Graham Allison Into One, by the Overwhelming Fact O’ U.S

THE RISE OF THE DIGITAL DICTATOR

MARCH/APRIL 2020 /     •  •
 •  ,  ? , 

Come Home, America?

FOREIGNAFFAIRS.COM

FA_MA20_cover.indd All Pages 1/17/20 8:34 PM DOWNLOAD CSS Notes, Books, MCQs, Magazines

www.thecsspoint.com

 Download CSS Notes  Download CSS Books  Download CSS Magazines  Download CSS MCQs  Download CSS Past Papers

The CSS Point, Pakistan’s The Best Online FREE Web source for All CSS Aspirants.

Email: [email protected]

BUY CSS / PMS / NTS & GENERAL KNOWLEDGE BOOKS ONLINE CASH ON DELIVERY ALL OVER PAKISTAN Visit Now: WWW.CSSBOOKS.NET For Oder & Inquiry Call/SMS/WhatsApp 0333 6042057 – 0726 540316

Brush Up Your English By S T Imam

Call/SMS 0726540141 - 03336042057 English Literature MCQs By Nawaz Khalid Emporium Publishers

Order Now Call/SMS 03336042057 - 0726540141 International law SK Kapoor & LN Tandon

Call/SMS 0726540141 - 03336042057 BUY CSS SOLVED MCQs BOOKS ONLINE CASH ON DELIVERY CALL/SMS 03336042057 | Visit: http://cssbooks.net

Volume 99, Number 2

COME HOME, AMERICA? The Folly of Retrenchment 10 Why America Can’t Withdraw From the World Thomas Wright

The Price of Primacy 19 Why America Shouldn’t Dominate the World Stephen Wertheim

The New Spheres of Influence 30 Sharing the Globe With Other Great Powers Graham Allison

Reality Check 41 American Power in an Age o Constraints Jennifer Lind and Daryl G. Press

Learning to Live With Despots 49

COVER: EMMANUEL POLANCO The Limits o Democracy Promotion Stephen D. Krasner

Getting to Less 56 The Truth About Defense Spending Kathleen Hicks

March/April 2020

Book 1.indb 1 1/17/20 9:26 PM ESSAYS Why America Must Lead Again 64 Rescuing U.S. Foreign Policy After Trump Joseph R. Biden, Jr.

How the Good War Went Bad 77 America’s Slow-Motion Failure in Afghanistan Carter Malkasian

The Epidemic of Despair 92 Will America’s Mortality Crisis Spread to the Rest o the World? Anne Case and Angus Deaton

The Digital Dictators 103 How Technology Strengthens Autocracy Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Erica Frantz, and Joseph Wright

Too Big to Prevail 116 The National Security Case for Breaking Up Big Tech Ganesh Sitaraman

Saving America’s Alliances 127 The United States Still Needs the System That Put It on Top Mira Rapp-Hooper

Mean Streets 141 The Global Traˆc Death Crisis Janette Sadik-Khan and Seth Solomonow

ON FOREIGNAFFAIRS.COM

Maysam Behravesh Amaka Anku and Michael Carpenter on on Iran’s Quds Force Tochi Eni-Kalu on Ukrainian oligarchs in after Soleimani. African urbanization. the Trump era.

March/April 2020

Book 1.indb 3 1/17/20 9:26 PM REVIEWS & RESPONSES The Dismal Kingdom 150 Do Economists Have Too Much Power? Paul Romer

The Wily Country 158 Understanding Putin’s Russia Michael Kimmage

Recent Books 165

“Foreign Aairs . . . will tolerate wide diŠerences of opinion. Its articles will not represent any consensus of beliefs. What is demanded of them is that they shall be competent and well informed, representing honest opinions seriously held and convincingly expressed. . . . It does not accept responsibility for the views in any articles, signed or unsigned, which appear in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear.” Archibald Cary Coolidge, Founding Editor Volume 1, Number 1 • September 1922

March/April 2020

Book 1.indb 5 1/17/20 9:26 PM March/April 2020 · Volume 99, Number 2 Published by the Council on Foreign Relations

  Editor, Peter G. Peterson Chair  - Executive Editor  ,    Managing Editors    Web Editor     Deputy Web Editor   Senior Editor   Social Media and Audience Development Editor      Sta Editor  ,    Assistant Editors    Art Director   Copy Chie   Business Operations Director    Editorial Assistant

Book Reviewers   . ,    ,   . , .   ,  ,   . ,   ,  . ,     ,  

  Chie­ Revenue O€ cer   Circulation Operations Director    Director o­ Product     Marketing Director   Advertising Director    Senior Manager, Advertising Accounts and Operations     Senior Manager, Events and Business Development  .  Senior Manager, Digital Analytics and Audience Development    ,   Marketing Operations Coordinators    Marketing Coordinator   Customer Retention Coordinator   Production and Business Coordinator   Marketing Promotions Associate    Deputy Director, Digital Development     Manager oƒ Web Development   Front End Web Developer   Quality Assurance Manager

 ,    ,    Media Relations

Board of Advisers    Chair  . ,  . ,  .  ,    ,  ,  ,   . ,    ,  .  ,   ,   ,  .  ,  .   ,   . ,   ,  ,    ,   .  ,   . ,  . ,  .  

†‡ ˆ‰Š‹ŒŠŽ‘ ’‰“Šˆ’ : Foreign A airs ForeignA airs.com/services 58 E. 68th Street, New York, NY 10065 Œ’–’‹—Ž‘’: §®“’‰ŒŠ Š‘¯: Call Edward Walsh at 212-434-9527 or visit 800-829-5539 U.S./Canada www.foreigna airs.com/advertising 845-267-2017 All other countries °’‡ ŠŒ’: ForeignA airs.com ’¦§Š–: foreigna [email protected] ‘’° –’ŒŒ’‰ : ForeignA airs.com/newsletters ¦§Š–: P.O. Box 324, Congers, NY 10920 ±§ˆ’‡ŽŽ²: Facebook.com/ForeignA airs ‰’‹‰Ž®†ˆŒŠŽ‘: The contents o Foreign A airs are copyrighted. No part o the magazine may be reproduced, hosted or distributed in any form or by any means without prior written permission from Foreign A airs. To obtain permission, visit ForeignA airs.com/permissions Foreign A airs is a member o the Alliance for Audited Media and the Association o­ Magazine Media. GST Number 127686483RT Canada Post Customer #4015177 Publication #40035310

02_TOC_Blues.indd 6 1/20/20 4:22 PM CONTRIBUTORS

KATHLEEN HICKS is a leading scholar-practitioner o U.S. defense policy. As a top Pentagon ocial in the Obama administration, she led the Defense Department’s eorts to pivot to Asia and helped devise contingency plans for crises the U.S. military might face in the decades ahead. In “Getting to Less” (page 56), Hicks, now a senior vice president and director o the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, argues that although it is possible to decrease U.S. defense spending, drastic cuts would require dangerous shifts in strategy.

A Šuent Pashto speaker, CARTER MALKASIAN spent two years in Afghanistan as a U.S. State Department ocial, working mostly in the war-torn district o Garmser, often traveling without a security detail to meet with village leaders. He reŠected on that work in War Comes to Garmser, one o the best books yet written about the U.S. war in Afghanistan, before going on to become an adviser to the chairman o the Joint Chiefs o Sta, General Joseph Dunford, from 2015 to 2019. In “How the Good War Went Bad” (page 77), Malkasian explores the factors that have made U.S. success in Afghanistan unlikely—and the decisions that have made it impossible.

ANNE CASE AND ANGUS DEATON have dedicated their careers to studying the economic issues that shape the lives o everyday people. Since receiving her Ph.D. in economics from Princeton, Case has focused her research on human health outcomes, examining, among other things, how childhood circumstances aect health and economic status in adulthood. Deaton, raised in Edinburgh and educated at the University o Cambridge, has shed light on people’s saving and consumption choices, both in the aggregate and at the level o individual households—work for which he was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2015. Today, both live in Princeton, where they have con- ducted groundbreaking research on the rise in deaths from drug abuse, alcohol-related illnesses, and suicide in the United States. In “The Epidemic ož Despair” (page 92), Case and Deaton warn that other countries could succumb to this American disease.

02_TOC_Blues.indd 7 1/20/20 6:23 PM COME HOME, AMERICA?

ealth and power breed Three tough-minded pieces oer ambition, in countries as in dierent ways Washington could lower Wpeople. Nations on the rise its sights. Graham Allison suggests dream big, dare greatly, and see failure as dealing with the loss o‘ hegemony by a challenge to be overcome. The same accepting spheres o’ in“uence. Jennifer process works in reverse: nations on the Lind and Daryl Press favor limiting wane scale back their ambitions, cut losses, U.S. objectives to whatever the domes- and see failure as a portent to be heeded. tic and international markets will bear. Feeling down these days, the United And Stephen Krasner advises settling States is questioning the global role it for good enough governance in the once embraced. The empire that Wash- world. Lastly, Kathleen Hicks throws ington absent-mindedly acquired during cold water on hopes (or fears) o’ any “usher times now seems to cost more dramatic defense cuts, explaining what than it’s worth, and many want to shed it would actually take to reduce mili- the burden. What that might involve is tary spending and why it’s so much the subject o’ this issue’s lead package. easier said than done. Thomas Wright and Stephen Wert- Similar calls for retrenchment were heim kick o the debate with strong heard hal’ a century ago, when the statements o’ the central arguments on United States was at another low ebb in each side. In general, Wright notes, its global fortunes—facing declining American alliances, security guarantees, relative power, increasing isolationism, and international economic leadership a lost war in the periphery, a scandal- over recent generations have been a ridden president under siege. But just a great success. It makes sense to prune few years later, after some creative lesser commitments, but certainly not to strategy and diplomacy, the country had abandon Washington’s essential global extricated itsel¤ from Vietnam, re- role. On the contrary, says Wertheim: it shaped the global balance o’ power, is precisely the notion o’ American reestablished its position in Asia, and primacy that needs to go. Instead o’ become the dominant force in the policing the world with endless military Middle East. And although it took a interventions, Washington should while, the U.S. economy ultimately rose withdraw from much o’ the greater to the challenge posed by increased Middle East, rein in the “war on terror,” international competition and came out rely on diplomacy instead o¤ force, and stronger for it. Could such miracles concentrate its attention on trying to repeat themselves, or is it ¥nally time steer the global economy toward fairer for America to come home? and greener pastures. —Gideon Rose, Editor

Book 1.indb 8 1/17/20 9:26 PM COME HOME, AMERICA?

The United States is questioning the global role it once embraced.

The Folly o Retrenchment Reality Check Thomas Wright 10 Jennifer Lind and Daryl G. Press 41 EMMANUEL POLANCO The Price o Primacy Learning to Live With Despots Stephen Wertheim 19 Stephen D. Krasner 49

The New Spheres o In‹uence Getting to Less Graham Allison 30 Kathleen Hicks 56

Book 1.indb 9 1/17/20 9:26 PM U.S. military commitments. But i‘ Trump The Folly of wins reelection, that could change quickly, as he would feel more empow- Retrenchment ered and Washington would need to adjust to the reality that Americans had recon¥rmed their support for a more Why America Can’t inward-looking approach to world Withdraw From the World aairs. At a private speech in November, according to press reports, John Bolton, Thomas Wright Trump’s former national security adviser, even predicted that Trump could or seven decades, U.S. grand strat- pull out o’ ²³µ¬ in a second term. The COME HOME, AMERICA? egy was characterized by a bipar- receptiveness o’ the American people to F tisan consensus on the United Trump’s “America ¥rst” rhetoric has States’ global role. Although successive revealed that there is a market for a administrations had major disagreements foreign policy in which the United States over the details, Democrats and Repub- plays a smaller role in the world. licans alike backed a system o’ alliances, Amid the shifting political winds, a the forward positioning o¤ forces, a rela- growing chorus o’ voices in the policy tively open international economy, and, community, from the left and the right, is albeit imperfectly, the principles o’ calling for a strategy o’ global retrench- freedom, human rights, and democracy. ment, whereby the United States would Today, that consensus has broken down. withdraw its forces from around the world President Donald Trump has ques- and reduce its security commitments. tioned the utility o’ the United States’ Leading scholars and policy experts, such alliances and its forward military presence as Barry Posen and Ian Bremmer, have in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. called on the United States to signi¥- He has displayed little regard for a shared cantly reduce its role in Europe and community o¤ free societies and is drawn Asia, including withdrawing from ²³µ¬. to authoritarian leaders. So far, Trump’s In 2019, a new think tank, the Quincy views are not shared by the vast majority Institute for Responsible Statecraft, set o‘ leading Republicans. Almost all leading up shop, with funding from the conserva- Democrats, for their part, are committed tive Charles Koch Foundation and the to the United States’ traditional role in liberal philanthropist George Soros. Its Europe and Asia, i’ not in the Middle mission, in its own words, is to advocate East. Trump has struggled to convert his “a new foreign policy centered on diplo- worldview into policy, and in many matic engagement and military restraint.” respects, his administration has increased Global retrenchment is fast emerg- ing as the most coherent and ready- THOMAS WRIGHT is Director of the Center on the United States and Europe and a Senior made alternative to the United States’ Fellow in the Project on International Order and postwar strategy. Yet pursuing it would Strategy at the Brookings Institution. He is the be a grave mistake. By dissolving U.S. author of All Measures Short of War: The Contest for the Twenty-first Century and the alliances and ending the forward Future of American Power. presence o’ U.S. forces, this strategy

10 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 10 1/17/20 9:26 PM The Folly of Retrenchment

would destabilize the regional security interest. According to this perspective, orders in Europe and Asia. It would which is closely associated with the also increase the risk o’ nuclear prolif- realist school o’ international relations, eration, empower right-wing national- the United States is fundamentally ists in Europe, and aggravate the threat secure thanks to its geography, nuclear o’ major-power con“ict. arsenal, and military advantage. Yet the This is not to say that U.S. strategy country has nonetheless chosen to should never change. The United States pursue a strategy o’ “liberal hegemony,” has regularly increased and decreased using force in an unwise attempt to its presence around the world as threats perpetuate a liberal international order have risen and ebbed. Even though (one that, as evidenced by U.S. support Washington followed a strategy o’ for authoritarian regimes, is not so containment throughout the Cold War, liberal, after all). Washington, the that took various forms, which meant argument goes, has distracted itsel’ with the dierence between war and peace in costly overseas commitments and Vietnam, between an arms race and interventions that breed resentment and arms control, and between détente and encourage free-riding abroad. an all-out attempt to defeat the Soviets. Critics o’ the status quo argue that After the fall o’ the Soviet Union, the the United States must take two steps to United States changed course again, change its ways. The ¥rst is retrench- expanding its alliances to include many ment itself: the action o’ withdrawing countries that had previously been part from many o’ the United States’ existing o’ the Warsaw Pact. commitments, such as the ongoing Likewise, the United States will now military interventions in the Middle have to do less in some areas and more in East and one-sided alliances in Europe others as it shifts its focus from counter- and Asia. The second is restraint: the terrorism and reform in the Middle East strategy o’ de¥ning U.S. interests toward great-power competition with narrowly, refusing to launch wars unless China and Russia. But advocates o’ global vital interests are directly threatened and retrenchment are not so much proposing Congress authorizes such action, com- changes within a strategy as they are pelling other nations to take care o’ their calling for the wholesale replacement o’ own security, and relying more on one that has been in place since World diplomatic, economic, and political tools. War II. What the United States needs In practice, this approach means now is a careful pruning o’ its overseas ending U.S. military operations in commitments—not the indiscriminate Afghanistan, withdrawing U.S. forces abandonment o’ a strategy that has served from the Middle East, relying on an it well for decades. over-the-horizon force that can uphold U.S. national interests, and no longer RETRENCHMENT REDUX taking on responsibility for the security Support for retrenchment stems from o’ other states. As for alliances, Posen the view that the United States has has argued that the United States should overextended itsel’ in countries that abandon the mutual-defense provision have little bearing on its national o’ ²³µ¬, replace the organization “with

March/April 2020 11

Book 1.indb 11 1/17/20 9:26 PM Thomas Wright

a new, more limited security cooperation many o’ the U.S. soldiers serving abroad, agreement,” and reduce U.S. commit- “leaving small forces to protect commer- ments to Japan, South Korea, and cial sea lanes,” as part o’ an eort to Taiwan. On the question o’ China, “deprive presidents o’ the temptation to realists have split in recent years. Some, answer every problem with a violent such as the scholar John Mearsheimer, solution.” He argues that U.S. allies may contend that even as the United States believe that the United States has been retrenches elsewhere, in Asia, it must in“ating regional threats and thus contain the threat o’ China, whereas conclude that they do not need to increase others, such as Posen, argue that nations their conventional or nuclear forces. in the region are perfectly capable o’ Another progressive thinker, Peter doing the job themselves. Beinart, has argued that the United States Since Trump’s election, some progres- should accept Chinese and Russian sive foreign policy thinkers have joined spheres o’ in“uence, a strategy that would the retrenchment camp. They diverge include abandoning Taiwan. from other progressives, who advocate maintaining the United States’ current IS LESS REALLY MORE? role. Like the realists, progressive The realists and the progressives retrenchers hold the view that the United arguing for retrenchment dier in their States is safe because o’ its geography assumptions, logic, and intentions. The and the size o’ its military. Where these realists tend to be more pessimistic progressives break from the realists, about the prospects for peace and frame however, is on the question o’ what will their arguments in hardheaded terms, happen i’ the United States pulls back. whereas the progressives downplay the While the realists favoring retrench- consequences o’ American withdrawal ment have few illusions about the sort and make a moral case against the o’ regional competition that will break current grand strategy. But they share a out in the absence o’ U.S. dominance, common claim: that the United States the progressives expect that the world would be better o i’ it dramatically will become more peaceful and coopera- reduced its global military footprint and tive, because Washington can still man- security commitments. age tensions through diplomatic, eco- This is a false promise, for a number nomic, and political tools. The immediate o’ reasons. First, retrenchment would focus o’ the progressives is the so-called worsen regional security competition in forever wars—U.S. military involvement Europe and Asia. The realists recognize in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and the that the U.S. military presence in broader war on terrorism—as well as the Europe and Asia does dampen security defense budget and overseas bases. competition, but they claim that it does Although the progressives have a less so at too high a price—and one that, at developed vision o‘ how to implement any rate, should be paid by U.S. allies in retrenchment than the realists, they do the regions themselves. Although pulling provide some guideposts. Stephen back would invite regional security Wertheim, a co-founder o’ the Quincy competition, realist retrenchers admit, Institute, has called for bringing home the United States could be safer in a

12 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 12 1/17/20 9:26 PM The Folly of Retrenchment

Hearts and minds: U.S. soldiers searching farmers in Afghanistan, December 2009

more dangerous world because regional U.S. pullback from those places is more rivals would check one another. This is likely to embolden the regional powers. a perilous gambit, however, because Since 2008, Russia has invaded two o‡ its regional con•icts often end up implicat- neighbors that are not members o‡ ˆ‰Š‹, ing U.S. interests. They might thus end and i‡ the Baltic states were no longer up drawing the United States back in protected by a U.S. security guarantee, it after it has left—resulting in a much is conceivable that Russia would test the more dangerous venture than heading boundaries with gray-zone warfare. In o— the con•ict in the ˜rst place by East Asia, a U.S. withdrawal would force staying. Realist retrenchment reveals a Japan to increase its defense capabilities hubris that the United States can and change its constitution to enable it to control consequences and prevent crises compete with China on its own, straining from erupting into war. relations with South Korea. The progressives’ view o‡ regional The second problem with retrench- security is similarly •awed. These ment involves nuclear proliferation. I‡ retrenchers reject the idea that regional the United States pulled out o‡ ˆ‰Š‹ or

FRANCO security competition will intensify i‡ the ended its alliance with Japan, as many United States leaves. In fact, they argue, realist advocates o‡ retrenchment

PAGETTI U.S. alliances often promote competition, recommend, some o‡ its allies, no longer as in the Middle East, where U.S. support protected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, for Saudi Arabia and the United Arab would be tempted to acquire nuclear / VII Emirates has emboldened those countries weapons o‡ their own. Unlike the progres-

/ REDUX in their cold war with Iran. But this logic sives for retrenchment, the realists are does not apply to Europe or Asia, where comfortable with that result, since they U.S. allies have behaved responsibly. A see deterrence as a stabilizing force.

March/April 2020 13

04_Wright_proof2_Blues.indd 13 1/20/20 7:12 PM Thomas Wright

Most Americans are not so sanguine, Moreover, the United States cannot and rightly so. There are good reasons simply grant other major powers a to worry about nuclear proliferation: sphere o’ in“uence—the countries that nuclear materials could end up in the would fall into those realms have hands o’ terrorists, states with less experi- agency, too. I’ the United States ceded ence might be more prone to nuclear Taiwan to China, for example, the accidents, and nuclear powers in close Taiwanese people could say no. The proximity have shorter response times and current U.S. policy toward the country thus con“icts among them have a greater is working and may be sustainable. chance o’ spiraling into escalation. Withdrawing support from Taiwan Third, retrenchment would heighten against its will would plunge cross-strait nationalism and xenophobia. In Europe, relations into chaos. The entire idea o’ a U.S. withdrawal would send the letting regional powers have their own message that every country must fend spheres o’ in“uence has an imperial air for itself. It would therefore empower that is at odds with modern principles o’ the far-right groups already making this sovereignty and international law. claim—such as the Alternative for A ¥fth problem with retrenchment is Germany, the League in Italy, and the that it lacks domestic support. The Amer- National Front in France—while ican people may favor greater burden undermining the centrist democratic sharing, but there is no evidence that they leaders there who told their populations are onboard with a withdrawal from that they could rely on the United Europe and Asia. As a survey conducted States and ²³µ¬. As a result, Washington in 2019 by the Chicago Council on Global would lose leverage over the domestic Aairs found, seven out o’ ten Americans politics o’ individual allies, particularly believe that maintaining military superi- younger and more fragile democracies ority makes the United States safer, and such as Poland. And since these national- almost three-quarters think that alliances ist populist groups are almost always contribute to U.S. security. A 2019 protectionist, retrenchment would Eurasia Group Foundation poll found damage U.S. economic interests, as well. that over 60 percent o’ Americans want Even more alarming, many o’ the to maintain or increase defense spending. right-wing nationalists that retrenchment As it became apparent that China and would empower have called for greater Russia would bene¥t from this shift accommodation o’ China and Russia. toward retrenchment, and as the United A fourth problem concerns regional States’ democratic allies objected to its stability after global retrenchment. The withdrawal, the domestic political most likely end state is a spheres-of- backlash would grow. One result could in“uence system, whereby China and be a prolonged foreign policy debate Russia dominate their neighbors, but such that would cause the United States to an order is inherently unstable. The oscillate between retrenchment and lines o’ demarcation for such spheres reengagement, creating uncertainty about tend to be unclear, and there is no its commitments and thus raising the guarantee that China and Russia will not risk o’ miscalculation by Washington, seek to move them outward over time. its allies, or its rivals.

14 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 14 1/17/20 9:27 PM Thomas Wright

Realist and progressive retrenchers like intelligence. But its ambitions are not to argue that the architects o’ the United limited to its own territory: Beijing has States’ postwar foreign policy naively exported its tactics and technology sought to remake the world in its image. abroad in an attempt to undermine But the real revisionists are those who liberalism. It has cracked down on argue for retrenchment, a geopolitical foreign nongovernmental organizations experiment o’ unprecedented scale in with a presence in China, pressured modern history. I’ this camp were to foreign corporations to endorse its have its way, Europe and Asia—two behavior, and grown more vocal within stable, peaceful, and prosperous regions the º² Human Rights Council in an that form the two main pillars o’ the eort to weaken international norms. U.S.-led order—would be plunged into China has also attempted to illicitly an era o’ uncertainty. in“uence Western democracies through operations such as illegally funneling THE CHINA CHALLENGE money into Australian politics to Such are the inherent “aws o’ retrench- support politicians favorable to China. ment, downsides that would apply at These actions are seen as threatening any time in the post–Cold War era. But by the United States. the strategy is particularly poorly suited The competition o’ systems between for the current moment, when the the United States and China increasingly United States ¥nds itsel’ in a systemic involves all parts o’ society—business, competition with China, in which each the media, sports, technology, education, side threatens the other not just be- politics, diplomacy, intelligence, the cause o’ what they do but also because military. This competition does not o’ what they are. generally involve the use o¤ force, but To China and other autocracies, the the geopolitical balance o’ power is a United States’ democratic system is vital component. It is the United States’ inherently threatening. The free press strength and the deterrence it produces promises to reveal vital secrets about that prevents this competition from the Chinese regime simply because it spilling over into the military domain. can, with American journalists’ 2012 The U.S. alliance system also provides a reports about elite corruption in China basis for helping other states preserve and Hong Kong and their 2019 revela- and strengthen their democratic systems tions about the repression o’ China’s in the shadow o’ Chinese in“uence. But Uighurs serving as Exhibits A and B. advocates o’ retrenchment aim to Social media, businesses, universities, weaken both the U.S. military and U.S. nongovernmental organizations, and alliances. It is vitally important that the Congress have all played a role in United States manage this competition undermining the regime in Beijing and o’ systems responsibly to protect U.S. sowing the seeds o’ democracy. interests and to prevent the rivalry from To combat these threats, Beijing is spiraling out o’ control. increasingly relying on repression, often In a moment o’ such ideological facilitated by innovations such as facial competition, global retrenchment would recognition technology and arti¥cial eectively concede victory to China

16 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 16 1/17/20 9:27 PM The Folly of Retrenchment

and other authoritarian states. It would peace deal were somehow achieved, the make it impossible to maintain a political Taliban are unlikely to abide by it. alliance with the democratic world— The United States cannot aord most notably, with France, Germany, and such an open-ended and deadly military the United Kingdom in Europe and with con“ict, one in which the only identi¥- Australia, Japan, and South Korea in able national interests are to avoid losing Asia. In the absence o’ U.S. support, and to hold on to the gains in human these countries could never hold the line rights, as precious as those are. The against China. Governments would begin United States has achieved its funda- to give Beijing the bene¥t o’ the doubt mental objective o’ rooting out al Qaeda, on everything from human rights to 5G and the threat from Islamist terrorism wireless technology. As the U.S. defense now arises more from other places, such budget plummeted, the United States as Iraq, Syria, and the Sahel. To mitigate would fall behind in new technologies, the human cost o’ withdrawal, the giving China an additional edge. United States should use diplomatic and economic tools to maintain gover- PICK AND CHOOSE nance standards and increase its intake For all the “aws with retrenchment, it o’ Afghan refugees. It is time to bring would be wrong for the United States to the longest-running American war to an pretend that the world has not changed, end. to deny that the unipolar moment is over In Iraq and Syria, U.S. forces cannot and that great-power competition has simply leave, because the resurgence o’ replaced counterterrorism as the central the Islamic State (or °´°´) there remains objective o’ U.S. foreign policy. In a real danger. The Obama administra- acknowledging the new circumstances it tion’s withdrawal o¤ forces from Iraq and faces, the United States can employ its diplomatic neglect o¤ Baghdad retrenchment selectively, carefully contributed to the rise o’ °´°´, and the abandoning some o’ its post–Cold War Trump administration seems intent on and post-9/11 commitments. repeating that error. With its indiscrimi- For one thing, the United States nate attacks against civilians and its should end its involvement in the war global recruitment, °´°´ poses a direct in Afghanistan. There are now some threat to the United States, and Ameri- 13,000 U.S. troops in the country, and cans overwhelmingly support military 2019 was the deadliest year for them since operations to defeat it. But Washington 2014. The initial objective in Afghanistan can carry out this mission while limiting was to root out al Qaeda after 9/11, but its military involvement in the Middle in subsequent years, the mission ex- East. It should narrow the focus o’ its panded to include preventing Afghani- military operations in the region to stan from destabilizing Pakistan and counterterrorism and the protection o’ strengthening the Afghan government other U.S. national interests, such as so it could stand up for itsel’ and preventing genocide, nuclear prolifera- negotiate a peace agreement with the tion, the use o’ chemical or biological Taliban. But the Afghan government is weapons, and interruptions in the oil likely to remain weak, and even i’ a supply. The United States should not

