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Xerox University Microfilms 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 MASTERS THESIS M-4416

NOLTON, Jr., John Sowerby, THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE INDONESIAN INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT: 1945-1949.

The American University, M.A., 1972 Political Science, international law and relations

University Microfilms, A XERO\Company , Ann Arbor, Michigan THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE INDONESIAN INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT : 1945-1949

by

John S. Nolton, Jr.

Submitted to the

School of International Service

of the American University

in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree

of

Master of Arts

in

International Studies

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

FEB 26 1973

Signatures/tffYCommittee:

Chairman ;

- : / Deans of the School

Date : Date I

The American University Washington, D.C. TABLE OF COLT ENT L,

CHAPTEh I. IMTHOBUCTICN AND bTATEMENT OF THE PHOBLEI/...... 1

CHAPTEh II. THE HOh-lWi'EnVETfiTON PERIOD: AUGUOT 1943 TO JUNE 1 9 4 7 ...... B

CHAPTER III. THE "EUROPE-FI RET" PERIOD: JUNE 1947 TO DECEMBER 1948 ...... 74

CHAPTER IV. THE DENuUrJ/iENT: 1949 ...... 199

APPEND IE 293

1. TEXT OF THE lINGGADJATI AGREEMENT

2. SECURITY COUNCIL RESGLUl’lONS ADOPTED AUGUST 25 , 1947

5. THE RENVILLE POLITICAL PRINCIPLES

BIBLIUGR/iPHY 305 CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

THE PROBLEM

It is the objective of this investigation to examine, critically and in some detail, the role played by the United States, by its Govern­ ment, its press, and public opinion, in the struggle of the fledgling

Republic of Indonesia for complete independence from the Netherlands in the critical postwar years of 1945-1949. It is not intended, secondly, that this examination be conceived in a political or policy vacuum, but rather that the actions taken or postures assumed by the United States

Government with regard to the Indonesian Question be viewed within the context of the larger and more far-reaching international issues of this most important period, A further objective which will be pursued in these pages is to examine and assess the process of the formulation and the means and skill of execution of American foreign policy vis-a-vis the Republic of Indonesia's independence struggle for purposes to be set forth below.

VALIDATION

The value of such an undertaking can be demonstrated on a number of different grounds, first of all, a judicious and objective study of

1 the part played by the United States in either hastening or delaying or in other ways materially affecting the Republic of Indonesia's tortuous progress toward the attainment of "Merdeka" should be of significant help in understanding the course of the bilateral relationship between these two republics in the years following the transfer of sovereignty. The impressions and attitudes built up during this four-year period on each side (but more particularly on the Indonesian side) obviously were to have a great influence on the policies adopted by each independent nation toward the other.

Secondly, this is the first of a long line of post-war "colonial" issues which impaled the United States on the horns of its by now famil­ iar (indeed, classic) dilemma of how to apportion its support between;

(l) the unfamiliar peoples of Asia and Africa who were striving to attain nationhood and who insisted upon invoking a moral-political weltaun- schauung not at all unfamiliar to the American national experience, on the one hand, and (2) on the other hand, the kindred Western European states with and for whom it had recently suffered so much, now in the agony of divesting themselves of the colonies on which (all were agreed) their past greatness and future prosperity depended. Being the first of these postwar crises in policy-making, the Indonesian Question in

American foreign policy should provide us with some insights as to how the United States can be expected to react when faced with this dilemma—

insists made particularly interesting due to the fact that the period witnessed the final death of American isolationism and took place just as

the United States was striving to rebuild and then rearm a Western Ehirope

with which it was increasingly to identify its own national security. 3

As such, this study should lead us into some suggestive insists subordinate to the above considerations. First of all, by keeping a close eye on the manifestations of congressional, press, and public opinion, it might be possible to cast some light on the potency with which the American anti-colonial tradition emerged into the postwar era.

Additionally, Indonesia provides a kind of steppingstone from a period of nearly exclusive concern in American foreign policy with Euro­ pean questions (from 1945 to 1948) to a period of major preoccupation with Asian matters brought on by the communist victory in the Chinese civil war and the advent of the Korean conflict. It may be possible to suggest what the effects of this shift were on the American attitude toward the Indonesian issue, as well as the ways in which Indonesia may have, in turn, contributed to the new policy emphasis.

A third major justification for this thesis would be the insists which might be gleaned into the means of formulation and techniques of execution of American foreign policy generally. In this issue, one is dealing with a most interesting "case study" in American foreign policy;

'iVhat factors in the Indonesian Question appeared to have relatively great or little relevance for American policy makers, as can be detected from the external policy manifestations subject to the scrutiny of the historian? How did the policies of the Soviet Union toward Indonesia alter the formation or execution of American policy? What effects did the propaganda efforts of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia have on American policy and American public opinion? Did public and congressional opinion exercise a noticeable restraining or limiting influence on the policies of the United States State Department (or those of the parties to the dispute) in this issue? Can any difference in emphasis or sympathy be discerned in the exposition and execution of

United States policy in Washington, at the United Nations, and "in the field"?

Largely because such matters have been competently discussed elsewhere, and because they would in any case fall outside the parameters of this study, the course of the Indonesian revolution from the stand­ point of internal Republican politics, the role of the United Nations, per sc, and the role of other major powers are largely ignored herein, except as these matters may reasonably be adjudged to have affected the policies of the United States. Obviously, however, there is a great deal to be said about how the policies of the Netherlands, the United

Kingdom, the Soviet Union, Australia, or India, for example, did affect

American policies. These should and will be examined, as will the extent to which United States policies were identifiable with, or were carried into effect by means of the United Nations.

ORGANIZATION

For purposes of ease and clarity of presentation, the organi­ zation of this thesis is basically a chronological one. Prom the stand­ point of the United States, the Indonesian independence struggle might be

separated into three more or less distinct phases or periods:

The first period, starting with the Republic's declaration of independence at the end of the war in August 1945 and ending with the

United States' note to the Republic in late June 1947, just prior to the

first Dutch "police action," m i ^ t be described as the "hands-off" or "non-policy" period. During this time, as the United States observed the opening rounds of the struggle and the maneuvers of the two major protagonists, while itself engaged in the joining of the Gold War,

little was known and even less was officially said or done about Indo­

nesia. However, no small amount of attention was paid to the developing

situation in the public communications media, and because it mi^t

reasonably be assumed that the extensiveness and accuracy of this re­

porting had a bearing on the later policies formulated by the United

States, it will be subjected to a more than casual scrutiny in the

pages that follow.

The second period which mi^t be identified is the period from

the time of the first police action in July of 1947 through the period

extending through the fall and early winter of the following year. This

period witnessed the fairly consistent pursuit of the American State

Department of qualified pro-Dutch policy, overlaid with a carefully

cultivated image of neutrality between the two parties. It was during

this period, however, that, with either the support or the acquiescence

of the United States, certain actions were taken which significantly

affected America's eventual posture toward (and therefore the eventual

outcome of) the dispute. The most notable of these was the acceptance

of the Republic as a party to a bilateral, international dispute. It

will be necessary to observe during this period that the United States'

Indonesia policy was a manifestation and an outgrowth (one mig^t say "a

victim") of its Europe First policy, wherein, in the most vital sense,

American security was viewed as being inextricably linked with the speedy

rehabilitation, economic health, political stability, and military strength of Western Europe. Indonesia became, therefore, an eminently subordinate issue in the eyes of Washington.

Yet, in conjunction with the increasingly universalized (and later militarized) concept of the Containment Policy first articulated by George Kennan, such disquieting events as the continuing pattern of communist victories in the Chinese civil war, the Calcutta Youth Con­ ference, the insurgencies in Malaya, Indochina, and the Philippines, as well as the Kadiun Affair in Indonesia, began to intrude on this view.

The shift toward a series of pragmatically conceived policies to solve the Indonesian Question, to get it removed forthwith from Wash­ ington's foreign policy agenda and thus "liberate" the Netherlands, as well as its Republican nemesis in Southeast Asia, resulted, with the inevitable benefits which accrued to the political position of the

Republic. This is the situation which characterizes the third and final

("pro-Republioan") period in our study.

One last word about methodology and source materials is in order.

The source materials are, in large part, original, with major reliance being placed on the New York Times, the United States Department of State

Bulletin, the Congressional Record, and relevant selected portions of the voluminous Official Records of the United Nations Security Council. Two major secondary works which have been of great help and guidance to this

student are George McTurman Kahin's Nationalism and Revolution in Indo­

nesia and Alastair MacDonald Taylor's Indonesian Independence and the

United Nations. While the basic approach, as stated, is chronological, the methodology in this study is evaluative and Interpretive, rather than

simply expository or discursive. A final comment on the overall attitudes of the writer may be indicated at this point. The present work, it has been noted, is a

"critical" examination of the American role in the Indonesian inde­ pendence struggle. Recalling that American spokesmen during these years frequently referred to, and invariable equated, at least inferentially, the "legitimate aspirations of the Indonesian people" for independence with the "legitimate interests" of the Netherlands in the archipelago, this student is compelled to state that he does not weigh these two

claims equally, and finds (and is confident that history will find) only

a limited justification and sympathy for the position of the Netherlands

throu^out the dispute. More importantly, however, this observer will

try to show that the policies adopted by the United States had gen­

erally unfortunate effects on the course and length of the dispute.

Policies ill-conceived and defective from the outset were pursued long

after they had been shown to be inadequate, and it does not seem wholly

unfair to observe that many lives were lost before such considerations

began to have a visible effect on these policies. CHAPTER II

THE NON-INTERVENTION PERIOD; AUGUST 1945 TO JUNE 1947

America's stand is the crucial factor that turned the balance against Indonesian independence. America has retreated to a policy of 'hands off with the hope that all will turn out well. The provincialism, ignorance and Isolation of the American public and many American statesmen is applying a "Jim Crow" attitude to the world. White people, we think, are superior and should be kept in charge over the dark-skinned people of the world. Once revolutionists, our wealth and power make us more and more conservative, ffe distrust revolutions and radicalism. We have always had a double standard of democracy in this country in regard to colored people and we are now supporting the same double standard in regard to all the colored people of the world. 1

With these harsh words, Dr. Raymond Kennedy, the late Professor of Sociology at Yale University and former Special Consultant on Far

Eastern affairs to the Department of State and the Office of Strategic

Services, condemned the role played by his Government up to May of 1946 in the increasingly difficult Indonesian Question, It will be the pur­ pose of the present Chapter to examine the ways in which this difficult problem intruded its way into the foreign policy agenda of the American

State Department in the immediate postwar period, to study how the

United States Government reacted to the intrusion in the initial stages, and to concentrate on those aspects of the question which appeared to have an important influence on both concurrent and later official and public thinking about Indonesia.

^New York Times. May 5, 1946. Before we turn to a specific examination of the issues involved, it is useful for us to recall some general considerations concerning the over- e J . 1 condition of the American republic in the closing months of 1945» as well as one or two more or less widely accepted generalizations concerning the nature of traditional American foreign policy. The most obvious point to be made, of course, is that the United States had just emerged "victori­ ous" from the largest and most violent war in her history. As with most wars in which the United States had taken part. World War II had been, in an important sense, a righteous crusade, one fought in pursuit of an all- consuming, transcendental goal. It has been observed that democracies are hard-pressed when called upon to wage limited wars for well-defined and lim­ ited objectives. So it is: democratic governments find it difficult to

convince their peoples that their sons and fathers and brothers are called

upon to die in battle in defense of such cynical and mundane abstractions

as preservation of the balance of power in Europe or Asia. Thus, Americans

entered the first World War to "make the world safe for democracy" (and

Britons, in defense of the "sanctity of treaties"), but not to curb German

power in Europe. Thus, the Allies (the democracies), waged World Wax II

against a collection of detested ideologies, against "aggressor nations,"

in order to establish the rule of law in international relations.

It was, of course, an understandably critical element of Allied

wartime propaganda to portray the enemy in stark, black, and satanic terms,

Americans and others have, in recent years, begun to understand that Nazi

Germany, for example, may have been as much a creation of the abysmal in­

adequacies of Allied peacemaking and inter-war diplomacy as it was a man­

ifestation of some inherent qualities in the German national character.

Hitler, they recalled, had risen to power on the backs of some very 10

-compelling national grievances* But when democracies engage in total

wars, these considerations are necessarily suppressed.

In addition, the student of the poet-war period is likely to be

struck by the uniformity with which political cartoonists of the day por­

trayed Japan. The admirable qualities of Japanese, which so many Ameri­

cans were to come to respect in the post-war years, were nowhere to be

found in 1945* The Japanese was pictured as a leering and evil-looking

sadist, with buck teeth and "slanty" eyes, who raped Western nuns. It

would have been difficult, indeed, in 1945 to convince an American that

the tragic upheavals in Asia wrou^t by Imperial Japan since 1937 needed

any explanation more complex or sophisticated than that provided by the

term "aggpressor nation." Americans would be hard pressed to understand

that the introduction of American political and military power into

Asia— at the time of what Samual Flagg Bemis termed "The Great Aber­

ration" of American foreign policy, in 1898— had been viewed by a mod­

ernizing Japan aa a direct challenge to her expanding national interests*

Neither would they comprehend the fact that the Open Door had been

viewed in a similar light by Toltyo. "Asia for the Asians" was easily

dismissed as a cynical propaganda tactic used to disguise the actual goal

of "Asia for the Japanese." War in the Far East had been caused by the

Machiavellian machinations of an aggressor nation, not by the clash of

national interests.

Because of the tendency for the propaganda of warring democracies

to assume the nature of abiding and universal truth, this propaganda also

tends to have^'an unfortunate quality of stubborn endurance in the face of

contrary realities. This seems to be true not only of public opinion. 11

but more Importantly, of policy makera as well. Possibly allied with this development, or at any rate aiding it in the vulgarisation and sim­ plification of policy-making, is the tendency of military exigencies to begin to take precedence over political considerations in the government of a doiocracy at war. It is possible to cite numerous wartime deci­ sions on the part of the Allied Powers, from the most important to the most trivial, which had as their sole or predominant motivation the nar­ row military considerations which seemed so critically important at the time. We shall have reason to allude to at least some of these decisions in the following paragraphs and to note that they carried with them unfortunate political consequences.

Another general consideration which may be suggested, as we ap­ proach our subject matter, is the at least partial alliance which tended

to grow up in the immediate post-war years between the advocates of a

return to the isolationist tradition and the advocates of anti-colonialism,

While in the late 1950's and early 196O's anti-colonialism was looked

upon in the United States as one of the hallmarks of "liberalism," it

seems fair to conclude that, in the years immediately following World

War II, the advocates of change in the field of foreign policy were the

internationalists like Senator Vandenburg of Michigan and Connally of

Texas and others. We shall shortly have occasion to note that many of

the public statements idiich on the surface seem to be motivated by anti-

colonialism and a favorable attitude toward the Republic of Indonesia

seen to be heavily tinged with anti-Dutch and, more particularly in the

"non-intervention period" under review here, anti-British colorations. 12

To many, the time-honored verities of non-involvement had been vindi­

cated by the wartime experience, and the old corollary of leadership by

example in international politics found situations like the one in Indo­

nesia made to order. It is instructive for us to re-examine, for ex­

ample, the American response to Winston Churchill's "Iron Curtain"

speech at Westminister College in 1946, taking particular note of the

grave warnings about the danger of trying to retrieve Britain's pro­

verbial "chestnuts" from her colonial and European fires. We must take

just a moment to recall that many Americans and many in the highest coun­

cils of the Roosevelt Administration viewed the United States' mission

in the post-war period to be one of mediating the quarrels between

Europe's two Great Powers, the Soviet Union and Britain*

A third major consideration appropriate for review at this time

is to take notice of the United States* clearly forecast intention to

withdraw from Southeast Asia as soon as feasible in the post-war era.

The most concrete manifestation of this intent was the almost immediate

granting of independence and sovereignty to the Philippines in July 1 9 4 6 ,

even though by the utilization of any of the standard colonial criteria,

the country was not by that time adequately prepared for her independ­

ence, particularly in light of the devastation wrouf^t by the war.

Another indication of this policy was the fundamental determina­

tion by President Roosevelt that the United States would not involve it­

self in assisting the colonial powers, or at least France, in effecting

their return to their colonies in Southeast Asia. While this position was later reversed in the Truman years, it seems to clearly support our

contention regarding the American intention that Southeast Asia would 13

not be an area of major American concern in the post-war period. In his

Navy Day speech on the “fundamentals of the foreign policy of the United

States" in October of 1945, President Truman stated, in part, as follows:

2. We believe in the eventual return of sovereign ri^ta and self- goverment to all peoples idio have been deprived of them by force.

3. We shall approve no territories, changes in any friendly part of the world unless they are in accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people.

4. We believe that all peoples who are prepared for self-government should be permitted to choose their own form of government by fully expressed choice without any interference from any foreign source.

What seems to be most important here, for our present purposes at least, is the clear and distinct support that is voiced for the principle of self-determination.

It is tempting at this particulcLr stage to point to the decision, reached only very late in the war and made on the part of the Combined

Chiefs of Staff (C.C.O.S.) to transfer the Netherlands East Indies from

General MacArthiur's Southwest Pacific Area Comgiand to the Southeast Asia

Command under Admiral Lord Louis Mount batten, as another example of the

American intention to withdraw from Southeast Asia. However, we are told by Charles Wold that this decision, which was to have so profound an

effect on the coming struggle for Indonesian independence, was reached, like 80 many others at the time, on the basis of military consid­

erations; "Despite later allegations to the contrary, it appears that military and not political considerations supplied the main motivations

for the transfer of authority. Military considerations may well have

^New York Times, Ootober 28, 1945. 14

been reinforced by political factors . . * . Wolf's speculations on this point are of interest: "Whether the situation would liave turned out differently had American troops come to Java is open to conjecture.

That there would have been certain differences in procedure is obvious."

Noting that at least the Americans would have come with enough strength to disarm and repatriate the Japanese and release Allied prisoners of war more quickly, he continues;

But even after these measures had been taken, it is still cer­ tain that . . . the Americans would have been at least as willing as the British to conduct extended military operations against the Indonesians; that the American troops od ^ t have been considerably more partisan— on ideological grounds— than were the British, and that they might have been especially unfriendly to any token mani­ festation of Dutch military might . . • [seems equally certain) .4

This much seems beyond dispute: if this largely military decision had

not been made, or had been made differently, there would have been no

such thing as a "non-intervention" period in the United States' role in

the Indonesian independence movement.

If it appears, then, that it was the intention of the United

States to effect a quiet withdrawal from Southeast Asian concerns, how

does this relate to the United States' overall 1 policy planning (such as

it may have been) toward East Asia in genercd? Certainly, the role en­

visioned by Washington for the newly liberated Republic of China goes a

long way toward answering this question. It can be stated without

Charles Wolf, The Indonesiam Story; The Birth. Growth and Struc­ ture of the Indonesian Republic (lew Yorici The J. Day Coapany, 1948)» p. lé. See also Idrus N. Djajadlningrat, The Beginnings of the Indoneslan-Dutch Negrotiations and the Hoge-Veluwe TaJks (Ithaca: Modem Indonesia Project, 1958)

^Wolf, op. cit., pp. 27, 28. 15

aerloua fear of centradiotion that the traditional cornerstone of Ameri­ can Far Eastern policy, that of Chinese hegemony in Asia, remained unal­ tered throu^ the war. Indeed, this was at least one of the subliminal objectives of the war in the Pacific, or more moderately stated, to re­ store the Slno-Japanese balance of Asian power.

An interesting article in the New York Times* "News of the Week in Review" section deals with some subordinate considerations. Taking note of the continuing hostilities in Southeast Asia and China, the writer says that the United States is hampered by trying to exert influ­ ence without either a "big stick" policy or one of weakness; finding the

United States '"squeezed* between the antagonism of contending forces," he outlines a three-point Asian policy being pursued by Washington;

First, we want long-range security for this nation, meaning that we never again want a situation to develop in which an aggressor nation, such as Japan was, can reach out to threaten us. Second, we would like to see democracy in the Far East, though we recognize that dmaocracy is something that a people must accept willingly «... Third, as a means of attaining democracy, we would like to estab­ lish stability in the seething, faction-ridden, economically bankrupt countries of the Far East. This last point is qur real immediate aim, the keynote of our policy in the Far East.^

Foreign policy, to be successful, needs not only brosid and gener­

alized conceptual frameworks, of which the foregoing is presented as an

adequate example, but also specific policies, suited to the specific aims

to which they may be directed, as well as rationalized with the overall

basic approach. And yet, we l e a m the following information from a

5 New York Times. November 11, 1945. 16

contemporary press report with a Washington, D.C. dateline:

While United States officials are keeping in close touch daily with developments in the explosive situation in Java, there has been no Allied consultation concerning this problem .... Informed quarters say that the United States does not have a olitical policy concerning Java"andL that up to now the problem has fëên treated as a military question.” The views of the United States have not 6een sou^i by tne NetKerlands Government nor by the British, and it is assumed they will not be volunteered.'

United States officials would, in time, have good reason to regret the

truth in the italicized portion of the foregoing quotation.

Row is this to be explained? It is certainly true, one must

reoall, that policy formulation, and particularly the structuring of

rationally coherent delineations of overall policies, require two most

important ingredients: time and knowledge. Yet with regard to the for­

mer, it is important for the student to recall that the historic break-

througii in weapons technology wrou^t by the Manhattan Project resulted

in a wartime decision (possibly the single best wartime example of the

supremacy of military exigencies over political requirements) to unleash

the violence thus made available on two port cities in western Japan.

We may recall that the Koiso Government actually put forth a number of

distinct peace feelers during 1945. The already exhausted Japanese could

not ignore the very clear handwriting on the wall in the Pacific, Yet

this could not make sense: "aggressor nations," practically by defi­

nition, do not sue for peace; rather, they must be brougdit to the point

of unconditional surrender, in accordance with the abiding justice and

italics not in the original.

^Hew York Tines. November 14, 1945. 17

righteousnesa of the war alma of the democracies. Our understanding of political realities was seriously vitiated by our own wartime propaganda.

It seems clear that the Allies seriously miscalculated both the

will and the capacity of Imperial Japan to continue to put forward fur­

ther resistance. The terms on which the Soviet Union was brought into

the Pacific theater seem to provide adequate substantiation of this

point. The most important result of this fact is that the unexpectedly

precipitous capitulation of Japan after Hiroshima and Nagasaki left the

Allies, and most particularly the United States, woefully unprepared to

deal with the serious and complex political problems that grew immedi­

ately out of the war, most notably, the unexpected appearance on the

Southeast Asian scene of something called the "Republic of Indonesia."

The report quoted above continued;

Because of the complexities of the Javanese situation, this Gov­ ernment has not been anxious to become involved. It would be embar­ rassing to this Administration if the British were to report that they lacked the force to disarm the Japanese and were to request this Government to furnish two army divisions to finish the job.8

Charles Wolf is even more explicit on this point :

Allied intelligence concerning Indonesia during the oocupation was more meager than for any other area in Southeast Asia. The charges of collaboration (between the Republic and the Japanese) thus found the world at large unable to judge the situation which had existed during the occupation or to recognize the larger scope which the nationalists movement was to attain immediately after the Japa­ nese capitulation. There had been no O.S.S. or Allied intelligence teams operating regularly throughout the archipelago as there had been in other parts of the region

®Ibid.

^Wolf, op. cit., p. 10. 10

That the United States found itself at the conclusion of World War II inadequately prepared for the exacting tasks of world leadership Is today accepted ae a verlsimilitude, Very little of the foregoing would

seem to detract from the force of this observation.

Under great pressure from the Indonesian revolutionary under­

ground organizations--led by Sutan Sjahrir— , Sukarno and Mohammed Hatta,

who by the terms of a 1942 agreement with Sjahrir, had collaborated with

the wartime Japanese occupation forces in the interests of having nation­

alist feet on both sides of the fence, read out on August 17, 1945 the

text of a short statement declaring the independence of the Republic of

Indonesia to a small group of supporters, from the porch of the home of

Vice Admiral Maeda, the Japanese naval intelligence chief in the archi­

pelago. However, under the surrender terms communicated by the Southeast

Asia Command to the Japanese administration in the area, the Japanese

command was to maintain the status quo until the unprepared forces under

Admiral Mount batten could arrive to take over. The military leadership

in Batavia^^ was thereupon immediately faced with the uninviting prospect

of either acquiescing in the Indonesian revolution thus launched and

countermanding the very clear orders of the victorious Allies, or

attempting to suppress a strong and rapidly maturing nationalist movement

with udiich, as eminently nationadistic Asians thmmselves, they could not

help but feel a certain degree of affinity. The latter course of action,

they knew, would mean great loss of life on both sides, and they had

beneath them a totally demoralized and dispirited army to begin with.

^%ecauee of the fact that the great majority of the source mate­ rial on this subject refers to the Netherlands East Indian / Indonesian capital city as "Batavia," rather than the nationalist name, Djakarta, this usage will be perpetuated for convenience sake herein. 19

Thus, as the last half of August and then early September wore on, the red and white nationalist flag began to appear in more and more village squares across Java and Sumatra, and supporters of the revo­ lution began slowly, and then with increasing effectiveness, to divest the Japanese of their positions of leadership and authority in these most important islands*

As a result, when the first contingents of British troops began to arrive in Batavia in the last days of September, they were faced with an unrecognized nationalist government which was in the process of rap­ idly securing more or less firm ^ facto control over the area. What is more crucial to the events which followed, however, is that the British

forces (and American observers) remained quite ignorant of this most

important fact. As the British arrived in great numbers, the serious­

ness and frequency of violent incidents began to increase as poorly con­

trolled or isolated Indonesian military and para-military organizations

reacted to the return of the white man. And by late October, the inci­

dents were beginning to draw page-one reporting in the western press.

The first concrete action taken by the United States Government

in regard to Indonesia is one which appears to be in conformity with

the general precepts described above. Secretary of State Byrnes re­

quested the United Kingdom and Royal Netherlands Governments to remove

United States Insignia from all American lend-lease equipment being

used against the Indonesian nationalists. The move was taken after re­

ports had been received (including an appeal from President Sukarno)

that the equipment bore United States markings. 20

Our request is in line with the hands-off policy we have adopted toward the Indonesian uprising, but we have not asked Britain and the Netherlands to return the equipment to us . . . . Mr. Byrnes described as a general routine policy, adopted some time ago for the post-war period, against the use of our insignia on the lend-lease military equipment in circumstances that could pro­ duce political complications for us. It has been applied elsewhere, he added, but he could not recall just where.^^

The first American response, then, was to answer increasingly critical questioning from public opinion sources of the uses being made of United States lend-lease and related support to the European powers.

In mid-January of 1946, the Navy Department felt constrained to explain that it had trained 5,000 Dutch Marines only for use against the Jap­ anese in the Netherlands Indies:

Its position was set forth by Acting Secretary H. Streuve Hensel in reply to recent charges by Representative Ellis E. Patterson, Dem­ ocrat of California, that the Navy had defied United States foreign policy by training and outfitting Dutch forces used to quell Indo­ nesian uprisings. Mr. Hensel, in a letter to Representative Jack Anderson, Repub­ lican of California, made no reference to Mr. Patterson's specific charge that the Dutch Marines were used against the Indonesians. He explained that the Netherlands agreed in 1943 to train the Dutch Marines, "having particularly in mind operations which mi^t have to be undertaken against the Dutch East Indies to free them from the Japanese." Japan surrendered while the Dutch were being trained at Camp Davis, N.C., he said, but the training was carried to com­ pletion so the Marines could participate in disarming the Japanese in the Pacific.^^

The British response to this increasingly untidy situation, par­ ticularly in view of far more serious developments fast taking shape in areas of demonstrably more vital concern to London (such as, India and

the Middle East), was understandable. Viewing the situation, it quickly decided that, de facto realities aside, the Netherlands was still

^^New York Times. October 25, 1945*

^^Ibid,, January 15, 1946. 21

sovereign. With this basic determination out of the way, it became a matter of withdrawing from this unfortunate situation as quickly as pos­

sible. This was to be done by bringing the Netherlands and Indonesian

leaders to some kind of at least temporary or partial agreement between

themselves, and then turning over the British-controlled port cities and

coastal enclaves to the Netherlands, and then withdrawing. With such a

general approach, the first necessity was to bring leaders of the two

aides together, thoug^i this was no easy task by itself.

In accordance with a wartime military decision, Indonesia had

been made a largely British area of responsibility. Thus it seemed

appropriate for United States policy to be one of acquiescing in and

even "back-stopping" British moves and decisions. This appears to have

been the case:

Prodded by American and British diplomatic representatives, Butch and Indonesian leaders appeared closer tonight to negotiating on their differences in the Netherlands East Indies.13 Both sides were under pressure by British and United States Gov­ ernment representatives to get together before a farther eruption developed in the native drive for independence from Netherlands colo­ nial rule. British and Americans were strsiining to prevent a racial war, food riots and mass starvation . . . .^4

It was becoming increasingly evident, however, that the British needed

American support, not only in the field, but also in siphoning off the

heat being applied by articulators of United States public opinion. In a

Washington dateline article, Arthur Krock of the New York Times notes that

^^Ibid., October 27, 1945.

^'^Ibid,, October 29, 1945. 22

if the C.C.O.S, had not agreed to transfer Indonesia from American to

British responsibility:

American and not British forces would now be under obligation to put down the uprising in Indonesia. This was learned today as crit­ icism mounted in Congress against a) British military activities against the native revolt in the Netherlands Indies and b) the fact, asserted in the House today by Representative Patterson of Cali­ fornia that "our Navy Department helped arm, train and equip" the Dutch Marines engaged in the same campaign* ^ 5

That at least a certain amount of criticism being brought to bear may have been isolationist in its inspiration, rather than anti-colonial, is indicated by the comment that.

The task is primarily that of the Dutch, . . . whose activities to this end would not be attacked in the United States on as many grounds as those of Britain.

If the Arthur Krock article was the result of a State Department attempt to educate congressional and press critics as to the rationale behind the British presence in Indonesia, it was apparently not suffi­ ciently successful, because the first official United States Government statement on the Indonesian Question followed seven days later. It offi­ cially made public the decision to assign responsibility for Indonesia to the Southeast Asia Command on behalf of the Allies, specifically to disarm and remove the Japanese forces there, to confiscate Japanese equipment, and to liberate and repatriate Allied prisoners of war and internees. It noted that this military evolution had been "complicated" by "differences" between the Dutch and Indonesians, requiring the main­ tenance of "such order as is necessary" for the execution of these

^^Ibid,, December 12, 1945»

^^Ibid. 2?

tasks. The statement continues:

In connection with the responsibilities relating to the sur­ render of the Japanese in the Netherlands East Indies, there was no thought, 80 far as the United States was concerned, of extending the Allied mandate beyond these specific responsibilities.^ 7

"There was no thou^t," indeed; the United States Department of

State is here readily testifying to its unpreparedness to deal with the

political questions growing out of prior military decisions.

The United States Government has viewed with increasing concern recent developments in the Netherlands East Indies. It had been hoped that conversations between the Indonesians and the Netherlands authorities would have resulted in a peaceful settlement, recog­ nizing alike the natural aspirations of the Indonesian peoples and the legitimate rigiits and interests of the Netherlands. There has apparently been a cessation of these conversations. The United States recognizes that the primary responsibility for arriving at agreement lies with the Netherlands authorities, as a representative of the territorial sovereign, and the Indonesian leaders. The United States cannot fail, however, to be deeply interested in the solution which may be achieved to problems that are of vital importance to the entire world. Our sole desire is to see a peaceful settlement achieved, as will best promote world sta­ bility and prosperity and the happiness of people. Such a set­ tlement can be attained only through a realistic, broad-minded approach on the part of all concerned and a will to reconcile dif­ ferences by peaceful means. Extremism or irresponsible action— or failure to present or consider specific proposals— can only lead to a disastrous situation. The United States earnestly hopes that all parties in the Neth­ erlands Indies will see the necessity of an early resumption of conversations looking toward a peaceful solution of the conflict . . . which will be in harmony with the principles and ideals of the Charter of the United Nations Organization and of the United Nations Declaration under which victory over the Axis was achieved.

This statement was designed to achieve a dual objective, in

support of the British: first, to educate the critical elements in the

United States as to the reasons behind Britain's presence in the

1?Ibid., December 20, 1945< iGlbid. 24

archipelago, and secondly, to give the hard-pressed British officials In

Batavia some additional leverage on the Parties. By its reference to

Holland as the "representative of the territorial sovereign," it further placed itself in agreement with London on this point, and doomed any mis­ taken hopes the Republican leaders mi ^ t have had that their independence would at once be recognized in Washington.

Most importantly, however, the statement expresses the United

States' strong and doubtlessly genuine desire for an early settlement of the problem. Indeed, even at this early stage, we have probably intro­ duced the single most consistent and compelling theme underlying the entire United States approach to this question. There will be ample opportunity to speculate, in the pages to follow whether this one pre­ dominant theme took precedence over the question of how the dispute was to be settled (by what means, in whose favor, etc.) But of this one point, there seems to be little doubt.

The effect on the Dutch, at least, was immediate. On the fol­ lowing day, in the lower house of the Netherlands Parliament, Minister of Overseas Territories J. H. A. Logenann said.

Anyone who mi^t have thougiit it possible, or even pexmissable or desirable, to postpone contact with the Indonesian spokesmen until law and order was restored by force must have been struck by . , . the recent statement by the State Department in Wash­ ington. 19

The Dutch Government took little time in replying to the American move, releasing a statement of its own aimed at the best possible impact on

United States policy makers, press and public. It "takes cognizance

l^lbid., December 22, 1945. 25

with deep and sincere appreciation" of the American statement, which it then carefully reviews, emphasizing those portions most favorable to its own position, urging the speedy accomplishment of the British mission in

Java, due in particular to the dangers posed to civilians by "the unpar­ donable excesses committed by extremist elements." It concludes by stressing the identity of its goals in Indonesia with those of the United 20 States, as expressed in the statement of December 19.

However, a comment made in Indonesia itself by the Dutch Lieu­ tenant Governor General, Hubertue van Hook, may be revealing of more candor, and more accuracy as well, as far as its insight into American

intentions is conoemed* Van Hook reportedly said that the Washington

statement amounted to a United States declaration of non-intervention,

showing that the State Department ' s interest in Java was confined to 21 retaining near non-involvement. If this report is an accurate re­

flection of the view held by Dutch colonial officials in the field, then

the statement met with only partial success in its apparent attenpt to

bring pressure to bear on the Parties toward a settlement.

The initiative was not to remain with the policy markers in the

State Department and the Foreign Office for long, however; On Jan­

uary 21, the representative of the Ukrainian S.S.R. communicated the

concern of his Government over the "threat to the maintenance of inter­

national peace and security" posed by the "military actions directed

against the local population" by the British. He requested a meeting of

on Ibid., December 25, 1945* 21 Ibid., December 31, 1945* 26

the Security Council to "put an end to the present situation/":'^ This action was taken In conjunction with another Soviet move requesting sim­ ilar investigation of the actions of British troops in Greece. There seemed little question in the minds of Western observera, furthermore, that both of these requests were adroitly designed counter-moves to the request on the part of the Iranian Government that the Council undertake

to discuss the problems raised by the apparent unwillingness of the

Soviet Union to evacuate the wartime occupation forces stationed in

northern Iran. The Iranian request had the backing and approval of both

Washington and London.

When debate opened some days later, the Soviet representative

introduced a resolution calling for a Security Council investigation,

complete with teams being dispatched to Indonesia. The British reaction

was quite heated. Foreign Minister Bevin denied that British actions

constituted a threat to the peace; noted that Javanese events were of no

concern to the Soviets; demanded that the matter be dropped and the

request for an investigation be disapproved; and noted, in passing, that

the Butch offered Indonesian natives rights "at least as great as the

Ukraine enjoys." Bevin also raised what was to become a burning sub­

issue in the Indonesian Question before it was resolved:

It may be that some other government will have some internal troubles somewhere. Are we always going, when internal troubles arise, to be sending a commission to investigate and deal with the problems arising within a sovereign power? I cannot agree to it as a matter of principle.^3

^^Ibid,, January 22, 1946.

23ibid,, February 10, 1946. 27

The statement of the American position on the Ukrainian com­ plaint was made by Edward R, Stettlnius, former Secretary of State, now

serving as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. He began by noting

the importance of the investigative powers of the Council and pointed

out that his Government would not wish to see any action taken which

might detract from the utility of that important function. Because of

this, he noted, investigations by the Council should not be undertaken

without sufficient cause. Such a cause, he felt, would be the strong

indications that continuation of a given situation constituted a more or

less clear threat to the peace. In addition, the Council should have a

well-defined purpose in view in undertaking such action and be careful

to avoid the introduction of further complications. He then began to

approach the substance of the issue. We would have no reason to

question his sincerity in stating that.

No one deplores more than the people of my country the fact that in the execution of tasks assumed by them the British forces have encountered difficulties and obstacles which have led to strife and armed clashes. The war has left us with many tangled situations. Each of us has heard reports about the way others of us have performed our respective assignments in carrying out the terms of surrender in various countries. It is helpful for us to exchange information and give one another the benefit of our views. Let us compete with each other in the standards we set in the performance of our respective tasks .... But I wish to put it to the members of the Council that peace will not be speeded nor friendly relations among us strengthened unless we start with the proposition that each of us is trying in good faith to carry out our respective tasks. I do not believe that any investigation is called for on this score.^4

These latter comments appear to be another example of the American desire

^^Ibid,, February 12, I9 4 6 . 28

to mediate between the respective positions of the British and Soviets.

With regard to the central question at hand, the future of the Neth­

erlands' relationship with Indonesia, Stettinius found it to be self-

evident that the problem was gravely complicated by the continued presence and past activities of the Japanese. This brou^t him to the

conclusion that the first order of business should be the carrying out

of the terms of surrender, thus removing this complicating factor from

the scene. He continued:

. . . I feel that we should note with satisfaction the state­ ments made by Dr. van Kleffens, the representative of the Nether­ lands, relating to the policy of his Government with respect to the carrying out of its responsibility as regards the future relation­ ship between the Netherlands Government and the Indonesians. Dr. van Kleffens stated that his Government accepts nationalism as a healthy development and, referring to Article XI of the Charter, added that his Government was engaged in a sincere attempt to arrive at an agreement with the Indonesians on a very liberal basis. It is, I am sure, the hope of all the members of the Council that the negotiations to which Dr. van Kleffens referred will be successful and that the results achieved will be in harmony with the ideals of the Charter and will thus meet the legitimate aspirations of the Indonesian people for self-government. Without going into the question of the Security Council's .juria- dlotlon in t ü s case,25 I must state frankly that I do not believe tEat it has been made clear to the Council that a constructive pur­ pose is to be served by investigation.26

The United States representative then concluded his remarks by

(1) asserting that the best hope for a solution of the conflict lay in

the successful completion of the Dutch-Indonesian negotiations then

taking place in Indonesia and (2 ) warning that the Security Council

would be making a grave error if it were to retard or jeopardize the

^^italica not in the original,

2^Ibid. 29

progress of these talks by its own ill-considered intervention.

Alastair MacD. Taylor dismisses this speech in the following manner: "The United States made no noteworthy contribution to the dis­ cussion, and its representative, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., spoke in generalities.This may be true, but it is also important to note that this statement articulated certain themes and basic judgments which were to become a lasting part of the American approach to the Indo­ nesian revolution. Another commentator made the following obser­ vations:

The position of the United States on the Council was in oppo­ sition to the [Soviet] resolution on the explicit ground that there were now signs of progress between the parties concerned which made the United Nations investigation no longer necessary, and on the tacit ground that the suggested cure, with presumablv some Russian ingredient, m i ^ t be worse than the ailment itself

A contemporary comment by a columnist expressed the fear that the Soviet introduction of the Indonesian and Greek issues, along with the Iranian complaint, might over-test and possibly weaken the infant 29 United Nations. We cannot ignore the possibility that this may have been at least a part of the United States Government's rationale as well. Certainly no great amount of time and effort need be spent in damonstrating that the United States had great hopes for the potential of the Organization. We shall later also have cause to note the rather consistent American policy of keeping United Nations participation in

27 Alastair MaoD. Taylor, Indonesian Inderpendenoe and the United Nations (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960), p. 42.

^®Wolf, The Indonesian Story, p. 5 6 .

^^New York Times. January 23, 1946, 30

this Western colonial problem to an absolute minimum. Whether this was a part of the rationale for this policy can only remain a matter of speculation, however.

The fast-moving events of late 1945 end January 1946 set the stage, then, for America's Indonesian policy up through the middle of

1 9 4 7 . And, in keeping with this posture of non-involvement, there is, appropriately enough, little to report concerning concrete actions taken by the United States in the following year and a half. The State

Department did have another occasion to deny that Washington was sup­ plying arms or munitions to the Netherlands East Indies Government, however, in August 1946:

"No arms, munitions or implements of war have been included in any of the surplus property transfers to the Netherlands East Indies Government," a spokesman said. "Only small amounts of demilitarized equipment having civilian use were sold .... "The foregoing policy will continue to be applied to any surplus property which the Netherlands East Indies Government may wish to procure under this surplus property credit."50

Meanwhile, the British exerted continuing pressure on the two

Parties to reach an agreement, and made known their intention to begin withdrawing their forces by the end of November 1946. Finally, on the fifteenth of that month, the two protagonists initialed what became known as the Linggadjati Agreement51 (see Appendix I, page 2 9 6 ), which, in brief, provided for the following: a) Dutch recognition of the de facto authority of the Republic of the islands of Java, Sumatra, and

Madura; b) that the two Parties would cooperate in the establishment of

5®Xbid., August 8, 1946.

^^Also referred to as the Cheribon or Tjirebon Agreement, 31

a United States of Indonesia, to consist of the Republic, Borneo, and the Great East (all islands east of a line tangential to the east coasts of Java and Borneo); c) that the two Parties cooperate in the formation of a Netherlands-Indonesian Union, to include the islands of Surinam and Curacao as well; d) that the Union and the United States of Indo­ nesia be formed no later than January 1, 1949; e) and that the Dutch forces be withdrawn from the areas of the Republic as fast as the exi­ gencies of law and order would allow, with the Republic agreeing to recognize all legitimate foreign claims for restitution and mainte­ nance of ri^ts and properties within the Republic .52

The American Department of State followed up the formal signing of that Agreement the following spring with a note to The Hague apprising it of the United States' intention to grant limited de facto recognition to the Republic. The Dutch were requested to notify the

Republic of that Intention. The type of recognition was such as to apply to local affairs only and was to be similar to that already ex­ tended by the Netherlands. The United States clearly stated its intention of continuing to recognize the authority of the Netherlsmds in the eireas of defense, foreign affairs, and foreign trade. No con­

sular officials were to be exchanged, but the United States would con­ tinue to rely on the Consul General in Batavia, Walter A. Fbote, already

accredited to the Netherland Indies Government .33

With the foregoing recitation of the major overt actions taken

^^aylor, op. cit,

^^New York Times, April 16, 1947. 32

by the Government of the United States in the Indonesian Question in its early and formative stages, we shall now move on to a consideration of the more important factors which appear to have had a bearing on these and later policy positions and actions. This will include an assess­ ment of the importance of the archipelago to the United States, of the

American estimation of the nature of the Republic, or the degree of public and official knowledge and understanding about Indonesia in this period, and of the manifestations of public opinion, particularly in regard to the early Allied intervention. We shall conclude this chap­ ter by tracing the abandonment of the policy of non-involv«nent, and by suggesting some possible reasons for the policy change thus effected.

Before the war, Indonesia ranked third among Far Eastern coun­ tries in total of American direct investments. Petroleum pro­ duction and refining and agriculture (rubber plantations) were the largest industrial groups in the total. Americans reportedly con­ trolled about forty percent of the oil interests in Indonesia throu^ the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey and the Socony Vacuum Corporation. Considering that the Standard Oil properties in the islands were valued at about $70 million in 1 9 3 6 , the official esti­ mate of the total American investments in Indonesia . . . is too conservative and [the] estimate of $100 million sewis more real­ istic. 34

In addition to the firms identified above, the Goodyear Tire and Rubber

Company had a truck, automobile, and bicycle tire plant in Buitenzorg in

Samatra, General Motors had an assembly plant in Batavia, and the

Califomla-Texas Oil Company had engaged in considerable exploratory

work in Indonesia.35

One of the raw materials the United States needed most in the

^^Agnes R. Miller, "American Investments in the Far East," Far Eastern Survey. XIX (May, 1950) 8 5 , 86.

55folf, op. cit., pp. 183, I8 4 . 33

early post-war years was tin. Aa early as January 1946, the Mining

Equipment Corporation purchased the first of nine of the largest capacity tin dredges in the world from Tampa Shipping Company, Tampa,

Florida, for use on Bangka Island off the east coast of Sumatra.

Due to the importance of tin for the reconversion of the Ameri­ can economy from war to peace, the program was sponsored by the United States Government and covered by a plan of the War Pro­ duction Board in September 1945. Government agencies assured the procurement of the materials and a speedy execution of the $40 million program , , , . The Dutch East Indies tin island group, comprising Banka, Billiton and Sin^ep islands, represented the world's second most important source of tin before the war . . . .36

American businessmen were reported in April 1946 to be waiting impatiently in the Allied-controlled enclaves for the attainment of peace in order that they could get on with the urgent business of reclaiming their investments and rebuilding their factories and plan­ tations.

Eight months after the Japanese surrender the Indies are still closed as a source of some of the world's most vitally needed com­ modities .... The Goodyear Tire factory at Buitenzorg remained in operation throughout the Japanese occupation and for a period of months after surrender, but its equipment also has been so neglected aa to become almost useless .... The American and British interests are confident their invest­ ments in the Indies area are not permanently lost and believe a set­ tlement giving Indonesians sovereignty or greater control of the government would not end their profits, in view of the Nationalists* expressed willingness to permit or even encourage foreign capital. Meanwhile, the agents must wait.37

Possibly because of the importance of the large American rubber invest­ ment in Sumatra, one of Consul General Walter Foote's first

56 New York Times, January 7, 1946.

5'^Ibid,, April 15, 1946. 34

recommendations to the Department was that it reopen the consulate in

Medan, Sumatra, in the center of the area of American plantations. 3®

The United States Government seemed willing to risk the objections from influential elements in Congress and elsewhere because of the importance of these investments. The Dutch were allowed to purchase United States landing craft to aid in getting the Sumatran oil fields in operation again.39 It was further noted, in the same report;

Internationally, an early solution of the Indonesian problmn is important because these products are among those the world needs most, furthermore, the Netherlands Indies were a rich market before the war, exploited chiefly by the Japanese. With the Japanese elim­ inated and prosperity restored, the new Indonesian commonwealth would offer a vast market for United States consumer goods.40

It is certainly quite safe to conclude that the United States

Government was to place a great deal of importance on the recovery and rehabilitation of American investments in Indonesia, particularly in view of the serious exigencies of conversion to a peacetime economy.

A secondaury factor of almost equal importance in the minds of

American policy makers, and one that would assume even greater weight with the passage of time, was the vital importance the East Indies were thought to have for the recovery of the Netherlands itself. United

States officials knew that the economy of Holland was geared to the processing of raw materials, such as tin ore and copra extracted from the archipelago, and then the resale of finished products in Germany.

3®Ibid., December 1 5 , 1945.

39ibid., June 9, 1946.

40,Ibid. 35

Holland's economic relations with the archipelago and its lucra­ tive trade with Germany were the two main reasons iriiy the Dutch people enjoyed one of the highest standards of living of any nation in pre-war Europe. As a result of World War II, the German trade has been almost completely wiped out, temporarily at least. Hol­ land's economic position has been further weakened by war damage to her productive resources, which has still not been fully repaired, but which will be ameliorated by the World Bank loan of August 7, 1947. From the Dutch point of view, these factors have combined to make the recovery of Dutch economic interests in Indonesia vital for the rehabilitation in Holland .41

One passing thought in connection with this quotation seems worthy of attention at this point: Cold War historians have laid the blame for the coming of the Cold War at the door of the policy of unconditional surrender. By thus creating a virtual vacuum of political and military power in Central Europe, wartime policy thereby made it inevitable that

Soviet and American military power would be drawn together in a hostile confrontation there. Furthermore, it also removed Germany as a market for the finished products of the Dutch economy, thus contributing to the seriousness of the economic plight brou^t about by the Indonesian revolution, as seen through the eyes of The Hague. In any case, the financial pages of the American press were frequently to carry articles predicting dire things for the future of Holland's prosperity, if the old economic relationship with Indonesia were not at least in largue measure restored .42

One is reminded, in reading such reports, of the Leninist cor­ ollary to the Marxian thesis on the downfall of world capitalism.

^Volf, The Indonesian Story, p. 1 5 5 .

4^See, for example, the New York Times of October 21, 1945, of October 27, 1946, of January 6, 1947. 36

Lenin, in his critically important theoretical work Imperialism, the

Highest Stage of Capitalism explained the apparent failure of the capi­ talist world to fulfill the historically inevitable role Marx had charted for it by the contention that through the expedient of acquiring imperial possessions, the capitalists postponed the ordained reckoning.

While historians commonly point out the near-universal acceptance of this explanation for the enormous gaps in productive power and living

standards between the industrialized and underdeveloped nations among formerly colonial peoples, what is not mentioned as frequei^ly is the traditional, if unacknowledged tribute paid to Lenin by the West as well. The dire predictions made by Dutch financial and commercial

spokesman in the mid-1940's and late 1940's, as described above, seem to

be in the best Leninist tradition. Adding to the irony, of course, is the fact that the former colonial powers— with the possible exception of the British, who retained more dependencies for a longer period of time— have shown an indecent propensity to prosper in the intervening

years. But however interesting our later wisdom, the fact is that these

considerations seemed terribly critical to European and American policy

officials at the time. Indonesia was important to the conversion of the

United States economy, the Netherlands was important to the recovery of

Europe and the economy of the United States, and Indonesia was vital to

the Netherlands economy.

If these Indonesian islands were of great importance to the

West, then, any future policy of a positive nature which might be

adopted by the United States would have to take into account the nature 37

of the Government which claimed to rule the economically and politically most important areas of that archipelago. Was this Republic spawned by the dying Imperial Japanese parent as a kind of fascist offspring, as a purposefully created afflication on the post-war tranquility envisioned by the Allies? Was it a collection of extremists and ter­ rorists who responded only to racialist appeals, led by Japanese puppets representing no one but themselves? Or was this a genuine nationalist movement, in the American anti-colonial tradition and sustained by widespread popular support? Upon the answers to questions like these, much would depend. We are struck by the tendency of contemporary accounts to set off with almost derisive quotation marks the words

"Republic," "president," "government," and "premier," when used in con­ nection with this new regime.

One of the most serious charges, in American eyes, and one of the most persistent, was the allegation that the Republic was led by collaborators of the Japanese. As it stands, there is no denial of this charge. A Hew York Times editorial refers to President Sukarno as "an

extremist tainted with collaboration with the Japanese . . . ."43 The

Netherlands Minister of Overseas Territories on October l6, 1945 prom­

ised to offer self-government within the Netherlands commonwealth to

Indonesia, as a solution to the uprisings, and said that the Government would discuss proposals with Indonesian leaders who "merit consid­

eration," but specifically excluded Sukarno, because he "had identified

^^Editorial, New York Times. July 1, 1946. 38

himself so completely with the Japanese regime and is completely hostile toward the Netherlands."^^ A letter to the editor in the New York Times refers to the Indonesian "extremists" who had been armed by the frus­ trated Japanese to "vicariously continue the fight against the United

Nations.In April 1946, Major General Yamamoto, the wartime Japanese

Sixteenth Army Group commander in Indonesia^ was removed by British authorities; private correspondence found in his possession "made it clear not only that his personal sympathies were with the Indonesian cause, but also that he had issued orders to Japanese forces to hand over their arms to Indonesian extremists,The New York Times edito­ rialized that one of the reasons for the continuing instability and violence in the Far East was the continued presence of Japanese forces throughout the area.

This does not mean that the great upsurge of national sentiment throughout the Fair Bast is not genuine or that the old order can be restored unchanged. But the first step toward a change must be the removal of the Jap^anese and their col lab orators47 and the cessation of civil strife.40

These criticisms were directed with particular fervor against

President Sukarno, and at least partially due to these outcries, the

Republican Government departed somewhat from its Constitution and

selected the leader of the Republican underground, Sutan Sjahrir, as its

^^ e w York Times, October I7 , 1945*

^^bid,, December 1 4 , 1945.

^4bid., April 12, 1 9 4 6 .

47ltalics not in the original.

4®ibid., January 2 4, 1946. 39

Premier, placing both Sukarno and Vice president Hatta into the back­

ground. In reporting these moves by the Republic, the Associated Press

stated that Sukarno had been "shelved" with his title intact, but

"little power." Sjahrir was described as a "moderate" who had written

critising extremism in his people as harmful to the nationalist cause.49

However, a closer look at the wartime and prewar history of

the Indonesian nationalist movement reveals that it had been agreed

between the nationalist leadership prior to the war that, as noted

above, Sukarno and Hatta would cooperate with the invading Japanese,

while Sjahrir and others prominent in the leadership of the nationalist

movement would form the underground organizations in order to resist the

Japanese. The important point is that the entire purpose of the pact

thus made was to work in the most effective ways possible to hasten the

coming of independence for the Indonesian people. Sukarno took fullest

possible ad.vantage of the vastly changed conditions under Japanese rule,

of the Japanese propaganda, "Asia for the Asians," of the greatly

improved communications thus made available, to accelerate the pace of

political modernization in Indonesia. His leadership of the movement,

his commanding personal presence, all were significant factors in this

regard. It is difficult to improve on the following observations:

Japan lost the war but her slogan, "Asia for the Asiatics," appears to have won. What is happening in the Far East is a warning that the oriental peoples, instead of being subdued by the victories of the western powers, are more stirred up than before at occidental domination. The result [in Indonesia] is to rouse the natives against the Dutch and magnify the independence movement to a point

49ibid., Novamber 14, 1945* 40

where it has to be recognized by the Netherlands Government and the United Nations .... The Japs initiated regimes of harshness and exploitation such as the natives had never known under white rule, but these regimes also gave the native leaders more support among the people and more con­ fidence in their right and power to govern.50

But the American response was not likely to take these factors into account. The point is that in Asia, the term "quisling" simply did not carry with it the emotional impact that it had in Europe. The Indo­ nesians had no exile government for which they felt any loyalty; it wasn't their government which had been defeated in 1942. Many of than felt at least aa much affinity for the conquering Japanese, despite their sometimes unspeakable cruelty, as they did for the Dutch. All

American thinking that took place early about this subject reflects the

same tendency, that of emphasizing the evil effects of racial hatred

left by Japanese propaganda; moreover, while it is undeniable that anti-

Europeanism accounted for a large part of the content of that propaganda,

it was just as much anti-colonial (that is, western colonial) in its message. But because of the wholly negative picture of the Japanese nation, and the black-and-white simplicity of American thinking about

Japan and her policies in Asia, it was completely beyond the capacity of

the American Government or people to comprehend any justice behind these

policies. Even if the Republic had been a Japanese "product," as was so

frequently alleged (and as anyone with the most rudimentary acquaintance

with colonial Indonesian history would know to be untrue) this should

not have constituted prima facie evidence that it was unsupportable.

