: “European colonialism and decolonization-especially that of Britain and France-have left many lega- cies which provide opportunities for continuing ties today and help or hinder new definitions, declaratory and operational, of purposes, policies, and procedures. The future of Europe and the future of the Third World are two profoundly open and complex sets of possibilities which will, in some manner, undoubtedly interact. Any substantial political rearrangements in Europe will, it is most likely, be inaugurated and practiced without any substantial influence from the Third World. If greater European unity is accomplished, then Europe could become a great benefactor to some, or most, of the countries of the Third World. Europe and the Third World are, in many important senses, co-members of one world”.27 Another set of issues, deeply linked to the processes occurring in the Global South, is represented by non-European immigration and its impact both on Western Euro- pean culture and on its economy and society. An example of the growing perception of the importance of the question of immigration for the formation of European societies is the widely read study of Harmut Kaelble on the social history of Western Europe. In its first edition (1990) it did not even refer to immigration; in its second edition (2007) immigration become one of the most important elements shaping European society.28 Non-European immigration and its study will be crucial in understanding the evolution of European economy in the 1970s: for example how much of the strong competitiveness of the German economy even after the 1973 oil shock was due to the possibility of containing salaries and wage demands from the less integrated and organized working class of Turkish origins? A related and potentially innovative field of study concerns the formation of “post-colonial” European identities and is lead by historians of colonial empires. These scholars are increasingly been intrigued by the way in which the loss of colonies contributed to the shaping of the new national and “European” identities. Todd Shepard, in a seminal study published in 2006, wrote on the French citizenship being identified with the Hexagon and continental Europe only after that Algerians had definitively been considered

25. G. BOSSUAT, L’Europe et la mondialisation, Ed. Soleb, Paris, 2006. 26. G. GARAVINI, Dopo gli imperi. L’integrazione europea nello scontro Nord-Sud, Le Monnier, Firenze, 2009. 27. P. LYON, Europe and the Third World, in: Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 386(1969). 28. H. KAELBLE, Sozialgeschichte Europas. 1945 bis zur Gegenwart, Beck, Munich, 2007. 346 Research Reports – Rapports de recherche – Forschungsberichte

Africans with no right to French citizenship in 1962.29 Similar studies are currently being undertaken for other countries. Even broader and more long-term questions arise from the debate and analysis of the question of loss of empires and the rise of new actors in the Third World. Among such broader issues is the impact of the non-European world on the colonial powers in a variety of ways on the longue durée, not exclusively in the 1960s and 1970s. This approach could help placing the EC and its outcomes in the longer process of formation and dissolution of European empires. An example of this new trend is for example evident in the conference organized in Freiburg (May 2010) with the theme: Making Europe. The Global Origins of the Old World.30 In the words of the orga- nizers, this conference outspokenly had the purpose of challenging a “Europeanised version of the history of Europe”: “Making Europe, in contrast, will demonstrate, for example, that large swaths of Europe were much more connected to extra-European spaces than to ‘Europe’ as such; that important European societies, such as in Britain, were at least as much defined by networks encompassing Asian, African and American territories than by their ‘European’ connections; that the famed political culture of European states was heavily influenced by imperialism, that Europe’s economic development, its ‘great divergence’, cannot even be begun to be understood without reference to connections to the rest of the world; and that Euro- pean political development in the twentieth century can only be made sense of by putting both decolonization and the Cold War superpowers at the centre of our narrative”. Historians of the colonial empires will necessarily have to engage in the future not only with the question of decolonization but also with the immediate aftermath of the decolonization process. John Darwin has argued that: “far from heralding a ‘world of nations’, decolonization’s unexpected course seemed to have set the scene for new kinds of empire”.31 The prevailing narrative of the historians of empires, that decolonization transformed European empires into an American empire, or that it only gave birth to another form of imperialism this time exercised through free trade and indirect economic and political control, is not entirely convincing. This narrative will have to take into account the agency of former colonies and the pressures rising from their newly acquired political and economic role. If these are all important tendencies in historiography, the broader issue than will be difficult to be avoided by diplomatic historians in the future is that the evolution of European integration cannot be explained if not in parallel with the pressures exercised upon it by the non-European world, and particularly by former colonies. By the beginning of the 1980s the Global South as a cooperative international actor was no more and globalization increased international competition rather than – or together with – international cooperation among countries of the South. This does not

29. T. SHEPARD, The Invention of Decolonization. The Algerian War and the Remaking of France, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2006. Although the same kind approach had been taken previously even from the 1970s in many of the works of Henri Wesseling on The Netherlands. 30. http://www.frias.uni-freiburg.de/history/veranstaltungen/KonfBeckert. 31. J. DARWIN, After Tamerlane. The Rise and Fall of Global Empires 1400-2000, Penguin, London, 2008, pp.476-477. The international history of European integration in the long 1970s 347 mean that European integration can then be explained only by its links with the other side of the Atlantic. For example: even the very strong efforts to revive integration through the Single Market Project, heavily sponsored by the European Commission in the second half of the 1980s also by promoting a search for the historical roots of the integration process (which incidentally brought to the creation of the Liaison Group of Historians of the European Union), cannot be explained without taking into account the tougher economic environment and the competition arising from the newly industrialized countries, specially in Asia. All the above does not mean that we will have to indulge in a narrative where there is no place for conflict both in cultural and political terms: the “multicultural” narrative of Brussels or of mainstream media and intellectuals for whom Western European countries have lost empires, become hubs of immigration, witnessed the rise of economic interdependence, and this process has all happened peacefully, finally contributing to the rise of a model European “civilian power”.32 All to the contrary, I think that the story of the long decade of the 1970s, from 1968 to the beginning of the 1980s was one of an effort of cooperation between Western European countries – including the EC – with the still cooperating Global South. At the same time the history of the last 30 years is one prevailingly defined by a reassuring public speech but also by profound tensions both in economic and cultural terms with the new economic and political actors formerly participating to the Third World project, by an inward-looking effort concentrated on a Europe-wide Single Market, and possibly by a revival of the ambition to link European identity to its supposedly Christian origins.33 Giuliano Garavini (Research Fellow, University of Padua)

Towards an International History of European Integration: The European Communities and the United States during the 1970s

We can hardly analyze the history of the relations of the European Communities (EC) with the United States during the 1970s without linking it to the wider context. Mo- mentous shifts in the global order shaped the course of events. The United States entered in a period of détente with the Soviet Union. The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the 1973 Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War were major break- throughs. By creating a new sense of security, superpower détente opened a field of independent diplomatic activity for EC countries. It also raised concerns about US- Soviet collusion. As such, it encouraged Western European decision-makers to think that their interests might differ from US policy. World economic transformations,

32. J. RIFKIN, Europe’s Dream. How Europe’s Vision of the Future is Quietly Eclypsing the American Dream, Penguin, London, 2004. 33. C. CALDWELL, Reflections on the Revolutions in Europe. Immigration, Islam and the West, Dou- bleday, New York, 2009. 348 Research Reports – Rapports de recherche – Forschungsberichte moreover, sowed transatlantic division. A widening US balance-of-payments deficit had intensified US domestic pressure for troop redeployment. The 1971-1973 collapse of Bretton Woods spurred transatlantic disagreements on the world monetary order. Last but not least, growing European prosperity and a declining US trade balance fuelled US opposition to EC protectionism.

State of the Art

New research pays due credit to the links between EC-US relations and the wider international context during the 1970s. The newly created European Political Coop- eration (EPC) offers a lens through which to view the connections with the Cold War. Daniel Möckli and I, among others, have stressed the link between EPC’s dynamism in 1973–1974 and US-Soviet relations.34 Mindful of the risk (more imaginary than real) of a US-Soviet “condominium”, the EC Nine responded to America’s “Year of Europe” initiative by asserting the distinctiveness of a united Europe. The US-Soviet dialogue/contest over the Yom Kippur War was an important factor behind their November 1973 Declaration on the Middle East, the first public statement by EC countries on a major international issue. The French and the British governments in particular pushed for it because they resented their exclusion from the talks over the Arab-Israeli conflict, both during and in the aftermath of the war.35 Sara Tavani’s work points to similar connections in the early 1980s.36 Despite the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the EC Ten remained wedded to détente unlike the US government. With the rise of the Solidarity mass movement in Poland, they developed a distinctive approach towards the Polish regime. They made initial gestures of good will to support its reformist attempts. After the 1981 introduction of Martial Law, they applied joint economic sanctions ― albeit milder ones than what the US government wanted. Recent work on Greece highlights the importance of the Cold War context for the southward enlargement of the EC. Antonio Varsori shows that broader geopolitical concerns were decisive in the EC Nine’s decision in 1976 to open accession negotiations with the new democratic government of Constantinos Karamanlis.37 Despite widespread concerns about Greece’s economic backwardness, EC states calculated that EC membership was essential to achieve domestic stability and anchor the coun-

34. D. MÖCKLI, European Foreign Policy During the Cold War: Heath, Brandt, Pompidou and the Dream of Political Unity, I.B. Tauris, London, 2009; A.É. GFELLER, Building a European Identity: France, the United States, and the Oil Shock, 1973-1974, Berghahn Books, New York, forthcoming. 35. A.É. GFELLER, A European Voice in the Arab World: France, the Superpowers and the Middle East, 1970-1974, in: Cold War History, 4 (2011). 36. S. TAVANI, CFSP Origins and European Détente: A Common European Stance on the Polish Crisis of 1980-1981, (paper presented at the Sixth History of European Integration Research Society (HEIRS) Colloquium, University of Reading, UK, 2010). 37. M. DEL PERO, V. GAVIN, F. GUIRAO, A. VARSORI, Democrazie. L’Europa meridionale e la fine delle dittature, Le Monnier, Firenze, 2010. The international history of European integration in the long 1970s 349 try firmly to the West. Cold War-related considerations also facilitated the Greek accession by reducing US apprehension about diminished influence in Southern Eu- rope. Eirini Karamouzi points to a cooperative division of labour between the United States and the EC Nine.38 Karamanlis’s government loosened its ties with the US government due to US support of the former military dictatorship and possible US involvement in the Turkish attack on Cyprus in 1974. In this context, the Ford administration, Karamouzi argues, supported EC membership as a way to strengthen its stabilizing role in the region. Historians have also started to probe the links between EC-US relations and international economic developments. I will not discuss the literature on European monetary reforms; this topic is addressed by Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol. Trade provides another fitting example. In 1957, US President Dwight Eisenhower had defended the Rome Treaty against opposition from Australia, Britain, Canada, and New Zealand. In 1973, by contrast, the Nixon administration requested financial compensation under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) for the EC’s enlargement to Britain, Ireland, and Denmark: despite lower tariffs on manufactured goods, EC membership implied a higher level of protection. How did this shift crys- tallize? The existing scholarship underscores the antagonistic stance of several governmental divisions: the US Department of the Treasury, the Department of Com- merce, and the Department of Agriculture.39 It also points to the declining influence of the State Department’s “Europeanists” in the Nixon administration.40 Whether this shift in the US stance had any implications for the accession agreement, however, remains a matter for further investigation.

