Essay Thursday, September 24, 2015 The Thucydides Trap Are the U.S. and China Headed for War?

by Graham Allison ancient Greece, or as Germany did Britain to displace a ruling power, standard crises a century ago. Most such contests have that would otherwise be contained, like When Barack Obama meets this ended badly, often for both nations, a team the assassination of an archduke in 1914, week with Xi Jinping during the Chinese of mine at the Harvard Belfer Center for can initiate a cascade of reactions that, president’s first state visit to America, one Science and International Affairs has in turn, produce outcomes none of the item probably won’t be on their agenda: concluded after analyzing the historical parties would otherwise have chosen. the possibility that the United States and record. In 12 of 16 cases over the past 500 War, however, is not inevitable. Four China could find themselves at war in the years, the result was war. When the par- of the 16 cases in our review did not end in next decade. In policy circles, this appears ties avoided war, it required huge, painful bloodshed. Those successes, as well as the as unlikely as it would be unwise. adjustments in attitudes and actions on failures, offer pertinent lessons for today’s world leaders. Escaping the Trap requires tremendous effort. As Xi Jinping himself “War between the U.S. and China said during a visit to Seattle on Tuesday, is more likely than recognized at the “There is no such thing as the so-called moment. Indeed, judging by the historical Thucydides Trap in the world. But should major countries time and again make the record, war is more likely than not.” mistakes of strategic miscalculation, they might create such traps for themselves.” And yet 100 years on, World War I the part not just of the challenger but also offers a sobering reminder of man’s ca- the challenged. * * * pacity for folly. When we say that war Based on the current trajectory, war is “inconceivable,” is this a statement between the United States and China in More than 2,400 years ago, the about what is possible in the world—or the decades ahead is not just possible, Athenian historian Thucydides offered only about what our limited minds can but much more likely than recognized at a powerful insight: “It was the rise of conceive? In 1914, few could imagine the moment. Indeed, judging by the his- Athens, and the fear that this inspired in slaughter on a scale that demanded a new torical record, war is more likely than not. Sparta, that made war inevitable.” Others category: world war. When war ended four Moreover, current underestimations and identified an array of contributing causes years later, Europe lay in ruins: the kaiser misapprehensions of the hazards inherent of the Peloponnesian War. But Thucydides gone, the Austro-Hungarian Empire dis- solved, the Russian tsar overthrown by the Bolsheviks, France bled for a genera- “The preeminent geostrategic tion, and England shorn of its youth and challenge of this era is not violent treasure. A millennium in which Europe had been the political center of the world Islamic extremists or a resurgent Russia. came to a crashing halt. It is the impact of China’s ascendance.” The defining question about global order for this generation is whether in the U.S.-China relationship contribute went to the heart of the matter, focusing China and the United States can escape greatly to those hazards. A risk associated on the inexorable, structural stress caused Thucydides’s Trap. The Greek historian’s with Thucydides’s Trap is that business as by a rapid shift in the balance of power metaphor reminds us of the attendant usual—not just an unexpected, extraordi- between two rivals. Note that Thucydides dangers when a rising power rivals a ruling nary event—can trigger large-scale con- identified two key drivers of this dynamic: power—as Athens challenged Sparta in flict. When a rising power is threatening the rising power’s growing entitlement, Essay The Atlantic Thursday, September 24, 2015 sense of its importance, and demand for unfriendly to his nephew Kaiser Wilhelm increasing hostility between Britain and greater say and sway, on the one hand, and II’s Germany, rather than keeping its eye Germany stem more from German capa- the fear, insecurity, and determination to on America, which he saw as the greater bilities or German conduct? Crowe put it defend the status quo this engenders in challenge. The prime minister instructed a bit differently: Did Germany’s pursuit the established power, on the other. the Foreign Office’s chief Germany watch- of “political hegemony and maritime In the case about which he wrote in er, Eyre Crowe, to write a memo answering ascendancy” pose an existential threat to the fifth century B.C., Athens had emerged the king’s question. Crowe delivered his “the independence of her neighbours and over a half century as a steeple of civili- memorandum on New Year’s Day, 1907. ultimately the existence of England?” zation, yielding advances in philosophy, The document is a gem in the annals of Crowe’s answer was unambiguous: history, drama, architecture, democracy, diplomacy. Capability was key. As Germany’s econ- and naval prowess. This shocked Sparta, The logic of Crowe’s analysis echoed omy surpassed Britain’s, Germany would which for a century had been the leading Thucydides’s insight. And his central ques- not only develop the strongest army on land power on the Peloponnese peninsula. tion, as paraphrased by Henry Kissinger the continent. It would soon also “build As Thucydides saw it, Athens’s position in On China, was the following: Did as powerful a navy as she can afford.” was understandable. As its clout grew, so too did its self-confidence, its conscious- ness of past injustices, its sensitivity to Thucydides Trap Case Studies