50Ibid., February 18, 1946, 41

Nowhere, to the credit of the Department of State, is there any evidence that the collaborationist issue became a matter of official concern to the American policy makers; however, it is never specifically mentioned in any statement. Nevertheless, anyone familiar with the workings of a bureaucracy is aware of the fact that the debates which go on outside the government usually provide a good indication of those taking place within, as well.

The next issue of importance with regard to the nature of the

Republic is the charge that it, or important and powerful elements within its movement, were inclined to extremism, terrorism and anti- westemism. A typical example is that furnished in the following Neth­ erlands News Agency report published in the New York Times;

Sixty-one extremists were killed in the Surabaya area and four­ teen more by an Allied patrol that was ambushed west of Batavia, today's Allied communique stated. The communique said that a general attack made by extremists on Allied positions in the southern sector of Surabaya resulted in the death of twenty-nine extremists and the capture of ten more in actions at Gedangan and petro . . . ,51

Another report highlighted the killing of a Dutch woman by Indo­ nesian nationalists, and reported van Mook's willingness to open dis­ cussions with nationalist leaders, but not as long as Indonesians held

100,000 Dutch prisoners.52 There seems little doubt that the Republican

Government did in fact, as charged by the Dutch, plan on using the Dutch and European war prisoners encamped in the inaccessible inferior areas

(which the Republican Government controlled) as bargaining counters.

51Ibid., September 8, 1946.

Editorial, New York Times, July 29, 1946. 42

While the untruetworthineas of the Dutch probably made it seem Irre­

sponsible to give up this Important restraint which the Republican Gov­

ernment held over any resort to violence or force the Dutch mi^t have

contemplated, such restraint did not sit well with American observers.

A fact that may be too little appreciated by the Indonesian Republican leaders is that they can immeasurably strengthen their cause if they can rally world opinion to their side. They hardly are strong enou^ to win their independence, or even a promise of it, without such support. Yet they seem at times to be determined to do everything possible to alienate those whose sympathies and support they otherwise would have. Abrupt cancellation of the agreed-on plan for air evacuation of the 30,000 to 40,000 Dutch and European internees still held in inaccessible camps in the interior is a case in point . . . .53

The press seems to have been extremely sensitive to reports or

incidents with racial overtones. The killings of Dutch civilians, some­

times by being "hacked to d e a t h , "34 geem to seldom fail to get into

print in a prominent way. It is, of course, true that there were count­

less atrocities committed on both sides, but, admittedly, more partic­

ularly by Japanese-trained para-military youth organizations which did,

on occasion, get out from under Republican control and which did have

tendencies toward extremism and terrorist attacks, sometimes against

defenseless Europeans. Nevertheless, the New York Times' able corre­

spondent, Robert Trumbull, had a cogent observation also worthy of

consideration:

Today this correspondent flew over Indonesian territory in a Dutch Army plane looking for what Dutch officers called "burned vil­ lages." In several towns he saw a house razed here and there, in close proximity to unharmed houses, as if the victims had been

^ 4 ew York Times, October 18, 1945. 43

chosen by design. This might have been a forthright way of dealing with persons saspected of being pro-Dutch. It was notable that the Dutch Army men never once referred to "Indonesians" in discussing incidents of violence. It was always "ter­ rorists" or "extremists." Some responsible Dutch officials now depre­ cate the overuse of these words, which are susceptible of propagandistic interpretation.55

The next yardstick likely to be used for measurement of this

Republic would be a determination of the extent of its popular support and its "preparedness" (the time-honored colonial standard for self-

government) to rule. There were allegations in print that, even by the

"testimony of 'Premier' Sjahrir himself, the . . . 'Republic' which he heads is not able to establish law and order,"5® But much of the unprejudiced reporting available to Americans in both private and public

capacities was quite accurate on this most important point. There are

critical references to:

. . . many people in Batavia and in the Netherlands who would like to believe that the Republican Government does not represent the bulk of the people, irtio are still hopeful that the Republicans will not be able to control their hotheads and will give the Dutch . . . an excuse to step in and re-establish the old coloni­ alism. 57

One reporter noted the extreme claims made by both the adherents and

detractors of the Republic as to its degree of popular support, and

stated,

There is . . . no doubt that the independence movement has wide if not majority support. I have driven throu^ cities, towns and villages in all parts of Java and seen the red and white Indonesian flags everywhere and heard cries of "Merdeka" from children and

^^Ibid., October 12, 1946.

^^Editorial, New York Times, February 12, 1946.

^^Editorial, New York Times, May 2, 1947. 44

grown-ups alike* The great majority of Indonesians I have met expressed a desire for independence, although many had only the haziest, if any, idea of its meaning.5°

Prom still another account, the policy maker could learn that:

The facts would seem to indicate that Indonesia could govern it­ self. It will require years of advice and economic assistance from the West and will have to evolve a more mature political philos­ ophy . . . There is no reason to doubt that, given time, the Indo­ nesians themselves will evolve answers to these questions in a manner consistent with the ideals of a domocratio way of life.59

But if it began to appear that the Republic of Indonesia was able to lay

claim, with at least some de^ee of legitimacy, to widespread popular

support, this would be of little value to American policy makers if it

also showed incipient "communistic" tendencies. Careful note was taken,

for example, of a pamphlet attributed to Sjahrir, entitled "Our

Struggle," which;

• . . holds that only the elimination of "imperialism and capi­ talism from the world" will give the Indonesians complete satis­ faction. Independence from the Netherlands would yield "a freedom in name only" so long as the British and American ideas of government and commerce prevail .... "As long as this will be the case," it said, "we shall certainly fall under and be ruled by the world of American-English imperialism and capitalism and, though we exert ourselves to the utmost, we have not sufficient power ourselves to cause the collapse of this world , , . , 6 0

But aside from a few such articles as this, throughout most of

the early period, communism was not viewed as being an important and

5®New York Times, January 13, 1946.

59paul Kattenburg, "Political Alignments in Indonesia," Far Eastern Survey, September, 1946, p. 294«

^^New York Times, December 2, 1945 45 critical factor In Indonesian political life. When the Ukrainian com­ plaint seized the United Nations Security Council, Sjahrir's comments indicating non-concurrence in the Soviet move received page-one cov­ erage,despite his later apparent equivocations on the suhject*^^ ^ very able Far Eastern correspondent of the New York Times named Foster

Hailey addressed himself to this subject with a good deal of accuracy more than once;

Achmed Sukarno, eloquent leader of the Indonesian nationalists since 1926, apparently mixed his own brew of ideas that had no relation to communism, which is not today an important factor here.^3 In Indonesia, the Communists are only a small party and Alimin, . the leader, is classed as a "conservative" by the revolutionary hot­ heads because he favored ratification of the Linggadjati Agreement that provides for a period of transition from colonial rule that will keep Indonesia within a Dutch union, similar to that of the British Empire,64

It is indeed true that the leaders of the Fartai Kommunis Indonesia

(F.K.I.) supported Linggadjati, and continued, as loyal members of the wartime underground, to support the Republican Government, It is impor­ tant that we note these factors at this early stage, however, because the question of communist strength within the councils of the Republic was to become one of the most crucial and burning issues on which the eventual positions taken by the United States were to depend.

Another important clue as to the nature of the Republic was its apparent emulation of the United States and its identification with the

American revolutionary and anti-colonial tradition. While there can be

Ibid,, January 23, 1946. ^^Ibid., January 28, 1946.

^^Mew York Times, February 9, 1947, Magazine Section, p. 6.

^^New York Times, November 13 , 1947, Magazine Section, p. 6. 46

no question that this was used by Indonesian propagandists to build up support for their oause within the United States, it would be unfairly cynical to note this fact and ignore the consideration that such a sense of identification was, in fact, genuine. This, for example, was the major point of President Sukarno's address to the United States Congress on his first visit to the United States. And at least a part of the motivation for such propaganda activity may have been a desire on the part of the Republican leadership to help Americans rediscover their own revolutionary tradition and the obvious similarities which they found between it and their own struggle. Here is an example:

Indonesian premier Amir Sjariffoddin asked the United States in a Fourth of July message today to remember her "revolutionary tra­ dition" and help the Indonesian Republic attain an "independence day free from fear." The message of the Indonesian Government leader, addressed to both the people and the Government of the United States, also urged America to "continue to exert its influence to safeguard the peace as we strive through peaceful . . . negotiations to reach agreements with the Netherlands .... Our goals are like those that Inspired the brave citizen's sol­ diery of Lexington and Concord— freedom from colonial rule, rights of a free people to move toward the universal good, to achieve free­ dom from want and universal education, to take our place in the brotherhood of nations."65

The contention that such sentiments were genuine seems to be partly validated by swme of the observations of Charles Wolf:

The Indonesian Constitution . . . clearly showed the influence of the American Constitution that had been used as its model. It provided inter alia for a President and Vice President exercising strong executive control and command of all armed forces, a Congress and a Council of Representatives to exercise the legislative function, and a Supreme Court vested with judicial power.

^^New York Times, July 5, 1 9 4 7 .

^^olf. The Indonesian Story, p. 17. 47

In another publication, he refers to the Indonesians*

. , naive faith in the United States, attested to by the myriad quotations from Lincoln and Jefferson painted on signs and buildings throu^out the capital city.°7

And, recalling that we are here discussing the "role of the United

States" in the Indonesian Revolution, we have touched upon a factor that

should not be passed over quickly: the role of the United States "by

example." While it would be incorrect to say that the United States was

ever in its history an exporter of revolution on the French or Soviet models, nonetheless, it has been historically endemic to American

thinking about foreign policy matters that the United States should, by

its own noble example, show other nations how to conduct their own polit­

ical affairs and their international intercourse. Observers of the

Indonesian scene could not help but be pleased, it would seem, by such

manifestations of admiration so much in accord with American thinking

about its role in world affairs.

The question which must be asked, however, is whether this emu­

lation of the American example, these feelings of revolutionary affinity

and identification were sufficient to overcome idiat Raymond Kennedy

referred to as American "distrust" of "radicalism" and revolution. In

1 9 4 5 , one central and all-pervading thought seemed to dominate the

thinking of Americans, whether citizen or diplomat, about foreign

affairs: the desire for peace. There can be no question that Americans

reacted with dismay and anguish to the upsetting series of crises and

Charles Wolf, Indonesian Assignment, written without attri­ bution to the author under the auspices of the Coomittee on Public Admin­ istration (Washington, U.C., 1950)> 17 pages. 40 dlsruptiona that accompanied the end of the war, We recall the eval­ uative article (see page I4 ) which identified "stability" and evo­

lution" ae the keynotes of the Par Eastern policy of the United States,

Closely akin to the desire for peace, then, is the traditional American

longing for a return to the old chimera "normalcy" and relief from the

upsetting and cataclysmic events of depression and war and revolution.

It could hardly be expected, then, that the traditional American identi­

fication with anti-colonialism would totally overcome the understandable

feelings of concern with idiich American policy officials viewed the out­

break of the Indonesian revolution in an area which they deemed so crit­

ically important to the recovery and reconversion of the war-ravaged

areas of Europe and Asia. That there were these feelings of suspicion

and distrust identified by Ur. Kennedy we shall have occasion to docu­

ment shortly.

We shall now have occasion to examine the degree to which Ameri­

can observers, both in the Goverianent Euid outside of it, actually

understood Indonesian nationalism. It may have been the result of offi­

cial concern with the inadequacy of information available to the Allied

Governments which resulted in the quick unofficial trip to Indonesia in

October 1943 made by the Political Advisor to the Southeast Asia Command,

Mr. Maberly E, Denning, accompanied by United States Army Brigadier Gen­

eral Robin Pape, a liaison officer on the Mount bat ten command. They

reportedly had arrived "for a first-hand look at the situation," empha­

sizing that they were merely observers,^®

68 New York Times* October 25, 1945. 49

But it ie not necessary to speculate on this issue. Charles

Wolf was the first American official to arrive in Indonesia after Consul

General Walter Poote, and in a pamphlet, written without identifying

Wolf as the author or Foote as the other dramatis personae (apparently for a study on decision-making in the bureaucracy, under the auspices of the United States Government Committee on Public Administration Cases),

Wolf tells us:

The interest and concern of the United States in Indonesia was economic and strategic. Indonesia was an area of past and potential American investment, a source of critically needed raw materi­ als , , . and a strategically located military and naval instal­ lation in the Pacific. As with Britain, the speed of the Japanese surrender and our inadequate intelligence sources found us totally unprepared to enunciate and execute a policy in Indonesia for the protection of ^erican interests and aspirations.**^ The need for on-the-spot information and analysis was critical if such a policy was to be formulated. 7®

C(uaing from one who was the Deputy Consul General in Batavia shortly after the Consulate itself was opened, this is "hard" infor­ mation indeed. And, if we accept the contention that the information which the State Department did receive in the early days of the Indo­ nesian revolution would have to have been affected and colored by the attitudes and outlook of the persons reporting this information, then

Mr. Wolf has a good deal more to tell us that is of importance to the

study at hand. After noting the near-chaotic and unhealthy conditions

in Batavia, he tells us that Foote was the first official American to

^^italics not in the original.

^®Wolf, Indonesian Assignment, pp. 2, 3, 50

arrive. At the age of sixty, he had been the American Consul General for twelve years before the war.

Much of his life, his feelings, hie values and recollections, were inextricably bound up with the pre-war pattern of colonial existence. His attitude toward the plight of the Dutch was naturally one of sympathy. Years of tropical service had taken their toll on him. Those who had known him before the war found him slowed down, his speech affected by a slight stutter. For these reasons, there had been considerable controversy within the Department of State at the time of his reassignment to Batavia in mid-1945* Some felt that his age and prejudices made his reassignment to an area of political unrest and uncertainty extremely unwise, and that a younger man was preferable. Others felt that his long experience and familiarity with the area and many of its key figures were such primary assets as to outweigh any other liabilities. Within the Department itself, jurisdiction over Indonesia was shared by the Division of Southeast Asian Affairs and the Division of Northern European Affairs. The former represented the "anti" faction, while the latter supported his appointment.71

Wolf goes on to relate how Foote was severely overworked, being the only United States Government official there (aside from a code clerk who was sent later on), and how he himself was sent out there to assist the Consul General and to report to the Department on economic matters.

He admits coming across the controversy over the wisdom of reappointing

Foote and that his own sympathies had been with those who had opposed the move.

At the end of February, 1946, I arrived in Batavia to begin work. My initial meeting with the Consul General was cordial and friendly though filled with innumerable admonitions about "caution," "danger," and "the need to move slowly."72

The writer then relates how he set to work, clearing up a backlog of work his superior had not been able to attend to, and then went about

71xbid., pp. 3, 4, 72ibid., p. 6, 51 his primary task of reporting on economic conditions. He would fix upon a subject for a report, obtain Foote's approval and his advice on the names of a number of Dutch officials to talk to, and then go about the work. When it was completed, the Consul General would co-sign the report before it was sent to Washington. However, on the third project, which dealt with the copra situation, he hit "a slight snag" due to the fact that the distribution of the most important copra areas indicated the strongest need to interview or consult with Republican officials.

When he asked the representative of the United States Government in

Batavia about this, he was treated to a strong restât «sent of the pre­ viously iterated views about the need for "caution," the "ticklish political situation which you must take my word for," and the "need for waiting and moving slowly."73

The point of the pamphlet, as becomes clear in the succeeding pages, is how, when faced with an explicit suggestion from the Depart­ ment that, in responding to a request for information on economic plans and policies in the archipelago, "if possible and with the utmost dis­ cretion, Dutch, Indonesian, and British sources should be consulted, as

far as feasible," he went ahead and requested information from Repub­

lican officials, who responded with the utmost of courtesy and help­

fulness, and risked incurring the displeasure of the Consul General. He

comments that, in making hie decision:

. . . I had a persistent feeling that the Department required full reporting from both sides to make coaipetent policy decisions in Indonesia; that competent and complete performance of my work required building sound contacts on the Republican as well as the

73ibid., pp. 7, 8. 52

Netherlands side. While I learned to feel a certain admiration for the pereerrerence of the Dutch, my ideological sympathies for the Indonesians had been reinforced by my experiences in the field.

It ie perhaps the most telling comment on the inadequacy of the earliest reporting received by the United States to note that the thought that

Britain could accomplish the twin military objectives of disarming and repatriating the Japanese and liberating the Allied prisoners of war and internees "without touching on the thorny problems of colonialism and imperialism among a sensitive people and in a sensitive world, was a fantasy to start with."*^5

Much more copious are the indications of the inaidequacies of public and press understanding of Indonesian nationalism. The New York

Times commented editorially that, because they disliked the Japanese even more than the Europeans, the independence movements among the peoples in

Southeast Asia (referring particularly to Indonesia) had actually "lost ground" during the w ar.76 in reviewing the build-up of Netherlands troops underway to put down the "unruly nationalist elements" in Indo­ nesia, a correspondent commented that "the opposition is not expected to be lion-hearted, so the force being dispatched from here is considered

large enough to fulfill this important m ission."77 After the signing of the truce in October 1946, we learn that:

The nationalists . . . cannot replace the weapons they seized from the Japanese. Premier Sjahrir, whose views have tended to become more moderate with the resumption of the latest parleys,

7 4 lb id ., pp. 9, 10.

7^olf, The Indonesian Story, p. 18. 76 Editorial, New York Times. October 9, 1945. 77 New York Times. October 20, 1945. 53

undoubtedly knows this. It is reasonable to suppose that he would never have agreed to let a new Dutch army entrench itself in Java unless he was reconciled to permanent Dutch occupâtion.78

Reports such as the foregoing tend to indicate— to those who have the benefit of the hindsi^t that comes with the passage of time and events--that Americans had a great deal to learn about the potency and depth of Asian nationalism. While there were good reports available in print in the United States during this period, reports which clearly set forth the dynamics of renaissance which were speedily sweeping through great areas of Asia, such material seems to have had only a limited effect on the thinking of, for example, the editorial staffs of large newspapers. The revolutionary effects on the Asian scene wrought by the Japanese interregnum (what some historians are today referring to

as one of two great watersheds in Southeast Asian history) did find their way into the press, however.

Possibly because of their recognition of the provincialism (to borrow another term from Raymond Kennedy) and ignorance irtiich hindered

the policy-making efforts of American statesmen, spokesmen of the Repub­

lic embarked on programs to acquaint Americans with the realities of

their situation. The American Government's first overt act, we recall,

was to request that the British and Dutch forces remove the United

States insignia from the lend-lease equipment they were using. One of

the reasons for this action was, in all probability, the radiogram sent

by Sukarno to President Truman on October 20, 1945, pointing out to the

American President that this situation left many of his countrymen

7®Editorial, New York Times, October 20, 1946. 54 believing that it was Americans who were attempting to suppress their revolution: "I appeal to you to disallow the infringement of American neutrality and order the immediate discontinuance of American disguise by the Dutch," wrote S u k a r n o . 79

In furtherance of such an education program was the invitation, also extended by Sukarno, to the British Parliament and the United

States Congress to send committees to Indonesia to see the "true sit­ uation" there for themselves.8® Americans residing in Indonesia were urged by the Republican newspaper Merdeka the following January to pro­ test to their Government about the Dutch use of the American-trained battalion of Dutch Marines, complete with American uniforms and equip­ ment.®^ One of the most consistent efforts on the part of the Republic was to convince the United States that they could be just as reliable as trading partners, with all of the "fabulous wealth" which all Americans knew was the blessing of Indonesian natural resources. In a meeting with Walter Foote held as early as October 26, 1945» Sukarno presumably

set about trying to communicate some of these thoughts to the American

Government.®2

Possibly the moat meaningful and revealing manifestation of the

lack of American understanding of the depth and force of Asian nation­

alism is the persistent tendency on the part of both policy makers and

7^New York Times, October 21, 1945* 80 Ibid., October 25, 1945»

S'*Ibid., October 21, 1945.

®2ibid,, October 26, 1945. 55

commentators to overestimate the ease with which the entire question could he solved. It is this issue, one which will recur time and again throu^out the coming pages, which we can label the "Solubility Ques­ tion," that appeared to plague so much of the thinking of United States statesmen and to hamper their policies. To the extent that we are cor­ rect about this, it might appear that the Republic would have better spent its time convincing Americans of the solidity of their support, first of all, and secondly, of their intransigence in the face of par­ tial solutions and palliatives.

On the basis of some tentative reports (from correspondents and news agencies from Batavia) that accord between the Parties might be near at hand, the editors of the New York Times gave in to almost unbridled celebrating in April of 1946. One editorial, entitled "Dawn over the Indies," began, "Since the end of the war, no more heartening news has come out of troubled Asia than the new .... etc.®)

Again, about one year later, the New York Times commented that:

The transition of the Netherlands Indies from colonial status to a mutually respected, dominion-1ike place within the Dutch Union appears to be making orderly and peaceful progress. A plan for Dutch-Indonesian exploitation of the rich islands' econwmy was an­ nounced a few days ago. Now the Dutch Goverzment announces that it will send Indonesians as Ministers to the Philippines, Siam, Iran and Saudi Arabia, and the United States Government extends ^ facto recognition to the Republic of Indonesia. This latter act woulâ hardly have been done without Dutch consent .... There have been skeptics on both sides that Linggadjati could be put into effect peacefully. It is considerably less than the "one hundred per cent Merdeka (freedom)" that has been the slogan of the Republicans in their fi ^ t against Dutch rule. Some former Dutch colonial officials and Dutch businessmen still oppose the agreement.

^^Editorial, New York Times, April 1, 1946. 56

But it does seem to be working, and peacefully. If present progress is continued, an example will have been set that other colonial Powers and peoples could follow with profit.®4

In fact, however, the Republicans had rejected the offer of partici­ pation in the representations of the Dutch Foreign Office in selected

Asian capitals by this time. And, a review of either of the major works on the Indonesian Revolution reveals that, as a matter of fact, things were not going well at all in Dutch-Indonesian negotiations on April 19,

1947*^^ Even as we grant that at least part of the reason for these optimistic utterances was the very strong desire on the part of the writers to see the question resolved, such hopefulness as is expressed above, in the face of large amounts of contrary evidence, can only be the result of inadequate information, particularly on the critical point of the strength of the Republic.

We will at this point review the expressions of American public opinion on the Indonesian Question during this period, in light of the effects which this opinion may have had on the actual moves made by the

United States Government. First, we shall look at some of the primary interest articulations on the part of institutional, anomic, and associational interest groups.

Very soon after the close of the war, such expressions as the following were being offered:

A demand for the withdrawal of all troops interfering with the rightful self-detezmination of the Indonesian people was issued

®^Editorial, New York Times, April 19, 1947. ®5see Alastair ItacD. Taylor, Indonesian Independence and the United Nations, p. 32» and George McT. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952), p. 206. 57

yesterday by the Protestant magazine and its Ministerial Action Com­ mittee, said to represent 6,000 Christian ministers, in the form of telegrams sent to President Truman and British Prime Minister Attlee. Protesting against "Dutch-Anglo-Araerican imperialism" in Indo­ nesia as a "flagrant betrayal of everything the United Nations fought for in this war, " the statement urged both leaders now meeting in Washington to consider the seriousness of the situation and "to order the immediate withdrawal of all troops from this area and thus wipe out this shameless affront to the conscience of the world. "The struggle of the Indonesian people symbolizes the rightful claim of all the world's people to self-determination," the state­ ment declared. "This attack is in direct contradiction to the foreign policy of the United States announced by president Truman in his Navy Day speech.

Demonstrations were conducted as well; for example, during the same month that the above statement was issued, a group protesting the actions of the United Kingdom and Holland in Indonesia picketed the con­ sulates of these two powers in San Francisco. Included among the spon­ sors of the demonstration were the San Francisco Committee for a Free

Indonesia, the local Congress of Industrial Organizations Council, the

National Maritime Union, the Marine Cooks and Stewards, and the Com­ munist Political Association of San F r a n c i s c o . ®7

The following month, at a Madison Square Garden rally under the auspices of the Independent Citizens Committee of Arts and Sciences, at which Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace was the featured speaker, a

resolution was offered which deplored the "use of American lend-lease material in Java and Indo-China."®®

^^New York Times. November 11 , 194^. ®7ibid., November 22, 1945*

®®Ibid., December 5, 1945* 58

In August of 1946, at the Labor Temple on Fourteenth Street in

New York City, a rally was held celebrating the first anniversary of the

Indonesian Declaration of Independence. This was sponsored by the Indo­ nesia League, which claimed an active membership of ninety-five percent of the Indonesiems in this country. It was revealed at this rally, in­ cidentally, that the preceding December, Indonesian Premier Sjahrir had written a letter to President Truman, appealing for American assistance in bringing the Indonesian Question before the United Nations. The

President of the Indonesia League, Mr. John R, Andu, in reading the let­ ter, claimed that it had been "suppressed by the White House. With­ out touching on the question of whether the President decided not to make this communication public, assuming that he read it at all, it is interesting to note this one way (of many) in which the Republic could and did try to influence American public opinion.

At the National Conference on China and the Par East, with five hundred delegates "representing some three hundred groups throughout the nation," a resolution was passed calling on the Government to cut off all 90 aid to the Anglo-Dutch forces in Indonesia.

But in addition to these more or less spontaneous expressions of public opinion, there are some interesting indications of congressional opinion during these early months as well. Senator Joseph C. 0 "Mahoney

(Democrat from Wyoming), speaiking before the Insurance Federation of New

York at the Hotel Commodore, attacked "totalitarian and imperialistic

®^Ibid., August 17, 1946.

^Ibid., October 21, I946. 59

ideas still struggling to preserve their power," He praised Britain for her resistance to such doctrines, but noted that she was fighting a

"little war of aggression in the Dutch East Indies to crush the Indo­ nesian counterparts of Washington's rebels." He criticized British use of Japanese "mercenaries" against the Republican adherents, and imperial exploitation in Asia generally. "He warned that if the principles of free government and free enterprise are to survive in this world, they must be defended by the United States."91

Governor Dwigjit H. Green of Illinois, in a welcoming state­ ment to the meeting of the Republican National Committee at Chicago, criticized the timidity of Republicans of both Houses of Congress in advancing foreign policy alternatives to those offered by the Adminis­ tration, He declared that, in an unsuccessful effort to "get Communist

and other radical votes, the Republican Party had not dared to raise its voice against the rape of Java by the British and the Dutch . . ."92

Probably the most persistent critic of Administration inaction,

however, was Representative Ellis E. Patterson (Republican from Cali­

fornia) . The following gives a good example of his thinking on the

subject:

Ur. Speaker, a flagrant violation of people's rights has been taking place for many months now. It is time that we in America, whose tradition is to support a people struggling for their inde­ pendence, take note of this little know part of the world. The Indo­ nesians, ever since V-J Day, have been struggling not Just against the Dutch, but against the British. In these islands of the Nether­ lands East Indies lies a serious trouble spot which could infect the world because of the usual imperialistic striving for trade advantages

Ibid., December 6 , 1945» 92ibid., December 8, 1945* 60

which is at the root of the Dutch and British resistance to self- determination of these subject peoples. This is certainly a problem for the United Nations Security Council to investigate. I am introducing a resolution which will express the wish of the House that such an investigation by the United Nations may be made . . . 93

The tone and tenor of this statement remind us of our earlier observation regarding the tacit links between the isolationists, with their anti-Ei'ropean outlook, and the anti-colonialists. Congressman

Patterson would probably have been an adherent of the Leninist Corollary, in light of his implications that the major motivation of the British and Dutch was economic. And the suggestion might be offered that such thinking was quite in accord with the traditional American opposition to colonialism from its own selfish economic and trade-advantage point of view. Americans were the most opposed to colonialism, of course, when it was in their own national interests to be so. It might well be that a rigorous examination of the anti-colonial tradition in American his­ tory would show that economic and trade factors were, since 1870, pri­ mary motivating factors* Like Germany, the United States had, after all, simply gotten into the race for colonies quite late in the game.

One of the most interesting commentaries on the administration* s policies came in a signed article by Harold B. Stassen. He advocated that the Government call upon the Dutch, British, and Indonesians to cease all hostilities and then proceed to get all of the "facts" on the situation. He dismisses the contention that this is not an area of

93u.S., Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 2nd Sees., XCII, Part 10, Appendix, A2254. 61

legitimate interest to the United States and invokes the references in the United Nations Charter to the right of self-determination as the applicable standard for judgment in the case. He continues along the following line:

And I do wish to say, with all the emphasis at my command, that the very weak statement of our Government, that the British and Dutch should be sure the United States emblems be taken off the lend-lease equipment used in this uprising, was a tragic manifestation of United States policy. Is it not clear that either these Javanese groups are complete outlaws and bandits and should be put down by whatever means necessary, or that the Japanese troops be disarmed and evicted? In this case, any equipment and forces of any of the Allies should be used in any manner that is militarily sound for the establishment of order and to complete the task of the war. But on the other hand, if these are forces that genuinely and broadly represent the people of Java, and if the Dutch have not been just in their approach and in their offer of post-war administration, then lend-lease equipment should not be used at all, with or without United States emblems, and a reasonable United Nations effort should be made for a fair and just solution.94

Good point. And criticisms such as these had their effects, as well.

The British, for example, were most anxious to defend their actions in the eyes of the United States, and it is quite probable that it was at

British request (or even insistence) that the statement of December 19,

1945 was issued. There were efforts on the part of the Dutch., as well, to influence United States opinion. An example is the following dis­ patch from The Hague:

The Dutch seek military equipment from the United States for operations in the Netherlands Indies. Repeated attempts to win the State Department's support have failed, it is learned here. A deal through the War Assets Adminis­ tration will not yield results in time, it is feared here and, more­ over, the impression here is that American public opinion would condemn the whole proceeding and render it exceedingly difficult for

^^New York Times, December 11, 1945. 62

Washington to grant official approval. A determined effort to rally the American public opinion to their cause inspired the authorities here to give the information that, they hope, will achieve that result. With this in mind, Lieutenant General S. H. Spoor, Commander of the Netherlands forces in Indonesia, granted a brief interview before his departure for Java. "The policy I will follow is that of the late President Theodore Roosevelt, namely, soft words backed up by a big stick," he ex­ plained . "Your people probably do not realize that up to now I have been running a sort of shooting gallery for the asmseeient of Indo­ nesian terrorists . . . |thij cannot be tolerated much longer."95

One of the most curious manifestations of United States opinion

in this question, at least in the first year after the end of the war, was the case of the Indonesian seamen. On November 12, 1945, eigd^t hun­

dred people gathered in a public hall in New York City and called for

aid to one hundred seventy-five Indonesian merchant seamen, who, in

harbors all over the east coast of the United States, had walked off

the Dutch vessels they had been serving on, protesting the Netherlands

attempts to ship troops and munitions to suppress the nationalist move­

ment, The meeting pledged support for the request that the seamen be

granted safe conduct to ports of their own choosing in Indonesia. It

was also resolved that telegrams would be sent to President Harry S.

Truman and British prime Minister Clement R. Attlee, pressing for the

withdrawal of British troops from the archipelago and for the end of

lend-lease support to the Dutch

However, the men were interned in New York shortly thereafter,

along with sixteen others who had jumped ship in Norfolk on the

^^bid., February 14, 1947.

^^Ibid., November 12, 1945* 63

sixteenth of November. They were held by the Immigration and natural- 97 Ization Service at Ellis Island, Six months later, after legal efforts to free them had been undertaken, a Federal judge in San Francisco denied their petition for a writ of habeas corpus and estopped an appeal in

spite of their contention that they might be executed or at least impris­

oned if they were sent to Indonesia. Their defense attorney, employed

by the C.I.O., argued that it was against United States policy to turn over

political refugees to their governments.^® A few weeks later, a bill

was introduced into the House Rules Committee by Representative Frank £.

Hook (Democrat from Michigan) to suspend the deportation of these men.^^

It should be considered indicative of the strength of the sup­

port behind these forlorn sailors, that the case was considered (though

never accepted) by the Supreme Court for adjudication.

The Justice Department told the Supreme Court it learned from the State Department that the seamen had received "explicit assurance in writing from the Netherlands Consul in San Francisco" that upon their repatriation, "they could go wherever they wished.

After the Supreme Court's second refusal to hear thecase*®^ thesubject

did not appear in print again in the New York Times.

An incident which particularly excited those anti-(European)-

colon!al-trade-monopoly elements in the United States was the case of

the steamship Martin Behraan, The owners of the ship, the Isbrandtsen

^^ibld., December 21, 1945. ^®Ibid., June 14, 1946. 99u.S., Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 2nd Sees., XCII, 1011).

^^^New York Times, December 17, 1946.

^®^Ibid,, January 14, 1947» 64

Steamship Line, signed a contract with the Republic's Banking and

Trading Corporation representatives for a cargo of badly needed rubber,

crepe, sugar, sisal, quinine, and other products* The ship arrived in

the Republican-controlled port of Cheribon in late February 1947. The

ship was then blockaded (since all Republican ports were blockaded at

that time), by a Netherlands destroyer, while Dutch officials informed

the United States Government that the vessel had taken on goods from

Dutch-owned plantations currently in Republican hands and that, if

allowed to proceed, regardless of any prior arrangement with Republican

authorities («ho had endeavored to prove their ownership of the goods

by producing bills of lading showing the dates of production), she

would be guilty of smuggling. The Dutch ordered the ship to proceed to

Batavia's harbor, Tandjong Prick, for inspection, and, after first

apparently refusing and considering the possibility of running the

blockade, the ship's captain, acting on the cabled advice of the Amer­

ican Consul General at Batavia, complied with Dutch instructions,

arriving at Tandjong Prick on the second of March. Reportedly, the

United States then protested to The Hague, whose reply pointed out the

Dutch ^ jure sovereignty in the archipelago, and then noted that, when

the ship's owners paid for the goods (a second time— to the Dutch), she

would be free to proceed. The Batavia Land Court shortly confirmed the

legality of the Dutch action.

102^hie account is taken from Wolf, The Indonesian Story, and the following issues of the New York Times: February 22 and 28, 1947; March 2. 5. 19, 28, 1947. 65

A May 2, 1947 Batavia dateline reported that,

All available Batavia fire-fighting equipment, aided by hastily summoned military forces, battled desperately all throu^ the night against a fire on the docks. The fire started in a warehouse where rubber unloaded from the American freighter Martin Behrman has been stored since the ship was seized early in March by Netherlands Indies authorities.1^3

Before this presumably Republican solution to the problem had been effected, an attorney for the Isbrandtsen Lines presented a direct appeal to Congress against the confiscation of the ship's cargo.

Congress, for its part, had not been slow in responding. On the twen­ tieth of March, Congressman Henry D. Larcade (Democrat of Louisiana) inserted into the Record an editorial from the Jefferson Davis Parish

News of Jennings, Louisiana which is of interest to us for the anti­

colonial sentiment it manifests;

Some of the gratitude for winning the Asiatic war and driving the Japs out of conquered islands is coming home to roost . . . All nations, save the British and the Dutch, are being system­ atically excluded from the Indies trade, and we must take all this lying down. During the war, the Dutch never turned a finger that was apparent to save their colonies from the Japs .... It was American blood and manhood and American treasure which freed the islands of the Japs and politely and gently we handed them back to the Dutch. With the Japanese safely gone, the fat Dutch are returning to exploit the lush islands, irtiile excluding the United States and others. We could probably get smd s of the raw materials we need, if we would be so kind as to send our mili­ tary forces over to bring the Javanese natives, who are crying for independence, to their knees. Things like these make us boiling mad . . . ,1®)

^^^New York Times, May 2, 1947*

''Q^i^id,, March 31, 19 4 7.

^®5u.S. Congressional Record, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., XCIII, Part 10, Appendix, All90' 66

Senator Alexander Wiley (Republican of Indiana) inserted into the Record a somewhat more restrained, but not by any means pro-Dutch, it«n, an advertisement from the New York Times placed by the Isbrandtsen

Line, which reviewed in terms of barely concealed anger, the shoddy, highhanded, inconsistent, and humiliating treatment received by the ship, its captain and owners, at the hands of Dutch officials in Indo­ nesia* Taking note of the Netherlands Government's suggestion that the ship be supplied with another cargo and compensated for its delay, the advertisement castigates such a solution as counter to the "habits of a lifetime of fair dealing," on the part of the firm.^®® The incident gave the American Government a foretaste of the imperious and super­ cilious attitudes of Dutch colonial officials with which its represen­ tatives would soon become familiar. The affair also had the effect of confirsd.ng the suspicion in many congressional minds, despite vigorous denials by The Hague, that its major objective there was to shut off competitive trade with the Indies. This was not, in fact, entirely the case, as an examination of the American investments already present in the islands would demonstrate. The effect was rather a matter of keeping the Republic from earning foreign currency and breaking the rather ti ^ t Dutch blockade, but this did not have smch effect on changing the minds of some very important Americans. It also had the effect, however, of confirming the State Department in its tacit con­ currence with the Netherlands in the Dutch definition of the appli­ cations of sovereignty.

op. cit.. Part 2, 2593. 67

It is now our purpose to examine the events leading up to the abandonment by the United States Government of its so-called "hands-off" policy and to try to suggest some of the reasons for this change. Many students of the Cold War say that it was declared in the United States by the announcM&ent of the Truman Doctrine; while we have been occupied with the pli^t of the Martin Behrman, however, the President of the

United States was concerning himself with the pll^t of Greece (and

Turkey) and what his advisors evaluated as indirect Soviet aggression

in southeastern Europe. In any case, the gauntlet was thrown down on

March 12, 1947. The Moscow Conference of Allied Foreign Ministers

(meeting at the time) concluded the following month with the clear re­

sult that Germany would remain divided. The following June, Secre­

tary of State George C. Marshall spoke to Harvard's Class of '47 and

told them and the world about a plan to reconstruct Europe to preserve

its democratic institutions and political stability.

And six days earlier, if he had read his dally newspaper care­

fully, the Secretary of State would have noticed that the Dutch com­

mander in Buitenzorg had charged that Indonesian terrorists were

attempting to sabotage the American-owned million Goodyear rubber

plant. The recovery of Western Europe had just become a matter of

desperate importance to the United States Government, and it was time

that this issue (Indonesia) be brou^t to a timely conclusion. Yet, a

careful reading of the press (and presumably of the reports from the

Government's representatives in the field) indicated that, not only

were they not making substantial progress on the implementation of the 68

Linggadjati Agreement, but, due to either the evasive and dilatory tac­ tics of the Republic, or to the intent on the part of the Dutch to effect a unilateral implementation of that Agreement, the two Parties were close to the resumption of open hostilities. The policy makers were able to observe that, by agreeing to join in an Interim Government which would be amenable to a considerable degree of Dutch control, on terms less favorable than the "extremists" in the Republic found desir­ able, the "moderate" Premier Sjahrir had lost a vote of confidence in the Republican Parliament and that the incensed Dutch, according to an

Indonesian Army spokesman who claimed to have intercepted an order from

Lieutenant General Spoor, were about to attack "on all fronts" on the morning of the sixth of J u l y 7 [phis could not be allowed to happen.

On the twenty-ei^th of June, the United States communicated the fol­ lowing to both Governments:

The United States Government has viewed with increasing alarm the danger inherent in failure to implement the Linggadjati (cheribon) Agreement. The United States Government necessarily must be concerned with developments in Indonesia as a factor in world stability, both economic and political. It wishes therefore to stress the suffering likely to result from a further deadlock. It wishes also to point out the benefits which will flow from prompt agreement and cooperative endeavor to overcome the problems with which Indonesia is confronted. The United States Government believes the immediate formation of an Interim Central Government as proposed by the Netherlands Govern­ ment and accepted in principle by the Indonesian Republic is urgently necessary. The Linggadjati Agreement specifies an interim period from now until January 1, 1949, during idiich the Netherlands is to retain sovereignty and ultimate authority in Indonesia. The United States Government therefore urges the Indonesian

^®7}^ew York Times, June 2 9, 1947. 69

Republic to cooperate without delay in the immediate formation of an Interim Federal Government. It is confident that when an agree­ ment thereon shall have been achieved, the remaining issues can be resolved in a spirit of goodwill. It is the expectation of the United States Government that the establishment of an Interim Government on the basis of mutual bene­ fits to both sides will provide the political stability essential to the development of a positive program of economic rehabilitation. The United States Government is therefore prepared after an Interim Government shall have been established and mutual cooperation along a constructive path assured, to discuss, if desired, with repre­ sentatives of the Netherlands Interim Government (including repre­ sentatives of the Republic and other constituent areas) financial aid to assist in the economic rehabilitation of Indonesia,10®

The press reports covering the note indicate that this action probably prevented "the possible renewal of military operations by the

Dutch against the Indonesian Republic,"109 However, there was evidently some difficulty in field-Department coordination, because while Mr. Foote is reported to have told the press that he delivered a "note" to the senior Republican representative in Batavia (with a copy to Lieutenant

Governor General van Hook, reportedly to forestall any Dutch military action), the Department, on the other hand, "knew of no note or even aide memoirs having been delivered." "Mr. Foote," said the Department,

"was directed merely to present its views orally." On the other hand, along with all this rather confusing commentary, the text of some note was printed (as above) in the New York Times. This important issue of the Times also reports that, in what was one of the major objectives of the move, aside from forestalling a Dutch attack on the Republic,

President Sukarno, although in part responsible for the fall of Sjahrir,

"'°®Ibid. ’’^^Ibid. 70 had asked him to form another cabinet To strengthen the elements

(on both sides) which the New York Times had been for two years identi­ fying as "moderates"— this was the intended purpose, at least major part.

But the message did a few other things, as well. First, let us examine some of its key phrases a little more closely. In stressing the

"suffering likely to result from a further deadlock" and the "benefits which will flow from prompt agreement" and in stating its confidence that, if only the Republic would back Sjahrir and Join the Interim Gov­ ernment, everything from there on would be downhill, the analysts in

Washington pay eloquent testimony to their belief that the solution is all 80 very obvious and that agreement should be quite easy. This is the view given of the Solubility Question. In point of fact, as later events were to show, the agreement on an Interim Federal Government did not bring a prompt solution "in a spirit of good will," at all. Wolf comments that:

There is little doubt that the United States' note of June 27 postponed the outbreak of hostilities until July 21. And yet, the United States' note also failed to recognize the vital fact that what separated the two sides was not a single issue— either on June 27 or on July 18— such as the position of the Crown's representative question first, and the Joint Gendarmerie question later, seemed to be. These were symptoms, not the disease. The disease was the inability of the two sides to arrive at a common interpretation of the original Linggadjati Agreement; or perhaps— back of this— the deep-seated distrust which each side maintained toward the other,^ ^ ^

11°Ibid.

IllWolf, The Indonesian Story, pp. 126, 127. 71

Yet there seemed to be some misunderstanding} while reports from unofficial but authoritative sources in The Hague were telling corre­ spondents that the note was "much appreciated,here was President

Sukarno finding it:

, . . gratifying to note the United States Government's sympa­ thetic attitude toward the Republic of Indonesia and its true com­ prehension of Indonesian problems, especially its desire to see— and I quote the State Department, "immediate formation of an Interim Government for Indonesia, established on the principle of federation, as proposed by the Indonesian Republic."^ )

Something had apparently gone wrong; Sukarno was certainly not supposed to find this note gratifying. The next day's news cleared up the problos; Indonesian leaders were dismayed to find in the official version of the note (there must have been a note) the words "by the

Netherlands Government and accepted in principle" now appearing in the third pairagraph. They noted the rather obvious point that this changed the entire context and flavor of the communication. ^ ^ 4 while it is pos­ sible that the Indonesian leaders were freigning the earlier under­ standing, it seems just am possible that there were some major lapses in the most pedestrian techniques of what is called "policy execution." If this was the case, the American Government appears to have entered the

Indonesian Question stumbling.

However, the really critical blunder came in paragraph four: it states, in the New York Times version printed above, that Linggadjati

^^^New York Times, June 29, 1947. ^^^Ibid., June 30, 1947.

"’‘’^bid., July 1, 1947. 72

"specifies" Dutch sovereignty and ultimate authority until January 1,

1949, The version printed in Wolf's book, as pointed out by Kahin,^^^ differs in some degree with this wording, but not in the making of the point about the sovereignty. The point is, and here again the student is indebted to Dr. Kahin, the Linggadjati Agreement did not specify this at all. In point of fact, this was one of the major points of con­ tention at that very time between the two Parties, from which the

"... Republican leaders could only conclude that the United

States . . . was backing the Dutch against the Republic,"116 Either the

United States Government deliberately misread the Linggadjati Agreement, which would seem to be a rather seedy diplomatic ploy, or it honestly misread the document. If the latter is the case, it would seem hardly necessary to dwell too much further on our point about the inadequacy of

United States understanding of the Indonesian Question, Such lapses seem hardly the mark of the diplomacy of a Great Power. Americans were indeed unprepared for the burdens of world leadership.

The New York Times promptly celebrated: a "tragedy beyond repair," which would have occurred if warfare had broken out over the

"hollow issue" of whether the Republic became sovereign "now or a year

and a half hence" (at least the editors had read the Linggadjati Agree­

ment) was "averted" by the American note.^^? As we know, the attack was

^^^Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, p. 209. Il^'lbid. ^ ^ ^Editorial, New York Times, June 30, 1947. 73 to come sixteen days hence, at which time the Tiroes was issuing edi- 116 torial warnings about a "new Crisis in Java."

Also, there was much (rather searching) thinking in the early months of 1947 about how the "ideological struggle" pertains to the colonial issues. Numerous authors began talking about Communist Ide­ ology being injected into the imperialist struggle. "This is the dilemma for Great Britain and the United States--to submit to Russian expansion or to seek to thwart it, if thwarting it means aligning them­ selves with native reaction."119 Some saw it a little more clearly:

In the signing of the Linggadjati Agreement democracy made some practical progress in the ideological conflict in the world today, which is not as clear cut in the Far East as it is in Europe but is nevertheless going on there too. In Asia, unlike Europe, the ide­ ological war is manysided; it is not a conflict between communism and democracy a l o n e . 1 ^

However, it was not a conflict between communism and democracy in the Indonesia of 1947 at all. It was, as the author tries to suggest, hesitatingly, a question of national self-determination. But the Cold

War would soon come to Indonesia.

118 Editorial, New York Times, July 18, 1947. ^ 1^ e w York Times, April 7, 1946, Magazine Section, p. 1 120new York Times, March JO, 1947, Magazine Section. c h a p t e r III

THE "EUROPE-FIRST" PERIOD: JUNE 1947 TO DECEMBER 1948

THE INITIAL AMERICAN RESPONSE TO WAR IN INDONESIA

It is the pursuit of Chapter III of this thesis to examine the results of the breakdown and abandonment of the nonintervention policy of the United States in Indonesia, the construction of a new policy, the applications of that new policy, and its eventual breakdown and abandon­ ment. Because of the fact that the United States began to involve itself, with whatever ignorance, with the substance of the Indonesian

Question, it will be necessary for us to begin by taking a look at what

Alastair Taylor has succinctly and expertly set forth as the Basic

Issues:

Transition Period; The question of sovereignty; the respective juridical claims of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia, in particular, the Republic's constitutional and international status prior to the establishment of the United States of Indonesia. The Republic's foreign relations. Internal security: in particular, the status of the Republic's armed forces, the justification for the retention of Dutch forces in • the archipelago, and the conflict of jurisdictional claims. The Republic's relationship to the Dutch-created and -supported "Malino States." InterimIgovemment: its structure and functions and, in partic- ular, the status and reserved powers to be accorded to the repre­ sentative of the Crown. Economic reconstruction: the restoration of foreign properties in Republican territory to their prewar owners, and the lifting of the Dutch "naval and economic blockade," and the Republican "food blockade."

74 75

Poat-transition Period; Netherlands-Indonesian Union: its character, structure, and function 8,1

In point of fact, the primary reason for the insertion of these

Basic Issues is to provide the reader with a bench mark against which to

view the pronouncements and actions of American policy, '^fhat is pri­

marily to be noticed is how seldom and coincidentally United States policy addressed itself to these considerations.

It will be a second major proposition offered herein that the

Indonesia policy of the United States in this period, as indicated at

the close of Chapter II, was a victim of the waging of the opening bat­

tles of the Cold War in Europe and, as a result, was a combination of

overt neutrality between the Parties and quasi-covert support for the

basic positions of the Dutch. It seems entirely possible that the

United States had some official foreknowledge of the first Dutch "police

action" which began on July 20, 1947, because shortly before these hos­

tilities commenced, the State Department communicated with the Repub­

lican Government to urge protection of the rich American-owned oil

fields in Sumatra: The Government of the United States wishes to emphasize its grave concern lest some action [>] will be taken causing loss of lives of Americans and destruction of American property .... The United States Government, in view of the ^ facto Indonesian control, looks to Indonesians that the wells are unharmed in the interests of Indonesia, America, and the world. Any sabotage of the high-pressure oil fields northwest of Palerabang would result in permanent and total loss, ruining completely American capital, which means a loss to Americans, Dutch and Indo­ nesians, and the world, regardless of who owns it.2

Vlastair MacD. Taylor, Indonesian Independence end the United Nations, p. 40» 2 New York Times. July 29, 1947, p. 6. 76

It would be the last circumstance for a long time in which the United

States would have occasion to emphasize the ^ facto status of the Repub­ lic as recognized at Linggadjati. The Republicans made the quite obvious point that the power responsible for initiating hostilities would have to share a large portion of whatever culpability was to be apportioned.

What is important, however, is the question this note raises as to prior

American awareness (and, not inconceivably, approval) of the police action. A perfectly valid explanation might well be that Washington was simply--reading the increasingly obvious handwriting on the wall, and the

State Department was reacting, as it is well trained to do, to insure the "protection of American lives and property" in an area of hostil­ ities. However, the most recent pronouncements indicated that the

Americans were confidently hopeful that Republican acquiescence to the one-sided Dutch proposals of May 27^ would result in a peaceful settle­ ment. This was the major objective of the note of June 27. Whether the persistent optimism was genuine or whether it was rather designed to fos­ ter agreement between the parties is not clear, but throughout this entire period, we shall have repeated occasion to note the consistent

American overestimation of the Solubility of the issue, based on a rather apparent and honest ignorance of the hard realities involved. It does not seem impossible, in any case, that The Hague actually consulted with the United States prior to the attack, and that Washington, while objecting and promising at least a pro forma negative public reaction, acquiesced in the interests of European and Atlantic reconstruction. At

^See Taylor, op. cit., p. 55, ff, and Kahin, op. cit., pp. 206, 207. 77 any rate, the damage to the Sumatran oil fields was minor

The British Government, in its first public reaction to the attack, stressed that the Foreign Office had acted throughout the crisis

(that is, since 1945) only in full consultation with the United States.

London had already offered its good offices to the parties in order to attempt to prevent the breakdown of all attempts at the implementation of

Linggadjati,^ As will become clear in the following pages, these British efforts are of further interest to us, in light of our previous obser­ vations concerning the apparent tendency of the State Department to fol­ low in the British wake in formulating its Indonesian policies.

In any case, the first public American reaction came on the twenty-first, and it consisted of an expression of regret that peaceful negotiations had given way to armed force in the effort to effect a

"voluntary association between the Netherlands and Indonesian peoples,"

While the statement indicated a displeasure with the short amount of advance notice given by the Netherlands, it emphasized the fact that the

Dutch had stated (rather inexplicably) that they had no designs on the territorial integrity of the Republic and that they persisted in their intent to carry out the Linggadjati Agreement. The Department reviewed the past American actions taken in the dispute, in particular the note of

June 27, and stated that apparently a disagreement over police procedures had precipitated the current hostilities. It was also reported that, while the United States was following events in Indonesia very closely.

^New York Times, August 4, 1947, p. ?. 5lbid., July 21, 1947, p. 1. 78 conununlcations had not been established with the Consul General in

Batavia.^

Two days after hostilities had commenced, the Department of

State released the text of the Dutch note to the United States, which reviewed The Hague's patient quest for agreement with the Republic; downgraded the importance of the Republic in the overall Indonesian picture; and emphasized: the importâmes of the Dutch-created states of

West Borneo and East Indonesia, the eminently good relations enjoyed by

Holland with those states, and the apparent desire of the Republic to achieve hegemony over them. The Dutch proposals ("whose reasonableness was not disputed") had been rejected by the Republican regime, and countered by "formulas which, though vague, sound conciliatory, but leave no doubt for the initiated as to their fundamentally dilatory, negative character." The Republic was castigated as totalitarian in inspiration and uncivilized, in view of its continued practice of keeping

Dutch hostages. The note emphasized that even these intolerable tactics had not exhausted Dutch patience, but that when Premier Sjahrir was repudiated by his Government, it then seemed all too clear that measures had to be taken "to create conditions more favorable to the successful implementation of the principles underlying the Linggadjati Agreement,"

As a result, the Netherlands was resorting to "police measures of a strictly limited character . . . ."7

By July 23, the Indonesian Question was on page one, column eight

^New York Times, July 1947, p. 5* See also U.S. Department of State Bulletin (1947), XVII, No, 422, p. 230. ^New York Times, July 23, 1947, p. 3* 79 of the New York Times and was dominating the first four pages of that newspaper. It was becoming increasingly clear, as well, that;

Despite the haziness of the political scope of the Dutch action, its military aims were fairly clear. The "limited police meas­ ures" . . . were neither "limited" nor "policing" in the usual sense of those words. They constituted full scale military action, em­ ploying large numbers of troops, airplanes and tanks with extensive and specific military objectives.®

It was editorialized that, aside from the various charges and countercharges being made by each side,

. . . a re-reading of the Linggadjati Agreement brings the ines­ capable conclusion that the Dutch, in abrogating unilaterally both the truce and the Agreement, failed in their negotiations to exhaust the methods agreed on at Linggadjati to meet the situation that pre­ vailed when Dutch ultimatums began to be issued a few weeks ago.9

Specific reference was being made to Article Seventeen of that document, which provided that the Parties would agree to submit disputes to a neutral third party or the International Court of Justice for arbi­ tration. Wolf deals with the Dutch charge that the disagreements causing the police action did not actually "arise" out of this Agreement, and then he seems to validate the contention (without actually claiming it as his own) that this amounted to "hair-splitting sophistry."I®

The problem, as seen in Washington, however, was much larger than could simply be deduced from the specific merits of the case, one way or another, in Indonesia. The prevailing State Department opinion must have been that priority had to be accorded to the rebuilding of Western Europe.