Methodological Challenges

The history of EC-US relations provides opportunities for linking European integration to other subfields of international history; it also raises methodological challenges. I shall mention two here. First, the EC and EPC were only one of the forums in which the US government interacted with Western European countries. Bilateral relations remained alive and well. There was also a plethora of Western organizations: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the GATT, the International Mon-

38. E. KARAMOUZI, Telling the Whole Story: America, the EEC and Greece 1974-1976, in: A. VAR- SORI, G. MIGANI (ed.), Europe in the International Arena During the 1970s: Entering a Different World, Peter Lang, Brussels, 2011. 39. L. COPPOLARO, The United States and EEC Enlargement (1969–1973): Reaffirming the Atlantic Framework, in: VAN DER HARST (ed.), Beyond the Customs Union: The European Community’s Quest for Deepening, Widening and Completion, 1969-1975, Bruylant, Brussels, 2007. See also L. NICHTER, Richard Nixon and Europe: Confrontation and Cooperation, 1969-1974, Ph.D. thesis, Bowling Green State University, 2008. 40. K. WEISBRODE, The Atlantic Century: Four Generations of Extraordinary Diplomats who Forged America’s Vital Alliance with Europe, Da Capo Press, Cambridge Mass., pp.209-219. 350 Research Reports – Rapports de recherche – Forschungsberichte etary Fund, the World Bank, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Further institutions were established in the 1970s to reduce Cold War tensions (the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) and to address global economic challenges (the Group of Five, which was subsequently enlarged to the Group of Seven, that is, Britain, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the United States, and West Germany). These forums were interconnected. What happened in one arena had implications for events unfolding in another, and conversely. Still, it is important to distinguish between them. Like historical actors themselves, historians are often guilty of semantic indeterminacy. Rather than specify which countries/organization they designate, they tend to use the phrase “the Europeans” as a convenient shortcut. Such indeterminacy is especially problematic since the historical use of this term was not value-neutral. US officials, for one, often used the phrases “the Europeans” and “the Allies” as interchangeable categories, failing to refer to the EC/EC states per se, because they did not recognize the existence of a separate European entity. These overlapping sets of relations imply that EC-US relations were only one aspect of a complex history. There are two competing narratives for the history of transatlantic relations after World War II: the paradigm of the “empire by invitation”, and the story of a gradual estrangement between the United States and Western Europe after a brief period of postwar cooperation. The term “empire by invitation” was coined by Norwegian historian Geir Lundestad.41 Yet Lundestad himself presents this empire as a temporary phenomenon, which lasted about thirty years. Beginning with the Carter administration, he claims, much of “the urge to involve the Ameri- cans that had characterized the early decades of the Atlantic relationship” vanished.42 Historians should engage explicitly with this debate when discussing EC-US relations. Their overall vision of transatlantic relations is bound to shape their analysis of specific events. This does not mean taking side. It is also possible to opt for a middle ground. In a recent edited volume, Matthias Schulz and Thomas Schwartz tell a cyclical tale: “these relations moved in cycles of cooperation and conflict”.43 This is a somewhat messier framework, but it seems better suited for describing the ebbs and flows of the transatlantic relationship since World War II.

Avenues for Further Research

There is still much that we could and should learn about EC-US relations during the 1970s. Much of the existing scholarship is in a classic diplomatic history vein. It gives

41. G. LUNDESTAD, Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945-1952, in: Journal of Peace Research, 3(1986). 42. G. LUNDESTAD, The United States and Western Europe since 1945: From "Empire" by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift, Oxford University Press, Oxford/New York, 2003, p.223. 43. M. SCHULTZ, T.A. SCHWARTZ, The Superpower and the Union in the Making: U.S.-European Relations, 1969-1980, in: M. SCHULTZ, T.A. SCHWARTZ (ed.), The Strained Alliance: U.S.- European Relations from Nixon to Carter, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2009, p.355. The international history of European integration in the long 1970s 351 pride of place to prominent individuals―President/Prime Minister and Foreign Mi- nister/Secretary of State. It also focuses on a limited number of countries, namely, Britain, France, the United States, and West Germany. Personalities were certainly influential, but even under a presidential regime such as France’s Fifth Republic a wider range of actors shaped foreign policy.44 Future research should place greater emphasis on diplomatic discussions beyond Richard Nixon, Henri Kissinger, Willy Brandt, Edward Heath, Georges Pompidou and the like. It should also explore policymaking within the EC beyond the big three (Britain, France, and West Germany). Studies on the Netherlands’ and Italy’s oil policy have begun to do so, but only tan- gentially.45 Existing studies on transatlantic relations during the 1970s deal essentially with the first half of the decade. Joe Renouard and Nathan Vigil’s study of the Carter administration’s European policy relies mostly on publicly available materials.46 As archival materials become available for the second half of the 1970s, historians should study the evolution of the US stance on European integration. The scholarship on the Nixon years points to a policy shift. Lundestad emphasizes the heightened sense of economic competition among US political actors and a new belief that a multi-centered, confederal structure would better serve US policy objectives than a single, supranational European body.47 In his doctoral thesis, Luke Nichter argues that the Nixon administration was the first US government to conclude that further integration was not in its best interest, ceasing to support either widening or deepening.48 Schulz and Schwartz stress the new “coolness” of the US government towards European integration, casting it as “one of the most distinctive changes in US policy during this era”.49 US concerns about European integration were not entirely new.50 The bel- ligerent tone of the Nixon administration, however, was unprecedented. Was this a temporary shift or a more lasting development? How did US policy evolve during the rest of the decade? Further research is needed to answer these questions. We should also investigate EPC’s history after 1974 and probe the links between its dynamism, or lack thereof, and transatlantic relations. The scholarship on EPC’s early days suggests that there were conflicting dynamics. Transatlantic antagonisms could foster European political unity contra the United States. This was true of the EC Nine’s response to the Year of Europe and of their Declaration on the Middle East. But the transatlantic connection could also work the opposite way. At the 1974 Washington Energy Conference, France parted way with its EC partners over US

44. See A.É. GFELLER, Building a European Identity …, op.cit. 45. D. HELLEMA, C. WIEBES, T. WHITE, The Netherlands and the Oil Crisis: Business as Usual, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2004; S. LABBATE, Il governo dell’energia. L’Italia dal petrolio al nucleare (1945-1975), Le Monnier, Firenze, 2010. 46. J. RENOUARD, D.N. VIGIL, The Quest for Leadership in a Time of Peace: Jimmy Carter and Western Europe, 1977-1981, in: M. SCHULTZ, T.A. SCHWARTZ (ed.), op.cit., pp.321-324. 47. G. Lundestad, The United States and Western Europe …, op.cit., pp.177-182. 48. L. NICHTER, op.cit. 49. M. SCHULTZ, T.A. SCHWARTZ, "The Superpower and the Union …, op.cit., p.362. 50. See V. HEYDE, De l’esprit de la Résistance jusqu’à l’idée de l’Europe, Peter Lang, Brussels, 2010. 352 Research Reports – Rapports de recherche – Forschungsberichte international energy policy. Did such contradictory effects characterize EPC’s further development? In 1980–1981, the EC Ten gave a new lease of life to EPC. They issued statements on the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Iran hostage crisis, Afghanistan, and Poland. They also adopted joint sanctions on Poland and Iran. By calling for an overall Middle East peace settlement and pleading for continued détente, they took a different stance from the United States. Did differences, and even antagonisms, with the US government spur this revival of EPC? Does US policy explain EPC’s lower profile after 1974 and 1981, respectively? These questions highlight the need for further research. The Southward enlargement of the EC and its transatlantic implications are another topic worthy of investigation. Did the Carter administration support Portugal’s and Spain’s 1977 application for EC membership in order to anchor these newly democratized countries to the West? Did the US government see EC membership as interfering with its policy objectives, that is, bringing Spain into NATO and keeping access to military bases in the Iberian Peninsula? The traditional interpretation stressed US misgivings about EC accession. More recent work has challenged this view.51 We could still benefit from more research on the interconnections between the transatlantic relationship and the EC’s third enlargement. In addition, there should be further work on EC-US trade relations. Disagreements abounded in the early 1970s. The tariff implications of the 1973 enlargement were only one of many contentious issues. There were also the reverse trade preferences (granted by former colonies to EC countries), the Common Agricultural Policy, the scope of a new round of trade liberalization, and the EC’s preferential trade agreements (with Israel, Spain, and European Free Trade Association countries). For all their differences, EC states and the United States reached agreement on launching a new GATT round in Tokyo in September 1974. By 1979, the Tokyo Round had come to a successful close; participants endorsed a series of tariff reductions and a Code on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties. How did EC-US relations evolve in this context? Was conflict, cooperation or a mix of both the dominant mode? What was the impact of the rise of new economic players like Japan? These questions are awaiting answers. More broadly, historians should analyze the interplay between EC-US relations and the United States’ interactions with Western European countries in other forums. How did these manifold conversations relate to one another? Did these multiple forums and patterns of cooperation allow EC countries to further their interests and European integration? How did officials on both sides of the Atlantic analyze the links between European integration and NATO? Did they point to a zero-sum game or to mutually reinforcing processes? We clearly need more research to tell how this complex story unfolded.