instances of disrespect, and its insistence that previous arrangements be revised to reflect new realities of power. It was also natural, Thucydides explained, that Sparta interpreted the Athenian posture as un- reasonable, ungrateful, and threatening to the system it had established—and within which Athens had flourished. Thucydides chronicled objective changes in relative power, but he also fo- cused on perceptions of change among the leaders of Athens and Sparta—and how this led each to strengthen alliances with other states in the hopes of counterbalanc- ing the other. But entanglement runs both ways. (It was for this reason that George Washington famously cautioned America to beware of “entangling alliances.”) When conflict broke out between the second- tier city-states of Corinth and Corcyra (now Corfu), Sparta felt it necessary to come to Corinth’s defense, which left Athens little choice but to back its ally. The Peloponnesian War followed. When it ended 30 years later, Sparta was the nominal victor. But both states lay in ruin, leaving Greece vulnerable to the Persians. For summaries of these 16 cases and the methodology for selecting them, and for a forum to register additions, subtractions, revisions, and disagreements with the cases, please visit the Harvard Belfer Center’s Thucydides * * * Trap Case File. For this first phase of the project, we at the Belfer Center identified “ruling” and “rising” powers by following the judgments of leading historical accounts, resisting the temptation to offer original or idiosyn- cratic interpretations of events. These histories use “rise” and “rule” according to their conventional definitions, Eight years before the outbreak generally emphasizing rapid shifts in relative GDP and military strength. Most of the cases in this initial round of of world war in Europe, Britain’s King analysis come from post-Westphalian Europe. Edward VII asked his prime minister why belfercenter.org/ThucydidesTrap the British government was becoming so Essay The Atlantic Thursday, September 24, 2015

In other words, Kissinger writes, “once Otto von Bismarck sought to unify a the history of the world.” Everyone knows Germany achieved naval supremacy … quarrelsome assortment of rising German about the rise of China. Few of us realize this in itself—regardless of German in- states, war with their common adversary, its magnitude. Never before in history tentions—would be an objective threat France, proved an effective instrument has a nation risen so far, so fast, on so to Britain, and incompatible with the to mobilize popular support for his mis- many dimensions of power. To paraphrase existence of the British Empire.” sion. After the Meiji Restoration in 1868, former Czech President Vaclav Havel, all Three years after reading that memo, a rapidly modernizing Japanese economy this has happened so rapidly that we have Edward VII died. Attendees at his funeral and military establishment challenged not yet had time to be astonished. included two “chief mourners”—Edward’s Chinese and Russian dominance of East My lecture on this topic at Harvard successor, George V, and Germany’s Asia, resulting in wars with both from begins with a quiz that asks students to Kaiser Wilhelm—along with Theodore which Japan emerged as the leading power compare China and the United States in Roosevelt representing the United States. in the region. 1980 with their rankings today. The reader At one point, Roosevelt (an avid student of Each case is, of course, unique. is invited to fill in the blanks: naval power and leading champion of the Ongoing debate about the buildup of the U.S. Navy) asked Wilhelm causes of the First World whether he would consider a moratorium War reminds us that each Quiz 1: Fill in the Blanks in the German-British naval arms race. is subject to competing China, as percent of U.S. The kaiser replied that Germany was un- interpretations. The great 1980 2014 alterably committed to having a powerful international historian, navy. But as he went on to explain, war Harvard’s Ernest May, GDP (PPP) between Germany and Britain was simply taught that when attempt- unthinkable, because “I was brought up in ing to reason from history, GDP (US$) England, very largely; I feel myself partly we should be as sensitive an Englishman. Next to Germany I care to the differences as to the Exports (US$) more for England than for any other coun- similarities among cases try.” And then with emphasis: “I ADORE we compare. (Indeed, in Reserves (US$) ENGLAND!” his Historical Reasoning However unimaginable conflict 101 class, May would take seems, however catastrophic the potential a sheet of paper, draw a line consequences for all actors, however deep down the middle of the page, label one The answers for the first column: In the cultural empathy among leaders, even column “Similar” and the other “Different,” 1980, China had 10 percent of America’s blood relatives, and however economically and fill in the sheet with at least a half GDP as measured by purchasing power interdependent states may be—none of dozen of each.) Nonetheless, acknowledg- parity; 7 percent of its GDP at current these factors is sufficient to prevent war, ing many differences, Thucydides directs U.S.-dollar exchange rates; and 6 percent in 1914 or today. us to a powerful commonality. of its exports. The foreign currency held by In fact, in 12 of 16 cases over the last China, meanwhile, was just one-sixth the 500 years in which there was a rapid shift * * * size of America’s reserves. The answers for in the relative power of a rising nation that the second column: By 2014, those figures threatened to displace a ruling state, the The preeminent geostrategic chal- were 101 percent of GDP; 60 percent at result was war. As the table below suggests, lenge of this era is not violent Islamic U.S.