The new Dutch Ambassador-designate, Eelco van KLeffens arrived in the

^ o l f , The Indonesian Story, p. 1)2.

^Editorial, New York Times, July 23, 1947, p. 22 ^^Wolf, op. cit., p. 130. 80

United States declaring: that the Dutch people "do not regard the mili­

tary operations in Indonesia as war," but as a necessity to restore

order "to a recalcitrant state in the federation that is to come into

being under the Cheribon Agreement"; that "many elements in Indonesia"

were "wholeheartedly loyal" to the Dutch; and that the Republic was

holding "thousands of white people, many of them women, detained in the

interior of Java."11 Dr. van Kief fens lost little time in meeting with

Secreteory of State George C. Marshall, and

In a forty-minute conference at the State Department, Dr. van Kief fens said he gave Mr. Marshall "a few points" on the breakdown of negotiations that resulted in what he termed the Dutch "police" campaign. 12

When the new ambassador presented his letters of credence to

President Truman, the President found nothing whatever to say about

Indonesia, but rather declared that

The cordial relationship between our two countries has been of very long standing. The people of the United States will not soon forget the gallant role played by the people of Holland during the war and have viewed with admiration the efforts and progress toward reconstruction and recovery in the Netherlands since the war. 1 )

It can be viewed as an act of support to the Dutch wherein the

Secretary of State sou^t to minimize the amount of military and other

lend-lease supplies given to the Dutch in the nearly two years since the

end of the war, when we consider that the natural anti-colonial and anti-

European proclivities of articulators of United States public opinion

11 New York Times. July 25, 1947, p. 2.

12Ibid., July 25, 1947, p. 3.

^^Ibid,, August 1, 1947, p. 2, 81 would have condemned such support.14 The fact is that, according to a

Republican communique of July 29, "American-built Dutch fighter planes strafed Republican airfields on Java today , . . ." The phrases

"American-built" or "American-trained" or "American-made" or "American- equipped" appeared in virtually every article on the course of the fighting, though the example cited was the first statement noted from an

Indonesian source.1^

In the same line as the Secretary of State's commentary was the statement by John J. McCloy, President of the International Bank for

Reconstruction and Development, that the Bank was considering a loan to the Netherlands "entirely on an economic basis." He told a news confer­ ence that "If we think it would be a sound and productive loan, we will make it. In doing that, we do not express any views on the merits or demerits of the Indonesian affair," Mr. McCloy may have been a little careless, however:

Asked if granting the loan would not have the effect of financing the Dutch military action in the East Indies, Mr, McCloy said, "Well, it may, indirectly." While the application was made long before hostilities began, he said, the military action "certainly is an element to be taken into account in considering the loan." However, he added, "At the present time it is not apt to have any effect on the outcome of the loan."1®

In any case the loan was soon approved in the amount of $195 mil­ lion "exclusively" for "the reconstruction of production facilities" in the Dutch homeland. Indeed, the Bank took care in emphasizing that the

1%bid., July 24, 1947, p. 5.

I5ibid., July 30, 1947, p. 2.

16Ibid.. 82 sole basis for the loan was for the Netherlands' internal economy, "the restoration of which will contribute materially to the recovery of Europe as a whole." It added that "None of the proceeds of the loan will be applied to the Netherlands East Indies, nor for military purposes,"1? In view of the most elementary economic considerations involved in the national budgetary process, however, this disclaimer seems somewhat trans­ parent to even the most casual observer.

The Soviet Government was, if anything, even quicker to interpret the advent of hostilities in Indonesia in Cold War terms. The Moscow

Radio on July 22 blamed the Truman Doctrine for the warfare, and the

United States' note of June 27 was termed an "open interference in Indo­ nesian affairs" and in "direct support of the Netherlands colonial regime."1® After the World Bank loan Just referred to had been granted, the Soviet representative to the Economic and Social Council at the temporary United Nations Headquarters at Lake Success castigated the Bank itself as a tool of American foreign policy. "The activities of the Bank are subordinated to political purposes which make it the instrument of one great power, " he said. "Thus, the Bank is promoting war against the

Indonesians by granting a loan to the Netherlands ^ The Republic of Indo­ nesia was ever more certainly being drawn into the vortex of the Cold War.

After eleven days of warfare, the issue was (inevitably, it would seem) brought formally to the attention of the United Nations Security

17 New York Times, August 8, 1947, P* 1.

1®Ibid., July 23, 1947, p. 4. I^Ibid., October 14, 1947, p, 4. 85

Council. The two governments responsible were India, already exercised over the earlier British use of Indian troops in the archipelago immedi­ ately after the war, and Australia. This move was not to come as any surprise to Washington, which had been consulted beforehand by at least

India^® any may have been expecting such a move in any case.^l The first major United States intervention in the Indonesian Question came with the first Security Council meeting on July 3I, when the American delegate, Herschel V. Johnson, announced that his Government was offering to the parties its good offices in pursuance of a negotiated settlement.

The reporting of his commentary is extremely interesting, signaling quite clearly the shifting American stance on the issue:

Mr. Johnson’s statements to the Council today indicated that the United States, which until now has viewed with obvious disapproval the military action taken by the Netherlands against the Indonesian Republic, was now shifting. The United States today referred to the "so-called" Republic and opposed the demand of Colonel William H, Hod son sic— Hodgson , Australian representative, that an Indonesian representative receive the right to state his case in the Council on the same footing as the Netherlands representative. Mr. Johnson held that it was not necessary at this stage to decide whether the representative of the "so-called" Republic should be invited to attend in a "consultative" capacity,^2

This same article goes on to state that the United States, Britain, and

France were all concerned over the possible ramifications of the fact that Australia's appeal had been made under the United Nations Charter,

Chapter VII, which deals with threats to international peace and security (and thereby took precedence over the Indian appeal, made under

Chapter VI, )

2°Ibid., July 2 9 , 1947, p. 1. 2libid,, July 22, 1947, p. 3*

22ibid,, August 1, 1947, p. 1. 84

THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF

UNITED STATES POLICY

It shall now be cur task to demonstrate that, informed before­ hand or not, the United States Government reacted in a largely negative way to the seizure of the Council with the Indonesian Question. In the discussions which took place on July )1, Dr. van Kleffens argued that the

Security Council had no more right to intervene in the "police action" than it would have in a dispute between the United States Government and one of the forty-ei^t states, or in a strike where troops were called out. "Such action," in his opinion, "would be contrary to Article Two of the United Nations Charter which forbids interference by the United

Nations in the domestic affairs of any country.This most crucial

issue was to undercut every action taken by the United States in or

through the United Nations for the rest of the period under review in

this current Chapter. Washington was extremely sensitive to such argu­ ments, and the Dutch, undoubtedly aware of this fact, directed them most

strongly at the United States, as the above example quite adequately

demonstrates. This Jurisdictional Question, as it came to be called,

stmick at the very heart of the entire colonial ethic and rationale, and

the American reaction to it, symbolic to the entire United States posi­

tion on colonial issues in the postwar era, was one best described as

equivocal.

^^Ibid. 85

The first move by the United States was to obtain Australian

agreement to delete all references to the Charter in its draft resolution,

because of the fact that such references raised "very complex and serious

questions of law.*"24 Mr. Johnson went further, however, and secured

deletion as well of the Australian reference to Article 1? of Linggadjati.

Then the United States supported a French proposal (subsequently defeated)

to explicitly state that the Council's action in no way affected the

juridical issue. With Australian acceptance of Chinese and Polish amend­

ments calling on the Parties to settle their dispute "by arbitration or

other peaceful means" (arbitration was already in the original draft) and

to keep the Council informed of their progress (in that order), the reso­

lution emerged as follows:

The Security Council : Noting with concern the hostilities in progress between the armed forces of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia, Calls upon the parties: (a) To cease hostilities forthwith, and (b) To settle their dispute by arbitration or by other peaceful means and to keep the Security Council informed about the progress of the settlement.25

Regarding the Netherlands' denial of the Council's right to

intervene in a dispute which it considered to be one of irtiolly domestic

jurisdiction, Taylor notes that.

By accepting the United States' suggestion to delete all ref­ erences to the Charter or its Articles in the resolution of August 1, the Council deliberately left this issue in abeyance. In point of fact, however, it did consider itself competent to call for an end to the fighting and to recommend a political settlement by arbitral

^^New York Times, August 2, 1947, p. 1; United Nations Security Council, Official Records. 173rd Meeting, August 1, 1947, p. 1676. 25united Nations Security Council, loc. cit. 06

or other means. This action in turn paved the way for an expansion of the Council's activities in the political sphere . . .

It is at this point that we may examine the American unilateral offer of its good offices to the parties. The offer, we have noted, was first tabled in the Security Council meeting of July and, on the same day, was appeurently communicated privately to the Dutch, as well. In

Washington, State Department spokesmen took pains to explain the dis­ tinctions between "mediation," "arbitration," and "good offices," noting the essentially bilateral approach involved in good offices.^^ The offer was immediately accepted by The Hague "with approval." In addressing oneself to the question of why the United States undertook to pursue a unilateral attempt to effect a solution simultaneous to the Security

Council's consideration, we are confronted by two important probable motivations. First of all, it seems clear that, as noted previously, the

United States felt very insecure about the implications of the Juridical

Question. It was even reported that delegates were expressing privately to correspondents the fear that the Security Council might eventually be requested to intervene if racial disorders occurred in the United S t a t e s . 2®

While the notion seems absurd to us today, a review of the debates in

Congress over ratification of the San Francisco Treaty provides an interesting insight into this fear. (One is continually impressed with the profundity of the adage about the damage done to American foreign

2®Alastair MacD. Taylor, Indonesian Independence and the United Nations, p. 55.

27yew York Times, August 2, 1947, p. 4. ^®Ibid., p. 1. 87 policy by the failure of the United States to deal with its domestic racial question.) Furthermore, there was genuine legal uncertainty as to whether or not Article 2 of the Charter did apply.

Another cause for United States' uneasiness over Security Council consideration doubtlessly was its fear of effective exploitation of its own ambivalence over this colonial issue by "Russian propaganda." Two brief quotations are illustrative;

Britain and Prance, the major colonial powers in the Council, sided with the Netherlands; Russia took the opposition. Prom the United States point of view, it was a delicate situation. In pre­ vious U.N. debates involving issues between America and Russia, Dr. van Kleffens had voted consistently with the U.S. But if America took the Dutch side now, Russia migbt use the issue as a springboard for attacks on "Western imperialism." There were hurried long­ distance telephone conversations between Lake Success and Washing­ ton, 29 .

Wolf writes,

. . . the United States' hope had been to extend its aid in bringing about a settlement outside the Council,5® so that the Indo­ nesian question would not degenerate into a political football game between the two major power groupings in the C o u n c i l . ^1

While this interpretation (of an American attempt to keep the Indonesian

issue from becoming another Cold War confrontation point) is a perfectly valid one, what the italicized phrase points to is most significant, and

is to be a major theme of the United States attitude on Security Council consideration; it was to be held to a minimum, and for just the reasons

outlined above. In fact, the offer of good offices was unquestionably,

2%ew York Times, "News of the Week in Review," Section IV, p. 1.

^^ItalicE not in the original. ^1 Wolf, The Indonesian Story, pp. 138, 139. 80

in view of its timing and mode of presentation, at least in part designed to take some of the steam out of United Nations consideration, or to effectively circumscribe any vigorous international intervention in the issue. It was largely at American initiative, as Taylor points out, that the Council left the Jurisdictional Question in abeyance, and we are wit­ ness to what was essentially a policy to evade the problem. The conse­ quences were to be most far-reaching.

On August 4, 1947, large headlines proclaimed, "Truce in Indies

Agreed on as Result of U.N, Appeal; Republic Lists Demands." The Nether­ lands on the previous day had accepted the cease-fire resolution, and now the Republic had also acceded to the Security Council's demand. In doing so, however, the Republican Government at Jogjakarta stated that it would

"ask for arbitration by a special commission of several countries ap­ pointed by the Security Council"; it also stated the Council decision was

"highly valued" by the Republic because it showed the Council's adherence to the Charter. Additional points made were; that the Republic had not yet officially received the resolution of August 1; that, "considering its experience in the past two years, the Republic considered it of the greatest importance that the Dutch forces be withdrawn from the whole archipelago"; that the Council should receive a representative of the

Republic to allow full expression of its views; and, finally, that the

Republic appealed to "all nations desiring to preserve peace based on the human roghts of freedom" to "exert all effort to stop the Dutch colonial aggression."52

52New York Times. August 4, 1947, p« 2. 89

It is with rather sad amusement that, knowing all of what was to come, we now take stock of the unbridled rejoicing that overtook the press and spokesmen for the governments involved.

, . . the general feeling was that the United Nations had prob­ ably won its first major victory and through this victory had given to the international organization a sorely needed boost in prestige.55

Herschel Johnson called it a "milestone in the history of the organi­ zation" and emphasized that this showed realization by all that the body

"meant to take effective action where necessary." However, this report with a Lake Success dateline continues;

There is some puzzlement over the reports as they have come in by radio, for in many instances it is indicated that the Indonesian offi­ cials may still be placing conditions on their offer to cease fighting. There is, in particular, the condition that the Dutch troops return to the positions they held before the "police action" was undertaken two weeks ago. In commenting upon these reports, Mr. Johnson insisted that it was impossible to place conditions upon such an offer. He declared that the onus would be upon the Indonesian Government if it failed to accede to the Council's request. Special gratification was expressed over the Dutch position. Many delegates had expressed the fear earlier that The Hague would withhold its compliance with the Council's cease-firing request until Dutch troops had first defeated the Indonesian forces, presumably in a matter of a few days. It was also feared that the Netherlands Government might reject United Nations "interference" since from the first the Dutch dele­ gation has insisted that the Security Council is not qualified for juridical reasons to debate the Indonesian question.5f

It is instructive to quote the title and first sentence of the lead edito­ rial of the New York Times on August 4: entitled "Triumph of the United

Nations," it began, "The United Nations achieved its first major victory as guardian of the peace when the Governments of the Netherlands and the

55ibid., p. 3. 34lbid. 90

Indonesian Republic promptly agreed to comply with the demand of the

Security Council to 'cease hostilities forthwith,'"55 The editorial pro­ ceeded to criticize the Indonesians for attaching conditions to their cease-fire with the following, rather exceptional thought;

In thus attaching to its compliance what appears to be a con­ dition, the Republican Government follows the lead of Russia, which also demands such a withdrawal (of Dutch troops) and which, though defeated in this demand by the Security Council on Friday, is ex­ pected to raise it anew today,36

To understand such reactions to the cease-fire declarations of the two Parties, it is necessary for us to recall that the Council had just completed lengthy and bitter debates over the Greek Question, which had ended in frustration with the eleventh Soviet veto. These feelings were, however, symbolic of the larger and profound western frustration over what was thought to be the failure of the United Nations to live up to wartime expectations. One discovers little realization of what is better understood today, that this blame was largely misplaced, and that the basic problem lay with the atrophy of great power unanimity upon which the very structure of the Security Council was (and had to be) founded. We may view as being both ironic and significant the statement, quoted earlier, that there was "some puzzlement" at the apparent unwill­ ingness of the Republican Government to counternance the ill-gotten Dutch territorial gains. Differently stated, what this puzzlement implicitly reveals is a quite ready acceptance on the part of the holders of such an opinion of the legitimacy of the Netherlands' resort to force and its

5Editorial, New York Times, August 4, 1947* p, 16,

56i'Ibid, 91

right to retain whatever may have been gained from actions which may or may not have been contrary to the Charter, (Depending, of course, on the answer to the Juridicial Question.) Behind all of this, then, one can clearly distinguish a passionate desire, at least on the part of Ameri­ cans, for a distinct United Nations success in one of its endeavors. We can also see how this desire worked to the disadvantage of the Republic, though we may later have occasion to observe this same process reversed.

But what of the American offer to make its good offices available to the disputants? The State Department had been prevented from formally tendering the offer to the Republic because of a lack of communications facilities. (We should recall from Chapter II that when Washington rec­ ognized the Republic after the signing of Linggadjati, it decided not to accredit a separate representative to the Jogjakarta Government, but to rely solely on Consul General Foote, also accredited to the Dutch colo­ nial Government.) In any case, while there was "no intention of

slighting the Indonesians," Mr. Foote had remained in Batavia, unable

(understandably, in view of the conditions) to establish contact with

the Republic.37 Finally, six days after the offer was made to the

Netherlands, it was extended to the Government of the new Premier, Amir

Sjariffudin, by means of radio transmission from Batavia.3® While

Secretary of State George G. Marshall was announcing that the United

States Government was preparing to send a special mediation commission

to Indonesia as soon as the Parties could agree on procedures to be

3?New York Tiroes, August 5* 1947, p. 2.

3®lbid., August 6, 1947, p. 12. 92

followed, and explaining the delay in communicating with the Republic,

Premier Sjarifuddin was "gladly" accepting the American offer and ex­ pressing the hope that Washington would "make the earliest use of its vast influence in the United Nations to ensure that an international arbitration commission be appointed without delay to arrange a final set­ tlement of the d i s p u t e . 39 Then it was made known that former Premier

Sjahrir would come to the United States in the hope that a Republican representative would be invited to take part in the Security Council dis­ cussions, and he was quoted, en route in Cairo, as saying that the offer of U.S. good offices was a "general proposition," the import of which was not clear, particularly in view of the Dutch ability to consolidate their military gains in the intervening time period.^®

On August 7, the Republic "accepted" Washington's good offices in the following words;

The Government and people of Indonesia heard with great gratitude and appreciation the broadcast offer on behalf of the United States to exert its good offices to the Republic in any future negotiations in which the Republic may be involved. The Government of the Republic has the honor to request the attention of the United States to the decision adopted by the Security Council. The Republic, in adhering to the principle of the United Nations, is fully prepared to submit to agreement on decisions in which arbitration has been recommended as a primary means of settling the present dispute. In cordially accepting the good offices of the United States, Indonesia requests the United States to use its influence with the Netherlands and the Security Council for the Indonesian proposal that an international arbitration commission be dispatched without delay to Indonesia. The Republic feels sure that the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands will all agree, in view of the fact that two years of negotiations and mediation failed to prevent the

3 9 I b i d . , August 7, 1949, p. 2.

4 0 Ib i d . 93

outbreak of large-scale hostilities, that in arbitration by a United Nations commission lies the only and final hope of settling the dis­ pute by peaceful means. The Republic is unanimous in the conviction that if the United States feels able to support the aforementioned proposal, it will, for the following reasons, be performing a lasting service to humanity; ( 1 ) The Republic and the Netherlands would agree to abide loy­ ally by any decision reached by the arbitration commission. (2) There is, therefore, strong reason to believe that such an international commission would bring about a lasting settlement. (3) The United Nations would thus be creating a much-needed pre­ cedent to prove to the world that its authority can stop wars and settle disputes. Finally, the Republic requests the United States to send a repre­ sentative as soon as possible by air to Jogjakarta in order that the Republic may more fully acquaint the United States with its official viewpoint. The Republic would appreciate by radio early advice from the United States of the estimated time of arrival of the representative of the United States at Jogjakarta airport, 41

George Kahin, a free-lance correspondent in Indonesia during this period, writes that following the introduction of the Australian reso­

lution into the Security Council, the debates were "closely followed and

long remembered" in Indonesia and strongly influenced the opinions of many Indonesians about the United States, particularly the American unwillingness to back the Australian draft proposal, "except in a dras­

tically amended form . . . With regard to the specific good offices

proposal, Indonesian rejection thereof

. . . was symptomatic of the fact that even at this early date the formerly overwhelming pro-American sentiment among Republicans had become strongly overlaid with the suspicion that covertly the United States was partial to the Dutch and that, if it had strongly desired to, it could have stopped them from resorting to f o r c e . 42

^Ifbid., August 8 , 1947, p. 6. ^^Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, pp. 214, 215. 94

While this statement probably reflects Kahin's disillusionment as much or more than it does the Republicans', there can be little question that the

Indonesians preferred (l) arbitration over good offices, and (2) Security

Council supervision over American. 43 Sjahrir said,

I wish it to be placed on record that my Government has grate­ fully accepted the offers of both the United States' good offices and the Government of Australia's mediation or arbitration as a construc­ tive step toward the setting up of {an arbitration] c o m m i s s i o n ^4

It was only with ill-concealed exasperation that the United

States, apparently feeling that the Republic might not have understood the diplomatic procedures involved, reviewed its previous offers of good offices, the prompt Dutch acceptance of the offer, the conditional nature of the Indonesian acceptELnces, and again reiterated the proposal, point­ edly for the last time,

If . . . the Indonesian authorities insist on specifying a par­ ticular method of settlement, as they have heretofore done, without taking into account whether it would be acceptable to the other party, our offer of good offices necessarily lapses. The United States would in that event have no alternative other than to inform the Netherlands Government and the Security Council that the Indonesian authorities have not accepted our o f f e r . 4 5

A few words about the tone of this note are in order. First of all, the State Department, in spite of its previous ^ facto recognition of the Republic's authority in Java, Sumatra, and Madura, chose to refer, without deviation, to "Indonesian authorities," much as it does in the present day, to the Governments of China and North Vietnam. Secondly, if

43cjee Wolf, The Indonesian Story, p. 139*

44ifew York Times, August 15, 1947, p. 3. 43xew York Times. August 17, 1947, p. 1; U.S., Department of State, Bulletin, KVII, No. 425 IAugust 24, 1947), 398. 95 the note is not threatening in its tone (as was subsequently charged by the Soviet8^^), or coercive, it can certainly be safely said that it was

intended to at least exert a certain amount of pressure. Thirdly, the

forthrightness of the Netherlands’ prompt reply is at least implicitly

contrasted favorably with the Republic's evasiveness and ambivalence.

This might be explained by the fact that the Republic probably did not

want to risk incurring the displeasure of so important and powerful a

potential friend as the United States by rejecting its offer outri^t.

Their means of response, if this was the case, were probably counter­

productive.

However this may be, the offer was again "accepted" (i.e., re­

jected) in precisely the same terms as the previous communications^^

and the United States duly notified all interested parties of the lapse

of its offer,4® though care was taken to express Washington's continuing

interest in and concern with the Indonesian Question, as well as its

"desire to be helpful." 4 9

Concurrent with the foregoing diplomatic charade, and possibly

having some influence on the U.S. attitude, were the following events

which at least provide additional insight into the state of American-

Indonesian communication; a Republican Army spokesman broadcasted orders

to the troops to resume scorched earth tactics if the Dutch failed to

4^ e w York Times, August 20, 1947, p. 4.

^^Ibid., August 18, 1947, p. 11.

4%bid., August 20, 1947, p. 4, and August 2), 1947, p.

4?lbid. 96

cease their truce violations:

Warning American, British and other foreign estate owners that the Indonesians would put the torch to property in their territory "if the Dutch extend their lines, " the spokesman called on them to ask the Dutch to remain in their present positions .... A broadcast dispatch of the Republican Antara News Agency said the Republicans were questioning American "impartiality" in the Indo­ nesian dispute because the World Bank had granted the Netherlands further credits. The Republicans, Antara said, believe that the money was lent because the Dutch Army had requisitioned rubber, rice, and sugar in Republican territory and made the Netherlands a better financial risk.50

Possibly over concern for the implications of such a pronouncement and possibly in response to the invitation made in the Republic's note of

August 7, Walter Foote left Batavia for Jogjakarta and a visit to the

Republic on August 11. It should not escape our attention that this was not only Foote's first visit, but the first visit of any U.S. State

Department representative to the city in the two-year history of the

Republic, Mr, Foote discussed the situation for two to three hours with the entire Republican cabinet, and then spoke with President Sukarno alone for another two hours, after which Foote quoted Sukarno as having said:

"Let us not be formal. I want to talk to you like a son to a father. During this conversation I will not be President of Indo­ nesia— I will be just Sukarno talking to Uncle Billy"--the nickname of the sixty-year-old Consul General. 51

It was also during the period of the discussion of the American attempt to have the parties accept its good offices that another quite significant event occurred. By a vote of eight to three, the Security

Council on August 12, decided to invite representatives of the Republic

5®New York Times. August 9, 1947, p. 6. 5^Ibid., August 12, 1947, p. 3. 97 of Indonesia to participate in its discussions as a non-voting observer.

This was accomplished only over the strongest objections of the Nether­ lands, and over the negative votes of the United Kingdom, France, and

Belgium (the veto did not apply). United States Delegate Herschel V.

Johnson's position was that, while the United States was not prejudicing its judgment to the question of the Republic's sovereignty (one of the

Basic Issues to which the United States was explicitly not addressing itself), it did seem best to hear the other side of the dispute.

But we must not pass li^tly over this extremely important

Council action and the similarly important part taken therein by the

United States. It might be said that one of the first steps taken in the policy formulation process, after the need for a policy has become clear, is the careful examination by decision-makers of past positions taken on the same (or similar) issues. ’.Vhen we take cognizance of the fact that at least fifty percent of all American policy statements in the United Nations seem to consist, at least as measured by volume, of careful reiterations of past United States positions, and careful dem­ onstrations of how these positions are consistant (whether they are, in fact, or not) with the current ones, it may be possible to identify this review process as one of the most consistent operational techniques of

United States foreign policy. And it will be suggested in the pages that follow that (to abide by State Department parlance) "in the crunch" on the Indonesian ^.uestion, the United States, to an important degree, found itself "locked in" to a certain policy by previous positions taken.

^^Ibid., August 13, 1947. P* 1 96

One such example was the question of Republican participation in the security Council discussions.

The status of the Republic of Indonesia, as Taylor points out, was central to the later course and eventual outcome of the dispute. Was it a "state" in the accepted sense? Notwithstanding Johnson’s disclaimer,

Sjahrir's request to take part in the Council's deliberations laid this issue on the line. Even though he was invited because the Council felt it "would be acting unilaterally if it refused to one of the parties to the dispute the ri^t to express its views," and though he did so solely to facilitate the work of the Security Council (while "in no way affecting any Government's position"), Sjahrir was invited, and as the represent­ ative of the Republic of Indonesia. The status of the Republic was further enhanced, Taylor continues, when the Council (this time over the somewhat illogical opposition of the United States) refused to extend similar invitations to East Indonesia and West Borneo, the two other

(Dutch-sponsored) components of the future United States of Indonesia,

It was pointed out during the debate on this question that these entities were recognized only by the Netherlands, and in any case, they were not

"parties to a dispute threatening international peace." The Republic, in the somewhat equivocal phrase of the Chinese delegate, became the

Netherland's "opposite number. "53

With the Indonesians' final rejection of the United States' good offices, it became clear that, if the United Nations or any of its

53Alastair MacD. Taylor, Indonesian Independence and the United Nations, p. $6. 99

members were to have any helpful influence on the outcome of the dispute, another vehicle for international intervention would have to be con­ structed. The two Parties had coincidentally, on August 12, from their respective capitals, pointedly demonstrated the difficulty which would face any attempts at finding an agreeable meeting ground. On this day, the Republic voiced its determination not to alter its request for the

Security Council to send an international arbitration commission--while in The Hague, the Dutch were simultaneously and emphatically rejecting arbitration as a means of settlement. The Dutch, in fact, voiced a determination to settle the affair independently with "assistance from

America." (And there appears to have been no dearth of "assistance from America" during this period.) Almost unnoticed, the Economic and

Social Council (ECOSOC) had Issued a direct invitation to the Republic to attend the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment at

HaVEUia in "recognition of the fact that the Republic enjoys in fact autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial relations." The

Dutch, on August 16, undertook to reopen this question in the ECOSOC, and while the move was defeated by a vote of twelve to five, the five votes had included that of the United States delegate.

The developments in the Security Council which followed these antithetical position statements by the two Parties, and which consisted of that body's attempt to find a suitable and mutually acceptable means for its own intervention, now need to be reviewed, with emphasis on the

54'New York Times, August 13, 1947, p . 10.

^^Ibid., August 17, 1947, P» 42. 100

important role played by the United States, and with some care. Essen­ tially, the Security Council was faced with two problems, problems which grew directly and consistently out of its resolution of August 1. That resolution, as was noted, called on the Parties to cease hostilities,

first of all, and then proceed to a political settlement of their dispute by "arbitration or by other peaceful means." Essentially, then, the Council now had to address itself to the fact that the two Parties had

failed, in fact, to comply with either portion of this resolution. The response from the Security Council was two-pronged, as well— appropriately

enough. For purposes of clarity, we shall examine each of these responses

separately, keeping in mind that they evolved simultaneously, and the voting date, August 25, was the same.

On August 12, Australia proposed that the Council establish a

commission to report on developments in Indonesia since the adoption of

the cease-fire resolution.However, the Dutch delegate, Eelco

van Kleffens, strongly objected to such action on the part of the Council,

In a speech denouncing and vilifying the Republic, he again denied

the right of the Council to arrogate to itself powers of jurisdiction

"which it so manifestly does not possess." He warned the Council members

of the danger of the precedent being established, and made it clear that

his Government would not consider the findings of such a commission as

binding. He suggested, instead, that a report mig^t be submitted by a

body composed of the career consuls already present in Batavia

United Nations, Security Council, Official Records, 181st meeting, pp. 1917, 1918; New York Times, August 1 1947, p. 5.

^^United Nations, Security Council, Official Records, 1 meeting, p. 2012; New York Times, August 18, 1947, p. 4» 101

One week later, the Australian delegate, Colonel W, R, Hodgson, agreed to accept the alternative suggestion put forward by the Dutch, despite Sjahrir's previous request that the Council adhere to the orig­ inal Australian suggestion. The United States supported the Chinese amendment of the Australian proposal, reflecting Dutch wishes, which read as follows:

The Council notes with satisfaction the statement by the Nether­ lands Government issued on August 11 in which it affirms its intention to organize a sovereign democratic United States of Indo­ nesia in accordance with the purpose of the Linggadjatl Agreement, The Council notes that the Netherlands Government intends imme­ diately to request the career consuls stationed in Batavia jointly to report on the present situation in the Republic of Indonesia and to propose to the said Republic the appointment of an impartial state by two states to be designated one by the said Republic and one by the Netherlands Government to inquire into the situation and to supervise the cease-fire. The Council resolves: (a ) That the measures of consular report and impartial inquiry and supervision be accepted by the Council as steps in the right direction. (B) That the consular body at Batavia and the impartial state be requested to forward copies of their reports to the Council, and (c) That should the situation require, the Council will consider the matter further,^

However, the Soviet representative, in essence, revived the

original Australian proposal, with a draft resolution establishing a

Council commission to superintend the cease-fire order. This commission

was to consist of representatives of all eleven members of the Council.

The Soviet delegate termed the Australian-Chinese proposal (later some­

what revised) as "unacceptable."^^ Essentially, the Council was faced

with a fairly clear alternative between a proposal which embraced the

^^New York Times, August 20, 1947, p* 4. 59united Nations, Security Council. Official Records, 194th meeting , p. 2197; New York Times, August 26, , P* '• 102

Republican position on the supervision of the cease-fire, and one which came very close to approximating the Dutch stand. The United States voted in favor of both proposals.^® The vote in favor of the Soviet resolution seems quite inexplicable when viewed in the light of all positions and statements made before and after this particular vote. The only sug­ gestion that might be offered is that the United States delegation may have been aware of the French intention to veto this resolution, which actually happened as their first such use of that powerIn any event, the Australian-Chinese resolution was adopted, with the Soviet Union,

France, Colombia, and the United Kingdom abstaining.^^ The following day, a Polish suggestion was adopted, which called on the Parties to adhere strictly to the Council's cease-fire request. The reader is referred to the Appendix section for the texts of the resolutions of August 25.

Having observed how the Council elected to enable itself to observe the adherence of the Parties to its cease-fire request, we now must review the means chosen by the Council to aid in effecting a polit­ ical settlement, the more difficult, clearly, of the two propositions.

Basically, while the original cease-fire resolution had left it up to the

Parties to choose "arbitration or other peaceful means" for the settlement of their dispute, their failure to make any significant movement in this direction left it up to the Council to select the particular means to be employed. As outlined earlier, the Republic desired the meuximum amount

^^New York Times, August 26, 1947, p. 1

^^Taylor, op. cit., p. 53. ^^New York Times, loc. cit. 103

of Security Council participation, while the Dutch preferred none at all, or at most, that it be kept within narrowly restricted limits. Consistent with this position, then, van Kleffens had proposed (in the same speech in which he had suggested the Consular Commission later accepted by Australia) that each party should designate one State, with those two States in turn appointing a third, impartial State to complete an organ for assisting in moving toward a political settlement.^5 At this same Council meeting, however, Poland proposed a mediation/arbitration commission composed of the entire membership of the Council, in consonance with the Republic’s position, as an amendment to the Australian motion, which put forth the idea of two States being chosen by the Parties (one each) with the Council appointing the third.^4

It was then reported that the United Nations was faced with the complete breakdown of its efforts to effect a settlement. Van Kleffens attacked the Republic as having "a microphone but no authority," while the Soviet representative, Andrei Gromyko, accused the United States,

France, and Britain of favoring the Netherlands, "despite statements intended to impress public opinion." It was also at this point that

Mr, Johnson conceded for the first time that the Indonesian Question did constitute a threat to peace and security and properly came under

Chapter VII of the Charter,

However, he repeated his arguments against action by the Council to effect a settlement, but said that if the fighting continued despite the Council order, he could not exaggerate the serious view taken by

^^New York Times, August 16, 1947, p. 4* 64ibid. 104

the United States and indicated that he would favor further action by the Council.65

Wrapped up within what appears to be an almost monumental inconsistency is clearly a veiled warning to the Dutch that the United States policy of support had its definite limits. Mr. Johnson also stated that the Council should avoid imposing any particular method of settlement on the Parties, but should rather simply tender its good offices. These good offices, he felt, could be made available through a three member committee, with each party selecting one, and the third, in its turn, being designated by the two 80 selected.

Over the following weekend, the United States determined to urge the Council the following Monday (August 25) to take action to supervise its cease-fire order in Indonesia. A spokesman was quoted as saying that

"All we want to do is to get them separated long enough to get a vote on overseeing the cease-fire order. Even an hour will do."^^ (There is the

Solubility Question, again.) This same report went on to state that the

United States delegation would hold weekend discussions on the United

States draft resolution for the Council to extend its good offices to the parties.

As the Security Council convened on Monday morning, then, and faced the issue of facilitating political discussions between the Parties, in between the respective demands of these Parties for Council arbitration

^5New York Times, August 2), 1947, P* 1 *

66 Ibid.

67n 0w York Times, August 24, 1947, p. 52. 105

on the one hand, and a three-member good offices committee (presumably not under the Council's aegis) on the other, it had three alternatives from which to choose. These choices can be readily arranged in order according to their amenability to the Dutch (or Republican) position. The Polish amendments were clearly an anthema to the Dutch, but quite in line with the Republic's wishes. They also provided, and this is an important key to all three, the greatest amount of Council participation in the nego­ tiation process and the outcome of the dispute.

Both the Australian and United States proposals came much closer to the Dutch position; however, there were two very important differences:

(1) most important, the Australian body would be endowed with powers of either arbitration or mediation, while the United States resolution only permitted the Security Council to attempt to do what Washington had tried and failed to do: extend its good offices to the Parties. (2) The other difference was that the Council would presumably be able to exert greater control in the selection of the committee because of the Australian pro­ vision that that body select the third member.

However, we should also hasten to point out that one important difference separated the American proposal from the Dutch ideal; it would be a Security Council body, thus guaranteeing the continued interest and indirect participation of the Council in the ensuing negotiations.

This fact of Security Council (and American) commitment was to eventually have a very profound effect on the outcome of the dispute, certainly unforeseen by the State Department drafters of this resolution during this

"Europe-first" period in American diplomacy. 106

At the time, however, this proposal must have seemed to its orig­ inators as an almost ideal solution to the problem faced by the Council.

One may resolutely condemn Dutch intransigence in these discussions; nevertheless, the practical diplomatist had to recognize that no proposal could, at this stage, have gotten very far without at least grudging

Dutch assent. This resolution provided at least a shadow of the Security

Council participation demanded by the Republic, while making the potency of the Council quite well circumscribed by the nature of good offices.

It may fairly be said that the United States constructed a solution which came as close to approximating the Dutch ideal as the Netherlands' relative power positions in Indonesia and the Security Council woula permit, while maintaining at least a certain amount of neutrality for the United States.

The voting in the Security Council meeting of August 25 on these important proposals went as follows; first of all, the Polish amendments to the Australian draft resolution were defeated with three votes in favor (the U.S.S.R., Syria, and the sponsor), four votes against (the

United States, the United Kingdom, Belgium, and France), with the rest abstaining. The resolution itself then fared no better. The way was cleared for the adoption of the United States proposal, with eight favorable votes and three abstentions (Poland, Syria, and the U.S.S.R.)^®

Some of the debate which attended the voting on this date is of more than passing interest to us. The Soviet representative condemned the United States resolution tendering the Council’s good offices.

6®United Nations, Security Council, Official Records, 194th meeting, pp. 2199-2203; New York Times, August 26, 1947, p. 1. 107

because it constituted an attempt to bypass the Council. Johnson accused

Gromyko of trying to "use the Council as a propaganda forum in the usual

Soviet method." However, Gromyko noted that "almost all the big news­ papers in the United States" agreed that the United States Government was attempting to bypass the Security Council. Noting that Washington had taken the lead in questioning the Council's competence, he claimed that the only explanation was that the United States was hoping the Indonesian

Question would be "stifled" in legal technicalities, to protect colonial and investment interest in the archipelago. It is interesting to note, in passing, that in speculating about the choices that the Parties might make, this same article considered that, while the Republic would surely choose Australia, The Hague might select the United Kingdom, Belgium, or the United States, with China as the probable third member.

Herschel Johnson defended the Good Offices concept in the fol­

lowing terms;

Due to the nature of the offer of good offices, such a solution would not raise any question whatsoever as to the Council's compe­ tence or jurisdiction in this matter .... Should the Parties accept the Council's good offices, they could request it to act as mediator or conciliator and to suggest a method of settlement, or to ask it to perform any other proper service they desired. So long as both parties join in making such a request, there is obviously no limit to the services which the Council can perform in facilitating a just and lasting settlement of this dispute.^®

The American resolution circumvented the Jurisdictional Question

and had almost limitless possibilities as to the services it could per­

form. That is the burden of these remarks. Are we able to make any

6^New York Times, August 26, 1947, p. 1. ^^United Nations, Security Council, Official Records, 193rd meeting, August 22, 1947, pp. 2177, 2178. 108

preliminary judgments as to the accuracy of these statements? As to the question of the Council's competence, this appears at best to have been a moot question. In an important sense, Mr. Johnson was simply shadow- boxing with an already decided issue. As Taylor pointed out in a passage quoted earlier, the tactic of abeyance cum intervention effectively set­ tled the question. The Council did consider itself competent, notwith­ standing the hesitancy and doubt exhibited by certain members. More important, however, to both the question of competence and the question of the utility of the vehicle being constructed, was the key phrase, "So long as both parties join in making . . . a request ..." These words will come to sound increasingly hollow in the passages to come. In light of the severe disparity of physical power available to the two Parties in the field, it is, even at this early stage, quite possible to foresee that, unless that disparity were replaced by some semblance of equality, this important assumption would be invalid. The result would be that the

Council's intervention would become increasingly open-ended. And in this connection, it is instructive to note that, with regard to the important issue of the degree of United Nations intervention, among the Security

Council members and participants in the discussions, the following align­ ment soon became evident; favoring maximum United Nations intervention were Australia, India, the Republic of Indonesia, Poland, the U.S.S.R., and the Ukraine. Supporting a minimum (or lack) of United Nations inter­ vention were Belgium, Prance, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The following day, possibly seeing that the United Nations commitment to a solution of the Indonesian Question could easily become 109 an open-ended one, Belgium offered a resolution to refer the Jurisdic­ tional Question to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion. Receiving the affirmative votes of only the sponsor, Prance, the United Kingdom, and the United States, with Poland abstaining, the motion was d e f e a t e d , 71 Taylor comments that "the United Nations was thereafter to continue to judge the dispute on its political rather than juridical merits." However, this was additionally to have a "decisive bearing" on the powers of the field machinery established by the Council.

Noting that the "key member" in the outcome of the decision as to whether arbitration or good offices would be extended was the United States, Taylor finds that.

In advocating a non-justiciable technique, Johnson declared that United States constitutional history demonstrated the seriousness with which his Government regarded the question of domestic jurisdiction, and it had "no less regard for such matters in the field of inter­ national affairs." Because of the "legitimate . . • doubt" as to whether the Council possessed Jurisdiction regarding the settlement of the Indonesian constitutional issues, the United States would not support any action based on such an assumption. Washington's proposal to establish a committee of good offices (had) consequences that were to be revealed by negotiations in the f i e l d .7^

How effective could the Security Council be, then, with its most powerful and influential member town by indecision and doubt over the most basic issues involved in the Indonesian Question? Here is how this prob­ lem was reported in the press at the time ;

Strong doubts that the United Nations had seen the last of the Indonesian quarrel persisted today, and involved the all-important question of how the American attitude would shape up . . . , Asked if he thought the Indonesian Question was settled insofar as the Security Council was concerned, one delegate, not connected with

New York Times, August 27, 1947, p. 1. Alastair MacD. Taylor, Indonesian Independence and the United Nations, pp. 57, 58. 110

the Soviet bloc, replied, "It's a long way from being settled." Argu­ ments before the Council, he said, had shown no real softening of either viewpoint and the Dutch seemed responsive mainly to Washington's views."73

Describing himself as skeptical as to the viability of the good offices formula just adopted, the reporter's informemt asked, "What is the Amer­ ican policy on Indonesia?" and then commented, "I wish I knew.

In accordance with the Council’s resolution of August 25, the

Parties proceeded to the construction of the Good Offices Committee (GOC).

On September 1, the Dutch chose Belgium as their representative on the

Committee,75 and five days later, the Republic selected Australia7^

Thereupon, there appeared in the New York Times a particularly interesting article:

Australia and Belgium cast about today for a third nation to help them mediate the Dutch-Indonesian dispute as directed by the United Nations Security Council. Either or both m i ^ t like to select the United States, but the American attitude is unofficially described as cool and unenthu- siastrc .... This attitude, an informant said, is the by-product of the Indo­ nesian rejections when the United States twice offered its good offices to settle the dispute outside the United Nations. He added, however, that the United States would be obliged to accept an offer if tendered. Ordinarily, the Americans would have been considerably more eager, perhaps openly so, because of the United States interest in the Indonesian question.77

fthile it is difficult to assess such a report without knowledge of the identity and motivations of its source, it is worth noting that Taylor

73 New York Times, August 28, 1947, p. 7. 74ibid.

75 New York Times, September 2, 1947, p. 10.

76Ibid., September 7, 1947, p* 45* 77 Ibid., September 11, 1947, p* 10. Ill

intimates, and ri^tly so, that the United States Government advocated

its own version of Security Council intervention in contrast to that

offered by the Government of Australia (with the third man on the com­ mittee to be chosen b\ the previous two, rather than by the Council as a whole), precisely because, as he puts it, "There was but one likely can­

didate . . . ."78 The United States was the one power which possessed

the requisite power and prestige, combined with at least an adequate

posture of neutrality, to lead the GOC as its neutral member. The United

States would be placed in a unique position to use the United Nations to

further its recently established policy goal of solving the dispute

through the medium of good offices, simultaneously maximizing its own

role, and minimizing the extent of the Security Council's influence. On

September 18, Foreign Ministers Spaak and Evatt, representing the two

powers already chosen, jointly announced the United States acceptance of

the third position on the GOC.7^ Whatever doubts there had been were

overcome. The development was simultaneously greeted with approval by

the Parties.

On the first day of the following month. President Truman named

Dr. Frank p. Graham, the President of the University of North Carolina

and a distinguished public servant on numerous wartime governmental flO boards and councils, to be the United States representative. This

filled out a most distinguished committee; the Belgians had appointed

^^Taylor, op. cit., pp. 592, 593.

^^New York Times, September 19, 1947, p« 17. 80 Ibid., October 2, 1947, p. 10 112

former Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Paul Van Zeeland,, and Canberra sent Justice Richard C. Kirby of the Australian Commonwealth Court of

Arbitration.^^

October first was well over one month past the date on which the

Security Council had authorized the establishment of the GOC, and the question arises, inevitably, as to what took so long. Such a question assumes more than passing importance, furthermore, when it is understood that during this time, far from a cease-fire, conditions in Indonesia, both political and military, had continued to deteriorate. The Dutch spearheads in their initial assault had left large numbers of Republican troops, still organized fighting forces, in between these spearheads.

The Dutch had laid down the "van Mook Line" (which was essentially a line drawn tangent to the farthest points of advance of the Dutch forces) and then proceeded to claim control, which they certainly did not have, in this entire territory. Republicans continued to resist, as the Dutch con­ tinued to engage in "mopping up operations" in these areas.

The point of all this is that any delay in putting the Consular

Commission and the Good Offices Committee into the field and into action would work solely to the advantage of the Netherlands, in view of the power disparity between the two Parties.

And delay there was. Gromyko complained about it in the Security

Council on September 11; he said the Council could not "wait indefinitely"

for information from the Consular Commission;

I am not going to ask the Council to discuss this matter at this time, as it is not on the agenda. I merely wish to say that if we do not receive any information in the very near future from the Con­ suls in Indonesia, then I, as President, shall be obliged to direct

^^Taylor, op. cit., p. 66. 113

the attention of the Council to this fact and to place this question on the agenda of one of our meetings.

in an editorial on the United States' acceptance of the third position on the GOC, the New York Times said.

It is unfortunate that there has been so long a delay in getting the [pOC] machinery organized— a delay for which the United States Government is largely responsible. Regardless of American reluctance to accept membership on the Council Committee, this was a duty our Government could not consistently refuse, and we are glad to see that the initial reluctance was finally overcome.83

Possibly reflecting the results of Gromyko's pressure, the Con­

sular Commission then reported that it would make an immediate interim report to the Council rather than remain silent until the completion of

its survey in about mid-Ceptember.

however, the word was received on the first day of October that

the final report would be delayed "up to two weeKs," due to United States

insistence in sending the long-delayed Uritea States military observers

into the field, The report noted that eight American military observers

hao arrived in Batavia only "yesterday," which was "more than a month

after their presence had been urgently requested and twelve days after

they left T o X y o .

.ihile finding solace in the "high character" of the GCC, the New

York Times criticized the "long delay in naming the Committee," a delay

for which they found ,Washington "largely to blame," and to which they

attributed the deterioration of conditions in Indonesia. "Quick action

^^New York Times, September 12, 1947, P- 11*

®^Editorial, New York Times, September 19, 1947, p. 22.

^^New Ypra Times, October 2, 1947, p. 10- 114

was called for. Instead, there has been delay.When the Council met

again on October 4, the Australian representative, Foreign Secretary

Evatt, felt it necessary to pass a resolution that the Secretary General

convene the Committee of Good Offices "at the earliest possible m o m e n t . "®6

The United States probably did not deliberately engage in dilatory

tactics for the purpose of weakening the Republic; while this possibility

is not to be completely ruled out, it is more likely that the United

States policy makers were simply ignorant of the serious consequences of

prolonged inaction on the position of the Republican military forces. And

what is most important is that, because of the extent to which the good

offices approach depended upon some kind of power balance between the

parties, the effect of this delay was to detract further from the GOC's

chances for success in the field.

But upon a much more important issue would depend the final out­

come of the changes which would or would not be effected by the Dutch

police action vis-à-vis the relative strength of the two Parties; would

the United Nations Security Council demand any withdrawal of troops by the

Netherlands Indies forces? Two resolutions demanding troops be withdrawn

by the Dutch were introduced into the Security Council in early October,

One, sponsored by the Soviet Union, simply called upon the Netherlands to

withdraw its forces to the positions held on July 20; the other was put

forward by the Government of Australia, and called only for both sides to

withdraw to "at least five kilometers behind the positions held at the

®^Editorial, New York Times, October 2, 1947, p. 26. ^^New York Times, October 4, 1947, p. 5. 115

date of the cease-fire of August 1st."®7

The reaction to these proposals of the new United States dele­ gate, Warren R. Austin, hears careful scrutiny. He began by recalling that the actions taken by the Council thus far had been taken, albeit implicitly, under the provisions of Article 40 of the Charter, having to do with provisional measures to safeguard the peace. He pointed to the following provision in the Charter, contained in this Article; "Huch provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims or position of the parties concerned." The press report stated,

Mr. Austin's argument, then, was that the Council had no evidence that a withdrawal was necessary and no evidence that withdrawal would not prejudice the rights of the parties involved. "There is one notable argument between the parties involved here which affects our action on this resolution, I think, and that is that the consequences of withdrawal would be serious," he said. "One of the parties alleges that the consequences would involve disorders and destruction; the other alleges that the consequences would involve peace. Therefore agreement with the aid of the committee of good offices must be sought by the parties."88

The point of this rather exceptional example of tortured reasoning was that the Council, by ordering any troop withdrawals, would be prejudicing the rights of the Netherlands. How the Netherlands had acquired these rights he failed to make clear. Peace would be better served, in any event, according to the United States representative, if the Council were to request the GOC to assist the Parties in working out an effective cease-fire observance. Taking note of Austin's contention that a demand for troop withdrawals by the Council "would vitally affect all the issues, military, political, and others," Taylor comments, rather

®7ujiited Nations, Security Council, Official Records, 210th meeting, October 11, 1947, p. 2555. ^^New York Times, October 10, 1947, p. 7. 116

laconically, that "the converse of his argument was equally valid,"

It was during the course of these debates that the full report of the Consular Commission was received. It noted that Dutch troops had been ordered, within their own self-established lines, to proceed with mopping-up operations, and that the Dutch advance had left many Indo­ nesian forces between their spearheads. In view of the Republic's orders to its troops to cease fire and to hold present positions, this combi­ nation resulted in further warfare. A considerable amount of "banditry, arson, looting and murder" by irregular Indonesian bands was also reported.

The population has suffered considerably, even before the police action for banditry and the scorched-earth policy. This was inten­ sified during and after the police action. The Chinese were a special target .... There is little hatred of the Dutch, whose assistance in running the country is essential.^

On October 22, the United States put forward its own draft reso­ lution for consideration along with the Soviet and Australian motions.

In advocating passage of this measure, Mr, Austin reminded the Council that it was obliged to work toward a long-term objective of settling the

Indonesian Question and that a cease-fire should be considered in that perspective. Taking note of the Consular Commission's report, he argued than an effective truce was "a prerequisite to fruitful negotiations" and that failure to achieve that truce would therefore prejudice the effectiveness of the GOC. Kis draft resolution took note of the fact

®^Alastair MacD. Taylor, Indonesian Independence Eind the United Nations, p. 42. * ' ^^nited Nations, Report by the Consular Conunission at Batavia to the Security Council, Unlte

that hostilities were continuing and that the parties had thus far failed to attempt to reach agreement with one another. The United States would then have had the Council call upon the Parties to consult immediately in

order to "give effect" to the cease-fire resolution of August 1, and

"pending agreement to cease any activities which directly or indirectly

contravene that resolution." The draft resolution then proceeded to ask

the Consular Commission to make its assets, including the military 91 observers, available to the GOC.

Austin later offered the following amendment to his own resolu­

tion;

The Security Council advises the parties concerned, the Com­ mittee of Good Offices and the Consular Commission that its reso­ lution of August 1 should be interpreted as not permitting the use of armed forces of either party by military action to alter substan­ tially the territory under its control on August 4, 1947.^^

This was the date on which both Parties had accepted the cease-fire.

These various resolutions came to a vote on October 31 and

November 1. The Soviet resolution was defeated with four negative votes

(those of the United States, Britain, Belgium, and France) and three

abstentions (Brazil, China, Syria), receiving only the positive votes of

the Soviet Union, Australia, Columbia, and Poland. The Australian motion

did little better, with five positive votes (Australia, Columbia, Poland,

Syria, and the U.S.S.H.) one vote against by Belgium, with the rest of the

powers abstaining.93 The way was thus cleared for Council approval of

^^New York Times, October 25, 1947, p. 8 , ^^Ibid., October 28, 1947, p. 11. ^^Ibid., November 1, 1947, p. 4. 110

the American draft resolution the following day, as amended by Australia,

China, and Belgium, Poland voted against it, while the Soviet Union,

Columbia, and Syria abstained. The text of this important statement is contained in Appendix II, The Council simultaneously rejected a Polish resolution (Poland and the Soviet Union--"for"; the United States,

Britain, France, and Belgium— "against"; with five abstentions) warning the Dutch that failure to comply with the earlier resolutions might necessitate enforcement measures by the Council. ^4

M r . Austin, at that time President of the Council, then said that he would send the adopted resolution to the field as an order of the

Security Council. In reply to a Columbian complaint that the resolution was tantamount to acceptance of the Netherlands' position regarding the competence of the Council, Austin ruled that the question of the Council's competence to intervene was not at issue, since the two governments had agreed to accept the decision.

Taylor's comments on these events are particularly cogent. The

Council, he observes, steadfastly refused (under American leadership, we might add) to countenance any proposals which called for a withdrawal of military forces. He quotes Austin's justification; "Is it not true that the Council seeks to have this business settled by peaceful means, without going into enforcements and sanctions and that sort of thing? . , .

That is why the Council took the course of offering good offices ..."

^^United Nations, Security Council, Official Records, 2l8th meeting, November 1, 1947, p. 2710. S^Ibid., p. 2711. 119

And he continues;

The resolution of November 1 marked the limit to which the Council was able to go in reinforcing this particular course of action. Its strongest moral pressure had been employed to make the parties nego­ tiate, and the G.G.C, was now empowered to give "assistance in both" the political and military spheres. The principal burden of con­ ciliation would henceforth have to be borne by the field machinery.