51. See for example Á. VINAS, En las garras del águila. Los pactos con Estados Unidos de Franco a Felipe González (1945-1995), Crítica, Barcelona, 2003. The international history of European integration in the long 1970s 353

Future research, moreover, should move beyond the state-centered focus of the existing scholarship to encompass a wider range of actors. One possible approach would combine international, political and cultural history and investigate the debate over global interdependence in the 1970s. The concept of interdependence became an increasingly popular construct in US political circles and academia during the 1970s. Harvard Professors Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye defined “complex interdependence” as an ideal type. Its main characteristics were numerous channels of communication, a lack of hierarchy between negotiation topics, and the reduced us- ability of force.52 Keohane and Nye’s argument implied that international interdependence reduced the ability of the superpowers to influence outcomes based on sheer military superiority. How did the discussions evolve on both sides of the Atlantic? Did political, economic and intellectual actors in EC countries view interdependence as a source of weakness or strength for medium-size European powers and a united Europe? A second, related approach would focus on the practical implications of the debate. How did business leaders in EC countries and the United States assess the situation? Which strategies did they apply, notably in the EC-US context? These research topics are important given the prominence of economic networks, notably the European Roundtable of Industrialists, in European integration in the early 1980s. All in all, future research should situate the history of EC-US relations during the 1970s in the context of an evolving transatlantic relationship and a shifting geopolitical and economic order. Only so will we gain a better understanding of the significance of the US component of the EC’s external dimension during this decade. Aurélie Élisa Gfeller (Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies)

“Looking Eastward”

The dramatic changes in the international system over the last twenty years call the EU to actively contribute to international security and the shaping of a new political and economic order, starting with Europe itself. In the post-Cold War system, the redefinition of equilibrium in the Continent has been of immediate concern, and EU’s relations with its neighbouring East, i.e. Russia and other former USSR countries, are still one of the key issues in the political and scholarly debate on international relations. With the collapse of the bipolar system, in fact, the newborn European Union proved an irresistible magnet for former allies of the Soviet Union, which all applied for membership. Their becoming part of the EU affects the international role of the latter in two intertwined ways. On the one hand, to agree on a common foreign policy à 27, and on the very mechanism to elaborate it, proves even more difficult.

52. R.O. KEOHANE, J.S. NYE, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, 3rd ed., Longman, New York, 2001; J.S. NYE, Independence and Interdependence, in: Foreign Policy, 22(1976). 354 Research Reports – Rapports de recherche – Forschungsberichte

On the other hand, the interests and sensibilities of these countries make relations with Russia more delicate to handle. Over the decades, research on this topic has been led by political scientists and jurists with expertise in international and/or EC law. International history scholars, on the contrary, have been slow to devote attention to the EC/EU as an international actor, and particularly reluctant to deal with the specific case of its relations with the Soviet bloc. Still, the necessity and feasibility of a Europe speaking with one voice came to dominate the scholarly and the political debate since the early 1970s, when the EC started to be more active and self-assertive in many areas, and when important institutional changes began to this end. Moreover, a preliminary historical analysis shows that dynamics and issues of current EU-Russia relations, e.g. human rights, co-operation in the fields of energy, security, and environment, all emerged in the 1970s. As well, the pattern of EU’s enlargement eastwards had its origins in the relations between the EC and Central and Eastern European countries in the previous decades. By placing recent developments in a longer perspective historical research would thus significantly contribute to a better understanding of present-day Euro- pe.53 In accomplishing this task, historians of European integration would largely benefit from linking with Cold War history, for the bipolar structure significantly affected the relations between the EC and the communist countries all along the Cold War years. Reversing the link, Cold War historians should take into higher consideration the external dimension of the integration process and EC’s international role.

State of the art

In the last decade, the scholarly debate on the Cold War has moved beyond superpowers’ policy and relationship to focus on the role of small and medium powers in the 1970s and early 1980s, also prompted by the release of primary sources in many archives. Recent studies in the field recognise the 1970s as a period marking a profound discontinuity in the political and economic international system.54 In particular, it is evident that the consolidated geopolitical and ideological bipolar equilibrium began to be eroded, and that small and medium powers enjoyed greater autonomy. In this context, Western European détente involving the East in financial, commercial and cultural links is now acknowledged among the crucial factors in determining the end of the Cold War, and explaining the pace of the fall of communism in Euro-

53. This contribution results from my research work as Jean Monnet Fellow 2009-2010 at RSCAS, EUI. 54. O.A. WESTAD (ed.), Reviewing the Cold War. Approaches, Interpretations and Theories, Frank Cass, London, 2000; F. KNIPPING, M. SCHÖNWALD (eds.), Aufbruch zum Europa der Zweiten Generation. Die europäische Einigung, 1969-1984, WVT, Trier, 2004; A. VARSORI. (ed.), Alle origini del presente. L’Europa occidentale nella crisi degli anni Settanta, Franco Angeli, Milano, 2007. The international history of European integration in the long 1970s 355 pe.55 So is the CSCE process, in which EC member states played a leading role in turning European international politics to a new kind of thinking.56 The EC too is recognised as a strong pole of attraction vis-à-vis the disastrous socialist experiment.57 Nonetheless, the emphasis to date has been bilateral and transatlantic rather than multilateral and pan-European, and the active role of the EC as such is still largely overlooked. On its part, recent European integration historiography devotes more attention to the external dimension of the process and to the international role of the EC, linking European integration dynamics to the broader history of international relations. In this new research field, however, EC’s relations with the Soviet bloc countries remain largely unexplored. To date, there are a few remarkable attempts to fill the gap. The volume edited by Piers Ludlow, European integration and the Cold War: Ostpolitik- Westpolitik, 1965-1973, brings evidence of the way in which the East-West conflict and the emergence of organised co-operation in Europe became entangled with one another in the member states’ foreign policy. Moreover, Ludlow’s own chapter brings the EC as such under scrutiny, debating the general assumption of a Community insulated from Cold War dynamics.58 Yamamoto successfully linked détente and integration in his article on EC response to the Soviet proposal for EC/Comecon relations in the early 1970s.59 However, his analysis is focused on French, British and West German governments’ approaches, identifies the EC with the Council of For- eign Ministers, and completely ignores the Commission. Making use of the vast amount of available EC primary sources, one finds that Soviet representatives approached the Commission first, and repeatedly since 1972, and that the supranational institution actively contributed to shaping EC response to Comecon.60

55. See F. BOZO et al. (eds.), Europe and the End of the Cold War. A Reappraisal, Routledge, London- New York, 2008; F. ROMERO, Storia della guerra fredda, Einaudi, Torino, 2009. P. VILLAUME, O.A. WESTAD (eds.), Perforating the Iron Curtain: European Détente, Transatlantic Relations, and the Cold War, 1965-1985, Museum Tusculanum, Copenhagen, 2010. M. LEFFLER, O. WES- TAD (eds.), Cambridge History of the Cold War, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010, vol. II (see in particular the chapters by J. HANHIMÄKI, Détente in Europe, 1969-1975, N.P. LUDLOW, European integration and the Cold War, and J. YOUNG, Western Europe and the end of the Cold War, 1979-1989). 56. See D. THOMAS, Human Rights Ideas, the Demise of Communism, and the End of the Cold War, in: Journal of Cold War Studies, 2(2005), pp.110-141. A. WENGER, V. MASTNY, C. NU- ENDLIST (eds.), Origins of the European Security System: The Helsinki Process Revisited, 1965-75, Routledge, London-New York, 2009. M. LEFFLER, O. WESTAD (eds.), Cambridge History of the Cold War, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010, vol. III (see in particular the chapters by A. Robert, An ’incredibly swift transition’: reflections on the end of the Cold War, and R. Foot, The Cold War and human rights). 57. F. ROMERO, op.cit. 58. N.P. LUDLOW, European integration and the Cold War: Ostpolitik-Westpolitik, 1965-1973, Rout- ledge, London-New York, 2007. 59. T. YAMAMOTO, Detente or Integration? EC Response to Soviet Policy Change towards the Com- mon Market, 1970-75, in: Cold War History, 1(2007), pp.75-94. 60. A. ROMANO, Behind closed doors. Contacts between EEC and CMEA in the early 1970s, in: C. MENEGUZZI (ed.), The Helsinki Process. A Historical Reappraisal, CEDAM, Padova, 2005. 356 Research Reports – Rapports de recherche – Forschungsberichte

Focusing on the multilateral and pan-European level, my book analyses the attempts of the EC-Nine to shape and promote a co-ordinated “European détente” on the occasion of the Helsinki CSCE. Not only does it demonstrate that EPC came to live and instantly flourished due to East-West dialogue, but also it brings into the argument the role and interests of the EC as such, and points to the question of gaining recognition from the Soviet bloc countries as one of the driving forces behind Western European collective action.61 The action of the Nine at Helsinki is also the one major success story Möckli reports in his thorough analysis on France, Britain, and West Germany and the emergence of EPC within the broader context of early 1970s Cold War intra-European and transatlantic relations.62 Moreover, while arguing that by 1974 this brief moment of concord had vanished and policy successes became rare, Möckli recognises the CSCE as the notable exception. In fact, my works moving beyond the early 1970s bring evidence of Western European collective CSCE action up into the 1980s. Fur- thermore, I point to a broader EC “Eastern policy”, in which CSCE features along EC’s intensifying bilateral relations with Eastern states. Most Soviet bloc countries informally approached the Commission to conclude bilateral dealings, and negotiations between the EC and Comecon went public.63 These contacts, together with the involvement of the Commission in several EPC working groups, made the EC institutions increasingly acknowledge East-West dynamics, appreciate the national political and economic realities of the Eastern countries, and shape EC policy and actions more accurately. The above-mentioned scholarship has demonstrated the fruitfulness of historical analysis linking European integration and Cold War. It has convincingly argued that in the first half of the 1970s the flourishing of détente between the superpowers as well as between European states provided the ideal framework for asserting a “Europe speaking with a single voice”. It has also shown that EPC turned out to be particularly successful at the Helsinki CSCE, and that the EC as such became actively involved in East-West relations. From the mid-1970s to the Gorbachev era the return of Cold War-like tensions between the superpowers narrowed EC-Nine’s room for manoeuvre. Yet, recent works show that détente became a permanent task of EPC, and that EC-Soviet bloc relations grew more intense and diversified. Research on the next chapter of this story is badly needed, and moving into the long 1970s perspective seems particularly promising for studies connecting the two historical sub-fields.

61. A. ROMANO, From Détente in Europe to European Détente. How the West Shaped the Helsinki CSCE, Peter Lang, Brussels, 2009. 62. D. MÖCKLI, op.cit. 63. See A. ROMANO, The European Community and the Belgrade CSCE, in: V. BILANDZIC, M. KASANOVIC (eds.), From Helsinki to Belgrade, OSCE Mission to Serbia and Žikić Fond, Belgrad, 2008; A. ROMANO, La Comunità europea e il blocco sovietico negli anni Settanta, in: A. BITUMI et al. (eds.), La Comunità europea e le relazioni esterne 1957-1992, Clueb, Forlì, 2008; A. RO- MANO, Western Europe, the US and the Madrid CSCE Follow-Up Meeting: Common Front, Dif- ferent Strategies, in: K. PATEL, K. WEISBRODE, Europe and America in the 1980s: Old Barriers, New Openings, forthcoming. The international history of European integration in the long 1970s 357

Research in this field moving its first steps, methodological issues are to be assessed and the research agenda is open to definition. I hereby suggest some directions, which are largely influenced by my own experience, interests, and agenda.