March/April 2020 17

Book 1.indb 17 1/17/20 9:27 PM Thomas Wright

embark on military interventions to bring cooperating based on shared values. With about a broader transformation o’ Saudi Arabia, for example, this may governance in the Middle East, whether mean partnering with the country on through democratizing Iraq or eecting counterterrorism and preventing regime change in Iran. Iranian aggression but refusing to be a As part o’ selective retrenchment, the party to its bloody intervention in United States should also impose new Yemen. And Washington should avoid limits and conditions on its alliances with lending political legitimacy to the many authoritarian states. The emerg- regime by appealing to shared values ing competition with China’s authoritar- and downplaying dierences. ian model has an unavoidable ideological As the United States debates the element. Those who want to defend future o’ its global role, it must be democratic, open, and free systems will clear-eyed about what unilateral with- be drawn to the United States, whereas drawal would really mean. Part o’ the those who do not will be drawn to folly o’ global retrenchers comes from an China. This will put signi¥cant pressure inability to dierentiate the United on nondemocratic American allies, such States’ involvement in the Middle East as Turkey and the Gul’ Arab states, to from its involvement in Europe and decide which side to back in diplomatic Asia. Critics are right to be frustrated and geopolitical crises. about U.S. policy in the Middle East. The United States regularly allied After decades o’ quixotic attempts to itsel’ with autocracies during the Cold transform the region, Washington ¥nds War and will need to do so again, but itsel‘ bogged down there, with vast only when it is necessary to protect vital commitments but no clear strategy and U.S. interests. To mount an eective few reliable partners. But using the campaign against China in Southeast Middle East as a justi¥cation for unilat- Asia, for example, Washington may eral global withdrawal ignores the tangible need to develop closer relations with bene¥ts o’ U.S. engagement in Europe Vietnam, a one-party state. But there will and Asia, where there is a clear purpose, also be times when allying with an strong partners, and shared interests. authoritarian state has no clear bene¥t Now is not the time for a revolution apart from merely racking up the score. in U.S. strategy. The United States In those instances, the United States should continue to play a leading role should avoid repeating one o’ the worst as a security provider in global aairs. mistakes o’ the Cold War: competing But it can and should be more selective for in“uence in states that do not really as it safeguards its interests—an approach matter. For example, i¤ Hungary that would have the added bene¥t o’ continues to drift away from democracy, addressing the concerns that have the United States must reassess its attracted some people to retrenchment alliance with Budapest. When there is a in the ¥rst place. The United States clear rationale for partnering with a must be disciplined enough to under- distasteful regime, the United States stand the distinction between the should make the alliance transactional places and things that really matter and and avoid pretending that they are those that do not.∂

18 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 18 1/17/20 9:27 PM mistaken priorities. At worst, they COME HOME, AMERICA? The Price of turned the United States into a destruc- tive actor in the world. Rather than Primacy practice and cultivate peace, Washington pursued armed domination and launched futile wars in Afghanistan in 2001, in Why America Shouldn’t Iraq in 2003, and in Libya in 2011. These Dominate the World actions created more enemies than they defeated. They killed hundreds o’ Stephen Wertheim thousands o’ civilians and overextended a generation o’ U.S. service members. They he collapse o’ the Soviet Union damaged laws and institutions that stabi- revealed the bankruptcy o’ lize the world and the United States. Tinternational communism. In They made the American people less safe. time, the absence o’ a Cold War foe also As the United States in“ated military exposed the bankruptcy o‘ Washing- threats and then poured resources into ton’s global ambitions. Freed from major countering them, it also failed to provide challengers, the United States had an for the global common good. Although it unprecedented chance to shape interna- has led some laudable eorts to address tional politics according to its wishes. It the ³°½´ pandemic and climate change, could have chosen to live in harmony the overall record is grim. Since 1990, the with the world, pulling back its armed United States, despite having only four forces and deploying them only for vital percent o’ the global population, has purposes. It could have helped build a emitted about 20 percent o’ the world’s world o’ peace, strengthening the laws total carbon dioxide, the main contributor and institutions that constrain war and to climate change. Although China is that most other states welcome. From now the world’s top emitter, the United this foundation o’ security and goodwill, States’ emissions per capita remain more the United States could have exercised than twice as high as China’s. American leadership on the already visible challenges leaders have alternated between denying ahead, including climate change and the the problem and taking insu¾cient concentration o’ ungoverned wealth. steps to solve it. It remains unclear Instead, Washington did the opposite. whether humanity can prevent the overall It adopted a grand strategy that gave pride global temperature from rising to be- o’ place to military threats and methods, tween 1.5 and 2.0 degrees Celsius over and it constructed a form o’ global inte- preindustrial levels; i’ not, the damage gration that served the immediate inter- may prove irreversible, and ¥res, droughts, ests o’ a few but imperiled the long-term and “oods may proliferate. interests o’ the many. At best, these were Meanwhile, the economic growth that has contributed to climate change has STEPHEN WERTHEIM is Deputy Director of not bene¥ted enough people. True, Research and Policy at the Quincy Institute for extreme poverty has plummeted globally Responsible Statecraft and a Research Scholar at the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and since the early 1990s. This spectacular Peace Studies at Columbia University. achievement is substantially the result o’

March/April 2020 19

Book 1.indb 19 1/17/20 9:27 PM Stephen Wertheim

growth in China and India, on terms were always more hegemonic than accepted but hardly dened by the United liberal. Despite diverging over whether States. In the same period, however, the and how to promote liberalism, U.S. share o income accruing to the wealthi- policymakers have for nearly three est one percent o the world’s population decades converged around the premise has steadily climbed, whereas that o the that Pentagon planners set forth in bottom 50 percent has stagnated. The rest 1992: the United States should main- o the world, including the vast majority tain a military superiority so over- o Americans, has actually lost ground. whelming that it would dissuade allies Wealth is now concentrated to the point and rivals alike from challenging that an estimated 11.5 percent o global Washington’s authority. That superior- ‰Š lies o‹shore, untaxed and unaccount- ity quickly became an end unto itself. able. The populist revolts o the past few By seeking dominance instead o years were a predictable result. And merely defense, the strategy o primacy American leaders bear direct responsibility plunged the United States into a down- for these outcomes, having spearheaded ward a spiral: American actions generated an economic order that puts capital rst. antagonists and enemies, who in turn U.S. President Donald Trump often made primacy more dangerous to pursue. portrays himsel as breaking with the For most o the 1990s, the costs o basic pattern o recent American foreign this strategy remained somewhat hidden. policy. Many o• his detractors also see With Russia ˜attened and China poor, him that way. In truth, Trump has carried the United States could simultaneously forward and even intensied the post– reduce its defense spending and expand Cold War agenda o• his predecessors: ¤, launch military interventions in spare no expense for military hegemony, the former Yugoslavia and for the rst and nd little to spare for the earth’s time station tens o thousands o troops climate or the well-being o anyone who in the Middle East. Yet by the end o the is not wealthy. Trump stands out chie˜y decade, U.S. dominance had begun to because he describes this agenda as generate blowback. Osama bin Laden national aggrandizement rather than and his al Qaeda terrorist group de- farsighted international leadership. In clared war on the United States in 1996, this regard, he has a point. citing the U.S. military’s presence in Washington’s post–Cold War strategy Saudi Arabia as their top grievance; two has failed. The United States should years later, al Qaeda bombed the U.S. abandon the quest for armed primacy in embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, favor o protecting the planet and creat- killing 224 people. U.S. policymakers, ing more opportunity for more people. It for their part, were already exaggerat- needs a grand strategy for the many. ing the threat posed by weak “rogue states” and gearing up for ambitious military THE WAR MACHINE interventions to promote democracy Both champions and critics o U.S. and human rights. These pathologies grand strategy after the Cold War have shaped Washington’s overly militarized christened the project “liberal hegemony.” reaction to the 9/11 attacks, as the But American objectives and methods United States entered into successive

20   

05_Wertheim_pp3_Blues.indd 20 1/20/20 4:24 PM The Price of Primacy

Fuel to the re: American troops in Kuwait, February 2010

con icts in which its capabilities and But clinging to the dream o never-ending JOÃO interests did not exceed those o€ local primacy will ensure trouble, mandating

SILVA actors. The result was endless war. the containment o rivals and provoking Now, as the United States struggles to insecurity and aggression in return. / THE extricate itsel„ from the Middle East, China has yet to undertake a costly bid

NEW China is growing into an economic and for military dominance in East Asia, let political powerhouse and Russia is assert- alone the world, but U.S. actions could YORK ing itsel as a spoiler. That outcome is push Beijing in that direction.

TIMES exactly what primacy was supposed to prevent. The rise o a near-peer competi- BEARING THE COSTS

/ REDUX tor does not necessarily pose a grave Primacy has not merely failed to provide danger to the United States, whose security as it is narrowly dened. It has nuclear deterrent secures it from attack. also damaged the environment, undercut

March/April 2020 21

05_Wertheim_pp3_Blues.indd 21 1/20/20 7:13 PM Stephen Wertheim

the economic interests o’ most Ameri- oil) “ow. But doing so does not require cans, and destabilized democracy. The globe-spanning dominance; it requires U.S. military consumes more oil and eective local partners to handle day-to- produces more greenhouse gases than any day tasks, with a light U.S. air and naval other institution on earth, according to presence that can be reinforced i’ and Brown University’s Costs o‘ War Project. when those partners cannot overcome a In 2017, the U.S. military’s emissions genuine challenge to maritime security. exceeded those o’ entire industrialized Whatever economic bene¥ts primacy may countries, such as Denmark and Sweden. indirectly yield, what is certain is that Nor does primacy oer a net eco- year after year, the United States spends nomic bene¥t. From the 1940s through hal’ o’ its federal discretionary budget to the 1960s, U.S. military preponderance fund a military that is costlier than the lubricated international capitalism by next seven largest armed forces combined. containing communism and facilitating Military spending is one o’ the least the expansion o’ the dollar, to which all e¾cient ways to create jobs, ranking other currencies were pegged. But after behind tax cuts and spending on education, the collapse o’ the Bretton Woods health care, infrastructure, and clean monetary system and then o’ the Soviet energy. The estimated $6.4 trillion Union, currencies were “oated, and poured into the “war on terror” so far global markets were integrated. As a could have rebuilt communities across the result, U.S. military strength became United States that were devastated by largely detached from the international the ¥nancial crisis and the recession that economic order. Today, the status o’ the followed. Now, many members o’ U.S. dollar as a reserve currency, which those communities resent the political allows Americans to borrow cheaply, elites who allowed them to crumble. rests largely on path dependence, the Primacy has also corroded the U.S. currency’s stability, and the dearth o’ political system, which has in turn attractive alternatives—factors that no produced irresponsible leaders to wield longer rely on the global projection o’ primacy’s power. During the Cold War, U.S. force that helped usher them in the need to counter a threatening originally. And the quest for primacy is adversary sometimes worked to unify now leading the United States to erode its disparate political factions and social own ¥nancial position by maintaining groups in the United States. The unnecessary hostilities with states such as post–Cold War quest for primacy oers Iran, imposing crippling sanctions on a perverse contrast. The United States them and forcing third parties who use has acquired a kaleidoscope o¤ foreign the dollar to follow suit. These actions enemies, whom U.S. o¾cials and the have compelled European states to seek mass media have encouraged the Ameri- alternatives to the dollar and have can public to fear and punish. Small driven down the dollar’s share in global wonder that in the second decade o’ the foreign exchange reserves. war on terror, a demagogue was able to The U.S. military contributes to turn hatred o¤ foreigners into a premise global commerce by protecting the that propelled him to the presidency, sea-lanes through which goods (including dividing the country further still.

22 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 22 1/17/20 9:27 PM Your dream job is a global adventure away.

Global Leadership for the #1 master’s Fourth Industrial Revolution. in management Thunderbird School Thunderbird’s top-ranked Masters of Global Management of Global Management prepares leaders with the future-ready skills and hands-on – Times Higher Education and experience that global organizations demand in this era of rapid The Wall Street Journal, 2019 technological transformation. Choose from 16 concentrations, including Global Business, Global Digital Transformation, #1 in the U.S. Sustainability Solutions, Integrated Healthcare, and more. Or, customize your own path to the top. for innovation ASU ahead of Stanford and MIT – U.S. News & World Report, Start today at thunderbird.asu.edu/mgm 5 years, 2016–2020

19-ASU-1707 MGM Foreign Affairs R01.indd 1 10/28/19 12:49 PM Stephen Wertheim

HOW TO FIX GLOBALIZATION $81 billion per year to its military to Americans and their leaders must act ensure the abundant supply o’ cheap oil now to end primacy’s downward spiral. around the globe, according to Securing This will not require overturning the America’s Future Energy, a clean energy familiar de¥nitions o¤ fundamental U.S. advocacy group. The United States interests: security for the nation and its should work to reduce the world’s reliance people, prosperity for all, and the on fossil fuels rather than underwrite it. preservation o’ the constitutional repub- The world still has a chance to avert lic. But those interests must be related the most severe climate impacts. To set to the domestic and international reali- the stage, the United States should use ties o’ 2020, rather than to those o’ 1947. its market power and its international The United States should seek to in“uence. At home, it should vastly transform globalization into a governable increase investment in the Department and sustainable force, one that protects o¤ Energy’s research-and-development the environment, spreads wealth equita- agency, levy taxes on producers and bly, and promotes peace. Such an importers o’ carbon-emitting fuels, and agenda would bring Americans together expand credits for electric vehicles and and bring their country into a healthy other renewables. At the same time, the alignment with the rest o’ the world. United States should adopt a range o’ Climate change aects everyone, and two green regulatory standards on which to o’ the very few trends common to both condition foreign access to its large U.S. political parties are mounting market, along the lines o’ the tailpipe support for economic progressivism and emissions requirements that the a profound wariness o’ military inter- Obama administration imposed on vention. A strategy to transform global- imported automobiles. ization would also transcend the current Globally, the United States should impasse between “America ¥rst” nation- seek much more far-reaching results alism and nostalgia for the U.S.-led than the voluntary national emissions “liberal international order.” The former standards established by the Paris is implacably hostile to the outside world climate accord in 2015. After rejoining (and hurts the United States by de¥ning that agreement, Washington should it in opposition to others rather than in ratify the Kigali Amendment to the terms o’ itsel’ and its interests). The Montreal Protocol, which calls for latter submerges U.S. interests in a vastly limiting the use o‘ hydro“uoro- vague abstraction (and hurts the world carbons, and should insist that multilat- by subordinating everyone to U.S. eral development agencies, such as the leadership). A better approach would International Monetary Fund and the be to focus on de¥nable interests and World Bank, support only those proj- major threats that genuinely require ects that would lead to fewer emissions. action across borders. The United States should also rally First among these is climate change. the industrialized world to provide Nothing better encapsulates the developing countries with technology backwardness o’ U.S. priorities than and ¥nancing to bypass fossil fuels. the fact that Washington directs at least Coercion will be less eective, and less

24 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 24 1/17/20 9:27 PM The Price of Primacy

just, than provision. Washington can HOW TO END ENDLESS WARSAND jump-start this initiative by investing at NOT START NEW ONES least $200 billion in the º² Green It will not su¾ce, however, to simply Climate Fund and opening discussions lay environmentalist and social demo- for debt relie’ with countries in the cratic initiatives on top o’ U.S. military global South. primacy, in pursuit o’ which the United A sticking point would be China, which States has formally obligated itsel’ to spews by far the most carbon dioxide o’ defend approximately one-third o’ the any country—over a quarter o’ the global world’s countries (and informally total—but also leads the world in mass- dozens more) and to maintain an producing low-carbon energy technolo- archipelago o’ more than 800 foreign gies. The highest priority in U.S. relations bases. The United States will also have with China should be to green Chinese to demilitarize its foreign policy. behavior, an objective that would preclude The essential ¥rst step would be to a policy o’ Cold War–style containment. end the era o’ costly and counterpro- Washington should encourage Beijing to ductive warfare that began after the keep innovating renewable technologies, 9/11 attacks. The United States should in part by stepping up U.S. research and remove its air and ground forces from development, and should push China to Afghanistan within 12 to 18 months implement those technologies in its and even sooner from Iraq and Syria. It domestic energy production and inter- should bring those troops home rather national development practices. than reposition them elsewhere in the A new U.S. strategy would not just region. Washington should o’ course try green the global economy; it would also to broker the best possible settlements democratize it. As Joseph Stiglitz, Todd to the con“icts in those places, and it Tucker, and Gabriel Zucman recently should continue to provide assistance to argued in these pages, the next U.S. the Afghan and Iraqi governments after president should launch a campaign to turning over the appropriate facilities combat global tax evasion by backing a and equipment to them. But the United global registry to reveal the true owners States should withdraw from these o’ all assets and by preventing corpora- con“ict zones even in the absence o’ tions from shifting money to subsidiaries credible agreements to end the ¥ghting. in low-tax jurisdictions. Those moves Washington lacks the leverage to alone would increase U.S. tax revenue demand what it could not impose by approximately 15 percent. Still more through two decades o’ warfare. revenue would come from establishing Although withdrawals may set back a global minimum tax to end race-to- U.S. allies and partners in the short the-bottom tax havens. Washington run, the region must ¥nd its own could use that revenue to ensure that U.S. balance o’ power in order to achieve workers bene¥t from the transition away peace and stability over time. from fossil fuels. In this way, environ- Indeed, no strategic logic warrants mental protection, economic justice, and the continuation o’ the war on terror, the restoration o’ trust in government which perpetuates itsel‘ by producing would proceed in lockstep. new enemies. That is why a swift and

March/April 2020 25

Book 1.indb 25 1/17/20 9:27 PM Stephen Wertheim

sweeping termination would be best. I’ external pressure; instead, the United signi¥cant attacks occur, the United States should seek to normalize rela- States should respond militarily but tions with North Korea and build peace with clear restrictions regarding whom, on the peninsula. Doing so would where, and for how long it can ¥ght. Its require a step-by-step process in which leaders should make a political virtue the United States, acting with its out o’ restraint, declaring that the partners, would lift sanctions and oer United States will defeat terrorists in development assistance in return for part by avoiding the kinds o’ indiscrim- North Korea’s accepting arms control inate attacks that militants exploit to measures, including capping its nuclear swell their coers and attract new recruits. arsenal, ceasing missile tests and other Accordingly, the next president should belligerent actions, and permitting º² drastically reduce so-called targeted inspections. This course oers the best killing operations. “Signature strikes,” way to address the nuclear threat: it in which drones take aim at unidenti¥ed would make North Korea’s intentions persons, should cease immediately less antagonistic and limit its capabilities because they hit unworthy targets, kill to the extent feasible. It would also be innocent civilians, and cause blowback. unlikely to cause proliferation by Japan Any remaining use o’ drone strikes should and South Korea, which have now lived be subject to a more literal conception o’ with North Korea’s nuclear capability “imminent threat” than the elastic for 14 years. Although some may be de¥nition applied by the Obama admin- tempted to condition nuclear diplomacy istration and further degraded by Trump. on human rights improvements in Congress, for its part, should replace the North Korea, the regime’s abuses are 2001 Authorization for Use o¤ Military likely to diminish signi¥cantly only i’ it Force, which was passed after 9/11, with a no longer perceives itsel’ to be besieged. far narrower version that allows the Iran is another enemy worth losing. president to use force against speci¥c The United States should end its or ganizations, in speci¥c countries, and grudge match with the Islamic Repub- for a speci¥c period and prohibits lethal lic by lifting sanctions and coming back operations against all others. Congress into compliance with the Joint Com- can also dissuade the president from prehensive Plan o’ Action, the nuclear launching unlawful strikes by empowering deal that Washington and other major U.S. federal courts to review after-the- powers negotiated with Tehran. That fact lawsuits brought on behal’ o’ victims. agreement proved not only that diplo- Beyond dismantling the war on terror, macy with Iran is possible but also that the United States should also shed it is the most eective method for unnecessary nemeses, especially weak addressing bilateral tensions. A thirst states that would not threaten the for vengeance, which seems to be United States except for its belligerent driving U.S. policy toward Iran under posture toward them. Take North Trump, is not a legitimate U.S. inter- Korea. Washington should abandon the est. In fact, no U.S. interest—not even fantasy that the regime o¤ Kim Jong Un the goal o’ preventing Iran from will fully denuclearize as a result o’ developing nuclear weapons—would

26 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 26 1/17/20 9:27 PM warrant war with Iran given that diplomacy with Tehran has worked. In the rest o the region, Washington should be guided by the maxim “no permanent friends, no permanent Shaping enemies.” It should downgrade relations with partners such as Saudi Arabia and tomorrow’s make clear that they are responsible for defending themselves. The United leaders, today. States should close nearly all its mili-

tary bases in the region. Retaining one

or two for air and naval forces, perhaps P

A

R

D

in Bahrain and Qatar, would give E

E

S

C

Washington what it needs: the ability to H

O O

ensure access to the maritime commons L

S T

should a serious threat arise that re- U

D

E N

gional actors cannot handle themselves. T

S

W

More broadly, the United States should I T

H

cease acting as a partisan in disputes F O

R M such as Yemen’s civil war and the Israeli- E R P R Palestinian con†ict; it would do more E S ID E N to help resolve those ˆghts by relying T O F on diplomacy without taking sides. G HA NA , JO HN D A. RAMANI MAHAM HOW TO DEAL WITH CHINA AND RUSSIA Earn a In the past three years, the Trump administration and a †otilla o defense specialization in analysts have proposed a strategy o DIPLOMACY “great-power competition,” which would with an MA in generally intensify geopolitical contes- tation in the service o maximizing International A airs. Washington’s military power. Precisely the opposite is needed. Competition among great powers is inevitable, but it should be a byproduct o underlying interests and is hardly to be desired in

its own right. As the United States SCHOOL PARDEE attempts to elicit cooperation from bu.edu/PardeeSchool @BUPardeeSchool China and Russia on combating climate change and governing global ˆnance, it should avoid costly military rivalries Frederick S. Pardee and ruinous large-scale wars. Washing- School of Global Studies ton should therefore signiˆcantly

March/April 2020 27

FA 27_rev.indd 1 1/20/20 9:45 AM Book 1.indb 27 1/17/20 9:27 PM Stephen Wertheim

reduce its forward-deployed military a peaceful status quo, deterring a Chinese presence in Asia and Europe alike, invasion while dissuading Taiwan from while retaining the ability to intervene thinking it could back its independence i’ either power truly threatens to aspirations with U.S. forces. become a hostile hegemon in its region. I’ it took this approach, the United Despite the rising alarm in Washing- States would still have ample time to ton, China is not poised to dominate mobilize and deploy its forces i’ China East Asia by force. Having grown in were to turn bellicose. For now, Wash- rough proportion to China’s economy, ington must make a serious bid to the People’s Liberation Army remains secure Beijing’s cooperation on core focused on local issues: defending the objectives, especially climate change. To Chinese mainland, winning disputes attempt to contain China would be a over small border areas and islands, and grave mistake, guaranteeing Chinese prevailing in what China sees as its enmity and directing resources into unresolved civil war with the govern- military escalation instead o’ environ- ment in Taiwan. A new administration mental cooperation. The United States should abandon its predecessors’ should clearly prioritize the present overreactions to Chinese military danger o’ an uninhabitable planet expansion. In order to prevent a serious above the speculative and manageable clash in the South China Sea, where prospect o’ an aggressive peer. Beijing’s interests outstrip those o’ U.S. relations with Russia also require Washington, the United States should a redesign. Russia, with an economy extricate itsel¤ from maritime jurisdic- smaller than that o¤ Italy, is not a cred- tional disputes and cease freedom-of- ible aspirant to hegemony in Europe and navigation operations and surveillance need not pose a security threat to the near disputed islands. It is not worth United States. The fact that, according antagonizing China over such issues. to a Gallup poll conducted last year, a The possibility that China might majority o’ Americans consider Russia to become more belligerent i’ it continues be a “critical threat” testi¥es to decades to grow stronger is a legitimate concern. o’ policy failure, including U.S. provoca- To account for this possibility without tions (²³µ¬ expansion and law-breaking taking actions that make it more likely, American military interventions) and Washington should strengthen the Russian hostility (culminating in its U.S. defenses o’ U.S. allies in Asia in ways election meddling in 2016). The next that do not provoke China. The United U.S. president should end this cycle by States can provide its allies with so- pursuing a policy that respects Russia’s called anti-access/area-denial capabili- consistent view o’ its vital interests: ties, such as improved surveillance and preserving its regime, avoiding hostile missile systems, which would severely governments in its “near abroad,” and impede any Chinese attack without participating in core European security signaling an oensive posture. It could and diplomatic discussions. then retract its oensive weaponry. In Because those objectives align with Taiwan, such an approach would ful¥ll the U.S. interests, the United States should long-standing U.S. objective o’ preserving assuage Russian concerns by ending

28 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 28 1/17/20 9:27 PM The Price of Primacy

²³µ¬ expansion and rejecting Ukraine’s THE CHOICE existing bid for membership in the The time has come to bid good riddance alliance. It should then, in consultation to the unipolar moment. Over three with its allies, begin a ten-year draw- decades, the United States has extended down o’ U.S. forces stationed in Europe. its military deployments and commit- Most o’ those troops should return to ments to the breaking point. Its poor stew- the United States, although some air ardship o’ globalization has left ordinary and naval forces could remain with the Americans and the earth’s climate in a agreement o’ their hosts. In addition, the similar place. To correct its course, the United States should encourage Russia United States should make the conscious and Ukraine to reach a deal whereby choice to pull back militarily—the Russia would stop backing separatists in better to build a world that is habitable, eastern Ukraine and Ukraine and the governable, and prosperous. United States would recognize Crimea The United States must use its power as part o¤ Russia. Such a settlement and in“uence to take on challenges that would allow the United States to lift bombs and bullets cannot ¥x. This is a task many o’ its sanctions on Russia and lay for grand strategy in its broadest sense. the foundation for decent relations. More than that, it is a task for politics. A These measures, in addition to grand strategy for the many must be being rooted in U.S. interests, would demanded by the many so that their serve to reassure Russia on security leaders will pursue the common good.∂ issues as the two powers grapple over climate change and ¥nancial corrup- tion. Russia relies on oil and gas revenue, and some Russians believe that their country, or the parts o’ it that are thawing, will bene¥t commercially from warming temperatures. Russia is also a global leader in money launder- ing and tax evasion. No U.S. strategy is going to wean Russia o petrodollars or kleptocracy. By minimizing points o’ friction, however, Washington would make it more likely that Moscow would temper its resistance to international campaigns on the climate and ¥nance. Doing so may even ultimately open the door to mutually bene¥cial exchanges through scienti¥c research and the transfer o’ green technologies. At a minimum, U.S. military retrenchment would help prevent Russia from be- coming desperate and aggressive as a result o’ international pressure.