Furthermore, the entire period of months of Security Council consideration had witnessed consistent refusal on the part of a majority of its member­ ship to allow that body to address itself to the Basic Issues in any important way, ATiile the slow and deliberate workings of the diplomatic machinery had allowed both political and military positions of the com­ batants to harden considerably, the Council, again under United States leadership, proceeded to establish a means for solution which depended on one most important assumption, which it then proceeded to weaken or invalidate. V.hile developments proceeded apace in Indonesia, there were inordinate delays in the first (United States-chaired) Consular Com­ mission report, in the sending of United States military observers to

Java, in the acceptance by the United States of its place in the GOC, and in the appointment of the American member thereof. These delays, com­ bined with the refusal to call for restoration of the military status quo ante, all worked solely to benefit the Netherlands. And with the divisions of the Council being what they were, with each Party having almost equal backing, in Wolfe’s words,

Such progress as was made occurred, generally, when the middle- of-the-road group— and particularly the United States--was able to give qualified support to the Pro-Indonesian bloc, of which Russia

^^Alastair MacU. Taylor, Indonesian Independence and the United Nations, p. 64. 120

97 and Australia were the two most outspoken members. '

He further claims that "... the preliminary results acheived at Lake

Success constituted a diplomatic victory for the Republic." He bases this opinion on these considerations; the attack on Djogjakarta had been indefinitely postponed; the Indonesian Question was brought into the spot­ light of world publicity; it was placed on the Security Council agenda; the Republic of Indonesia was given official representation at the Council;

East Indonesia and West Borneo haa been denied seating, while India and the

Philippines had not; and (probably most important) the Dutch had been denied a unilateral solution to the crisis.This does not invalidate the contention, however, that the major effect of United States partici­ pation in the Security Council discussion was to keep these Republican diplomatic successes within the bounds of what the Dutch would consider tolerable.

Preoccupied with organizing defenses in the area which it con­ ceived most vulnerable to a Soviet challenge, the State Department emphasized, first and foremost, European cooperation and mutual interests. Translated into terms of the Indonesian Question, this meant that . . , U.S. involvement in the dispute was to take the form of measures to "go easy" on the Dutch, 99

However, the United States, the Netherlands and other powers con­

cerned with this problem were faced with the stubborn and irreducible

fact that the Republic of Indonesia was the principle, if not the only,

embodiment of Indonesian nationalism, and the Republic controlled, in

fact, the major islands.

97 Ablfe, The Indonesian Story, p. 142,

^®lbid., p . 143. 99 Taylor, op. cit., p. 592. 121

The events of 1946 and 1947 signalize the birth of a nation in Indonesia. The birth may have been premature, although in the case of political births, "prematurity" and "maturity" are concepts too sub­ jective to be accurately determined. In any case, the fact is that the embryo is there. It cannot very well be returned to the womb for incubation to await a more gradual birth, any more than the clock of histoiy can be turned back to the days preceding the Japanese inva­ sion.

It was the strength of Indonesian nationalism which had won these (minimal) diplomatic "victories" enumerated by Wolfe. And it was, as we have seen,

American diplomacy which, in large measure, kept them to a minimum.

THE RENVILLE AGREEMENT

The Good Offices Committee met for the first time in Sydney, en route to Indonesia, On October 2 0 Early discussions faltered over the choice of a mutually acceptable site, however, and it was only on

November 8 that both Parties agreed to hold discussions on board a neutral ship to be provided by the United Htates.^^^ However, it was not until the second day of December (characteristically) that the Navy attack transport, the U.S.S. Renville, arrived at Tanjung Prick (Batavia harbor) for the commencement of discussions.1^3

Taylor tells us that when the Belgium GOC representative, Mr.

Van Zeeland, returned from extensive talks in Brussels and The Hague, he convinced his colleagues that "the Dutch were not going to withdraw a single soldier from their forward positions." Taylor reports that Graham

^^%olfe, op. cit., pp. 152, 153.

1®lHew York Times, October 21, 1947, p. 12. 102 Ibid., November 8, 1947, p. 8. ^^^Ibid., December 3, 1947, p. 18. 122

described himself as convinced that "to continue the disagreement over the van Kook line for more weeks would simply be a part of the program of delay and attrition which worked to the unfair disadvantage of the

Republic." He considered it:

. . . more equitable in the long run to accept the van Kook line on a temporary basis as part of an integrated programme which would include democratic principles of self-determination. ^

possibly because they could see the way things were tending, and had an appreciation of the importance of the power disparity between the

Parties, the Australians proposed in the Security Council that a message be sent to the GOC in Batavia asking it to report full details on its reported plan for making the cease-fire effective. This was immediately

supported by Gromyko; Katz-Suchy, the Polish representative; and L, N.

Palar, the Republican spokesman. The United States, however, said such

a message would suggest the Council's doubt regarding the "wisdom,

honesty and ability of the Committee of Good Offices. No premature or

intemperate or hasty conduct on our part," said Mr. Austin, "can help the

Committee of Good Offices."^^5

On December 23* the GOC proposed to the parties that each submit

proposals showing the demilitarized zones to demarkate areas between them.

If these did not agree, the Committee would table its version, which the

Parties would then be asked to accept. After acceptance, arrangements

would be made to evacuate armed adherents of one side (which could only

apply to the Indonesians) out of the territory of the other. While both

TC^Taylor, op. cit., pp. 81, 82. 105 New York Times, December 20, 1947, p. 8 . 123

sides tentatively accepted the offer, the Netherlands issued conditions and clarifications, and Republican Premier Sjarifuddin returned to Jog­ jakarta due to dissatisfaction with the progress of the talks.1^6

As the situation continued to deteriorate in this manner, the Com­ mittee conceived a special message to the parties. Tabled on December 25,

it became known as the "Christmas Message," It consisted of nine sug­ gestions for effecting an immediate truce:

(l) There was to be an immediate standfast and cease-fire order along the van Mook line. (2, 3) This was to be followed at once by the conclusion of a truce agreement with demilitarized zones estab­ lished "in the first instance and for the time being"— but without prejudice to the parties' rights, claims, or positions--in general conformity with the above line, except in western Java where the GOC's military assistants would determine the proper location of the zones. (4, 5) Responsibility for order would be vested in the civil police forces of both parties, while the GOC's military advisers would be available to assist as requested. (6, 7) Trade and intercourse be­ tween all areas should be permitted as far as possible and any restrictions required agreement by both parties, (6) The GOC's mili­ tary assistants would investigate whether any Republican forces still carried on resistance behind Dutch forward positions. (9) All forces on the other party's side of a demilitarized zone— or in a zone itself— were to move peacefully, under the GOC's supervision, with arms and equipment, to their own side of the zone. The Committee was of the view that the truce agreement should become "an accomplished fact" before the end of December and that it need not await a polit­ ical settlement.107

Then, with respect to the political issues, the Committee started

by stressing the Parties' stated agreement, on repeated occasions, to the

principles of Linggadjati. These have been summarized as follows:

Independence of the Indonesian peoples; Cooperation between the peoples of the Netherlands and Indonesia; A sovereign state on a federal basis, possessing a constitution

^^^Ibid., December 24, 1947, p. 6.

I07n aylor, op. cit., p. 83. 124

to be arrived at by democratic processes; A union between the United States of Indonesia and other parts of the Kingdom under the Crown.108

Inviting the Parties to set forth their own elaborations of these basic principles, the Committee then went ahead and offered its own ver­

sion. This was reported in the press as a "secret annex" to the GOC's plan. The Committee's version provided that: (l) the Parties utilize

the services of the Committee in working out and signing a settlement of

the political dispute; (2) each Party abjure the setting up or organi­

zation of states in Java, Sumatra, or Madura; (3) after the conclusion of

a political agreement, the Netherlands withdraw to the positions it held

on July 20, and the Republic resume civil administration in the evacuated

areas; (4) at this time, provisions be made for reducing each Party's

armed forces; (5) after the political agreement is signed, free economic

intercourse be "completely restored"; (6) free and uncoerced discussion

of vital political issues be permitted during the second six-month period

following the conclusion of an agreement, with free elections at the end

of this period to determine political relationships with the Republic

and the United States of Indonesia; (7) that a constitutional convention

be chosen democratically to draft the United States of Indonesia consti­

tution; (8) that a United Nations agency be asked to observe conditions

during this period and the final formation of the United States of Indo­

nesia.1^9

While Republican leaders apparently had strong misgivings about

lOGlbid., pp. 03, 84. ^^^New York Times, January 16, 1948, p. 6. 125

the proposals, especially concerning any failure to implement them as an integrated "package," the Dutch approved the-truce proposals and showed a strong distaste for the political program. Noting that a number of them could not be accepted, the Dutch then called for withdrawal of the entire list, Taylor notes that

. . . the G.O.C. had been served notice that the Netherlands interpreted the function of "good offices" so restrictively that even the informal 110 submission of suggestions in the political sphere was not welcome.Ill

Instead, the Netherlands forwarded twelve counter-proposals, and these differed in three major ways from the original Christmas message; first, the GOC's second and third principles were revised to allow the

Dutch to permit "free expression" in the former Republican areas; next, all references to the Republic of Indonesia were deleted; finally, no guarantees of international observation were to be found in the Dutch draft. But they went one step further; these proposals were considered to be final, were to be accepted (or rejected) in their entirety, and, within forty-eight hours of their receipt by the Indonesians. And the quite pointed warning was issued as well that, in the event of their rejection, they would be withdrawn and the Netherlands would resume its

"freedom of action.It was at this point that, with rupture imminent in the negotiations on which the United States had staked its policy.

110 Italics are in the original.

lllAlastair MacD. Taylor, Indonesian Independence and the United Nations, p. 86. p. 67. 126

Graham made an important move.

A new set of suggestions was tabled, with the purpose of allevi­ ating the inadequacies of the Netherlands' twelve; these were the GOC's

"six additional principles": ( 1 ) Sovereignty throughout the Netherlands

East Indies was to remain with the Netherlands until it was transferred to the United States of Indonesia, which was then to be a sovereign and equal member within the Netherlands-Indonesian Union, headed by the Dutch crown; the Republic was to be a state within the United States of Indonesia;

(2) All states were to be represented fairly in any provisional, interim government prior to ratification of the United States of Indonesia con­ stitution; (3) Either party could, without objection from the other, request the continuance of the GCC's services to adjust differences during the interim period; (4) A plebiscite was to be held, between six months and one year from the signing of the political agreement to determine whether the peoples of Java, Madura, and Sumatra wished to associate with the Republic or another entity of the United States of Indonesia. Should either party request it, this would also be under GOC auspices; (5) After the states were delineated according to this procedure, a constitutional convention was to be convened with states represented according to their populations; (6) Neither party was to object if any state should not ratify the constitution, but wished, instead, to negotiate a special relationship with the Netherlands or the United States of Indonesia. ^ 1 5

It is necessary for us to continue to rely on Alastair Taylor's excellent exposition of these events; he terms these six proposals a

^"'^Ibid,, pp. 80, 89. 127

"last minute initiative, obviously b o m of desperation" which "appeared

just as obviously doomed to failure."^^4 This was particularly true in view of the previous Dutch rejection of the GOC's political recommen­

dations and their request that these be withdrawn, and that the Com­

mittee refrain from undertaking such liberties in the future. The GOG

had not only taken the initiative in the political realm again, "but had

done so with proposals whose scope and significance exceeded those

already rejected in the Christmas Message." Mr. Taylor goes on to make

this observation:

Yet the following day, the G.O.C. was informed of Dutch acceptance of these six additional principles. Because it constituted an unpre­ cedented volte-face from a consistently maintained position, contained no counter-proposals, . . , and took place even before The Hague knew whether the Republican Government had accepted or rejected its own ultimatum, this accept^ce was--within the context of existing known factors, inexplicable. ^^

Meanwhile, in the discussions held in Xaliurang, outside of

Jogjakarta, between the GOC and the Republican leaders, the latter were

assured that the truce agreement and the political principles were bound

1 1 together as "two parts of one programme," and that the status of the

Republic would remain unaffected until the creation of the United States

of Indonesia, that while agreement did not guarantee against the setting

up of new states, this would be done only under a plebiscite and under

the GOC's auspices. The Committee further "presumed" that the Nether­

lands military forces would be withdrawn or substantially reduced. IVhile

'’"'^ibid., p. 89.

IlSibid., pp. 89, 90.

‘’’’^Ibid.-, p. 90. 128

it was emphasized that the Committee members were only expressing their personal views, these were bound to carry great weight with the leader­ ship of the young Republic, especially those of the American member. It is readily apparent that the Committee members repeatedly conveyed to the

Republic's leaders their personal confidence in the reliability and hon­ orable intentions of the Dutch. This was to have profound implications lateral?

Kahin found it surprising that the Committee, under the prevailing conditions, was able to obtain even fleeting success. This achievement was, he believed, due "in a very large measure" to "the determination of the Committee's American Member, Dr. Frank Graham." The Republic's assent to the principles (later named for the ship aboard which they were nego­ tiated) was based on Republican trust in Graham and their belief that

"his proposals would, as he honestly expected, be backed up by the Ameri­ can Government,"118

The Christian Republican leader, Johannes Leimena, wrote,

It is a well-known fact that a considerable part of the Indo­ nesian people, and in particular the combatant groups, actually wanted to carry on the fight. The Republican Government, however, under perceptible American pressure, decided upon acceptance of the Renville Principles and the Truce Agreement of January 17, 1948. They involved a reduction of Republican territory, by half on Java and about one-fifth on Sumatra. It also involved the surrender of the economically richest parts to the Dutch. It caused the invol­ untary return under Dutch administration of half of the total popu­ lation of the Republic.11°

l^^lbid., pp. 90-93.

11^ Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, pp. 222, 223.

119i'ayior, op. cit., p. 311. 129

Yet Taylor notes that for most of this period the Republic nego­ tiated from a position of perceptible weakness, «/hen the GOC arrived for talks, it was quite clear that there would be no Dutch withdrawal from the van Mook Line and that the Netherlands Government would proceed with its federal program. There was no question of the Republic's ability to dislodge the Dutch from their positions. In noting the predicament in which the Republic was placed on receipt of the Dutch twelve political principles in the form of an ultimatum, Taylor finds it one "from which it [the HepublicJ was partially extricated only by the last-minute sub­ mission and acceptance of the G.O.C.'s six additional principles,"120

So we may be able to conclude from this that Liemena's sug­ gestion, that United States pressure was used to force Indonesia to accept Dutch terms, must be viewed in light of its implicitly self­ admitted position of military weakness; and, secondly, it appears that

Graham, in conveying the seriousness with which he (and the entire GOC) viewed the Dutch implied threat to resume "freedom of action," was con­

veying to Republican leaders, and in an accurate manner, the admitted

pressure being exerted by the Dutch with their ultimatum.

-tUite right. As Taylor later points out, prior to the submission

of the six additional principles, the Republic had actually been con­

sidering the acceptance of the twelve-principle ultimatum. "That it did

not reject them out of hand," he continues, "must be ascribed tc its

realization that it possessed no organized strength with which to sustain

1 ? 1 this decision." But what is more to the point is that the United

IZüibid., p. 315.

121Ibid., p. 316 130

States Government, the one power capable of exerting by far the most amount of credible pressure on the Dutch, had early accepted the Dutch arrogation to themselves of the fruits of the first police action by re­ fusing to at any time countenance troop withdrawals. As a result of this factor— and the (we will assume) innocent delays in getting the United

Nations observation and good offices machinery into the field on the part of the United States— the Republic, as we have noted, was seriously weakened militarily. The broad, general outlines of the Renville agree­ ment, in other words, were practically foreordained when the Council (and, most important, the American member) steadfastly refused to call for the withdrawal of troops. idrthermore, military factors alone should not be evaluated ^ vacuo; i'; was the Dutch foreknowledge of the non-negotiable nature of its military gains which contributed to making its political position so firm. American responsibility stands out clearly.

Most important to an understanding of the Renville conversations, however, is an understanding of how the Dutch came to accept the GOC's

six additional principles. This action constituted a bewildering non

secuitur, made to seem all the more difficult to understand by the fact that these six principles were in some ways less favorable than the

Christmas Message and the fact that the Dutch assented to them even

before the Republic had replied to their ultimatum.

Obviously massive--and decisive--pressure had been applied at the last minute by a third party. The only party in a sufficiently strong — and strategic— position to exercise this force was the United Ctates. ïtirthermore, that Government's performance in the Security Council between August and November entailed, as a logical corollary, the preservation of a breakdown in negotiations at this critical juncture. And that is precisely what happened. It can be stated categor­ ically that Graham spoke by long distance telephone with either Secretary of State Marshall or one of his senior assistants immediately 131

prior to the G.C.C.'s visit to Xaliurang to discuss the Dutch ulti­ matum with the Republican Government. In that conversation Graham emphasized the gravity of the situation and urged that direct con­ tact be made with the Netherlamds Government (presumably through van Kleffens) for the purpose of impressing upon it the necessity of accepting the six additional principles.

Mr, Taylor later observes that the circumstances surrounding the sub­ mission and acceptance of the six additional Renville principles show that ;

Dutch consent was procured not by "good offices," but by pressure applied at the last minute by that Government which was most concerned with ensuring that its own policy for bringing about agreement did not fail.125

Ke might rather have said "seem to fail," for the very exertion of that pressure was most certainly as clear and unmistakable a sign as

■Vashington could have needed that "good offices," as structured by the

United btates and interpreted by the Netherlands, had already failed.

And the U.S. had itself contributed materially to that failure. If the

Security Council, under American leadership, had demanded that the Nether­ lands restore the military status quo ante, and then relied on good offices to settle the remaining differences, this approach might well have been successful, Ahat seems particularly ironic to the observer benefiting from two decades of hindsight is that the Republic had con­

sistently maintained that the good offices approach was inadequate, that more stringent requirements and stronger international machinery would be

required in order for a peaceful settlement to be achieved. History was

beginning to vindicate their position. The major premise of the United

States' Indonesia policy— namely, that a peaceful solution to the problem

122ibid. ^25xbid., p. 354. 132

should and could he achieved in a bilateral framework, with a minimum of

international assistance and intervent ion--had been proved to be invalid a short five months after its conception. The remaining portion of the period under study will provide frequent opportunities for us to observe

the accuracy of this contention being demonstrated by events in Indonesia.

On January 17, at last, aboard the United States attack transport

ship, the U.b.S. Renville, the Dutch and Indonesian delegations signed the

truce agreement and the Netherlands' twelve political principles, with the

six additional principles being signed two days later.(Uee Appendix 5*)

THE AFTEmiATH OF HE WILDE

In reality, the aftermath of the Renville accords began even

before the agreement itself was signed. In The Hague on January 13, the

Dutch announced the formation, two days previously, of a federal interim

government for Indonesia. They added that "an important development" had

taken place "in the last few days" and went on to describe the general

outline of a proposed constitution for Indonesia, for which the United

States constitution had served as a model.^^5

The following day, at Lake Success, Dr. L. N. Palar, the new

Republican spokesman, accused the Dutch of setting up "puppet" govern­

ments in Indonesia, noted that such activity contradicted the wishes of

the Committee of Good Offices, and accused the Dutch of setting up a

"smokescreen" for these activities. ^ 26

124j;ew York Times, January 18, 1948, p. 1. 125ibid., January 14, 1948, p. 11. ^^^Ibid., January 15, 1948, p. 8, 133

Virtually simultaneously with the signing of Renville, further­ more, the Netherlands delegation protested the Committee's interpretation of the six additional principles. It states that this GOC action had prejudiced the position of the Dutch Government, and then commented:

The Netherlands Government trusts that the Good Offices Committee, in order to prevent the recurrence of similar difficulties, will make no pronouncement, especially with respect to the "political settle­ ment," unless both parties request it to do so; in the first place on account of the by no means imaginary danger that this might alienate the parties rather than draw them together; and in the second place, because this might wrongly lead public opinion to believe that the Good Offices Committee favours a particular solution which would not be consistent with its task and the essence of good offices.^ 1^®

This statement makes it quite clear that the Committee of Good Offices and the Dutch were following conceptions and interpretations of the United

Nations body's mission and functions that were quite at variance. This will become a most important factor in the outcome of the Indonesian

(Question.

In late February, at Lake Success, Republican spokesman Ali

Sastroamidjojo charged that the Dutch were attempting to circumvent the requirement in Renville for free plebisites in Indonesia by moving quickly to set up "puppet" states in East and West Java and in Madura. Denying the charge, however, van Kleffens gives us some idea of what was taking place.when we learn that he replied that the Netherlands would neither

"foment" nor "stifle" legitimate political action,^29 %n fact, however.

1 27 Italics in the original, 1 28 Alastair WacL. Taylor, Indonesian Independence and the United Nations, p. 101 . ^^°New York Times, February 22, 1946, p. 1). 134

the Dutch were fast proceeding to do both. They both encouraged (and indeed, all but created) pro-Dutch sentiment in the former Republican areas and severely curtailed any and all manifestations of pro-Republican political expression,1 The Dutch were, in essence, moving with speed and skill to subvert those portions of the Renville Agreement, partic­ ularly the six additional principles, with which they remained in basic disagreement. By March 8, they were able to install the Netherlands East

Indian Interim Government at Batavia (without Republican participation, of course)J31 and it was not until May 3 that this activity was offi­ cially brought to the Council's attention by anyone other than the Repub­ lican delegation. It was at this point that the GOC, in its first post-

Renville report to the Council, gave a simply factual account of the three political conferences held by the Dutch in ,,'est Java leading toward the formation of new political entities in the areas lost by the Republic.

However, the report failed to charge the Dutch with violation of the

Agreement and said nothing about the continuing (and intensified) Dutch naval blockade of the Republic^2 The Netherlands was, in other words, proceeüing directly to a unilateral interpretation and implementation of the Renville Agreement. Having completely evacuateo its forces from behind the van Mook Line, and weakened by the police action, the Republic was unable forcibly to prevent this.

Another important aftermath of Renville was the internal political

150 See Kahin, op. cit., Chapter VIII, pp. 230-255

^^^Kew York Times, March 9 , 1946, p. 8 ,

^^^Ibid., Kay 4, 1948, p. 15» 135

instability it caused within the Republic. The day after the truce agree­ ment was signed, Dr. Graham hurried off to Jogjakarta to try to heal what­

ever damages had resulted from the resignations of two Masjumi (Moslem

political party) members of Sjarifuddin's cabinet. It is interesting that

on this same day Gjarifuddin was quoted as follows:

Tell the American people that we count on them to ensure a fair plebiscite here. The plebiscite will chart the future destiny of a people. It is a big test for the United Nations, and the American people as one of the leaders of the United Nations must maintain their interest, The Dutch can no longer contend that the Indonesian question is an internal matter. They have accepted mediation. The plebiscite is of world interest and its success will be a fine example to the world in strengthening the United Nations.

.And, in the opinion of this student, the above quotation, if anything,

understates the extent to which the Republic felt itself dependent upon

the United Dtates for a just implementation of Renville.

Possibly seeing the amount of support which would be forthcoming

from the United Dtates in this matter, influential political elements

within the Republic soon brought about the resignation of the Ujarifuadin

cabinet, primarily because of its responsibility for the Renville Agree­

ment. The Government was accused of selling out to the Dutch, and a

widespread interpretation of this event abroad was that it would directly

imperil the Renville accords even before they could be implemented. ^ 54

Dr. Graham, the Australian deputy member, Thomas Critchely, and the Belgian

Committee member's assistant, Mr. Kerremans, as well as Charleston Ogburn

of the United States State Department went directly to Jogjakarta ^ 55

^^^Ibid., January 19, 1948, p. 10. ^54ibid., January 24, 1948, p. 7.

^55jbid., January 25, 1948, p. 4?* 136

extracted the Republic's unconditional acceptance of the GOC's "plans for a political settlement in J a v a . "156

The considerations and events discussed above concerning the means by which the Renville Agreement was achieved and the events immediately

following its signing seem to place the following United States State

Department press release in a somewhat curious light;

The United States Government has received with much gratification the news that the Netherlands and Indonesian delegations have accepted the proposals of the Security Council's Committee of Good Offices as a basis for settlement of the Dutch-Indonesian dispute. The United States Government regards these proposals as eminently just and practical and believes that they will provide a sound basis for political and economic development of the Indies, beneficial not only to the Indonesians and the Dutch but also to the rest of the world, The United States Government wishes to congratulate both Nether- landers and Indonesians on the spirit of high statesmanship with which they have concluded the negotiations before the committee. The United States Government will continue to follow with deepest interest the progress of reconstruction in the Netherlands East Indies and in exploring ways and means of extending economic and financial assistance to this reconstruction.157

Only passing note need be taken of the fact that this statement

strongly, if implicitly, suggests that the United States would tend to

agree with the Dutch that economic reconstruction was Indonesia's most

pressing problem, rather than agreeing with Republican leaders who most

certainly would have placed political independence in the position of

first priority. What is more important is that, if what Mir. Taylor has

told us is accurate--and just simply circumstantial evidence points

strongly to the conclusion he reaches concerning Dutch acceptance of the

six additional principles--then the foregoing statement begins to take on

^ ^^Ibid., January 26, 1948, p. 15.

^ ^Alnited States, Department of State, Bulletin, XVIII, No. 448 (February 1, 1948), 143. 137

an almost hypocritical, or at the very least, intentionally deceptive connotation.

However, there were contrary opinions as to the success of the

Renville conversations which were being expressed. As the Security

Council resumed debate on the issue, the Soviet delegate charged that the truce agreement amounted to a betrayal of the Indonesians in favor of colonial interests. Ke said the agreement was designed to set back the

Indonesian liberation movement and consolidate Dutch holdings. The work of the Committee was labeled as "one-sided" and its report just as partial. Pressure on the Committee on the part of the colonial powers was to blame. Mr. Gromyko made it very clear that he liked nothing about the GOC, the way it was set up, the way if started work, its attitude toward the Security Council, and the results it turned in. He accused the Committee of suppressing documents unfavorable to the Dutch and dis­ regarding the Security Council. He felt that the Committee’s report showed that the Dutch had used the GOC for the purpose of putting ulti­ matums to the Indonesians, and that the concept of a United States of

Indonesia within the Netherlands Kingdom was merely a scheme for perpet­ uating colonial control. Ke characterized the American attitude as one of showing "crocodile tears" for the Indonesian people, while doing

everything possible to help the Netherlands "break down the Republic of

Indonesia." The only way to have prevented this, he concluded, would have been the passage of the Soviet resolution for troop withdrawals. 138

Nine days later Gromyko returned to this theme, placing stronger

^^^New York Times, February 19, 1948, p. 8 , 138

emphasis on .American responsibility and explaining United States actions on the basis of .American investments in Indonesia. He said, referring to the Renville Agreement and the GCC's report,

They are among the most shameful documents which have ever been published under the aegis of the United Nations and should be placed in a museum as proof of how shameful a document can be produced when some of the members of the United Nations betray the interests of the Indonesian people for the benefit of the colonial powers.

Responding to the earlier of these two speeches, Warren K. Austin

said that

No one here or in Indonesia or in the Netherlands need be fright­ ened by those spurious and threadbare charges of bad faith on the part of member nations in the Security Council who are doing their utmost to advance the cause of peace in I n d o n e s i a .140

The truce agreement, he continued, was an outstanding achievement not only

for the Netherlands and the Republic, but also for the United Nations

through the GCC, Apart from the cessation of hostilities, the parties had

gone on to agree on a series of basic democratic principles as the ground­

work to further discussions. He noted that the guarantees of free speech,

press, and assembly were unequivocal, and would certainly lead to fair

plebiscites on the islands of Java, Sumatra, and Madura regarding their

projected associations with the Republic. The closing paragraphs of the

speech are of particular interest to us:

The Indonesian nationalist movement of half a century, the aspi­ rations for freedom of seventy million Indonesians, the struggles of the peoples of the Republic of Indonesia, the noble declarations of the '..,ueen and the wise commitments of the jMinister of the Netherlands are, we are sure, soon to be fulfilled in the transfer of the historic and acknowledged sovereignty of the Netherlands to a free and

I39ibid., February 27, 1948, p. 9. 140 Ibid., February 21, 1948, p. 5* 139

independent United States of Indonesia as an equal nation in the . , . United Nations, Those of little faith would deny the good faith of the parties and, therefore, doubt the great fulfillment. A'e wish to say for the good name of both parties before the world that it is inconceivable to them, that it is inconceivable to the three Member Nations which make up the Committee of Good Offices, and it is inconceivable to the Security Council of the United Nations that either the Kingdom of the Netherlands or the Republic of Indonesia or any representative of either government would seek directly or in­ directly to delay or wear down by attrition or to renounce on a mere pretext or otherwise undermine either the truce or the great prin­ ciples of human freedom, national independence and mutual cooperation which are now joined in an historic agreement as the latest chapter in the history of the self-determination of peoples.141

One of the most valuable things about Kahin's work is the extent to which it provides an insight into the thinking of the Republic during these years. He says,

The violation of the Renville Agreement by the iAitch, the refusal of the Security Council even to note these violations, and in partic­ ular the failure of the American Government (which most Indonesians saw as dominating the Security Council discussions) to honor what Indonesians considered to be its promise to oversee the implementa­ tion of the Renville principles, were extremely disillusioning and embittering to the Indonesians. ^ 2

In the context of opinions such as these latter, Mr, Austin’s words begin to take on a hollow ring indeed. It almost would seem that in the last paragraph he was describing the maximum extent to which the

Dutch might go in disregarding the Agreement and effecting their own

interpretation of it. In actuality (and in fairness), however, it must be said that a full reading of the speech leaves one with the clearest impression that, above all else, the United States desired that the Ren­ ville Agreement succeed in accomplishing its very important objectives.

But American desires notwithstanding, the Indonesian Question had

141united States, Department of State, Bulletin, KVIII, No. 454 (March 14, 1948), 533.

^'^^Kahin, Nationalism amd Revolution in Indonesia, p. 254. 140 by now clearly become a Cold War issue, and the Republic's outlook on this development is well described by Kahin;

Indonesian representatives abroad near the nerve centers of the West were . . . disheartened as to the prospect of effective Western action against Dutch aggression. In general, they felt that Indo­ nesia' s future was being sacrificed to what American and Soviet leaders believed to be their own interests in the struggle that di­ vided them. The Soviet's actions appeared to some of them to be dictated more by the desire to embarrass the United btates ana Great Britain and to acquire a strong propaganda base against them than to help Indonesia win its independence. However, practically all of them saw the United otates as so obsessed with the aesire not to antagonize its conti­ nental Western European allies . . , with their strong colonial inter­ ests, as to pay no more than lip service to the principle of colonial self-determination. Though these Indonesians could not themselves see that these countries, certainly Holland, had any alternative but to follow America's lead, they encountered the argument that too much pressure by the United Nations on the Netherlands might dangerously weaken the relationship between the Netherlands and the United States and thereby the whole system of Western security.'45

Certainly, then, this is one of the most important results of Renville;

the internationalization of the dispute; through the Agreement, an organ

of the United States Security Council, and the Council itself, became

officially cognizant of the dispute and committed to its peaceful solution.

This, despite its justifiable dissatisfaction with the effects of the Cold

War on the dispute, was clearly to the Republic's advantage.

But this was more than offset, it would seem, by the military

losses which Renville formalized and reinforced for the Republic.

Prom the GOC's standpoint, the Renville principles could be justi­ fied only on the basis of bilateral interpretation and implementation. Its members had staked their judgment on the good faith of the parties and, in particular, on the assumption that the Republic would be assured of a quid pro quo for its sacrifices in the military sphere .... By June, however, virtually all hope of a political agree­ ment— on which any quid pro quo must depend--had disappeared. 144

143 Ibid., p. 344.

144 Alastair MacD. Taylor, Indonesian Independence and the United Nations, p. 125. 141

As a result of Henvi1 le,

The Republic had paid a prohibitive price; loss of physical con­ tact with areas formerly under its authority--a loss made complete by evacuation of 35,000 soldiers from behind the [status quo linej — and consequent impotence in preventing the formation of Dutch-sponsored btates; and the continued attrition of its physical resources by the Dutch "blockade."145

It was certainly clear by March of 1948 that the major actors in the Indonesian drama were engaged in a quite basic three-way conflict of interpretation of the Renville Agreement. The Republic and its sup­ porters were committed to an international solution of the dispute, with the Agreements providing the sanction. The Security Council, and partic­ ularly the United States, seemed to be behind a bilateral solution of the

Indonesian Question, with Renville embodying this methodology, and the limited assistance from the international community which might be re­ quired. The Dutch, for their part, however, were clearly attempting to effect, in perfect accordance with their overall interpretation of the affair, a unilateral solution in Indonesia, working whereever possible within the confines laid down by the itenville Agreement,

THE CRITCHLEY - DU BUIE FRCPOSALS

V.'ith the signing of Renville, Dr. Graham and Justice Kirby

resigned from the Committee, returning to their respective countries and professions. President Truman named a retired Foreign Service Officer

with long experience in Southeast Asia and the Caribbean to replace

Graham, V.r. Coert du Bois.146 As he developed an increasing familiarily

I 45ib id ., p. 131. 146^;ew York Times, February 14, 1948, p. 6, 142

with the developing post-Henville situation in Indonesia, it became in­ creasingly clear to du Bois, as it already was to the new Australian rep­ resentative, Thomas Critchley (formerly Kirby's deputy), that it was now clearly incumbent upon the Committee to assist the parties in moving towards a political settlement, as envisioned in the Agreement.

By early June, a plan had been formulated which was well-conceived to at least begin a discussion between the Dutch and Indonesians on these

sensitive matters. Electors were to be elected from the smallest admin­ istrative units throughout the archipelago to elect, in turn, delegates to a Constituent Assembly, which would then doubly serve as a legislative organ and a constitutional convention. Constituent states of the United

States of Indonesia would then be delineated by this Assembly, a Presiaent

would be chosen, who would appoint a Prime Minister. The Prime Minister,

in turn, would select a cabinet responsible tc the Assembly, v.hile the

Assembly would have powers of self-government (including command of the

armed forces), the Netherlands High Commissioner would retain certain veto

rights and extraordinary powers, including the ability to assume command

of the armed forces.

The Assembly would then have the responsibility for framing, with

the Netherlands Government, the statute for the Netherlands-Indonesian

Union, and for writing the constitution for the United Etat es of Indo­

nesia. 147

147pnited Etates, Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. ( 1948), IXV, Part 5, 3925 ("Statement of Senator Graham on the Indonesian bi-uuaiion. " ' 143

And this was the beginning of the Dutch response:

Grave concern is felt in official quarters here (The Hague) at what is considered to be meddling by the United Nations Commission [sic] of Good Offices in Indonesian affairs beyond its jurisdiction. It is the opinion in highest Dutch circles that some members of the commission are now engaged in the composition of new "proposals" markedly favorable to the republic and correspondingly disadvan­ tageous to the Netherlands, 143

Four days later, the discussions were reportedly completely dead­

locked due to Dutch objections on the following (procedural) issues:

first, the Netherlands found grounds for objecting due to the fact that

the procedures had been submitted without being requested by either of the

two parties; secondly, they pointeo out that the proposals were not unani­ mous, because the Belgian member had refused to associate himself with

them; finally, they broke off further talks pending instructions from The

Hague, because these confidentially submitted proposals had been leaked to 1 / Q the press. And it was suggested that this had been done by du Hois

himself. In dealing with this incident, Kahin relates that there was

some confusion on the part of the Dutch negotiators as to the identity of

the offending correspondent and publication (first identifying Daniel

Echorr and Time magazine, and then later a United Press dispatch) 1^*^ and

that there was a certain inconsistency in breaking off negotiations "in

view of the publication of the strictly confidential document" (Kahin's

quotation and italics), when, in fact, it had not been published. Kahin

also states categorically that it was, in fact, the Dutch themselves that

148New York Times, June 13, 1948, p. 11. ^^^Ibid,, June 17, 1946, p. 21 (Two articles, datelined The Hague and Batavia, respectively). 150Ka1iin, op. cit., p. 249; New York Times. June 19, 1948, p. 5. 144

had leaked the information to the news m e d i a . 1^1 This, he goes on to explain, was because the Dutch did not wish to reap a whirlwind of crit­ icism for breaking off negotiations on the substance of these reasonable proposals, and thus created and used a procedural pretext.

When the Council met on June 17 to consider this new situation and elected to send a cable to the Committee asking for a report on the Dutch statement suspending talks because of the news leak, it was the American delegate, Philip C. Jessup, who succeeded in convincing the Council to strixe from the message all references or requests that the GOC make any assessment as to the responsibility for the breakdown in negotiations. 1 S2

This move was clearly one designated to support the Dutch and to save them from embarrassment at the Eecurity Council table. But, it was also con­ sistent with the basic bilateral American approach to the problem.

However, the request for a report was sent, and the GCC duly replied, reporting pessirnistacally that it was unable to break the dead­ lock in negotiations. It went on to state that, despite Renville's provisions, there had been no significant increase in the freedom of com­ munication or volume of trade and commerce into and out of the Republic, that that area was thus suffering serious food and medical shortages, that no avenues for normal political expression had been opened up in either territory for opposition groups, that the parties had not yet widened the demilitarized zones, and that political disagreements were as

151 New York Times, June 19, 1948, p. 5.

^^^Ibid., June 19, 1946, p. 17. 145 sharp as ever. While Soviet, Republican, Filipino, Chinese, and Austra­ lian spokesmen severely criticized Dutch obstructionism:

Guy de la Tournelle of France and Dr, Philip C. Jessup of the United States both urged the Council to put its confidence in the Com­ mittee of Good Offices and give it every help in continuing its work. 153

Jessup stated that he could find no evidence that the GOC felt it would be necessary or desirable to have the text of the Critchley-du Bois plan transmitted to the Council, as was now proposed in a Chinese reso- 154 lution. But, because the Proposals had been defeated at the field level by the Netherlands on procedural grounds, if they were to have any effect in preventing a unilateral Dutch solution to the dispute, Security

Council examination of the plan would have to be effected.

Yet it was Jessup's abstention which was crucial in preventing passage of the Chinese motion. (The vote was six in favor and five abstentions.)"The records likewise show an apparent lack of under­

standing on Jessup's part regarding the gravity of the situation in Indo­ nesia." 1 But, unless we can assume that Jessup was making his own policies, it shows a lack of understanding on the part of the entire

United States policy-making structure for Indonesia.

In commenting upon the Good Offices Committee's report that the

Dutch had refused to negotiate further, he noted that "another pebble had

appeared on the path of the negotiators," and he asked the Council to

155 Ibid., June 24, 1948, p. l6. 154 United Nations, Security Council, Official Records, 328th meeting, July 1, 1948, pp. 21, 22. 155jjew York Times, July 2, 1948, p. 5. aylor, op. cit., p. 394. 146

"continue to place confidence" in the GOC. But while he urged that the

Parties give the Committee's informal suggestions "careful consideration," the Committee itself had just made it clear that one Party had refused to do so; while he was noting that the "difficulties which had led to a slowing down of negotiations for a political settlement are in the course of being surmounted," the discussions were in fact deadlocked; while he was warning the Council against interfering with the Committee by discussing matters "which are in the Committee records and which have been the sub­

ject of negotiations," in point of fact, the Dutch had prevented these matters from being a subject of negotiations. Taylor offers the judgment

that this "unrealistic appraisal" of conditions in Indonesia (which he persists in identifying only as Jessup's) was due to continued adherence

by the United States to its original concept of good offices. 157

The Critchley-du Bois proposals were, in a sense, put forward in

defense of the premise upon which the Committee had participated at

Renville;

. . . that the Republic's military sacrifices would not impair its basic ri^ts, claims and position and that the Council would, if necessary, support the field machinery in implementing agreements in which the military and political factors were treated as inextric­ able. "'58

Thus, the United States' responsibility for preventing the Council from

calling for the Proposals was more than just a procedural question; with

American leadership, the Council effectively sabotaged the defense of this

premise by refusing to call for the text of Critchley-du Bois, and thus

^57ibid., pp. 394, 395.

">58ibid., p . 4 0 7 . 147 compounded the failure of the good offices approach.

If the basic American approach throughout these discussions was to continue to rely upon good offices and the bilateral solution, the tech­ nique appeared to be persistent optimism and exhortation. Speaking on

July 29, Mr. Jessup voiced the opinion that the necessary restrictions growing out of a wartime situation were at least partially to blame for the economic and commercial difficulties plaguing the Republic. He pointed to explicit Dutch statements that the Netherlands had no thought to hindering the Republic's economic development, and emphasized the Com­ mittee's hopefulness that some means could be worked out pending political agreement to ease this increasingly critical situation. He noted that a new United States Committee member, H. Merle Cochran (appointed to replace the ill Du Bois), would soon arrive in Indonesia, and that a new Dutch Gov­ ernment was about to take office, and concluded that negotiations could then reconvene "with every prospect of success,

Taylor observes that one of the most consistent of Dutch tactics was that of keeping the Indonesian Question off the Security Council's agenda whenever possible. This was obviously because of the fact that the

Council offered "unrivaled facilities" for the airing of views hostile to its own, and also because the Council "held in reserve powers that could remove the ultimate settlement of the dispute from the hands of the parties themselves," Taylor continues;

Hence it was customary for Van Kleffens to put the most favorable

Ibid. ^^^United Nations, Security Council, Official Records, 341st meeting, July 29, 1948, p. 25. 148

interpretation possible upon the progress of negotiations in the field; to caution the Council not to hold periodical debates that only "es­ tranged " the parties; and to urge that the United Nations' fielo machinery— which was composed of "competent men" familiar with condi­ tions on the spot— shoula be permitted to work in its "effective" way.161

While what Taylor says is certainly quite true, what is important to one concerned with the American role in these events is the almost complete applicability of these observations to the positions taken by the United

States as well. it is well documented, further, that the United States representatives on the GÜC did not share the credulity evinced by their colleagues in Washington and at Lake Success as to the viability of good

-j ^ ^ offices. jind yet it was under the banner of unflinching support for the United Nations Good Lffices Committee that the United States consis­ tently, during 1948, most effectively undercut, and even sabotaged, that

Committee's work. The refusal to countenance Security Council inspection of the Critchley-du Lois Proposals is an important example of this. No other conclusion seems possible.

iNUCNKClA AN'J THP CC-LD VrAh IN KIL-1948

V.e have implied certain dissatisfactions with the shortsightedness ana inadequacy of America's evolving Indonesia policy in late 1947 and early

1948, It has been suggested that this "Indonesia policy," such as it was, had been fashioned in response to largely alien ar.a irrelevant (but seem- i^gly compelling; objective considerations; namely, the importance of the

Netherlands in the developing Cold war, while it will be the objective of

*1 é Taylor, Indonesian Independence and the United Nations, p. 279-

T^^lbid., pp. 397, 598. 149

a later chapter to suggest that this policy did little to affect favorably the strength of the potential Dutch ally in Europe (and had observably harmful results in Indonesia), it is nevertheless appropriate at this point in our story to examine briefly the nature of the compelling Euro­ pean realities in order to comprehend more fully the policies that did evolve in this period. We may conclude this section by examining two im­ portant official articulations of United States policy in Indonesia, delivered in July and September of 1948.

As the basic principles which were to culminate in the signing of the Renville Agreement were being formulated by American, Australian, and

Belgian representatives of the Good Offices Committee, a far more important group of statesmen, the Big Four foreign ministers, were concluding their conference in London in total failure. And despite the fact that the

Soviet intransigence manifested in London was quite foreseeable in light of the threat posed to Moscow's national interest (in her view) by the launching of the Marshall Plan, these events apparently had a nearly traumatic effect on the Western European governments. It was during the months following, then, that the concept of an Atlantic alliance was being formulated.

Late February and early March witnessed the deterioration and final communist coup d'etat in Czechoslovakia and the conference of

European foreign ministers in Brussels. Even more disquieting in its im­ pact on official opinion in Washington, however, was the telegram from

European commander General Lucius Clay in which he voiced his growing fear of an early military confrontation with the Soviet Union in Europe. This 150 precipitated the historic "March Crisis" of 1946 during which the hipest levels of the American Government were genuinely concerned with the imme­ diate prospect of war in Europe,

And finally, almost simultaneously with the Security Council dis­ cussion over the Chinese motion to call for the Critchley-du Bois pro­ posals, the Soviet Union instituted the blockade of BerlinIt is im­ portant for the historian to remember, then, that Washington's policy moves in the Indonesian Question were not being conceived in a vacuum; rather, in this highly charged, war-of-nerves atmosphere, it must have been extremely difficult for those concerned with Southeast Asian affairs to convince the

"European desk" at the State Department that it was necessary and important to keep pressure on the Dutch, both in Washington and Batavia, to live up to the provisions of the Renville Agreement,

It is in light of these prevading concerns and pressures that the manifestations of United States policy towards the Netherlands and Indo­ nesia during the middle of 1946 should be viewed. And the Dutch, of course, were fully aware of the nature of these pressures and accordingly tailored their policies to have the maximum effect on Washington. Queen

Wilhelmina, in a speech broadcast to the United States and Britain, and delivered in English, declared that "colonialism is dead" and said that

Indonesia could make important contributions to the success of the Marshall

Plan;

Blessed with many riches of the earth, a United States of Indonesia can take a great share in the common fi^t against famine and need. In free association with the Netherlands, Surinam and the Antilles,

I^^New York Times. June 25, 1948, p. 1. 151

a sovereign Indonesia will be able to carry on her economic develop­ ment which already before the war was unprecedented in Asia. Providing Europe and America with her goods and raw materials, Indonesia will be able to make a real contribution to the tremendous efforts now being asked from the American people under the Marshall Plan.164

Military assistance to the Netherlands was also continued through

1948. In March, two B-17's, three P-47's and three P-51's, all of which were in a demilitarized and non-flyable condition, were sold to the Dutch for about what it would have cost to transport them from the United States.

While it was emphasized that these aircraft were for ground instruction only, and for use "in educational institutions," the fact that training facilities are a basic part of any military establishment illustrates their rather obvious usefulness to The Hague.1^^

In late April, correspondence was exchanged between Acting Secre­ tary of State Lovett and Netherlands Ambassador van Kleffens in which the

Dutch were informed of the provisions of the Economic Cooperation Act to which they must adhere to qualify for United States' assistance, and in which The Hague communicated to the United States Government its inten- tions of adhering to these provisions. 166

That United States' assistance m i ^ t be forthcoming for more than just the Dutch homeland itself was suggested when it was announced on

June 4 that Eugene R. Black, the United States representative on the

Board of Directors for the World Bank, would depart shortly for the

l64jjew York Times, February 4, 1948, p. 1,

l65United States, Department of State, Bulletin. XVIII, No. 455 (March 21, 1948), 241. I66ibid,, XVIII, No. 465 (May I6, 1948), 46I. 152

Netherlands East Indies at the invitation of the Dutch, stopping in London

and Amsterdam en route. The purpose of the trip was to "gather economic

information."1 ^7 j^id on the date prior to Black's departure, the Nether­

lands Government announced that it was seeking a 8400 million loan from

the United States for the East Indies. It was also made known that dollar

proceeds from Bangka Island tin were to be used to secure the advance. A

portion of the loan would be underwritten, the report stated, by the

Export-Import Bank, given internal stability.168

The conclusion of bilateral European Recovery Program agreements

with fourteen countries, which were finally effective for ten of them,

was announced in July. Among the ten was the Netherlands.^By October,

the Economic Cooperation Administration approved loans for eleven Marshall

Plan countries, and the Netherlands was second only to Britain and France

in the amount of funds to be received, with eighty million dollars going

to The Hague itself and another fifteen million to the Dutch East

Indies.17°

In an article seemingly addressed to the Republic of Indonesia,

Professor Raymond Kennedy said that Indonesians should not be surprised by

the United States' temporizing attitude during the Renville negotiations

and should know that the "main lines" of United States foreign policy were

predicated on possible war with the Soviet Union. "The United States

l6?New York Times, June 5, 1948, p. 22.

I68%bid., June 8, 1948, p. 7.

^^^United States, Department of State, Bulletin, IXX. No. 473 (July 25, 1948), 104. I^Oyew York Times, October 7, 1948, p. 12. 153

Government and military command— which in foreign affairs are rapidly becoming one and the same thing-- ..." refused to countenance any weak­ ening of the Western European allies, due to this possibility,

the United States, therefore, for the time being at least, sup­ ports the preservation of the colonial system. Other consider­ ations— the current American fear of all revolutionary movements, the deep American feelings concerning the inferiority of non-white racial groups, the concern of American business interests for their invest­ ments in colonial territories, and the American apprehension over the socialistic tendencies of the Indonesian and other colonial revolu­ tionary movementa--are probably involved in the foreign policy of the United States with respect to Indonesia. But above all, it is the anti-Russian obsession of the United States Government which determines American policy in all parts of the world today and which had practically made the United States a member of the "colonial bloc" in international affairs pertaining to the dependent peoples of the earth.171

Dr. Kennedy overstated his case. As a matter of fact, there con­ tinued to emerge during this period concrete signs of United States' pressure on the Netherlands. In July, for example, the following article appeared in the State Department Bulletin;

The Security Council decided on July 6th to ask its Good Offices Committee in Indonesia for a full report on restrictions applied to trade with the Indonesian Republic. The action followed a complaint by the Indonesia Republic representative Lambertus Palar, that "the Dutch are trying to strangle the Republic." The Good Offices Committee reported on June 21st . . . that, al­ though the truce agreement signed aboard the USS Renville on January 17, 1948 stipulated that normal trade channels, both domestic and foreign, were to be reopened, no significant increase in trade in and out of the Republican territory had occurred, and there were severe shortages of vital commodities. 172

1 71 Raymond Kennedy, "Truce in Indonesia," Far Eastern Survey, March 3, 1948, pp. 65-68.

172united States, Department of State, Bulletin, IXX, No. 471, July 11, 1948, p. 47. 154

The point to this, of course, is not that the continuation of the Dutch

blockade of the Republic was something new, nor even that the Security

Council was apparently laying the necessary groundwork to take cognizance

of this clear breach of the Renville principles: what is important is

that by the very act of printing such an article in the official record of

the foreign policy of the United States, a certain clear, if oblique

criticism of the Dutch activity was being Implied.

The Good Offices Committee, in response to this request for infor­

mation, apparently caught the Council's mood; it used the sharpest language

that it had employed to date in relating to the Council that the blockade

was effectively preventing the economic rehabilitation of the Republican

areas of Indonesia. It largely supported the Republic's charges that the

Dutch did not give effect to the economic provisions of R e n v i l l e . ^ 73

This was followed, on July 29* with the passage (with United

States' approval) of a Chinese resolution calling on the Netherlands and

the Republic of Indonesia to live up to all of the military and economic

provisions of the Renville Agreement. Little attempt was made, even by

the United States delegation, to hide the fact that it was the Nether­

lands blockade of the Republic which was the major, if not the sole,

target of the resolution.174 This too was written up in a succeeding

State Department Bulletin. 175

173 New York Times, July 27, 1949, p. 14. 174 Ibid., July 30, 1946, p. 10. 175united States, Department of State, Bulletin, IXX, No. 474 (August 1, 1948), 133. 155

Several weeks prior to this, in the single most concise and. ex­ plicit statement of the United States* policy in the Indonesian Question during 1948, the State Department's Deputy Director for Far Eastern

Affairs, H. Merle Benninghoff, began his speech over the Columbia Broad­ casting System by attempting to delineate the differences separating the

Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia. "For 300 years Indonesia has been a Dutch colony. Both the Dutch and Indonesian people derived great benefit from this relationship." Taking note of the historic Dutch respect for freedom and independence, Benninghoff reviews The Hague's past statements of intent regarding Indonesian independence and finds that these had been "tragically interrupted" by the Pacific war. The next paragraph in his introduction is interesting as much for its tone as for its content;

The Dutch, emerging from Nazi occupation, regarded their sov­ ereignty over Indonesia as unimpaired. So did the United States and other nations. The Dutch naturally regarded the Indonesian Republic as an experiment in rebellion. We must remember that many thousand Dutchmen regarded Indonesia as their home and had over some 300 years built for themselves a large stake in the area. Dutch attempts to re­ store their control over the archipelago were resisted by force in the islands of Java, Sumatra, and M a d u r a . 1 7 6

In describing the Dutch attack upon the Republic nearly one year previously, he says the Netherlands "embarked on what it called a police action to restore peace and order ..." The seizure of the Council with the issue is then described, as is the formulation of the GOC,

Mr. Benninghoff then reviews the formulation of the Renville Agreement

(", . . which both the Netherlands and the Indonesian Republic voluntarily

^76united States, Department of State, Bulletin, IXX (July 4, 1948) 9-11. (Speech entitled "Progress in Indonesia.""5 156 accepted,") The following rather exceptional statement is then made:

I have just referred to the differences which separated the Netherlands and the Indonesian Republic. Fortunately, those dif- erences are of means and not ends .... The Netherlands has announced to the world its desire to give the Indonesian people the privileges and responsibilities of self-government. The Indonesian people have, during the past three years, demonstrated their deter­ mination to secure self-government. Both parties, in accepting the Renville agreements, have agreed to the grand design which shall embody the purposes of these two great peoples. All that remains is to negotiate the details of that design,"

In what seems almost an afterthought, the speaker goes on to admit that the task is not really all that easy.

At this point the Renville Agreement itself is described in some detail, with the important exception that there is no mention of the van Mook Line, and the importance and implications of the Republican

acceptance thereof.

Thus, the old empire will be transformed into a union of friends, mutually dependent on each other and mutually helpful to each other and to the world. This should be a satisfaction to all Americans, since your representative is helping to work out the first solution of its kind to one of the most difficult problems with which the world is faced.

It was the following portion of this speech which was most

heavily quoted in the press;

There are, of course, normal difficulties in negotiations and honest doubts on both sides. These are yet to be overcome. I am sorry to tell you that in addition to these difficulties, there are those who are conniving to subvert fhe ends sought in the Renville agreements. They are those same people whose policies require the preservation and the intensification of chaos and hatred everywhere in the world. Those people viewed the acceptance of the Renville agreements in January with genuine alarm and they have tried ever since to destroy the faith of the Netherlands j^d] Indonesian people in the just and practical character of the proposed settlement. Their ways are devious and ruthless. You know of whom I apeak— the Communists who even at this hour are at work in the Netherlands, in Indonesia and throughout Asia, and even in the United States to call the good faith of the Good Offices Committee and its work into 157

question. I must put you on your guard against these efforts, which take the form of trying to identify communism, a doctrine of enslave­ ment, with the natural aspirations of peoples throughout the world for independence.