Problems and methodological issues

The “long 1970s” suggests the opportunity to define the period of analysis according to criteria more sophisticated than the simple time span of a decade. As for EC’s relations with the East, I would propose the long 1970s as beginning in December 1969 – taking the EC Summit of The Hague as starting point – and ending in 1983 with the conclusion of the Madrid CSCE follow-up meeting. If we consider European détente, and the continuity in EPC machinery to deal with it, this choice proves consistent. As Prof. Wilfried Loth argued during workshop discussion, 1983 “is also plausible because the so-called Second Cold War ended just in this year. It was in early 1984, more than one year before Mikhail Gorbachev came into power, that Ronald Reagan started his charming offensive towards Moscow, genuinely aiming to improve relations and reduce the level of armaments”. In approaching research in this field, historians should free their minds from some narrative habits. First, the “East” or “Soviet bloc” is too often referred to as a single entity, almost coincident with the USSR, while differences among communist states were impressive as for political and economic rationales, interests and actions, especially when it came to relations with the EC. Second, scholars should get rid of the idea of “lost opportunities”. Kissinger-attributed remark “Whom do I call if I want to speak to Europe?” still echoes in the public and academic discourse, especially of political scientists. Historians should refuse presupposition that only a supranational foreign policy might produce results. This is linked to the problem of defining the EC actor whilst appreciating its complexities. I have heretofore referred to EC’s relations with the East for reasons of convenience. Indeed, relations with the East involved both the EC as such and EPC, the latter being intended as collective action by the nine governments. Research may well focus on either of two, consider the two in parallel, or propose the definition of a hybrid entity comprising the two. The latter is usually the case when scholars refer to “EC-Nine”. The choice is directly linked with the specific object of research. However, it is worth reminding that the borders between EC competence, EPC domains, and national prerogative is everything but rigid. First, the European integration itself is a process, and competence in specific areas may – and did in 1970s – shift from states to the EC. Second, the possible fields of co-operation with the communist countries required a combined EC/member states’ action in case of shared competence. Third, the highly political character of relations with the East necessitated EC member states’ diplomatic action even when the EC had exclusive competence. Fi- nally, although foreign and security policies remained entirely within the scope of 358 Research Reports – Rapports de recherche – Forschungsberichte national governments and were dealt with via intergovernmental cooperation, their touching upon the integration process, actual and potential, increasingly required involvement of the EC Commission in discussions and decision making. The hybrid EC polity gets further complex in the mid-1970s with the creation of the European Council. Its role is still overlooked although it represents one of the most interesting innovations within the integration process. I encourage scholars to take it into full consideration when analysing EC’s relations with the East, for it is hard to imagine that the highest political authorities of the member states completely neglected issues such as East-West conflict and the international role of the EC. EC Council, EPC, and European Council: no doubt the role of the member states remains crucial within the European polity. However, research should move beyond purely national approaches and examine, in a transnational perspective, the ways in which mutual influences, common European ideas and standards, EC legacy, and path-dependencies deriving from previous decisions played a role in decision making. Ideological commitments, the willingness to avoid isolation, the socialisation among national officials and politicians all feature prominently in explaining the choice of member states to share sovereign decision-making with a supranational institution, or to agree to common foreign policy actions limiting their room for manoeuvre. Prof. Loth suggests to consider also joint leadership in the Nine’s collective action. We now know that Willy Brandt, Georges Pompidou, and Edward Heath shared the vision of a politically independent Europe and influenced the development of the European project. At least for the Franco-German couple a basic understanding continued beyond the political changes of 1974, and its influence deserves further research and acknowledgment. Given the complexity of EC polity, research in this field should be multi-national and multi-archival. To start with, foreign ministries’ documents should be comple- mented with sources from other branches of the administration, policy-makers’ private papers and, when relevant, non-governmental actors’ papers. Furthermore, scholars should move beyond national sources and make full use of European institutions’ documents. Beyond archival sources, academic journals of the time may provide useful insights into the political and economic debate; and journalists’ reports may serve as both eyewitness accounts and critical commentaries on international relations and politics, although their accuracy should always be checked against other available material. To conclude on methodology, I would favour some degree of openness to other disciplines. As generations of French and Italian scholars of histoire des relations internationales have learned from Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, Pierre Renouvin, and Ennio Di Nolfo, historiography significantly benefits from concepts and theories developed by political scientists, sociologists, economists, jurists.64 I envisage promis-

64. P. RENOUVIN, J.-B. DUROSELLE, Introduction …, op.cit.; E. DI NOLFO., Prima lezione di storia delle relazioni internazionali, Laterza, Roma, 2006. The international history of European integration in the long 1970s 359 ing outcome from a targeted use of their scholarship on matters such as economic interdependence and warfare, multilateralism, governance, decision-making.

2. Research agenda: possible topics

To start with, historians might look at EC “Eastern policy” as part of a more general effort at asserting an international political role of the EC, and thus analyse European polity’s changing governance in this respect. In particular, and beyond national politics, development of EPC mechanism, the broadening of EC policies, the role of the European Parliament and European Council should all be taken into consideration. I would also encourage studies on the influence of the European civil society on EC/ EPC decisions. Being economic issues a most prominent part of EC’s relations with Soviet bloc countries, it would be interesting to analyse the role of the industrial and business community and their attempts at influencing either national governments or EC institutions, the perceptions and responses of the latter, the actual influence on EC/EPC decisions. The same kind of approach might apply to public opinion, and particularly its most vocal parts such as human rights activists and peaceful movements, to which the CSCE process opened a formidable stage. This kind of analysis has led to fascinating results in the case of the US.65 Given the collective action of the EC-Nine in the CSCE process, it might prove equally fruitful in European studies. Scholars could also analyse attempts at promoting “European détente” further, looking at the political debate within both EPC and the Community framework. In this context, the debate on the role of economic relations, i.e. interdependence vs. economic warfare, is of major importance. Research might also deal with the transatlantic dimension of EC policy towards the East, and focus not only on détente, but also on the debate on international trade and the possibility to involve centrally planned economies in international regimes. On the one side, the end of the Bretton Woods system, the rising rates of inflation and unemployment, the process of de-industrialisation all involved capitalist countries in attempts at rethinking international economic structures and relations. On the other side, European communist regimes were re-thinking political economy and intra-bloc trade. Both the national and Comecon debates show an increasing openness to trade and co-operation with the West, as well as a growing willingness to participate in (and possibly help refine) international economic organisations. Within this broader context, one of the key issues historians should also address is EC’s attempt at gaining recognition from the communist countries. Moreover, research on this topic might take into consideration the cases of Yugoslavia and China, either in a compar-

65. S. SNYDER, Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War: A Transnational History of the Helsinki Network, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011. 360 Research Reports – Rapports de recherche – Forschungsberichte ative perspective or as influencing negotiations between the EC and Soviet bloc countries.66 Finally, scholars might appraise EC’s policy towards the East and thus highlight the factors, whether supranational, national or international, determining both the characteristics of EC’s action and the extent to which it achieved its goals. Studies on this topic might consider not only bilateral relations, but also multilateral contexts such as the CSCE process and the UN Economic Commission for Europe. Angela Romano (Marie Curie Fellow, LSE)

66. On EC and China see the promising research of Marie-Julie Chenard, PhD candidate at LSE Inter- national History Department. 361

PHD Theses – Thèses de doctorat – Doktorarbeiten

If you are about to complete or have recently completed a PhD in European integration history or a related field, and would like to see your abstract published here, please contact: Si vous êtes sur le point de terminer une thèse de doctorat en histoire de l’inté- gration européenne ou dans une discipline proche, et vous voulez publier un abstract de votre travail, contactez s.v.p.: Falls Sie ein Doktorat im Bereich der europäischen Integrationsgeschichte oder einer ihr nahestehenden Disziplin abgeschlossen haben, oder demnächst abschließen und eine Kurzfassung ihrer Arbeit veröffentlichen möchten, melden Sie sich bitte bei: [email protected] [email protected]

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Pauli HEIKKILÄ, Imagining Europe, Imagining the Nation. Estonian Discussion on European Unification, 1923-1957 – University of Turku supervisor/jury: Timo SOIKKANEN, University of Turku; Andres KASEKAMP, University of Tartu; Pertti GRÖNHOLM, University of Turku date of the exam: 28.5.2011 contact: [email protected] The dissertation looks at the history of European unification from the Estonian point of view. Estonia’s domestic discussions have been studied from the collections in Estonian and Swedish national archives and correspondence with the European organisations in Russian State Military Archives and Historical Archives of the Euro- pean Union. The thesis consists of six articles, which have been published in international publications 2007-2010. The first three articles deal with the Estonian discussion on the unification during the interwar period. Estonians responded very positively to the Briand Memorandum but a common stance with the closest neighbours was out of reach. An Estonian Section of the Paneuropean Union was established in August 1929. In public discussion the promoters cherished the idea of European solidarity as the ultimate reason for unification and the opponents considered national identities too weak to engage in unification. Occasionally cooperation among immediate neighbours bordering the Baltic Sea was compared to these continental aspirations. The discussion had with- ered by 1934, the beginning of 'the silent era' in Estonian politics. Estonia lost her independence during the World War II. The forth article intro- duces Aleksander Warma's plan for consolidating European peace in December 1942 written in exile in Helsinki for the US State Department. Warma saw Europe as a network of small, equal states and his European federation would consist of regional unions. 362 PHD Theses – Thèses de doctorat – Doktorarbeiten

The last two articles examine the exiled Estonian politicians in the European Movement in the early Cold War period. Arvo Horm attended the Congress of Europe in The Hague in May 1948 but his name is not to be found in the list of delegates. It took a year and a half for Estonians to become members. Unfortunately, at same time, West European interest in the European Movement declined as European integration rapidly intensified through the European Coal and Steel Community. By 1957, dis- appointment in the inability of European unification to help regaining Estonian independence became evident. These various cases in different international situations show the Estonian appeal for a firmer European system in order to secure their national independence.