March/April 2020 29

Book 1.indb 29 1/17/20 9:27 PM American sphere. Spheres o’ in“uence The New Spheres had given way to a sphere o’ in“uence. The strong still imposed their will on of Influence the weak; the rest o’ the world was compelled to play largely by American rules, or else face a steep price, from Sharing the Globe With crippling sanctions to outright regime Other Great Powers change. Spheres o’ in“uence hadn’t gone away; they had been collapsed Graham Allison into one, by the overwhelming fact o’ U.S. hegemony. n the heady aftermath o’ the Cold Now, however, that hegemony is COME HOME, AMERICA? War, American policymakers fading, and Washington has awakened Ipronounced one o’ the fundamental to what it calls “a new era o’ great- concepts o’ geopolitics obsolete. power competition,” with China and Secretary o’ State Condoleezza Rice Russia increasingly using their power to described a new world “in which great assert interests and values that often power is de¥ned not by spheres o’ con“ict with those o’ the United States. in“uence . . . or the strong imposing But American policymakers and ana- their will on the weak.” Secretary o’ lysts are still struggling to come to grips State Hillary Clinton declared that “the with what this new era means for the United States does not recognize spheres U.S. role in the world. Going forward, o’ in“uence.” Secretary o’ State John that role will not only be dierent; it Kerry proclaimed that “the era o’ the will also be signi¥cantly diminished. Monroe Doctrine is over,” ending While leaders will continue announcing almost two centuries o’ the United grand ambitions, diminished means will States staking claim to its own sphere o’ mean diminished results. in“uence in the Western Hemisphere. Unipolarity is over, and with it the Such pronouncements were right in illusion that other nations would simply that something about geopolitics had take their assigned place in a U.S.-led changed. But they were wrong about international order. For the United what exactly it was. U.S. policymakers States, that will require accepting the had ceased to recognize spheres o’ reality that there are spheres o’ in“u- in“uence—the ability o’ other powers ence in the world today—and that not to demand deference from other states all o’ them are American spheres. in their own regions or exert predomi- nant control there—not because the THE WORLD AS IT WAS concept had become obsolete. Rather, Before making pronouncements about the entire world had become a de facto the new rules o’ geopolitics, post–Cold War U.S. secretaries o’ state should GRAHAM ALLISON is Douglas Dillon have looked back to the ¥nal months o’ Professor of Government at the Harvard World War II, when U.S. policymakers Kennedy School and the author of Destined for War: Can America and China Escape were similarly resistant to accepting a Thucydides’s Trap? world in which spheres o’ in“uence

30 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 30 1/17/20 9:27 PM The New Spheres of Influence

remained a central feature o’ geopoli- and economic—after the war, there is tics. Competing views on the issue lay complete disunity between the Soviet at the core o’ a debate between two top Union and the satellites on one side and Soviet experts in the U.S. government. the rest o’ the world on the other,” On February 4, 1945, President Bohlen acknowledged in the summer o’ Franklin Roosevelt met with Soviet 1947 in a memo to Secretary o’ State leader Joseph Stalin and British Prime George Marshall. “There are, in short, Minister Winston Churchill at Yalta. At two worlds instead o’ one.” Roosevelt’s side was his translator and When he ¥nally came to share Ken- principal adviser on the Soviet Union, nan’s diagnosis, Bohlen did not shrink Charles Bohlen. Just that morning, from the implications. His memo to Bohlen had opened an urgent private Marshall concluded: missive from his close colleague George Kennan in Moscow. Kennan correctly Faced with this disagreeable fact, however much we may deplore it, the forecast that the Soviet Union would United States in the interest o’ its attempt to maintain control o’ as much own well-being and security and o¤ Europe as it could. The question was those o’ the free non-Soviet world what the United States should do about must . . . draw [the non-Soviet that. Kennan asked, “Why could we not world] closer together politically, make a decent and de¥nitive compro- economically, ¥nancially, and, in the mise with it—divide Europe frankly last analysis, militarily in order to be into spheres o’ in“uence—keep ourselves in a position to deal eectively with out o’ the Russian sphere and keep the the consolidated Soviet area. Russians out o’ ours?” Bohlen was appalled. “Utterly impos- This conviction became a pillar o’ the sible,” he erupted in response. “Foreign United States’ strategy for the coming policy o’ that kind cannot be made in a decades, and it rested on the accep- democracy.” Re“ecting on this moment tance o’ spheres o’ in“uence. There later, Bohlen explained: “The American would be areas that would be subjected people, who had fought a long, hard to Soviet domination, with often war, deserved at least an attempt to terrible consequences, but the best course work out a better world.” Between 1945 for the United States was to bolster and 1947, Bohlen worked alongside those powers on the periphery o’ this other leading ¥gures in the Roosevelt Soviet sphere while reinforcing the and then the Truman administration to strength and unity o’ its own sphere. realize their “one world” vision, in For the four decades that followed, which the allies who had fought to- the United States and the Soviet Union gether to defeat the Nazis would remain engaged in the great-power competi- allied in creating a new global order. tion that we know as the Cold War. In But he ultimately resigned himsel’ to the the Soviet sphere, the captive nations o’ world as it was—in short, Kennan had Eastern Europe remained under the been right. “Instead o’ unity among the boot o’ an “evil empire.” American great powers on the major issues o’ presidents faced repeated crises in which world reconstruction—both political they had to choose between sending

March/April 2020 31

Book 1.indb 31 1/17/20 9:27 PM Graham Allison

troops into Soviet-dominated nations to ten nations combined (¥ve o’ them U.S. support freedom ¥ghters seeking to treaty allies). Operationally, that meant exercise rights that the American creed that, as Secretary o¤ Defense James declares universal and standing by as Mattis’s 2018 National Defense Strategy those freedom ¥ghters were slaughtered put it, the United States “enjoyed or suppressed. Without exception, U.S. uncontested or dominant superiority in presidents chose to watch instead o’ every operating domain. We could intervene: consider Dwight Eisenhower generally deploy our forces when we when Hungarians rose up in 1956 and wanted, assemble them where we Lyndon Johnson during the Prague wanted, and operate how we wanted.” Spring o’ 1968 (or, after the Cold War, The United States and its allies could George W. Bush when Russian troops welcome new members into ²³µ¬, attacked Georgia in 2008 and Barack applying to them its Article 5 security Obama when Russian special forces seized guarantee, without thinking about the Crimea). Why? Each had internalized risks, since the alliance faced no real an unacceptable yet undeniable truth: threat. In that world, strategy in essence that, as U.S. President Ronald Reagan consisted o’ overwhelming challenges once explained in a joint statement with resources. with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, But that was then. The tectonic shift “a nuclear war cannot be won and must in the balance o’ power that occurred never be fought.” in the ¥rst two decades o’ the twenty- This bit o’ Cold War history should ¥rst century was as dramatic as any serve as a reminder: a nation that is shift the United States has witnessed simultaneously idealistic and realistic will over an equivalent period in its 244 years. always struggle to reconcile rationales To paraphrase Vaclav Havel, then the and rationalizations o’ purpose, on the president o’ Czechoslovakia, it has one hand, with realities o’ power, on the happened so fast, we have not yet had other. The result, in the foreign policy time to be astonished. The U.S. share analyst Fareed Zakaria’s apt summary, has o’ global ±½Ä—nearly one-hal’ in been “the rhetoric o’ transformation but 1950—has gone from one-quarter in 1991 the reality o’ accommodation.” Even at to one-seventh today. (Although ±½Ä is the height o’ U.S. power, accommoda- not everything, it does form the sub- tion meant accepting the ugly fact o’ a structure o’ power in relations among Soviet sphere o’ in“uence. nations.) And as the United States’ relative power has declined, the menu o’ TECTONIC SHIFTS feasible options for policymakers has After nearly hal’ a century o’ competi- shrunk. Consider, for example, the U.S. tion, when the Cold War ended and the response to China’s Belt and Road Soviet Union disappeared, in 1991, the Initiative. With currency reserves o’ United States was left economically, almost $3 trillion, China can invest militarily, and geopolitically dominant. $1.3 trillion in infrastructure linking In the ¥rst two decades o’ the post–Cold most o¤ Eurasia to a China-centered War era, U.S. defense spending ex- order. When Secretary o’ State Mike ceeded the defense budgets o’ the next Pompeo announced that the United

32 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 32 1/17/20 9:27 PM The New Spheres of Influence U.S. NATIONAL

In—uencers: Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin at the Yalta conference, 1945 ARCHIVES

States would increase its own invest- 1991 to 120 percent today (measured by

ALAMY / ments in the Indo-Paci¥c in response, purchasing power parity, the metric that he was able to come up with just $113 both the Å°³ and the International million in new investments. Monetary Fund use to compare national PHOTO STOCK China has, o’ course, been the chie’ economies). Although China faces many bene¥ciary o’ this transformation. In internal challenges, there are more the past generation, its ±½Ä has soared: reasons to expect this basic economic from 20 percent o’ the U.S. level in trend to continue than to bet that it will

March/April 2020 33

Book 1.indb 33 1/17/20 9:27 PM Graham Allison

stop soon. With four times as many specic military scenarios involving a citizens as the United States, and i conict over Taiwan or in the South Chinese workers become as productive China Sea, China may have already as Portuguese workers are today (that is, taken the lead. Short o actual war, the around hal as productive as Ameri- best tests o relative military capabili- cans), China will see its žŸ rise to ties are war games. In 2019, Robert double that o the United States. Work, a former U.S. deputy secretary In Asia, the economic balance o o defense, and David Ochmanek, power has tilted especially dramatically one o the Defense Department’s key in China’s favor. As the world’s largest defense planners, o‘ered a public exporter and second-largest importer, summary o the results from a series o China is the top trading partner o every classied recent war games. Their other major East Asian country, including bottom line, in Ochmanek’s words: U.S. allies. (And as an aggressive practi- “When we ght Russia and China, tioner o economic statecraft, Beijing does ‘blue’ [the United States] gets its ass not hesitate to use the leverage this handed to it.” As The New York Times provides, squeezing countries such as the summarized, “In 18 o the last 18 Philippines and South Korea when they Pentagon war games involving China in resist Chinese demands.) Globally, China the Taiwan Strait, the U.S. lost.” is also rapidly becoming a peer competi- Russia is a di‘erent matter. What- tor o the United States in advanced ever President Vladimir Putin might technologies. Today, o the 20 largest want, Russia will never again be his information technology companies, nine father’s Soviet Union. When the Soviet are Chinese. Four years ago, when Google, Union dissolved, the resulting Russian the global leader in articial intelligence state was left with less than hal the žŸ (), the most signicant advanced tech- and hal the population and saw its nology, assessed its competition, Chi- borders rolled back to the days before nese companies ranked alongside Catherine the Great. Yet Russia remains European companies. Now, that state o a nuclear superpower with an arsenal a‘airs is barely visible in the rearview that is functionally equivalent to that o mirror: Chinese companies lead in many the United States; it has a defense areas o applied , including surveil- industry that produces weapons the world lance, facial and voice recognition, and is eager to buy (as India and Turkey nancial technology. have demonstrated in the past year); and China’s military spending and it boasts military forces that can ght capabilities have surged, as well. A and win—as they have demonstrated quarter century ago, its defense budget repeatedly in Chechnya, Georgia, was one-25th that o the United States; Ukraine, and Syria. On a continent now, it is one-third and on a path to where most o the other nations imag- parity. And whereas the U.S. defense ine that war has become obsolete, and budget is spread across global commit- maintain military forces more for ments, many o them in Europe and ceremonial than combat operations, the Middle East, China’s budget is military prowess may now be Russia’s focused on East Asia. Accordingly, in major comparative advantage.

34   

06_Allison_pp_Blues.indd 34 1/20/20 4:25 PM Graham Allison

BACK TO BASICS actions by China and Russia in their The claim that spheres o’ in“uence had respective neighborhoods are just the been consigned to the dustbin o‘ history most recent examples o’ that tradition. assumed that other nations would Spheres o’ in“uence also extend simply take their assigned places in a beyond geography. When the United U.S.-led order. In retrospect, that States led the world in the creation o’ assumption seems worse than naive. Yet the Internet, and the hardware and because many U.S. analysts and policy- software that empowered it, the United makers still cling to images o’ China States enjoyed what Michael Hayden, a and Russia formed during this bygone former director o’ the National Security era, their views about what the United Agency, later called a “golden age o’ States should and should not do continues electronic surveillance.” Since most to re“ect a world that has vanished. countries were unaware o’ the surveil- Over the course o’ centuries o’ lance capabilities revealed by the former geopolitical competition, policymakers ²´³ contractor Edward Snowden, the and theorists developed a set o’ core United States had an unparalleled ability concepts to help clarify the complexities to exploit technology to listen to, track, o’ relations among states, including and even in“uence them. But post- spheres o’ in“uence, balances o’ power, Snowden, many states are resisting the and alliances. These concepts must be current U.S. campaign to prevent them adapted to take account o’ speci¥c from buying their 5G wireless infrastruc- conditions in the twenty-¥rst century. ture from the Chinese telecommunica- Yet they remain the sturdiest building tions giant Huawei. As the leader o’ a blocks available for understanding and country currently considering the choice constructing international order. recently put it, Washington is trying to Where the equilibrium o¤ forces persuade other countries not to buy between one state and another shifts to Chinese hardware because it will make it the point where the ¥rst becomes easier for China to spy and instead to buy predominant, the resulting new balance American hardware, which would make it o’ power casts a shadow that becomes, easier for the United States to spy. in eect, a “sphere o’ in“uence.” That speci¥c term entered the vocabulary o’ A REALISTIC RECKONING diplomacy in the early nineteenth cen- From the perspective o’ American inter- tury, but the concept is as old as interna- ests and values, the consequences o’ tional relations itself. (As Thucydides increases in China’s and Russia’s power noted, after the defeat o’ the Persians in relative to that o’ the United States are the ¥fth century ÆÅ, Sparta demanded not good. As great powers, China and that Athens not rebuild the walls around Russia can use their power to suppress its city-state to leave itsel’ vulnerable.) protesters’ freedom in Hong Kong or Traditionally, great powers have de- block Ukrainian membership in ²³µ¬. manded a degree o’ deference from lesser The South China Sea is likely to become powers on their borders and in adja- more like the Caribbean than the Medi- cent seas, and they have expected other terranean—that is, China’s neighbors in great powers to respect that fact. Recent Southeast Asia will be as beholden to

36 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 36 1/17/20 9:27 PM The New Spheres of Influence

China as Latin Americans have been to Acknowledging that other powers their hemispheric hegemon. Ukraine will have spheres o’ in“uence does not, o’ have to get over the loss o’ Crimea as course, mean that the United States can countries in Russia’s “near abroad” learn do nothing. It is a re“ection o’ the to be both more fearful o’ and more recent overmilitarization o’ U.S. foreign deferential to the Kremlin. policy that restraint in the use o’ mili- For many other nations and indi- tary force is often equated with acquies- viduals around the world who have cence. Washington has other ways in found shelter under the American which it can shape other countries’ security umbrella and found inspiration calculations o’ costs and bene¥ts: through in a vision o’ an American-led interna- the condemnation o’ unacceptable tional order that safeguards core liber- actions; the denial o‘ legal status; the ties, the consequences will be tragic. imposition o’ economic sanctions on Recent events in Syria oer a preview countries, companies, and individuals; o’ what’s to come. As the Arab Spring and support for local resisters. But such erupted in late 2010 and 2011, Obama tools can rarely decisively alter a deci- famously declared that Syrian leader sion another power has made when Bashar al-Assad “must go.” But Putin interests it sees as vital are at stake. And had other ideas, and he was willing to it is worth remembering how often a act on them. He demonstrated that a na- refusal to recognize and accept realities tion Obama had dismissed as a “regional on the ground in the shadow o’ other power” could use its military forces to powers has led to major U.S. policy defy the United States and help the failures. From General Douglas MacAr- Syrian leader consolidate his control. thur’s rush to the Chinese border This has been a horror for Syrians, during the Korean War (which trig- and the millions o’ displaced people gered Chinese intervention and a have had a major impact on neighbor- bloody, inconclusive war) to George W. ing countries and Europe. But did Bush’s insistence that ²³µ¬ oer mem- Obama, or, later, President Donald bership to Georgia and Ukraine (which Trump, conclude that this outcome was led to Georgian overcon¥dence, ending so costly that it would be better to send in the country’s partial dismember- large numbers o’ U.S. troops to ¥ght ment by Russia), a stubborn disregard o’ and perhaps die in Syria? Can Ameri- brute facts has been counterproductive. cans sleep soundly in a world in which Putin and Assad now smile when they THE MUSEUM OF RETIRED ask visitors who is gone and who is still INTERESTS standing? U.S. inaction speaks for itself. When it comes to doing what it can, Sadly, Americans will come to accept Washington should focus above all on such outcomes as good enough—at least its alliances and partnerships. I’ China for the foreseeable future. Like Assad’s is destined to be “the biggest player in atrocities, Russia’s absorption o’ Crimea the history o’ the world,” as the and China’s militarization o’ the South longtime Singaporean leader Lee China Sea are now facts on the ground Kuan Yew once claimed, the United that no one will contest militarily. States must work to assemble allied

March/April 2020 37

Book 1.indb 37 1/17/20 9:27 PM Graham Allison

powers who together will constitute a what risks and costs. Alliances are not correlation o› forces to which China forever. Historically, when conditions will have to adjust. have changed, particularly when a focal This logic is most evident in the enemy has disappeared or balances o economic arena. Before the Trump power have shifted dramatically, so, too, administration ended U.S. participation have other relationships among nations. in the Trans-Paci£c Partnership, that Most Americans today have forgotten trade agreement promised to bring an era in which ­ had a counterpart together countries accounting for 40 in Asia, ­ (the Southeast Asia percent o global §¨ under a common Treaty Organization), and even an set o rules on everything from tari©s to analogue in the Middle East, ˆ­ state-owned enterprises to labor and (the Central Treaty Organization); both environmental standards—providing a o those are now artifacts in the mu- counterweight to Chinese economic might seum o retired national interests. As that could have made Beijing a rule-taker Kennan noted, “There is more respect rather than a rule-maker. Thanks to the to be won . . . by a resolute and coura- e©orts o Japanese Prime Minister geous liquidation o unsound positions Shinzo Abe, the ­¨¨ is now a reality—but than by the most stubborn pursuit o without the United States. I American extravagant or unpromising objectives.” policymakers could £nd a way to allow To understand the risks entailed in strategic interests to trump politics, the the inheritance o current U.S. alli- United States could rejoin the ­¨¨. I ances, consider two scenarios U.S. that new ­¨¨ were combined with the defense planners worry about today. If, parallel trade agreement between the watching China’s suppression o United States and the European Union protests in Hong Kong, Taiwan should that was being negotiated at the end o make a dramatic move toward inde- the Obama administration, nearly 70 pendence that leads China to react vio- percent o the world’s §¨ could be on lently, would the United States go to one side o the balance, versus China’s war with China to preserve Taiwan’s approximately 20 percent on the other. status? Should it? On the European In the military arena, the same logic front, i in response to an uprising o applies, but with more complexity. ethnic Russian workers in Riga’s Washington will need partners—but shipyards, the Latvian government partners that bring more in assets than cracked down on ethnic Russians and they introduce in risks. Unfortunately, sparked Russia’s annexation o a swath few o the United States’ current allies o› Latvia—Crimea 2.0—would ­ meet this standard. The U.S. alliance launch an immediate military response, system should be subjected to a zero- in accordance with its Article 5 guaran- based analysis: every current ally and tee? Should it? I the answer to any o partner, from Pakistan, the Philippines, those questions is not a straightforward and Thailand to Latvia, Saudi Arabia, yes—and it is not—then the time has and Turkey, should be considered in come for an alliance-focused version o terms o what it is doing to enhance the stress tests for banks used after the U.S. security and well-being, and with 2008 £nancial crisis.

38   

06_Allison_pp_Blues.indd 38 1/20/20 4:26 PM Such an approach is all the more important given the realities o nuclear weapons in this new world. Both China “A FASCINATING, detailed account of and Russia have reliable second-strike the HISTORY OF TENSIONS in nuclear capabilities—that is, the ability America’s trade relationship with China.” to withstand an initial nuclear attack and — The Economist, "Our Books of the Year." conduct a retaliatory strike that could destroy the United States. Accordingly, not only is nuclear war not a viable “The MOST IMPORTANT book [on option; even a conventional war that could trade] is Paul Blustein's....a very important escalate to nuclear war risks catastrophe. book on a very IMPORTANT SUBJECT.” Competition must thus be tempered by — Martin Wolf, Financial Times "Best Books of 2019 in Economics." caution, constraints, and careful calcula- tions in risk taking. For a nation that has accumulated a long list o entangle- ments with nations that may have, or may imagine they have, a blank check from Washington, this creates a big problem. The line between reassuring an ally and emboldening its leadership to act recklessly is a ­ne one. I the balance o military power in a conventional war over Taiwan or the Baltics has shifted decisively in China’s and Russia’s favor, current U.S. commit- ments are not sustainable. The gap between those commitments and the United States’ actual military capabilities is a classic case o overstretch. What a zero-based assessment would mean for the current alliance system, and for U.S. relations with each o more than 50 treaty allies and partners, should emerge as a result o an analysis o the evidence. But it would likely lead the United States to shed some allies, double down on others whose assets are as important for U.S. TWO TITANS security as U.S. assets are for them, and CLASH OVER TRADE. radically revise the terms o each commit- ment to make obligations and restraints as CIGI Press books are distributed by McGill-Queen’s University Press (mqup.ca) prominent as reassurances and guarantees. and can be found in better bookstores and through online book retailers. This process would also enhance the credibility o the commitments that the United States chose to renew. While

March/April 2020 39

FA 39_rev.indd 1 1/20/20 9:48 AM Book 1.indb 39 1/17/20 9:27 PM Graham Allison

the veterans o’ the Cold War rightly U.S. victory in the Cold War. That claim that ²³µ¬ has been the greatest world is now gone. The consequences alliance in the history o’ the world, are as profound as those that Americans neither Trump nor Obama before him confronted in the late 1940s. Accord- was convinced. Tellingly, American ingly, it is worth remembering how long military commanders doubted that the it took individuals now revered as “wise North Atlantic Council would authorize men” to understand the world they a military response to the Russian faced. Nearly ¥ve years passed between annexation o’ Crimea or that the U.S. Kennan’s “Long Telegram,” an early government would be able to make a warning o’ Cold War competition, and decision about how to respond before the policy paper NSC-68, which ¥nally the event was over. Rethinking the laid out a comprehensive strategy. The United States’ commitments to its allies confusion that reigns in the U.S. foreign would enhance American security and policy community today should thus not make these same pacts stronger. be a cause for alarm. I’ it took the great strategists o’ the Cold War nearly ¥ve PRESENT AT THE RECREATION years to forge a basic approach, it would Strategy is the purposeful alignment o’ be beyond hubris to expect this genera- means and ends. Among the many ways tion to do better.∂ in which a strategy fails, the two most common are mismatch—when the means an actor can organize and sustain are insu¾cient to achieve the stated ends—and vision blindness, when an actor is mesmerized by an ideal but unachievable end. The United States’ twenty-¥rst-century wars in the Middle East oer vivid examples o‘ both. Going forward, U.S. policymakers will have to abandon unattainable aspirations for the worlds they dreamed o’ and accept the fact that spheres o’ in“uence will remain a central feature o’ geopolitics. That acceptance will inevitably be a protracted, confusing, and wrenching process. Yet it could also bring a wave o’ strategic creativity—an opportunity for nothing less than a fundamental rethinking o’ the concep- tual arsenal o’ U.S. national security. The basic view o’ the United States’ role in the world held by most o’ today’s foreign-policy makers was imprinted in the quarter century that followed the

40 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 40 1/17/20 9:27 PM adversaries with a fraction o’ the United COME HOME, AMERICA? Reality Check States’ resources could ¥nd ways to resist U.S. eorts and impose high costs in the process. Today, Washington’s American Power in an Age primacy mindset—its disregard for the of Constraints core interests o’ potential adversaries— is even more counterproductive. With Jennifer Lind and Daryl G. Press China on the rise, Russia de¥ant, and the United States’ liberal international or the past three decades, as the coalition weakened from within, United States stood at the pin- Washington faces a much more con- F nacle o’ global power, U.S. leaders strained environment. A foreign policy framed their foreign policy around a that neglects that fact will stymie single question: What should the United cooperation and set the United States States seek to achieve in the world? on a collision course with its rivals. Buoyed by their victory in the Cold War To avoid that outcome, U.S. foreign and freed o’ powerful adversaries abroad, policy must adapt both in substance successive U.S. administrations forged and in mindset. In the coming decades, an ambitious agenda: spreading liberal- the essential question will be a new one: ism and Western in“uence around the What global aims can the country world, integrating China into the global pursue that its allies can support and economy, and transforming the politics that its geopolitical rivals can accept? o’ the Middle East. Taking this approach will open up In setting these goals, Washington did, possibilities for compromise with Beijing to some extent, factor in external and Moscow and will help establish constraints, such as the potential objec- mutually acceptable, i’ imperfect, equi- tions o’ important regional powers libriums around the globe. around the world. But for the most part, foreign policy debates focused on what THE TEMPTATIONS OF PRIMACY a given measure might cost or on whether To understand where U.S. foreign spreading Western institutions was policy went wrong, compare the two desirable as a matter o’ principle. The pivotal moments when the United interests o’ other countries, particularly States reached the pinnacle o’ world adversaries, were secondary concerns. power: once at the end o‘ World War II This approach to foreign policy was and again at the end o’ the Cold War. misguided even at the peak o’ American In 1945, the country’s economic and power. As the endless wars in Afghani- military might was unmatched. The stan and Iraq and Russian intervention- United States had emerged from the ism in eastern Europe have shown, war as the only major power to have avoided both large-scale bombing and JENNIFER LIND is Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College and a the occupation o’ its mainland. The Research Associate at Chatham House. country had lost an estimated 0.3 DARYL G. PRESS is Associate Professor of percent o’ its population in the war— Government at Dartmouth College. compared with four percent for Japan,

March/April 2020 41

Book 1.indb 41 1/17/20 9:27 PM Jennifer Lind and Daryl G. Press

nine percent for Germany, and a stag- the most powerful military, and a roster gering 14 percent for the Soviet Union. o’ allies that included the world’s The U.S. economy accounted for nearly richest, most technologically advanced hal’ o’ total world economic output. And countries. At this unipolar moment, a o’ course, the United States was the only few voices argued for a strategy o’ country that possessed the atomic bomb. restraint, calling on the United States Given the United States’ dominant to husband its economic resources, position, several American voices called focus on domestic challenges, and avoid for a muscular foreign policy to roll stumbling into new con“icts. But back Soviet in“uence and communist Washington, unconstrained by the lack regimes in eastern Europe. But ulti- o’ any peer competitor, rejected this mately, U.S. leaders adopted a more approach. Russia was on its knees; restrained strategy: to help reestablish China was weak. And potential oppo- democracy and markets in western nents o‘ liberalism and free markets were Europe, protect those countries from chasing a dead-end cause. The “end o’ Soviet expansion, and limit Soviet history” had arrived. in“uence around the globe. In the inter- American leaders chose to promote the est o’ preventing a war, that strategy, U.S.-led liberal international order. In which came to be known as “contain- concert with its allies, Washington ment,” sought to avoid steps that the steadily expanded core Western institu- Soviet Union would deem unaccept- tions, above all ²³µ¬ and the European able, such as the elimination o’ commu- Union, into eastern Europe. As they did nist buer states in eastern Europe. so, Washington and its partners debated Containment was neither modest nor the appropriate speed o’ expansion and meek. During the brie’ postwar period the political and economic criteria that o’ primacy and the decades o‘ bipolar- entrants into their order should meet. But ity that followed, the United States and they paid little heed to Russian concerns its allies spread their in“uence and about Western encroachment, despite battled communism all over the world, earlier pledges to the contrary. Russia, often excessively, engaging in covert wrote the journalist Julia Ioe, had actions and bloody wars. Critically, become “a place to be mocked rather than however, the strategy respected core feared”: not a great power any longer but Soviet national interests, especially “Upper Volta with missiles.” And after the communist control o’ what the Soviets 9/11 attacks, Washington embarked on a viewed as their “near abroad.” In the project not merely to destroy al Qaeda prescient vision o’ the diplomat George but also to transform the Middle East. Kennan, the architect o’ containment, Afghanistan and Iraq were just the ¥rst the United States would defeat Moscow two targets; the goal was broader: regime by allowing the Soviet system to col- change in Iran, Syria, and elsewhere. lapse from its own internal rot. Even at the peak o’ American power, it The second U.S. experience with was unwise to disregard the core interests primacy played out dierently. When the o’ potential adversaries. But 30 years after Soviet Union dissolved, the United the end o’ the Cold War, Washington’s States had the world’s largest economy, relative power has dramatically declined.

42 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 42 1/17/20 9:27 PM Reality Check

Here’s to great power: Chinese President Xi Jinping and Putin in Tajikistan, June 2019 In Russia and China, the United States rife with corruption; and it is almost now faces two emboldened rivals willing totally reliant on oil revenues—hardly to push against what they see as American markers o innovation and growth. And overreach. To make matters worse, a ˆerce yet Moscow has found clever and eective populist backlash rejecting core tenets o ways to push back against an international the liberal international order has roiled order that Russian President Vladimir both the United States and Europe. As a Putin correctly views as hostile to his result, the uniˆed and powerful bloc o country’s interests. Through wars against Western democracies that once ampliˆed Georgia and Ukraine, Russia has man- U.S. inŠuence across the globe has aged to not only halt those countries’ fractured, leaving Washington without a movements toward integration with the crucial source o support in its competi- U.S.-backed order but also create divisions tion with great-power rivals. And as between Washington and its European Washington’s global inŠuence wanes, the allies. And by spreading disinformation costs o the primacy mindset are rising. via government-funded media outlets and bankrolling extremist European parties, SPUTNIK PHOTO SPUTNIK GETTING REAL WITH RUSSIA Russia has exploited vulnerabilities in the One source o geopolitical change is open political systems o its adversaries Russia. The country is in many ways an and has sown polarization and division unlikely impediment to U.S. primacy. It is within their electorates.