This was the first major counterattack by the United States on Soviet policy in Indonesia; the stress of previous months had certainly taken its toll.

In refreshing contrast to the malevolent and mischievous policies outlined above comes the following statement;

If you could ask me questions now, you would ask what United States policy towara Indonesia is. I will tell you. First and fore­ most your government is determined to do everything it can to bring peace, prosperity and the freedoms of a democratic system to the peo­ ples of Indonesia and to the peoples everywhere in the world. Sec­ ondly, your government, in this particular instance, seeks to help Indonesians and Dutch people to rediscover their dependence on each other and to learn anew the great contribution each can make to the welfare and security of the other. Thirdly, your government realizes, as do the peoples of the Netherlands and Indonesia, that the rest of the world desperately needs what the two of them, working together, can provide. Finally, your government is determined that the efforts of totalitarianism to defeat these purposes shall not succeed.

This policy statement seems to have the following characteristics: it is calculated to be appealing to popular opinion, yet it is highly general­ ized and unspecific, and heavily laden with the by now familiar American exhortation to the parties to generate and act upon a mutual trust and confidence that neither had danonstrated in the three year history of the crisis.

The following, and concluding, passage is of interest for the implicit manifestation of distrust for the "revolutionary situation" and the description of the Parties' acceptance of the Renville principles.

Progress has been made toward the solution of the Indonesian problem which should be heartening to you and to everyone, anywhere in the world, who genuinely hopes for a peaceful settlement of the world's problems. The Indonesian Republic and the Netherlands have agreed to a truce which halted a bloody war. This truce has been successful for 158

over five months. The two parties have voluntarily accepted the Renville agreements, which provide an agreed basis for negotiating a final settlement of their differences. In other words, . . . a rev­ olutionary situation has been transformed into one in which the legit­ imate desires of both Dutch and Indonesian peoples can be achieved through evolutionary processes. We recognize that there are still difficulties of give and take to be overcome, but given the good will of both parties, and the will to work with patience and restraint, they can and must be solved. I assure you that the Government of the United States will continue with resolution and patience to contribute in every way it can to the solu­ tion of the Indonesian problem to the end that Dutch and Indonesian peoples will march together in dignity in a world of peace and freedom. 177

The other articulation of United States' Indonesian policy with which we must deal is far more succinct, but requires somewhat closer anal- ysis. It was delivered in a speech by Secretary of State George Marshall when he spoke before the third regular session of the United Nations

General Assembly on September 23, 1948.

We believe that the ends to be sought on these matters may be briefly summarized as follows: . . . 4. A negotiated settlement without further bloodshed in Indonesia along the broad lines of the Renville Agreement, providing within a brief period both the sovereign independence sought by the peoples of Indonesia and continued cooperation between them and the people of the Netherlands.^ 78

"Along the broad lines" of Renville? This is decidedly not to say, "in

strict accordance with Renville." How may we interpret this? The major development, as has been indicated, in the post-Renville period had been

the unilateral interpretation and implementation of that agreement by the

Netherlands. It would seem that calling only for the most general adher­ ence to the agreement must be viewed favorably by that power. The only other explanation would be that the Dutch had already gone so far along

177portions of this speech were quoted in the New York Times, June 27, 1948, p. 5* ^7®uew York Times, September 24, 1948, p. 1.; United States, Departmentnt oi state, ruiletin, XIX, No. 48 3 (October 3, 1948), 454* 159 this path that Secretary Marshall’s words were in fact a warning not to scrap Renville altogether, at least publicly. After all, Washington was quite heavily committed to this particular solution, as the Dutch knew very well.

The phrase "within a brief period" was most probably intended to be a reflection (though not the first) that American patience was limited, that early independence should be a goal of the Parties and the Committee.

However, by speaking of the sovereign independence desired by "the peoples of Indonesia" (instead of referring specifically to the Republic of Indonesia) he made the entire statement eminently palatable to the

Netherlands, Indeed, the Republic was the only element in the Indonesian picture to which The Hague objected. And this is not an academic or sterile issue; it was the careful elimination of any reference to the

Republic in the Dutch ultimatum/counter proposals (following the Christmas message) which made them so thoroughly unacceptable to the Republic. Was the omission intentional? We have ample evidence that the United States accepted the Republic as at least the major embodiment of Indonesian nationalism; or was this passage written by the European desk at State?

Without satisfactorily answering these questions, we may conclude by noting that, even within the short and compacted policy statement, the

Secretaiy found space to mention the "continued cooperation" between the two Parties— one of the major Dutch and American goals, but one which later history, at least, has demonstrated was of very little interest to the Republic of Indonesia. An editorial in the New York Times, which showed markedly greater interest in the prestige of the United Nations and the economy of the Netherlands than in the independence of Indonesia, 160 contained the following rather exceptional assertion:

The hope of a peaceful solution was compromised by the Dutch "police action" of last July but there still has not been aroused on either side in the Indies the bitterness that makes a just solution too difficult to reach. 179

THE MEDAN AFFAIR AND UNITED STATES’ INDONESIAN POLICY

If 1948 was the year which witnessed the coming of a total Cold

War to Europe, and with it (after the coup in Czechoslovakia) a certain stability-in-tension, 1948 seemed also to bring the violent advent of this struggle to Indonesia. The twin subjects of the strength of domestic com­ munism within the Republican political spectrum and the expressed attitudes of the Soviet Union towards the Indonesian Question have not been treated in any but a cursory fashion up to this point in our story. One major reason for this is that, up until 1948 at least, the broad issue of "com­ munism and Indonesia" (per se) is evaluated as having played a secondary role as a determinant of United States’ foreign policy in Indonesia.

It would seem that the strength, popularity and widespread acceptance of the P.K.I. within the political life of the Republic was counterbalanced in the view of American policy makers only by the compar­ atively moderate nature of P.K.I, policies. Prom the advent of the Rev­ olution, the Party had generally lent its support to the Sjahrir and

Sjahrifuddin Cabinets and had acquiesced in the signing of the Linggadjati and (for a time) the Renville Agreements. We may further speculate that the fulsome and unstinting praise from the Soviet Union for the Indonesian

Revolution might have had an inhibiting effect on American policy makers

l79Editorial, New York Times, September 24, 1948, p. 24. 161 in dealings with the Republic, It is to be emphasized that prior to the

Fall of 1946, this student can find no direct evidence of this. Never­ theless, there seems to be a large amount of circumstantial evidence which would tend to support the contention that a substantial amount of

Washington's thinking about Indonesia revolved around the question of internal and external communist influence in the archipelago. Some of this evidence will be reviewed in the following pages.

It is appropriate at this juncture to recall ourearlier state­ ment (see page 44) that, so far as the United States was concerned,

"... throughout most of the early period, communism was not viewed as being an important and critical factor in Indonesian political life."

However, Netherlands leaders and spokesmen were not quite this sanguine on the subject. And, to the degree that the heavy emphasis given this matter in Dutch statements and propaganda designed for American consump­ tion represented an accurate assessment on the part of The Hague as to what would be likely to elicit a critical reaction in Washington, we have our first major piece of circumstantial evidence.

When Lieutenant Governor General van Mo ok was in Washington in

September of 1947, he declared at a press conference that the "usual out­

side influences" were apparent in Indonesia.

Pressed on this point, he added:

"There is a Communist party, which certainly has lines of com­ munication with the outside, and the Communist influence is not negli­ gible. Also, there are different groups of people that profit by selling out the Republic," However, he explained that the Moslems were the largest element in Indonesia and that they were anti-communist.1 ^0

100New York Times, September 10, 1947, P* 11 162

Because of its direct relevance to our point, the following New York

Times dispatch, datelined November 2, 1947, The Hague, is quoted in full;

Pronounced communist activity in Indonesia, manifest in under­ ground resistance to the Dutch and in long term planning to dominate the economy of the archipelago, is being closely watched by the Netherlands. The authorities here attach much importance to it. A careful check of a wide variety of sources of information over the last two and one half months indicates that Indonesian communism is stronger than ever before, that it is well directed by experienced and deter­ mined men who have chosen to remain in the background as much as possible for the present. On the face of it the communists are not a major factor in the present Indonesian situation. They endorsed the Cheribon Agreement, providing for an autonomous Indonesia within the Netherlands Kingdom. Assertions of rigfit-wing organizations in the Netherlands that the communists control the Jogjakarta Government and that Java is alive with Russian-equipped military units are ridiculed in most well- informed quarters, private as well as official. The best information available in the Netherlands suggests that the Communists are willing to play a relatively quiet game now, with the prospect of rich prizes later. There are thirty-five Communists in the Provisional Republican Parliament. However, it can be said that the Communists are conspicuous by their absence from the fore­ front of Indonesian politics. They have no mass support in Indonesia and the plan to which they are said to be committed concentrates on the slow building up of influence in the other Leftists groups, notably those with young members.

Charles Wolf's observations, penned in early 1948, are quite

sound. He noted that the Labor Party and the major labor union federation

in Indonesia, S.O.B.S.I, (Sentrai Organisasi Burah Seluru Indonesia—

Central Organization of All Indonesian Labor), were not communist con­

trolled. While the SOBSI Congress in Malang in May of 1947 was widely

publicized by the Dutch as an indication of strong communists in Indo­

nesian labor, Wolf found this to be largely a Dutch propaganda exercise.

Noting the presence of leftist Australian and Dutch labor leaders at

18llbid., November 5, 1947, p. 18. 163

Malang, he quotes a h i ^ Indonesian official; "There was nothing at

Malang which was communistic except some slightly foolish statements by 162 foreign communists." He shows how tenuous the P.K.I.'s contact with foreign communist parties was by reviewing the solicitation of an invi­ tation to Indonesia by French, Russian, and Yugoslav members of the World

Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), their trip to that country, and their encouragement to Indonesian youth to attend the forthcoming WFDY meeting in Prague later in 1947. He finds that there was "no active, direct and continuous contact with Russia . . ."at that time, but a real danger existed that, "without an end to the political strife and economic

isolation," and without some indications of American sympathy and interest,

"the Republican Government migjit be forced to seek its friends and its

support wherever it can find them . . . eventually perhaps in Russia as well. 1 65

This is a particularly crucial point; would limited American

support to the Republic strengthen the international and regional bar­

gaining power of an already communist-infested regime, as the Dutch seemed

to believe, or did the withholding of United States support strengthen

the purely internal power of what was an otherwise weak Indonesian Com­

munist Party, as many sympathetic American observers and the Republican

spokesmen alleged? An observation which can safely be made at this stage

is that, as the Cold War intensified and spread to non-European areas of

the world, this question could be counted on to assume increasing impor­

tance in the deliberations of the American Department of State.

16^Wolf, The Indonesian Story, p. 84.

185ibid., p p . 85-87. 164

The New York Times correspondent in Amsterdam, Paul Catz, seemed to deal largely with Dutch industrial and banking interests, and the stories he filed, often printed on the Financial Page, frequently addressed themselves to this issue. He wrote in April of 1948 that many of his contacts had stressed to him the unsound conditions which prevailed in the Republic.

These experts emphasized the great importance of the opinion of the United States and posed the question; "Won't American eyes now be opened to the fact that the Republican Government has not authority and no experience and will continue to be ruled by terrorist and com­ munist influences?" 1^4

The growing concern over the problem of Indonesian communism was reflected in a Times editorial after the Dutch national elections of 1948, which saw a marked shift to the r i ^ t in the political spectrum at The

Hague. The writer warned that this development in the mother country might be a "hollow victory," if the Netherlands;

. . , should permit a settlement in Indonesia to drag along and let communism take firm hold in the rich Indies, whose tin and oil and copra and spices have nourished the home country for more than three hundred years,"185

It has been observed by Cold War historians that, stymied in Berlin, the Balkans, and in the hope of seeing the early accession to power of the

French and Italian Communist Parties, and seeing an increasingly hopeful situation developing in China, Stalin turned from a stalemated Europe to the fluid and unsteady areas of Asia as promising greater hope for reward, particularly in view of the United States' demonstrably lower interest in this area of the world. In the years following the Korean War, in fact.

164ÿfew York Times, April 19, 1948, p. 34. ^6^Editorial, New York Times, July 9, 1948, p. 18. 165 this observation seemed to assume the status of conventional wisdom. The latter months of 1948 witnessed the outbreaks of communist revolts or insurgency in the Philippines, Burma, Malaya, Viet Nam, and Indonesia.

In keeping with the monolithic, "international conspiracy" conceptuali­ zation of world communism, it was quite easy to see the hand of the

Cominform behind all this.

The following is a most important example of this kind of thinking, which was to become so prevalent in late 1948 and after. Said the New

York Times' correspondent, Robert Trumbull, writing from New Dehli in

July:

It is believed that communist agents from all Southeast Asian countries met secretly in Calcutta in February and March behind the screen of the Southeast Asian Youth Conference and the Indian Com­ munist Party convention held a week later and there received instruc­ tions. It was after this that the party line in India took a new turn against the Nehru Government and that unrest grew in Malaya, Burma and Siam. The outlook for communism in Southeastern Asia leaves no room for complacency in the democratic West . . . , The immediate purpose of the communist organization is to deprive the Western powers of Southeast Asia's natural resources .... To date, the communists have succeeded to this extent; They have slowed industrial advances in India; have kept Burma in a ferment; brou^t Malayan industry to a virtual standstill; contributed impor­ tantly to prevention of normal output from producing areas of French Indo-China and the Netherlands East Indies and have complicated the combustible situation in S i a m .186

Ruth McVey published an excellent monograph on this very subject 187 in 1958. It is significant that in his preface to this work, George

McT, Kahin wrote the following words :

The Calcutta Conference of February 1948 has been the subject of a great deal of conjecture and very little scholarship, A number of

186jfew York Times, July 18, 1948, Section IV, p. 7. 167jtuth T. McVey, The Calcutta Conference and the Southeast Asian Uprisings (Ithaca: Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1958). 166

writers, on the basis of the rather meagre knowledge available to them concerning the Conference, have drawn important conclusions, and these have often served as a significant part of the foundation for substantial theoretical edifices concerning the nature of Asian Com­ munist movements and their relationships with Moscow. 188

It is quite evident that Dr. Kahin is addressing himself to writing such as Mr. Trumbull's report from New Dehli, in view of the con­ tent of McVey'8 monograph. Addressing herself to the central question of whether or not Moscow used this conference as the opportunity to issue operational orders for the rather marked increase in communist-inspired insurgency and revolt which seemed to manifest itself througjiout South­ east Asia in (particularly) the closing months of 1948 (and after), Ruth

McVey draws a number of interesting conclusions. The most important of these is that Moscow did not, in all probability, issue a call to in­ surrection at the Youth Conference. She goes on to point out, however, that the occasion was used as a forum for the discussion, if not the promulgation, of the newly formulated two-camp doctrine. And it was clear that the non-European corollary of this doctrine decreed an end to the cooperation between non-ruling communist parties and the bourgeois- nationalist forces which were leading the independence revolutions throughout much of Southeast Asia. And the author does seem to allow that the insurrection which marked the end of 1948 in Southeast Asia could have been inspired, at least in part, by the interpretations of the new two-camp doctrine made by each of the communist parties in the states and colonies affected.

But in an important sence. Miss McVey's valuable conclusions are of little more than marginal relevance to the problem with which we are

188ibid., p, 1. 167 confronted. iVhat ^ must concern ourselves with is not so much the truth of the matter, though this is of considerable import, but rather what

American policy makers thought was happening, with the perceived realities as they were viewed from Washington. While it is neither necessary nor academically sound to do so, we might at least attempt an approximation of what these perceived realities were by setting forth those conceptions which Ruth McVey has undertaken to dispel. Without question, the most important of these is the belief that the Cominform ordered the uprisings of 1948 in Southeast Asia at the Calcutta Youth Conference in February of that year. And before leaving this topic, the author has one additional observation which is of importance to the issues posed herein.

. . , whatever its ultimate aims, the Soviet Union has generally dictated world Communist strategy, not with an eye to touching off world social revolution, but to the immediate foreign policy interests of the USSR. At this time, the Russians were interested in weak­ ening the Western powers in any way possible short of world war; and they were particularly interested in injuring the United States. This reflection of the Soviet national interest is made most clear in the two-camp doctrine's designation of the United States as the prime imperialist enemy. 189

Judging from some of the rhetoric which the writer of the above lines then proceeds to quote, from the records of the Conference, it seems quite clear that American foreign policy officials could neither have overlooked nor been unconcerned with, the proceedings and import of the gathering at

Calcutta.

By early September, press reports began to reflect considerable alarm over the growth of Indonesian communism. The Associated Press fore­ saw the renewal of hostilities in Indonesia as a "strong possibility" which

''6%bid., p. 18. 168

come about In one of two waya:

First, the Communists, #io have just swallowed up the Socialist, Labor, and young Soolalist parties, may join with the Indonesian Army and attempt a coup d ' etat against Premier Mohammed Hatta's . . . Gov­ ernment. The Indonesian Army is known to be closely linked with former Premier Amir Sjarifuddin, who has just declared that secretly he has been a communist since 1935. ^

It was envisioned that the Dutch would welcome such a develop­ ment, as it would provide a clear and unambiguous pretext for the opening of a second police action.

Three days later, a thirty-one year old Londoner named John Coast emerged from the Republic and told the Reuters agency in Singapore that, in his capacity as an adviser to the Indonesian Foreign Ministry, he had learned that

. . . the Indonesian Republicans were turning to the Soviet Union as their only hope in helping them to gain a just settlmnent with the Dutch. Addressing a press conference, he said that the Indonesians now inclined to the belief that the Thaited States would not help their Republic to gain such a settlement. Dr. Zain, another member of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry, said that the Republicans were asking if the United States could take a firm stand on Palestine, why could she not take the same stand on Indonesia.191

The problem of indigenous Indonesian communism having been a mat­ ter of long-standing concern to the Netherlands authorities, the growth in communist activity during this period apparently came as no partic­ ular surprise in The Hague. The Dutch Government vowed, however, that this activity would be outlawed and fou^t "with all the legal means" available. Further, Foreign Minister D. V. Stikker would fly to

^^^New York Times, September 5, 1948, p. )1

191 Ibid., September 8, 1946, p. 14. 169

Washington immediately, in his words, "to discuss the general political 192 situation and the development of communism in the Far East." And the

Dutch hit this theme hard:

The development of Communist activity during the last few months in Southeast Asia and elsewhere has thrown a clear light on the methods and aims of this activity. . . * cwnmunistic action must be desig^nated as a criminal offense .... It does not hesitate to create unrest from republican territory and to apply violence in non-republican areas in flagrant conflict with the truce agreement. 1^5

Then, at the eleventh hour, came some very clear signs of the

Republican Government's attitude. Hatta bitterly denounced the FKI in

Parliament for trying to . . drag the Republic into a Soviet-American

global conflict." This he described as "suicide" for Indonesia, and reminded his listeners that Republican endorsement of the anti-imperialist aims of the USSR did not imply that the Republic was obliged to "follow

in the footsteps of Soviet Russia, whose history indicates a zigzag line

in conformity with conditions she herself encounters." Russia had

changed her line seven times since 1917, "now turning left, now right."

The future of Indonesia "does not rest with Soviet ideology.

On the same day, the Department of State let it be known that it was watching "the communist movement " in Southeast Asia very closely, and

"that there were indications sincere nationalist leaders there were not

deceived by Communist pretentions of support."

^^^Ibid., September 10, 194S, p. 3*

^^^Ibid.

^^^New York Times, September 17, 1948, p. 13. 170

The article continued:

Ae one major strategca, the State Department observed, the Com­ munists in that area had sought to win allies in their drive for power by having their leaders pretend to champion the cause of local nationalists.

A Department spokesman noted that an attempt was being made to identify communism and nationalism in the minds of people, which worked well,

. . . at least until the Cominform*s denunciation of the Yugo­ slav communist leaders as being, among other things, guilty of nationalism. There is some evidence that sincere nationalist leaders in South­ east Asia, originally deceived by this device, have now awakened to the fact that in Communist-controlled states outside the Soviet Union, the nationalism to which they aspire is regarded as a hig^ crime and grounds for ruthless interference in the internal affairs of such states by international communist organizations.l°^

Here we witness the first manifestations (in the public realm) of what were to become some very important themes in American foreign policy in Indonesia, and indeed in all of the developing areas. Despite the rather insulting disrespect which the above statement reflects for the political maturity and perceptiveness of the leaders of the newly emerging states of Asia, it also sketches the broad outlines of the counterattack against the two-camp philosophy. Communism and nationalism had nothing to do with one another; their goals were antithetical. The break with

Tito was to be offered up frequently to demonstrate that Russian national interests were to take precedence when in conflict with internationalist solidarity. But what is most important, at least for our purposes, is that the United States was beginning to show concern for the "communist threat" in areas beyond Europe.

Foreign Minister Stikker appstrently wished to encourage this trend. On his arrival in New York from the Netherlands, he said he hoped

^^^Ibid., September 17, 1948, p. 15- 171 the United States would look at oommunism as a world problem and "take a stand against it," just as was already being done in Berlin, He added that there was "a plan behind all these happenings in the Far East.

Reports of hostilities from areas controlled by the Republic began to come in on September 18;

Unofficial reports said today that the Indoneeieui Republic's Communist troubles apparently had spread from Java to West Sumatra. A Communist group was reported to be fighting units of the Republican Army (TNIJ in Tapanouli. Fitting was also reported in Fadang, Sidempuan and Sibolga. The Indonesian news agency Antara said that the three-way bat­ tle among Trotskyite and Stalinite [sic] communists had spread to northeastern and southern sections of the Javanese City of Sura­ karta .... Serious implications were seen in an Indonesian spokesman's statement here today that the Army units in Surakarta were divided and the police were "too weak" to keep order.19?

Then, on September 20, the fall of Madiun was reported: the page ten headline read, "Reds in Indonesia take a major city;" the article began, "Communists have overthrown the Government in Maduin, a city in the Indonesian Republic, and set up a 'Soviet' regime. President

Sukarno announced today," The article reported the President's martial law proclamation, and quoted a portion of hie radio speech:

This seizure of power by the Comnuniets may be regarded as a start for seizing the whole Republic .... Musso [a Mo scow-trained Communist] and his Communist party staged a coup, seized power in Madiun and established there a Soviet Government under his leadership. 198

Musso was denounced by Sukarno as a "traitor," and his early capture was called for. The insurgents were aided by a brigade of the Republican

‘‘^^Ibid.

York Times. September 18, 1948, p. 8.

^^®Ibid., Septœnber 20, 1948, p. 10. 172

Army and a unit of the People's Army. The Republican Information Min­ istry said that the coup was probably Moscow-inspired, and the major

Governmental leaders, notably the Sultan of Jogjakarta and Hatta, joined in Sukarno's appeal.

The report continued:

The Indonesian Communists recently came into the open when former premier Sjarifuddin's Socialists and former Vice premier Setiadjit's Labor party merged with them. The Communists already have stirred up serious incidents in Surakarta and there have been strikes— apparently Communist-inspired— in Madiun. The Republican Ministry of Information issued a communique de­ claring that the Dutch blockade of Indonesia and Dutch agitation had created favorable conditions for the communist coup. "It is probably a part of Moscow's plan for a Southeast Asia under the leadership of Musso," the communique said .... A British adviser to the Republic's Foreign Office said that the upsurge in Communism was the result of popular disillusionment with the Iftiited States' policy toward Indonesia. He quoted former Premier Amir Sjarifuddin as having told him when he went over with the Com­ munists: "I am still a Left Wing Socialist, not a Communist. But I do not think that the Americans have any intention of supporting a just solution. The Russians are our only hope." . . . Russia has consist­ ently sided with the Indonesians and has attacked Dutch "imperi­ alism."199

Such reports, we may confidently suppose, were read with considerable care, and, in all probability, provoked serious thought and discussion within the policy-formulating organs of the Government of the United

States. We may also assume that the single most important concern of

American policy makers was how (and how effectively) the battered, fledgling Republican Government would react to the fall of Hadian. Let us closely follow the early hours of the coup a little further.

The following day, the New York Times quoted a Times of London dispatch which reported that the Republican Provisional Parliament had

199 Ibid., September 20, 1948, p. 10. 173 granted three months unlimited power to Sukarno to deal with the crisis; left-wing newspapers were banned; the headquarters of the Indonesian

Communist Party's (PKI's) youth and trade union organizations were seized; several hundred persons were arrested in Jogjakarta, including many communists. The "rl^t-wing" Masjumi (political party) and the

"moderate" nationalist Party (PNI) formed a national independence front

"to safeguard the Republic." While little was known about the situation in Madiun, fighting was reported continuing in Surakarta, where the local

Army commander had ordered all fighting to cease by noon on the twenty- first, and had commanded all local array unit commanders to appear before him prior to this time. Any failing to do so would be regarded as in­ surgents, according to the report.

The Associated Press reported that the PKI had called for the complete overthrow of the Republic and had "brou^t the young Republic to the brink of civil war." The Madiun radio had outlined a program that included confiscation of all industrial enterprises by the Government and the placing of military forces in the hands of the people, as well as the establishment of internal security committees.

The program followed the usual communist pattern. The slogan was, "Land for those who toll it." Today, informed sources said that documents had been discovered in the communist files directing that a Red coup in Java should fol­ low within three months after the commencement of Communist activ­ ities in Malaya and form a part of the spread of communism in Southeast Asia.200

And, under a Washington, D. C. dateline, this appeared:

Netherlands Foreign Minister Dr. D. V. Stikker said today that his Government would refuse to make any concession to the Indonesian

9 0 0 ^^Ibid,, September 21, 1948, p. 15. 174

Republic that would strengthen the Communist movement. At a news conference he repeatedly indicated his belief that Russia was directing the Communist activities in Java, but declined to say so in so many words,20"'

And the long hand of Moscow seemed to emerge even more clearly with the report which the New York Times carried on the following day:

From incognito traveler from Moscow to President of Java's self- proclaimed Communist Republic in thirty-seven days is the meteoric rise of fame of Mus so, Indonesia's fifty-year-old, stocky Communist leader, who was once an obscure young school teacher.202

The report went on to recall that, under a false name, Musso had arrived in Java from Moscow, via Bangkok on the twelfth of August, and was now the acknowledged leader of the Communist "counter-revolution" against the

Republic, He first went to Moscow twenty-three years ago, it said, to request active help in the communist revolt to drive out the Dutch, but got no assistance due to Soviet skepticism about the chances for success.

His first public appearance was at a PKI meeting at Jogjakarta on

August 20, at which time he demanded that the Republican Government break off negotiations with the Dutch, exchange consuls with the USSR, form a

"national front" government with communists occupying the major cabinet posts. In nine days, Musso had, according to this report, gotten all of the left-wing political parties, and the SOBSI (Sentral Organ!sasi Burah

Seluru Indonesia— Central Organization of All Indonesian Labor) to join the communist ranks. Madiun, it was noted, was an area of considerable

PKI strength, in which the communists had been able to concentrate their propaganda, ^

Ibid., September 22, 1948, p. 17.

^°^Ibid., September 25, 1948.

"("^Ibid. 175

By September 24, It was being reported that, while the commu­ nists were calling for a general strike and uprisings all over Indonesia, 204 the Republican Army was attacking Madiun from three directions. Two days later reports began to filter in of towns in east and central Java which were beginning to fall back into Government hands; and it was at this time that the Republican propaganda line regarding the revolt began to emerge: Alexander A, Mar amis, Finance Minister of the Republic, arrived in Washington for consultations and called for an end to the

Dutch blockade of Indonesia, so that the Communist uprising mi ^ t "be put down shortly," He added that his Government had told him that the up­ rising was being suppressed successfully.^®^

And so it was. Town after town fell to the armed forces of the

Republic, and Government spokesmen were increasingly given over to anti­ communist statements, which could only have been received with feelings of gratification and satisfaction by American observers of the Southeast

Asian scene. And, on the last day of September, the recapture of Madiun was proclaimed by the Republican forces, and from this point on, the out­ come could not have been in doubt. While the executions of major PKI leaders and the taking of further towns and villages in the interior of

Java were yet to come, the major point, at least as far as the United

States was concerned, had certainly been established: the Republic of

Indonesia was both willing and capable of putting down a most serious and determined coimnunist threat to its internal security.

204 Mew York Times, September 24, 1948* P* 11

^^^Ibid., September 26, 1948, p. 1?. 176

Did these events constitute a changed situation, as far as the international position of the Republic and American policy toward it were concerned? The editors of the New York Times called for con­ cessions from the Dutch, in the expectation that,

. . . The Hague might gain far more than it would immediately lose. And Communism in ^utheast Asia would have been struck the hardest blow p o s s i b l e . 206

On the contrary, however, it is possible to detect, if anything, a dis­ tinct hardening of attitudes on the part of the Dutch after the Madiun coup attempt. The Dutch press and military both began issuing highly exaggerated stories and communiques concerning the degree of instability and dislocation in Republican-controlled areas, emphasizing in partic­ ular any fighting taking place in the proximity of American or European plantations or oil fields.

It may be recalled that, in Chapter II, one of the important

subjects which were discussed concerned the "nature of the Republic of

Indonesia," and particularly the strength of communism within the

Republic. Certainly, by this time enough of the returns were in to permit some firm judgments on this subject; surely, if American ambiv­ alence with regard to the question of the degree of effective inter­

national support the Republic merited from the IRiited States turned on

the question of the strength of Indonesian communism, there could be

little further reason for doubt; surely, now, it was both opportune and

politic to restructure our Indonesia policy. American policy, calling,

as we have seen, for an essentially bilateral approach with a minimum

206 Editorial, New York Times, October 8, 1948, p. 24, 177 of international intervention, had surely failed by now: indeed, it had just escaped ending in what would be best described as disaster.

THE AMERICAN-INDONESIAN CORPORATION

Prior to turning to the unhappy events which mark the conclusion of this "Europe-first" chapter in the United States involvement in the

Indonesian independence movement, it is appropriate briefly to review an important, if little-known facet of this involvement which took place primarily in the private realm of international business. What makes the fascinating story of the American-Indonesian Corporation important as well, however, is the way in which these events influenced both events and attitudes in the public arena of inteimational relations. And we have chosen this point in our story to examine this phenomenon because of what it reveals about the composition of United States' Indonesian policy during the period under review.

The story centers around former Hollywood movie executive Matthew Fox who was by chance drawn into the Indonesian struggle and became so involved ideologically and emotionally that he spent nearly three years of full-time effort on a tremendous commercial gamble— and lost. Fox, several lawyers, and the Indonesian representatives in the United States guided the American Congress into pressures that succeeded in toughening the State Department policy with the result that Independ­ ence was probably hastened by several years,207

At the time of the first police action, a number of Indonesians, including L. N. Palar, Sudjatmoko and Sumitro arrived in the United

States to promote United States' capital investment in Indonesia. The most immediate problem was simply to find the funds with which to operate

207 Alexander Shakow, Foreign Economic Assistance in Indonesia, 1950-1961 (Tokyo: Econwnic Cooperation Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, 1964), p. 6. 178

abroad. A number of New York lawyers involved themselves with the Repub­ lican representatives, due to the attractiveness of their cause, and without promise of remuneration. Sumitro was introduced to the "boy won­ der" movie executive, Matthew Fox, who also found the cause appealing and agreed to help. Fox was particularly interested in ensuring that all prepsirations be made for United States business involvement in Indonesia after sovereignty was attained.^®®

It was Sumitro who suggested to his Government the establishment of a trading corporation. Though certain attractions had to be offered to United States' business interests, he wrote, even more importantly,

American businessmen must be made to realize that the Republican Government can maintain law and order, that it will always honor its promises, that there will be no unilateral confiscation of foreign interests, that state control over the economy would be limited so as to allow free enterprise a fair chance, that the Indonesian Govern­ ment was not inclined to sponsor monopolies, and that the Indonesian Government should not in any way associate itself with communist in­ fluence a. 209

The formation of the Corporation was approved by the Republican

Parliament in mid-July 1948 as part of the "... Republic's broad pro­ gram to rehabilitate and modernize the Indonesian economy, " again in

Sumitro's words. While details of the Corporation's capitalization were not available to the news media, it was disclosed that Fox and the Repub­ lic were to be equal partners in the ownership of the Corporation,

Sumitro said,

It is intended that purchases and sales will be made throu^ established channels of trade in the Iftiited States. The corporation's

90ft "^""“ibid., pp. 10, 11,

^®9%tid., p. 11. 179

function in no way interferes with the right of private Indonesian business interests to deal with private American interests di­ rectly .... Indonesia, after having been cut off from normal trade for six years requires modernization of its transportation, communications, power facilities and public works, as well as extensive quantities of all kinds of consumer and productive goods.

He then noted that Indonesia, in her turn, was a "vast store­ house of products needed by a war-ravaged world," And then he proceeded to enumerate an impressive list of Indonesian products, mineral and grain, which would now be more readily accessible to the world’s mar- 210 kets "... without the paralyzing influence of cartel."

The AIC was to function in the following manner; it was charged with handling exports and imports for the Republic of Indonesia Gov­

ernment in the United States and was to act as the Republic's "sole and exclusive agent" for purchases (by the Government) in the United States for ten years following Washington's ^ jure recognition of the Republic; 211 meanwhile the Corporation was to receive seven and one half percent of the invoice price on all Government sales and purchases in the United

States. The ownership of the company was to be divided evenly between

Matthew Fox and the Republic, with voting split 51-49 in Fox' favor.

Indonesian approval was required for all development projects and 212 exports/imports. Fox, of course, provided the working funds.

In regard to the later controversy over the seven and one half percent commission, the 51-49 voting rights, and the "exclusive agent"

^^®New York Times, July 15, 1948, financial page, p. 33. 211 Later (August 20, 1948), five percent. 212 Shakow, op. cit,, p* 1 180 aspect, Alexander Shakow writes:

Sumitro, who had earlier stimulated the idea of a corpo­ ration . . . was also aware of the difficulties in overcoming the strongly Dutch-oriented New York financial interests which looked with considerable distrust and displeasure upon activities by the Republican representatives. Fox was the only person willing to take the financial risks involved in such a proposition at a time when very few people were willing to touch any part of the Indo­ nesian question.2'5

But what is of acute interest to our study is the attitude manifested toward the AIC by the Department of State. From the outset,

Fox said that he would only agree to the scheme with the full knowledge and concurrence of that agency, whose tentative, initial acquiescence he had obtained by late 1947» He kept in close touch with the Department and, in April of 1948, wrote Dr. Willard Thorpe, Assistant Secretary for

Economic Affairs, explaining the contract in view of the anticipated public announcement. Fox emphasized the great financial risks, the great potential benefit to both Indonesia and the United States:

But most of all, this contract was a political document, for it gave the Republic the integrity of a partnership with American businessmen, an avenue to national development outside of the long- established Dutch monopoly over the islands. No longer was the Re­ public a group of dedicated individuals struggling against the powerful Dutch crown, but rather a young government with important friends in the world's major power.

Indeed, Sumitro explicitly stated (in writing) that the objectives of his office, to which the Corporation was so essential a

support, were: to exert a favorable influence on the negotiations in

Indonesia and at the Security Council; to strengthen the Republic's

financial and economic position; to make the Renville plebiscite

21 ? ^Ibid., p. 14.

^’’^Ibid., p. 15. 181

overwhelmingly pro-Republic; and to create the poseibilitiee and prepare the way for the future aid of the United States in the reconstruction and development of the Indonesian economy. The goal, in short, was to use the alluring economic resources of Indonesia to exert political leverage, to accomplish political purposes. 21S It would not be the last time the Republic of Indonesia's leaders would use this practice.

The point here is, of course, that the State Department would similarly view the Corporation's contract as a political document, and react accordingly. This is what happened;

In April 1946, the State Department turned its attention to the Fox Agreement, despite having given general approval prior to the January third signing. Fox was called to Washington in April and in high level conference was told that practically the entire American foreign policy rested upon the withdrawal of his agreement. It was argued seriously that the contract was succeeding in stiffening the Indonesian attitude toward the Dutch with the resultant danger that political talks following upon the Renville Agreement of January would fail. Were that to happen, the Dutch would probably drop out of the Marshall Plan, causing the entire operation to collapse, as Holland was the key to the important BENELUX nations. The officials continued to draw dire conclusions regarding the fall of Europe to communism, laying the responsibility at the feet of Matthew Fox unless he withdrew his agreement. Fox found this prognosis . . . absurd, but as he did not wish to violate U.S. policy, he stated his willingness to tear up the agreement— if he could obtain the per­ mission of President Sukarno and Premier Hatta, to whom he was responsible. His request for permission to go to Indonesia to con­ sult with the Indonesian leaders was greeted with dismay by the State Department officials who feared that Russia's Kremlin and America's Wallace group (Progressive Party) would beseigre the State Department and the Republican Government with charges of imperialism and the betrayal of the Indonesian people, in view of Fox's reputation as a "big operator" and the fear of monopoly. Fox refused to withdraw unless he received permission from the Republic; the State Department withdrew his passport, thereby making his trip impossible, and there the matter r e m a i n e d .2 *6

^^^Ibid., p. 16,

^^^Ibid., pp. 16, 17. 182

Sumitro was called in to the State Department and given approxi­ mately the same treatment. While he aeeured Department officials that the AIC agreement was no hindrance to the conclusion of talks based on

RenvilleI

The crux of the State Department position was revealed when W.S.B Lacy, Indonesian Desk Officer, said that he "personally guaranteed" that the U.S. Gcveimment had sufficient leverage to force the Dutch to conform to the Renville Agreement, When Sumitro noted that, in light of experience, there was good reason to be apprehensive, Lacy said that it was crucial that the Indonesians begin by trusting Dutch intentions. The entire State Department, he said, was con­ vinced that the Dutch would faithfully implement all Renville prin­ ciples, Sumitro concluded from his talk that they seemed to doubt Republican good faith, but were confident of Dutch reliability.^^7

Thus: the Indonesia policy of the United States in 1948. And

thus, the levels of success of the American-Indonesian Corporation. The

tight Dutch naval blockade and the less overt obstruction (and such it

later was) on the part of the State Department, together, effectively prevented the growth of trade between the United States and Indonesia until after 1949» However, the Corporation did not cease to play an

important role in the struggle, as we shall shortly have occasion to

see.

THE SECOND POLICE ACTION

It now becomes our unpleasant task to describe the final denoue­

ment and disastrous end of the United States' first "Indonesia policy"

which could be considered worthy of the name. "Unpleasant" because, as

we have endeavored to show, the United States had, since October 1, 1948,

known all it needed to know regarding the nature of the Republic of

21 7 'ibid., p. 16. 183

Indonesia, and had, certainly and more importantly, known all it needed to know about the viability of its bilateral approach to a peaceful solution in Indonesia since prior to the conclusion of the Renville accords.

And continuing from the date of the recapture of Madiun, there seems to have been one major thought, one important fear which was uppermost in the minds of all of the major parties involved in the Indo­ nesian Question: would the Dutch reopen the hostilities in Indonesia with another "police action" designed this time to eliminate the Repub­ lic entirely? In New York in mid-November, for example. Republican

Finance Minister Dr, Alexander A. Mar ami s, in a statement which argued that the Netherlands East Indian guilder (and the Dutch guilder itself) were being undermined by the blockade, inserted the following statement:

Moreover, unless the United States takes some strong measures to prevent the Dutch from instituting military action in Indonesia, there is a great likelihood that they will attack the Republican forces.218

Only ten days later, all foreign correspondents were barred by the Neth­ erlands authorities from Jogjakarta, and then all Dutch correspondents PI Q were similarly restricted two days after that, ^ A Cîood Offices Com­ mittee report was forwarded to the Security Council (meeting in Paris) at the start of December, setting forth the situation in Indonesia and alluding to the Committee's "acute fears" that the truce m i ^ t break down completely; a discussion of the critical economic and health prob­ lems in the Republic was also provided.

218 New York Times, November 14, 1948, Section III, p. 1.

^^^Ibid., November 25» 1948, p. 16. 184

James Rosenthal of the New York Times wrote from Paris on

December 7, that the issue of peace or war in Indonesia was to be de­ cided in the next few weeks, according to United Nations' sources. The real possibility of a resumption of hostilities was feared. Then there followed this extremely significant statement;

The United States is said to be seriously concerned that warfare in Indonesia, combined with the possible collapse of the Chinese Government, would upset the Far Eastern picture in favor of the Soviet IMion, Added to that worry is another; if the Dutch become involved militarily in the Indies, it may upset the stability of the position as a cornerstone of the Western European union.^2®

Washington's "strategic consciousness" was clearly shifting eastward.

But this important development may have escaped the awareness of The

Hague,

It had been in an atmosphere of increasing bitterness, tension, and alienation that the new American representative in the COG, H. Merle

Cochran, had arrived in Indonesia. Holding Informal talks with each side first, he submitted a new series of proposals— the Cochran Plan— for a political settlement. Because the major Dutch objections to the

Critchley-Du Bois proposals were the (unadmitted) Dutch fear of Repub­ lican numerical and military domination of the federal interim government, his plan sought to alleviate these fears by guaranteeing that the Repub­ lic would hold no more than one-third representation in a (newly pro­ posed) Federal Council, which would regulate the maximum size of any

State's militia and conditions under which it would be made available

290 Ibid., December 7, 1948, p. 16. 185 to the interim government. The Plan helped to guarantee the continued 221 federal character of the interim government, as well.

On September 20, the Republic accepted the Plan; on October 14, the Dutch replied, but their "assent" was so sweeping as to constitute counter-proposals. Taylor explains it this way:

Cochran envisaged: a territorially constituted Federal Council with limited powers, a popularly elected Federal Representative Assembly with broad legislative and constituent functions; an execu­ tive directly responsible to this Assembly; and a Netherlands- appointed High Commissioner who was to employ his reserved powers only to present contravention of the political agreement, or, with the assent of the President or Prime Minister, to restore public peace in the event that such a task was beyond the abilities of the interim Government, The Counter-Proposals, on the other hand, transposed the gov­ ernmental machinery from a popular to a territorial foundation and entrusted its limited powers to "selected" rather than "elected" organs. While there was eventually to be an elected Constituent Assembly, its functions were designated less to initiate action than to ratify decisions taken by selected bodies. Meanwhile, in keeping with its consistent emphasis upon the ultimate attributes of sov­ ereignty, the Netherlands had entrusted all powers without exception either to the Representative of the Crown or to organs whose com­ position or activities were under his control.222

It is important to note, as Taylor does from a close analysis of the

Dutch counter-proposals, that they were so designed that, had they been accepted, they would have lead, through a process of atrophy and attri­ tion, to the early, peaceful political extinction of the Republic itself.22?

The States General (the Dutch Parliament) enacted legislation providing for the appointment of a "High Representative of the Dutch

^^^Taylor, Indonesian Independence and the United Nations, pp. 1 4 2 , 145 222 Ibid., pp. 1 4 8 , 1 4 9 .

zz^ibid., pp. 148-1 5 5 . 186

Crown" to be sent to form the Federal Interim Government. Foreign Min­ ister Stikker then visited Indonesia for direct talks with Hatta. And it was during these talks that Hatta made a number of far-reaching conces­ sions to Dutch demands, which Stikker took back to The Hague, feeling the way was open for further talks. In late November he returned at the head of a delegation with new demands for unilateral Republican action to prevent truce violations and a new demand for a binding political declara­ tion from Hatta* When this was not forthcoming, the Prime Minister was accused of having retracted on his previous commitments. Failing full satisfaction, the Dutch Government proceeded to draw far-reaching and generally spurious conclusions, including one to the effect that the

Republic had nullified the Cochran Plan, that it was "absolutely impos­

sible" to reach an agreement with the Republican Government, that in view of its (the Netherlands') commitments to the federal states and the

Dutch Parliament, it was obliged to proceed unilaterally with the estab­ lishment of a Federal interim government,224

But the Dutch went further; the ominous statement was made that,

"For the Netherlands Government, it goes without saying that the possi­ bility for the Incorporation of the Republican-held areas in the federal

system must remain o p e n . "225 226 They found further negotiations under the Committee's auspices to be "futile" at this stage due to the funda­ mental lack of a basis for agreement.

^^^Ibid., p. 1 5 7 . 225 Ibid., p. 158, Italics not in the original. 187

And it was announced in The Hague on December 10 that the Dutch

authorities in Indonesia were going to proceed with the establishment of the interim government without agreement from the Republic, While the

Dutch braced for the expected reaction, particularly from Washington,

they also tried to anticipate and counter it:

Much can be read into these developments. It is clear, according to a source close to the Cabinet, that Dutch anger over the truce violations contains an implied rebuff to the Good Offices Commission [sic] and even to the United States State Department, both of which have attempted to sell the Dutch the idea of trusting Republican good will.227 New York Times correspondent Anderson commented from The Hague the fol­

lowing day, "Thus the door has been firmly closed on the approach toward

a solution that was urged upon the Netherlands Government by the United

States State Department in the strongest terms.

However, in addition to this, the Dutch leadership undertook to

express its opinions directly to Washington: the next quotation is

apparently in response to a note from the United States which (again

apparently, for the text of the note is not available) urged on the Dutch

Government restraint, peaceful settlement, and further negotiations due

to the fact that some avenues to agreement remained to be explored. The

Hague discounted these arguments, and warned:

If, by unjustified intervention, future developments in the Indonesian dispute lead to a weakening of the Western European struc­ ture and have severe repercussions on Western influence in the Far East, the Netherlands Government must disclaim responsibility,229

227ncw York Times, December 11, 1948, p. 8. pop Ibid., December 12, 1946, p. 1.

229 ^Ibid., December 12, 1948. 188

The Dutch were clearly doing all possible, at this important stage of developments, to play heavily on America’s rawest nerve. It was reported that the Dutch were prepared to accept the full consequences of the breaking off of negotiations with the Republic. The Dutch cabinet was

, . . primarily concerned with the reaction to its policy in the United States, which has been urging the Netherlands to adopt a con­ ciliatory policy aimed at a negotiated settlement in Indonesia .... The Netherlands is deeply convinced that the ultimate alms of the policy that has been followed so far with regard to Indonesia are identical with the Far Eastern policy of the United States.^)®

The Netherlands’ note reported and offered to document for the United

States the "disintegration of organized government and the deterioration of economic conditions in the irtiole of Indonesia." The Dutch saw them­ selves faced with two alternatives; either the Republic would at last recognize Netherlands authority in Indonesia and agree to exclude the

Republican army from the future Indonesian army, or the Netherlands would be obliged to decide how it could best "... implement its formal pledges to the peoples of the Netherlands and Indonesia. " The Dutch expected the worst; i.e., military action in Java, condemnation in the Security Coun­ cil, a sharp reprimand from the United States, and sanctions in the form of union boycotts; even in this case ("this worst case"), however, the

Netherlands would be able to wait out the storm.

It is of more than passing importance that we pause briefly at this point to consider this report. The Dutch were, predictably, "pri­ marily concerned" about the American reactions to their actions, both accomplished and anticipated. Further, unmistakable signs had been

230 New York Times, December 1), 1940, p. 9; the material in this entire paragraph is based on this source. 189

available, both here and elsewhere, that the Netherlands was, at the very least, seriously contemplating a resumption of military action

against the Republic. And finally, it might be argued, that the Dutch had practically laid all of their cards on the table by coiranunicating to

the press (if the report is an accurate reflection of Dutch views) their

expectations regarding American reactions to the contemplated police

action. However justified such a step might have seemed to the Nether­

lands, thou^, the Dutch must have understood that it would be viewed,

ii(temationally and by the United States, as a most serious act. This

b ^ n g s one to the disturbing question of whether, by some forceful action,

above and beyond the note answered by the communication discussed in the

foregoing paragraph, the United States Department of State (as distin­

guished from the American GOC representative, whose efforts will be dis­

cussed shortly) could have prevented a tragic renewal of hostilities in

Indonesia. Based on the very temporary success achieved by the eleventh-

hour American effort which preceded the first police action, and the

consideration that the Dutch may have been so frustrated and angered by

December of 1948 that they were firmly set upon their course, as well as

the fact that they had become used to at least a degree of tacit, con­

fidential American support, we rai^t tenatively answer this question in

the negative. Still, it seems quite difficult to envision the Nether­

lands going ahead with such a plan if, for example, there had been a

serious question whether or not it would result in the cancellation of

further Marshall Plan assistance from the United States. This contention,

in its turn, however, begs the important question of whether the United

States would have effected such a cancellation, without first itself 190 experiencing the flustration of witnessing a second police action in

Indonesia, and with it the utter failure of its own policy in the dis­ pute. Subsequent events suggest that it would not have.

This does not enable us to conclude, finally, that the United

States could not have prevented the second police action: we may only surmise that the United States could not have prevented the second police action by December of 1948.

And events in Indonesia now marched (inexorably, it would seem) toward their climax. The Dutch Cabinet postponed the Royal decree on the establishment of the interim government due to the receipt of a letter from prime Minister Hatta. Hatta's letter accepted and recognized the Renville Agreement and Dutch sovereignty, the veto of the Dutch gov­ ernor, and Dutch leadership of the armed forces. This statement went further, clearly, than any previous Republican statement had gone in accepting the Dutch position.

In response, however, the Dutch found this to be yet unsatisfac­ tory and to constitute insufficient reason for the resumption of nego­ tiations, It may be said that this note achieved a pinnacle of arrogance and dilatory condescention for the Dutch, which is saying a great deal.

Cochran commented that this letter called for Republican "surrender" and

"for a non-negotiated blanket assent which would preclude the possibility of bona fide negotiations, rather than effect their resumption." He considered that the Republic was being asked to lower itself from the

status of a party to an international dispute involving the future of

Ibid., December 16, 1948, p. 18. 191

Indonesia, and to take on a status equal in power and prestige to the states which had been "unilaterally established by Netherlands authority" and were, by such criteria as population, area, and political devel­ opment, clearly inferior to the Republic. Cochran found that the

Parties had "surely" not exhausted the resources of the GOC, in view of the fact that there had been "no political negotiations whatsoever, in the Committee for a period of nearly seven months.

But the letter's definite character of ultimatum was the crucial point. The Republic had to respond to a letter received midday on the seventeenth by ten o'clock the following morning. These were Cochran's comments:

I feel constrained to express my regrets that it was thought necessary to impose a time limit which allows, if taken literally, a total of less than 18 hours, including the hours of ni^t, for the making of copies; the delivery of the note to Mr. Hatta by the Iftiited States representative; consideration by Mr. Hatta; the necessary con­ sultations with manbers of his Government; the preparation of a con­ sidered reply; the trip from Kaliurang to Jogjakarta and then the flight to Batavia. I cannot help but recall, by way of comparison, that I gave Mr. Hatta's letter to you at 5:30 p.m. on Monday, Decem­ ber 13. That letter was answered only today, five days later, despite the fact that it asked only for a decision to resume nego­ tiations. Your telegram was delivered to Mr. Hatta after the making of copies, at 4:30 p.m. today. You will agree, I am sure, that in such circumstances, I cannot in justice press Mr. Hatta for an imme­ diate reply to a letter which calls not for a mere expression of willingness to resume negotiations, but rather for surrender to the position of your Government on every material point. The situation becomes even clearer when you recall that Mr. Hatta, who in fact has been under his physician's orders to do no work for two weeks, is in Kaliurang, apart from members of his Government whose assistance therefore cannot be immediately obtained.235

^^%'aylor, op. cit., pp. 162, 163.

^^^Ibid., pp. 163, 164. 192

The Dutch had thoroughly alienated Mr. Cochran. It would prove to be an

expensive mistake.

In the meantime, in Paris, as the Security Council was about to

conclude a series of meetings (for Christmas recess). Republican repre­

sentatives made an urgent appeal that immediate consideration of the

threat to peace occasioned by the breakdown of discussions in Indonesia

be undertaken.

However, Ferdinand van Langhove, the Belgian representative, who is chairman of the Council for December, refused to place the ques­ tion on the agenda for tomorrow’s meeting. United States' sources, pointing out that Robert A. Lovett, U.S. Under Secretary of State, had expressed hope yesterday that relations would be resumed, indi­ cated that Dr. Philip C. Jessup of the U.S. would not raise the question at the Council meeting .... Some delegations expressed the belief that, in view of the re­ ports from Batavia indicating the possibility of a resumption of negotiations, it would be better for the Council not to take up the question for the time being.234

Did "some delegations" include the American delegation? If so, could the

American Government have been so badly uninformed? Did Mr. Cochran not

communicate the situation that existed to Washington or Paris? Pos­

sibly so. In any case, the Council adjourned on December 17 without

taking note of the Republican appeal.

Professor Kahin relates an incident occuring during this period

which appears to shed further light on the American position, A few

days prior to the commencement of the Dutch attack,

. . . Indonesian representatives expressed to the State Depart­ ment official primarily concerned with Southeast Asian affairs their apprehension that the Dutch would soon launch an attack. They asked

^^^New York Times, December 17, 1948, p. 9*

^^^Ibid., December 18, 1948, p. 5« 193

him whether in this case the United States would recognize new territorial gains made by the Dutch at the expense of the Republic. According to these Indonesians, the State Department official answered, "It depends on the situation." His answer and the context of general conversation within which he gave it convinced them that the United States would give real support to the Indonesian position only if and when Indonesian arms had demonstrated their ability to prevent the Dutch from achieving their objectives. 236

And it is precisely to this subject we shall direct our attention in the chapter which follows.

CONCLUSION

On December 19, 1948 the Dutch attacked. As before, the attack was labeled a "police action" and even more so than before, the police action quite closely approximated full-scale warfare. As American-made aircraft bombed Jogjakarta airfield into near rubble, American foreign policy in Indonesia similarly lay in shambles.

What may we say concerning the spectacular failure of a policy which must have seemed so pragmatic, judicious, and well-balanced to its advocates only a short year before? How can such a singular disaster be explained? a few tentative and provisional answers will be suggested.