Guido INNOCENTI, Development Policy and Foreign Relations in Ghana after independence (1957-1978) – Università degli Studi di Firenze supervisor: Elena CALANDRI, PA, Università degli Studi di Padova jury: Bruna BAGNATO, Università degli Studi di Firenze; Matteo PIZZIGALLO, Università Federico II di Napoli; Mariole MERLATI, Ricercatore, Università statle di Milano study Expert: Gianpaolo CALCHI NOVATI, Università di Pavia date of exam: 3.5.2011 contact: [email protected] The political independence which Ghana achieved in 1957 represents one of the landmarks of the contemporary African history and constitutes a fascinating case- study of a post-colonial state. This thesis is a detailed archives-based study of the first twenty years after independence. It is based on extensive multi-archival and multinational research, including archives of the Ghanean, British and French governments, as well as of the EEC Commission. In general, the dissertation analyses the interrelation between the development policies and three main orientations of Ghana’s foreign policy: non-alignment, panafricanism, and relations with developed countries. In the latter area, it analyses also how and why Ghana moved from hostility to cooperation in its relations with the EEC. In order to explain the reasons of this evolution, it is essential to examine the commercial links between the European Community and Ghana, assuming that the economy of the latter was structurally weak, dominated by foreign interests (especially British) and unbalanced as it relied on exports of cocoa beans whose price in international markets was declining. Nevertheless, this thesis delves into also a more sophisticated understanding of the interplay between various local themes (nation building, development strategies, public debt, military role, chieftancy and traditions), and different international issues in both the regional context (West Africa integration, relations between francophone and anglophone countries) and the global arena (cold war strategies, North/South divide). With regard to the 1970s, the conventional account on the Lomé Convention focuses basically on the negotiations between EEC members and ACP countries. In- stead, after examining the Ghanean attitude towards the European Community before PHD Theses – Thèses de doctorat – Doktorarbeiten 363 the UK's entry in the EEC and the oil crisis, this thesis delves into the Ghana's government contribution in defining positions of both the Commonwealth Group (1972-73) and the ACP group (1973-1975). Afterwards, it focuses on the implementation of the Lomé Convention (projects that obtained EDF financing, stabex, technical cooperation). Therefore, this thesis shows that more profound trends (and in particular development strategies) considerably influenced the orientations of the Black Star's foreign policy.

Alexander REINFELDT, Akteure und Strategien supranationaler Informationspo- litik in der Gründungsphase der europäischen Integration (1952-1972) – Universität Hamburg supervisor: Gabriele CLEMENS, Universität Hamburg jury: Axel SCHILDT, Universität Hamburg; Franklin KOPITZSCH, Universität Hamburg date of the exam: 21.6.2011 contact: [email protected] Der supranationale europäische Integrationsprozess war ein Elitenprozess, wesentlich geprägt durch das Prinzip der funktionalen Herrschaft unabhängiger Ex- perten, durch Output-Legitimation anstelle von demokratischer Input-Legitimation. Die Beteiligung einer breiteren Öffentlichkeit war demgegenüber nachrangig. Vor diesem Hintergrund analysiert die Arbeit die Informationspolitik der Hohen Behörde der EGKS, der EWG-Kommission und der EURATOM-Kommission bzw. – nach der Fusion der europäischen Exekutiven – der Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften in der Gründungsphase der europäischen Integration von den frühen 1950er bis in die frühen 1970er Jahre. Im einzelnen werden die Motive und Ziele herausgearbeitet, die angesichts dieser Strukturprinzipien des Integrationsprozesses für die supranationalen europäischen Exekutiven maßgeblich waren, überhaupt In- formationspolitik zu betreiben, sowie die Strategien bei deren Umsetzung. Die Anal- yse folgt einem akteurszentrierten, supranationalen Untersuchungsansatz und stützt sich primär auf das unveröffentlichte Schriftgut aus den Beständen der Historischen Archive der Europäischen Kommission (AHCE). Im Ergebnis reichten die überaus vielschichtigen Motive und Ziele der Informa- tionspolitik von der bloßen Rechenschaftspflicht gegenüber der Öffentlichkeit bis hin zur Schaffung eines europäischen Bewusstseins. Die Untersuchung der Informati- onspolitik zeigt auch, dass insbesondere Hohe Behörde und EWG-Kommission bis zur Fusion der Exekutiven um den politischen Führungsanspruch in der Informati- onspolitik und im Integrationsprozess insgesamt konkurrierten, wodurch zeitweilig die Informationspolitik selbst beeinträchtigt wurde. Darüber hinaus erlaubt die Ana- lyse der Informationspolitik Rückschlüsse auf das Selbstverständnis und die Rolle der supranationalen Akteure im europäischen Integrationsprozess. So haben sich die europäischen Exekutiven in ihrer Informationspolitik insgesamt als Förderer der In- tegration gesehen, etwa durch die gezielte Förderung einer institutionalisierten trans- nationalen europäischen Zusammenarbeit, beispielsweise im Bereich der Jugendin- 364 PHD Theses – Thèses de doctorat – Doktorarbeiten formation, zwischen den nationalen Verwaltungen der Mitgliedstaaten, von nicht- staatlichen Organisationen und Medien. Ähnliches gilt für ihre Zusammenarbeit mit der Europabewegung. In diesem Bemühen um die Förderung transnationaler euro- päischer Zusammenarbeit – und weniger in der direkten Beeinflussung der öffentli- chen Meinung – liegt dann auch die eigentliche Bedeutung der Informationspolitik für den europäischen Integrationsprozess. Informationspolitik war immer auch Inte- grationspolitik.

Nicolas Verschueren, Fermer les mines en construisant l’Europe. Une histoire sociale de l’intégration européenne – Université libre de Bruxelles supervisor: Pieter LAGROU, Université libre de Bruxelles jury: Pieter LAGROU, Université libre de Bruxelles; Kiran PATEL, Maastricht University; René LEBOUTTE, Université du Luxembourg; Kenneth BERTRAMS, Université libre de Bruxelles; Serge JAUMAIN, Université libre de Bruxelles date of the exam: 21.12.2010 contact: [email protected] Le prisme de l'Europe sociale a une profondeur historique sous-estimée, des espoirs investis notamment par le mouvement syndical dans cette intervention étatique d'un nouveau type et des programmes sociaux effectivement échafaudées par la CECA dans les années 1950 jusqu'aux déceptions des années 1960 et l'émergence d'un nouveau paysage économique et social en Europe. Alors que les premières années de la construction européenne sont présentées comme la période de la grande œuvre sociale des institutions communautaires, sa portée et sa signification reste à décrypter. Des batailles du charbon aux occupations d’usine dans les années 1970, cette histoire d’une désindustrialisation constitue une tentative d’histoire sociale de la construction européenne à deux niveaux. La première partie s’attèle à décrypter les tentatives de politiques sociales euro- péennes à travers trois thèmes principaux: les aléas de la création d’un contre-pouvoir syndical communautaire, l’influence de la Haute Autorité sur l’architecture des mai- sons ouvrières et le projet d’un statut européen du mineur qui n’avait pas encore fait l’objet d’une étude historique conséquente. La seconde partie est une étude de la restructuration d’un bassin charbonnier dans le cadre de la construction européenne en prenant le Borinage comme champ d’investigation. La crise charbonnière de la fin des années 1950 représente une première crise sociale et une crise de légitimité pour la Haute Autorité. L’observation des troubles sociaux vise à analyser la place et le rôle des institutions européennes dans ce processus et les réactions qu’elles ont sus- citées. La reconversion du bassin minier, thème omniprésent dans l’historiographie industrielle contemporaine, s’insère dans la constitution progressive des politiques régionales européennes. Au-delà du décompte des aides communautaires obtenues, cette recherche appréhende les transformations industrielles lors d’une des premières tentatives de reconversion régionale sur le continent européen. L’examen des discussions au sein des institutions européennes et des organismes locaux en charge de la reconversion offre une mise en perspective de la reconversion en variant la focale PHD Theses – Thèses de doctorat – Doktorarbeiten 365 de l’analyse du niveau macro au micro. Afin d’en mesurer les conséquences sociales, l’étude des conflits sociaux dans les années 1970 apporte un éclairage pertinent sur la perpétuation d’une identité locale fondée sur la lutte sociale depuis les grèves des mineurs jusqu’aux occupations d’usine par les descendants de ceux-ci. En accom- plissant le grand écart entre une histoire sociale par le haut et une micro-histoire d’un bassin minier en reconversion, cette thèse propose de poser la question sociale au cœur de l'histoire de l'intégration européenne, et inversement, de placer l'Europe au centre de l'histoire sociale du deuxième après-guerre. Regulierung in Europa

Schriftenreihe des Arbeitskreises Europäische Integration e.V.

Ludwig Gramlich/Cornelia Manger-Nestler (Hrsg.) Europäisierte Regulierungsstrukturen und -netzwerke

Basis einer künftigen Infrastrukturvorsorge

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Regulierung ist bereits in ihrem national- strukturen. Der Band will den Begriﬀ eines rechtlichen Kern einem ständigen Wandel „europäischen“ Regulierungsrechts stärker unterworfen; zudem bestimmen die EU konturieren. Dabei werden Ziele, Strukturen sowie transnationale Netzwerkstrukturen und Instrumente erfasst und die Vielfalt des das Management von Risiken und Infra- Regulierungsrechts untersucht.

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Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen

Guido THIEMEYER, Isabel TÖLLE Supranationality in the 19th century? The Central Commission for Navigation on the Rhine and the Octroi-treaty, 1804-1851

European integration research has considered supranationality a 20th century phenomenon. From this point of view, the European Community for Coal and Steel was the first supranational organisation. This article shows that supranational organisations already existed in the 19th century, although to a limited extent. The Central Commission for Navigation on the Rhine and its predecessor, the Octroi treaty between France and the Holy Roman Empire, even then contained supranational elements in the field of jurisdiction. The police regulation that was developed by the Cen- tral Commission had a supranational character as well. The sources reveal economic and technical reasons for that supranationality. There is, thus, a remarkable continuity between the economic and technical integration of the early 19th century and the supranational organisations of the 20th century. A profound research of the term supranationality remains to be done.