AGENCY neither a thriving society nor a rising As a result, Washington and Mos- power. On the contrary, it is a country cow are now locked in a dangerous with an aging, shrinking population; it is cycle o escalation. The United States

March/April 2020 43

07_LindPress_pp4_Blues.indd 43 1/20/20 7:14 PM Jennifer Lind and Daryl G. Press

and Europe continue to expand their game to limit each side’s espionage and political and military in“uence into covert actions against the other. I’ one Russia’s near abroad. (Bosnia, Georgia, side determined that the other had gone North Macedonia, and Ukraine all are too far, it would retaliate, after which queuing up for entry into ²³µ¬, for things would go back to normal. There example.) Russia, in turn, has launched is no reason why Washington and covert military interventions in Moscow could not manage the same Ukraine, carried out dramatic assassina- today. Nor would such an agreement tion attempts in the United Kingdom, require much trust, which is clearly and conducted political interference lacking on both sides. Were Moscow to campaigns across the West. continue its policy o’ domestic political To de-escalate this con“ict, the two interference, Washington could initiate sides should strike a bargain: Western programs to destabilize Russia’s own nonexpansion for Russian noninterfer- domestic politics. Authoritarian regimes, ence. The West would cease any further always afraid o’ rivals at home, are at enlargement o’ ²³µ¬ and the ¯º in least as vulnerable to such outside eastern Europe. In return, Russia interference as democracies are. And i’ would agree to cease its campaign o’ the West reneges on its promises, domestic political interference. (The Moscow can retaliate by ramping up its degree o’ U.S. government interference own information war. in Russia’s domestic politics is unclear, Perhaps the biggest hurdle to achiev- but Washington would also need to ing such an agreement—even an infor- disavow such methods.) mal one—is the reluctance o’ U.S. Whatever the speci¥cs o’ the deal, foreign policy leaders to acknowledge its goal would be mutual accommoda- that Russia has valid national security tion. Let the Russians come forth and interests in eastern Europe. But ignor- list whatever they see as the most ing Russia’s concerns will not make egregious Western encroachments on them disappear. “It is totally unrealistic their interests—perhaps it is indeed the to think that the West can gain desired expansion o’ ²³µ¬ and the ¯º, perhaps Russian restraint and cooperation,” some other policy. Western govern- wrote the former U.S. diplomat Leslie ments can do the same, and the two Gelb in 2015, “without dealing with sides can negotiate with the goal o’ Moscow as a great power that possesses removing the worst irritants. Such an real and legitimate interests.” understanding, even i’ it leaves both sides dissatis¥ed on the margins, would A DEAL FOR CHINA oer a clear path forward. U.S. primacy has also come under Critics might object that such a deal strain from a rising China. In 1990, the would be unenforceable given the country was a geopolitical afterthought: di¾culty, in an age o’ disinformation, o’ its economy was only six percent o’ the proving who carried out what political size o’ the U.S. economy; today, that operation against whom. But during the ¥gure is 63 percent. (Considering Cold War, the two sides managed this purchasing power parity adjustments to problem and established rules o’ the ±½Ä, China has already surpassed the

44 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 44 1/17/20 9:27 PM Reality Check

United States economically.) More has been the cornerstone o’ cooperative important, China’s fast economic relations with Beijing from the last growth—which even after slowing down decades o’ the Cold War to the present. is nearly triple the rate o’ U.S. Several other aspects o’ U.S. policy, growth—means that unless some however, antagonize Beijing. The political catastrophe befalls China, the United States’ policy o’ economic country will be the economic jugger- engagement with China, often cast as a naut o’ the twenty-¥rst century. benign eort to welcome the country China has also become a regional into the global trade regime, also has a military power. Beijing has transformed transformative logic. Its proponents have the bloated, technologically backward talked openly about their hopes that military it ¥elded in 1990 into one with the policy would force China to reform sophisticated capabilities for the types o’ its illiberal institutions, reduce its human missions that Chinese leaders care about rights violations, and create a new, most: coercing Taiwan and hindering wealthy elite that would reject the Chi- U.S. military movements in East Asian nese Communist Party’s grasp on power. waters. Deng Xiaoping, China’s leader in Chinese observers have correctly consid- the 1980s, famously counseled his country ered a U.S. strategy endowed with such to “hide your strength, bide your time.” hopes to be a soft form o’ regime change. Today, the country is done with hiding The Chinese are also wary o’ U.S. and biding. Instead, it has extended its alliances in the region, fearing that reach in Asia by building two aircraft Washington’s decision to maintain Cold carriers, constructing and then militariz- War alliances in Asia after 1990 was ing arti¥cial islands in the South China aimed at containing China. Resenting Sea, and securing access to military bases U.S. military dominance, the Chinese across Asia and the Indian Ocean. As a have seethed when U.S. military vessels result, China is on its way to becoming a have crossed into Chinese waters and peer competitor in a region where U.S. airspace, or when the United States diplomatic, economic, and military sailed two aircraft carriers through the power went unrivaled not long ago. Taiwan Strait in 1995, at a time o’ U.S. foreign policy was relatively heightened tension between Taiwan and mindful o¤ Beijing’s core interests even the mainland. More recently, as the before China’s rise. In deference to United States has strengthened political Beijing’s claims o’ sovereignty over and military ties with countries along Taiwan, the Nixon administration ended the region’s major trade routes and the U.S. alliance with the Republic o’ along China’s borders (notably India China (Taiwan), o¾cially recognized and Vietnam), Chinese leaders have that there was only “one China,” and complained o’ encirclement. normalized relations with Beijing. That Today, however, China can do much policy was undermined by pushback more than complain. As part o’ a sweep- from Congress and by continued U.S. ing overseas in“uence campaign, Beijing arms sales to Taiwan, which the Chinese has interfered in the domestic politics o’ say violate U.S.-Chinese bilateral other countries (Australia, Canada, and agreements. Still, the “one China” policy New Zealand, for example), used eco-

March/April 2020 45

Book 1.indb 45 1/17/20 9:27 PM Jennifer Lind and Daryl G. Press

nomic pressure to punish countries that United States can refrain from adding it deems hostile to China, and built the new allies and military partners, in capabilities needed to challenge U.S. particular along China’s borders. Estab- military superiority in East Asia. In an lishing such relationships would ignore era in which U.S. political, economic, Beijing’s concerns in the same way and military dominance in the region has Washington disregarded Moscow’s by declined, avoiding con“ict and cooperat- extending ²³µ¬ into the Baltics. And in ing with Beijing will require respect for Asia, the United States would be poking its core concerns. The two countries share the eye o’ a rising, not a declining, power. many interests, regionally and globally. In exchange for these concessions, They both want a denuclearized North Washington could require Beijing to Korea and stability on the Korean respect the status quo in Taiwan and in Peninsula. The same goes for addressing other territorial disputes. Out o’ con- climate change, terrorism, nuclear cern for human rights and for geopolitical proliferation, and numerous other global reasons, the United States does not want problems. Washington and Beijing can the Taiwan issue settled forcibly, nor does make headway on such issues together, or it want the region’s several island or they can have a hostile relationship. border disputes to lead to violence that They cannot do both. could spiral into a wider war. I¤ Beijing In a post-primacy era, U.S. leaders were to agree but later stray from its should ask what they can realistically commitments, Washington could use achieve without poisoning U.S.-Chinese force i’ appropriate (for example, to relations. O’ course, the United States defend its allies) or covertly intervene in wants China to democratize and respect Chinese domestic politics, calibrating its the human rights o’ its people. It also response based on the severity o’ wants to see the Taiwan question China’s transgressions. resolved in a way that grants peace and China may well be open to a deal o’ autonomy to that thriving democratic this kind. Chinese leaders routinely society. But pushing for those goals emphasize the need to avoid con“ict would directly challenge core interests with the United States and say they o’ the Chinese Communist Party. welcome a U.S. presence in the region, Doing so would stymie bilateral coop- so long as the United States does not eration, threaten the United States’ seek to contain China. Beijing also relationship with partners in the region understands that U.S. disengagement (who want to maintain stable relations would likely cause Japan to increase its with China), and risk war. military power and adopt a more A deal with Beijing would center on a assertive security policy—something few central issues. One is the future o’ China would prefer to avoid. American alliances in the region. The Détente with Washington would be United States’ relationships in East Asia the more prudent path for Beijing, are an important source o’ U.S. political because its leaders face pressing domes- and military power, so it would be unwise tic problems, such as corruption, envi- for Washington to sacri¥ce them for a ronmental degradation, and an insu¾cient rapprochement with China. But the social safety net. But China is a rising

46 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 46 1/17/20 9:27 PM Reality Check

power “ush with pride in its achievements with China, have demurred to Washing- and brimming with a sense o’ righteous- ton’s more confrontational approach ness from the regime’s narrative about toward Beijing. With its voters over- past national humiliations. Although the whelmed by the burden o’ global leader- country has good reasons to take a deal, ship and its alliances fraying, the United there is no guarantee that it will. States lacks the domestic and coalitional unity necessary to pursue a confronta- BACK TO NORMAL tional and costly foreign policy. The challenges to American primacy do Some may dispute that so much has not end with its great-power rivals. U.S. really changed. After all, many measures power has also weakened from within. o’ national power (±½Ä per capita, total In the United States and among several defense spending, and the metrics o’ o’ its core allies, large parts o’ the economic innovation, to name just a few) public have lost con¥dence in the liberal suggest that the United States remains a project that long animated Western geopolitical titan. And many people foreign policy. The disillusion is in part hope that perhaps after a brie’ dalliance a reaction to the twin forces o’ economic with reckless chauvinism, democratic globalization and automation, which peoples around the world will decide they have decimated employment in manu- prefer the old, safer order. facturing in the developed world. It is But this optimism is misguided. also re“ected in growing opposition to Opponents o’ the U.S.-led order immigration, which contributed to the around the world have discovered that United Kingdom’s vote to leave the ¯º, they can resist U.S. in“uence even i’ the rise o’ chauvinist parties across Eu- they lag far behind the United States in rope, and the election o¤ Donald Trump in aggregate power. Recall that the Soviet the United States. In his 2017 inaugural Union competed with the United address, Trump lamented the “American States for more than four decades carnage” that he asserted the former without ever having the equivalent o’ presidents and assorted o¾cials sitting in more than 40 percent o’ U.S. ±½Ä. China the gallery behind him had caused. Their already vastly exceeds that threshold. policies, he said, had “enriched foreign The United States’ great-power rivals industry at the expense o’ American have the added advantage o‘ being able industry” and bene¥ted other countries to apply their military and political even as the United States’ own wealth, resources close to home, whereas strength, and con¥dence had crumbled. Washington must spread its capabili- Trump’s political ascent, his disdain for ties across the world i’ it is to maintain U.S. allies, and his administration’s its current status. Nor will the domes- controversial policies—on matters such as tic backlash against the liberal order trade, Syria, and Iran, for example—have subside quickly. Even i’ voters decide all dismayed longtime U.S. partners. to reject the most extreme and incom- Doubts about the United States’ reliabil- petent populist standard-bearers, the ity as a military ally have grown. And sources o’ their dissatisfaction will allies across Asia and Europe, keen to remain, and more eective leaders will maintain valuable economic relationships arise to give voice to it.

March/April 2020 47

Book 1.indb 47 1/17/20 9:27 PM Jennifer Lind and Daryl G. Press

Together, those shifts leave the interests near its borders. At the time, United States little option but to adapt. hawks disparaged containment as too For roughly 25 years, the United States’ accommodating or immoral. Now, all-surpassing power allowed the Americans venerate containment as country to take a vacation from geopoli- brilliant statecraft. tics. That Zeitgeist was captured by a I’ the United States wants to avoid senior adviser in the George W. Bush war and cooperate on matters o’ shared administration who, in a 2004 conversa- interests with powerful countries, its tion with the writer Ron Suskind, leaders need to shed the primacy scoed at what he called “the reality- mindset and combine their laudable based community” for its judicious ambition and creativity with a pragma- policy analyses o’ pros and cons. “That’s tism appropriate to an era o’ great- not the way the world really works power competition. The question is no anymore,” the o¾cial said. “We’re an longer what the United States wants to empire now, and when we act, we create achieve. It is rather what the United our own reality.” States can achieve that an increasingly Because no other country had the fractured coalition can support and that power to mount a powerful resistance, its rivals can live with.∂ U.S. leaders felt free to reimagine reality largely unconstrained by the objections o’ those who opposed the global liberal project. Scholars will debate the wisdom o’ the path they took—some arguing that, on balance, the United States’ project o‘ liberal hegemony achieved many o’ its goals, others saying that the country squandered its power and expedited a return to multipolarity. Yet whatever the verdict, it is clear today that the United States’ geopolitical vacation is over and that a major course correction is due. To some, such a change may feel like a traumatic revision, but it would in fact be a return to normalcy. For almost all countries throughout history, the essence o¤ foreign policy has been to pursue pressing national interests in a world o’ constraints and competing powers. Indeed, this was the mindset o’ U.S. leaders during the Cold War, when they settled on a policy to compete intensely with the Soviet Union around the globe but to defer to its core

48 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 48 1/17/20 9:27 PM Afghanistan to Iraq. The view that COME HOME, AMERICA? Learning to Live Washington should oer a shining example but nothing more fails to appre- With Despots ciate the dangers o’ the contemporary world, in which groups and individuals with few resources can kill thousands or The Limits of Democracy even hundreds o’ thousands o’ Ameri- Promotion cans. The United States cannot ¥x the world’s problems, but nor does it have Stephen D. Krasner the luxury o’ ignoring them. Washington should take a third course, adopting a foreign policy that keeps the hroughout its history, the United country safe by working with the rulers States has oscillated between the world has, not the ones the United Ttwo foreign policies. One aims States wishes it had. That means adopt- to remake other countries in the Ameri- ing policies abroad that can improve can image. The other regards the rest o’ other states’ security, boost their economic the world as essentially beyond repair. growth, and strengthen their ability to According to the second vision, Wash- deliver some services while nevertheless ington should demonstrate the bene¥ts accommodating a despotic ruler. For the o’ consolidated democracy—free and fair purposes o’ U.S. security, it matters elections, a free press, the rule o‘ law, more that leaders in the rest o’ the world the separation o’ powers, and an active govern well than it does that they civil society—but not seek to impose govern democratically. And in any case, those things on other countries. The helping ensure that others govern George W. Bush administration took the well—or at least well enough—may be the ¥rst approach. The Obama administra- best that U.S. foreign policy can hope to tion took the second, as has the Trump achieve in most countries. administration, choosing to avoid actively trying to promote freedom and democ- THE WAY WE LIVED THEN racy in other countries. Homo sapiens has been around for about Both strategies are, however, deeply 8,000 generations, and for most o’ that “awed. The conceit that the United time, life has been rather unpleasant. States can turn all countries into consoli- Life expectancy began to increase around dated democracies has been disproved 1850, just seven generations ago, and over and over again, from Vietnam to accelerated only after 1900. Prior to that point, the average person lived for STEPHEN D. KRASNER is Graham H. Stuart around 30 years (although high infant Professor of International Relations at Stanford mortality explained much o’ this ¥gure); University and a Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and today, life expectancy is in the high 70s the Hoover Institution. He is the author of How or above for wealthy countries and to Make Love to a Despot: An Alternative Foreign approaching 70 or more for many poor Policy for the Twenty-first Century (Liveright, 2020), from which this article is adapted. ones. In the past, women—rich and poor Copyright © 2020 by Stephen D. Krasner. alike—frequently died in childbirth.

March/April 2020 49

Book 1.indb 49 1/17/20 9:27 PM Stephen D. Krasner

Pandemic diseases, such as the Black nevertheless expressed a grudging Death, which wiped out more than admiration for the vitality o’ its democ- one-third o¤ Europe’s population in the racy.” Those people hoped, he wrote, that fourteenth century, were common. In the “the United States would support their Western Hemisphere, European colonists cause.” The trouble is that, regardless brought diseases that devastated indig- o’ such hopes, despotic leaders do not enous populations. Until the nineteenth want to provide bene¥ts to those they century, no country had the rule o‘ law; govern; they want to support with arms at best, countries had rule by law, in or money those who can keep them in which formal laws applied only to some. power. They will not accept policies that For most people, regardless o’ their social aim to end their rule. What’s more, rank, violence was endemic. Only in the organizing against a despot is dangerous last century or two has per capita and unusual. Revolutions are rare. income grown signi¥cantly. Most Despots usually stay in power. humans who have ever lived have done Yet although the United States cannot so under despotic regimes. build wealthy democracies abroad, it Most still do. Consolidated democracy, cannot ignore the problems o’ the rest in which the arbitrary power o’ the state o’ the world, either, contrary to what is constrained and almost all residents Americans have been told by people have access to the rule o‘ law, is a recent such as U.S. President Donald Trump, and unique development. The experience who in his ¥rst speech after he was o’ people living in wealthy industrialized elected said, “There is no global anthem, democracies since the end o‘ World War no global currency, no certi¥cate o’ II, with lives relatively free o’ violence, is global citizenship. We pledge allegiance the exception. Wealthy democratic states to one “ag, and that “ag is the Ameri- have existed for only a short period o’ can “ag. From now on, it’s going to be history, perhaps 150 years, and in only a America ¥rst, OK? America ¥rst. We’re few places in the world—western Europe, going to put ourselves ¥rst.” North America, Australasia, and parts o’ The trouble with wanting to withdraw Asia. Even today, only about 30 countries and focus on home is that, like it or not, are wealthy, consolidated democracies. globalization has indeed shrunk the world, Perhaps another 20 might someday make and technology has severed the relation- the leap, but most will remain in some ship between material resources and the form o’ despotism. ability to do harm. A few individuals in The United States cannot change badly governed and impoverished states that, despite the hopes o’ policymakers control enough nuclear and biological who served in the Bush administration weapons to kill millions o’ Americans. and scholars such as the political scientist And nuclear weapons are spreading. Larry Diamond. Last year, Diamond, Pakistan has sold nuclear technology to re“ecting on his decades o’ studying North Korea; the North Koreans might democratization all over the world, wrote one day sell it to somebody else. Nuclear that “even people who resented America weapons could fall into the hands o’ jihadi for its wealth, its global power, its groups. Pandemic diseases can arise arrogance, and its use o’ military force naturally in badly governed states and

50 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 50 1/17/20 9:27 PM Learning to Live With Despots

No James Madison: President Jair Bolsonaro in Belo Horizonte, Brazil, July 2019

could spread to the developed world, clear improvement in governance. killing millions. The technology needed Trying to eliminate corruption entirely to create arti¥cial pathogens is becom- may preclude eliminating the worst ing more widely available. For these forms o’ corruption. And greater security reasons, the United States has to play a may mean more violations o’ individual role in the outside world, whether it rights. Good government is not in the wants to or not, in order to lower the interests o’ the elites in most countries chances o’ the worst possible outcomes. the United States wants to change, where And because despots are here for the rulers will reject or undermine reforms foreseeable future, Washington will that could weaken their hold on power. always have to deal with them. That will A foreign policy with more limited mean promoting not good government aims, by contrast, might actually achieve but good enough governance. Good more. Greater security, some economic government is based on a Western ideal growth, and the better provision o’ some in which the government delivers a services is the best the United States

PILAR wide variety o’ services to the popula- can hope for in most countries. Achieving tion based on the rule o‘ law, with laws good enough governance is feasible, OLIVARES determined by representatives selected would protect U.S. interests, and would through free and fair elections. Good not preclude progress toward greater

/ REUTERS government is relatively free o’ corrup- democracy down the road. tion and provides reliable security for all Policies aiming for good enough citizens. But pushing for elections governance have already succeeded. often results only in bloodshed, with no The best example comes from Colombia,

March/April 2020 51

Book 1.indb 51 1/17/20 9:27 PM Stephen D. Krasner

where for the past two decades, the THE SWEET SPOT United States has sought to curb violence American naiveté about the likelihood o’ and drug tra¾cking by providing ¥nan- creating wealthy democratic states has cial aid, security training, military been based on a widely held view o’ technology, and intelligence under what development and democracy known as was known until 2016 as Plan Colombia “modernization theory.” This theory holds (now Peace Colombia). The results have that wealth and democracy can be at- been remarkable. Between 2002 and tained relatively easily. All that is neces- 2008, homicides in Colombia dropped sary are population growth and techno- by 45 percent. Between 2002 and 2012, logical progress. Greater wealth begets kidnappings dropped by 90 percent. Since greater democracy, which in turn begets the turn o’ the century, Colombia has greater wealth. I’ countries can ¥nd the improved its scores on a number o’ ¥rst step o’ the escalator, they can ride it governance measures, including control all the way to the top. Yet modernization o’ corruption, the rule o‘ law, govern- theory has a conspicuous failure: it ment eectiveness, and government cannot explain why consolidated democ- accountability. That progress culmi- racy has emerged only very recently, nated in 2016 with a peace deal between only in a small number o’ countries, and the government and the guerilla move- only in certain geographic areas. ment the «³®Å (Revolutionary Armed U.S. leaders have also been in“u- Forces o’ Colombia). enced by a second perspective on devel- Yet despite Plan Colombia’s success, opment, one that emphasizes institutional it has not transformed the country. capacity. They have usually assumed that Violence has declined, but Colombia is rulers in poorly governed states want to not yet on the path to becoming a do the right thing but fail because their consolidated democracy. A narrow elite governments do not have the capacity to still dominates the country. Colombia’s govern well, not because the rulers want high economic inequality has not to stay in power. But theories that stress budged. Elections matter, but they serve institutional capacity fall at the ¥rst mostly to transfer power from one hurdle: they cannot explain why leaders segment o’ the ruling class to another. in most countries would want to act in Colombia’s elites accepted intrusive the best interests o’ their populations U.S. assistance not because they were rather than in their own best interests. committed to making the country a U.S. leaders would be more successful consolidated democracy but because, by i’ they adopted a third theory o’ devel- the 1990s, violence in Colombia had opment: rational choice institutionalism. reached such an extreme level that the This theory emphasizes the importance country was near collapse. Without U.S. o’ elites and stresses that only under help, the elites would not have been certain conditions will they be willing to able to maintain their position. Plan tie their own hands and adopt policies Colombia provides both a model for U.S. that bene¥t the population as a whole. intervention elsewhere and a sobering The sweet spot, in which the govern- reminder o’ the limits o’ change that ment is strong enough to provide key can be brought from the outside. services but does not repress its people,

52 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 52 1/17/20 9:27 PM Learning to Live With Despots

has been achieved by only a few polities. who saw aligning with Washington as As James Madison wrote in The Federalist the best o’ di¾cult choices. General Papers, no. 51, “In framing a govern- Douglas MacArthur allied with the ment which is to be administered by emperor o’ Japan rather than trying him men over men, the great di¾culty lies in as a war criminal. Hirohito was no this: you must ¥rst enable the govern- democrat. But the alternative, a commu- ment to control the governed; and in nist system, was even worse. the next place oblige it to control itself.” There is no teleological trajectory, no No wiser words on government have natural and inevitable path from extrac- ever been written. tive, closed states to inclusive, open Rational choice institutionalism states. Sustained economic growth and makes it clear that wealth and democracy consolidated democracy have eluded are not the natural order o’ things. most societies. Progress requires aligning More wealth and a large middle class may the incentives o’ repressive elites with make democracy more likely, but they those o’ the repressed masses. This has do not guarantee it. Luck matters, too. happened rarely and has depended on I’ the wind had blown in a dierent many factors that cannot be controlled direction in June 1588, the Spanish by outside powers. Armada might have been able to support the Duke o¤ Parma’s invasion o¤ Eng- GOOD ENOUGH FOR GOVERNMENT land. Queen Elizabeth I would probably WORK have been deposed. Great Britain might The United States can still exert in“u- never have become the birthplace o’ the ence on the rest o’ the world, but it Industrial Revolution or the cradle o’ must carefully tailor its strategy to ¥t liberty. Likewise, in 1940, i’ the waters the circumstances. There are three main o’ the English Channel had prevented kinds o’ countries: wealthy, consoli- the small boats from rescuing the British dated democracies, countries that are Expeditionary Force from Dunkirk, transitional (with a mix o’ democratic the British government might have and nondemocratic features), and sought peace, and Nazi Germany might despotic regimes. have been able to devote all its resources O’ the world’s wealthy countries, to the defeat o’ the Soviet Union. The de¥ned as having a per capita annual outcome o‘ World War II might have income greater than $17,000, around 30 been very dierent. are consolidated democracies according Pointing out that outside actors to the measures used by the Center for cannot usually create democracy, eec- Systemic Peace’s Polity Project, which tive government, and a free-market rates the democratic quality o’ countries economy hardly amounts to a revelation. on a scale o’ negative ten to ten. All the The successes in West Germany, Italy, consolidated democracies (with the and Japan after World War II were exception o’ Australia and New Zea- aberrations made possible by the power land) are in East Asia, Europe, or o’ the United States, the delegitimiza- North America. The United States can tion o¤ fascist governments, and the best help these countries by working to existence o‘ local members o’ the elite perfect its own democracy, as well as

March/April 2020 53

Book 1.indb 53 1/17/20 9:27 PM Stephen D. Krasner

strengthening the U.S. alliance system, The key to helping these places reach containing or deterring threats to the consolidated democracy is to identify U.S.-led order, keeping trade barriers and support the right local leaders. low, and sharing intelligence. Even democratic elections, after all, can Demonstrating the eectiveness o’ produce leaders with little commitment democracy is not an easy task. The U.S. to democracy, such as Brazilian Presi- Constitution is di¾cult to change. dent Jair Bolsonaro and Turkish Presi- What worked at the end o’ the eight- dent Recep Tayyip Erdogan. And some eenth century does not necessarily work leaders who have only a limited com- today. The U.S. Senate is growing less mitment to democracy can prove to be democratic as the population ratio valuable partners, as Hirohito did in between the most populous and the Japan after World War II. least populous state increases. That Knowing which leaders are likely to ratio was about 13 to 1 (Virginia to deliver good enough governance—re- Delaware) when the Constitution was gardless o’ their commitment to democ- written; it is now more than 60 to 1 racy—requires an intimate knowledge o’ (California to Wyoming). This means local elites, their beliefs, and their that a small part o’ the population (less followers. To that end, the U.S. State than 20 percent) can frustrate legisla- Department should alter its practice o’ tion. The Internet has changed political moving Foreign Service o¾cers from communication. Anyone can publish post to post every two or three years and anything, including groups acting at the instead institute longer stays so that they direction o¤ foreign entities, which can can develop a close, deep understanding now in“uence U.S. politics far more o’ the countries to which they are cheaply and easily than in the past. And assigned. The department will also need as digital technology advances, distin- to ¥nd ways to allow Foreign Service guishing between true and false infor- o¾cers to have greater access to and mation will only become harder. more in“uence with top decision-makers. Imperfect though American democracy With luck, the United States, work- may be, Washington can nevertheless ing with other advanced democracies, help countries that are in transition. The might succeed in moving some countries best chances exist in the 19 countries toward consolidated democracy and the with per capita annual incomes between greater wealth that comes from unleash- $7,000 and $17,000 and Polity scores o’ ing individual initiative and constraining six or higher, a group that includes the state from seizing its fruits. Most Botswana, Brazil, Croatia, Malaysia, and o’ the world’s polities, however, are not Panama. The most promising candidates going to make the jump to sustained in this group are former satellite states growth or full democracy. In those places, o’ the Soviet Union, such as Bulgaria most o’ which are poor, despots are too and Romania, which have relatively high anxious to cling to power. Here, too, incomes and levels o’ education, robust the most important task is to pick the ¯º development programs, and, in many right leaders to support. First, Washing- cases, leaders who want their countries ton should ask not whether local elites to be a part o¤ Europe. are committed to democratic values but

54 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 54 1/17/20 9:27 PM Learning to Live With Despots

whether they can maintain eective the United States should give it because security within their borders. The United it helps individuals and not because it States should support these leaders with will lead to good government. security assistance. Local elites might Washington can succeed only i’ its also accept help from Washington that policies align with the interests o‘ local would result in improvements in public rulers; in most cases, those rulers will services, especially health care, because be despots. Tolerating them and even better public health might mean more cooperating with them may be anath- popular support. Finally, rulers in ema to many Americans. But the despotic regimes might accept assistance alternatives—hubristically trying to in boosting economic growth, provided remake the world in the image o’ the that such growth does not threaten their United States or pretending that own hold on power. Washington can simply ignore leaders it The question is how to provide such dislikes—would be even worse.∂ assistance. Outside actors have di¾culty suggesting reforms because they have their own interests and only limited knowledge o‘ local conditions. A more realistic approach that can achieve good enough governance would start with a series o’ practical questions. For exam- ple, U.S. policymakers should be asking i’ the government o¤ Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi is inclusive and competent enough to establish stability, not whether the general came to power through a coup. I’ the answer is yes, then the United States should support Egypt’s security forces, help strengthen the regime’s provision o’ public health services, and open U.S. markets to at least some Egyptian exports. Similar considerations should guide U.S. policy elsewhere. For example, Washington should be asking i’ there are local leaders in Afghanistan and Iraq who could provide stability, regardless o’ their past sins or how they might have come to power. The United States should acknowledge that there is little it can do to alter the political systems in China and Russia, despotic states with strong central governments. Humanitarian aid is a good thing, but