First, one may quite safely contend that United States' policy in

Indonesia during this entire period was characterized by ignorance and lack of understanding of the political realities shaping events in Indo­ nesia. The following passage by Alastair Taylor seems to corroborate this point ;

On the evidence of the voluminous records of debates, a prepon­ derant majority of the Security Council were not more than super­ ficially cognizant of the history of the Indonesian dispute or the

^^^Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, p. 345* 194

various stages throu^ which the Netherlands-Republican negotiations had passed prior to the Council's seizure of the question. This con­ clusion finds corroboration in the piecemeal approach by which mem­ bers sought to compartmentalize the military, political, and juridical aspects of the question .... Yet a knowledge of the dispute's antecedents might well have convinced them of the futility of any such approach .... Nor do the Council's debates disclose any real grasp by the members of the Basic Issues. Consequently, there was little informed discussion, for example, of the relationship of the Republic of the Kilino States; of the problems which had arisen during the post-Linggadjati negotiations over the formation of an interim government; or what was intended by Linggadjati from the standpoint of (a) Netherlands sovereignty, (b) the Republic's status, or (c) the structure of the projected U.S.I, Again, by falling to come to grips with the fundamental political and juridical aspects of the dispute, the Council could never decide to just what extent it was competent to act— which meant in turn that it did not know which was (a) juri- dicially permissable and (b) politically preferable; arbitration, good offices or mediation.237

It need hardly be added that such comments applied most particularly to the United States.

Possibly just as important was the persistent American proclivity toward almost boundless optimism regarding the possibilities for a peaceful settlement through the good offices/bilateral ( "abeyemce cum intervention") approach. This is the Solubility Question again. This phenomenon has been introduced before in these pages and, at this stage, seems to require some further elucidation. It seems to have multiple roots. The first of these which may be suggested is that the United

States showed a consistent tendency to underrate the potency and tenacity of Indonesian nationalism. It has been suggested more than once^^® that the major reason for the historic disparity in the relative levels of success achieved by American diplomacy in Europe and Asia in the postwar

2 3 7 Taylor, Indonesian Independence and the United Nations, pp. 425, 4 2 6 . 270 See, for example, Edwin Reischauer's Beyond Vietnam; the United States and Asia (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1 9 6 7 ) . 195 decades has been the relatively greater United States understanding of

European realities (or possibly the greater relevance of American assump­ tions about Europe). The following warning, issued by Charles Wolf at the conclusion of his book about the Indonesian revolution, which was published in mid-1948, has a disturbing timeliness in 1968 as well;

However, the possible alternative [to a peaceful settlement] can­ not yet be ignored or ruled out. There are still strong groups which favor a resumption of military action and a forceful breaking-up of the Republican Government. The worst that can be said about the possibility of such a step— aside from the moral considerations in­ volved— is that it is not likely to accomplish anything. It will bring neither peace nor order nor economic rehabilitation to Indo­ nesia any more than it has brought such conditions to Indo-China. In such an eventuality, the Dutch may find themselves embroiled in a long, indecisive and costly campaign against the Republican guerillas. The "rounding up" of 200,000 T.R.I. (Republican army) guerillas, dis­ guised as coolies and rice-paddy laborers, would not be an easy or quick task. The Dutch would be required to maintain a large army in Indonesia for years. As the Indo-China example has shown, cities and ports may be won in such a campaign, but not the hearts of either the country or the people.239

Another importemt ingredient of the Solubility Question appears to be an even clearer and, if anything more consistent, American tendency to misjudge (specifically, to overestimate) the willingness of the Dutch to agree to real compromises in the negotiations with the Republic.

American references to Dutch statements and actions in the period just covered invariably placed the most hopeful and favorable construction on these moves. While a part of this may be laid to the historically favor­ able reputation in United States opinion enjoyed by the people of "little

Holland," and the unbroken history of friendly relations between these two nations (Indeed we are about to pass through the historic nadir of

Dutch-American relations), it seems equally true that United States

^^^Wolf, The Indonesian Story, p. 154< 1% policy makers underestimated the tenacity with which the Netherlands would cling to the juridical-colonial logic of its position in what was clearly a "gut" issue, in terms of The Hague's interpretation of Dutch national interests.

The third leg of our stool, in regard to this Solubility Issue, 240 is one which has been the subject of some very persuasive argumentation' in recent years, and it is an ingredient intimately linked with the pre­ vious two; the Tfiiited States seems greatly to have overestimated its own ability to influence events in Indonesia. For a student who has dwelt quite heavily in the foregoing pages on the importance of the Amer­ ican influence in the Indonesian Question, this may seem contradictory.

And it is unquestionably true, further, that no nation, other than the

Parties themselves, exercised greater influence in the affair. What is really striking, however, is how small a percentage of its total poten­ tial leverage Washington estimated would be necessary, at critical stages in the struggle to turn the trick and accomplish the desired result. The tragic events of December 19, which beeir eloquent testimony to the inad­ equacy of the bilateral approach, seem to make this point a nearly self- evident one.

A t the risk of seeming adjectival in our analysis of American

Indonesia policy, we might add to the characterization "ignorance" (as it relates to policy formulation) the term "rigidity" as it applies to policy execution.

We need not cover an excessive amount of old ground to recall the

^^^One of the first works on this subject was Charles Burton Marshall's The Limits of Foreign Policy (New York; Holt, Rlnehard and Winston, 19M}1 197

imputed eignificance of Frank Graham'b telephone call to Secretary

Marshall (or someone close to him), which seemed to have resulted in the singular reversal of the Butch position after the submission of the

"six additional principles" in January 1948* which in turn resulted in the Renville Agreement, The conclusion indeed seems Inescapable: the bilateral/good offices approach succeeded only when it was temporarily and covertly abandoned. But the point here is that the implications of this conclusion seem equally compelling: the policy was defective and unworkable in its most basic assumptions and deserved to be abandoned

(covertly, if necessary) at that moment.

We must remind ourselves, in broad and general terms, what

United States foreign policy had contributed to the Indonesian dispute in 1948. The foregoing record seems clearly to illustrate that the

United States began the year of I948 by bringing the Republic around (by whatever means) to a major, and potentially fatal, military and political concession, i.e., recognition of the van Mook Line and evacuation of the

Butoh-claimed areas of Java, Sumatra, and Madura; this was followed by the forceful extrication from the Dutch of a nominally equivalent con­ cession (acceptance of the six additional principles) which, as Repub­

lican negotiators anxiously pointed out, had to be treated as an integral part of the entire agreement. And it is not unfair to say that the rest

of 1948 witnessed Washington's tacit acceptance and even support of the

Netherlands program unilaterally to implement (which is to say, abandon)

the Renville Agreement thus achieved. The Department of State simply did not live up to the promises made to the Republican leaders by Graham in January. 198

Did the formulators of American policy honestly and courageously face these disturbing implications concerning the viability of their policy, particularly in relation to the larger and grander objectives of

American foreign policies in Europe and Asia? The circumstantial evi­ dence presented above suggests a somewhat equivocal answer: it seems that American policy toward Indonesia began to undergo serious re- evaluation only in the wake of what was, in light of our working frame of reference (,the defective bilateral approach), a marginally relevant event: the Republic’s unilateral suppression of the Madiun revolt. And this event, after all, was apparently seen in the context of a massive push into Asia by the forces of "international communism." When we can postulate, on the basis of what we know about the attitudes of the three

United States representatives on the Committee of Good Offices, that they

strove manfully to educate their superiors in Washington to the futility of the framework (Graham called it a "straightjacket") in which they each had tried to work, the rigidity of American policy, in the face of so much

compelling evidence, seems truly inexplicable.

Inexplicable, except for one consideration: then, as now, by any

rational criterion one might employ, from the seriousness of present or

historic danger to the volume of international trade, Europe clearly

overbalances Asia in the firmament of United States national interests.

The drawback to this "non-conclusion," of course, is that in the "crunch,"

American interests in Europe were no better served than they were in Asia

by the "Europe-first" period in American Indonesia policy. CHAPTER IV

THE LEN0UÎ3ŒNT; I949

IMl'RODUCl'ION

The closing days of 1948 and the first few months of 1949 wit­ nessed a very clear change in the emphasis of Washington's Indonesian policy, if not a change in the policy itself. Prom a dominant concern

for European recovery and stability at the expense of Asian problems,

from the corollary of providing at least minimal support for most of the basic tenets of the Dutch position in Indonesia, the United States moved,

in the space of a very short period of time, toward concern for the

spread of communism throughout Asia, to a concern for the possible "fall"

of Indonesia (to accompany that of China), and finally to a pragmatic

policy to remove the Indonesian Question from the American foreign policy agenda.

Once the Dutch had apparently achieved the military objectives of

their second "police action," it then became a question of exerting ever-

increasing amounts of American leverage on The Hague until it agreed to

resurrection of the Republic and restoration of its status as a party to

an international dispute under the cognizance of the United Nations

Security Council, Recalling that a major objective of all Dutch actions, throughout the entire dispute, was the complete elimination of the

199 200

Republic, and realizing that this goal was wholly incompatible with the positions taken by the United States, by the Security Council, and by its

Committee of Good Offices, it becomes easy to understand how the test of wills soon came to be focused on a single issue: the restoration of the

Republic of Indonesia to its capital at the Jogjakarta residency. Once it was finally clear to the Netherlands that the Republic (as such) would play a part in the formation of the United States of Indonesia, then the resolution of the rest of the Basic Issues followed quite rapidly.

This is not to state that there were not other very important issues left unresolved at this stage; the status of West Irian, the question of Indonesia's debts (if any) to the Netherlands, and the exact nature of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union were all problems that re­ mained to be hammered out. But the critical issue had been decided. It is for this reason that we will concentrate our attention primarily on the period extending from the opening of the second police action to the conclusion of the Roem-Van Royen conversations in May 1949, specifically, of course, on the part played by the United States in the events of these days. A fell treatment of the substantive issues in the Round Table

Conference at The Hague would seem to be beyond the scope of (and anti- climactic to) the present study; instead, a few paragraphs will be devoted to the part played by the United States in the (frequently very temporary) solution of the major questions dealt with by that Conference. 201

THE SECOND POLICE ACTION AND THE INITIAL

UNITED STATES RESPONSE

The predictably thorou^ and well-planned Dutch attack began with amphibious operations against the north coast of Java and heavy bombing of Jogjakarta on December 18. Simultaneously, The Hague was announcing the formation of the long-awaited Federal Interim Government in Batavia. In Washington, "Acting Secretary of State Robert Lovett reviewed the Indonesian-Dutch crisis with State Department advisers today, and it was indicated that this Government would await develop-

1 ments before deciding its next policy move."

By the twentieth of December, the story was more or less top news in the United States press, with all reports indicating widespread and very effective Dutch military operations; Republican leaders Sukarno,

Hatta, Salim, Sjahrir, Surderimen (of the Army) and others were reported 2 to have been captured and placed under house arrest. The Dutch were said to be hoping for a decisive, quick military victory in Indonesia, over in twenty-four hours except for mopping-up operations. The strat­ egy was to crush the Republic's forces in the field quickly and set up a new euid malleable Republican Government before world opinion could be mobilized. Foreign Minister Dirk Stikker was quoted as commenting that

Mohammed Hatta might be a suitable candidate to head a new Republican

Government. ^

^New York Times, December 19* 1948, p* 1,

^Ibid., December 20, 1948, p. 1. ^Ibid., December 20, 1948, p. 13* 202

And apparently there was going to be very little to prevent just such an unencumbered Dutch military victory; by Christmas Day, Dutch military activity was virtually unhindered, taking the last important

Republican strongholds in Java (at Madiun, of all places)

With these words, the American representative to the Security

Council, which was meeting at this time in Paris, showed Washington's initial reaction to the events in Indonesia;

Reports have come to my Government emanating from the Nether­ lands Government and Indonesian Republican sources that large- scale military operations commenced on Saturday, December 18th in Indonesia* Under the instructions of my Government, I therefore request an emergency meeting of the Security Council to consider the Indo­ nesian question in the light of these events and in light of the concluding paragraph (7) of the last report of the Committee of Good Offices. My Government feels that the Security Council should meet at the earliest possible moment, which I would take to be no later than Monday, December 20th. The representative of Australia has requested me to associate his Government with this request.5

The newspaper article wdiich reported the foregoing letter from Dr. Jessup to the Security Council President (then Belgian representative Van

Langenhoye) also added these comments;

The Indonesian question until now has been counted one of the few dealt with successfully by the Security Council. Unless the United States takes the lead, it is unlikely that the Council will do anything positive about Indonesia.^

Aside from these actions, however. Department spokesmen refused further

^Ibid., December 26, 1948, p. 1.

^Ibid., December 20, 1948, p. 12.

^Ibid. 203

comment on the crisis, noting that it was in the hands of the Council.^

In the United States the following day. Acting Secretary Lovett saw Dr. Sumitro, Republican spokesman and Minister, who said that he had asked for American "political and economic support" including a dis­ continuance of "American aid to the Netherlands under the European Recov­ ery Plan or otherwise." Elsewhere an official flatly denied that the

United States Government had lodged an official protest with the Dutch, noting that no official representations had been made since the period prior to the outbreak of hostilities, "although it had been urging the

Dutch for several months to negotiate their differences with the Indo­ nesian Republic and 'not to start shooting.'"

When asked about another report that the Netherlands might press the United States not to interfere in Indonesia in view of current efforts to enlist Netherlands' support of a North Atlantic pact against communist aggression, the official said that he could not answer.®

Elsewhere the same day, the New York Times printed the full text of Dr.

Sumitro's statement to Lovett, which the State Department had elected to Q release to the press.^

And the Dutch were having little difficulty understanding the

handwriting on the wall:

Now that the campaign in Indonesia is underway, the dominant thought in the Netherlands concerns the coming meeting of the Security Council, and, above all, the attitude to be taken by the United States .... The position of the United States seems ominous to the Dutch. Not

7 New York Times, December 20, 1948, p. 14. g Ibid., December 21, 1948, p. 7.

^Ibid., p. 6. 204

long ago they were admonished by the State Department with a warning that the United States Government was prepared to take certain unspec­ ified measures that could be harmful to the Netherlands unless a peaceful settlement were made. The Dutch have disregarded that broad hint. Thus far, no official word has been received from Washington, but it is learned that the mood of the State Department has not changed, 10

The following day Washington, in what may have been an effort to telegraph its own punches, was "reliably said" to be determined to demand a cessation of military activity in Indonesia and the release of all political prisoners. Two stories, datelined Washington and Paris, seemed to agree on these points, but then the Washington article went on to say that consideration was being given to cutting of Marshall Plan aid to the Dutch if they refused to comply with such a request; the Paris arti­ cle, on the other hand, was reliably reporting that responsible officials were admitting that the resolution would constitute a considerable watering down of an earlier proposal, "which would have called for a restoration of the previous truce lines and a resumption of negotiations between the Netherlands and the Indonesian Republic," allegedly because the requisite number of votes could not be mustered in favor of troop withdrawals^

The following day came the first concrete sign of the mood of

the United States policy makers: the Economic Cooperation Administra­ tion, with State Department concurrence, suspended further Marshall Plan

assistance to Indonesia (that is, to the Dutch colonial government in

Batavia), pending "clarification" of the situation growing out of the

^°Ibid., p. 7. ^^New York Times, December 22, 1948, P* 1* 205 second police action. EGA Administrator Paul Hoffman stated that with the current state of affairs in Indonesia, it was impossible to tell whether United States' aid could be distributed effectively or contribute

to economic recovery there or in Europe,

The immediate effect of the decision was to deprive Indonesia, at least temporarily, of about 314,000,000 of the $68,000,000 already allocated to it by the Marshall Plan agency. The decision has no effect on the $54,000,000 of purchases already contracted for and which will continue to move for some time because of the time lag between contracts and shipments.

Hoffman justified past aid on the basis of the assumption that increased

production in Indonesia "would provide a great stimulus to the recovery

1 P of not only the Netherlands, but also of West Europe as a whole."

Despite such efforts to sweeten the pill, the intended symbolic

and psychological effect of the decision was not lost on the Dutch;

while Foreign Office officials refrained from commenting on the EGA cut­

off, this news, coming on the heels of the leaks as to the general outline

of the United States' position before the upcoming Security Gouncil dis­

cussions, caused considerable consternation. One official commented (for

quotation, thou^ not for attribution) that, "It's simply ridiculous for

the United States to suppose that it can cajole and threaten us.^

As we move at this point to a consideration of the events in the

Security Council meetings, it may be useful to recall to the reader our

earlier observation that the Dutch would come to have reason to regret

the cavalier, if not contemptuous, treatment they accorded to the Good

Offices Committee and its efforts; the influence exerted by the Com­

mittee's attitude on the attitude of the United States during these

^^Ibid., December 23, 1948, p. 1.

"•^Ibid., p. 4. 2 0 6

meetings was apparently very strong and showed little sympathy for the

Dutch position in the dispute.

On December 20, the Committee called on the Council to consider on the basis of the "utmost urgency" the renewed outbreak of hostilities.

It reported that, ", , . in their repudiation of the Renville Agreement the Netherlands have thus not fulfilled the requirements of Article 10 of

the truce agreement, . , which obliged both parties to give notice if

the fitting was to be resumed. The Dutch representative's claim, that the Republic had been informed of the deadline for the termination of the

truce, was contradicted by Merle Cochran, who noted that the notice was

handed to the Republican delegation in Batavia at 11:45 p.m. and then telegraphic communication between Batavia and Jogjakarta was cut before

the notification could even be sent. As a matter of fact, the Australian

and Belgium representatives on the Committee were in Republican territory

at the time, so Cochran was unable to inform them of the Dutch decision.

As a result, Cochran and Australian Deputy T . W. Cutts were "constrained

to forward this report in the name of their committee without reference

to Australian and Belgian representatives."^^

Cochran's scathing indictment of the Dutch tactics on the resump­

tion of hostilities (quoted, from at length in the closing pages of the

preceding chapter) was placed on the provisional agenda for the upcoming

Security Council meeting by the United States representative,^ ^

The speech given by Phillip G. Jessup, Deputy United States

^^New York Times, December 21, 1948, p. 1.

^^Ibid. 207

Security Council representative, before the first Council meeting in the wake of the second police action, was surprisingly blunt and quite unsym­ pathetic to the Dutch, He opened noting that there was no uncertainty as to the fact of a breakdown of the truce agreement, in view of the formal

Dutch announcement to that effect. He then reviewed the deterioration of the situation in late 1948 and the GOC's efforts to get negotiations started again. Jessup noted the Committee's observation that the Dutch were, by continuing to make preparations to set up an interim government, contributing to the Republican suspicion that they were proceeding unilat­ erally to establish an Indonesian government without reference to the

Republic. He then examined the "circumstances under which the Netherlands

Government has seen fit to abandon the truce," noting that one-half hour's notice was given to the only one of the Committee representatives (Cochran) left in Batavia, and with transport and communications facilities to

Jogjakarta denied him. Then this;

In light of the above record and in view of the recent events in Indonesia, my Government is unable to conclude that the Netherlands has either consistently or conscientiously endeavored to exhaust all possibilities of resuming negotiations under the Committee's aus­ pices .... After carefully studying the material thus far made available by the Committee, my Government fails to find any justification for renewal of military operations in Indonesia. This is particularly so in light of the fact that there has been a resort to force following a period of seven months in which the resources of the Committee of Good Offices have not been utilized. If, as is alleged, violations of the truce agreement by the Republic have been so extensive and so per­ sistent over a period of time, then it seems to me that the Nether­ lands Government should have reported these violations directly to the Security Council before renouncing the truce agreement and resorting to military action . . , against the Republic.^®

^^United States, Department of State, Bulletin, XX, No. 496 (January 2, 1949). 26; New York Times, December 23, 1$48, p. 5. 208

Jessup then considers and bluntly dismisses the Dutch claim to having fulfilled the Renville requirements for advance notification of abandonment of the truce. He concludes,

It seems to me that the Council is obligated under the Charter at this stage of its deliberations immediately to order a cessation of hostilities in Indonesia and to require the armed forces of both parties immediately to withdraw to their own sides of the demil­ itarized zones which are delineated in detail in the truce agreement of January 17, 1948. I must reiterate my Government's view that the cease-fire order of August I947 continues to be binding on both parties and that it has been violated by the recent armed action taken by the Netherlands authorities in Indonesia.^7

In conjunction with Columbia and Syria, the United States intro­ duced a resolution with the following provisions;

The Security Council; Noting with concern the resumption of hostilities in Indonesia, and Having taken note of the reports of the Committee of Good Offices; Considers such resumption of hostilities to be in conflict with the resolutions adopted by the Security Council at its 171st meeting of the first of August 1947; Calls upon the parties: (.a) to cease hostilities forthwith; and (b) Immediately to withdraw their armed forces to their respec­ tive sides of the demilitarized zones established under the truce agreements of 17 January 1948; Instructs the Committee of Good Offices to report to the Security Council fully and urgently by telegraph on the events which have transpired in Indonesia since 12 December 1948, assessing res-ponsi- bility for the outbreak of hostilities.18 19

(This latter provision was, of course, aimed directly at the Dutch.)

However, despite the final inclusion of the troop withdrawal provision in the draft resolution, this particular item did not survive

^^United States, Department of State, Bulletin, XX, No. 496, (January 2, 1949), 25, 26. 18 New York Times, December 23, 1948, p. 1. ^^Last italics not, in the original. 209 the Security Council voting on the following day, falling two votes short of adoption. The clause regarding assessment of responsibility did not survive either, but the final version contained an Australian amendment ordering the release of the captured Republican leaders.

The Dutch delegate van Royen reserved the position of his Gov­ ernment, commenting that the resolution was "impractical for the moment and superfluous for the future. PO This press report continued.

It is generally believed that if the Dutch accede to the much milder terms of the resolution adopted today, it will be because of United States' pressure rather than because of the Security Council. Britain's decision to support the joint resolution and France's decision to abstain rather than veto * . . were both attributed in part at least to U.S. influence.21

Nor were the Security Council's proceedings devoid of the usual

Cold War recriminations. First, on the day prior to the introduction of the United States' resolution, Soviet delegate Yakov Malik announced that he would submit a resolution of his own which would order a Dutch troop withdrawal and condemn the police action as a threat to international peace and security, thus placing the resolution under Chapter VII of the

Charter and thus allowing for eventual economic/diplomatic sanctions.

He said it would also provide for the replacement of the GOC by an eleven- member Security Council committee. 22 While this was probably an honest reflection of Moscow's frustration and irritation over the Dutch actions

in Indonesia, it probably also springs from an astute identification of,

^^New York Times, December 25, 1948, p. 1. 21 Ibid.

^^New York Times, December 24, 1948, p. 1, 210 and the desire to exploit and expose, certain weaknesses inherent in the ambivalence of the American position. The United States asked that the

GOC assess responsibility for the outbreak of hostilities (knowing quite well where that responsibility lay) and that both sides withdraw to the previous cease-fire lines, even though no organized Indonesian forces would have been likely to have crossed these lines. These points are of interest to us as early examples of a by-now-historic phenomenon; Soviet

efforts to exploit the weaücnesses of American positions on colonial ques­ tions which are often more vigorous than any efforts which might be dir­

ected to resolving the particular issue itself.

Soviet commentary on the second police action continued to stress

the theme of Anglo-American culpability for Dutch action. The following

is a New York Times quote from Fravda;

It is no secret to anyone that the United States of America, while participating on the one hand in the Good Offices Committee called upon to bring about conciliation between Holland and the Indonesian Republic, on the other hand, intensely supplied Holland with armaments which the Dutch colonizers did not hesitate to use.

Dutch imperialists acted in full confidence that the United States and the

United Kingdom would continue this policy of connivance. It was;

. . . common knowledge that the United States exerted no little effort to split the national liberation movement in Indonesia and blow it up from within by supporting the treacherous reactionary ele­ ments of the Indonesian national bourgeoisie.^3

In any case, the Soviet Union abstained on all provisions of the

three-power draft resolution (and the Ukrainian delegate was absent,

unable to obtain a visa to leave New York) When Argentina and Canada

2^Ibid., December 27, 1948, p. 5* 2^Ibid., December 28, 1948, p. 1. 211 deserted the Council majority to abstain on the troop withdrawal pro­ vision, this ensured its defeat. The United States delegate chose to point out, however, that Soviet and Ukrainian abstentions had also con­ tributed to the same end. He further stated that, had the Soviet delegate been serious about achieving Council approval of his own troop with­ drawal resolution, he could have done so by making it more palatable to members whose affirmative votes would be needed and make certain that the

Ukrainian representative was present. On the other hand, the Soviets argued that the delay in providing the Ukrainian representative, Tarasenko, with his visa was an intentional tactic designed to allow the United

States and the United Kingdom to vote in favor of troop withdrawals, confident in the knowledge that it would still fail of adoption.

The arguments in the Security Council became somewhat undignified;

He [Malikj pointed out also that even if the Soviet Union had voted for the provision--he ignored the absence of the Ukraine— it would still have lacked 1 vote of adoption. Dr. Jessup . . . said, "I refuse to be put in a false position by such resolutions" and insisted that neither of the Soviet resolutions introduced today would contribute to a solution of the Indonesian problem. He said that the Council should wait for a definite Dutch answer .... Mr. Malik, in a bitter reply, accused the U.S. of inciting the Dutch to attack the Indonesian Republic and contended that the policy followed by the U.S. and Britain— "a medley of falsehood and hypoc- ricy"— was merely intended to give the "semblance of action." Whatever the reasons for the fact that the Ukraine had no repre­ sentative here last Friday, the important thing as seen by members of the Council is that by abstaining on different votes, the Soviet Union and the United States brought about the defeat of proposals that would have had exactly the same effect--to tell the Dutch to withdraw their troops to the positions they held under the Renville truce agree­ ment of January 1947. [Sic.] Dr. Jessup and Mr. Malik each tried to place the responsibility on the other country.26

25 Taylor, Indonesian Independence and the United Nations, p. 173. 26 New York Times, December 26, 1946, p. 6. 212

Not long afterwards, both powers were subjected to a blistering attack by

Philippine Foreign Minister Carlos Romulo; both powers, he noted, had voted for troop withdrawals, but on separate resolutions, thus ensuring 27 the defeat of this important provision.

As Taylor observes, the Council's failure to order the withdrawal of military forces pulled the teeth of the resolution, saving the Dutch

from the unpleasant (and unavoidable) dilemma of blatantly defying a

n o direct Security Council order. Indeed, the effect of the Soviet-

American reciprocal defeat of each other's withdrawal orders may have been

to remove whatever real motivation the Dutch might otherwise have had to

heed any of the Council's orders, thus making the confrontation to come

inevitably more protracted and painful, from the standpoint of the emerging

Atlantic community.

The series of Council meetings in Paris continued for a few days,

with a growing evidence of members' impatience over Dutch inability to

report compliance with the resolution of December 24. Finally, on

December 28, two additional resolutions were passed; one called for the

Dutch to set the Republican leaders free "forthwith," and the other asked

the Consular Commission to give a complete report on the conditions and

situation in the Republic.on the following day the Council adjourned,

to resume its debate nine days later at Lake Success.

In reading the statements of Dr. Jessup at the Council meeting of

^"^Ibid., January 6, 1949, p. 1. 28 Taylor, op. cit., p. 173. ^^New York Times, December 30, 1948, p. 1 2'i5

December 29, one is likely to gain the impression that a considerable amount of back-pedaling is taking place:

The original emergency meeting of the Council on the Indonesian question was called at the request of the United States, and Dr. Jessup— who had just received instructions from Washington to oppose further action at this time— seemed somewhat embarrassed at having to justify the sudden change in the U.S. position .... According to usually well-informed sources, the State Depart­ ment's instructions to Dr. Jessup to oppose the adoption of any additional resolution resulted from strong representations by Great Britain in Washington. These are said to have emphasized that a condemnation of the Netherlands would have extremely grave effects on the establishment of the North Atlantic Ikiion . . , .30

While it is clearly unnecessary at this stage of the present

study to dwell on the importance of such considerations as these to the

policy makers in Washington, it does seem to be legitimate (althou^

possibly a delineation of the obvious) to speculate that the United

States might at this point have still gone either way on the fundamental

political questions of Indonesian independence. It is difficult to state

with certainty that the final gamble which the Dutch resort to force

represented could not have succeeded. Despite American pique, reflected

in Jessup's statements before the Security Council, and despite the

Americsm commitment to the authority and prestige of the United Nations,

considerations such as those apparently raised by the British, as in the

foregoing quotation, had a strong influence as well, and powerful

interests in the United States had every reason to side with the Dutch.

It m i ^ t even have been possible for American diplomacy to have engi­

neered a solution which papered over the political issues at stake, much

as American diplomacy had long been endeavoring to do. The point is.

^°Ibid. 214 of course, that this is not what happened. We shall thus want to concern ourselves with the question of why it did not.

It had been observed that one of the major causes for the basic

Dutch orientation of Washington's policy toward Indonesia was that the twin demands of assisting Western European reconstruction and waging the opening battles of the Cold Watr with the Soviet Union seemed to dictate that such questions as the exact role to be played by the Republican forces in the construction of an independent Indonesia be relegated to a secondary importance; it also seemed to dictate that the Dutch be given wide latitude in solving this and related questions, especially in light of their critical importance to successful European reconstruction and defense. One of the factors which contributed most immediately and directly to a change in this outlook by bringing new and additional fac­ tors to bear, was the Conference of Asian Nations convened at New Delhi in January 1949 to discuss the Indonesian Question.

THE INFLUENCE OF THE NEW DEHLI CONFERENCE

A cartoon from the Minneapolis Tribune reprinted in the Janu­ ary l6 issue of the New York Times shows Uncle Sam, with a firefighter’s hat and a firehose in hand, battling a blaze labeled "Communism in

Europe" (the hose being twisted into the shape of a dollar), while simul­

taneously his coattails are catching fire from a smaller blaze entitled

"Communism in Asia." The caption read, "Look Around.The foregoing

^^New York Times, January 16, 1949, "News of the Week in Review," p. 5. 215 example is presented as representative of a large amount of the dis­ cussion on international politics taking place in the news media at about this time. The New Delhi Conference effectively ensured that Washington would indeed "look around," and that it would do so sooner rather than later.

Even in early December 1948, commentators were linking the Indo­ nesian Question with the Chinese Civil War; the Times' editors, com­ menting on Dutch plans to go ahead with preliminary steps for setting up the Interim Federal Government, stated that, thou^ Dutch sovereignty was recognized, the existence of a threat to peace also had to be recog­ nized, particularly now:

. . . with a communist revolt within the Republic not yet quelled and all Asia in a high state of tension as Chinese Communist armies push on toward Nanking.32

Then after the second police action had begun, the British were reported to be annoyed because of the effects that the Dutch action could have on the prospects for the formation of a "general anti-communist

'front' throughout southeast Asia":

This plan has been long in the making and hopes for its success were mounting here [London]. Now the British say that violent Dutch action may turn India, Pakistan, Burma and Siam away from any volun­ tary association with the European p o w e r s . 33

Prime Minister Jawaharial Nehru of India was particularly out­

spoken and incensed over the Dutch resort to force. India had stren­

uously objected to the use of Indian military forces against the Republic

^^Editorial, New York Times, December 12, 1948, Section IV, p. 8.

^^New York Times, December 21, 1948, p. 7. 216

back in 1945 and had, along with Australia, been originally responsible for bringing the Indonesian Question before the United Nations in the first place, as the reader will recall. Nehru was quoted in Allahabad on New Year's Day as follows;

We have to confess with sorrow that the attitude of some powers has been one of tacit approval or acceptance of this aggression. There is a Western Union. What does that Union stand for? Money has flowed from the Western Union. Recently Marshall aid going to the Netherlands Indies has been stopped, but the aid is still being given to Holland, I believe I am voicing the concerns of all countries of Asia in this matter.34

The New York Times apparently sent a request out to its Far

Eastern correspondents to solicit the reactions of Asian leaders in the wake of the second police action. These reactions were apparently uni­ formly negative. Even Japanese leaders were bold enough to express con­ cern that the move would add to instability in Asia. Indian leaders were particularly hostile to the police action, Nehru even going to the point of seriously considering a break in diplomatic relations with the

Netherlands.35

Apparently this dispatch from London came close to the heart of

Western apprehensions over the possible results of the action:

The possibility of the formation of an Asiatic Monroe Doctrine armed against the European powers resulting from the recent Dutch drive in Indonesia is becoming an increasing source of concern to high level diplomats here. These diplomats . , . say that their reports indicate increasing anti-European sentiment throughout most of Asia as a result of the Dutch action.36

^^Ibid., January 2, 1949, p. I3. ^^Ibid., Section IV, p. 5. 36n6w York Times, January 4» 1949, p. 14. 217

The evidences of the strength of Asian reaction continued to mount throughout the early part of January. The Commonwealth H i ^ Com­ missioners in London (representing India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Australia and

New Zealand) called on Foreign Minister Aneurin Sevan to urge that Britain

"reconsider" her pro-Dutch policy and help stop the spread of communism

in Asia.^^ The New York Times' perceptive correspondent Robert Trumbull

(permanently assigned to New Delhi at this time) took a fact-finding trip

to Batavia by way of Burma and Malaya. He found that, in the opinion of

the leaders he interviewed, in addition to clouding the possibility of

settlement in Indonesia itself, the police action had done "damage to the

stability of perhaps all Asian colonial areas," These leaders believed

that, "an immediate strengthening of the communist line not only here but

internationally ..." had resulted. He stated that.

Among the colonials themselves— the British in Malaya and the Dutch in Indonesia— there is much huffing and puffing and whistling in the dark that seems almost unreal to anyone who has been in slight contact with the boiling cauldrons of non-white opinion in Southeast Asia.38

These are very strong words, we rai^t note in passing; it is well to

recall, parenthetically, that the strongly-held opinions of a respected

correspondent can often carry considerable weight with Washington-level

policy makers. The following day, note was taken of the article on the

Times* editorial page, and the editorial concluded with the judgment that

the Dutch action "harms the whole cause of Western democracy

57lbid., January 9, 1949, p. 1.

^^Ibid,, January 10, 1949, p. 1.

^^Editorial, New York Times, January 11, 1949» p. 26. 218

On the eve of the convening of the conference, more and more con­ cern was being expressea over the dangers of the emergence of an "Asian bloc" united only in its condemnations of the democracies of the West.

Evidence is strong that there was, in Washington ana London, a real and honest fear that the Conference would degenerate into such a condemnatory spectacle, and that this would in turn be taken full advantage of by "the communists.

The nineteen-nation Conference convened on January 20 ana began its aeliberations by receiving a long memorandum in which the Republic of

Indonesia outlined its demands; complete withdrawal of all butch forces ana the transfer of sovereignty to the Republic of Indonesia by September; immediate release of the leaders of the Republic; immediate withdrawal to the cease-fire lines of December 18; a lifting of the 1/utch blockade to allow the Republic to function normally; and actions that should be taken regarding the Good Offices Committee to empower it to arbitrate ana to expand it to include Asian representation.

While the sessions of the Conference were held in secret, con­ siderable detail became available to the news media almost at once. On its first day of deliberations, the conferees agreed to ask the becurity

Council to order Dutch troop withdrawals and full independence for Indo­ nesia by the end of 1949- Nehru appeared to dominate the Conference

from the start, receiving only slight competition from Philippine Foreign

Minister Carlos Pena Romulo. while efforts were made to expand the

'I^New York Times, January 16, 1949, Section IV, p. 2,

^1lbid., January 20, 1949, p* 15» 219 agenda of the Conference, Nehru successfully resisted the idea. Pak­

istani Foreign Minister Sir Mohammed Zafrulla Khan tried to get approval

for the creation of an Asian bloc along the lines of the Western European

Union, but Nehru maintained that the Conference should confine itself to

the Indonesian question, for which it had been called.

'tVhile we cannot be certain, there is also strong evidence that

United States Ambassador Loy Henderson played a significant role in the

Conference. He was observed in the distinguished visitors' gallery on

each day of the Conference, and was "understood to be tactfully ad­

vising . . . Nehru of American and British hopes that the final reso­

lutions of the Conference will be moderate and workable.

On January 22, the Conference transmitted its agreed-upon

resolution to the United Nations Security Council, asking that the Coun­

cil demand of the Dutch Government:

(1) that all Dutch forces be withdrawn immediately from Jogja­ karta and progressively from the rest of the Republic of Indonesia which was occupied after December 18, to be completed by March 15, 1949; (2) that all Republican officials, leaders and political pris­ oners be restored complete freedom at once; (5) the Jogjakarta residency be returned at once to the Republic and the Dutch refrain from further interference with Republican Gov­ ernment functioning and that the Republic receive facilities and freedom of consultation throughout the archipelago; (4) all trade restrictions against the Republic be removed imme­ diately and the Republic given the necessary facilities for communi­ cation with the outside world, pending formation of the Interim Government; (5) the Interim Federal Government be formed with both Repub­ lican and non-Republican representatives by March 15, 1949;

^^Ibid., January 21, 1949, P- 1, and January 22, 1949, p* 2.

^^Ibld., January 22, 1949, P* 2. 220

(6) that elections of a Constituent Assembly of Indonesia be com­ pleted by October 1 , 1949 and no new regional governments be formed or recognized pending the results of deliberations by that body; (7) the Interim Government control its own armed forces and, to ensure this, that all Dutch troops be withdrawn from all of Indonesia on a date to be determined by the Good offices Committee or other Security Council agent.4^^

It was observed that no "Asian bloc" had emerged from the Con­ ference, although this was ascribed in part to the "practical reason" that :

. . . to antagonize powerful Western nations for the formation of a potentially anti-Western group would be greatly disadvantageous to the weaker Eastern powers,

"Deep concern" was shown by the United States and European powers for this eventuality, and this fact "reacted powerfully" on Nehru, so that he made clear his intent to act within the United Nations and not try to form such a bloc.45

Back in New Dehli, Trumbull observed that this radicalized, anti­ colonial, anti-Western bloc had existed "only in the minds of Western observers." He did not add, however, that the Conference was able to demonstrate a degree of solidarity and political action on a subject of considerable concern to all participants.^^

'What is of interest to us in this regard is the nature of Ambas­ sador Henderson's instructions on dealing with the New Dehli Conference and the nature of whatever bargaining may have gone on between him and

Pandit Nehru on this same subject. It seems at least a legitimate specu­ lation, given the events to come at the Council table at Lake Success,

^ ^ I b i d . , January 23, 1949, P* 1. ^^Ibid., p. 4.

^^New York Times, January 25, 1949, p. 2?. 221 that Mr. Hemerson was empowered to provide Nehru with assurance. This was that if Nehru were able to exert his full influence (as we have seen he apparently dia) to ensure that the Conference produce a reasonable and

"workable" resolution embodying the responsible views of the conferees, then the United Ctates woula in turn exert its influence at the Council to ensure that there be clear and uefinite movement toward the goal of

Indonesian independence,

in any event, the Conference was not without perceptible effects on the United States Government ana public opinion and on the Council itself. Taylor observes that the Conference was among the "outside pressures" building up on the Council and its most important members; he adds, "It may well be that such pressures helped force the policy makers in Washington to reassess the situation in Asiai'^'^ Elsewhere, he takes this point somewhat further with the contention that New Dehli made clear the fact that non-communist Asia "would tolerate nothing less than unconditional independence for Indonesia." He approaches our theory just

set forth above as he continues,

These were among the reasons prompting the United Dtates to take a leading role in securing the adoption of the resolution of Jan­ uary 28, which in turn had appreciably altered the balance of power in the archipelago.48

Most importantly, of course, the New Delhi Conference had a strong

influence on United States' Indonesia policy at a most critical juncture.

Just as it was finally made unmistakably clear that the "bilateral"

approach advocated for so long lay in shambles, that the policy of covert

^^Taylor, op. cit., p. 277*

4®lbid., pp. 524, 325. 222 support for the Dutch position had earned the gratitude of neither the

Dutch nor the Indonesians, and, most importantly, had failed to help in resolving the issue, Washington was provided with a strong and decisive statement of Asian views just as it was subjecting its own policies in

Indonesia to a complete overhaul. Thus, whether Henderson was authorized to "make a deal" with Nehru, or whether he simply closely observed and then reported the strength of Asian feeling on the subject as it was mar.ifested at the Conference, is not really critical.

A NEW POLICY EVOLVES

Alastair Taylor has provided us with a very interesting statement which he obtained from Mohammed Roem in an interview in New York City in

1957. In discussing this period we have been reviewing, Roem said.

After the second military action, we [Republicans] noticed that the speeches of Jessup were completely different— they were stronger and tougher , . . . The spirit of the attitude of the United States delegates to the Indonesian Question was different. I think the way the Dutch treated the United States delegate in Indonesia had something to do with it. Cochran tried to be im­ partial— and I think he was— but then to be treated like that--do you remember his answer to the Dutch after the commencement of the second military action? Personal factors are important and also national prestige and policies, Cochran flew to Paris to help Jessup at the Security Council--and I am sure he helped to write Jessup's speeches and to draft the resolution of January 28, 1949*49

In our examination of the events immediately preceding the defin­

itive Council resolution of January 28, one of the very first things to

look at is Dr. Jessup's hard-hitting speech of the eleventh. He stated

that the United States still could find no adequate justification for

the military action taken by the Dutch and, "In many important respects,

^^United States, Department of State, Bulletin, XX, No. 498 (January 16, 1949), 74* 223 the reasons put forth by the Netherlands representative are not sup­ ported by the reports of the Committee of Good Offices," The Dutch action conflicted, he said, with previous Council resolutions. He char­ acterized The Hague's lack of response to the resolution of December 24 as a clear act of defiance. In Washington's opinion, van Roy en had

"failed to relieve his Government from the serious charges that it has

violated the Charter of the United Nations.

At this point, Jessup came as close as any United States repre­

sentative at the Council table to actually addressing himself to the

Basic Issues. Real peace in Indonesia would only come with a settlement

of the political issues on the basis of Renville and Linggadjati and

under the auspices of the United Nations machinery. He registered the

Opinion that a "first and fundamental step" ought to be the fixing of a

date for archipelago-wide elections: then a date should be set on which

sovereignty would be transferred from the Netherlands to the United

States of Indonesia. He said:

My Government believes that the length of time which should elapse between the present and the date when elections should take place and also the date of the transfer of sovereignty should be calculated in terms of months and not in terms of years.

When the elections had been held, a provisional regime should be set up

and authority progressively surrendered to the new regime until the time

set for full transfer of sovereignty,^^

Then, apparently virtually in league with the Republic's estab­

lished United Nations allies, particularly Australia and India, the

^^Ibid, and New York Times, January 12, 1g49, p. 1 . SI Mew York Times, January 12, 1949, p. 1. 224

United States set about searching for the right formula for a new reso­ lution. Some of the problems must have seemed all but intractable; how to avoid both the French and Soviet veto; whether to skirt or raise anew the now painful question of Dutch troop withdrawals to the positions held prior to the renewal of hostilities; how to make the resolution sufficiently forthright so that the Dutch would find it difficult to again evade the Council's intent while at the same time not giving the

Council the joo of negotiating on the immediate day-to-day issues (with all the propaganda opportunities this woulu give the USSR); how to find a formula which would convince the Republic and its Asian sympathizers, soon to meet in New Delhi, that significant forward progress was honestly being sought after, while at the same time avoiding subjecting the Dutch to complete humiliation. Also to be dealt with was the whole question of reconstituting the Republic as a geographic, if not a political,

entity. (Few Indonesians would agree that it ever ceased to be a polit­

ical entity.;

On January 14, the United States circulated to selected Council members a working paper containing some of V^ashington* s ideas and pro­ posals for dealing with these difficult questions. It reportedly would

have authorized that a new United Nations Commission be set up to deter­

mine the areas of Java, Sumatra, and Madura which would be evacuated by

the Dutch ana returned to Republican administration, "consistent with

the requirements of public security." It also provided for the imme­

diate and unconditional release of Sukarno at and their speedy

52 See New York Times, issues from January I3-15, 1949» 225

return to an evacuated Jogjakarta. It further set forth suggested dates for the establishment of the interim federal government (March 1), the holding of elections to a constituent assembly (October 1), and the transfer of sovereignty (April 1, 1950). The entire process would be supervised by the proposed commission, to be called the United Nations

Commission for Indonesia (UNCJl), composed of the present GOG members, the

United States, Australia, and Belgium, but with increased responsibility: this meant authority over the entire archipelago and not just Republican areas, with the ability to make recommendations and responsibility to

ensure the free and democratic nature of the elections. Provisions for

free elections and freedom of speech, however, would not allow advocacy

of violence and reprisals. The resolution essentially left to the new

field machinery the whole question of the timing and execution of troop

withdrawals, rather than trying to have the Council deal directly with

the issue.55

At the Council table the same day, van Hoyen said that the Dutch

would not accept any provision for the UNCI to order the withdrawal of

Dutch troops, but he welcomed United Nations observers, "despite their

lack of jurisdiction." And, while denying that the United Nations could

lay down any timetable, he then proposed a similar one. He pointedly

noted the "marked lack of impartiality" in Jessup's speech of Jan­

uary 11.54

A short time later an event occurred which bore directly on the

^^Ibid.

^^New York Times, January 15, 1949, P- 1* 226 matters being dealt with at the Council and which had an important psy­ chological effect on their deliberations. On January 16, the Council received a report from the GOC based on its recent visit with the incar­ cerated leadership of the Republic on the island of Bangka, in the town of ttuntok. The Committee reported that the Indonesian leaders were confined to two rooms under close guard; its report of the overall con­ ditions of interment contrasted sharply with the report given to the

Council previously by the Dutch representative, who had stated that they had complete freedom of the island, with the area of about 4,500 square miles. The cramped and degrading, prison-like conditions were described

in some detail in the report. Further, the Indonesians had been told that the Dutch High Commissioner, Jjouis J. M. Beel, "no longer recog­

nized either the legal existence of the Republic or the official status

of its servants." They were assured that the Committee and the Council

continued to recognize both and continued to view the Republic as a

party to the dispute.55 this distance in time, we .can only speculate

on the effects such a report must have had on the moral and psychological

position of the Netherlands, which had based so much of its case on trust

in its basic intentions and solemnly stated objectives.

The following day the Council quickly approved a Republican

recommendation by passing a resolution which required that the Dutch

allow one captured Republican leader to testify before the Council.

Meanwhile, van Hoyen was constrained to offer his "deep regrets" over

the conditions of the Republican leaders.5^

55ibici., January 17, 1949, P* 1*

^ ^ I b i d . , January 18, 1949, P» 11. 227

Directly in the wake of these events came the introduction (on

January 21) of the previously informally circulated United States' pro­ posals to the full Security Council for consideration. It came in the form of an omnibus measure under the sponsorship of four powers; China,

Cuba, Norway, and the United States, The resolution had the following provisions;

(1) It called on the Dutch immediately to cease military opera­ tions and on the Republic to cease guerilla warfare; (?) The "immediate" and "unconditional" release of all detained Republican political prisoners was demanded, as well as permission for them to return "at once" to Jogjakarta, which they should then be allowed to Eidminister freely, and in which they should be able to function as a government ; (3) Under UNCI auspices, negotiations should then begin for the (a) establishment of the interim government by March 15, (b) conduct of elections to a Constituent Assembly by October 1, and (c) the transfer of sovereignty no later than July 1, 1950. (4) The GOC was reconstituted at the UNCI to be the "representa­ tive of the Security Council in Indonesia" and could act on the basis of a majority vote. It was further empowered to make recommendations to the Parties, to deal directly with the Federalist states, to ob­ serve the anticipated general elections and, after recommending which Dutch-held areas could be turned back to the Republic, supervise those transfers. If either party failed to accept any of the Commis­ sion's reco:ijmendations, it should then report this immediately to the Council, along with its recommendations for a solution.57

Jessup, in his introductory remarks, admitted that the resolution did not

meet the desires of all parties, but said that it did provide the basis

for a concrete settlement of the entire problem. Malik, on the other

hand, condemned the resolution as a "deal" for consolidating Dutch

aggression.5®

From the Dutch capital, the reaction was predictably unfavorable;

57 United Nations, Security Council, Official Records, 4th yr. supplement for January, 1949, pp. 53-6; New York Times, January 22, 1949, p. 1. ^^New York Times, January 22, 1949, P* 1» 228 speaking before the Foreign Press Association there, Foreign Minister

Stikker said,

I can foresee only chaos if the resolution is allowed to stand as it now is before the Security Council— chaos in Indonesia and subsequently chaos in the Netherlands— and all this because of a lack of confidence, a lack of faith in the spiritual forces and values of the West, a basic mistrust of our proclaimed intentions, of our most formal pledges.59 The "trust" theme may have carried less weight in the wake of the mix-up over the status of the Republican leaders' conditions of imprisonment. Furthermore, despite all ol the United States' and GCC efforts to convince the leaders of the Republic that the basic inten­ tions and motives of the Dutch were honorable, the following might be offered as a more accurate and reliable indication of their true in­ tentions;

Such criticism [as Stikker's] of the American resolution centers in the main on its treatment of the Republic of Indonesia, which the Dutch say no longer exists. 'The Republic is a ghost come to haunt us and make us miserable," a Government official declared.

Debate on the resolution revealed that there were three basic positions which emerged; those, including the Republic and the New

Delhi conferees (as well as the boviet Union) who did not believe the

resolution went far enough; those, particularly the sponsors, who felt

that it should be approved; and, finally, the colonial powers who felt

that it went too far in encroaching on Dutch sovereignty in Indonesia.

During the debate on January ?7, ten speakers addressed the Council.

Three (the Republic, Australia, and Burma) criticized the fact that the

59 Ibid., January 25, 1949, P* 1•

^°lbid. 229 resolution fell short of the one adopted at New Delhi. Speaking for the

Republic, L. N. Palar said the major fault was the resolution's reliance on Netherlands' good faith; as far as he was concerned, guarantees

against Dutch "double-crossing" were required, Jessup countered that

the aims of the resolution were identical to those of the New Delhi Con­

ference, He defended the provision for leaving troop withdrawal recom­

mendations to the projected UNCI because the Security Council would be

unable to do this "at this distance.

Finally, on January 28, the resolution was adopted, with the

addition of three amendments; first, the Dutch were ordered to evacuate

both the city and "the environs" of Jogjakarta; secondly, the UNCI was

to be permitted to recommend economic measures necessary for the proper

functioning of the administration of the Republic; finally, the Fed­

eralist states were to be "invited" rather than "permitted" to take part

in the negotiations on establishment of the interim government,The

voting came paragraph by paragraph, in accord with the Soviet demand;

usually the vote was eight for, none against, and three abstentions (the

USER, the Ukraine, and France), except on a Soviet amendment demanding an

immediate Dutch withdrawal, which received the favorable votes of only the

sponsor, the Ukraine, Egypt, and Cuba.

The Dutch delegate van Royen unleashed a bitter attack on the

resolution (and the Council) after the voting was completed. He said that

61 New York Times, January 28, 1949, p. 16.

^^United Nations, Security Council, Official Records, 405th meeting (January 27, 1949)» p. 57.

^^New York Times, January 29, 1949, p. 1. 230 it served to place United Nations' "guardianship" over the Netherlands and demanded sacrifices to which no sovereign country could accede. He warned that the return of Jogjakarta threatened further disorder and that the resolution interfered in Dutch domestic affairs. The Council was arrogating to itself the decisions on the future of Indonesia, despite the Netherlands' sovereignty. The Hague would accept the reso­ lution only as it was "compatible with the Netherlands' responsibility for law and order" in the archipelago .^4

For his part, the Republican delegate simply said he would have

to reserve judgment until all Republican leaders were released, in order

to know the Government's "collective opinion" and pending the hutch

"complete acceptance" of the resolution,^5

While the resolution failed to address itself in substance to a

solution of the Basic Issues, as Taylor noted,

The significance of the resolution did not lie in those direc­ tions, but in the fact that it had wrested initiative and ultimate powers of decision from the parties (which at this juncture meant the Netherlands) and had given them to the new UNCI. As a con­ sequence, it had empowered the Commission to ensure that the parties would face up to all issues obstructing a definite political settle­ ment.66

For our purposes, however, the resolution signifies more than

this. The resolution of January 28 represents the culmination of a month­

long process (the groundwork for which may have been laid as early as the

jViadiun affair) in which the United Etat es hammered out an essentially new

G^ibid. ^^Ibid. 66,^, aylor, Indonesian Independence and the United Nations, p. 191 231

Indonesia policy. Ahile the immediate stimulus for this new policy may have been the second police action, we have seen that this evolution necessarily occurred in the context of a geographical shift in (or pos­ sibly, expansion of) Washington's area of awareness of an increasing concern for the viability of the United Nations as a peace-keeping organization, and finally, in the context of the world-wide application

of the concept of containment,

IMPLtaiENTIHG THE' NKW POLICY

We are now confronted with the task of examining the way in which

the general intent, if not the specific provisions, of the Council's reso­

lution of January 28, 1949 was implemented. And for our purposes, this

cecomes a question of following two separate but related paths which

eventually begin to merge with the agreement of the Parties to the resto­

ration of the Republican Government to the Jogjakarta residency, the

holding of a Dutch-sponsored Hound Table conference at The Hague and a

cease-fire in Indonesia. The first of these stories can be sketched in

less than full detail; it concerns the response of the Dutch Government

to the resolution of January 28, the Security Council directed response

of the UN Cl, and the preliminary discussions on Batavia between Dutch and

Republican representatives, J. H. van Hoyen and Mohammed Hoem, The other

area, which we must cover somewhat more carefully, concerns the widening

of American public and congressional interest in and concern over the

Indonesian Question, the manifestations of this expanded popular aware­

ness, and the effects that it had, both on the United States policy

rnaKers and on the parties themselves. 232

The reader should occasionally remind himself that both of these evolutions took place against the backdrop of the increasing successes of the Kepublicari guerilla warfare in Indonesia; it does not seem to be stretching the facts in any way to comment that the Dutch position was soon to be caught between the hammer of an increasingly hostile world

(and particularly American) public opinion and the anvil of Indonesian guerilla warfare. Vihile other factors— such as the increasing weariness of the Dutch population itself for continued warfare and the surprising hostility of the Federalist states to the second police action— also played their part, we believe that these two factors we have enumerated were, in the end, decisive. Ana, while it is the purpose of the present

study to concentrate on the hammer at the expense of the anvil, it is

important that we not lose sight of the fact that the Indonesian people

won their right to sovereignty and independence, and that they did so

as much on the battlefield as they did at the conference table.