Supranationalité au XIXe siècle? La Commission centrale pour la navigation du Rhin et le traité de l'octroi (1804-1851)

Jusqu’à aujourd’hui, le principe de la supranationalité a été considéré par les chercheurs de l’histoire de l’intégration européenne comme un phénomène du XXe siècle. Dans cette perspective, la Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l’Acier était la première organisation supranationale. L’article montre qu’il y avaient déjà au XIXe siècle des organisations supranationales en Europe, même si elles existent dans un cadre limité. La Commission centrale pour la navigation du Rhin et son prédé- cesseur, le contrat de l’octroi entre la France et le Saint Empire Romain Germanique, contenaient déjà le principe de la supranationalité pour la juridiction. Le règlement de police fluviale rhénane développé par la commission centrale avait aussi un ca- ractère supranational. Selon les sources disponibles, le principe a été introduit pour des raisons économiques et techniques. Il y a donc une continuité remarquable entre l’intégration économique et technique du XIXe siècle et l’intégration supranationale du XXe siècle. Une recherche détaillée sur la notion de la supranationalité reste à faire.

Supranationalität im 19. Jahrhundert? Die Beispiele der Zentralkommission für die Rheinschifffahrt und des Octroivertrages 1804-1851

Bislang ging die europäische Integrationsforschung von der These aus, dass die Su- pranationalität eine Besonderheit der europäischen Integration des 20. Jahrhunderts ist. Die Europäische Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl sei die erste supranationale internationale Organisation gewesen. Der Beitrag zeigt, dass es bereits im 19. Jah- rhundert supranationale Organisationen gab, wenn auch in begrenztem Maße. Die 368 Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen

Zentralkommission für die Rheinschifffahrt und ihr Vorgänger, der bilaterale Octroi- Vertrag zwischen Frankreich und dem Heiligen Römischen Reich deutscher Nation, enthielten hinsichtlich der Rechtsprechung starke supranationale Elemente. Auch die im Rahmen der Zentralkommission entwickelte Polizeiverordnung für die Rhein- schifffahrt folgte diesem Prinzip. Als Begründung für die Supranationalität werden in den Quellen wirtschaftliche und technische Argumente angeführt. Es gibt daher eine bemerkenswerte Kontinuität zwischen der wirtschaftlichen und technischen In- tegration des frühen 19. Jahrhunderts und den supranationalen Organisationen des 20. Jahrhunderts. Eine detaillierte Erforschung des Begriffes der Supranationalität und seines Wandels ist ein Forschungsdesiderat.

Jieskje HOLLANDER The Dutch Intellectual Debate on European Integration (1948-present). On Teachings and Life

Since the beginning of the new millennium, in the Netherlands dissension has grown about the integration of Europe and the form that this integration should take. From a historical perspective it is remarkable that essential questions on the political character of European cooperation began to get their grip on the Netherlands only then. What had the Dutch been talking about since their first steps on the European path some sixty years ago? This article seeks to answer this question by mapping out the history of the Dutch intellectual debate on European integration between 1948 and the present. In doing this, it fills a gap in the Dutch historiography on the process. Moreover, the analysis of the intellectual debate explains – from a historical perspective – the origin of the gap between the Dutch political elite and the public at large that was revealed by the Dutch referendum on the Treaty Establishing a Con- stitution for Europe in June 2005.

Le débat intellectuel néerlandais sur l’intégration Européenne (1948-présent). Sur les enseignements et la vie

Aux Pays-Bas, l’intégration européenne et la forme que celle-ci devrait adopter sont depuis le début du nouveau millénaire l’objet de controverses. D’un point de vue historique, il est étonnant que des questions essentielles à propos du caractère politique de la coopération européenne ont attendus si longtemps pour voir le jour aux Pays-Bas. De quoi les Néerlandais ont-ils débattu depuis leurs premiers pas sur la route européenne il y a une soixantaine d’années? Cet article cherche à répondre à cette question en présentant l’histoire du débat intellectuel néerlandais sur l’intégra- tion européenne depuis 1948 jusqu’à présent. Ce faisant, la contribution comble une lacune dans l’analyse historique néerlandaise sur ce processus. De plus, cette analyse du débat intellectuel explique – d’un point de vue historique – l’origine du fossé qui sépare l’élite politique néerlandaise du public en général, fossé dont l'existence s'est révélée à l'occasion du referendum de juin 2005 sur le Traité établissant une Consti- tution pour l’Europe. Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen 369

Die niederländische Debatte über die europäische Integration (1948-bis heute). Über die Lehre und das Leben

Seit Anfang des neuen Millenniums geht in den Niederlanden die Rede von wach- sender Uneinigkeit über die Integration von Europa und die Form, die diese Integra- tion annehmen sollte. Aus historischer Perspektive ist bemerkenswert, dass wesentliche Fragen in Bezug auf den politischen Charakter europäischer Zusammenarbeit Holland erst dann in den Griff bekam. Worüber sprachen die Niederländer seitdem das Land vor ungefähr sechzig Jahren anfing, seine ersten Schritte auf den Pfaden Europas zu tun? Dieser Artikel versucht, diese Frage zu beantworten, indem die Ge- schichte der niederländischen intellektuellen Debatte über europäische Integration zwischen 1948 und der Gegenwart skizziert wird. Dadurch wird eine Lücke in der niederländischen Historiographie bezüglich dieses Prozesses geschlossen. Außerdem – aus einer historischen Perspektive – füllt die Analyse der intellektuellen Debatte eine Lücke, die es zwischen der holländischen politischen Elite und der Masse des Publikums gab. Sie wurde sichtbar durch das niederländische Referendum zum Ver- tag über eine Verfassung für Europa im Juni 2005.

Andrea BENVENUTI Australia and Western European Integration in the 1950s

This article examines Australia’s attitude towards Western European integration in the 1950s. It focuses on the responses of the Menzies government to the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community, the ill-fated experiment of the European Defence Community and the creation of the European Economic Community. The article argues that while supportive of steps towards greater Western European cooperation, Australia adopted an ambivalent attitude towards the integration process. Policymakers in Canberra did recognize the importance of a politically cohesive and economically prosperous Western Europe. Yet, the formation of a strong Continental grouping also posed major challenges to the makers of post-war Australian foreign policy. As this article shows, the Menzies government soon began to wonder whether attempts to create supranational bodies in Continental Europe accorded with Austra- lian political, economic and security interests.

L'Australie et l'intégration de l'Europe occidentale dans les années 1950

Cet article examine l'attitude de l'Australie face à l'intégration de l'Europe occidentale dans les années 1950. Il se concentre sur les réponses du gouvernement Menzies à la création de la Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l'Acier, à l'expérience malheureuse de la Communauté Européenne de Défense et la formation de la Com- munauté Economique Européenne. L'article fait valoir que, tout en soutenant des mesures favorables à une plus grande coopération avec l'Europe occidentale, l'Aus- tralie adopta une attitude ambivalente à l'égard du processus d'intégration. D'une part, Canberra reconnut l'importance d'une Europe de l'Ouest politiquement cohérente et économiquement prospère; d'autre part, la formation d'un fort groupement continental 370 Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen européen confronta les décideurs de la politique étrangère australienne d'après-guerre à des défis majeurs. Comme le montre cet article, le gouvernement Menzies ne tarda pas à se demander si les tentatives de créer des organismes supranationaux en Europe continentale étaient bien en harmonie avec les intérêts politiques, économiques et sécuritaires de l'Australie.

Australien und die westeuropäische Integration in den 1950er Jahren

Dieser Artikel untersucht Australien's Stellung gegenüber der westeuropäischen In- tegration in den 1950er Jahren. Er analysiert insbesondere die Reaktionen der Re- gierung Menzies auf die Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl, den erfolglosen Versuch einer europäischen Verteidigungsgemeinschaft und die Schaffung der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft. Der Artikel legt dar, wie Australien trotz einer prinzipiellen Bejahung der verstärkten westeuropäischen Ko- operation den Integrationsprozess sehr zwiespältig beurteilte. Auf der einen Seite erkannten führende Politiker in Canberra die Wichtigkeit eines politisch gemeinschaftlichen und wirtschaftlich prosperierenden Europa an; auf der anderen Seite stellte die Entstehung einer starken europäischen Gruppierung eine Herausforderung für die australische Außenpolitik der Nachkriegsjahre dar. Wie der Artikel zeigt, begann die Menzies Regierung schon sehr früh zu zweifeln, ob die Bildung einer supranationalen Gemeinschaft in Kontinentaleuropa mit den politischen, wirtschaftlichen und sicherheitspolitischen Interessen Australiens vereinbar war.

Sibylle HAMBLOCH EEC Competition Policy in the Early Phase of European Integration

Besides the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), competition policy was an area of major importance for the European Economic Community (EEC) as it was there that first successes in the European integration process were achieved. The aim of this paper is to analyse the circumstances under which EEC competition policy was successful, success being measured by whether common European laws, i.e. regulations and directives, were passed. This article makes a conscious effort to include both case studies of examples which resulted in a common legislative act during the period under consideration, and those which did not. An example for a successful outcome was EEC Regulation 17/62 enforcing European cartel law. A case study where a legislative act failed to materialise was European company law: the attempt of creating a Societas Europaea.

La politique de concurrence de la CEE au commencement de l'intégration européenne

À côté de la Politique Agricole Commune (PAC), la politique de concurrence était un des champs les plus importants de la politique de la Communauté Economique Européenne (CEE) puisque ce fut ici que furent réalisés les premiers progrès du processus d'intégration européen. Le but de cet exposé est d'analyser les conditions dans lesquelles la politique de concurrence de la CEE fut couronnée de succès. Ce succès Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen 371 sera mesuré par l’adoption ou le rejet au niveau européen des lois communes, c'est- à-dire des règlements et directives. Un exemple de résultat positif fut le règlement 17/62 établissant le droit européen des cartels. Comme exemple d'un projet de loi qui a échoué au cours de la phase des débuts de la communauté, nous prendrons celui de la Societas Europaea qui devait mettre en place un statut juridique pour les sociétés anonymes.

EWG-Wettbewerbspolitik in der Frühphase der Europäischen Integration

Neben der Gemeinsamen Landwirtschaftspolitik war die Wettbewerbspolitik eines der bedeutenden Politikfelder der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft (EWG), da hier erste Fortschritte im europäischen Integrationsprozess erzielt wurden. Anliegen dieses Aufsatzes ist es, die Bedingungen zu analysieren, unter denen die EWG-Wett- bewerbspolitik erfolgreich war. Dies wird daran gemessen, ob gemeinsame Gesetze, d.h. Verordnungen und Richtlinien, auf europäischer Ebene verabschiedet wurden. Ein Beispiel für ein erfolgreiches Ergebnis war die Verordnung 17/62, mit der ein europäisches Kartellrecht etabliert wurde. Als Fallbeispiel für ein gescheitertes Ge- setzgebungsprojekt in der Frühphase der Gemeinschaft dient die Societas Euro- paea, mit der eine Rechtsform für ein Aktiengesellschaft geschaffen werden sollte.