March/April 2020 55

Book 1.indb 55 1/17/20 9:27 PM Rarely, however, does this debate Getting to Less touch on the real question at the heart o’ defense spending: what the U.S. military should be doing and should be The Truth About Defense prepared to do. The closer one looks at Spending the details o’ military spending, the clearer it becomes that although radical Kathleen Hicks defense cuts would require dangerous shifts in strategy, there are savings to be had. Getting them, however, would n the question o‘ how much to require making politically tough choices, spend on national defense, as embracing innovative thinking, and COME HOME, AMERICA? Owith so much else, Americans asking the armed forces to do less than are divided. A Gallup poll taken in 2019 they have in the past. The end result found that 25 percent o’ them think the would be a less militarized yet more United States spends too little on its globally competitive United States. military, 29 percent believe it spends too much, and 43 percent think it is spend- UP AND DOWN ing about the right amount—a remark- Since World War II, U.S. defense spend- able degree o’ incoherence for politicians ing has followed a well-worn pattern o’ trying to interpret the public’s will. rising during major operations and falling President Donald Trump, having cam- (although never by equal measure) in paigned on a promise to “rebuild” the their aftermath. At the outset o’ the U.S. military, has touted the “billions and Korean War, in 1950, military spending billions o’ dollars more” he has added to grew by a remarkable 290 percent in the Pentagon’s budget each year o‘ his two years—reaching $692 billion in tenure. On the campaign trail, some current dollars and 13 percent o’ ±½Ä— Democratic candidates are moving in the before declining by 51 percent between opposite direction. To free up money for 1952 and 1955. During the Vietnam her health-care plan, Senator Elizabeth War, it grew again, hitting $605 billion Warren o¤ Massachusetts has said she in current dollars and nine percent o’ plans to slash defense spending. Like- ±½Ä in 1968, after which it dropped by wise, Senator Bernie Sanders o‘ Vermont 25 percent between then and 1975. But has said that in order to “invest in the as Cold War tensions rose in the late working families o’ this country and 1970s and early 1980s, Presidents Jimmy protect the most vulnerable,” the United Carter and Ronald Reagan increased States should put an end to “massive the Pentagon’s budget. After the fall o’ spending on a bloated military budget.” the Soviet Union, it shrank again under Presidents George H. W. Bush and Bill KATHLEEN HICKS is Director of the Interna- tional Security Program at the Center for Clinton, with spending falling 34 Strategic and International Studies. She served percent between 1985 and 1997. in the U.S. Defense Department for 17 years, Then came 9/11. The wars that including as a senior oicial in the Obama administration responsible for defense followed, in Afghanistan and Iraq, caused strategy, plans, and force development. defense spending to shoot up again,

56 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 56 1/17/20 9:27 PM Getting to Less

reaching almost $820 billion and 4.7 today as it was in 2010, at the height o’ percent o’ ±½Ä in 2010. Spending kept the combined U.S. troop presence in climbing through the Obama adminis- Afghanistan and Iraq. What is more tration’s budget for ¥scal year 2012, useful is to look at how the money is only to run into the budget stando in spent. Broadly speaking, there are three Congress and the resultant automatic purposes toward which the funds can cuts (or so-called budget sequestration) be directed: making the military ready o’ 2013. For the next three years, for today (readiness), preparing it for spending fell slightly in accordance with tomorrow (investment), and designing congressional budget caps. and sizing it (structure). The drop didn’t last long. Soon, Russia Consider some o’ the new tasks the annexed Crimea, the Islamic State (or U.S. military has taken on to deal with °´°´) emerged in Iraq and Syria, and the threat posed by Russia in the wake China expanded its campaign o‘ land o’ its annexation o’ Crimea. To improve reclamation in the South China Sea. And readiness, it has upped the pace o’ so U.S. military spending started rising military exercises in eastern Europe and again, beginning with the budget for ¥scal trained new armored forces. In terms o’ year 2016, the last one enacted under the investment, it has increased the research, Obama administration. It increased even development, and procurement o’ more in 2017, after the inauguration o’ short-range missile and air defense Trump, who had campaigned on the systems. As for structure, it has deployed need to build up the military. During his more forces in Bulgaria, Poland, Roma- ¥rst three years in o¾ce, Trump deliv- nia, and the Baltic states. ered modest annual growth in defense The challenge o‘ how to apportion spending, assisted by the newfound resources plays out across a wide array willingness o¤ Republicans to raise o’ U.S. interests, including nuclear spending caps and the availability o’ the deterrence, counterterrorism, and the Overseas Contingency Operations assurance o’ the free “ow o’ commerce account—a budget line not subject to in the Paci¥c Ocean. Currently, spending congressionally imposed budget caps that is split almost equally among those was originally created to fund the wars three categories. Clearly de¥ned priori- in Afghanistan and Iraq but is now used ties make it easier to accept tradeos for a much broader range o’ purposes. between various missions and time frames, In ¥scal year 2020, the United States is but ¥nding the perfect balance is always set to spend some $738 billion on defense. di¾cult. Doing that involves the tricky Is that too little, too much, or just business o’ predicting global and right? Looking merely at the numbers is domestic trends—including the desires not particularly helpful. On the one o¤ future policymakers. hand, defense spending now constitutes a smaller percentage o’ ±½Ä and federal THE WRONG WAY TO CUT discretionary spending than at any time Making the right strategic choices can go since 1962. On the other hand, in a long way toward getting the most out in“ation-adjusted dollars, the Defense o’ the defense budget, but it is also Department is spending almost as much crucial that the Pentagon execute those

March/April 2020 57

Book 1.indb 57 1/17/20 9:27 PM Kathleen Hicks

choices in an e¾cient manner. In practice, from budget cuts. Indeed, during both however, eorts to wring out savings from the Clinton and the Obama adminis- e¾ciency have tended to fall “at. Too trations, the Defense Department often, policymakers have harbored outsize undertook major eorts to increase expectations, achieved short-lived results, e¾ciency by reducing management and dodged politically di¾cult choices. sta¾ng across the department, espe- One common error has been the cially the jobs o¤ federal civilian temptation to reach for the easiest, employees, and Secretary o¤ Defense rather than the smartest, cuts—to slash Mark Esper has sought to do the same. the budget items that can be reduced But the savings achieved from such quickly and without much o’ a political eorts are usually far less than pro- ¥ght. A good example o’ this is research jected. Predictably, for example, even and development. Compared with though Congress directed the Defense procurement, R & D is relatively easy Department to cut $10 billion through to cut fast: whereas halting production administrative e¾ciencies between o’ a major weapons system can threaten 2015 and 2019, the Pentagon failed to thousands o’ jobs, shutting down a substantiate that it had achieved those program at an earlier stage o’ develop- savings. The reason these eorts rarely ment generally threatens far fewer. Yet succeed is that they merely shift the R & D is the lifeblood o¤ future capa- work being done by civilians to others, bilities, and cuts made today have such as military personnel or defense consequences a decade down the line, contractors. It is especially foolish, when the military could be forced to then, to count on those imagined savings forgo its advantage or play an expensive while planning future budgets, as the game o’ catch-up. Another go-to Pentagon typically does. cost-saving strategy is to defer spending Yet another error is to assume away on scheduled maintenance and keep missions despite strong evidence that they ships, planes, and other equipment in the will remain relevant. Perhaps the most ¥eld longer. AgaÉn, the eects are felt egregious example o’ this was the years later, this time in the form o’ George W. Bush administration’s failure higher accident rates and fewer combat- to plan for the occupation o¤ Iraq. ready units. Poor maintenance partly From the beginning o’ that war, Secre- explains why the Marine Corps saw tary o¤ Defense Donald Rumsfeld aviation accidents rise by 80 percent resisted calls from the U.S. Army to between 2013 and 2017 and why in the fall ready more troops for a stabilization o’ 2019 every single one o’ the U.S. mission, resulting in chaos in the country Navy’s six East Coast–based aircraft and untold human, ¥nancial, and carriers was sitting in dry dock. strategic costs. After a four-year delay, Another error has been the re“exive Rumsfeld was forced out, and the Penta- tendency to concentrate on reducing gon and the White House ultimately sta at headquarters. As in the corpo- reversed his approach with the 2007 rate world, cutting overhead can signal U.S. troop surge. For the defense resolve, by showing that the leadership strategist or budgeter, it can be tempting is willing to absorb some o’ the pain to believe that today’s problems will

58 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 58 1/17/20 9:27 PM Getting to Less

The price is right: the USS John F. Kennedy in Virginia, October 2019 fade, or that tomorrow’s problems will quo leaves much room for improvement. magically solve themselves, but history Closing military installations is suggests otherwise. another third rail. The Defense Depart- Policymakers also make the mistake ment itsel admits that it has 19 percent o avoiding politically challenging cuts. excess capacity domestically, and by Personnel costs are one o the touchiest consolidating or closing unneeded targets. Adjusting for in‹ation, spend- facilities, Congress could reap major sav- ing per active-duty member o the ings. But legislators, fearful o the military grew by more than 60 percent political consequences o shutting down between 1999 and 2019. Part o the rise bases in their own districts, have is attributable to increases in cash declined to do so. It has been 15 years compensation, but most has to do with since the last round o closures, and it bene’ts. Over the same period, the is long past time for another one, costs o military health care alone more which, after some upfront costs, could than doubled. Yet policymakers have save several billion dollars every year. taken only modest steps to check the Similarly, politicians have been reluc- explosion o personnel costs, failing to tant to curtail procurement programs ALAMY slow the growth o military pay or bring that have outlived their usefulness. Doing

PHOTO STOCK insurance copays in line with those in so could make room for new investments the private health-care market. Any better tailored to future challenges but changes in these areas would need to take would carry big political costs: lost jobs, into account goals about recruiting and shuttered facilities, and bankrupt retaining capable people, but the status defense suppliers. These are not easy

March/April 2020 59

09_Hicks_pp_Blues.indd 59 1/20/20 7:28 PM Kathleen Hicks

choices, but the pain can be lessened aggressors at bay. It could back out o’ through job-transition programs akin to current treaty commitments, forsaking the ones that have traditionally accom- permanent alliances in favor o’ temporary panied base closures. coalitions. The military could shed much o’ its conventional power-projection STRATEGY AND SPENDING capability, especially its ground forces, but Strategic fallacies have been equally retain enough for a limited set o’ mis- unhelpful in the quest for defense savings. sions: securing the means o’ American Consider Trump’s repeated pledge to commerce, responding to direct attacks as bring U.S. troops home. Overseas needed, and thwarting terrorists before military spending is a tempting target, they attack. It could lay o tens o’ since it is politically safer to cut than thousands o’ military personnel and funds spent at home. But keeping forces federal workers. stationed on allied soil is often cheaper But it is worth remembering just how than moving them to the United States, radical a departure such a strategy where their presence is not subsidized by would be. The defense o’ places such as foreign governments and where signi¥- Alaska, Guam, and Hawaii—far from cant new spending would be needed to the continental United States—would house, train, and deploy them. be particularly di¾cult with the military Or look at Warren’s call for “shutting that this strategy would buy. American down a slush fund for defense spend- people and businesses abroad would ing”—liquidating the entire Overseas have to accept that their interests and Contingency Operations account and security would be protected more by the using the freed-up money for nonde- United States’ diplomatic and economic fense priorities. That proposal is also power than by its military might. deeply misguided: the majority o’ the Nuclear proliferation would surely grow, account covers expenses not directly as former allies no longer covered by the related to the U.S. presence in Afghan- U.S. nuclear umbrella, along with foes istan, Iraq, and Syria. It pays for eorts sensing an American retreat, would seek as varied as the stationing o’ ground to build their own nuclear capabilities. and air forces in Europe, naval opera- And perhaps most important, i’ the tions in the Persian Gul’ and the United States changed its mind and Indian Ocean, and the ability to scram- decided that it needed to regenerate its ble jets over American cities in the military capabilities, it might not be able event o’ an emergency. to do so quickly, and it would almost Short o¤ full-scale disarmament, the certainly pay a substantial premium i’ it most radical approach to reducing tried. Given the strategic price, an defense spending would be to adopt a “America ¥rst” strategy is not a rational truly “America ¥rst” national security choice—and is in no way a bargain. strategy. One could imagine ways to reap $100 billion or so in defense cuts, A DIFFERENT PATH which could grow over time. The There is a better way. A wiser strategy, United States could rely largely on its and one more in line with public nuclear deterrent to keep would-be opinion, would build trust in the United

60 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 60 1/17/20 9:27 PM Getting to Less

States’ promises and reimagine the military prowess, which gives credence United States’ role as a leader in solving to both commitments to allies and the most di¾cult global challenges, even threats to enemies. To maintain that as it accepted that American primacy was type o’ credibility, the United States not what it used to be. Under this will need to keep forces deployed strategy, the United States would nur- overseas, especially in Asia and Europe. ture, rather than spurn, allies, cultivating It will need to rea¾rm its commitment a vital—and increasingly imperiled—ad- to extended nuclear deterrence for its vantage over China and Russia. Working treaty allies, which has the added in concert with like-minded states, bene¥t o’ strengthening nonproliferation Washington would protect the global by reducing their incentives to go nuclear. economy so as to allow private com- It will need to contribute to combined merce and free people to “ourish even eorts to head o threats in the air, the in the face o’ rising authoritarianism. sea, space, and cyberspace. And it will At the same time, U.S. allies would be need to retain its counterterrorism and expected to take primary responsibility crisis-response capabilities in and around for their own defense. the Middle East, even as it reduces its Abroad, the United States would overall force levels in the region. build out its nonmilitary tools o’ This strategy would require reshap- foreign policy, appointing ambassadors ing the defense budget. As ever, the and building back up cadres o’ U.S. military would need to navigate painful diplomats and development workers. At tradeos among readiness, investment, home, it would build up its sources o’ and structure, since all three types o’ strength, devoting more resources to spending are needed to keep pace with education (which, by increasing the pool China and Russia. Yet because this o’ quali¥ed candidates, reduces the costs strategy envisions a somewhat smaller o’ military recruitment and training), force, the Pentagon could spend less on investing in R & D (which generates structure, which would in turn lessen innovation that bene¥ts the military), the pressure on the other two catego- and letting in a healthy in“ux o’ immi- ries. In terms o’ investment, it could grants with science, technology, engi- favor long-term priorities over upgrades neering, and math skills (which would o’ current hardware. Spending on also promote innovation). The end readiness would have to be kept high, result would be a lesser burden on the although the absolute costs would go U.S. military—especially for security down since the force would be smaller. missions that fall short o’ war, such as At the same time as they reshaped the cyber-operations and counterterror- overall priorities o’ defense spending, ism—and thus reduced defense costs. policymakers could seek to generate the Nevertheless, military capabilities political courage and cultural changes to still have an important role to play. achieve savings within it. Here, domestic The United States’ armed forces and foreign policy objectives can con- underwrite its economic prosperity and verge. Lowering overall health-care costs, strengthen its alliances. American for instance, also lowers the cost o’ diplomacy is stronger when it rests on military health insurance, which is second

March/April 2020 61

Book 1.indb 61 1/17/20 9:27 PM Kathleen Hicks

only to pay as the biggest driver o’ States’ primacy is fading calls for a new growing personnel spending in the mili- approach, especially as authoritarian tary. Investments in education, infra- competitors pursue new strategies to structure, and programs that help hasten the decline o’ American power. workers transition between jobs have The time is right, then, for a grand the added bene¥t o’ making it easier for strategy that expands the range o’ politicians to stop protecting manufac- foreign policy tools well beyond what turing plants that produce yesterday’s defense spending buys. equipment and instead invest in capa- But for all the savings that can and bilities for tomorrow. Strong trade with should be had, it’s worth remembering trusted democracies reduces the costs o’ that the least expensive military is small, supplying the military. Closing and rarely used, inexpensively housed, and consolidating excess defense installa- poorly paid. That is not a military that tions is perhaps the hardest political Americans want or need. Poll after poll hurdle to jump, but Congress could ease has shown that a large majority o’ the pain by using existing transition- Americans believe that their prosperity assistance programs to encourage and security are tied to events beyond commercial redevelopment in places U.S. borders. Protecting the country that stand to lose military facilities. from foreign threats and securing U.S. But to truly achieve enduring capabili- interests abroad will necessarily involve ties and savings, the military would have costly military power. to embrace a culture o’ innovation and It’s also worth remembering that the experimentation. There are ways to core o’ the United States’ ¥scal challenge encourage that. The secretary o’ defense is not discretionary spending, such as could, for example, create special funds the budget for defense, but the inability for which the various branches and to make up the shortfall between commands o’ the military would compete, declining tax revenue and the increasing with the winning ideas getting written costs o’ the social safety net and grow- into the budget. The Pentagon could also ing interest on the national debt. In place a premium on agility and foresight other words, the United States may not when it awarded promotions. be able to ¥nance the future it seeks Together, these choices—reshaping primarily through defense savings. But overall strategy, pursuing politically it can build a better and more e¾cient di¾cult e¾ciency gains, and cultivating defense for its future.∂ innovation—would yield substantial savings. After some upfront investment, the Defense Department could expect to reduce its annual costs by some $20 billion to $30 billion.

WHAT AMERICANS WANT For too long, Washington has had an overly militarized approach to national security. A world in which the United

62 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 62 1/17/20 9:27 PM ESSAYS In the conduct of foreign policy, and especially in times of crisis, a nation’s word is its most valuable asset. –Joseph Biden MARK Why America Must Lead Again Too Big to Prevail MAKELA Joseph R. Biden, Jr. 64 Ganesh Sitaraman 116

/ THE How the Good War Went Bad Saving America’s Alliances

NEW Carter Malkasian 77 Mira Rapp-Hooper 127

YORK The Epidemic o Despair Mean Streets

TIMES Anne Case and Angus Deaton 92 Janette Sadik-Khan and Seth Solomonow 141

/ REDUX The Digital Dictators Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Erica Frantz, and Joseph Wright 103

10_Essay_div_Blues.indd 63 1/20/20 7:16 PM Why America Must Lead Again Rescuing U.S. Foreign Policy After Trump Joseph R. Biden, Jr.

y nearly every measure, the credibility and in“uence o’ the United States in the world have diminished since President BBarack Obama and I left o¾ce on January 20, 2017. President Donald Trump has belittled, undermined, and in some cases abandoned U.S. allies and partners. He has turned on our own intelligence profes- sionals, diplomats, and troops. He has emboldened our adversaries and squandered our leverage to contend with national security challenges from North Korea to Iran, from Syria to Afghanistan to Venezuela, with practically nothing to show for it. He has launched ill-advised trade wars, against the United States’ friends and foes alike, that are hurting the American middle class. He has abdicated American leadership in mobilizing collective action to meet new threats, especially those unique to this century. Most profoundly, he has turned away from the demo- cratic values that give strength to our nation and unify us as a people. Meanwhile, the global challenges facing the United States—from cli- mate change and mass migration to technological disruption and infec- tious diseases—have grown more complex and more urgent, while the rapid advance o’ authoritarianism, nationalism, and illiberalism has un- dermined our ability to collectively meet them. Democracies—paralyzed by hyperpartisanship, hobbled by corruption, weighed down by extreme inequality—are having a harder time delivering for their people. Trust in democratic institutions is down. Fear o’ the Other is up. And the in- ternational system that the United States so carefully constructed is coming apart at the seams. Trump and demagogues around the world are leaning into these forces for their own personal and political gain.

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., served as Vice President of the United States from 2009 to 2017 and is a candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination.

64 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 64 1/17/20 9:27 PM Why America Must Lead Again

The next U.S. president will have to address the world as it is in January 2021, and picking up the pieces will be an enormous task. He or she will have to salvage our reputation, rebuild condence in our leadership, and mobilize our country and our allies to rapidly meet new challenges. There will be no time to lose. As president, I will take immediate steps to renew U.S. democracy and alliances, protect the United States’ economic future, and once more have America lead the world. This is not a moment for fear. This is the time to tap the strength and audacity that took us to victory in two world wars and brought down the Iron Curtain. The triumph o‚ democracy and liberalism over fascism and autoc- racy created the free world. But this contest does not just dene our past. It will dene our future, as well.

RENEWING DEMOCRACY AT HOME First and foremost, we must repair and reinvigorate our own democ- racy, even as we strengthen the coalition o‚ democracies that stand with us around the world. The United States’ ability to be a force for progress in the world and to mobilize collective action starts at home. That is why I will remake our educational system so that a child’s op- portunity in life isn’t determined by his or her zip code or race, re- form the criminal justice system to eliminate inequitable disparities and end the epidemic o‚ mass incarceration, restore the Voting Rights Act to ensure that everyone can be heard, and return transparency and accountability to our government. But democracy is not just the foundation o‚ American society. It is also the wellspring o‚ our power. It strengthens and amplies our leadership to keep us safe in the world. It is the engine o‚ our ingenuity that drives our economic prosperity. It is the heart o‚ who we are and how we see the world—and how the world sees us. It allows us to self-correct and keep striving to reach our ideals over time. As a nation, we have to prove to the world that the United States is prepared to lead again—not just with the example o‚ our power but also with the power o‚ our example. To that end, as president, I will take decisive steps to renew our core values. I will immedi- ately reverse the Trump administration’s cruel and senseless policies that separate parents from their children at our border; end Trump’s detrimental asylum policies; terminate the travel ban; order a re- view oŒ Temporary Protected Status, for vulnerable populations;

March/April 2020 65

11_Biden_proof_3_Blues.indd 65 1/20/20 4:54 PM Joseph R. Biden, Jr.

and set our annual refugee admissions at 125,000, and seek to raise it over time, commensurate with our responsibility and our values. I will rea¾rm the ban on torture and restore greater transparency in U.S. military operations, including policies instituted during the Obama-Biden administration to reduce civilian casualties. I will restore a government-wide focus on lifting up women and girls around the world. And I will ensure As a nation, we have to that the White House is once again prove to the world that the the great defender—not the chie’ assailant—o’ the core pillars and in- United States is prepared to stitutions o’ our democratic values, lead again. from respecting freedom o’ the press, to protecting and securing the sacred right to vote, to upholding judicial independence. These changes are just a start, a day-one down payment on our commitment to liv- ing up to democratic values at home. I will enforce U.S. laws without targeting particular communities, violating due process, or tearing apart families, as Trump has done. I will secure our borders while ensuring the dignity o’ migrants and upholding their legal right to seek asylum. I have released plans that outline these policies in detail and describe how the United States will focus on the root causes driving immigrants to our southwestern border. As vice president, I secured bipartisan support for a $750 mil- lion aid program to back up commitments from the leaders o¤ El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras to take on the corruption, vio- lence, and endemic poverty driving people to leave their homes there. Security improved and migration “ows began to decrease in coun- tries such as El Salvador. As president, I will build on that initiative with a comprehensive four-year, $4 billion regional strategy that re- quires countries to contribute their own resources and undertake sig- ni¥cant, concrete, veri¥able reforms. I will also take steps to tackle the self-dealing, con“icts o’ inter- est, dark money, and rank corruption that are serving narrow, pri- vate, or foreign agendas and undermining our democracy. That starts by ¥ghting for a constitutional amendment to completely eliminate private dollars from federal elections. In addition, I will propose a law to strengthen prohibitions on foreign nationals or governments trying to in“uence U.S. federal, state, or local elec- tions and direct a new independent agency—the Commission on

66 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 66 1/17/20 9:27 PM Why America Must Lead Again

Federal Ethics—to ensure vigorous and uni¥ed enforcement o’ this and other anticorruption laws. The lack o’ transparency in our cam- paign ¥nance system, combined with extensive foreign money laun- dering, creates a signi¥cant vulnerability. We need to close the loopholes that corrupt our democracy. Having taken these essential steps to reinforce the democratic foundation o’ the United States and inspire action in others, I will invite my fellow democratic leaders around the world to put strength- ening democracy back on the global agenda. Today, democracy is under more pressure than at any time since the 1930s. Freedom House has reported that o’ the 41 countries consistently ranked “free” from 1985 to 2005, 22 have registered net declines in freedom over the last ¥ve years. From Hong Kong to Sudan, Chile to Lebanon, citizens are once more reminding us o’ the common yearning for honest governance and the universal abhorrence o’ corruption. An insidious pandemic, corruption is fueling oppression, corroding human dignity, and equip- ping authoritarian leaders with a powerful tool to divide and weaken democracies across the world. Yet when the world’s democracies look to the United States to stand for the values that unite the country—to truly lead the free world—Trump seems to be on the other team, tak- ing the word o’ autocrats while showing disdain for democrats. By presiding over the most corrupt administration in modern American history, he has given license to kleptocrats everywhere. During my ¥rst year in o¾ce, the United States will organize and host a global Summit for Democracy to renew the spirit and shared purpose o’ the nations o’ the free world. It will bring together the world’s democracies to strengthen our democratic institutions, hon- estly confront nations that are backsliding, and forge a common agenda. Building on the successful model instituted during the Obama-Biden administration with the Nuclear Security Summit, the United States will prioritize results by galvanizing signi¥cant new country commitments in three areas: ¥ghting corruption, de- fending against authoritarianism, and advancing human rights in their own nations and abroad. As a summit commitment o’ the United States, I will issue a presidential policy directive that estab- lishes combating corruption as a core national security interest and democratic responsibility, and I will lead eorts internationally to bring transparency to the global ¥nancial system, go after illicit tax

March/April 2020 67

Book 1.indb 67 1/17/20 9:27 PM Joseph R. Biden, Jr.

havens, seize stolen assets, and make it more di¾cult for leaders who steal from their people to hide behind anonymous front companies. The Summit for Democracy will also include civil society organi- zations from around the world that stand on the frontlines in de- fense o’ democracy. And the summit members will issue a call to action for the private sector, including technology companies and social media giants, which must recognize their responsibilities and overwhelming interest in preserving democratic societies and pro- tecting free speech. At the same time, free speech cannot serve as a license for technology and social media companies to facilitate the spread o’ malicious lies. Those companies must act to ensure that their tools and platforms are not empowering the surveillance state, gutting privacy, facilitating repression in China and elsewhere, spreading hate and misinformation, spurring people to violence, or remaining susceptible to other misuse.

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE MIDDLE CLASS Second, my administration will equip Americans to succeed in the global economy—with a foreign policy for the middle class. To win the competition for the future against China or anyone else, the United States must sharpen its innovative edge and unite the eco- nomic might o’ democracies around the world to counter abusive eco- nomic practices and reduce inequality. Economic security is national security. Our trade policy has to start at home, by strengthening our greatest asset—our middle class—and making sure that everyone can share in the success o’ the country, no matter one’s race, gender, zip code, religion, sexual ori- entation, or disability. That will require enormous investments in our infrastructure—broadband, highways, rail, the energy grid, smart cities—and in education. We must give every student the skills necessary to obtain a good twenty-¥rst-century job; make sure every single American has access to quality, aordable health care; raise the minimum wage to $15 an hour; and lead the clean economy revolution to create ten million good new jobs—including union jobs—in the United States. I will make investment in research and development a corner- stone o’ my presidency, so that the United States is leading the charge in innovation. There is no reason we should be falling behind China or anyone else when it comes to clean energy, quantum com-

68 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 68 1/17/20 9:27 PM Joseph R. Biden, Jr.

puting, arti cial intelligence, 5G, high-speed rail, or the race to end cancer as we know it. We have the greatest research universities in the world. We have a strong tradition o the rule o law. And most important, we have an extraordinary population o workers and in- novators who have never let our country down. A foreign policy for the middle class will also work to make sure the rules o the international economy are not rigged against the United States—because when American businesses compete on a fair playing eld, they win. I believe in fair trade. More than 95 per- cent o the world’s population lives beyond our borders—we want to tap those markets. We need to be able to build the very best in the United States and sell the very best around the world. That means taking down trade barriers that penalize Americans and resisting a dangerous global slide toward protectionism. That’s what happened a century ago, after World War I—and it exacerbated the Great De- pression and helped lead to World War II. The wrong thing to do is to put our heads in the sand and say no more trade deals. Countries will trade with or without the United States. The question is, Who writes the rules that govern trade? Who will make sure they protect workers, the environment, transparency, and middle- class wages? The United States, not China, should be leading that e•ort. As president, I will not enter into any new trade agreements until we have invested in Americans and equipped them to succeed in the global economy. And I will not negotiate new deals without having labor and environmental leaders at the table in a meaningful way and without including strong enforcement provisions to hold our partners to the deals they sign. China represents a special challenge. I have spent many hours with its leaders, and I understand what we are up against. China is playing the long game by extending its global reach, promoting its own po- litical model, and investing in the technologies o the future. Mean- while, Trump has designated imports from the United States’ closest allies—from Canada to the European Union—as national security threats in order to impose damaging and reckless tari•s. By cutting us o• from the economic clout o our partners, Trump has kneecapped our country’s capacity to take on the real economic threat. The United States does need to get tough with China. I China has its way, it will keep robbing the United States and American companies o their technology and intellectual property. It will also keep using

70   

11_Biden_proof_3_Blues.indd 70 1/20/20 4:59 PM Why America Must Lead Again

subsidies to give its state-owned enterprises an unfair advantage—and a leg up on dominating the technologies and industries o’ the future. The most eective way to meet that challenge is to build a united front o’ U.S. allies and partners to confront China’s abusive behaviors and human rights violations, even as we seek to cooperate with Bei- jing on issues where our interests converge, such as climate change, nonproliferation, and global health security. On its own, the United States represents about a quarter o’ global ±½Ä. When we join to- gether with fellow democracies, our strength more than doubles. China can’t aord to ignore more than hal’ the global economy. That gives us substantial leverage to shape the rules o’ the road on every- thing from the environment to labor, trade, technology, and transpar- ency, so they continue to re“ect democratic interests and values.