The Hague's response to the resolution of January 28 did not

come without a certain amount of prodding. As Republican sources were

charging that the Dutch were continuing with further arrests of Repub­

lican leaders, the UNCI was learning in its first meeting as the Com­

mission that the Dutch representative in Batavia "has no orders from his

government and therefore car.not comply with the latest United Nations'

orders."6? His government, indeed, was scheduling a cabinet meeting for

Monday, January 51 to discuss the resolution. Dutch officials were

described as refusing to accept the resolution, but hopeful of finding a

6 7 New York Times, January 30, 1949, p. 18, 233

workable compromise.^® An indication of the feelings of mounting pres­ sure in the Netherlands is the comment by one Dutch source, who found the situation analogous to having a smoking bomb thrown through the window; "We know it is there, but we try to get on with our job, hoping it will not go off before we are finished."®^

Cn the third of February, Merle Cochran ended his consultations at the State Department and embarked on the first leg of his return trip

to Indonesia. He traveled to Brussels, then The Hague, before re­

turning.^^

It becomes clear that, despite frequent disavowals by State

department spokesmen of seeking or being able to control or influence the

UNCI, a creation of the Security Council,Merle Cochran was dealing

with the Belgian and Dutch officials as one tasked with implementation of

United States foreign policy: while he was offering the Dutch his "per­

sonal conviction" that the resolution offered a fair basis for settlement

and that the Dutch had everything to gain by accepting it and treating

with the new Commission, the Dutch were reportedly approaching the reso­

lution "like they would a commercial treaty and were bargaining hard

every inch of the way." Because of this, "neutral observers" were pre- 72 dieting an increasingly decisive role for Cochran and the UNCI.

^®Ibid.

^^New York Times. February 3, 1949, P* 11 .

United States, Department of State, Bulletin, hX, No. 501 (February 6, 1949), 162; New York Times, February 4, 1949*

Ibid.

^^New York Times. February 8, 1949, p« 13. 234

On February 10, the Commission warned the parties that they had only five more days to reach agreement on an interim Indonesian regime; if no agreement were to be reached by that time, the UNCI would begin drafting its own. The first sign of the intense pressure to which the

Dutch Cabinet and Government were being subjected by these unfavorable developments was the resignation of the Minister of Overseas Territories,

Dr. E. M. Sasaen. Eumitro, returning from New Delhi, informed Americans

that Sassen had been the exponent of the "most reactionary group in the

Dutch Cabinet.

Taylor places these events in their proper prospective, and

helps to explain The Hague's anxieties:

The Cabinet was in a dilemma. Negotiations were well advanced for concluding the N. Atlantic Treaty, In his inaugural address on January 20th, President Truman had announced that the United States would provide military equipment for nations prepared to cooperate in maintaining peace and security— and on February 4, Stikker had admitted in the Second Chamber that while Dutch policy should never be determined merely by Washington's wishes, yet the fact remained that cooperation with the United States in the present circumstances had become a cornerstone of the foreign policy of both the Nether­ lands and Western Europe.74

There followed a Ul'iCl request to the Council for permission to

delay its required report (due February 15) in light of the impending

arrival in Batavia of Dutch High Commissioner Louis J. M, Beel.

THE BEEL PLAi'<

Finally, on February 26, The Hague put forth what can only be

73 United States, Department of State, Bulletin, XX, No. 502 (February 13, 1949), 185; New York Times, February 12, 1949, p. 5»

^Taylor, op. cit., pp. 197, 198.

^^United States, Department of State, Bulletin, XX, No. 503 (February 20, 1949), 228; New York Times, February 16, 1949, p. 20. 235 described as its counter-proposals to the Security Council resolution of

January 28. The "Beel Plan" was the name given the counter-proposals, in recognition of the official responsible for conceiving them, (it is worth noting, in passing, that the tone and the manner in which these counter-proposals were set forth are revealing of the lingering Dutch misconceptions as to the altered circumstances: the plan was "an­ nounced," rather than, "proposed"; the tone wps imperative and the tense,

future definite. The fundamental viewpoint was still unilateral.)

The Beel Plan proposée substantially the following: sovereignty

would be transferred to the United States of Indonesia even earlier than

the Council's target date of July 1, 1950; the leaders of the Republic

would be set free "inunediately" to assist in this accelerated transfer of

power, the details of which would be worked out at a Hound Table Con­

ference (RTC) at The Hague, to convene as early as possible. This

conference would also set up the Federal Interim Government and the

Netherlands-Indonesian Union. Both Sukarno and Hamid II (as "President

of the Republic" and leader of the Federalist states, respectively) were 76 invited to appoint delegations to the RTC.

The Republican and Commission reactions were described as mani­

festing a "marked lack of enthusiasm." Meantime, the Dutch commenced a

iairly strenous advertising campaign: Ajnbassador van Kleffens said the

Netherlands was "going farther to meet the demands of Indonesian nation­

alism than the Eecurity Council itself.^'' Showing the policy sagacity,

not to say shrewdness, for which he was to become famous, President

76 New York Times. February 27, 1949, p. 1; Taylor, op. cit., pp. 119, 200. 77 New York Times, February 27, I949, p. 1. 236

Sukamo rejected the Dutch invitation two days later. Republican delegate to the United Nations Palar condemned the proposal as "a clear 70 rejection and outright defiance" of the Council's resolution.

On the first of March, the Commission transmitted its delayed report to the Council. It made note of the Beel Plan, blamed the dead­

lock on the Netherlands' non-compliance with the Council’s resolution, and reminded the Council that (l) the war was continuing, (2) the two

Parties had not gotten together, and (3) the overall situation was dete­ riorating. It pointedly commented that, "This situation results from

the failure of the Netherlands Government to accept the procedures of

the resolution of January 28, and not from a mere difference of view­

point on details of governmental structure and functions. "^9 Beel

Plan, the Commission noted, called for actions not contemplated in the

Council resolution. It requested the Council ' s guidance as to what its

reaction should be to its invitation to the Round Table Conference,

pointing out that it had no authority to accept it. The report also

made clear that the first step to meaningful negotiations, i.e., release

80 of Republican political prisoners, had not yet been taken.

As if to ensure that there be no doubt regarding the particular

position of the United :^tates (as opposed to that of the United Nations

Commission for Indonesia) a United States delegation spokesman at Lake

Success reported that the United States was in "full agreement" with the

78 ' Ibid., March 1, 1949, P* 1 . 79 United States, Department of State, Bulletin, XX, No. 505 (March 6, '949), 296. ®®See New York Times, March 2, 1949, p* 21, and Taylor, op. cit., p. 201. 257

Commission's report "blaming the Netherlands for the current political and military deadlock in Indonesia," and intended to "support fully" the

UNCI's report.®”*

On the third of March, the Dutch provided further evidence as to their ultimate intentions, if such were needed, by appointing a new Û p group to represent the "former Republican territory" at the RTC. A spokesman in Batavia (Commissioner Beel, precisely) had already stated

that the Conference would be held regardless of whether the Republican

leaders attended.

While governmental circles in The Hague were manifesting symp­

toms of depression and defeat over the unfavorable reception accorded the

Beel P l a n , ^4 p^e United States delegate to the Security Council, Warren R.

Austin, was preparing his Government's reply. The main thrust of this

speech, which wan delivered on the tenth of March, was soon to become

the one central and critical issue on which the entire Indonesian Question

soon came to turn; restoration of the Republican Government to the

capitol at Djokjakarta. Austin began,

I should like to state that the United States Government continues to believe that the Security Council's resolution of January 28th represents a sound and practical basis for a just and lasting solution of the Indonesian Question and we continue to support it fully.

Austin made note of the continuation of hostilities over wide areas of the

archipelago and, recalling the Dutch agreement to free the Indonesian

®^New York Times, March 3, 1949, P* 9* 82 Ibid., March 4i 1949» V* 8#

®^Ibid., March 2, 1949, p. 21.

®4lbid., March 10, 1949, p. 11. 238

leaders, stated that . . we have yet to see . , . the practical results of that decision." He remarked that the Dutch reasoning for its unwillingness to restore the Republic to Djokjakarta, to the effect that

the Republican authorities could not maintain law and order, was "fal­

lacious and internally contradictory." The United States representative

reiterated that military action could not be.allowed to eliminate one of

the parties to a dispute before the Security Council, and, returning to

his central theme, he contended that for any meaningful negotiations to

take place, the Republican authorities had to be allowed to "assemble as

a government in their own territory," He viewed the original inclusion

of the "restoration" order in the resolution of January 29 as evidence

of the Council's judgment that this was a sine qua non to any kind of

fruitful negotiations. He then proceeded to analyze, systematically and

critically, the Netherlands' arguments for being unwilling to agree to

restoring the Republican Government. Then, with the American Govern­

ment's viewpoint on that critical issue made clear, Mr. Austin took note

of the UNCI's characterization of the Round Table Conference as a counter­

proposal, and of President Sukarno's rejection of that proposal without

the prior restoration of his Government to its capitol. With this in

mind, once the Republic's one justified objection was met, the United

States saw no reason why such a Conference would be inconsistent with the

resolution of January 28, "which, of course, would remain in full force

and effect." Washington would agree to the UNCI consulting with three

parties (including the Federalists) to reach agreement on a conference at

The Hatue, and to UNCI participation therein.®'

®^Complete text of Austin's March 10 speech quoted in; United States, Department of State, Bulletin, XX, No. 508 (March 27, 1949), 379, 380. 239

THE CANADIAN DIRECTIVE

In the Security Council (;ifter hearing a very persuasive and reasonable defense of the Beel plan from Dutch delegate van Royen) , the

Soviet, Indian, Australian, Cuban, and Filipino delegates (observers) all condemned the plan and urged its outright rejection. They viewed it as it ill another Dutch plan for accomplishing the Netherland's original goals while simultaneously reducing the role of the Commission and the

Security Council back to their former near impotence, all under the guise of compliance.

These reactions had been based on the premise that because the means envisaged in the Beel Plan appeared irreconcilable with those in the resolution, therefore the avowed aims of the former could not seriously be equated with the Council's. Canada and Ch.ina, however- did not view the two propositions in simple antithetical terms.86 8?

Nor did the United States, for that matter, as we have just seen. Pro- vided the Republic were restored to its former capital and peace were

restored to Indonesia, there was no reason, as far as these powers could

see, that the UNCI could not accept a Dutch invitation to a conference to

arrange and effect the eventual transfer of sovereignty. A resolution

was finally proposed, and adopted (with France, the Ukraine, and the

USSR abstaining) on March 23, which declared it to be the "sense of the

Security Council" that the UNCI should aid the parties in agreeing on

implementation of the January resolution (emphasizing the restoration

issue), and on the arrangements for a conference at The Hague, "to the

end that the negotiations contemplated by the resolution of January 2fi

®^Taylor, Indonesian Independence and the United Nations, p. 203. By Italics are in the original. 240 may be held as soon as possible." Finally UNCI participation in such a conference would be "consistent with the purposes and objectives" of 88 that resolution.

Taylor has very ably analyzed the question 'To what extent did the Canadian Directive represent an accommodation of the Security Coun­ cil's earlier position to the Beel Plan?" Without endeavoring to repro­ duce his excellent work here in detail, we may note his observations

that the paramount objectives of the police action and the Beel Plan were

to allow the Netherlands to transfer sovereignty to a United States of

Indonesia in which the Republic would not be a cohesive (or even extant)

political force. Pointing out that the Dutch had failed in their effort

to eliminate organized resistance and failed in their effort to prevent

the Council from demanding the restoration of the Republic, he demon­

strates that time was now, for once, no longer working in their favor.

The crucial point is, of course, that by refusing to countenance any

action other than or prior to the re-establishment of the Republican

capital, the Council succeeaed in taking advantage of the opportunity

presented by the Beel 1 Ian to break the deadlock and exploit the

concessions thus offered by the Dutch without sacrificing any of the

Republic's basic interests. By means of the Canadian Directive, the

Security Council, in fact, accommodated the Beel Flan to the resolution

of January 28, and in so doing, not only showed that it had a better

comprehension of what constituted the Republic's basic interests than

aid the Republican observer at the Council table himself, but also

88 Taylor, op. cit., p. 204. 241 confronted the Netherlands .ith the alternative of giving up its long- sought goal or admitting that the true objective of the Beel Plan was the destruction of the Republic and not the acceleration of the transfer 89 of sovereignty.

Turning to the question of the degree of United States partici­ pation in the conception of this near brilliant piece of diplomacy, we

find that satisfyingly definitive statements on the subject are lacking.

'Ahile Kahin, after badly misinterpreting the significance of the Direc­

tive, alleges that the Republicans "believed that the resolution, despite

its name, was American instigatea, we have no reliable references to

substantiate this contention. About all that one may say with certainty

is that Austin's speech thirteen days previously had clearly pointed in

this direction, that American and Canadian diplomatic moves, particularly

in the United Nations, have been demonstrably and historically well

coordinated, and in particular, in certain circumstances, Washington was

not averse to requesting the Canadians to put forward as their own,

diplomatic initiatives which in fact may have been originatea by both or

even by the Unitec States alone. Finally, we have pointed to a sensi­

tivity on the part of the State Department toward appearing to be the

single, all-powerful arbiter of the entire dispute. While the foregoing

analysis is both circumstantial and tentâti\ e, we hope it wou.u see-r

reasonably persuasive.

89 ^Ibiü., pp. 205, 210. 90 Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, p. 414. 242

THE RGtM - V an ROYEN TALKS

Following the Canadian Directive, the United Nations Commission met in Batavia on March 25 and Cochran proposed that the CNCI take the initiative in calling for a conference. Tr.ylor points out that a call for formal negotiations, however, was not made; there was only a call for

informal exploratory talks. With the likelihood of the Republic insisting on restoration prior to any talks, and with the Dutch insisting on the

Republic's commitment to a cessation of guerilla warfare ana to attend­

ance at the RTC, this was very wise, diplomatically, as attested to by

the cautious but positive replies received from each side.^^

In aereeing, the Dutch signified the appointment of their United

Vat ions Ambassador, Dr. Jar Herman van Hoyen, Tie Indonesians stated

that they were willing and appointed Mohammed Roem. Both sides, however,

signified certain reservations: the Dutch wanted it made clear that

their agreement in no way prejuaicea their responsibility for the main­

tenance of freedom and order in Indonesia. The Republicans manifested

reservations about agreeing to meet with the Dutch prior to their ac­

ceptance of the restoration of the Republic.

The opening meeting eventually took place on April 14; the cause

for the delay, by now a well-established pattern, was that van Royen was

unable to reach Batavia until two weeks had elapsed from the time of the

proposed opening date. V/ith the altered situation, however, this "inter­

vening period saw a further strengthening of the Republic's bargaining

Tayl o r , op. cit., pp. 210, 211,

^^New York T i m e s , March 27, 1949, p* 16 ; March 50, 1949, p. 22; April 4, 1949, p. 5. 245 position.(Why this was so we shall shortly have the opportunity to review.) Cochran began the discussions with requests for a cease-fire, while advising the delegates, "It is not for us to find faults, but to

find a solution."^4

Taylor found that the newly constituted Commission's markedly

increased vigor and powers were reflected in the firmness of Cochran's

opening remarks. The unconditional and non-negotiable nature of the

return of the Republican Government to Jogjakarta was implicit in his

statements; "he simply took [the reinstatementJ for granted," and tabled

a working paper containing seventeen points which he presented for the

Parties' consideration.^^

finally, at the third meeting, the important break came; in

response to a questionnaire given them by Cochran (which, significantly,

asKed the hutch how long they would take to restore the Republican

capital, rather than whether they would do so), van Hoyen replied that

the Netherlands would agree to this point on two conditions; that the

present discussions would result in binding agreements; and that the

turnover could be accomplished without danger to law and order. Taylor

points up that the Republic coula not possibly be committed to binding

agreements in their incarcerated condition; additionally, having no assur­

ances that the Dutch would not proceed (as they had during the "mopping-

up operations" after the first police action) to try to eliminate the

93 Taylor, op. cit., p. 211.

94 Hew York T i m e s , April 15, 1949, P. 2.

^^Taylor, op. cit., pp. 212, 213. 244

Republican guerilla forces once the Republic had been restored to Jog­ jakarta and had committed itself to a cease-fire directed by the Secur­ ity Council, all under the guise of maintaining law and order. Thus, the 96 parties were still far apart.

"It was here that Cochran played a decisive role in bringing van Royen and Roem together," For a seven-aay period starting on the fourteenth, four formal meetings haa been held; then, for over two weeks,

there were none. V.'hile the Australians consulted closely with the

Republicans, ana the Belgians with the uutch, "there was a fairly steady

flow of Republican and Dutch officials to the verandah of Cochran's suite

ana the Hotel des Indes." In the meantime, the rest of the UNCI busiea

itself with administrative and other routine work.^^

The results of these private discussions were maae known on

May 7. Roem announced that he was authorized by Sukarno and Hatta to

give the Dutch "their personal assurances" that, in conformity with the

resolution of January 28 and the Directive of March 25, they favored the

following steps;

(1) Issuance of an order to the Republican armed adherents to cease guerilla warfare; (2 ) Cooperation in the restoration of peace ana the maintenance of law and order; and (3) Participation in a Round Table Conference at The Hague with a view to accelerating the unconditional transfer of real and complete sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia. President Sukarno and Vice President Hatta undertake that they will urge the adoption of such a policy by the government of the

96 Taylor, op. cit., pp. 215, 214; New York Times, April 22, 1949, p. 5.

^^Taylor, op. cit., pp 215, 216. 245

Republic of Indonesia as soon as possible after its restoration to Djokjakarta.98

Responding for his Government, van Hoyen agreed to the following:

(1) Return of the Itepublican Government to Jogjakarta: (2) Facilitate that Government's exercise of its appropriate junctions in the Residency; (3) Cease military operations and release all political prisoners seized since December 17, 1948. (4) Refrain from establishment ol' new or enlargement of existing federal states so as to affect areas under Republican control prior to the nineteenth of December. (5) Kis Government's support of the Republic as a state to take its place in the UGI with one-thira strength of the federal repre­ sentative body; (6) The early holding of an RTC at The Hague to accelerate the transfer of sovereignty; and (7) To allow Republican civil functionaries still operating out­ side of the Jogjakarta Residency to continue to do so.99

Two days later, the department of State released the following statement to the press:

The United States Government expresses its wholehearted approval of the ]-.reliminary agreement between the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia which was reached in Batavia on May 7, 1949, the terms of which should result in the near future in the restoration of the Republican Government to the residency oJ' Jogjakarta, the issuance of an effective cease-fire, ar.d the holding of a conference at The Hague leading to a definitive political settlement. The statesmanship dis­ played by both nanties . . . augurs well for the success of The Hague conference. . . . This Government is happy to extend congratulations to both

parties on the results thus far a c h i e v e d . 1^0

There may have been an element of self-congratulations in this

statement as well. As Taylor observes, the Commission's success in

96 Reported in Kahin, op. cit., p. 423; Taylor, op. cit., p. 217; New York Times, May 8, 1949; and United States, Department of State, Bulletin, XX, No. 506 (May 22, 1949), 653, 654.

99See sources listed in immediately preceding footnote.

^®®United States, Department of State, Bulletin, XX, No. 5O6 (May 22, 1949), 654. 246

. . . assisting the parties to reach preliminary agreement on all outstanding issues was due particularly to Cochran. His col­ leagues kept contact with both delegations, of course, and their advice was sought out .... Yet it was to Cochran that the two parties . . . turned as primus inter pares within the Commission. They did so because of his negotiating skill, hie strategic position as the middle or "neutral" member of the UNCI, and his Government's role in world a f f a i r s . ^01 furthermore, according again to Taylor, the speed with which Austin moved to support the Canadian Directive indicated that "the clearest possible understanaing now existed between the United States delegations at Lake Success ana Batavia.'®^ And, of course, by virtue of the very maxe-up of the UNCI (and the GOC before it), the position taken by the

United btates was almost invariably decisive.

"ith this, we have, as the reader familiar with these events well realizes, reached a most important juncture in the story of Indonesia's struggle for independence. r/hile jnuch of Indonesia remained irredenta and, while many di: ficult problems remained yet to be resolved, obviously it was now determined that the solutions would not be uni laterally Dutch.

The second party to the dispute haa been resuscitated (if one can, inaeed, properly assume its prior demise,-, and it was now agreed that the

Republic, as such, would form a part of free Indonesia.

IKDGNEUIAN llDEPrU'fLENCE

AND THE Al.UUiICAi. PEOf Lr:

It is now appropriate, with the foregoing recitations of events

as part of the background, to retrace our steps to the period immediately

101 Taylor, op. cit., p. 409. 102 I b i d . , p . 410. 247

following the initiation of the second police action and to examine, in some detail, the development and the effects of the response of the

American public (or rather, of the American "attenta^ive public" in

Gabriel Almond's terms) and the American, press and Congress to the hutch actions. We have referred earlier to the fact that the growing crescendo of hostile United States public and congressional opinion created an important source of pressure on The Hague which, in combination with other factors, eventually forced the hutch to accede on the all-important question of restoration. We hope to illustrate in the following pages just how intense this particular source of pressure must have been, as viewed from the Netherlands, and, without overdrawing its importance, show that its contribution to the "outcome" we have just reviewed in the hoem-van Hoyen btatements was probably almost as important as the Repub­ lican military successes,

in previous forays into this area in this work, we have had occasion to observe that Aiterican public opinion or. the relative merits of the respective Dutch and Republican cases in Indonesia was clearly

divided. Lany influential barking and industrial interests (particularly

in the oil industry), some with close commercial ties to the Netherlands,

were quite clearly sympathetic to the Dutch cause in Indonesia, This

fact is quite well illustrated, for example, by the frustrating experi­

ences of Matthew Fox and the American-Indonesian Corporation. Many other

sources of support existed as well: there are, as is well known, a large

number of American citizens of Dutch ancestry. Additionally, many well-

educated and perceptive Americans who placed great importance on the

potential contributions of the Netherlands to the building of the North 246

Atlantic alliance deplored the risks to that alliance, risks which they consioered woula result from overly strong American diplomatic and polit­

ical pressure on the (clearly subordinate) Indonesian Question. Many of

these same opinion-holders (again, one of Mr. Almond's terms) believed

that some form of Dutch control over the productive resources in the

archipelago would be crucial in the difficult reconstruction tasks facing

both the Netherlands and the rest of free Europe, tasks to which Sec­

retary oi State George (J. Marshall hau just strongly urged the commit­

ment of large-scale American assistance.

Cr. the other hard, we have also observed that the strong and

historic American bias against colonialism certainly emerged from World

War II with much of its former strength intact. This student found it

curious, though understandable, that while anti-colonialism came to be

associated with a "liberal" outlook on international affairs in the late

19î?G's and early 1960's, that many of the spokesmen who reacted most

sharply and negatively to the initial itutch postwar efforts to reclaim

their East Indian colony were those elements who were often identified

with inter-war "isolationism"and a general awareness towaros close

American identification with the policies and fortunes of the western

aemocratic powers.

One such person was Nevada's Eenator George W, Malone (Repub­

lican), who told a New York Times correspondent in Cairo on December 22,

1948 that, ", . . Without the money we gave the Dutch under the Marshall

Plan, they could not do what they are doing in Indonesia. They have

blockaded those little Indonesians and now they are going to whip them."

He continued that ’"I'he peoples of the Near East and East are on the move. 249

They are going to gain their independence .... They can handle their own affairs." lie said that he feareo that the ?Y:arshall Plan tended to finance regimes that, "li::e the Jutch in Indonesia, are alreaay out­ moded.

To illustrate the point that the sources of American support, while very possibly drawing on the same historical traditions, were quite varied, we may note that (chronologically) the very next public statement of support for the Republican position came two days later from a group of organizations which gathered for that purpose in New York City: repre­ sentatives from the Socialist Party, the Young People's Socialist League,

and others picketed the Dutch consulate on Rockefeller Plaza with placeras denouncing the "imperialistic murder in Indonesia." The group did not

have the leadership of Norman Thomas on that praticular day, but the

Socialist Party . ;ader did send the State Department a commendatory tele­

gram for calling the first Security Council meeting,None of these

voices were considered close political allies of Senator Malone's.

While we shall, in the pages to come, have occasion to sample

expressions of public sentiment from elements in the American political

structure which are not particularly powerful or influential, the fol­

lowing is clearly not an example. On December 25, Philip Murray, Presi­

dent of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, sent to the Secretary

of State (and released to the press) a letter which elucidated the posi­

tion of a most important element of American organized labor regarding the

Indonesian aispute:

^*^^New York Times, December 25, 1948, p. 5*

^^^Ibid., December 24, 1948, p. 2. 250

Dear Mr. Secretary: I wish to express on behalf of the six million members of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, our pleasure that the American Government, both in the Uniteo Nations and elsewhere, has taken the leadership in seeking a speedy end to the hostilities initiated by the Dutch in Indonesia. The CIO has always felt that the peoples of the colonial coun­ tries should be given the greatest possible assistance in developing free, democratic governments. As our recent convention at Portland, Oregon declared; "An enduring peace demands that people everywhere, including the economically backward and colonial countries, be pro­ tected in their rights of self-determination and self-government free from military, political and economic coercion." At a time when the world is striving desperately to find a road to peace, we feel that the action of the Netherlands government in suddenly and wantonly attacking the people of Indonesia conforms neither to the morality of our civilization nor to the practical po­ litical needs of the people of western Europe and the United States. We feel that insofar as American aid is now available to the Netherlands government, it is being used for purposes inconsistent with the original intent and objectives of the European Recovery Program. I voice the hope, on behalf of the members of the CIO, that the government of the United Etates will continue to take every feasible step in the realm of diplomacy and economics to help terminate the Dutch aggression in Indonesia, and to assure a speedy settlement rec­ ognizing the rightful interest of the Indonesian people in their quest for democratic self-rule. You may rest assured that the Etate Department will enjoy the full support of American workers in what­ ever steps it may take in this direction. Sincerely,

}hilip Murray^^^

Such an unequivocable and negative reaction from an "interest group" which, as the Dutch unquestionably understood, was so important to any

United Etates Auministration, but particularly a democratic one, could hardly have been viewed with equanimity or pleasure in The Hague, partic­ ularly with the not particularly indirect threat to oppose further

Marshall Plan assistance.

The Foreign Policy Association, meeting in Washington, made its

^^^United States, Department of State, Bulletin, XX, No, 498 (January 16, 1959), 82; New York Times, January 24, 1948, p. 2. 251

views known a few days later. The organization, in a report written by

Dr. Raymond Kennedy of Yale (who had been interned by the Japanese in

Indonesia during the war), described the Renville Agreement as a "fair solution" to the conflict. "To the degree thc>t this agreement remains unfulfilled," they declared, "there ls danger that Russia can and will continue to gain popular allegiance in Indonesia and ail Eouth Asia."

A fear was voiced that the confidence of Indonesians in the friendship and sympathy of the West was "sure to weaken" unless an equitable and just solution were found.^

Striking another blow in the sensitive area of Marshall Plan assistance, former Treasury Secretary and Progressive Party candidate henry A. V.'allace called for immediate cessation of all American assis­ tance to the Dutch; he further demanded an embargo on all armament

shipments to the Netherlands Government. Having opposed, as Progressive

Party candidate for President, all such aid to any nation, Wallace de­

nounced the United Nations Security Council cease-fire order as a "hypo­

critical, deliberately ineffectual gesture.

Two days later, ;.,atthew Fox demanded the same thing. He went

further and stated that Congress would cut off the aid if the Department

of State did not. He then detailed a number of prospective business

deals which had not been consummated because of Dutch activities in the

archipelago. Fox predicted that if the Renville Agreement were not ful­

filled, the Netherlands Indies would become a severe "deficit operation"

^^New York Times, December 27, 1948, P* 8 . 107 Ibid., December 28, 1948, p. 14- 252 which the Dutch would be unable to support for long. He was credited

with saying (by an article printed on the financial page of the New York

Times) that Indonesia wished to tie its economy to the United States and

that some twenty-six American companies had had business interest in

Indonesia and were willing to resume trading there when stability was

assured.^

The Freshman Republican Senator from Maine, Margaret Chase Smith,

in a speech before the Federation of Business and Professional Women's

Clubs, stated,

The potency of the United Nations is threatened by renewed fighting in the Dutch-Indonesian war. Holland has defied the United Nations by starting what it calls a "police action." People have been killed by the use of arms. If the United Nations fails to stop this war, then its own future is threatened. In my first statement as a United States Senator, I am prompted by what I know is in the hearts of all American women to call upon the queen of Holland to exercise the power that is hers to stop the Dutch-Indonesian fighting. Women of the world are on trial. Queen Juliana, by her individual decision, can prove to the world the will and the power of women for peace. Hers is an unprecedented opportunity for women. (Applause; 109

Cn January 6, the India League of America passed a resolution

asking the United States Government to halt European Recovery Plan (ERP)

aid to the Netherlands and to institute Security Council action to brand

the Netherlands an aggressor. The Dutch police action was branded the

"most blatant example of ruthless imperialism in the world.

Then, the (Protestant) Foreign Missions Conference of North

America lauded the Government for refusing to "buttress" colonialism in

1 08 Ibid., December 50, 1948, Finance Page, p. 29. 109 Ibid., January 4, 1949, p. 5* 110 Ibid., January 7, 1949, p. 10. 255

Indonesia and called on the Administration to hold in abeyance any fur­

ther Marshall Plan aid to the Netherlands until it complied fully with

all demands made by the Council. The Protestant mission body passed a

resolution requesting the United States representative at the Security

Council to demand withdrawal of butch troops to the pre-December lines

end to release all Republican leaaers without "reservation or restric­

tion. " They continued;

A European nation of democratic tracitions and outstanding devotion to the Christian faith has, by a sudden attack on the Indonesian Republic and the imprisonment of its leaders, violated the letter and spirit of both its profession in these matters and directives of the United Nations. Their unjustifiable resort to arms is a denial of human brotherhood and of the basic Christian principle that men everywhere have the right of self-determination.

The missionaries decried the United Nations tendency to accept as fait

accompli the results of successful aggressive warfare, and noted that it

would undermine the world body.^ ^' The text of their resolution was

later inserted into the Congressional Record by Representative Lawrence

Smith of iVisconsin. ^ ^ ^

Columnist Walter Lippman, writing in the Hew York Herald Tribune,

recorded the following thoughts;

Cur friends in Western Europe should try to understand why we cannot and must not be maneuvered, why we dare not drift into gen­ eral opposition to the independent movements in Asia. They should tell their propagandists to stop smearing these movements. They should try to realize how disasterous it would be to them and to the cause of Western Civilization, if ever it could be said that the Western Union for the defense of freedom in Europe was in Asia a syndicate for the preservation of decadent empires.H)

111 Ibid., January 8, 1949, p. 16. 112 United States, Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (January 3, 1949-March 12, I949) , ICV, Part 12, A1-AU20, Appendix, A 483.

^^^Hew York Herald Tribune, January 10, 1949, cited by Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, pp. 404, 405. 254

The American Association for the United Nations urged the Admin­ istration to take the lead in the Security Council in condemning the

Netherlands for its "deliberately planned coup" in Indonesia. In a telegram to Acting Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett, they condemned the police action as a violation of the Charter. It is vitally important for American leadership in the Security Council that the position of this country be a consistent one against aggression. We regret that the vigor of the American position in the first meeting of the Council on the present Iruonesian crisis has not been consistently maintained.1 14

The United World Federalists, another American organization,

urged, in an open letter to president Truman, that the Government halt

Marshall Plan aid to the Lutch until its troops withdrew "from Indo­

nesia," releasee inuonesian Republicat. leaders, and reopened negotiations

in good faith. It conuemned the Dutch for their "suaaen and brutal attack

upon the Indonesian Government." IIS^

Whether in response to this growing chorus of criticism or not,

we can only conjecture. The Lutch Ambassador in Washington, Felco van

Kleffens, spoke to the Overseas Press Club in New York on the twelfth

of January. He declared that Indonesia would be a free, independent,

sovereign state in a matter of weeks or months. He noted what he viewed

as a widespread misunaerstanding of the dutch position, and characterized

Jessup's speech of January 11 as "a variety of violent things, sometimes

bordering on the intemperate," He asserted that there was no question

that the United Nations was incompetent to deal with the crisis, and

^^\'ew York Times, January 10, 1949, P . 4.

^ ^^Ibid., p. 5. 255 asked rhetorically, if this were not the case, why had the United States refused to allow the question to be brought before the International

Court of Justice? He said the Dutch police action was not against the

Republican leaders but against armed gangs "who prevented these leaders lié from coii'.ing to mutually acceptable terms with the Dutch,"

Congressional reaction, while somewhat slower in materializing than some of the assorted interest groups we have been quoting, began to be heard. Representative Arthur G. Klein, Democrat of ''ew York, speaking in the House on January 27, condemned the Dutch attack, ar,d recommended that the Administration condemn the Netherlands as an "aggressor nation"

(an opprobrium widely employed against the Germans and Japanese all during iVorld War ll), stop all financial aid to the Netherlands, press for immediate United Nations' diplomatic and economic sanctions against the

Dutch, call i'o; an eleven-nation Security Council commission to supervise the "immediate withdrawal of Dutch troops from Indonesia,” and support

the Indonesian peoples' fight for independence. He expressed apprecia­

tion of the Government'£ disapprobation of the Dutch actions as expressed

thus far. ^ ^ ^

Dr. FYank P. Graham, President of the University of North

Carolina, former United States representative on the Good Offices Com­

mittee, and soon to be appointed to the United Etates Senate (Democrat),

in a speech made on the occasion of his receipt of the Amalgamated

Clothing Workers of America's Sydney Hilman Award, urged the United

^^^Kew York Times, January I3, 1949i p* 6. 11 7 United States, Congressional Record, op. cit., pp. A356, A359. 256

Nations to act to free the Republican leaders and to aid in the formation of a "free, independent and sovereign" United States of Indonesia.

Speaking to such dinner guests as Vice President Alben W. Barkley and

Associate Supreme Court Justice Wiley Rutledge, he stated that United

Nations follow-throu^ on the January 26 resolution was essential to do

justice to millions of people, to avoid sanctioning broken agreements and

defiance of the Security Council, to strengthen the moral foundations of

the United Nations, and to strengthen the cause of liberty in a world

wavering between freedom and totalitarianism. He urged the West to re-

pair the "broken front of freedom" fostered by the Netherlands, 118

Congressional comment continued to build ; Representative

Lawrence Smith of Wisconsin made the comment that, "If we fail in our

duty to this Republic [of Indonesia], we shall witness its fall to the

Communists," and then inserted into the Record an article from Christian

Century entitled "Last Chance in Indonesia." The article was severely

critical of past United Etates policies in the Indonesian Question, and

quoted Amir Ajarifuddin as having said, "I do not think the Americans

have any intention of supporting a just solution" [of the controversy].

I'he author, Garland rîvans Hopkins, also pointed out that funds of the

United States’ European Recovery Program (ERP) which were provided for 119 butch postwar recovery had been diverted for use in Indonesia.

In the foregoing paragraphs, we have endeavo'^’ed to sketch, in an

admittedly, if unavoidably, somewhat random fashion, how the attentive

118 New York Times, January 50, 1949* P* 17. 119 United States, Congressional Record, op. cit., A482, A485. 257

American public, often expressing itself through both structured and anomic interest groups, through opinion leaders in both the news media and the Congress, manifested its largely negative, though often diffuse and unstructured, reaction to the second police action in Indonesia. we have noted that many of these statements of concern, and even hostility, were followed by recommendations that economic recovery assistance to the

Netherlands be suspended until full Dutch compliance with the resolution of January 28 had been extracted. Whether or not one views the con­ fluence of events which brought together the crucial period (of further

legislative examination of the Marshall Plan simultaneously with the

American pressure on the Dutch to acquit themselves of their East Indian

colony in compliance with Security Council demands) as a mere accident of

history, the fact remains that the Dutch undertook their police action

without fully realizing the potential reactions in the United States, and

apparently without fully appreciating the vulnerability of their economic

and political position vis a vis the continuance of EKF assistance.

THE RHEWSTEh AMEN'DMENT

Thus, with this recitation of the growth of a largely critical

reaction on the part of the American public to recent Dutch moves in

Indonesia behind us, we can appropriately pass on to an account of the

most important concrete expression of this reaction, one which came to the

fore, as is so often the case, in the United States Senate.

On February 7» 1949, Senator Owen Brewster, senior Hepublican

from Maine, and an influential member of the Senate Foreign Relations

Committee, giving only a foretaste of what was soon to follow, inserted 258 into the Congressional Record a resolution specifically condemning the

Netherlands' actions in Indonesia and its open defiance of the Security

Council, urging the President to halt all further financial aid to the

Netherlands, He then read into the Record a series of "facts" critical of both the activities of the Dutch and of the equivocal nature of

American reaction to them. He then reaa Jessup's speech of January 11 in toto, followed by the following list of "questions":

(1; Is our State Department engaged in international double talk? (2) iVill the Dutch withdraw from the Atlantic Alliance? ibid what difference will it make if they do? And where will they go? (5) By our continuing to support the Dutch, are we not throwing all of Asia to Moscow? (Note that this contains the assumption that Asia is ours to "throw," just as China was ours to "lose.") (4) If the Dutch have $4 billion in assets in Indonesia and are shutting out American business, why are we financing the Dutch at the rate of #500,000,000 a year? (5) V/hy has [sic] the President and the State Department attempted to kill the proposed Senate resolution? (6) Has the State Department been telling the Dutch to go ahead— privately, of course? (7) How long do we propose to pour American money into countries whose governments take actions that create the exact opposite of what our policy intends to accomplish? (6) Do we intend to support nineteenth century British-Dutch- French imperialism in Asia which will create a climate for the growth of communism? Or do we intend to support the moderate Republican nationalists throughout Asia? (9) Does the United States intend to uphold the United Nations or not?

Ana then a final question which tends to bring the Senator very much up

to date:

(10) roes the Senate intend to take dictation from the Executive Department on all foreign policy matters? Has the Senate relinquished its right to ask questions regarding our foreign spending policy?^^®

Significantly, on the same date. Administration bills were

1 20 United States, Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. [January 3, 1949-February 1?, 1949) 10V, Part 1, 851-834. 259 introduced into each House of Congress which would authorize 35*43 billion in KHP assistance to Western Europe, The news article reporting the introduction of this legislation also reported Brewster's resolution, and noted that he was joined by nine Republican co-signers of the reso­ lution: Styles Bridges of New Hampshire, Hugh Butler and Kenneth Wherry of Nebraska, George W. Malone of Nevada, Margaret Chase Smith of Maine,

Joseph R, McCarthy of Wisconsin, Raymond E. Baldwin of Connecticut, 121 William Langer of North Dakota, and Wayne L. Morse of Oregon.

On February 14, Dr. Alan Valentine, head of the mission to the

Netherlands of the United States' Economic Cooperation Administration

(ECA), told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the #355 million

allocated to the Netherlands was "much less than enough, really, to

ensure economic recovery." Committee members concentrated on the situa­

tion in Indonesia, however: Mr. Valentine was subjected to a fairly

rigorous "cross-examination" as to whether or not Marshall Plan funds

might I’fe used for financing military operation in Inaonesia. Valenti; e

said that, as far as he knew, they were financed with revenues from Indo-

nesia itself.

Then, three days afterward. Senator Brewster introauced what we

may confidently characterize as an historic amendment to the European

Recovery Bill. Though mentioning no specific country by naj;ie, it was

clearly and recognizably directed, for the moment, against the Dutch:

No funds authorized for the purposes of this act shall be allo­ cated to or expended for any foreign government which fails to

121 New Yorj. Times, February 8, 1949» P* 1 .

^^^Ibid., February 15, 1949» P* 6. 2éO

comply with the orders or requests of the Security Council of the United Nations until such time as the [Economic Cooperation] Admin­ istrator is advised, in writing, by the president of the Security Council that such compliance has been effected.1^5

Brewster stated that the general approach in the amendment had been intended;

While it appears to be directed only at the Netherlands at the moment, there have been occasions in connection with Palestine when the Security Council's requests have been overridden. The purpose of this amendment is to strengthen the prestige of the United Nations at a time when it has been threatened with decline through non- compliance with Security Council decisions.

The writer of the New York Times article commented that a fight was

predicted over the amendment. 'There was reported to be considerable

sentiment in the Senate for its expressed objectives,

Though it is hardly necessary to awell on the point, it is also

important not to lose sight of the fact that, over and above the stated

sympathies of Brewster and other Republican Senators for the Republican

cause in Inaonesia, and even acknowledging the anti-colonial and neo-

isolationist bias of their positions, tney were also operating in re-

rponse to their domestic political instincts. Here, after all, was an

opportunity to embarrass (or rather to exploit the embarrassment of)

the Truman Administration in a time when Republicans were still smarting

over the Democratic upset in the Presidential elections the previous

November. Alexander Shakow gives us some insight into the partisan

political maneuverings during this period. After Jessup's speech of

January 11, several Democratic Senators agreed to sponsor a resolution

123 United States, Congressional Record, op. cit., p. 4073.

^ ^'^New York Times, February 18, 1949, p. 6. 261 supporting the United States* position, as expressed, and to go further, recommending cessation of ECA aid to the Netherlands. These Senators included, according to Shakow; Edwin C. Johnson (Colorado); Lister

Kill (Alabama); Harley M. Kilgore (West Virginia); Claude D. Pepper

(Florida); John J. Sparkman (Alabama); James E. Murray (Montana); Dennis

Chavez (New Mexico); Matthew K, Neely (WT.st Virginia); Guy M. Gillette

(Iowa); and Warren G. J/.agnuson (Washington). Majority Leader Scott W.

Lucas, Democrat of Illinois, asked them to hold off until he could contact newly-appointed Secretary of State Dean G, Acheson, who might have a dif­ ferent view. According to the author, 'Acheson sent word that he was too busy to see them, and sent Councelor Charles Bohlen. The Democratic

Senators, however, wanted Acheson. Sensing an opportunity to exploit

this emerging breakdown in communications, Brewster introduced his reso­

lution of February 7. Shakow quotes an unidentified "lobbyist" report

that ;

. . . there is considerable doubt among the Democrats that Acheson knows what has happened in connection with the [Brewster] resolution. They feel that Lovett has left a time bomb behind him and that Bohlen is insulating Acheson from the interested Democratic Senators. They feel, too, that the Republicans will embarrass the Democrats consider­ ably by exposing the duplicity of the State Department which has been taking a strongly critical attitude toward the Dutch publicly, but has apparently privately promised the Dutch to protect them in the EGA pocketbook.125

In a racio talk on February 20, Senator Brewster demonstrated

that he intended seriously to campaign for the enactment of his Amend­

ment. He urged Congress to deny further aid to the Netherlands until it

complied with the Security Council's resolution. He said the United

125 Hhakow, Alexander, Foreign Economic Assistance in Indonesia, pp. 50 , 31. 262

States was continuing to grant millions to a government that was "using all its power to crush" the Indonesian Republic, for which the United

States Government had expressed its sympathies. He also alleged that the

Department of State had prevented Democratic Senators from proposing a

"no-Dutch-aid action" ai.d asked if the Department was indulging in

"double talk" on Indonesia. He contined;

The argument which they are using is that if we go forward with this idea (of denying aid to the Dutch), then the Dutch won't join the Atlantic Pact .... If we must buy Dutch cooperation in the Atlantic Pact at the price of crucifying the people whom we allege are our frienas, I am sure the Atlantic Fact and the United Nations will come to a very sorry end.^^^

Had there been any doubt that the Dutch were attentive to some of the developments we have just described, a New York Times dispatch from The Hague, dated March 8, should have dispelled it. In a report on the operation in the Netherlands of the European Recovery Program, the

Netherlands Government blamed the United States for the impending col­

lapse of the Indonesian economy: the withholding of ECA funds for the

Netherlands East Indies had been catastrophic, and further withholding of

aid would be disastrous; even with the adequate and speedy resumption of

aid, recovery would come only in a few years. The Dutch stated that the

cut-off had come just as their economic position in Indonesia haa begun

to show "signs of light" ^at the end of the tunnel?] , and that the solu- 1 27 tion was to be founa in the prompt restoration of these funds. The

Associated Press reportea on the same date that the Dutch Cabinet had

126 New York Times, February 21, 1949, p. 12.

^^"^Ibid., larch 3, 12 49» P* 14. 265

met in special session, and the Government had admitted that the KTC 128 would not be able to start as planned.

The New York Times' Washington correspondent James Heston, in

following the ECA debates in Congress, reported that one among the com­

plex problems facing the legislation was the opposition to granting of

arms to the Dutch before settlement of the Indonesian Question. His

report continued:

. . . unless some formula is found . . . reasonably soon, the feeling in official quarters here is that it might lead to even more serious problems between North America and Western Europe just when the security experiment is being launched.129

.Vith the indulgence of the reader, it may be both useful and

instructive to recall in some detail and at some length selected portions

of the floor debate which surrounded the Senate's deliberations on the

Brewster Amendment. Cne should probably read the passages which follow

with at least one eye on the effects which they must have had on the

increasingly hard-pressed decision makers in the xiutch cabinet. We know,

after all, that American recovery assistance to the Netherlands never was

actually suspended at any time, so whatever the effects of these debates

on the Dutch, it was only in the realm of a potential or implied threat,

however serious.^

Speaking in the Upper Chamber on March 29, Senator Brewster named

'^"ibid.

^^^New York Times, March 22, 1949, P* 1 «

^ ^^.tuotations on this and the following pages are all taken from; United States, Concessional Record, Hist Cong., 1st Sess. (March 21, 1949-April 9, 1949;, lev. Part 3, 5563-5391. 2f 4

nine other Republicans (identified above) and alluded to the fact that ten or twelve Democrats as well were associated with him in his amend­ ment to shut off ECA funds to any government failing to comply with orders and requests of the Security Council. Brewster declared that the

United Nations was "sinking in international prestige" and that the amendment constituted a "fundamental declaration of the great moral

principle upon which the United Nations is founded." He said he was

speaking as "one who followed the course of the League of Nations to its

disastrous ena ..." after Manchuria and Ethiopia.

The particular situation in Indonesia . . . came to my attention first before we entered the becond Vmrld ,Var, when we were seeking to stockpile strategic materials which seemed vital to the preservation of democracy.

The Aar Investigation Committee was seeking the reasons for the difficul­

ties in acquiring rubber and oil from the Netherlands Indies, and found

that ;

. . . rubber and oil cartels, which even in the hour of our r.reatest need, when we already had embarked upon . . . lend-lease to try to give some aid and assistance to the beleaguered democracies, were even then refusing to accord to us a share of their rubber sup­ plies except upon [exorbitant terms]. That was my first introduction to the fact that considerations other than the welfare of the people of those areas were governing the action of those who controlled the Dutch East Indies at that time.

Brewster recalled the circumstances under which he had met Consul

General Aalter Foote (without naming him) ana noted that Foote hau made a

report to the Department, the gist of which had been related to the

enator by the author;

In that report . . . he pointed out the utterly unconscionable advantage which those interests , . . had taken of the United States, as well as other powers in need; he further pointed out that upon 265

the conclusion of the war . . . it was imperative that those in­ terests should not be re-established in a position to dominate the vital rubber supplies on which we must depend; and he further pointed out that any action calculated to re-establish those interests . . . would be a disaster to the United States.

Describing the current situation in Indonesia, Brewster continued;

I find considerable difficulty in comprehending how the Nether­ lands Ckjvernment is coming here to Washington next week to sign the Atlantic Pact, when I reaa the first article of the Atlantic Pact, as follows: The parties undertake . . . to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means . . , and to refrain . . . from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsist­ ent with the purposes of the United Nations." That seems to be a very clear and a very mandatory provision, and yet if we are to believe the solemn decrees of the Security Council . . . and the utterances of our own representative , , . the Nether­ lands Government is in plain ana repeated violation of the solemn decisions of the decrees of the [Council] .

Senator Harry P. Cain, Hepublican of Washington, then inquired as to whether the Dutch had, as they claimed, maintained "an open door pol­ icy in Indonesia." Brewster quoted at length from a New York Times dispatch published the previous December 24, which portrayec the strict

Netherlands trade monopoly in Indonesia. (". . . The American merchant

exporter . . , has haa practically no share in this lucrative market,"

concluded the article.)

Benator George W. ; alone. Republican of Nevada, interjected a

question as to the Netherlands Government's position regarding the trans­

fer of sovereignty, which Brewster explained with some accuracy, re­

counting briefly the Dinggadjati and Renville Agreements. To Malone's

question about the type of interim government proposed by the Nether­

lands, Brewster noted the PTC proposal and the Republican and Security

Council ^ic] "rejection" of this proposal. Malone asked;

'^as it not, as a matter of fact, a federation of states that the Netherlands Government suggested they would buila up in Indonesia, 266

keeping control of the police power and the money exchanges, and the imports and exports, for an interim period with no definite termi­ nation?

Brewster deferred to Malone’s knowledge on these matters, in light of his recent visit. lAalone duly reviewed the monetary controls by the

Dutch, so that "when an Indonesian merchant or producer sells a dollar’s worth of goods, the dollar goes into the exchange," and the Indonesian merchant eventually receives "approximately twenty cents on the dollar."

Senator Cain then asked if one could "reasonably conclude" from

Brewster’s remarks that the Dutch might withdraw from the Atlantic Fact.

Brewster answered;

There woula be raised a very interesting point. Gf course, I cannot undertake to say what the Dutch Government would do. But 1 think we have been very adequately briefed on the idea that our strategic spot is in Europe, that that is where we are mobilizing our forces. Gome of us have felt that we were somewhat neglecting the I'ar East, China and other spots. Here is an example of where we are reversing our field, so to speak, as we are, indirectly, I think there is no question that we are actually supporting an army of 150,000 Dutch in Indonesia to suppress the Republic of Indonesia which we claim is entitled to its freedom and independence. It costs #1 million a day, or approximately #550«000,000 a year. That is approximately the amount we have turned over to the Dutch to maintain their lorces in Indonesia, carrying on a war which we say is an utterly unjust and illegal one, in defiance of the Security Council. I suggest that one of the best things the Dutch could do would be to bring their ten divisions back to the Netherlands, and there would be a nucleus, if they are equipped and capable of fighting .... All they would have to do would be to give up their unwarranted and defiant war on the Indonesians and, inciden­ tally, we would have an array ready to go.

Brewster voiced his personal belief, however, that, were his Amendment

adopted, the Indonesian war would quickly end, and the Atlantic Pact

would not be adversely affected in any way.

Genator Cain then asked if "we might be encouraging most of Asia to look to Moscow for help, guidance, and assistance by continuing our

present support of the Dutch Government." Brewster replied by citing the 267

New Delhi Conference ar.d portraying Asian nations as concerned over a

"contradiction in our policy."

These Eastern people are realists, and how could they reconcile our statements before the Security Council when the war was in prog­ ress with the fact that we were giving the Dutch $550,000,000 to #400,0 0 0,000? It is the greatest possible incentive for them to con­ sider that they need not look to us for aid. Mr. Cain; Perhaps the Senator would agree it is such a contra­ diction in itself that it lends encouragement— Mr. Brewster: To the Kussiari propaganda? Mr. Cain; Yes. Mr. Brewster: Beyona any question.

At this point Senator Malone brought up, and then expounded on, the training and equipping in the United States of a division of Dutch

Marines which were quickly sent to Indonesia. Brewster noted that "prob­ ably many of the bullets which are going into the Indonesians today, in defiance of the Security Council, are American bullets."

Senator George D, Aiken (Republican from Vermont) asked, "Has the

Senator knowledge as to what has quieted down the American Government's

protest over the Dutch exploitation in Indonesia?"

Mr. Brewster; There have been various explanations in the press, how authoritative 1 do not know, and ten or a uozen Senators on the other side of the aisle who were going forward with this resolution were quieted down by some very effective protests. It has been whis­ pered that the North Atlantic Pact was the vital factor in the deci­ sion, and unless we went forward with this grant of funds they would not join the Atlantic Pact.

benator Aiken asked what good the Pact would be if it forced a billion

Orientals to look elsewhere for friendship and even trade," Brewster

replied, 'That is the tragic aspect of the affair."

Genatora Brewster and Malone then examined the Dutch contention

that their efforts were preventing the communists from "obtaining a

foothold" in Indonesia, and with references to the Republican reaction to 268 the Madium Affair, dismissed the argument. Malone then lead Brewster into a discussion of the degree to which the continued maintenance of colonial regimes throughout southeast Asia was increasingly forcing nationalist leaders to look to the Goviet Union for support and assist­ ance, Brewster said, 'The whole question of colonial imperial policy is to my mir.d what is evolving out of tliis situation."

Malone asked whether the Indonesians had not, in fact, had con­ trol over the islands right after the war, and;

. . . are not many of these people, like Lr. hat ta and Mr. Gu- k a m o , the President of the Indonesian Republic, and others a really high-type people? In other woras, they are not savages, they are not just ordinary jungle folk, but really unuerstood government . . .?

Brewster answered that he "hadn't had the pleasure" of meeting "these

gentlemen. " Malone testifiea that he had, "and it was my considered

opinion that they were very capable, highly educated, ana understood gov­

ernment . "

Senator Brewster then opened an attack on what he describea as the

"very curious and ar.omalous position" of the State ..ep art ment. Prewster

contrastée (l) the statements made by I hi Hi p V.. Jessup ana Rarren H.

Austin, as United Gtates representatives to the Unitea Nations, in

their speeches before the Gecurity Council, and (?) the Department's firm

opposition to Brewster's own amendment, "which would be the most persua­

sive argument that the Dutch should cease their utterly unjustified

action." He then made note of a recent series of actions on the part of

the EGA Administrator for the Netherlands, Dr. Valentine, and, speculating

that Valentine had either discussed or cleared his actions with the

department, noted Valentine’s statement to the Dutch press on his return

to The Hague that, "If Congress planned to stop aid to Holland, I would 26 y

not have returned today." Brewster commented,

1 wonder how Mr. Valentine knew that Congress was not going to stop aid to Holland? Did he have any mysterious power of prophetic vision to tell what the Genate and the House would do? Would he have dared make that statement unless it had been previously cleared with the State Department? Yet if that is correct, they were delib­ erately defying the legislative processes of this Government, when an amendment to bring this about was pending and when their own representatives in the Gecurity Council were denouncing the actions of the Dutch. How far would that go in persuading the Dutch Govern­ ment to comply with the demands of Mr. Austin and Mr. Jessup?