Philip BAJON De Gaulle finds his “Master”. Gerhard Schröder’s “Fairly Audacious Politics” in the European Crisis of 1965–66

This article presents a new perspective on the interactions between two prominent European political figures amid the thorny empty chair crisis of 1965—66, namely French President Charles de Gaulle and German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder. First, it explains why the ‘proven and tested’ mechanisms of French-German conciliation collapsed, why Federal European policy failed to prevent France from provoking the major constitutional crisis of the EEC and why, consequently, Schröder was able to seize almost exclusive control over the definition of the Federal European policy line. Second, the article aims to place emphasis on the rivalry between the two statesmen. The empirical analysis demonstrates that de Gaulle found his “Master” in Schröder, who secured a German leadership role within the coalition of France’s partners and pursued a policy of brinkmanship à la de Gaulle to force the French government back to the negotiating table. Thus, the Federal Republic actually played the central role in managing and overcoming the crisis of the empty chair.

De Gaulle trouve son «maître». La «politique audacieuse» de Gerhard Schröder et la crise européenne de 1965-66

Le présent article met en perspective les interactions et la rivalité entre deux hommes politiques européens dans la crise de la chaise vide de 1965—66, le président français Charles de Gaulle et le ministre des Affaires étrangères allemand Gerhard Schröder. Premièrement, l’article vise à expliquer l’échec de la coopération franco-allemande, 372 Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen ce qui donna l’occasion au général de Gaulle de déclencher la plus grande crise constitutionnelle que l’intégration européenne ait connue. Deuxièmement, sur la base de nouvelles sources archivistiques, cet article montre que de Gaulle trouva son «maître» en Schröder, parce que le ministre allemand chercha la confrontation avec le général et poursuivit une politique «sur le fil du rasoir» pour forcer le gouvernement français à revenir à la table de négociation. La République Fédérale d'Allemagne joua donc un rôle prépondérant dans la genèse de la crise de la chaise vide.

De Gaulle findet seinen „Meister”. Gerhard Schröders „recht kühne Politik” und die europäische Krise von 1965-66

Der vorliegende Aufsatz ist dem Zusammenspiel und der Rivalität zweier europäi- scher Staatsmänner, des französischen Staatspräsidenten Charles de Gaulle und des bundesdeutschen Außenministers Gerhard Schröder, während der Krise des „leeren Stuhls” 1965—66 gewidmet. Der Artikel diskutiert zunächst, warum die erprobten Mechanismen des deutsch-französischen Ausgleichs im Jahre 1965 versagten und warum de Gaulle daraufhin die bislang schwerste Verfassungskrise der Europäischen Gemeinschaften provozierte. Die auf neuen Archivmaterialien beruhende Analyse belegt überdies, dass de Gaulle im Verlauf der Krise in Schröder seinen „Lehrmeister” fand, denn der deutsche Außenminister manövrierte die Bundesrepublik in eine Kon- frontationsstellung gegen Frankreich und betrieb eine Politik „am Rande des Ab- grunds”, um die französische Regierung an den Verhandlungstisch zurück zu zwin- gen. Deutschland spielte somit die zentrale Rolle bei der Bewältigung und Überwin- dung der Krise des „leeren Stuhls”.

Marijn MOLEMA European integration from below: the construction of the Ems-Dollart Region, 1964-1978

This article analyses the construction of the Ems-Dollart Region, a cross-border organization linking the Northern Netherlands and North West Germany. The analysis shows that the institutionalization of cross-border cooperation resulted from social practices and discourses in which four types of actors participated. First, politicians and policymakers at the regional or subnational level played a passive role. Second, regional civil society actors were a driving force behind the idea of cross-border cooperation. Third, policymakers from the national Ministries of Economic Affairs accepted the cross-border initiatives. Fourth, the European Commission’s achievements in setting up a European regional policy had a stimulating effect on all the actors involved. By addressing all of these actors and their motives, the construction of cross-border cooperation is shown to be a multi-layered process. Cross-border cooperation is rooted in interaction between agents from several domains of society, operating on different scales. Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen 373

L’intégration Européenne par en-dessous: la construction de Ems-Dollart Region, 1964-1978

Cet article analyse la mise en œuvre de la région Ems-Dollart, une organisation transfrontalière qui embrasse le Nord des Pays-Bas et le Nord-Ouest de l’Allemagne. L'analyse montre que l'institutionnalisation de la coopération transfrontalière a en- traîné des pratiques sociales et des discours auxquels quatre types d’acteurs ont par- ticipé. Premièrement, les politiciens et les décideurs au niveau régional et subnational qui ont joué un rôle passif. Deuxièmement, les acteurs régionaux de la société civile qui ont poussé l'idée de la coopération transfrontalière. Troisièmement, les décideurs issus des ministères nationaux de l'Economie et des Finances qui ont accepté ces initiatives. Finalement, les réalisations de la Commission Européenne dans la mise en place d’une politique européenne régionale qui a eu un effet stimulant sur l’ensemble des acteurs impliqués. En adressant tous ces acteurs et leurs motivations, il a été démontré que la construction d’une coopération transfrontalière est un processus à plusieurs niveaux. Elle est fondée sur l’interaction entre des agents de plusieurs domaines de la société qui opèrent à des différentes échelles.

Europaïsche Integration von unten: die Konstruktion der Ems-Dollart Region, 1964-1978

Dieser Aufsatz analysiert die Entstehung der Ems-Dollart Region, eine grenzüber- schreitende Region, die den Norden der Niederlande und den Nordwesten Deutsch- lands miteinander verbindet. Die Analyse belegt, dass die Institutionalisierung der grenzüberschreitenden Kooperation aus sozialen Praktiken und Diskursen heraus erfolgt, indem vier Arten von Akteuren beteiligt sind. Erstens spielten Politiker und Beamte der regionalen und subnationalen Ebene eine passive Rolle. Zweitens waren regionale Akteure aus der Zivilgesellschaft eine treibende Kraft hinter der Idee der grenzüberschreitenden Kooperation. Drittens akzeptierten Beamte der nationalen Wirtschafts- und Finanzministerien die grenzüberschreitenden Initiativen. Viertens beflügelten alle in der regionalen Entwicklungspolitik involvierten Akteure die Wei- terverfolgung der europäischen Regionalpolitik. In der Thematisierung der verschiedenen Akteure und ihrer Handlungsmotive zeigt sich die Konstruktion der grenz- überschreitenden Kooperation als ein vielschichtiger Prozess. Grenzüberschreitende Kooperation wurzelt in der Interaktion von Akteuren aus unterschiedlichen Domänen der Gesellschaft, die auf verschiedenen Ebenen operieren.

Valentina VARDABASSO The Cinderella of History: the EC Court of Auditors and the Democratisation of the European Institutions, 1970-1976

The Decision of 21 April 1970 on the Community’s own resources marks the beginning of long negotiations between the Community's Member States and some members of the European Parliament supported by Heinrich Aigner in order to increase its power on financial matters and strengthen the monitoring system through the creation of the EC Court of Auditors and so aim at the direct election of the Members 374 Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen of the European Parliament. Aigner’s intent to reconcile the different points of views about the direct election of the EC Parliament found its main opponent in the French President George Pompidou whose policy aimed to procrastinate the direct suffrage and restrict the Community’s financial autonomy to its administrative expenses. Sus- picions and disagreements on the implementations of the European Parliament’s pre- rogatives will be finally overcome by conferring the Parliament the right of veto on the Community budget and letting the different States the chance to elect his own members of the Court of Auditors whose report the Community Budget bases on.

La cendrillon de l'histoire: la Cour des comptes européenne et la démocratisation des institutions européennes (1970-1976)

Le Traité sur l’autonomie financière du 21 avril 1970 marque le début d’une longue négociation entre les Etats membres de la Communauté européenne et quelques membres du PE supportés par le député Heinrich Aigner, qui aspirent à élargir les prérogatives de contrôle budgétaire du PE en renforçant le système de contrôle par la création de la Cour des comptes. Ils espèrent par là arriver à l’élection directe du PE. Les propos d'Aigner de concilier les différents points de vue sur l’élection directe du PE trouvent leur adversaire principal dans le président français Georges Pompidou, dont la politique veut limiter l’autonomie financière de la Communauté aux dépenses administratives. Les soupçons et les désaccords sur la mise en œuvre des prérogatives parlementaires seront finalement surmontées en attribuant au PE le droit de veto sur le budget et en laissant aux Etats la possibilité d’élire les membres de la Cour des comptes européenne sur le rapport desquels se base le budget communautaire.

Das Aschenputtel der Geschichte: der Europäische Rechnungshof und die Demokratisierung der europäischen Institutionen

Der Vertrag über die Finanzautonomie vom 21. April 1970 steht am Anfang einer langwierigen Verhandlung zwischen den Mitgliedsstaaten der Europäischen Ge- meinschaft und einigen Mitgliedern des Europaparlaments die vom Abgeordneten Heinrich Aigner unterstützt wurden und deren erklärtes Ziel es war, die Befugnisse des Parlaments bezüglich der Haushaltskontrolle auszudehnen indem ein besseres Kontrollsystem und ein Europäischer Rechnungshof eingeführt werden sollten. Gleichzeitig hofften sie dadurch die Direktwahl des Europaparlaments herbeiführen zu können. Aigners Bemühungen die unterschiedlichen Standpunkte zusammenzu- führen stießen beim französischen Präsidenten Georges Pompidou auf wenig Ge- genliebe. Er wollte die Autonomie lediglich auf die Verwaltungsausgaben beschrän- ken. Die Anschuldigungen und Streitigkeiten wurden schlussendlich beigelegt als das Parlament das Vetorecht über den Haushalt bekam und ihm die Möglichkeit ge- boten wurde, die Mitglieder des Rechnungshofes zu wählen, die den Bericht ver- fassten auf dem der europäische Haushalt seither beruht. Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen 375

Andreas PUDLAT The long way to Schengen: A Process in a Four-phased Schedule

Border protection with its control and monitoring measures serves different purposes, including protection against threats, fiscal aspects (customs), and environment protection, but especially crime fighting and migration control. Furthermore, it is an expression of state sovereignty. But sometimes borders imply also potential for conflicts. That’s why pro-European propaganda after World War II communicated negative border images. Nevertheless it takes decades until the idea of Central Europe without border controls became reality. Under the Schengen Agreement, systematic border control between the participating states has been removed. This article retraces the long way to the Schengen area within four phases and tells a success story.