-dollar exchange rates; and 106 per- the struggle for mastery in Europe and extremists or a resurgent Russia. It is the cent of exports. China’s reserves today are Asia over the past half millennium offers impact that China’s ascendance will have 28 times larger than America’s. a succession of variations on a common on the U.S.-led international order, which In a single generation, a nation that storyline. has provided unprecedented great-power did not appear on any of the interna- When a rising, revolutionary France peace and prosperity for the past 70 years. tional league tables has vaulted into the challenged Britain’s dominance of the As Singapore’s late leader, Lee Kuan Yew, top ranks. In 1980, China’s economy was oceans and the balance of power on the observed, “the size of China’s displace- smaller than that of the Netherlands. Last European continent, Britain destroyed ment of the world balance is such that the year, the increment of growth in China’s Napoleon Bonaparte’s fleet in 1805 and world must find a new balance. It is not GDP was roughly equal to the entire later sent troops to the continent to defeat possible to pretend that this is just another Dutch economy. his armies in Spain and at Waterloo. As big player. This is the biggest player in The second question in my quiz Essay The Atlantic Thursday, September 24, 2015 asks students: Could China become #1? Most are stunned to learn that on each * * * In what year could China overtake the of these 20 indicators, China has already United States to become, say, the largest surpassed the U.S. Americans have a tendency to lecture economy in the world, or primary engine Will China be able to sustain eco- others about why they should be “more of global growth, or biggest market for nomic-growth rates several times those like us.” In urging China to follow the lead luxury goods? of the United States for another decade of the United States, should we Americans and beyond? If and as it does, be careful what we wish for? Quiz 2: In what year will China surpass are its current leaders serious As the United States emerged as the the U.S. as the largest... about displacing the U.S. as the dominant power in the Western hemi- predominant power in Asia? sphere in the 1890s, how did it behave? Manufacturer Will China follow the path Future President Theodore Roosevelt of Japan and Germany, and personified a nation supremely confi- Exporter take its place as a responsible dent that the 100 years ahead would be stakeholder in the international an American century. Over a decade that Trading nation order that America has built began in 1895 with the U.S. secretary of over the past seven decades? state declaring the United States “sover- Saver The answer to these questions eign on this continent,” America liberated is obviously that no one knows. Cuba; threatened Britain and Germany Holder of U.S. debt But if anyone’s forecasts with war to force them to accept American are worth heeding, it’s those positions on disputes in Venezuela and Foreign-direct-investment of Lee Kuan Yew, the world’s Canada; backed an insurrection that split destination premier China watcher and Colombia to create a new state of Panama Energy consumer a mentor to Chinese leaders (which immediately gave the U.S. conces- since Deng Xiaoping. Before sions to build the Panama Canal); and Oil importer his death in March, the founder attempted to overthrow the government of Singapore put the odds of of Mexico, which was supported by the Carbon emitter China continuing to grow at United Kingdom and financed by London several times U.S. rates for bankers. In the half century that followed, Steel producer the next decade and beyond U.S. military forces intervened in “our as “four chances in five.” On hemisphere” on more than 30 separate Auto market whether China’s leaders are occasions to settle economic or territorial serious about displacing the disputes in terms favorable to Americans, Smartphone market United States as the top power or oust leaders they judged unacceptable. in Asia in the foreseeable For example, in 1902, when British E-commerce market future, Lee answered directly: and German ships attempted to impose “Of course. Why not … how a naval blockade to force Venezuela to Luxury-goods market could they not aspire to be pay its debts to them, Roosevelt warned Internet user number one in Asia and in both countries that he would “be obliged time the world?” And about to interfere by force if necessary” if they Fastest supercomputer accepting its place in an inter- did not withdraw their ships. The British national order designed and led and Germans were persuaded to retreat Holder of foreign reserves by America, he said absolutely and to resolve their dispute in terms not: “China wants to be China satisfactory to the U.S. at The Hague. Source of initial public offerings and accepted as such—not as The following year, when Colombia re- an honorary member of the fused to lease the Panama Canal Zone Primary engine of global growth West.” to the United States, America sponsored Panamanian secessionists, recognized Economy the new Panamanian government within hours of its declaration of independence, and sent the Marines to defend the new country. Roosevelt defended the U.S. Essay The Atlantic Thursday, September 24, 2015 intervention on the grounds that it was great divergence between China’s econom- wish to be not only rich but also powerful. “justified in morals and therefore justified ic performance and that of its competitors At the core of China’s civilizational creed in law.” Shortly thereafter, Panama granted over the seven years since the financial is the belief—or conceit—that China is the the United States rights to the Canal Zone crisis of 2008 and Great Recession. That center of the