In a somewhat speculative fashion, Senators Malone and Brewster proceeded to suggest that "the Gtate Department was at that time secretly encouraging the Dutch and giving assurance that nothing would happen and just to sit tight , . . ketuming again to Valentine's statement,

Brewster noted that the Dutch Cabinet wss about to resume consideration of its Indonesia policy, and comments that "Nothing was more nicely cal­ culated to fortify the group who said, "ix) not worry about that. Go right ahead and kill the Indonesians. There will be no difficulty so far as the Americans are concerned."

At this point, Senator Arthur Vandenberg, Hepublican of Michigan,

injected himself into the debate by asking.

As the Senator goes through this record, in order to make it com­ plete, if he has the information, will he indicate for the record what action, if any, the Security Council itself taxes each time this question is raised?

Brewster replied that he knew of no time when the Council had condoned or

other than condemned Dutch actions, but deferred "to the much more ade­

quate sources of information possessed by the highly respected senior

minority member of the Committee on Foreign Relations." Vandenberg said

he was

. . . simply wondering whether [Brewster] has any record of any movement by the Gecurity Council itself to implement its orders or to ■70

bring to a conclusion, by way of sanctions, any of the criticisms that have been made."

Brewster acknowledged that the Council had voted no sanctions.

Mr. Vandenberg: Have they not in each instance— and this is not in controversy with the Genator's position at all, because I am simply trying to keep the record straight--left the whole matter still in the fiela of negotiation, apparently still hoping for the process of negotiation to produce an ultimately satisfactory result? Is that not the record?

Agreeing, Brewster wondered aloud "W!ether that is adequate to cover our interest or obligations. ..." After that, Brewster and

Aiken endeavored to establish the point that the Council would be unable to vote sanctions in any case, because they would probably be voted by the Goviet Union. (A contention which remains far from obvious or estab­ lished in the mind of this student. Britain ana France would seem more likely candidates.) The debate heated up as Vandenberg repeatedly attempted to compel Brewster to acknowledge that tie Security Council had itself taxen no action to impose any kina of sanctions on the Nether­

lands, with Brewster repeatedly replying by citing remarks by Jessup which could be construed to indicate that the only reason this was the

case was because the Soviets always vetoed effective Security Council

action.

Vandenberg: "Tt(hatever the procedure was, nothing happened."

Brewster insisted that this was solely due to the Soviet veto. Vanden­

berg said th< t he himself might well agree with the Senator from Maine

that some action should have been imposed, but that he was merely en­

deavoring to establish, ". , . without any challenge to the enthusiastic

sympathies of [Brewster] that it has been, let us say, impossible for the

Security Council to issue an order under any sanctions available to it, 271

or at least it has not done so."

Senator Brewster then returned to reading extended passages from

Jessup's Security Council speech; he was shortly interrupted by Senator i-aul H. T ou glas, Democrat of Illinois, who raised the problem of the difficulty of the choice facing the Senate and the Administration regarding the divided loyalties and sympathies to the cause of the Indo­ nesians in the archipelago and the defense of the Netherlands as part of the Atlantic Alliance. Posing very accurately what was becoming the classic j\merican dilemma in postwar colonialist questions, Douglas asked if Brewster were not being somewhat harsh in his judgments, in light of this. Encouraging Douglas to re-pose his question as one of the possible willingness of The Hague to join the Alliance, Brewster and Malone then

congratulated the Senator for bringing the question out into the open.

Mr, Brewster: , . . The Genator is anticipating that they would refuse to join the Atlantic Pact. I say, all right, what of it? 'Mi-.at would happen if they did not join? Why are they so vital? '.Vhat was the story in the last 'World 'War, and of the First World War? But I think we are indebted to the Senator for bringing the argument out onto the floor and intimating that the Indonesians must be sacri­ ficed— Mr. Douglas: No. Mr. Brewster: . . . for our security in western Europe. Mr. Douglas; No. Mr. Brewster; That is the plain and inevitable logic of the argu­ ment that the Genator presents . . . Mr. Douglas; I was merely trying to put into words the con­ flicting struggle that goes on in the hearts of every one of us when this issue is raised. Mr. Brewster: I am trying to put into words what happens in my heart also.

Senator Malone went on from this point to invoke the ringing

words of the United Nations Charter regarding human rights and freedoms.

Are we going to live up to [the Charter] or are we going to say that the countries of southeastern Asia, Indochina, and the 75 mil­ lion Indonesians must, as the distinguished Senator has already said, be sacrificed? Are we to go back on the great document we wrote at San Francisco? Are we not right up under the gun now, I ask the 272

Senator from Maine? Must we not make the decision now, whether we believe in the gospel we have been spreading all over the world, or are we going to say that from now on we must protect the colonial system in Asia and Africa, and throughout the world, and hold the status quo with our own money, as the Senator from Maine has so ably suggested?

Senator Wayne L. Morse (then, Republican) of Oregon raised the issue anew on the Senate floor on the first of April, He said he knew some Democrats were embarrassed on this issue because, "at least up until this hour, the principal defense on this great issue of human liberty has come from the Republican side of the aisle." Still further illustrating the considerable tactical advantages enjoyed by the loyal opposition in situations such as these, Morse continued,

It is pure hypocrisy for our Government to represent to the peoples of the world that we stand behind the human rights section of the United Nations Charter; that we stand for the protection of free people who are making a fight for liberty and then countenance the conduct of the Dutch Government in respect to Indonesia, The Indonesians are the only people in that part of the world who, up to this hour, have made a successful fight against Russian communism within their borders. Having made that fight . . . we now apparently find the United States Government aiding the Dutch Gov­ ernment in its insistence upon the right further to exploit the Indo­ nesians. Mr, President, I say the time has come to make perfectly clear to the Dutch Government that there are at least a few of us in the Sen­ ate of the United States who are not going to become parties to any proposed amendment which rests on the basis of either political strategy or political expediency. Lr. President, we cannot honestly face those millions of peoples in the world who are today raising questions as to whether or not we mean it when we say we are ready to stand as the protector of the people who oppose the advance to totalitarian government. I say that if we have any partnership with a government such as the Dutch Government, that is willing to exploit the Indonesians and [who] at the same time say that "unless our program is sanctioned or unless the funds under SCA are made available to us, we will not co­ operate in this world endeavor to protect freedom," the sooner we find out the better.

Senator Morse made note of the approximate text of a proposed substitute for the Brewster Amendment, and continued; 275

My answer now, in advance of the introduction of any such amend­ ment, Mr. President, is that it is not worth the paper on which it is written. It is a subterfuge. It is a face-saver . . . in the last analysis it plays right into the hands of the Russian veto power on the Security Council. Let us not fool ourselves about that, and let us not be guilty of misleading the American public as to the true meaning and effect of any such proposed cunendment. Well, it is argued that to follow the Brewster Amendment would be to follow a unilateral course of action. Why, Mr. President, we have followed unilateral courses of action in these matters in a great number of instances. In fact, the cutting of the SI 5 million of EGA funds to Indonesia itself . . , was a unilateral action . . . .^51

There were contrary opinions voiced on the floor of the Senate, however. Senator Thomas T. Connally, Democrat of Texas, opposed cur­ tailment of European Recovery Program appropriations to the Netherlands, giving the following reasons: First, he said, "... the impositions of sanction is thoroughly covered in the Charter, It would, therefore, be totally improper to use the EGA, an agency of the United States, to apply sanctions unilaterally in such a case." Second, EGA assistance to the

Netherlands Indies had already been cut off. Third, "After a careful examination of the evidence, the [Foreign Relations] committee was con­ vinced that continued aid to the Netherlands will not contribute in any significant degree to the support of its operations in Indonesia."

Finally, Connally observed, . . the Security Council is actively en­ gaged in working out a solution of this entire Indonesian problem. It would, therefore, seem best to concentrate our efforts on assisting in reaching a collective answer in the Security Council, which might be complicated if we should now insist on taking unilateral action to deal 1 -^2 with one segment of the problem,

^Speaking on the floor of the Senate, April 1, 1949: United States, Congressional Record, 81st Cong., let Sess., ICV, Part 3, 5668.

^^^Ibid., p. 3 0 8 8 . 274

As reflected in the statements and interpolations of Senators

Connally and Vandenberg, we see the general outlines of the very effec­

tive counter-arguments put forward by the Department of State to the

Amendment put forwara by Brewster and his Republican colleagues. What­

ever the reason, the Security Council had not elected to impose any kind

of economic or other sanctions on the Netherlands, at least thus far, for

their continued non-compliance with the resolution of January 28 and the

Canadian Directive. As one of the main lines of argument of the spon­

sors of the Amendment was support for the United Nations, this could

effectively be turned against them; the effect and intent of their pro­

posed legislation would go beyond Security Council action and thus

counter its purposes, rather than support them. Thus emerged the Van-

denberg "compromise" resolution,

'^'he New York Times reported on April 5 that the pending authori­

zation ijust over five and one half billion) for continuing the European

Recovery Program was brought nearer Senate passage the day before by a

compromise "drawing the teeth" from Brewster's proposal to suspend aid

to any country not in compliance with United Nations mandates. Brewster

disclosed the compromise, contrived by Vandenberg (in full consultations

with the State Department) in which ". , . aid would be denied if the

United States would be violating any United Nations obligation not to

furnish aid to a country against which the United Nations was taking

perventive or enforcement action." He explained that it would become

operative only if the United Nations decreed sanctions itself. Brewster

found the compromise far from acceptable, but better than nothing. He predicted that it would pass "overwhelmingly," As Brewster's own 273 amendment had been rejected the same day by the Senate Foreign Relations 1 55 Committee, this was, ouviously, a judicious position for him to take.

Furthermore, newly-appointed Senator Frank p, Graham, Democrat from North Carolina, urged that the United States not undertake unilat­ eral sanctions against the Dutch because of Indonesia. He said this was not the time to do it: it was not, after all, cut off "during the period of Dutch defiance" and so it would certainly be inappropriate now, when negotiations might well be resumed. He said that he would have

favored this action "at the time of the shameful attack by the Nether­

lands on the Republic of Indonesia, " but not now when their defiance might be ending. While he could not support the Brewster amendment, he

did give the Senator credit for "bringing the Indonesiafi question to the

iloor of the benate." If the Netherlands' "fair words should become a

cover for more delay," then the cut-off would be merited. He made it

very plain that he had "no sympathy for the Netherlands' positioT .

Senator Morse, however, voiced dissatisfaction over the com­

promise and declared that he would continue to fight for the original

version, btill, the press noted that Brewster's acceptance of the com­

promise would shorten debate and make the outcome a foregone conclu­

sion.^ And, on April 6, the Senate approved the Vandenberg compromise

resolution. The Senate was described as going on record as "looking with

disfavor on the Dutch intervention in Indonesia by voting to suspend

1 New York Times, April 4, 1949, p. 1.

^^^Ibid., April 6, 1949, P- 16.

^^^Ibid., p. 26, 276

Marshall Plan aid to the Netherlands in the event that the UN Security

Council tooK preventive or enforcement action to implement its directives against the Netherlands in that area.

The Vandenberg Compromise and the Department of State's role in its formulation require one or two comments: first, the Times’ phrase describing it as an action "drawing the teeth" of the Brewster Amendment is quite apt; there was very little chance that a proposal to impose economic sanctions on the Netherlands would ever obtain a majority vote in the Security Council; even the United States, under any but the most extreme conditions, would have been quite unlikely to support such action. And even if a majority were obtained, probably the British, and almost certainly the French, would have promptly vetoed it. The State ufpartment, of cours-, was well aware of this.

One adtiitional comment here may be in order. The Department's position that the Brewster Amendment really constituted non-support or

improper support for the united Nations, while persuasive in one sense, was somewl.at specious in another. As Benator Morse pointed out, no such

considerations troubled the policy makers in deciding to cut off aid to

Dutch Indonesia. Furthermore, the act of haltin^^ economic assistance

initiated by the donor nation is not, strictly speaking, identical with

the imposition of economic sanctions, even though its effects might be

similar. The Department fought the Brewster Amendment not because it

was concerned, particularly, with improper support to the United Nations,

but simply because it was Unwise and undesirable, in the framework of

American foreign policy. And, while the Department's position may have

^^^New York Times, April 7, 1949, p. 1. 277

been quite correct and justifiable, it is of interest to us to note that they did not try to sell it on its merits.

FOREIGN PULIGY AJ'D PUBLIC OPINION

'iVhat we have essentially been looking at in our discussion of the

American role in the Indonesian independence struggle during its waning flays is a case study in the interplay of public opinion and foreign policy. In a certain sense, furthermore, our discussion of the foreign policy aspects of this question has been primarily concerned not with

Indonesian-American affairs but Dutch-American relations. We have ex­ amined the ways in which some greatly diversified elements in the Ameri­ can body politic found themselves thrown together as unaccustomed and temporary allies in their efforts to stiffen American opposition to the continuation of unilateral Dutch direction of the Indonesian path to sovereignty.

Our study may be able to add a most modest contribution to the growing (and increasingly interesting) scholarly examination of the interplay between foreign policy and public opinion in the United States.

It will be cur contention that, while the Department of Btate quite clearly and consistently opposed actual adoption of the Brewster Amend­ ment in its domestic dealings, it was quite willing to exploit and pos­ sibly even exaggerate the leverage that the clear-cut trends in public opinion in its own country provider it in dealing with the Dutch in securing Dutch minimal compliance with the orders of the Security Council.

To place these actions in proper perspective, finally, it is important to recall that the January 28 resolution and the Canadian Directive were 278 both, quite probably, identical with (one might even say, expressions of)

American foreign policy positions on the Indonesian question.

Returning to early January 1949, in fact, we can find a possible

example of the Department of State already making use of the expression

by Ajaerican interest groups of opposition to Dutch policies. Recalling

the letter from Philip Murray, President of the CIO, to the Secretary of

State— setting forth the viewpoint of the CiO on the Indonesian question

in general and on the second police action in particular— it is inter­

esting to take note of both the fact and the content of the State Depart­

ment's public reply to Murray's letter. Thanking Murray for his "thought-

ful and helpful letter," Acting Secretary of State Lovett began.

The interests you regard as being at stake in this difficult problem, which can be solvea only if recognition is afforded the legitimate desires of the Indonesian peoples for self-determination and democratic self-rule, are the very interests which the Depart­ ment of State has recognized and which have prompted it to taxe every feasible action to promote just such a solution.

After carefully reviewing the role that the United States had playeu

through memberships on the Security Council and the Good Offices Com­

mittee, and noting particularly the strenuous efforts of Mr. Cochran,

Lovett said.

This Government had given him all the support it could appro­ priately render, having in particular consistently urged upon the Netherlands Government the necessity of reaching an agreement with the Republic which would meet the reasonable and legitimate demands of the Indonesian nationalist movement, as well as safeguard the legitimate interests of the Dutch and stressing the serious conse­ quences likely to follow upon a renewal of hostilities .... In its efforts to persuade the Netherlands Government to agree to the terms of a settlement which the Republican Government for its part could accept, this Government was mindful of the proved nationalist character of the Republican Government of President Gukamo and Irime Minister Hatta, which, laboring under signal dif­ ficulties, had resolutely taken action against and eliminates a 279

communist revolt against its authority, engineered by a Moscow- trained and disciplined communist agent.

Lovett then said that this demonstrated the Republic's "appreciation of what is so well understood by all indepenaent peoples"; namely, that the communists immediately try to suppress nationalism and freedom. He recalled the statements made thus far by Mj-. Jessup in the Security Coun­ cil, ana the GOC's contention that bona fide negotiations presupposed the existence of two parties "each uncoerced by the armed force of the other and each preparea to move toward the reasonable viewpoint of the other . . . He also pointed out that any solution which the Dutch mi,:ht unilaterally fashion, if opposed by the majority of the people of

Inaonesia, woulu probably prove unworkable in the end. He wrote,

It it- reasonable to assume that the Netherlands Government is aware that peace will be impossible of attainment un lest- the trust and cooperation of the Indonesian people, including the Republican elements which have been in the van of the nationalist movement, are enlisted. Accordingly, it is hoped that the Netherlands Government will seize the present opportunity to make concrete demonstrations of its intentions to satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the Indo­ nesians for self-rule and to organize an Indonesian Government in which all parties may seek and obtain representation in accordance with their popular followings, through the exercise of free demo­ cratic processes .... Please be assured of the Department of State's continuing interest arid reaainesB to assist in every appropriate way in the attainment of this highly desirable and in fact essential objective. Your expres­ sion of support in this endeavor is greatly appreciated. Sincerely yours,

Robert A. Lovett ^ Acting Secretary of State

As we have noted, the CIO represented a very important element

within the traditional Democratic coalition, and it may be argued that

the Administration was simply responding to domestic political consid­ erations rather than using the CIO'., letter to increase The Hague's

1 57 United States, Department of State, Bulletin, a /., No. 498 (January l6, 1949) 81, 82; New York Times, January 7, 1949, P* 10. 280 feelings of discomfort. However, the two suppositions are far from being mutually exclusive, and it has been this student's observation that, in the bureaucratic policy-making thickets, a given course of action always seems more attractive and is easier to sell to the deci­

sion makers when there are two good reasons for taking it. And finally,

Administration officials could hardly have been unaware or unminaful of

the fact that, by the very act of publicly responding to the Murray

letter, further domestic and international attention would be drawn to

it, not the least being that of the Dutch.

it is possible, furthermore, to offer the reader an even more

concrete and far more important example of the Department of State's

effort to Skillfully parlay the expressions of critical American public

sentiment into a bargaining element for use in securing Dutch compliance

with the Council's orders, in pursuit of American policy objectives. At

the height of the Denate debate over the Brewster Amendment ana the

legislation authorizing further allocations for the European Recovery

Program, Foreign Minister Dirk U. Ctikker of the Netherlands visited

Washington for talks with Cecretary of Btate Dean Acheson,

Acheson expressed to Btikker the United Btates Government's hopes

for an early compromise in Indonesia. Btikker »as understood to have

voiced disappointment over United States policy, and gave his own Gov­

ernment 's views— he said he hoped the discussions in Batavia would lead

to a peaceful settlement, a brief joint statement called the discussion

full and frank. The press noted that the Department had been opposing

efforts on Capitol Hill to "eliminate ERl' aid to the Netherlands until

the Indonesian (question was settled," Noting that the Administration's 261 military equipment program for Western Europe was certain to be a matter of contention, the Times stated,

There is strong opposition to the arms program in general, so strong, in fact, that the Ctate Department is now seriously concerned about it. The opposition contains more than a few influential legis­ lators who argue that the United States should not give arms to the Netherlands to replace or supplement military equipment being used in the Netherlands Indies.

Noting Stikker's comment that, 'The whole problem is that somebody has got to trust somebody," the article continued,

The problem of getting the trust and understanding of Congress, however, is complicated by the colonial tradition of the Netherlands ana the anti-colonial tradition of the United States. These clashing trends have brought relations between The Hague and Washington to a much more serious position than is generally known on Capitol Hill. Meanwhile, the arms program for Western Europe is likely to be under debate on Capitol Hill long before the Batavia Conference on Indonesia is completed. That is one of the reasons why Kr. Acheson was said to have expressed the hope that a compromise could be reached soon ."I 58 1 59

bhakow also states that the Department was highly concerned over the effects of the Dutch actions in Indonesia on congressional receptive­ ness to the EhP. He notes Stikker's arrival in Washington on March 51

and says that the Foreign Minister:

. . . was apparently told that there was a good possibility that the Department could no longer oppose the attitude of the benate as evidenced in the Brewster amendment unless the Dutch were willing to make concessions,

Neahwhfile, still according to Ghakow, department officers /got together

with Senators Vandenberg and Graham and promised to do everything pos­

sible to bring the Dutch around, but that the amendment should be

^^^Italics not in the original. ^^^New York Times, April 1, 1949, p. 14. 282 softened so as not to alienate the Dutch at the time when they seemed willing to negotiate. Graham had his own reasons for seeing the Brewster

Amendment come to a vote; if it lost— and Vandenberg said that it would— it would then seem that the United States was deserting the cause.

Later, the same author states the case even more explicitly:

The iBrewster] proposal was, at base, a matter of tactics on the part of the State Department as to the best means of accomplishing both European unity ana a solution to the Indonesian problem, Acheson had guaranteed the Senators that he would assure Dutch con­ cessions; if they were not forthcoming, the Senators would then be able to utilize their resolution .... Soon afterward, the Dutch reacted.141

The New York Times report on the conclusion of Foreign Minister

Stikker's visit tends to support the contentions made by Shakow. Acheson

indicated that, as a result of talks with Stikker, . . a basis had

been found for aiscussions that would bring about a solution of the Indo­

nesian question. ' . . . without giving details, Iv'.r. Acheson told a news

conference the talks were complete and frank and he was very encouragea

by them.142

In a certain sense, as we endeavor to reconstruct the motivations

and planning discussions within the State Department in the early days of

April 1949* much that is important seems to hang on the degree to which

the Department shared Senator Vandenberg's contention that the Brewster

Amendment was not likely to be adopted. If they believed that it would,

or might very well be passed, then Acheson probably simply and honestly

1 40 bhakow. Foreign Economic Assistance in Indonesia, p. 33*

^"^^Ibid., pp. 34, 35. 14^jvew York Times, April 9, 1949, p. 3. 283 conveyed his serious concern and apprehension to Stikker. If they did not, then our position would seem to be somewhat more persuasive. It is also possible, of course, that the Department might simply have wanted to eliminate the Brewster Amendment from the scene, whatever its chances, because of the seriousness with which the Department viewed the Amendment's possible consequences. Finally, we must not lose sight of one point which remains; the United States really did want the Repub­ lican Government restored to Jogjakarta.

THE PINAL EVENl’S

As we have endeavored to indicate in the foregoing pages, the climactic point in our story comes with the final agreement on the part of the Metherlanas Government to the restoration of the Republic to the

Jogjakarta Residency, which came with the Hoem-van Royen Statements of

May 7, 1949. Appropriately, we can detect a rather precipitate decline in the status of the Indonesian h.uestion as a continuing "news item" in the following months. In addition, there followed, similarly appropri­

ately, a decline in the decisive nature of the American role in the nego­

tiations. Ahile many issues of great importance to both parties remained

to be negotiated, and the UNCI, including its American member, continued

to be of assistance to the parties, the all-important issue of whether

there would W two parties (the Federalists— properly— not included) had

been decided, with the assistance of Senator Brewster and his colleagues.

Due to these factors the subsequent negotiations (which are

critically important to any telling of the course of the Indonesian

Revolution itself) are less important when one is viewing the American 284 role in those events. It is for this reason, and in light of the rather lengthy proportions already attained by this study, that we will pass over the events from May until the formal transfer of sovereignty on

December 27, 1949» rather quickly.

Following the Koem-van Koyen Agreements, the Federalists were invited into the discussions on June 10, and twelve days later, the

Agreements were formalized with statements from both parties. On June 30, the administration of Jogjakarta Residency was turned over to the Repub­ lic and, five days later. Commission members witnessed the triumphal return of President bukamo to the erstwhile capital of the Republic of

Indonesia, now reborn. During this entire period there took place what must be viewed as a rather unfortunate (indeed, later tragic) visit by fifteen American newspaper correspondents, unaer the sponsorship of the

Dutch. These journalists were selected, apparently, on the basis of the potentially or extant pro-Dutch attitudes, were thoroughly briefed and counseled both in the United btates and in Holland prior to their depar­ ture, and then finally transported, all at Dutch expense, to Indonesia for an impartial, fact-finaing visit. The visit lasted from June 19 to

July 10 and ended, tragically, with an air accident when the correspond­ ents' plane crashed while attempting to land in Bombay on July 12. Two of the fifteen survived to bring their generally pro-uutch views of the

subject back to the United States p r e s s . ^ 4 3

New York Times, July 13, 1949: (See Arizona Daily Star, Indo­ nesia Report, "The Collected Dispatches of the American Correspondents V,Tio Died in Bombay, India, July 12, 1949, on Return from a Tour of Indo­ nesia. ") 283 Then, in two sessions, stretching from July 19 through August 2,

the two Indonesian parties, the Republic and the Federalists, arrived at

certain agreements: it was to be a federal State with a president and a

Prime Minister; the Republic was to regain its nenville boundaries and

the Republican Army was to form the nucleus of the new federal military

force. linally, a constitution was to be ratified one year after the

transfer of sovereignty. As Taylor commented,

Here the van Royen-Roem statements, themselves the outcome of the March 23 directive, had been brought to their logical conclusion, en­ suring the final failure of the strategy of the Beel plan to consol­ idate the immediate gains of the second police action .... Now the Republic's restoration, together with its armed forces, ensured that Government's return to the status held as of Renville.144

On the first of August, the Parties met for the final time in

Batavia to conclude their agreements: (l) cease-fire orders were to be

issueci to the military forces of both sides at midnight on August 10-11;

(2) it was jointly declared that no one coula be prosecuted for taking

siaes in the dispute; (the release of political prisoners was provided

for as well, along with strictures against sabotage, reprisals, ter-

roriom, etc.); (3j finally, provisions were maae for regulation of the

cease-fire agreement. 1 45

The Round Table Conference was openea formally on August 23, 1949

by Dutch Prime Minister Dr. .villem Drees; it lastea until November 2 and

dealt, sometimes very inadequately, with the remaining outstanaing issues

between the parties. „e will endeavor to discuss each of these questions.

^44’1'a^ylor, Inaonesian Inaepenaence ana the United Nations, p. 223-

^'^^Ibia., p. 226. 286 very briefly, emphasizing the contribution of the UNCJ, particularly the

American representative. Merle Cochran. One of the first items under discussion was the nature of the long-contemplated Netherlands-Indonesian

Union: was it to be a super-national body with the ability to enter into and conduct international relations on its own accord, or was it to be simply a vehicle for facilitating and coordinating the anticipated closer- than-normal cooperation between the United btates of Indonesia and The

Hague, once independence was achieved? The Republicans maintained that agreement on the subject shoula have the character of an international treaty, while the Dutch wanted to create a permanent organism with on­ going rights and responsibilities, under the overall direction of the

Dutch crown. The RTC Steering Committee adjourned to Namur, Belgium,

inviting Cochran to participate in a "personal capacity." The latter offered a compromise solution which was adopted by tne Parties, and which,

by compromising on certain items and leaving others for future negotia­

tion, did not impair the sovereignty of the future Indonesian federation.

It decided the issues at hand essentially in favor of the Republicans.

As a result, the last hope of the Dutch for compromising the complete­

ness of the new Government's sovereignty disappeared:

The members of the Commission played an important role at this juncture. Cochran was acle to break the deaalock on which the RTC might have foundered had the outcome been left solely to the parties, since they were publicly committed to strongly divergent positions. In fact, the Commission threw its support behind, and largely ensured adoption of a "light" conception of the Union. It did so in keeping with the position consistently advocated in the past by its Austral­

ian and United btates m e m b e r s . 146

^^^Ibid., p. 232, 287

The parties were further unable to agree on the question of whether or not component areas of the archipelago should be allowed self- determination in the sense that they m i ^ t be able to vote not to join the new United Spates of Inaonesia. A UNGl-composed formula, which essentially granted this ri^t of "external" self-determination, was finally accepted by the Republican representatives just one day before

the last-scheduled session of the Conference. If a state were to refuse

to ratify the United States of Indonesia constitution, it would then have

to negotiate a special relationship with both the Netherlands and the

United States of Indonesia.^ 47

On the subject of West New Guinea (West Irian or Irian Barat in

the Indonesians' terminology), it was maintained by the Republicans and

(if anything, even more stoutly) by the Federalists that this territory

constituted a part of Indonesia just as it had been part of the Nether­

lands East I:,aies ; the Dutch position was in almost every way diametri­

cally opposed to the Indonesian position. As this subject has been well

and thoroughly examined elsewhere (probably the best being Robert C.

bone's The Dynamics of the Western New Guinea (Irian Barat) Problem,

Ithaca, Southeast Asia Program, 1950), it is probably sufficient for our

purposes to note that (l) sovereignty over West New Guinea was retained

in the end by the Dutch, and (2) the RTC, therefore, did not "solve" the

dispute, but left it for future negotiation. (And, as is well known,

left it to poison Dutch-Indonesian relations for more than a decade.)

The financial questions at the Conference, dealing with the

^'^^Ibio., p. 235. 286

degree to which the new federation was to be made legally responsible for both the internal and international debts incurred by the Nether­ lands East Indian government, became a very intricate and heated issue between the respective parties. The positions of the respective delega­ tions were as follows; the Dutch, relying on admittedly inexact records

(from the prewar years) reckoned the Netherlands East Indies Government's

debt at a total of 6,125 guilders. 14® This figure, they believed, should be assumed as the indebtedness of the new "successor" state. The Indo­ nesians, for thei:' part, agreed that they should justifiably assume some of this debt, but refused to be held to account for "extraordinary mili­ tary expenditures" from 1945 onward; that is, they refused to finance a war waged by the Dutch over the last four years against them.

Again, the student, for the sake of brevity and coherence, is well advised to concentrate on the writings (primarily) of Mr. Taylor and, to a secondary degree, Kahin. Essentially, the two sides, finding their positions very far apart, endeavored to converge somewhat, the

Dutch by agreeing to write off 500 million guilders of the overall ex­ ternal debt, the Indonesians by agreeing to assume responsibility for éOO

guilders more than they had initially agreed to. There was a certain

amount of debate between the two sides, in which the Dutch endeavored to

establish a lien, of sorts, against future Indonesian trade and pro­ duction— particularly tin production— to guarantee repayment, and in

which the Indonesians tried to get the Dutch to agree to postponement of

the question unuil after the transfer of sovereignty. Following this

1 ^ Ibid., p. 240. 209

debate, it was agreed to establish a "Debt Commission" to determine a solution. ’Whether by "forcing his way" or simply as the UNCI's repre­ sentative, Merle Cochran was named to the Comic.ission and had a deter­ mining influence on the overall shape of the final settlement. It was on the basis of his recommendations that the final compromise solution was founded. It provided for Indonesian payment of an external debt far in excess of what Indonesian negotiators believed justifiable (or prac­ tical), but on the other hand, it was reduced greatly from the original figure desired by the Dutch and, in the end more importantly, provided no effective means of enforcing repayment, such as the "Tin Pledge" or the guaranteed percentage of Indonesian exports.^49

Taylor concludes his discussion of these matters by making a point that is important for our study as well. He notes that, in the closing days and weeks of the Hound Table Conference, as a final agree­ ment was beint' shaped, with the (Republican-imposed) time limit of the first of November drawing closer, the UNCI came to play an increasingly active, and indeed decisive, role in the Conference's deliberations.

"This," he notes, "is shown by the issues which were settled in the final days of the Conference as a direct result of _the UNCI'si mediation and

compromise formulae;"

New Guinea; Cooperation of the Union Partners in the field of foreign rela­ tions; R i ^ t of self-determination of peoples; Consultations on monetary matters; Transfer of pensions and other similar payments to Netherlanders;

^ 4 \ ’aylor, Indonesian Independence and the United Nations, pp. 259- 247; Kahin, Nationalism and devolution in Indonesia, pp. 438-443» 290

Transfer of indemnities for expropriated properties; Revision of existing shipping agreement; Representation of foreign enterprises in Indonesia; iviost-favored-nation treatment in the economic field; Netherlands warships in Indonesian waters; Surabaya Naval Base; Vi'ithdrawal of troops. 1^0

The final agreements signed on the date of the final plenary meeting of November 2 conformed to the outline we have traced above, and

stipulated that the UNCI or some other United Nations agency was to ob­

serve the implementation of the agreements.

Ratification of the Round Table Agreements was completed in the

Dutch parliament on December 19 (with the Government reminding the legis­

lators that the issue of /Imerican Marshall Plan assistance had not yet

been finally decided; and in the Indonesian provisional parliament five

days earlier.1^1

Also taking place during the month of December, 1949» was the

final Security Council consideration of the Indonesian (independence)

Question. The UNCI reported the results attained at The Hague to its

parent body, and declared its intention to oversee the carrying out of

these agreements after the formal transfer of sovereignty. On

December 1), a Canadian resolution, authorizing the Commission to con­

tinue this work and congratulating both it and the parties themselves on

the results they had attained, was vetoed by the Goviet Union, thus ending

Security Council consideration of the Indonesian question the way it had

begun; in frustration.

^ ^'^T ay lor, op. cit., pp. 238, 259.

^^^Taylor, op. cit., pp. 260, 261; Kahin, op. cit., pp. 444, 443< 291

Un December 27, in ceremonies in The Hague and in (newly renamed)

Djakarta, the Netherlands "unconditionally and irrevocably" transferred

"complete sovereignty over Indonesia" (minus West New Guinea) to the 152 United States of Indonesia.

COMMEN’l'AHY

While the comments which follow are largely analytical (or, possibly more truthfully, "speculative"), they are in turn based on some of the evaluative commentary offered by both Taylor and Kahin on the merits of the participation of the UNCI, and particularly its controlling

American member.

To trace this line of thought to its origin, it is important to note that, during the period of greatest tension during the year 1949

Inamely, after the issuance of the Canadian Directive, but before the conclusion of the Hoem-van Hoyen conversations) reports from Java and

Sumatra of heavier and heavier Republican guerilla warfare pressure on the Dutch were coupled with articles on the financial page of an over­ whelming drain on the still weak Dutch economy, from the war effort.

This, indeed, may have been a most important factor in the United States' decision-making in the crisis which followed the second police action: the longer the Dutch remained intransigent, the greater the drain on the mother country, financially and militarily, and therefore, the

less the potential Dutch contribution, militarily, to an Atlantic

Alliance. ïdrthermore, in a possible misreading of the potential

^^^New York Times, December 28, 1949. 292 effects of such information on Washington, the Dutch made no effort to conceal this drain, and may have even exaggerated it, hoping that it would bring more sympathetic consideration to its military and economic aid requests.

Whatever the effects of this dilution of Dutch financial strength during the spring of 1949, there seems little reason to doubt that both the American and Dutch governments went into the Round Table Conference

at least mindful of the problem and attuned to its implications for the

balance of power in Ehirope.

hahin, again providing us with an excellent reflection of the

attitudes of the Indonesians, suggests that Cochran intruded his way into

the Debt Commission and, though quite unfamiliar with the complexities of

the financial questions at issue, fashioned a settlement to go no further

than the maximum concessions the Dutch were willing to m a k e . 1^5 Could an

attitude of concern for the possibly precarious post-independence finan­

cial status of the mother country have been a large enough part of the

American outlook on these issues, so that the United States' member of

the UNCI would countenance Indonesian assumption of a debt structure

which was, by any standards, quite onerous for a newly independent and

badly underdeveloped Asian nation? Could part of the American outlook

have been conditioned by a feeling of gratitude or at least good will

toward the Dutch for eventually agreeing to the restoration of the Re­

public (based equally on a lack of awareness of the strength of the

Republican guerilla resistance)? Thus, the Dutch might have had some

155Kahin, op. cit., pp. 443, 444. 293 success in winning United States' sympathy for their positions on some of the (still very important) "secondary" issues dealt with at the RTC.

ïihatever the case, it is unarguable that the Republic moved all

the way or a long way toward the Dutch position on two very important

issues at the RTC, and largely on the basis of "solutions" formulated by

the United Gtates-dominated UNCI: West New Guinea and the financial

issue (respectively). It seems appropriate for us to recall that Ameri­

can spokesmen had, almost from the very inception of the struggle in

late 1943, repeatedly stressed the great amount that both the Dutch and

Indonesians had to gain from one another through trust, cooperation and

mutual assistance, tvhile these statements now seem to have been, at

times, terribly naive, viewed with hindsight, nevertheless they were

absolutely correct: the two did have much to gain from one another in a

post-colonial relationship.

Our point, of course, is this: Indonesia and the Netherlands,

for well over a decade after the transfer of sovereignty, failed to

realize the benefits of this cooperation which United States spokesmen

had so often foreseen. And the two major irritants which poisoned this

relationship, which rendered the long-heralded Netherlands-Indonesian

Union virtually stillborn, were West New Guinea and the financial issue.

Indonesia simply defaulted on her financial obligations in 1936. Could

the United States have sustained sufficient pressure on the Dutch to

have forced greater concessions on these issues? A most difficult

question. On the financial questions, possibly; on West New Guinea,

probably not. In any case, if we take a longer view of the history of

Dutch colonialism in Indonesia and of the development and progress of 294

the Indonesian independence movement through the twentieth century, we realise that much of what went wrong with the post-colonial Dutch-

Indonesian relationship was due to factors of very long standing over which the United States would never have been able to exercise much in­ fluence, let alone effective control. To find that the United States had a major influence on the nature of the outcome of the Indonesian independence struggle is both proper ana legitimate; to conclude, however, that the United States bears major responsibility either for the future course of Dutch-Indonesian relations or for the disappointments of Indo­ nesia's domestic politics during the next decade and a half is to indulge in a typical American penchant for overemphasizing this country's ability

to influence the course of human affairs within and between foreign nations. A p F E N J. I A

295 ,\PPENUIX 1

TPIa T OP’ THE LINGGADJATI AGHEP3AEN1'

Preamble. The Netherlands Government, represented by the Commission-General for the Netherlands Indies, and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, represented by the Indonesian delegation, moved by a sincere desire to ensure good relations between the peoples of the Netherlands and Indonesia in new forms of voluntary cooperation, which offer the best guarantee for sound and strong development of both coun­ tries in the future and which make it possible to give a new foundation to the relationship between the two peoples; agree as follows and will submit this agreement at the shortest possible notice for the approval of the respective parliaments:

Article 1 . The Netherlands Government recognizes the Government of the Republic of Indonesia as exercising ^ facto authority over Java, Madura and Sumatra. The areas occupied by Allied or Netherlands forces shall be included gradually, through mutual cooperation, in Republican territory. To this end, the necessary measures shall at once be taken in order that this inclusion shall be completed at the latest on the date mentioned in Article 12.

Article 2. The Netherlands Government and the Government of the Republic shall cooperate in the rapid formation of a sovereign demo- ' 'cratic State on a federal basis to be called the United States of Indo­ nesia.

Article j. The United States of Indonesia shall comprise the entire territory of the Netherlands Indies with the provision, however, that in case the population of any territory, after due consultation with the other territories, should decide by democratic process that they are not, or not yet, willing to join the United States of Indonesia, they can establish a special relationship for such a territory to the United States of Indonesia and to the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

Article 4. The component parts of the United States of Indonesia shall be the Republic of Indonesia, Borneo, and the Great East without prejudice to the right of the population of any territory to decide by democratic process that its position in the United States of Indonesia shall be arranged otherwise.

296 297

Article 4 , continuect. Without derogation of the provisions of Article 5 of the first paragraph of this Article, the United States of Indonesia may make special arrangements concerning the territory of its capital.

Article 5 « The constitution of the United States of Indonesia shall be determined by a constituent assembly composed of the democrati­ cally nominated representatives of the Hepublic and of the other future partners of the United States of Indonesia to which the following para­ graph of this Article shall apply. Both parties shall consult each other on the method of partici­ pation in this constituent assembly by the Hepublic of Indonesia, by the territories not under the authority of the Republic and by the groups of the population not, or insufficiently, represented with due observance of the responsibility of the Netherlands Government and the Government of the Republic, respectively.

Aj'ticle 6 . To promote the joint interests of the Netherlands ana Indonesia, the Netherlands Government and the Government of the Re­ public of Indonesia shall cooperate in the establishment of a Netherlands Indonesian Union by which the Kingdom of the Netherlands, comprising the Netherlands, the Netherlands Indies, Surinam and Guraqao, shall be con­ verted into the said Union consisting on the one hand of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, comprising the Netherlands, Surinam and Guraqao, and on the other hand the United States of Indonesia. The foregoing paragraph does not exclude the possibility of a further arrangement of the relations between the Netherlands, Surinam and Guraqao.

Article 7 . A. The Netherlands Indonesian Union shall have its own organs to promote the joint interests of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United States of Indonesia. B. These organs shall be formed by the Governments of the King­ dom of the Netherlands and the United Btates of Indonesia and, if neces­ sary, by the parliaments of those countries. C. The joint interests shall be considered to be cooperation on foreign relations, defense and, as far as necessary, finance as well as subjects of an economic or cultural nature.

Article B . The King (Qpeen) of the Netherlands shall be at the head of the Netherlands Indonesian Union. Lecrees and resolutions con­ cerning the joint interests shall be issued by the organs of the Union in the King's (^.ueen's) name.

Article 9 . In order to promote the interests of the United States of Indonesia in the Netherlands and of the Kingdom of the Nether­ lands in Indonesia, a High Commissioner shall be appointed by the respec­ tive Governments. 298

Article 10. Statutes of the Netherlands Indonesian Union shall, furthermore, contain provisions regarding; A. Safeguarding the rights of both parties towards one another and guarantees for the fulfillment of their mutual obligations. B. Mutual exercise of civil rights by Netherlands and Indone­ sian citizens. C. Regulations containing provisions in case no agreement can be reached by the organs of the Union. jj. Regulation of the manner and conditions of the assistance to be given by the services of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the United States of Indonesia as long as the services of the latter are not, or are insufficiently, organized; and E. Safeguarding in both parts of the Union of the fundamental human rights and liberties referred to in the Charter of the United Na­ tions Organization.

Article 11. A. The Statutes of the Netherlands Inuonesiar Union shall be draftee by a conference of representatives of the Kingdom of the Nether­ lands and the future United States of Indonesia. B. The statutes shall come into effect after approval by the respective parliaments.

Article 12. The Netherlands Government and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia shall endeavor to establish the United States of Indonesia and the Netherlands Indonesian Union before January 1, 1949.

Article 1j. The Netherlands Government shall forthwith take the necessary steps in order to obtain the admission of the United States of Inaonesia as a w.ember of the United Nations Organization immediately af­ ter the formation of the Netherlands Indonesian Union.

Article 14* The Government of the Republic of Indonesia recog­ nizes the claims of all non-Indonesians to the restoration of their rights and the restitution of their goods as far as they are exercised or to be found in the territory over which it exercises ^ facto authority. A joint commission will be set up to effect this restoration and restitu­ tion.

Article 15. In order to reform the Government of the Indies in such a way that its composition and procedure shall conform as closely as possible to the recognition of the Republic of Indonesia and to its pro­ jected constitutional structure, the Netherlands Government, pending the realization of the United States of Indonesia and of the Netherlands Indo­ nesian Union, shall forthwith initiate the necessary legal measures to adjust the constitutional and international position of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the new situation.

Article 16. Directly after the conclusion of this agreement, both parties shall proceed to reduce their armed forces. They will consult together concerning the extent and rate of the reduction and their cooper­ ation in military matters. 299

Article 17. XI For the cooperation between the Netherlands Government and the Government of the Republic contemplated in this agreement, an organi­ zation shall be called into existence of delegations to be appointed by each of the Governments with a joint secretariat. B. The Netherlands Government and the Government of the Repub­ lic of Indonesia shall settle by arbitration any dispute which might arise from this agreement and which cannot be solved by joint consulta­ tion in conference between those delegations. In that case a chairman of another nationality with a deciding vote shall be appointed by agree­ ment between the delegations or, if such agreement cannot be reached, by the president of the International Court of Justice.

Article 16. This agreement shall be drawn up in the Netherlands and Indonesian languages. Both texts shall have equal authority.

The Agreement was signea on March 29, 1947. AJ’PENDIX 2

LiKClJHITv COUîi'CIL HEaOLUTIÜNS ADOFi'ED AUGUST 29, 1947

I.

Whereas, the Security Council on August 1, 1947, called upon the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia to cease hostilities forthwith, And Whereas communications have been received from the Govern­ ments of the Netherlands and of the Republic of Indonesia advising that orders have been given for the cessation of hostilities, And Whereas it is desirable that steps should be taken to avoid disputes and friction relating to the observance of the "cease-fire” or­ ders, and to create conditions which will facilitate agreement between the parties,

THE SECURITY COUNCIL

(l) notes with satisfaction the steps taken by the parties to comply with the resolution of August 1, 1947. V2) notes with satisfaction the statement by the Netherlands Government issued on August 11, in which it affirms its in­ tention to organize a sovereign, democratic United States of Indonesia in accordance with the purpose of the Linggadjati Agreement, (9/ notes that the Netherlands Government intends immediately to request the career consuls stationed in Batavia jointly to report on the present situation in the Republic of Inaonesia. (4) notes that the Government of the Republic of Indonesia has requested appointment by the Security Council of a commis­ sion of observers, (5) requests the Governments of members of the Council who have career consular representatives in Batavia to instruct them to prepare jointly, for the information and guidance of the Security Council, reports on the situation in the Republic of Indonesia following the resolution of the Council of Au­ gust 1, 1947, such reports to cover the observance of the "cease-fire” orders and the conditions prevailing in areas under military occupation or from which armed forces now in occupation may be withdrawn by agreement between the parties.

500 501

(6) requests the Governments of the Netherlands and of the Repub­ lic of Indonesia to grant to the representatives referred to in paragraph (5) all facilities necessary for the effective fulfillment of their mission, (7) resolves to consider the matter further, should the situa­ tion require.

II.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Resolves to tender its good offices to the parties in order to assist in the pacific settlement of their dispute in accordance with paragraph (b) of the resolution of the Council on August 1, 1947. The Council expresses its readiness, if the parties so request, to assist in the settlement through a committee of the Council consisting of three members of the Council, each party selecting one, and the third to be designated by the two so selected.

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ADOPTED NOVEMBER 1, 1947

TrK SECURITY COUNCIL

Having received ana taken note of the Report of the Consular Com­ mission dated October 14, 1947, indicating that the Council's resolution of August 1, 1947, relating to the cessation of hostilities had not been fully effective; Having taken note that according to the Report no attempt was made by either side to come to an agreement with the other about the means of giving effect to that resolution;

Calls upon the parties concerned forthwith to consult with each other, either directly or through the Committee of Good Offices as to the means to be employed in order to give effect to the cease-fire reso­ lution, ana, pending agreement, to cease any activities or incitement to activities which contravene that resolution, and to taxe appropriate measures for safeguarding life and property; Requests the Consular Commission, together with its military assistants, to make its services available to the Committee of Good Of­ fices; Advises the parties concerned, the Committee of Good Offices, and the Consular Commission that its resolution of August 1 should be interpreted as meaning that the use of the armed forces of either party by hostile action to extend its control over the territory not occupied by it on August 4, 1947, is inconsistent with the Council resolution of August 1 . Should it appear that some withdrawals of armed forces be neces­ sary, invites the parties to conclude between them as soon as possible, the agreements referred to in its resolution of August 23, 1947. APPENDIX i

THE RENVILLE POLITICAL PHlNCrPLEC

A. The Principles proposed by the Nethrrlands and accepted by the Par­ ties on January 17, 1946:

1 . That the assistance of the Committee of Good offices be con­ tinued in the working out and signing of an agreement for the settlement of the political dispute in the islands of Java, Sumatra and Madura, based upon the principles underlying the Linggadjati Agreement. 2. It is understood that neither party has the right to prevent the free expression of popular movements looking toward political organi­ zations which are in accord with the principles of the Linggadjati Agree­ ment. It is further understood that each party will guarantee the freedom of assembly, speech and publication at all times, provided that this guar­ antee is not construed so as to include the advocacy of violence or re­ prisals. 5. It is understood that the decisions concerning the changes in administration of territory should be made only with the full and free consent of the populations of those territories and at a time when the security and freedom from coercion of such populations will have been en­ sured. 4- That on the signing of the political agreement, provision be made for the gradual reduction of the armed forces of both parties. 5. That as soon as practicable after the signing of the truce agreement, economic activity, trade, transportation and communications be restored through the cooperation of both parties, taking into considera­ tion the interests of all constituent parts of Indonesia. 6. That provision be made for a suitable period of not less than six months nor more than one year after the signing of the agreement, during which time uncoerced and free discussion and consideration of vital issues will proceed; at the end of this period free elections will be held for self-determination by the people of their political relationship to the United States of Indonesia. 7. That a constitutional convention be chosen according to demo­ cratic procedure to draft a constitution for the United States of Indone­ sia. B. It is understood that if, after signing the agreement referred to in Item 1, either party should ask the United Nations to provide an agency to observe conditions at any time up to the point at which sover­ eignty is transferred from the Government of the Netherlands to the

902 5 0

8. Continued. Government of the United States of Indonesia, the other party will take this request in serious consideration. The following four principles are taxen from the Linggadjati Agreement; - 9* Independence for the Indonesian peoples. -10. Cooperation between the peoples of the Netherlands and Indo­ nesia. -11. A sovereign State on a federal basis under a constitution which will be arrived at by democratic processes. -12, a union between the United States of Indonesia ana other parts of the kingdom of the Netherlands under the king of the Netherlands. n. Six additional Principles submitted by the Committee of Good Offices and accepted by the Parties on January 19, 1948.

1, Sovereignty throughout the Netherlands Indies is and shall remain with the kingdom of the Netherlands until, after a stated interval, the Kingdom of the Netherlands transfers its sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia. Prior to the termination of such stated interval, the Kingdom of the Netherlands may confer appropriate rights, duties, and responsibilities on a provisional federal Government of the territories of the future United Gtates of Indonesia. The United States of Indonesia, when created, will be a sovereign and independent State in equal partner­ ship with the Kingdom of the Netherlands in a Netherlands Indonesian Union, at the head of which shall be the King of the Netherlands. The status of the Hepublic of Indonesia will be that of a Gtate within the United Gtates of Indonesia. 2, In any provisional federal Government created prior to rati­ fication of the constitution of the future United States of Indonesia, all States will be offered fair representation. 5- Irior to the dissolution of the Committee of Good Offices, either party may request that the services of the Committee be continued to assist in adjusting differences between the parties and which relate to the political agreement smd which may arise during the interim period. The other party will interpose no objection to such a request. This re­ quest would be brought to the attention of the Security Council of the United Nations by the Government of the Netherlands. 4. (Vithin a period of not less than six months or more than one year from the signing of this agreement, a plebiscite will be held to determine whether the populations of the various territories of Java, Madura and Sumatra wish their territory to form part of the Republic of Indonesia or another State within the United States of Indonesia, such plebiscite to be conducted under observation by the Committee of Good Offices, should either party in accordance with the procedure set forth in Paragraph 5 above request the services of the Committee in this ca­ pacity. The parties may agree that another method for ascertaining the will of the populations may be employed in place of a plebiscite. 304

5. Following the delineation of the States in accordance with the procedure set forth in Paragraph 4 above, a constitutional conven­ tion will be convened through democratic procedures to draft a consti­ tution for the United States of Indonesia. The representation of the various States in the convention will be in proportion to their popu- lat ions. 6. Should any State decide not to ratify the constitution ana desire, in accordance with the principles of Articles 9 and 4 of the Linggadjati Agreement, to negotiate a special relationship with the United States of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, neither party will object. bibliography

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NET HER LAIRDS

Netherlands Information Bureau. Communism in the republic of Indonesia. 8 pages. New York: 19481 (Mimeographed.')

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A-'Ondar, E. 'The Situation in Indonesia." Soviet Press Translations, 2, September I5 , 1947, pp. 102-4. Elvin, 1. "International uairy; The Indonesian Republic." Soviet Press Translations, October 1, 1947, pp. 138-40.

Guber, A. "The Struggle of Indonesia for Independence and the Maneuvers of the Dutch Imperialists." Soviet Press Translations, 2, March 91, 1947, pp. 4-8.

Vasilyeva, V. "Events in Indonesia." Soviet Press Translations, 2, January, 1946, pp. 10-9.

Viktorov, Y. "The Establishment of Consular Relations Between the USSR ana the Indonesian Republic." Soviet Press Translations, July 15, 1948, pp. 425-8. 309

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Djajadiningrat, lurus Nasir. The Beginnings of the Indonesian-Dutch Negotiations and the Hoge-Veluwe Talks. Ithaca, N.Y.; Modem Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Department of Far Eastern Studies, Cornell University, 1958.

Henderson, William. Pacific Settlement of Disputes; the Indonesian question, 1946-1949. New" Yorx: Woodrow Wilson Foundation, 1954.

Kahin, G rorge McTTirnin, Nationalism and Revolution in Inaonesia. Ithaca, N.Y.; Cornell University Press, 1955.

Kennedy, Raymond, and j-.attenburg, Paul M. Indonesia in Crisis. New York: Foreign Policy Association in cooperation with the Institute for Pacific Halations, 1948.

■YcVey, Ruth Thor:ias. The Calcutta Conference and the Southeast Asian Uprisings. Ithaca, N.Y.; Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Department of P'ar East Studies, Cornell University, 1958.

______. The Soviet View of the Indonesian Revolution. Ithaca, N.Y.; Moaern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Study Program, Depart­ ment of P’ar East Studies, Cornell University, 1957.

fi.ook, Hubertus Johanness van. The Stakes of Democracy in Southeast Asia. London; George Allen and Urwin, Limitée, 1950*

Schiller, A. Arthur. The Formation of Federal Indonesia, 1945-1949. The Hague: Vi. van Ho eve, 1955 .

bhaxow, Alexander. Fo._eign economic Assistance in Indonesia, 195G-1961 . Tokyo; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Economic Cooperation Bureau, Japan, in cooperation with London School of Economics, I964. (See Chapter I, "The Establishment of Indonesian Independence and Foreign Aid," pp. 8-45.)

Taylor, Alastair MacDonald. Indonesian Independence and the United Nations. Ithaca, IwYTl Cornel’l ÜniversFty Press, 1 '96b , 510 lïûlf, Charles, Jr. Indonesian Assignment. Washington, B.C.; Committee on public Administration Cases, United States Government Printing Office, 1950. (Note: Written without attribution to the author under the auspices of the United States Government Committee on public Administration Cases.)

______. The Iidonesian Story; The Birth, Growth and Structure of the Inaonesian Republic. New York; J. Day Company, 1948.

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______. 'The Communist Revolt in Java: the Crisis and its After- math." Par Eastern Survey, Vol. XVII (November 17, 1948), 261 -5.

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______• "I .donesia and the Problem of Southeast Asia." Foreign Affairs, Vol. XxVII (July, 19-:9; , 274-85. 511 bastroamidjojo, Ali. "The Status of the Republic of Indonesia in Inter­ national Law." Columbia Law Review. Vol. IL (March, 1949), 544-61 .

______• "Survey of the Indonesian National Movement." Asian Horizon. Vol. II (Autumn, 'Winter, 1949-1950), 29-57.

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5. Un publish eg i.iaterials

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renny, h'awara L. The United Nations' Handling of the Two 'Territorial ■questions: Palestine and Indonesia. I.iW l601, Washington, D.C, Master's Thesis, American University, 196O.