BACK AT THE HEAD OF THE TABLE The Biden foreign policy agenda will place the United States back at the head o’ the table, in a position to work with its allies and part- ners to mobilize collective action on global threats. The world does not organize itself. For 70 years, the United States, under Demo- cratic and Republican presidents, played a leading role in writing the rules, forging the agreements, and animating the institutions that guide relations among nations and advance collective security and prosperity—until Trump. I’ we continue his abdication o’ that responsibility, then one o’ two things will happen: either someone else will take the United States’ place, but not in a way that advances our interests and values, or no one will, and chaos will ensue. Either way, that’s not good for America. American leadership is not infallible; we have made missteps and mistakes. Too often, we have relied solely on the might o’ our mili- tary instead o’ drawing on our full array o’ strengths. Trump’s disas- trous foreign policy record reminds us every day o’ the dangers o’ an unbalanced and incoherent approach, and one that defunds and denigrates the role o’ diplomacy. I will never hesitate to protect the American people, including, when necessary, by using force. O’ all the roles a president o’ the United States must ¥ll, none is more consequential than that o’ com- mander in chief. The United States has the strongest military in the world, and as president, I will ensure it stays that way, making the investments necessary to equip our troops for the challenges o’ this

March/April 2020 71

Book 1.indb 71 1/17/20 9:27 PM Joseph R. Biden, Jr.

century, not the last one. But the use o¤ force should be the last re- sort, not the ¥rst. It should be used only to defend U.S. vital inter- ests, when the objective is clear and achievable, and with the informed consent o’ the American people. It is past time to end the forever wars, which have cost the United States untold blood and treasure. As I have long argued, we should bring the vast majority o’ our troops home from the wars in Afghanistan and the Middle East and narrowly de¥ne our Diplomacy should be the mission as defeating al Qaeda and the žrst instrument of Islamic State (or °´°´). We should also end our support for the Saudi-led war in American power. Yemen. We must maintain our focus on counterterrorism, around the world and at home, but staying entrenched in unwinnable con“icts drains our ca- pacity to lead on other issues that require our attention, and it prevents us from rebuilding the other instruments o’ American power. We can be strong and smart at the same time. There is a big dif- ference between large-scale, open-ended deployments o’ tens o’ thousands o’ American combat troops, which must end, and using a few hundred Special Forces soldiers and intelligence assets to sup- port local partners against a common enemy. Those smaller-scale missions are sustainable militarily, economically, and politically, and they advance the national interest. Yet diplomacy should be the ¥rst instrument o’ American power. I am proud o’ what American diplomacy achieved during the Obama- Biden administration, from driving global eorts to bring the Paris climate agreement into force, to leading the international response to end the Ebola outbreak in West Africa, to securing the landmark multilateral deal to stop Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. Diplo- macy is not just a series o‘ handshakes and photo ops. It is building and tending relationships and working to identify areas o’ common interest while managing points o’ con“ict. It requires discipline, a coherent policymaking process, and a team o’ experienced and em- powered professionals. As president, I will elevate diplomacy as the United States’ principal tool o¤ foreign policy. I will reinvest in the diplomatic corps, which this administration has hollowed out, and put U.S. diplomacy back in the hands o’ genuine professionals. Diplomacy also requires credibility, and Trump has shattered ours. In the conduct o¤ foreign policy, and especially in times o’

72 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 72 1/17/20 9:27 PM Why America Must Lead Again

crisis, a nation’s word is its most valuable asset. By pulling out o’ treaty after treaty, reneging on policy after policy, walking away from U.S. responsibilities, and lying about matters big and small, Trump has bankrupted the United States’ word in the world. He has also alienated the United States from the very democratic allies it needs most. He has taken a battering ram to the ²³µ¬ alli- ance, treating it like an American-run protection racket. Our allies should do their fair share, which is why I’m proud o’ the commit- ments the Obama-Biden administration negotiated to ensure that ²³µ¬ members increase their defense spending (a move Trump now claims credit for). But the alliance transcends dollars and cents; the United States’ commitment is sacred, not transactional. N³µ¬ is at the very heart o’ the United States’ national security, and it is the bulwark o’ the liberal democratic ideal—an alliance o’ values, which makes it far more durable, reliable, and powerful than part- nerships built by coercion or cash. As president, I will do more than just restore our historic partner- ships; I will lead the eort to reimagine them for the world we face today. The Kremlin fears a strong ²³µ¬, the most eective political- military alliance in modern history. To counter Russian aggression, we must keep the alliance’s military capabilities sharp while also ex- panding its capacity to take on nontraditional threats, such as weap- onized corruption, disinformation, and cybertheft. We must impose real costs on Russia for its violations o’ international norms and stand with Russian civil society, which has bravely stood up time and again against President Vladimir Putin’s kleptocratic authoritarian system. Working cooperatively with other nations that share our values and goals does not make the United States a chump. It makes us more secure and more successful. We amplify our own strength, extend our presence around the globe, and magnify our impact while sharing global responsibilities with willing partners. We need to fortify our collective capabilities with democratic friends beyond North America and Europe by reinvesting in our treaty alliances with Australia, Ja- pan, and South Korea and deepening partnerships from India to In- donesia to advance shared values in a region that will determine the United States’ future. We need to sustain our ironclad commitment to Israel’s security. And we need to do more to integrate our friends in Latin America and Africa into the broader network o’ democracies and to seize opportunities for cooperation in those regions.

March/April 2020 73

Book 1.indb 73 1/17/20 9:27 PM Joseph R. Biden, Jr.

In order to regain the con¥dence o’ the world, we are going to have to prove that the United States says what it means and means what it says. This is especially important when it comes to the chal- lenges that will de¥ne our time: climate change, the renewed threat o’ nuclear war, and disruptive technology. The United States must lead the world to take on the existential threat we face—climate change. I’ we don’t get this right, nothing else will matter. I will make massive, urgent investments at home that put the United States on track to have a clean energy economy with net-zero emissions by 2050. Equally important, because the United States creates only 15 percent o’ global emissions, I will lever- age our economic and moral authority to push the world to deter- mined action. I will rejoin the Paris climate agreement on day one o’ a Biden administration and then convene a summit o’ the world’s major carbon emitters, rallying nations to raise their ambitions and push progress further and faster. We will lock in enforceable commit- ments that will reduce emissions in global shipping and aviation, and we will pursue strong measures to make sure other nations can’t un- dercut the United States economically as we meet our own commit- ments. That includes insisting that China—the world’s largest emitter o’ carbon—stop subsidizing coal exports and outsourcing pollution to other countries by ¥nancing billions o’ dollars’ worth o’ dirty fos- sil fuel energy projects through its Belt and Road Initiative. On nonproliferation and nuclear security, the United States can- not be a credible voice while it is abandoning the deals it negotiated. From Iran to North Korea, Russia to Saudi Arabia, Trump has made the prospect o’ nuclear proliferation, a new nuclear arms race, and even the use o’ nuclear weapons more likely. As president, I will renew our commitment to arms control for a new era. The historic Iran nuclear deal that the Obama-Biden administration negotiated blocked Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. Yet Trump rashly cast the deal aside, prompting Iran to restart its nuclear program and become more provocative, raising the risk o’ another disastrous war in the region. I’m under no illusions about the Iranian regime, which has engaged in destabilizing behavior across the Middle East, bru- tally cracked down on protesters at home, and unjustly detained Americans. But there is a smart way to counter the threat that Iran poses to our interests and a self-defeating way—and Trump has cho- sen the latter. The recent killing o’ Qasem Soleimani, the com-

74 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 74 1/17/20 9:27 PM Why America Must Lead Again

mander o¤ Iran’s Quds Force, removed a dangerous actor but also raised the prospect o’ an ever-escalating cycle o’ violence in the re- gion, and it has prompted Tehran to jettison the nuclear limits es- tablished under the nuclear deal. Tehran must return to strict compliance with the deal. I’ it does so, I would rejoin the agreement and use The United States cannot our renewed commitment to diplomacy be a credible voice while it to work with our allies to strengthen and extend it, while more eectively is abandoning the deals it pushing back against Iran’s other de- negotiated. stabilizing activities. With North Korea, I will empower our negotiators and jump- start a sustained, coordinated campaign with our allies and others, including China, to advance our shared objective o’ a denuclearized North Korea. I will also pursue an extension o’ the New ´µ³®µ treaty, an anchor o’ strategic stability between the United States and Russia, and use that as a foundation for new arms control ar- rangements. And I will take other steps to demonstrate our commit- ment to reducing the role o’ nuclear weapons. As I said in 2017, I believe that the sole purpose o’ the U.S. nuclear arsenal should be deterring—and, i’ necessary, retaliating against—a nuclear attack. As president, I will work to put that belie’ into practice, in consulta- tion with the U.S. military and U.S. allies. When it comes to technologies o’ the future, such as 5G and arti- ¥cial intelligence, other nations are devoting national resources to dominating their development and determining how they are used. The United States needs to do more to ensure that these technolo- gies are used to promote greater democracy and shared prosperity, not to curb freedom and opportunity at home and abroad. For ex- ample, a Biden administration will join together with the United States’ democratic allies to develop secure, private-sector-led 5G networks that do not leave any community, rural or low income, be- hind. As new technologies reshape our economy and society, we must ensure that these engines o’ progress are bound by laws and ethics, as we have done at previous technological turning points in history, and avoid a race to the bottom, where the rules o’ the digital age are written by China and Russia. It is time for the United States to lead in forging a technological future that enables democratic societies to thrive and prosperity to be shared broadly.

March/April 2020 75

Book 1.indb 75 1/17/20 9:27 PM Joseph R. Biden, Jr.

These are ambitious goals, and none o’ them can be reached with- out the United States—“anked by fellow democracies—leading the way. We are facing adversaries, both externally and internally, hoping to exploit the ¥ssures in our society, undermine our democracy, break up our alliances, and bring about the return o’ an international system where might determines right. The answer to this threat is more openness, not less: more friendships, more cooperation, more alliances, more democracy.

PREPARED TO LEAD Putin wants to tell himself, and anyone else he can dupe into believ- ing him, that the liberal idea is “obsolete.” But he does so because he is afraid o’ its power. No army on earth can match the way the electric idea o‘ liberty passes freely from person to person, jumps borders, transcends languages and cultures, and supercharges communities o’ ordinary citizens into activists and organizers and change agents. We must once more harness that power and rally the free world to meet the challenges facing the world today. It falls to the United States to lead the way. No other nation has that capacity. No other nation is built on that idea. We have to champion liberty and democ- racy, reclaim our credibility, and look with unrelenting optimism and determination toward our future.∂

76 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 76 1/17/20 9:27 PM How the Good War Went Bad America’s Slow-Motion Failure in Afghanistan Carter Malkasian

he United States has been ¥ghting a war in Afghanistan for over 18 years. More than 2,300 U.S. military personnel have lost their Tlives there; more than 20,000 others have been wounded. At least hal’ a million Afghans—government forces, Taliban ¥ghters, and civil- ians—have been killed or wounded. Washington has spent close to $1 tril- lion on the war. Although the al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden is dead and no major attack on the U.S. homeland has been carried out by a ter- rorist group based in Afghanistan since 9/11, the United States has been unable to end the violence or hand o the war to the Afghan authorities, and the Afghan government cannot survive without U.S. military backing. At the end o’ 2019, The Washington Post published a series titled “The Afghanistan Papers,” a collection o’ U.S. government documents that included notes o’ interviews conducted by the special inspector general for Afghanistan reconstruction. In those interviews, numer- ous U.S. o¾cials conceded that they had long seen the war as unwin- nable. Polls have found that a majority o’ Americans now view the war as a failure. Every U.S. president since 2001 has sought to reach a point in Afghanistan when the violence would be su¾ciently low or the Afghan government strong enough to allow U.S. military forces to withdraw without signi¥cantly increasing the risk o’ a resurgent ter- rorist threat. That day has not come. In that sense, whatever the future brings, for 18 years the United States has been unable to prevail.

CARTER MALKASIAN is the author of War Comes to Garmser: Thirty Years of Conflict on the Afghan Frontier. From 2015 to 2019, he was Senior Adviser to U.S. General Joseph Dunford, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Sta“.

March/April 2020 77

Book 1.indb 77 1/17/20 9:27 PM Carter Malkasian

The obstacles to success in Afghanistan were daunting: widespread corruption, intense grievances, Pakistani meddling, and deep-rooted resistance to foreign occupation. Yet there were also “eeting opportu- nities to ¥nd peace, or at least a more sustainable, less costly, and less violent stalemate. American leaders failed to grasp those chances, thanks to unjusti¥ed overcon¥dence following U.S. military victories and thanks to their fear o‘ being held responsible i’ terrorists based in Afghanistan once again attacked the United States. Above all, o¾cials in Washington clung too long to their preconceived notions o‘ how the war would play out and neglected opportunities and options that did not ¥t their biases. Winning in Afghanistan was always going to be di¾cult. Avoidable errors made it impossible.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF A LONG WAR On October 7, 2001, U.S. President George W. Bush launched an in- vasion o’ Afghanistan in retaliation for the 9/11 attacks. In the months that followed, U.S. and allied forces and their partners in the North- ern Alliance, an Afghan faction, chased out al Qaeda and upended the Taliban regime. Bin Laden “ed to Pakistan; the leader o’ the Taliban, Mullah Omar, went to the mountains. Taliban commanders and ¥ght- ers returned to their homes or escaped to safe havens in Pakistan. Skillful diplomatic eorts spearheaded by a U.S. special envoy, Zal- may Khalilzad, established a process that created a new Afghan gov- ernment led by the conciliatory Hamid Karzai. For the next four years, Afghanistan was deceptively peaceful. The U.S. military deaths during that time represent just a tenth o’ the total that have occurred during the war. Bush maintained a light U.S. military footprint in the country (around 8,000 troops in 2002, in- creasing to about 20,000 by the end o’ 2005) aimed at completing the defeat o’ al Qaeda and the Taliban and helping set up a new democ- racy that could prevent terrorists from coming back. The idea was to withdraw eventually, but there was no clear plan for how to make that happen, other than killing or capturing al Qaeda and Taliban leaders. Still, political progress encouraged optimism. In January 2004, an Af- ghan loya jirga, or grand council, approved a new constitution. Presi- dential and then parliamentary elections followed. All the while, Karzai strove to bring the country’s many factions together. But in Pakistan, the Taliban were rebuilding. In early 2003, Mul- lah Omar, still in hiding, sent a voice recording to his subordinates

78 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 78 1/17/20 9:27 PM How the Good War Went Bad

What, us worry? Karzai and Rumsfeld in Washington, D.C., September 2006

calling on them to reorganize the movement and prepare for a major o ensive within a few years. Key Taliban gures founded a leader- ship council known as the Quetta Shura, after the Pakistani city where they assembled. Training and recruitment moved forward. Cadres inltrated back into Afghanistan. In Washington, however, the narrative o€ success continued to hold sway, and Pakistan was still seen as a valuable partner. Violence increased slowly; then, in February 2006, the Taliban pounced. Thousands o€ insurgents overran entire districts and sur- rounded provincial capitals. The Quetta Shura built what amounted to a rival regime. Over the course o€ the next three years, the Tali- ban captured most o€ the country’s south and much o€ its east. U.S. forces and their ŒŽ‘’ allies were sucked into heavy ghting. By the end o€ 2008, U.S. troop levels had risen to over 30,000 without

JIM stemming the tide. Yet the overall strategy did not change. Bush

YOUNG remained determined to defeat the Taliban and win what he deemed “a victory for the forces o˜ liberty.” / REUTERS President Barack Obama came into ošce in January 2009 promis- ing to turn around what many o˜ his advisers and supporters saw as “the good war” in Afghanistan (as opposed to “the bad war” in Iraq,

March/April 2020 79

12_Malkasian_pp6_Blues.indd 79 1/20/20 7:17 PM Carter Malkasian

which they mostly saw as a lost cause). After a protracted debate, he opted to send reinforcements to Afghanistan: 21,000 troops in March and then, more reluctantly, another 30,000 or so in December, putting the total number o’ U.S. troops in the country at close to 100,000. Wary o’ overinvesting, he limited the goals o’ this “surge”—modeled on the one that had turned around the U.S. The Taliban exempližed an war in Iraq a few years earlier—to re- idea—resistance to moving the terrorist threat to the Amer- ican homeland. Gone was Bush’s intent occupation—that runs deep to defeat the Taliban no matter what, in Afghan culture. even though the group could not be trusted to stop terrorists from using Af- ghanistan as a refuge. Instead, the United States would deny al Qaeda a safe haven, reverse the Taliban’s momentum, and strengthen the Afghan government and its security forces. The plan was to begin a drawdown o’ the surge forces in mid-2011 and eventually hand o full responsibil- ity for the country’s security to the Afghan government. Over the next three years, the surge stabilized the most important cities and districts, vitalized the Afghan army and police, and rallied support for the government. The threat from al Qaeda fell after the 2011 death o‘ bin Laden at the hands o’ U.S. special operations forces in Pakistan. Yet the costs o’ the surge outweighed the gains. Between 2009 and 2012, more than 1,500 U.S. military personnel were killed and over 15,000 were wounded—more American casualties than dur- ing the entire rest o’ the 18-year war. At the height o’ the surge, the United States was spending approximately $110 billion per year in Afghanistan, roughly 50 percent more than annual U.S. federal spend- ing on education. Obama came to see the war eort as unsustainable. In a series o’ announcements between 2010 and 2014, he laid out a schedule to draw down U.S. military forces to zero (excluding a small embassy presence) by the end o’ 2016. By 2013, more than 350,000 Afghan soldiers and police had been trained, armed, and deployed. Their performance was mixed, marred by corruption and by “insider attacks” carried out on American and allied advisers. Many units depended on U.S. advisers and air sup- port to defeat the Taliban in battle. By 2015, just 9,800 U.S. troops were left in Afghanistan. As the withdrawal continued, they focused on counterterrorism and on ad- vising and training the Afghans. That fall, the Taliban mounted a

80 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 80 1/17/20 9:27 PM Carter Malkasian

series o well-planned oensives that became one o the most decisive events o the war. In the province o Kunduz, 500 Taliban ‚ghters routed some 3,000 Afghan soldiers and police and captured a provincial capital for the ‚rst time. In Helmand Province, around 1,800 Taliban ‚ghters defeated some 4,500 Afghan soldiers and police and recap- tured almost all the ground the group had lost in the surge. “They ran!” cried an angry Omar Jan, the most talented Afghan frontline commander in Helmand, when I spoke to him in early 2016. “Two thousand men. They had everything they needed—numbers, arms, ammunition—and they gave up!” Only last-minute reinforcements from U.S. and Afghan special operations forces saved the provinces. In battle after battle, numerically superior and well-supplied sol- diers and police in intact defensive positions made a collective decision to throw in the towel rather than go another round against the Taliban. Those who did stay to ‚ght often paid dearly for their courage: some 14,000 Afghan soldiers and police were killed in 2015 and 2016. By 2016, the Afghan government, now headed by Ashra Ghani, was weaker than ever before. The Taliban held more ground than at any time since 2001. In July o that year, Obama suspended the drawdown. When President Donald Trump took o¢ce in January 2017, the war raged on. He initially approved an increase o U.S. forces in Afghan- istan to roughly 14,000. Trump disliked the war, however, and, look- ing for an exit, started negotiations with the Taliban in 2018. Those negotiations have yet to bear fruit, and the level o violence and Afghan casualties rates in 2019 were on par with those o recent years.

THE INSPIRATION GAP Why did things go wrong? One crucial factor is that the Afghan gov- ernment and its warlord allies were corrupt and treated Afghans poorly, fomenting grievances and inspiring an insurgency. They stole land, distributed government jobs as patronage, and often tricked U.S. special operations forces into targeting their political rivals. This mistreatment pushed certain tribes into the Taliban’s arms, providing the movement with ‚ghters, a support network, and territory from which to attack. The experience o Raees Baghrani, a respected Alizai tribal leader, is typical. In 2005, after a Karzai-backed warlord disarmed him and stole some oª his land and that oª his tribesmen, Baghrani surrendered the rest oª his territory in Helmand to the Taliban. Many others like him felt forced into similar choices.

82   

12_Malkasian_pp6_Blues.indd 82 1/20/20 5:00 PM How the Good War Went Bad

Washington could have done more to address the corruption and the grievances that Afghans felt under the new regime and the U.S. occupation, such as pushing Karzai to remove the worst-oending o¾cials from their positions, making all forms o’ U.S. assistance contingent on reforms, and reducing special operations raids and the mistaken targeting o’ innocent Afghans. That said, the complex- ity o’ addressing corruption and grievances should not be underes- timated. No comprehensive solution existed that could have denied the Taliban a support base. Another major factor in the U.S. failure was Pakistan’s in“uence. Pakistan’s strategy in Afghanistan has always been shaped in large part by the Indian-Pakistani rivalry. In 2001, Pakistani President Pervez Musharra’ o¾cially cut o support for the Taliban at the behest o’ the Bush administration. But he soon feared that India was gaining in“uence in Afghanistan. In 2004, he reopened assis- tance to the Taliban, as he later admitted to The Guardian in 2015, because Karzai, he alleged, had “helped India stab Pakistan in the back” by allowing anti-Pakistan Tajiks to play a large role in his gov- ernment and by fostering good relations with India. The Pakistani military funded the Taliban, granted them a safe haven, ran training camps, and advised them on war planning. The critical mass o’ re- cruits for the 2006 oensive came from Afghan refugees in Paki- stan. A long succession o’ U.S. leaders tried to change Pakistani policy, all to no avail: it is unlikely that there was anything Washing- ton could have done to convince Pakistan’s leaders to take steps that would have risked their in“uence in Afghanistan. Underneath these factors, something more fundamental was at play. The Taliban exempli¥ed an idea—an idea that runs deep in Afghan culture, that inspired their ¥ghters, that made them power- ful in battle, and that, in the eyes o’ many Afghans, de¥nes an indi- vidual’s worth. In simple terms, that idea is resistance to occupation. The very presence o’ Americans in Afghanistan was an assault on what it meant to be Afghan. It inspired Afghans to defend their honor, their religion, and their homeland. The importance o’ this cul- tural factor has been con¥rmed and recon¥rmed by multiple surveys o‘ Taliban ¥ghters since 2007 conducted by a range o’ researchers. The Afghan government, tainted by its alignment with foreign occupiers, could not inspire the same devotion. In 2015, a survey o’ 1,657 police o¾cers in 11 provinces conducted by the Afghan Institute

March/April 2020 83

Book 1.indb 83 1/17/20 9:27 PM Carter Malkasian

for Strategic Studies found that only 11 percent o’ respondents had joined the force speci¥cally to ¥ght the Taliban; most o’ them had joined to serve their country or to earn a salary, motivations that did not necessarily warrant ¥ghting, much less dying. Many interviewees agreed with the claim that police “rank and ¥le are not convinced that they are ¥ghting for a just cause.” There can be little doubt that a far larger percentage o‘ Taliban ¥ghters had joined the group spe- ci¥cally to confront the United States and the Afghans who were cooperating with the Americans. This asymmetry in commitment explains why, at so many decisive moments, Afghan security forces retreated without putting up much o’ a ¥ght despite their numerical superiority and their having at least an equal amount o’ ammunition and supplies. As a Taliban religious scholar from Kandahar told me in January 2019, “The Taliban ¥ght for belief, for jannat [heaven] and ghazi [killing in¥dels]. . . . The army and police ¥ght for money. . . . The Taliban are willing to lose their heads to ¥ght. . . . How can the army and police compete with the Taliban?” The Taliban had an edge in inspiration. Many Afghans were willing to kill and be killed on behal’ o’ the Taliban. That made all the dierence.

MISSION ACCOMPLISHED These powerful factors have kept the United States and the Afghan government from prevailing. But failure was not inevitable. The best opportunities to succeed appeared early on, between 2001 and 2005. The Taliban were in disarray. Popular support for the new Afghan government was relatively high, as was patience with the foreign pres- ence. Unfortunately, U.S. decisions during that time foreclosed paths that might have avoided the years o’ war that followed. The ¥rst mistake was the Bush administration’s decision to exclude the Taliban from the postinvasion political settlement. Senior Taliban leaders tried to negotiate a peace deal with Karzai in December 2001. They were willing to lay down their arms and recognize Karzai as the country’s legitimate leader. But U.S. Secretary o¤ Defense Donald Rumsfeld shot down the deal—in a press conference, no less. After that, between 2002 and 2004, Taliban leaders continued to reach out to Karzai to ask to be allowed to participate in the political process. Karzai brought up these overtures to U.S. o¾cials only to have the Bush administration respond by banning negotiations with any top Taliban ¥gures. In the end, the new government was established

84 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 84 1/17/20 9:27 PM Make your next career move today.

CAREER CENTER

careers.foreignaairs.com Carter Malkasian

without the Taliban getting a seat at the table. Whether or not the entire group would have compromised, enough senior leaders were interested that future violence could have been lessened. After pushing the Taliban back to war, Bush and his team then moved far too slowly in building up the Afghan security forces. After the initial invasion, a year passed before Washington committed to building and funding a small national army o’ 70,000. Recruitment and training then proceeded haltingly. By 2006, only 26,000 Afghan army soldiers had been trained. So when the Taliban struck back that year, there was little to stop them. In his memoir, Bush concedes the error. “In an attempt to keep the Afghan government from taking on an unsustainable expense,” he writes, “we had kept the army too small.” The Bush administration thus missed the two best opportunities to ¥nd peace. An inclusive settlement could have won over key Tal- iban leaders, and capable armed forces could have held o the hold- outs. Overcon¥dence prevented the Bush team from seeing this. The administration presumed that the Taliban had been defeated. Barely two years after the Taliban regime fell, U.S. Central Com- mand labeled the group a “spent force.” Rumsfeld announced at a news conference in early 2003: “We clearly have moved from major combat activity to a period o’ stability and stabilization and recon- struction activities. . . . The bulk o’ the country today is permissive; it’s secure.” In other words, “Mission accomplished.” The ease o’ the initial invasion in 2001 distorted Washington’s perceptions. The administration disregarded arguments by Karzai, Khalilzad, U.S. Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry (then the sen- ior U.S. general in Afghanistan), Ronald Neumann (at the time the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan), and others that the insurgents were staging a comeback. Believing they had already won the war in Afghanistan, Bush and his team turned their attention to Iraq. And although the ¥asco in Iraq was not a cause o’ the failure in Afghani- stan, it compounded the errors in U.S. strategy by diverting the scarce time and attention o‘ key decision-makers.

“I DO NOT NEED ADVISERS” After 2006, the odds o’ a better outcome narrowed. The reemer- gence o’ the Taliban catalyzed further resistance to the occupation. U.S. airstrikes and night raids heightened a sense o’ oppression among Afghans and triggered in many an obligation to resist. After

86 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 86 1/17/20 9:27 PM How the Good War Went Bad

the Taliban oensive that year, it is hard to see how any strategy could have resulted in victory for the United States and the Afghan government. Nevertheless, a few points stand out when Washington might have cleared a way to a less bad outcome. The surge was one o’ them. In retrospect, the United States would have been better o i’ it had never surged at all. I‘ his campaign promises obligated some number o’ reinforcements, Obama still might have deployed fewer troops than he did—perhaps just the initial The intention to get out of tranche o’ 21,000. But General Stan- Afghanistan met reality ley McChrystal, the top U.S. com- mander in Afghanistan, and General and blinked. David Petraeus, the commander o’ U.S. Central Command, did not present the president with that kind o’ option: all their proposals involved further increases in the number o’ U.S. military personnel deployed to Afghanistan. Both generals be- lieved that escalation was warranted owing to the threat posed by the possible reestablishment o’ Afghanistan as a safe haven for terrorists. Both had witnessed how a counterinsurgency strategy and unswerv- ing resolve had turned things around in Iraq, and both thought the same could be done in Afghanistan. Their case that something had to be done and their overcon¥dence in counterinsurgency crowded out the practical alternative o¤ forgoing further reinforcements. Had Obama done less, U.S. casualties and expenses would likely have been far lower and still the conditions would have changed little. It is worth noting that the much-criticized 18-month deadline that Obama attached to the surge, although unnecessary, was not it- sel’ a major missed opportunity. There is scant evidence to support the charge that i’ Obama had given no timeline, the Taliban would have been more exhausted by the surge and would have given up or negotiated a settlement. But Obama did err when it came to placing restrictions on U.S. forces. Prior to 2014, U.S. airstrikes had been used when necessary to strike enemy targets, and commanders took steps to avoid civilian casualties. That year, however, as part o’ the drawdown process, it was decided that U.S. airstrikes in support o’ the Afghan army and police would be employed only “in extremis”—when a strategic location or major Afghan formation was in danger o’ imminent annihilation. The idea was to disentangle U.S. forces from combat and, to a lesser extent,

March/April 2020 87

Book 1.indb 87 1/17/20 9:27 PM Carter Malkasian

to reduce civilian casualties. As a result o’ the change, there was a pronounced reduction in the number o’ U.S. strikes, even as the Tali- ban gained strength. Into 2016, U.S. forces carried out an average o’ 80 airstrikes per month, less than a quarter o’ the monthly average for 2012. Meanwhile, over 500 airstrikes per month were being conducted in Iraq and Syria against a comparable adversary. “I’ America just helps with airstrikes and . . . supplies, we can win,” pleaded Omar Jan, the frontline commander in Helmand, in 2016. “My weapons are worn from shooting. My ammunition stocks are low. I do not need advisers. I just need someone to call when things are really bad.” The decision to use airstrikes only in extremis virtually ensured defeat. Obama had purchased too little insurance on his withdrawal policy. When the unexpected happened, he was unprepared. Bush had enjoyed the freedom to maneuver in Afghanistan for hal’ his presidency and had still passed up signi¥cant opportunities. Fac- ing far greater constraints, Obama had to play the cards he had been dealt. The Afghan government had been formed, violence had re- turned, and a spirit o’ resistance had arisen in the Afghan people. Obama’s errors derived less from a willful refusal to take advantage o’ clear opportunities than from oversights and miscalculations made under pressure. They nevertheless had major consequences.