universe. In the oft-repeated “in perpetuity.” shock caused virtually all other major narrative, a century of Chinese weakness economies to falter and decline. China led to exploitation and national humili- * * * never missed a year of growth, sustain- ation by Western colonialists and Japan. ing an average growth rate exceeding 8 In Beijing’s view, China is now being re- When Deng Xiaoping initiated percent. Indeed, since the financial crisis, stored to its rightful place, where its power China’s fast march to the market in 1978, nearly 40 percent of all growth in the global commands recognition of and respect for he announced a policy known as “hide economy has occurred in just one country: China’s core interests. and bide.” What China needed most China. The chart below illustrates China’s Last November, in a seminal meeting abroad was stability and access to markets. growth compared to growth among its of the entire Chinese political and foreign- The Chinese would thus “bide our time peers in the BRICS group of emerging policy establishment, including the leader- and hide our capabilities,” which Chinese economies, advanced economies, and the ship of the People’s Liberation Army, Xi military officers sometimes paraphrased world. From a common index of 100 in provided a comprehensive overview of as getting strong before getting even. 2007, the divergence is dramatic. his vision of China’s role in the world. The display of self-confidence bordered on hubris. Xi began by offering an essentially “With the arrival of China’s new Hegelian conception of the major histori- cal trends toward multipolarity (i.e. not paramount leader, Xi Jinping, the U.S. unipolarity) and the transformation era of ‘hide and bide’ is over.” of the international system (i.e. not the current U.S.-led system). In his words, a rejuvenated Chinese nation will build With the arrival of China’s new Today, China has displaced the United a “new type of international relations” paramount leader, Xi Jinping, the era States as the world’s largest economy mea- through a “protracted” struggle over the of “hide and bide” is over. Nearly three sured in terms of the amount of goods nature of the international order. In the years into his 10-year term, Xi has stunned and services a citizen can buy in his own end, he assured his audience that “the colleagues at home and China watchers country (purchasing power parity). growing trend toward a multipolar world abroad with the speed at which he has What Xi Jinping calls the “China will not change.” moved and the audacity of his ambitions. Dream” expresses the deepest aspirations Given objective trends, realists see Domestically, he has bypassed rule by of hundreds of millions of Chinese, who an irresistible force approaching an a seven-man standing committee and instead consolidated power in his own GDP, 2007–2015 hands; ended flirtations with democra- tization by reasserting the Communist Party’s monopoly on political power; and attempted to transform China’s engine of growth from an export-focused economy to one driven by domestic consumption. Overseas, he has pursued a more active Chinese foreign policy that is increas- ingly assertive in advancing the country’s interests. While the Western press is seized by the storyline of “China’s economic slow- down,” few pause to note that China’s lower growth rate remains more than three times that of the United States. Many observers outside China have missed the Essay The Atlantic Thursday, September 24, 2015 immovable object. They ask which is less peaceful and prosperous relations with over a generation. Success will require not likely: China demanding a lesser role in China. Shoehorning this challenge into just a new slogan, more frequent summits the East and South China Seas than the that template would demonstrate only of presidents, and additional meetings of United States did in the Caribbean or one thing: a failure to understand the departmental working groups. Managing Atlantic in the early 20th century, or the central point I’m trying to make. What this relationship without war will demand U.S. sharing with China the predominance strategists need most at the moment is sustained attention, week by week, at the in the Western Pacific that America has not a new strategy, but a long pause for highest level in both countries. It will enjoyed since World War II? reflection. If the tectonic shift caused by entail a depth of mutual understanding And yet in four of the 16 cases that China’s rise poses a challenge of genu- not seen since the Henry Kissinger-Zhou the Belfer Center team analyzed, similar inely Thucydidean proportions, declara- Enlai conversations in the 1970s. Most rivalries did not end in war. If leaders in tions about “rebalancing,” or revitalizing significantly, it will mean more radical the United States and China let structural “engage and hedge,” or presidential hope- changes in attitudes and actions, by lead- factors drive these two great nations to fuls’ calls for more “muscular” or “robust” ers and publics alike, than anyone has yet war, they will not be able to hide behind variants of the same, amount to little more imagined. a cloak of inevitability. Those who don’t than aspirin treating cancer. Future histo- learn from past successes and failures to rians will compare such assertions to the find a better way forward will have no one reveries of British, German, and Russian to blame but themselves. leaders as they sleepwalked into 1914. At this point, the established script for The rise of a 5,000-year-old civiliza- discussion of policy challenges calls for a tion with 1.3 billion people is not a prob- pivot to a new strategy (or at least slogan), lem to be fixed. It is a condition—a chronic with a short to-do list that promises condition that will have to be managed