La longue route vers l'espace Schengen: Un processus en quatre temps

Avec ses contrôles et mesures de surveillance, la protection des frontières sert non seulement à la prévention de dangers, à des intérêts fiscaux, à la sécurité routière et à la protection de l'environnement, mais surtout à la lutte contre la criminalité et au contrôle de l'immigration. Elle est l'expression de la puissance souveraine des Etats et peut de ce fait aussi renfermer du potentiel conflictuel. C'est pourquoi la propa- gande pro-européenne de l'après-Seconde Guerre mondiale se plaisait à transmettre une image négative des frontières. Pourtant il fallait patienter pendant plusieurs dé- cennies avant de voir émerger en Europe un noyau d'Etats qui renoncent aux contrôles systématiques le long de leurs frontières. Grâce aux accords de Schengen, qui font l'objet du présent exposé, cet espace de libre circulation des personnes devint enfin réalité.

Der lange Weg zum Schengen-Raum: Ein Prozess im Vier-Phasen-Modell

Grenzschutz mit seinen Kontroll- und Überwachungsmaßnahmen dient der Gefah- renabwehr, fiskalischen Interessen, der Verkehrssicherheit und dem Umweltschutz, vor allem aber der Kriminalitätsbekämpfung sowie Migrationskontrolle und ist Aus- druck staatlicher Souveränität. Grenzen können aber auch Konfliktpotential haben. Deshalb vermittelte die pro-europäische Propaganda der Nachkriegszeit negative Bilder von Grenzen. Dennoch dauerte es mehrere Jahrzehnte bis ein (Kern-)Europa ohne Grenzkontrollen Realität wurde. Mit dem Schengener Übereinkommen fielen die systematischen Kontrollen zwischen den Teilnehmerstaaten. Der vorliegende Artikel zeichnet den langen Weg zum Schengen-Raum und damit eine Erfolgsge- schichte in vier Phasen nach. Erklären, verstehen, argumentieren

Nach langjährigen politischen Bemühungen Zeitnah zu dieser Vertragsreform bietet ist der europäische Reformprozess endlich der neue Handkommentar eine aktuelle am Ziel: Der Vertrag von Lissabon ist in Kraft Gesamtdarstellung des Europäischen getreten. Dieses Vertragswerk bringt tief- Primärrechts. Bereits berücksichtigt wurde greifende Reformen und stellt die Europäi- das Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts sche Union auf eine erneuerte Grundlage. zum Euro-Rettungsschirm.

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Europäisches Unionsrecht EUV | AEUV | Grundrechte-Charta Handkommentar Herausgegeben von Christoph Vedder | Wolﬀ Heintschel von Heinegg , . S., geb., ,– € ISBN ---- 377

Contributors – Auteurs – Autoren

BAJON Philip, Postdoctoral Fellow, European University Institute, Florence Address: Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Via delle Palazzine 17, 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole, Italy Email: [email protected]

BENVENUTI Andrea, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the School of Social Sciences and International Studies Address: Room 157, Morven Brown Building, University of New South Wales (UN- SW), Kensington NSW 2052, AUSTRALIA Email: [email protected]

HAMBLOCH Sibylle, Assistant Professor, University of Siegen Address: Institute for European Regional Research (IFER), 57068 Siegen, Germany Email: [email protected]

HOLLANDER Jieskje, PhD Candidate, Groningen University Address: European Law Department, PO Box 716, 9700 AS Groningen, NL Email: [email protected]

MOLEMA Marijn, Post-doctoral Researcher, Wageningen University Address: PO Box 47, 6700 AA Wageningen, NL Email: [email protected]

PUDLAT Andreas, Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter, Universität Hildesheim Adress: Institute for History, Tilsiter Straße 1, 31141 Hildesheim, Germany Email: [email protected]

THIEMEYER Guido, Université de Cergy-Pontoise Address: Université de Cergy-Pontoise, UFR Lettres et Sciences Humaines, 33, bou- levard du port, F-95011 Cergy-Pontoise Email: [email protected]

TÖLLE Isabel, Doctoral researcher, University of Siegen Address: Institute for European Regional Research (IFER), D-57068 Siegen, Ger- many Email: [email protected]

VARDABASSO Valentina, Post doctoral Researcher, UMR IRICE-Panthéon Sorbonne Adress: 1, rue Victor Cousin, 75006 Paris Email: [email protected] Studies on the European Union

Studies on the European Union |

Funda Tekin

Differentiated Integration at Work The Institutionalisation and Implementation of Opt-Outs from European Integration in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice

Nomos Nomos

The book extends the research that acknow- tural patterns of integration. To this end ledges diﬀ erentiated integration to form an analytical frame has been developed reality. An analysis of the implementation that fuses historical institutionalism and of the British, Irish and Danish opt-outs in an extended version of diﬀ erentiated inte- the AFSJ generates insights on the struc- gration theory.

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Diﬀ erentiated Integration at Work The Institutionalisation and Implementation of Opt-Outs from European Integration in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice By Funda Tekin , vol. , pp., pb., € . ISBN ---- 379

Books received – Livres reçus – Eingegangene Bücher

ALDRICH Robert, Les traces coloniales dans le paysage français, Monuments et Mémoires, Publications de la Société française d’histoire d’outre-mer, Paris, 2011, 388 p. – ISBN 978-285-9700-447 – 26,00 €.

BECK Joachim, WASSENBERG Birte (Hrsg.), Grenzüberschreitende Zusam- menarbeit leben und erforschen, vol.2, Governance in deutschen Grenzregionen, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 2011, 363 S. – ISBN 978-3-515-09829-8 – 49,00 €.

BOSSUAT Gérard, Emile Noël, premier secrétaire général de la Commission eu- ropéenne, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2011, 471 p. – ISBN 978-2-8027-2913-6 – 75,00 €.

BURIGANA David, DELOGE Pascal e.a., L’Europe des coopérations aéronau- tiques, Armand Colin, Paris, 2010, 128 p. – ISSN 0752-5702 – 20,20 €.

BOUNEAU Christophe, BURIGANA David, VARSORI Antonio, Les trajec- toires de l’innovation technologique et la construction européenne, Peter Lang, Bruxelles, 2010, 259 p. – ISBN 978-90-5201-605-4 – 35,75 €.

CHIVVIS Christopher S., The Monetary conservative, Jacques Rueff and Twentieth –century Free Market Thought, Northern Illinois University Press, Chicago, 2010, 234 p. – ISBN 978-0-87580-417-0 – 24,58 €.

FAYAUD Viviane, REGNAULT Jean-Marc (dir.), Images et pouvoirs dans le pacifique, Publications de la Société française d’histoire d’outre-mer, Paris, 2010, 188 p. – ISBN 978-2-859700-48-5 – 18,00 €.

FONDATION JEAN MONNET POUR L’EUROPE, Une dynamique européen- ne. Le comité d’action pour les Etats-Unis d’Europe, Economica, Paris, 2011, 402 p. – ISBN 978-2-7178-6037-5 – 29,00 €.

HODSON Dermont, Governing the Euro Area in good times & bad, Oxford Uni- versity Press, Oxford, 2011, 170 p. – ISBN 978-0-19-957250-2 – 65,80 €.

MÖLLER Horst, Akten zur auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland Band 1980 Band I & II, Oldenbourg, München, 2011, 2115 S. – ISBN 978-3-486-70219-4 – 148,00 €.

PSCHICHHOLZ Christin, Zwischen Diaspora, Diakonie und deutscher Orient- politik, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, 2011, 288 S. – ISBN 978-3-17-022025-6 – 39,90 €. 380 Books received – Livres reçus – Eingegangene Bücher

REGNAULT Jean-Marc, FAYAUD Viviane, New Caledonia, Twenty years on: 1988-2008, Publications de la Société française d’histoire d’outre-mer, Paris, 2008, 240 p. – ISBN – 978-285-970-0461 – 20,00 €.

SIEDENTOPF Heinrich, SPEER Benedikt, Deutschland und Frankreich in der europäischen Integration: «Motor» oder «Blockierer»?, Duncker & Humblot, Ber- lin, 2011, 198 S.- ISBN -978-3428135653 – 77,70 €.

TAI Li-Chuan, L’anthropologie française entre sciences coloniales et décolonisa- tion (1880-1960), Publications de la Société française d’histoire d’outre-mer, Paris, 2010, 340 p. – ISBN – 978-2-859700-47-8 – 20,00 €.

WASSENBERG Birte, BECK Joachim (Hrsg.), Living and researching cross- border cooperation, vol.3, The European Dimension, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 2011, 339 p. – ISBN – 978-3-515-09863-2 – 49,00 €.

WASSENBERG Birte, BECK Joachim (Hrsg.), Vivre et penser la coopération transfrontalière, vol.4, Les régions frontalières sensibles, Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 2011, 319 S. – ISBN – 978-3-515-09896-0 – 46,00 €. Access to Primary EU Law

This collection of legal texts – written in diff erences between the offi cial languages. English, German, and French language – This is helpful in taking a fi rst step across provides the reader with easier access to the language barrier. The book also provides primary EU law. The book stems from the insight into diff erent legal systems and re- conclusion that any systematic approach at cognizes the need to scrutinize legal opinions interpretation of EU law has to consider the from a comparative perspective.

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Europarecht (EUV/AEUV/GRCh) – European Law (TEU/TFEU/CFREU) – Droit Européen (TUE/TFUE/CDFEU) Textsammlung – Text Collection – Recueil de textes Edited by Jörg Philipp Terhechte , pp., pb., € ., ISBN --- - Do We Need Europe?

Denkart Europa. Schriften zur europäischen Politik, Wirtschaft und Kultur |

Christian D. Falkowski

Europe for us

Why we need Europe

Nomos Nomos

This book establishes why we need Europe the European Union is more than the sum today and tomorrow, why it must continue of its members in a world order that is no to integrate and which Europe we should longer Western and why the Union guaran- have for peace and solidarity. It explains why tees security and prosperity for all.

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Europe for us Why we need Europe By Christian D. Falkowski , pp., pb., € , ISBN ---- (Denkart Europa, vol. )