FEAR OF TERROR Given the high costs and slim bene¥ts o’ the war, why hasn’t the United States simply left Afghanistan? The answer is the combina- tion o’ terrorism and U.S. electoral politics. In the post-9/11 world, U.S. presidents have had to choose between spending resources in places o’ very low geostrategic value and accepting some unknown risk o’ a terrorist attack, worried that voters will never forgive them or their party i’ they underestimate the threat. Nowhere has that dynamic been more evident than in Afghanistan. In the early years after the 9/11 attacks, the political atmosphere in the United States was charged with fears o’ another assault. Throughout 2002, various Gallup polls showed that a majority o’ Americans believed that another attack on the United States was likely. That is one reason why Bush, after having overseen the initial defeat o’ al Qaeda and the Taliban, never considered simply declar- ing victory and bringing the troops home. He has said that an option o’ “attack, destroy the Taliban, destroy al Qaeda as best we could,

88 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 88 1/17/20 9:27 PM How the Good War Went Bad

and leave” was never appealing because “that would have created a vacuum [in] which . . . radicalism could become even stronger.” The terrorist threat receded during the ¥rst hal’ o’ Obama’s pres- idency, yet he, too, could not ignore it, and its persistence took the prospect o’ a full withdrawal from Afghanistan o the table in the run-up to the surge. According to the available evidence, at no point during the debate over the surge did any high-level Obama adminis- tration o¾cial advocate such a move. One concern was that with- drawing completely would have opened up the administration to intense criticism, possibly disrupting Obama’s domestic agenda, which was focused on reviving the U.S. economy after the ¥nancial crisis o’ 2008 and the subsequent recession. Only after the surge and the death o‘ bin Laden did a “zero option” become conceivable. Days after bin Laden was captured and killed, in May 2011, a Gallup poll showed that 59 percent o’ Americans believed the U.S. mission in Afghanistan had been accomplished. “It is time to focus on nation building here at home,” Obama announced in his June 2011 address on the drawdown. Even so, concerns about the ability o’ the Afghan government to contain the residual terrorist threat defeated pro- posals, backed by some members o’ the administration, to fully withdraw more quickly. Then, in 2014, the rise o’ the Islamic State (or °´°´) in Iraq and Syria and a subsequent string o‘ high-pro¥le terrorist attacks in Eu- rope and the United States made even the original, modest drawdown schedule less strategically and politically feasible. After the setbacks o’ 2015, the U.S. intelligence community assessed that i’ the drawdown went forward on schedule, security could deteriorate to the point where terrorist groups could once again establish safe havens in Afghanistan. Confronted with that ¥nding, Obama essentially accepted the advice o’ his top generals to keep U.S. forces there, provide greater air support to the Afghan army and police, and continue counterterrorism operations in the country. The intention to get out had met reality and blinked. So far, a similar fate has befallen Trump, the U.S. president with the least patience for the mission in Afghanistan. With Trump agi- tating for an exit, substantive talks between the Taliban and the United States commenced in 2018. An earlier eort between 2010 and 2013 had failed because the conditions were not ripe: the White House was occupied with other issues, negotiating teams were not in place, and Mullah Omar, the Taliban’s leader, was in seclusion— and then died in 2013. By 2019, those obstacles no longer stood in

March/April 2020 89

Book 1.indb 89 1/17/20 9:27 PM Carter Malkasian

the way, and Trump was uniquely determined to leave. The result was the closest the United States has come to ending the war. Khalilzad, once again serving as a special envoy, made quick prog- ress by oering a timeline for the complete withdrawal o’ U.S. forces in return for the Taliban engaging in negotiations with the Afghan government, reducing violence as the two sides worked toward a com- prehensive cease-¥re, and not aiding al Qaeda or other terrorist groups. Over the course o’ nine rounds o’ talks, the two sides devel- oped a draft agreement. The Taliban representatives in the talks and the group’s senior leaders refused to meet all o¤ Khalilzad’s conditions. But the initial agreement was a real opportunity for Trump to get the United States out o’ Afghanistan and still have a chance at peace. It fell apart. Although Trump toyed with the idea o‘ holding a dra- matic summit to announce a deal at Camp David in September 2019, he was torn between his campaign promise to end “endless wars” and the possibility o’ a resurgent terrorist threat, which could harm him politically. During an interview with Fox News in August, he was dis- tinctly noncommittal about fully withdrawing. “We’re going down to 8,600 [troops], and then we’ll make a determination from there,” he said, adding that a “high intelligence presence” would stay in the coun- try. So when the Taliban drastically escalated their attacks in the run- up to a possible announcement, killing one American soldier and wounding many more, Trump concluded that he was getting a bad deal and called o the negotiations, blasting the Taliban as untrustworthy. Trump, like Obama before him, would not risk a withdrawal that might someday make him vulnerable to the charge o’ willingly unlocking the terrorist threat. And so yet another chance to end the war slipped away. The notion that the United States should have just left Afghani- stan presumes that a U.S. president was free to pull the plug as he pleased. In reality, getting out was nearly as di¾cult as prevailing. It was one thing to boldly promise that the United States would leave in the near future. It was quite another to peer over the edge when the moment arrived, see the uncertainties, weigh the political fallout o’ a terrorist attack, and still take the leap.

EXPECT THE BAD, PREPARE FOR THE WORST The United States failed in Afghanistan largely because o’ intracta- ble grievances, Pakistan’s meddling, and an intense Afghan commit- ment to resisting occupiers, and it stayed largely because o’ unrelenting

90 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 90 1/17/20 9:27 PM How the Good War Went Bad

terrorist threats and their eect on U.S. electoral politics. There were few chances to prevail and few chances to get out. In this situation, a better outcome demanded an especially well- managed strategy. Perhaps the most important lesson is the value o¤ fore- thought: considering a variety o’ outcomes rather than focusing on the preferred one. U.S. presidents and generals repeatedly saw their plans fall short when what they expected to happen did not: for Bush, when the Taliban turned out not to be defeated; for McChrystal and Petraeus, when the surge proved unsustainable; for Obama, when the terrorist threat re- turned; for Trump, when the political costs o‘ leaving proved steeper than he had assumed. I’ U.S. leaders had thought more about the dier- ent ways that things could play out, the United States and Afghanistan might have experienced a less costly, less violent war, or even found peace. This lack o¤ forethought is not disconnected from the revelation in The Washington Post’s “Afghanistan Papers” that U.S. leaders misled the American people. A single-minded focus on preferred outcomes had the unhealthy side eect o’ sidelining inconvenient evidence. In most cases, determined U.S. leaders did this inadvertently, or be- cause they truly believed things were going well. At times, however, evidence o¤ failure was purposefully swept under the rug. Afghanistan’s past may not be its future. Just because the war has been di¾cult to end does not mean it will go on inde¥nitely. Last November, Trump reopened talks with the Taliban. A chance exists that Khalilzad will conjure a political settlement. I’ not, Trump may decide to get out anyway. Trump has committed to reducing force levels to roughly the same number that Obama had in place at the end o‘ his term. Further reductions could be pending. Great-power competition is the rising concern in Washington. With the death last year o’ °´°´’s leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the shadow o’ 9/11 might at last recede, and the specter o’ terrorism might lose some o’ its in“uence on U.S. politics. At the same time, the roiling U.S. con- frontation with Iran is a wild card that could alter the nature o’ the Afghan war, including by re-entrenching the American presence. But none o’ that can change the past 18 years. Afghanistan will still be the United States’ longest war. Americans can best learn its lessons by studying the missed opportunities that kept the United States from making progress. Ultimately, the war should be under- stood neither as an avoidable folly nor as an inevitable tragedy but rather as an unresolved dilemma.∂

March/April 2020 91

Book 1.indb 91 1/17/20 9:27 PM The Epidemic of Despair Will America’s Mortality Crisis Spread to the Rest o’ the World? Anne Case and Angus Deaton

ince the mid-1990s, the United States has been suering from an epidemic o’ “deaths o’ despair”—a term we coined in 2015 to Sdescribe fatalities caused by drug overdose, alcoholic liver dis- ease, or suicide. The inexorable increase in these deaths, together with a slowdown and reversal in the long-standing reduction in deaths from heart disease, led to an astonishing development: life expectancy at birth for Americans declined for three consecutive years, from 2015 through 2017, something that had not happened since the in“uenza pandemic at the end o‘ World War I. In the twentieth century, the United States led the way in reducing mortality rates and raising life expectancy. Many important health improvements—such as the decline in mortality from heart disease as a result o’ reductions in smoking and the increased use o’ antihyper- tensives and the decrease in infant mortality rates because o’ the de- velopment o’ neonatal intensive care units—originated in the United States and precipitated mortality reductions elsewhere as knowledge, medicines, and techniques spread. Now, the United States may be leading Western nations in the opposite direction. Might American deaths o’ despair spread to other developed countries? On the one hand, perhaps not. Parsing the data shows just how uniquely bleak the situation is in the United States. When it comes to deaths o’ despair, the United States is

ANNE CASE is Alexander Stewart 1886 Professor of Economics and Public A“airs Emerita at Princeton University, where she is Director of the Research Program in Development Studies.

ANGUS DEATON is Dwight D. Eisenhower Professor of Economics and International A“airs Emeritus at Princeton University. He was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2015.

They are the authors of the forthcoming book Deaths of Despair and the Future of Capitalism.

92 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 92 1/17/20 9:27 PM The Epidemic of Despair

hopefully less a bellwether than a warning, an example for the rest o the world o what to avoid. On the other hand, there are genuine reasons for concern. Already, deaths from drug overdose, alcohol, and suicide are on the rise in Australia, Canada, Ireland, and the United Kingdom. Although those countries have better health-care systems, stronger safety nets, and better control o opioids than the United States, their less educated citizens also face the relentless threats o globalization, outsourcing, and automation that erode working-class ways o life throughout the West and have helped fuel the crisis o deaths o despair in the United States.

AN AMERICAN MALADY Mortality rates in the United States fell through the last three quar- ters o the twentieth century. But then, in the late 1990s, the progress slowed—and soon went into reverse. A major reason for the decline in life expectancy is increasing mor- tality in midlife, between the ages o 25 and 64, when the most rapidly rising causes o death are accidental poisoning (nearly always from a drug overdose), alcoholic liver disease, and suicide. Overdoses are the most prevalent o the three types o deaths o despair, killing 70,000 Americans in 2017 and more than 700,000 since 2000. The 2017 total is more than the annual deaths from “”•– at its peak in 1995 and more than the total number o U.S. deaths in the Vietnam War; the total since 2000 outstrips the number o U.S. deaths in both world wars. The U.S. suicide rate has risen by a third since 1999; there are now more suicides than deaths on the roads each year, and there are two and a hal times as many suicides as murders. In 2017 alone, there were 158,000 deaths o despair, the equivalent o three fully loaded Boeing 737 ›“œ jets falling out o the sky every day for a year. Younger birth cohorts—Americans born more recently—face a higher risk o dying from drugs, alcohol, or suicide at any given age than older cohorts, and their deaths rise more rapidly with age than was the case for earlier cohorts. This increase in mortality is similar for men and women, although the base rates for women are lower; women are less likely to die by suicide than men and less likely to overdose or to succumb to alcohol. African Americans did not Ÿgure greatly in this trend until 2013; the subsequent rise in their deaths is attributable in part to a sudden slowdown in progress against heart disease and a rapid increase in deaths from drugs laced with fentanyl, a deadly opioid that hit the

March/April 2020 93

13_Case_Deaton_Blues.indd 93 1/20/20 7:42 PM Anne Case and Angus Deaton

streets in 2013. Until then, the epidemic o’ deaths o’ despair was largely con¥ned to white non-Hispanic Americans. The increase in deaths o’ despair has been almost exclusively among Americans without a four-year college degree. A bachelor’s degree ap- pears to be a shield against whatever is driving the increase in deaths from drugs, alcohol, and suicide. The proportion o’ the midlife popu- lation with an undergraduate degree has changed little in recent years, so any possible changes in the type o’ people who graduate from col- lege are not what’s shaping this pattern. It was long believed that sui- cide was an aÊiction o’ the more educated. The suicide rates for the more and less educated in the United States are virtually identical for people born before 1945, but they diverge markedly by education for those born later in the century: for Americans born in 1970, for ex- ample, the suicide rate for non-college graduates is more than twice that o’ college graduates. About two-thirds o’ white non-Hispanic Americans do not have a bachelor’s degree, 42 percent o’ the adult population, and it is this group that is most at risk o’ deaths o’ despair.

ACROSS THE POND The United States is not entirely alone in seeing a rise in deaths o’ despair. These three categories o’ death are, o’ course, present every- where, but most rich countries show no upward trend. The exceptions are the English-speaking countries, which all show some increase since 2000, although their mortality rates from deaths o’ despair re- main much lower than those o’ the United States. No other country has seen parallel increases in all three kinds o’ deaths o’ despair, nor are their rates o’ such deaths close to those in the United States. The United Kingdom oers an informative case. Deaths o’ despair in England and Wales have risen steadily since 1990. There was a large upsurge in alcohol-related liver mortality in the 1990s and early years o’ this century, but that has subsided in recent years. Suicide rates have risen since 2000, but most o’ the growth in deaths o’ de- spair comes from drug overdoses. Deaths o’ despair are now more common in midlife than deaths from heart disease, long a major killer. But despite those unfortunate trends, the mortality rate from deaths o’ despair in England and Wales is still less than hal’ o’ the rate in the United States. (One black spot in the United Kingdom as a whole is Scotland, where, thanks to illegal drug use, the rate o’ deaths from drug overdose is almost at the U.S. level.)

94 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 94 1/17/20 9:27 PM The Epidemic of Despair

Drown your sorrows: in a bar in Janesville, Wisconsin, June 2009

Data linking level o’ education to deaths o’ despair are not generally available in countries outside the United States. However, there are several studies indicating that the gap in the rate o’ mortality (from all causes o’ death taken together) between those with low levels o’ edu- cation and those with high levels has been closing over time in several European countries, including the United Kingdom, in sharp contrast to what has been happening in recent years in the United States. U.S. rates o’ suicide have climbed to such an extent that the country ¥nds itsel’ drifting away from its Western counterparts and into a group DANNY WILCOX FRAZIER that includes the countries o’ eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, which have long suered from high suicide rates. Trends in life expectancy at birth also reveal how the United States diers from other rich countries. In what was a startling event, life expectancy in 11 European countries declined in 2015. This decline

/ VII was attributed to an in“uenza vaccine that was poorly matched to the

/ REDUX virus that year; many elderly people died as a consequence. Beyond that episode, there has been a slowing o’ progress more generally across the continent. Once again, the United Kingdom has fared par-

March/April 2020 95

Book 1.indb 95 1/17/20 9:27 PM Anne Case and Angus Deaton

ticularly badly, and its long-standing increase in life expectancy has plateaued. These dolorous trends, in the United Kingdom as in much o the rest o northern Europe, come mostly from increased mortal- ity—or slowdowns in the decrease o mortality—among the elderly. This trend is in sharp contrast to what has happened in the United States, where the biggest increase in mortality from all causes has been among middle-aged people vulnerable to both the rise in deaths o despair and the slowdown in progress against heart disease. Those over 65 in the United States have not been a†ected much, although there are signs now that the youngest people still considered elderly— those between 65 and 69—are beginning to experience increases in mortality from drugs, alcohol, and suicide.

WORKINGCLASS ELEGY What is causing deaths o despair in the United States, and can those causes translate to other countries, either now or in the future? There has been a long-term, slow-moving undermining o the white working class in the United States. Falling wages and a dearth o good jobs have weakened the basic institutions o working-class life, including mar- riage, churchgoing, and community. The decline in marriage has con- tributed signiŽcantly to the epidemic o despair among those with less than a four-year college degree: marriage rates among that group at age 40 declined by 50 percent between 1980 and 2018. With lower wages, fewer poorly educated men are considered marriageable, and this has given rise to a pattern o serial cohabitation—when individu- als live with a number o partners in succession without ever getting married—with the majority o— less educated white mothers having children out o wedlock and with many fathers in midlife separated from their children, living without the beneŽts o a stable and suppor- tive family life. These trends among less educated Americans—declines in wages, the quality and number o jobs, marriage, and community life—are central in instilling despair, spurring suicide and other self- inšicted harms, such as alcohol and drug abuse. The Great Recession that began after the Žnancial crisis o 2008 has caused much pain in the United States and elsewhere. But it did not spark the epidemic o deaths among the U.S. working class. Even though the recession worsened the conditions o many people’s lives and stoked anger and division in both the United States and Europe, it was not an immediate cause o deaths o despair. These deaths were

96   

13_Case_Deaton.indd 96 1/20/20 5:03 PM The Epidemic of Despair

rising long before the recession began and continued to rise smoothly and without pause after the recession ended, in 2009. The real roots o’ the epidemic lie in the long-term malaise that began around 1970, when economic growth in the United States slowed, inequality began to rise, younger workers realized that they would never do as well as their par- ents had done, and those without high-level skills fell further behind. In the United States, the median wage for men has been stagnant since The roots of the epidemic lie the early 1970s, even though ±½Ä has in the long-term malaise risen substantially; men without a bach- elor’s degree have seen their wages fall that began around 1970. for hal’ a century. There are echoes o’ this pattern in some European countries, but they are only echoes. Some other countries have also seen slowly growing or stagnant wages over the last 20 years, including Australia, Canada, Germany, Italy, and Spain. Once again, the closest comparison to the United States is the United Kingdom, where there has been no increase in median or aver- age earnings for more than a decade—the longest period o’ wage stag- nation in the country since the Industrial Revolution. Still, even the British experience is but a shadow o’ the hal’ century o’ wage stagna- tion and decline in the United States. An important dierence between the United States and Europe is that countries in the latter have well-developed social support systems that can mute or reverse the worst impacts o’ shifts in the labor market. In the United Kingdom between 1994 and 2015, for example, earnings in the bottom tenth o¤ families grew much more slowly than earnings in the top deciles. And yet owing to the redistributive mechanisms o’ the British welfare state, the rate o’ growth in after-tax family incomes was roughly the same across all sections o’ the population. Nothing o’ the sort happened in the United States, where the social safety net is more limited. Between 1979 and 2007, for example, incomes after taxes and bene¥ts grew by 18 percent for the bottom 20 percent o’ U.S. house- holds, by 65 percent for those between the 80th and 99th percentiles, and by 275 percent for the top one percent. During this period, the system o’ tax and transfers became less favorable for poorer Americans. Europe is also not experiencing the same breakdown o’ marriage on display in the United States. It’s common for couples to live to- gether out o’ wedlock in Europe, but cohabitation there more closely resembles marriage. The kind o’ serial cohabitation that often occurs

March/April 2020 97

Book 1.indb 97 1/17/20 9:27 PM Anne Case and Angus Deaton

among less educated American men and women, many o’ whom have children with more than one person to whom they are not married, is much rarer across the Atlantic.

MORE MONEY, MORE PROBLEMS Another factor unique to the United States contributes signi¥cantly to the hollowing out o’ the U.S. labor market: the tremendous cost o’ the U.S. health-care system. The United States spends 18 percent o’ its ±½Ä on health care; the second-highest percentage among coun- tries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop- ment is in Switzerland, where that ¥gure is 12 percent. The United Kingdom spends only ten percent; Canada, 11 percent. But Ameri- cans don’t get many health bene¥ts in return for their huge expendi- ture. Life expectancy in the United States is lower than in any other rich country, levels o’ morbidity—the experience o’ ill health—are worse, and millions o’ people don’t have health insurance. The crucial problem is not that the system does so little for health but that it does so much harm to the economy. I’ the United States were to reduce its percentage o‘ health-care spending to the level o’ the Swiss percentage, it would save six percent o’ ±½Ä—over $1 trillion a year, or approximately $8,600 a year for every household in the coun- try. Savings o’ that kind would come to 180 percent o’ what the United States spends on its military. This wasteful spending on health care is a cancer that has metastasized throughout the economy. (The investor Warren Buett has referred to its eects on U.S. business as like those o’ a “tapeworm.”) The cost in“ates the federal de¥cit, compromises state budgets, and drains resources for education and other services. U.S. workers would have much better lives today i’ they didn’t have to pay this enormous additional tribute. Yes, the health-care industry cre- ates employment, pays the salaries o’ providers, and boosts the pro¥ts and dividends o’ shareholders; all that waste is an income for someone. But the resources swallowed up by the health-care industry would be better used in other ways, in improving education, investing in research and development, and repairing roads, bridges, airports, and railways. Less skilled workers lose the most in this arrangement. Uniquely among rich countries, employers in the United States are responsible for the health insurance o’ their employees; ¥rms with 50 employees or more must oer health insurance. In 2018, the average annual cost o’ a family policy was $20,000. For the employer, this is simply a labor

98 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 98 1/17/20 9:27 PM GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY PRESS HNEW TITLES AND BESTSELLING BACKLISTI

Available March 2020 Available June 2020 Available April 2020 Now available!

224 pages, 6 x 9, 1 figure & 2 tables 224, 6 x 9, 3 maps & 3 figures 312, 6 x 9, 8 figures 344, 7 x 10, 31 boxes & 10 figures cloth, 978-1-62616-752-0, $29.95 cloth, 978-1-62616-797-1, $32.95 cloth, 978-1-62616-764-3, $104.95 cloth, 978-1-62616-742-1, $149.95 ebook, 978-1-62616-754-4, $29.95 ebook, 978-1-62616-799-5, $32.95 paper, 978-1-62616-765-0, $34.95 paper, 978-1-62616-743-8, $49.95 ebook, 978-1-62616-766-7, $34.95 ebook, 978-1-62616-744-5, $49.95

Available July 2020 Available May 2020 Available June 2020 Now available!

272, 6 x 9, 5 figures & 22 tables 328, 6 x 9, 13 figures & 10 tables 264, 7 x 10, 27 figures & 8 tables 200, 6 x 9 cloth, 978-1-62616-794-0, $119.95 cloth, 978-1-62616-781-0, $110.95 cloth, 978-1-62616-767-4, $134.95 cloth, 978-1-62616-733-9, $98.95 paper, 978-1-62616-795-7, $39.95 paper, 978-1-62616-782-7, $36.95 paper, 978-1-62616-768-1, $44.95 paper, 978-1-62616-734-6, $32.95 ebook, 978-1-62616-796-4, $39.95 ebook, 978-1-62616-783-4, $36.95 ebook, 978-1-62616-769-8, $44.95 ebook, 978-1-62616-735-3, $32.95

Available May 2020 Available March 2020 Available June 2020 Now available!

296, 10 x 8, 140 color illus. & 116 b&w illus. cloth, 978-1-7332831-0-6, $55.00 paper, 978-1-7332831-1-3, $35.00

320, 6 x 9, 10 figures & 4 tables 128, 6 x 9, 7 figures & 5 tables 244, 6 x 9, 2 figures cloth, 978-1-62616-770-4, $149.95 cloth, 978-1-62616-775-9, $56.95 cloth, 978-1-62616-677-6, $104.95 paper, 978-1-62616-771-1, $49.95 paper, 978-1-62616-773-5, $18.95 paper, 978-1-62616-678-3, $34.95 ebook, 978-1-62616-772-8, $49.95 ebook, 978-1-62616-774-2, $18.95 ebook, 978-1-62616-679-0, $34.95

FOLLOW US @GEORGETOWN_UP 800.537.5487 • www.press.georgetown.edu

FA 99_5_GUP_rev.indd 1 1/20/20 12:58 PM Anne Case and Angus Deaton

cost, like wages, and the employer does not care whether the price o’ labor takes the form o’ wages or health insurance or other bene¥ts. The inexorable rise in the cost o‘ health care invariably compromises both employment and wage growth. For high-skilled workers who earn $150,000 per year, for example, the cost o‘ health insurance is a tolerable fraction for a ¥rm, but for a lower-skilled and lower-wage worker, the health insurance cost can be a deal breaker. The ¥rm tries to ¥gure out whether it can do without the worker or whether it can perhaps outsource the job to the booming in- dustry o’ companies that supply low-skilled labor. Outsourcing is grow- ing quickly in Europe, too, and health care is increasingly expensive everywhere. But because health-care costs in other countries are not borne by employers and are not tied to employment, there is no im- mediate link there between rising health-care costs, on the one hand, and lower wages and fewer good jobs, on the other. The high costs o’ health care don’t encourage Canadian and European ¥rms to shed jobs. Providing health care through employers would be less o’ a strain i’ U.S. health care were not so exceptionally expensive. As societies get richer, it makes sense for them to spend more o’ their national income on prolonging life and on making it less painful. The reduction in can- cer mortality is one o’ the success stories o’ modern medicine. But not all medical expenditures produce such (or even any) bene¥ts, and the costs o’ the whole system hamper the economy as a whole, contributing to falling wages, worsening jobs, declining marriages, and the conse- quent deaths o’ despair. The United States, unlike other rich countries, exercises no control over the prices o’ new drugs or procedures, and its health-care sector, including doctors, device manufacturers, hospitals, and pharmaceutical companies, has developed immense political power. The health-care industry has ¥ve lobbyists for every member o’ Con- gress. Although there is lobbying on behal’ o‘ health-care companies in Europe, its scale pales in comparison to that in the United States. The opioid epidemic in the United States is largely a failure o’ regula- tion and control in an environment where pharmaceutical companies have great political in“uence. Along with the rise in mortality rates since the late 1990s, the United States has witnessed a rise in morbidity with a sweeping increase in self-reported pain, disability, di¾culty socializing, and inability to work. Pharmaceutical companies and their distributors took advantage o’ this growing desperation, pushing opioid painkillers such as OxyContin, a legal drug that is essentially «½³-approved

100 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 100 1/17/20 9:27 PM The Epidemic of Despair

heroin. Between 1999 and 2018, more than 200,000 Americans died from prescription opioid overdoses. As the damage caused by these drugs mounted, physicians stopped prescribing them as readily, opening a gap for illegal drugs: heroin from Mexico and, more recently, fentanyl from China, which is much more lethal. Without working-class distress, these drugs would have done great harm and killed many people; when loosed into a void o’ social disruption and meaninglessness, they ampli¥ed The mass prescription of the suicides and alcohol-related deaths legalized heroin should that would have happened without them. The mass prescription o‘ legalized never have happened. heroin should never have happened— and it did not happen in Europe. Painkillers such as OxyContin are legal in Europe, but their use is largely con¥ned to hospitals, which employ them to treat pain in the immediate aftermath o’ surgery (for example, after a hip or knee replacement). In the United States, by contrast, doctors and dentists prescribed these drugs in such large numbers that in 2010 there were enough opioids prescribed to the public to give every American adult a month’s supply. Pharmaceutical distributors “ooded the market, on occasion sending millions o’ pills to pharmacies in towns with only a few hundred inhabitants. When the Drug Enforcement Administration tried to stop that practice, members o’ Congress brought pressure to remove the agents in charge, and in 2016, it passed a bill to make enforcement o’ controls on opi- oids more di¾cult. A subsidiary o’ Johnson & Johnson farmed pop- pies in Tasmania in the mid-1990s to provide the raw material for opioids, exploiting a loophole in international narcotic controls. Lob- byists successfully fought against attempts by the ½¯³ to close the loophole. According to court documents, the Sackler family, which owns the privately held company Purdue Pharma, has made between $11 billion and $12 billion in pro¥ts largely from selling OxyContin since the drug’s approval in 1995. Europe, unlike the United States, does not allow pharmaceutical companies to kill people for money.

CONTAINING THE EPIDEMIC A number o’ practical measures would help curb the American epi- demic o’ deaths o’ despair and end the United States’ status as an outlier among wealthy nations. In health care, the United States needs an agency such as the United Kingdom’s National Institute for Health

March/April 2020 101

Book 1.indb 101 1/17/20 9:27 PM Anne Case and Angus Deaton

and Care Excellence (²°Å¯), which assesses the costs and bene¥ts o’ treatments and has the power to prevent the adoption o’ treatments whose bene¥ts fail to exceed their costs. With an agency o’ this kind regulating the U.S. pharmaceutical industry, the scourge o’ opioids would never have been unleashed on the country. More broadly, unregulated markets for health care are not socially bene¥cial. The United States should follow other rich countries in pro- viding universal health insurance and in controlling health-care costs through an agency such as ²°Å¯; the former is important, and the latter even more so. The United States currently has the worst o‘ both worlds, where government interference, instead o’ controlling costs, creates op- portunities for rent seeking, which in“ates costs and widens inequalities. The roots o’ the crisis o’ deaths o’ despair lie in the loss o’ good jobs for less educated Americans, in part due to globalization, out- sourcing, and automation, and in part due to the cost o‘ health care. The loss o’ jobs devastates many communities and destroys ways o’ life. There is a strong case for public policy that raises wages and builds a more comprehensive social safety net. Capitalism needs to serve people and not have people serve it. As an economic system, it is an immensely powerful force for progress and for good. The United States doesn’t need some fantastic socialist utopia in which the state takes over industry; instead, what is required is better monitoring and regulation o’ the private sector, including the reining in o’ the health-care system. Other rich countries have a range o’ dierent ways o‘ handling health care; any one o’ those would be an improvement over the current system in the United States. The epidemic o’ deaths o’ despair in the United States neither was nor is inevitable, but other rich countries are not guaranteed to have immunity from this American disease. For now, the United States is something o’ an anomaly among wealthy nations, a status it owes to speci¥c policies and circumstances. But other countries may ¥nd themselves following in American footsteps. I’ wage stagnation per- sists in Western countries and i’ the use o’ illegal drugs grows, the social dysfunctions o’ the United States could well spread in a more concerted way. Working classes elsewhere are also grappling with the consequences o’ globalization, outsourcing, and automation. The dy- namic that has helped fuel the U.S. crisis o’ deaths o’ despair—o’ elites prospering while less educated workers get left behind—may produce similar devastating results in other wealthy countries.∂

102 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 102 1/17/20 9:27 PM The Digital Dictators How Technology Strengthens Autocracy Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Erica Frantz, and Joseph Wright

he Stasi, East Germany’s state security service, may have been one o’ the most pervasive secret police agencies that Tever existed. It was infamous for its capacity to monitor indi- viduals and control information “ows. By 1989, it had almost 100,000 regular employees and, according to some accounts, between 500,000 and two million informants in a country with a population o’ about 16 million. Its sheer manpower and resources allowed it to permeate so- ciety and keep tabs on virtually every aspect o’ the lives o¤ East Ger- man citizens. Thousands o’ agents worked to tap telephones, in¥ltrate underground political movements, and report on personal and famil- ial relationships. O¾cers were even positioned at post o¾ces to open letters and packages entering from or heading to noncommunist countries. For decades, the Stasi was a model for how a highly capable authoritarian regime could use repression to maintain control. In the wake o’ the apparent triumph o‘ liberal democracy after the Cold War, police states o’ this kind no longer seemed viable. Global norms about what constituted a legitimate regime had shifted. At the turn o’ the millennium, new technologies, including the Internet and the cell phone, promised to empower citizens, allowing individuals greater access to information and the possibility to make new connec- tions and build new communities. But this wishful vision o’ a more democratic future proved naive. Instead, new technologies now aord rulers fresh methods for pre- serving power that in many ways rival, i’ not improve on, the Stasi’s

ANDREA KENDALL TAYLOR is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Transatlantic Security Program at the Center for a New American Security. ERICA FRANTZ is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Michigan State University. JOSEPH WRIGHT is Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University.

March/April 2020 103

Book 1.indb 103 1/17/20 9:27 PM Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Erica Frantz, and Joseph Wright

tactics. Surveillance powered by arti¥cial intelligence (³°), for exam- ple, allows despots to automate the monitoring and tracking o’ their opposition in ways that are far less intrusive than traditional surveil- lance. Not only do these digital tools enable authoritarian regimes to cast a wider net than with human-dependent methods; they can do so using far fewer resources: no one has to pay a software program to monitor people’s text messages, read their social media posts, or track their movements. And once citizens learn to assume that all those things are happening, they alter their behavior without the regime having to resort to physical repression. This alarming picture stands in stark contrast to the optimism that originally accompanied the spread o’ the Internet, social media, and other new technologies that have emerged since 2000. Such hopeful- ness peaked in the early 2010s as social media facilitated the ouster o’ four o’ the world’s longest-ruling dictators, in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen. In a world o’ unfettered access to information and o’ indi- viduals empowered by technology, the argument went, autocrats would no longer be able to maintain the concentration o’ power that their systems depend on. It’s now clear, however, that technology does not necessarily favor those seeking to make their voices heard or stand up to repressive regimes. Faced with growing pressure and mounting fear o’ their own people, authoritarian regimes are evolving. They are em- bracing technology to refashion authoritarianism for the modern age. Led by China, today’s digital autocracies are using technology—the Internet, social media, ³°—to supercharge long-standing authoritarian survival tactics. They are harnessing a new arsenal o’ digital tools to counteract what has become the most signi¥cant threat to the typical authoritarian regime today: the physical, human force o’ mass anti- government protests. As a result, digital autocracies have grown far more durable than their pre-tech predecessors and their less techno- logically savvy peers. In contrast to what technology optimists envi- sioned at the dawn o’ the millennium, autocracies are bene¥ting from the Internet and other new technologies, not falling victim to them.

THE SPECTER OF PROTEST The digital age changed the context in which authoritarian regimes operate. Such new technologies as the Internet and social media re- duced barriers to coordination, making it easier for ordinary citizens to mobilize and challenge unresponsive and repressive governments.

104 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 104 1/17/20 9:27 PM The Digital Dictators

I’ll be watching you: outside a mosque in Xinjiang, China, June 2008

Data from the Mass Mobilization Project, compiled the political sci- entists David Clark and Patrick Regan, and the Autocratic Regimes data set, which two o’ us (Erica Frantz and Joseph Wright) have helped build, reveal that between 2000 and 2017, 60 percent o’ all dictator- ships faced at least one antigovernment protest o’ 50 participants or more. Although many o’ these demonstrations were small and posed KADIR little threat to the regime, their sheer frequency underscores the con- VAN tinuous unrest that many authoritarian governments face.

LOHUIZEN Many o’ these movements are succeeding in bringing about the downfall o’ authoritarian regimes. Between 2000 and 2017, protests unseated ten autocracies, or 23 percent o’ the 44 authoritarian re- NOOR / gimes that fell during the period. Another 19 authoritarian regimes

/ REDUX lost power via elections. And while there were nearly twice as many regimes ousted by elections as by protests, many o’ the elections had followed mass protest campaigns.

March/April 2020 105

Book 1.indb 105 1/17/20 9:27 PM Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Erica Frantz, and Joseph Wright

The rise in protests marks a signi¥cant change in authoritarian politics. Historically, coups by military elites and o¾cers posed the greatest threat to dictatorships. Between 1946 and 2000, coups ousted roughly a third o’ the 198 authoritarian regimes that col- lapsed in that period. Protests, in contrast, unseated far fewer, ac- counting for about 16 percent o’ that total. Fast-forward to this century, and a dierent reality emerges: coups unseated around nine percent o’ the dictatorships that fell between 2001 and 2017, while mass movements led to the toppling o’ twice as many governments. In addition to toppling regimes in the Arab Spring, protests led to the ouster o’ dictatorships in Burkina Faso, Georgia, and Kyrgyz- stan. Protests have become the most signi¥cant challenge that twenty-¥rst-century authoritarian regimes face. The growing threat o’ protests has not been lost on today’s auto- crats. In the past, when they feared coups, most such leaders relied on “coup proo¥ng” tactics, such as overpaying the security services to win their loyalty or rotating elites through positions o’ power so that no one could develop an independent base o’ support. As pro- tests have increased, however, authoritarian regimes have adapted their survival tactics to focus on mitigating the threat from mass mobilization. Data compiled by Freedom House reveal that since 2000, the number o’ restrictions on political and civil liberties glob- ally has grown. A large share o’ this increase has occurred in au- thoritarian countries, where leaders impose restrictions on political and civil liberties to make it harder for citizens to organize and agi- tate against the state. Beyond narrowing the space for civil society, authoritarian states are also learning to use digital tools to quell dissent. Although tech- nology has helped facilitate protests, today’s digitally savvy authori- tarian regimes are using some o’ the same technological innovations to push back against dangerous popular mobilizations.

MEANS OF CONTROL Our analysis using data from Varieties o¤ Democracy’s data set (which covers 202 countries) and the Mass Mobilization Project shows that autocracies that use digital repression face a lower risk o’ protests than do those autocratic regimes that do not employ these same tools. Digital repression not only decreases the likelihood that a protest will occur but also reduces the chances that a government

106 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 106 1/17/20 9:27 PM THE HUNTINGTON PRIZE Bring the CALL FOR BOOKS REAL WORLD Students and friends of Samuel P. Huntington (1927–2008) have to your classroom

established a prize in the amount of $10,000 for the best book published Case Studies each year in the field of national security. The book can be a work of history or political science, or a work by a practitioner of statecraft. American foreign policy The prize will not be awarded if the Global institutions Huntington Prize Committee judges that the submissions in a given year Terrorism & security do not meet the high standards set International trade by Samuel P. Huntington. Women, peace and security The Huntington Prize Committee is Health and science pleased to solicit nominations for and more... books published in 2019.

Nominations will be accepted until Join our Faculty Lounge for 31 May 2020 premier access to this unique A letter of nomination and two copies of the book should be sent to: online library of nearly 250 Ann Townes case studies and simulations Weatherhead Center for International Affairs — and make diplomacy part Knafel Building 1737 Cambridge Street of your course Cambridge, MA 02138 https://casestudies.isd.georgetown.edu/

FA 107_ads.indd 1 1/16/20 2:42 PM Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Erica Frantz, and Joseph Wright

will face large, sustained mobilization eorts, such as the “red shirt” protests in Thailand in 2010 or the anti-Mubarak and antimilitary protests in Egypt in 2011. The example o’ Cambodia illustrates how these dynamics can play out. The government o¤ Prime Minister Hun Sen, who has been in o¾ce since 1985, has adopted technological methods o’ control to help maintain its grip on power. Un- As protests have increased, der Hun Sen’s rule, traditional media authoritarian regimes have have restricted their coverage o’ the Cambodian opposition. In the run-up adapted their survival to the July 2013 election, this led the tactics. opposition to rely heavily on digital tools to mobilize its supporters. The election was fraudulent, prompting thousands o’ citizens to take to the streets to demand a new vote. In addition to employing brute force to quell the protests, the government ratcheted up its use o’ digital repression. For instance, in August 2013, one Internet service provider temporarily blocked Facebook, and in December 2013, au- thorities in the province o’ Siem Reap closed down more than 40 Internet cafés. The following year, the government announced the creation o’ the Cyber War Team, tasked with monitoring the Inter- net to “ag antigovernment activity online. A year later, the govern- ment passed a law giving it broad control over the telecommunications industry and established an enforcement body that could suspend telecommunications ¥rms’ services and even ¥re their sta. Partly as a result o’ these steps, the protest movement in Cambodia ¥zzled out. According to the Mass Mobilization Project, there was only one antigovernment protest in the country in 2017, compared with 36 in 2014, when the opposition movement was at its peak. Dictatorships harness technology not only to suppress protests but also to stien older methods o’ control. Our analysis drawing from Varieties o¤ Democracy’s data set suggests that dictatorships that increase their use o’ digital repression also tend to increase their use o’ violent forms o’ repression “in real life,” particularly torture and the killing o’ opponents. This indicates that authoritar- ian leaders don’t replace traditional repression with digital repres- sion. Instead, by making it easier for authoritarian regimes to identify their opposition, digital repression allows them to more eectively determine who should get a knock on the door or be

108 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 108 1/17/20 9:27 PM The Digital Dictators

thrown in a cell. This closer targeting o’ opponents reduces the need to resort to indiscriminate repression, which can trigger a popular backlash and elite defections.

THE CHINA MODEL The advancement o’ ³°-powered surveillance is the most signi¥cant evolution in digital authoritarianism. High-resolution cameras, facial recognition, spying malware, automated text analysis, and big-data pro- cessing have opened up a wide range o’ new methods o’ citizen control. These technologies allow governments to monitor citizens and identify dissidents in a timely—and sometimes even preemptive—manner. No regime has exploited the repressive potential o’ ³° quite as thor- oughly as the one in China. The Chinese Communist Party collects an incredible amount o’ data on individuals and businesses: tax re- turns, bank statements, purchasing histories, and criminal and medi- cal records. The regime then uses ³° to analyze this information and compile “social credit scores,” which it seeks to use to set the param- eters o’ acceptable behavior and improve citizen control. Individuals or companies deemed “untrustworthy” can ¥nd themselves excluded from state-sponsored bene¥ts, such as deposit-free apartment rentals, or banned from air and rail travel. Although the ÅÅÄ is still honing this system, advances in big-data analysis and decision-making tech- nologies will only improve the regime’s capacity for predictive con- trol, what the government calls “social management.” China also demonstrates the way digital repression aids the physi- cal variety—on a mass scale. In Xinjiang, the Chinese government has detained more than a million Uighurs in “reeducation” camps. Those not in camps are stuck in cities where neighborhoods are surrounded by gates equipped with facial recognition software. That software de- termines who may pass, who may not, and who will be detained on sight. China has collected a vast amount o’ data on its Uighur popula- tion, including cell phone information, genetic data, and information about religious practices, which it aggregates in an attempt to stave o actions deemed harmful to public order or national security. New technologies also aord Chinese o¾cials greater control over members o’ the government. Authoritarian regimes are always vul- nerable to threats from within, including coups and high-level elite defections. With the new digital tools, leaders can keep tabs on gov- ernment o¾cials, gauging the extent to which they advance regime

March/April 2020 109

Book 1.indb 109 1/17/20 9:27 PM Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Erica Frantz, and Joseph Wright

objectives and rooting out underperforming o¾cials who over time can tarnish public perception o’ the regime. For example, research has shown that Beijing avoids censoring citizens’ posts about local corrup- tion on Weibo (the Chinese equivalent o‘ Twitter) because those posts give the regime a window into the performance o‘ local o¾cials. In addition, the Chinese government deploys technology to perfect its systems o’ censorship. A°, for example, can sift through massive amounts o’ images and text, ¥ltering and blocking content that is unfavorable to the regime. As a protest movement heated up in Hong Kong last summer, for example, the Chinese regime simply strength- ened its “Great Firewall,” removing subversive content from the In- ternet in mainland China almost instantaneously. And even i’ censorship fails and dissent escalates, digital autocracies have an added line o’ defense: they can block all citizens’ access to the Internet (or large parts o’ it) to prevent members o’ the opposition from commu- nicating, organizing, or broadcasting their messages. In Iran, for ex- ample, the government successfully shut down the Internet across the country amid widespread protests last November. Although China is the leading player in digital repression, autocra- cies o’ all stripes are looking to follow suit. The Russian government, for example, is taking steps to rein in its citizens’ relative freedom online by incorporating elements o’ China’s Great Firewall, allowing the Kremlin to cut o the country’s Internet from the rest o’ the world. Likewise, Freedom House reported in 2018 that several countries were seeking to emulate the Chinese model o’ extensive censorship and automated surveillance, and numerous o¾cials from autocracies across Africa have gone to China to participate in “cyberspace management” training sessions, where they learn Chinese methods o’ control.

THE VELVET GLOVE Today’s technologies not only make it easier for governments to re- press critics; they also make it easy to co-opt them. Tech-powered integration between government agencies allows the Chinese re- gime to more precisely control access to government services, so that it can calibrate the distribution—or denial—o’ everything from bus passes and passports to jobs and access to education. The na- scent social credit system in China has the eect o’ punishing indi- viduals critical o’ the regime and rewarding loyalty. Citizens with good social credit scores bene¥t from a range o’ perks, including

110 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 110 1/17/20 9:27 PM The Digital Dictators

expedited overseas travel applications, discounted energy bills, and less frequent audits. In this way, new technologies help authoritar- ian regimes ¥ne-tune their use o’ reward and refusal, blurring the line between co-option and coercive control. Dictatorships can also use new technologies to shape public per- ception o’ the regime and its legitimacy. Automated accounts (or “bots”) on social media can amplify in“uence campaigns and produce a China is the leading player “urry o’ distracting or misleading posts that crowd out opponents’ mes- in digital repression, but saging. This is an area in which Russia others are following suit. has played a leading role. The Kremlin “oods the Internet with pro-regime stories, distracting online users from negative news, and creates confusion and uncertainty through the spread o’ alternative narratives. Maturing technologies such as so-called microtargeting and deep- fakes—digital forgeries impossible to distinguish from authentic audio, video, or images—are likely to further boost the capacity o’ authoritar- ian regimes to manipulate their citizens’ perceptions. Microtargeting will eventually allow autocracies to tailor content for speci¥c indi- viduals or segments o’ society, just as the commercial world uses demographic and behavioral characteristics to customize advertise- ments. A°-powered algorithms will allow autocracies to microtarget individuals with information that either reinforces their support for the regime or seeks to counteract speci¥c sources o’ discontent. Like- wise, the production o’ deepfakes will make it easier to discredit op- position leaders and will make it increasingly di¾cult for the public to know what is real, sowing doubt, confusion, and apathy. Digital tools might even help regimes make themselves appear less repressive and more responsive to their citizens. In some cases, authoritarian regimes have deployed new technologies to mimic components o’ democracy, such as participation and deliberation. Some local Chinese o¾cials, for example, are using the Internet and social media to allow citizens to voice their opinions in online polls or through other digitally based participatory channels. A 2014 study by the political scientist Rory Truex suggested that such on- line participation enhanced public perception o’ the ÅÅÄ among less educated citizens. Consultative sites, such as the regime’s “You Pro- pose My Opinion” portal, make citizens feel that their voices matter

March/April 2020 111

Book 1.indb 111 1/17/20 9:27 PM Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Erica Frantz, and Joseph Wright

without the regime having to actually pursue genuine reform. By emu- lating elements o’ democracy, dictatorships can improve their attrac- tiveness to citizens and de“ate the bottom-up pressure for change.

DURABLE DIGITAL AUTOCRACIES As autocracies have learned to co-opt new technologies, they have become a more formidable threat to democracy. In particular, to- day’s dictatorships have grown more durable. Between 1946 and 2000—the year digital tools began to proliferate—the typical dicta- torship ruled for around ten years. Since 2000, this number has more than doubled, to nearly 25 years. Not only has the rising tide o’ technology seemingly bene¥ted all dictatorships, but our own empirical analysis shows that those au- thoritarian regimes that rely more heavily on digital repression are among the most durable. Between 2000 and 2017, 37 o’ the 91 dicta- torships that had lasted more than a year collapsed; those regimes that avoided collapse had signi¥cantly higher levels o’ digital repression, on average, than those that fell. Rather than succumb to what ap- peared to be a devastating challenge to their power—the emergence and spread o’ new technologies—many dictatorships leverage those tools in ways that bolster their rule. Although autocracies have long relied on various degrees o’ repres- sion to support their objectives, the ease with which today’s authori- tarian regimes can acquire this repressive capacity marks a signi¥cant departure from the police states o’ the past. Building the eectiveness and pervasiveness o’ the East German Stasi, for example, was not something that could be achieved overnight. The regime had to culti- vate the loyalty o’ thousands o’ cadres, training them and preparing them to engage in on-the-ground surveillance. Most dictatorships simply do not have the ability to create such a vast operation. There was, according to some accounts, one East German spy for every 66 citizens. The proportion in most contemporary dictatorships (for which there are data) pales in comparison. It is true that in North Korea, which ranks as possibly the most intense police state in power today, the ratio o’ internal security personnel and informants to citi- zens is 1 to 40—but it was 1 to 5,090 in Iraq under Saddam Hussein and 1 to 10,000 in Chad under Hissène Habré. In the digital age, however, dictatorships don’t need to summon immense manpower to eectively surveil and monitor their citizens.

112 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 112 1/17/20 9:27 PM The Digital Dictators

Instead, aspiring dictatorships can purchase new technologies, train a small group o’ o¾cials in how to use them—often with the support o’ external actors, such as China—and they are ready to go. For ex- ample, Huawei, a Chinese state-backed telecommunications ¥rm, has deployed its digital surveillance technology in over a dozen authori- tarian regimes. In 2019, reports surfaced that the Ugandan govern- ment was using it to hack the social media accounts and electronic communications o’ its political opponents. The vendors o’ such tech- nologies don’t always reside in authoritarian countries. Israeli and Italian ¥rms have also sold digital surveillance software to the Ugan- dan regime. Israeli companies have sold espionage and intelligence- gathering software to a number o’ authoritarian regimes across the world, including Angola, Bahrain, Kazakhstan, Mozambique, and Ni- caragua. And U.S. ¥rms have exported facial recognition technology to governments in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

A SLIPPERY SLOPE As autocracies last longer, the number o’ such regimes in place at any point in time is likely to increase, as some countries backslide on democratic rule. Although the number o’ autocracies globally has not risen substantially in recent years, and more people than ever before live in countries that hold free and fair elections, the tide may be turning. Data collected by Freedom House show, for exam- ple, that between 2013 and 2018, although there were three coun- tries that transitioned from “partly free” to “free” status (the Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, and Tunisia), there were seven that experienced the reverse, moving from a status o’ “free” to one o’ “partly free” (the Dominican Republic, Hungary, Indonesia, Leso- tho, Montenegro, Serbia, and Sierra Leone). The risk that technology will usher in a wave o’ authoritarianism is all the more concerning because our own empirical research has indi- cated that beyond buttressing autocracies, digital tools are associated with an increased risk o’ democratic backsliding in fragile democracies. New technologies are particularly dangerous for weak democracies be- cause many o’ these digital tools are dual use: technology can enhance government e¾ciency and provide the capacity to address challenges such as crime and terrorism, but no matter the intentions with which governments initially acquire such technology, they can also use these tools to muzzle and restrict the activities o’ their opponents.

March/April 2020 113

Book 1.indb 113 1/17/20 9:27 PM Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Erica Frantz, and Joseph Wright

Pushing back against the spread o’ digital authoritarianism will require addressing the detrimental eects o’ new technologies on governance in autocracies and democracies alike. As a ¥rst step, the United States should modernize and expand legislation to help en- sure that U.S. entities are not enabling AI and other innovations human rights abuses. A December 2019 report by the Center for a New hold great promise, but they American Security (where one o’ us is have indisputably a senior fellow) highlights the need for strengthened the grip of Congress to restrict the export o‘ hard- ware that incorporates ³°-enabled bio- authoritarian regimes. metric identi¥cation technologies, such as facial, voice, and gait recogni- tion; impose further sanctions on businesses and entities that provide surveillance technology, training, or equipment to authoritarian re- gimes implicated in human rights abuses; and consider legislation to prevent U.S. entities from investing in companies that are building ³° tools for repression, such as the Chinese ³° company SenseTime. The U.S. government should also use the Global Magnitsky Act, which allows the U.S. Treasury Department to sanction foreign individu- als involved in human rights abuses, to punish foreigners who engage in or facilitate ³°-powered human rights abuses. CÅÄ o¾cials responsible for atrocities in Xinjiang are clear candidates for such sanctions. U.S. government agencies and civil society groups should also pursue actions to mitigate the potentially negative eects o’ the spread o’ surveillance technology, especially in fragile democracies. The focus o’ such engagement should be on strengthening the po- litical and legal frameworks that govern how surveillance technolo- gies are used and building the capacity o’ civil society and watchdog organizations to check government abuse. What is perhaps most critical, the United States must make sure it leads in ³° and helps shape global norms for its use in ways that are consistent with democratic values and respect for human rights. This means ¥rst and foremost that Americans must get this right at home, creating a model that people worldwide will want to emulate. The United States should also work in conjunction with like-minded democracies to develop a standard for digital surveillance that strikes the right balance between security and respect for privacy and human rights. The United States will also need to work closely

114 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 114 1/17/20 9:27 PM The Digital Dictators

with like-minded allies and partners to set and enforce the rules o’ the road, including by restoring U.S. leadership in multilateral in- stitutions such as the United Nations. A° and other technological innovations hold great promise for improving everyday lives, but they have indisputably strengthened the grip o’ authoritarian regimes. The intensifying digital repres- sion in countries such as China oers a bleak vision o’ ever-expanding state control and ever-shrinking individual liberty. But that need not be the only vision. In the near term, rapid tech- nological change will likely produce a cat-and-mouse dynamic as citi- zens and governments race to gain the upper hand. I‘ history is any guide, the creativity and responsiveness o’ open societies will in the long term allow democracies to more eectively navigate this era o’ technological transformation. Just as today’s autocracies have evolved to embrace new tools, so, too, must democracies develop new ideas, new approaches, and the leadership to ensure that the promise o’ technology in the twenty-¥rst century doesn’t become a curse.∂

March/April 2020 115

Book 1.indb 115 1/17/20 9:27 PM Too Big to Prevail The National Security Case for Breaking Up Big Tech Ganesh Sitaraman

hen executives at the biggest U.S. technology companies are confronted with the argument that they have grown too W powerful and should be broken up, they have a ready re- sponse: breaking up Big Tech would open the way for Chinese dominance and thereby undermine U.S. national security. In a new era o’ great- power competition, the argument goes, the United States cannot aord to undercut superstar companies such as Amazon, Facebook, and Alpha- bet (the parent company o’ Google). Big as these companies are, con- straints on them would simply allow Chinese behemoths to gain an edge, and the United States would stand no chance o’ winning the global arti- ¥cial intelligence (³°) arms race. That technology executives would prof- fer these arguments is not surprising, but the position is gaining traction outside Silicon Valley; even Democratic politicians who have been critical o¤ Big Tech, such as Representative Ro Khanna o’ California and Senator Mark Warner o‘ Virginia, have expressed concerns along these lines. But the national security case against breaking up Big Tech is not just weak; it is backward. Far from competing with China, many big technol- ogy companies are operating in the country, and their growing entangle- ments there create vulnerabilities for the United States by exposing its ¥rms to espionage and economic coercion. At home, market concentra- tion in the technology sector also means less competition and therefore less innovation, which threatens to leave the United States in a worse position to compete with foreign rivals. Rather than threatening to un- dermine national security, breaking up and regulating Big Tech is neces- sary to protect the United States’ democratic freedoms and preserve its ability to compete with and defend against new great-power rivals.

GANESH SITARAMAN is Professor of Law at Vanderbilt Law School and the author of The Great Democracy: How to Fix Our Politics, Unrig the Economy, and Unite America.

116 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 116 1/17/20 9:27 PM Too Big to Prevail

DESTINATION: CHINA Competition with China will de¥ne U.S. national security conversa- tions for decades to come, and Americans need to think carefully about the role technology will play in this increasingly competitive environment. But to claim that the likes o’ Amazon and Google are helping counter China’s technological and geopolitical rise simply be- cause they are American companies makes little sense. Almost all big U.S. technology companies have extensive opera- tions in China today. Google announced plans for an ³° research cen- ter in Beijing in 2017 and is exploring a partnership with the Chinese Internet behemoth Tencent. Microsoft is expanding its data centers in China and has recently built an entire operating system, Windows 10 China Government Edition, for the Chinese government. Ama- zon’s cloud service in China is second in popularity only to that o’ its Chinese counterpart, Alibaba. Apple famously designs its phones in California but manufactures them in China. Facebook, notably, does not operate in China—but not for lack o’ trying. The company re- peatedly attempted to gain access to the Chinese market only to be blocked by Chinese government o¾cials. Merely operating in China may seem harmless. Yet according to scholars, U.S. government o¾cials, and even American business as- sociations, any U.S. technology company working in China could very well be supporting the Chinese state and the expansion o’ digi- tal authoritarianism. In the course o’ their operations in the country, U.S. companies routinely interact with Chinese companies, some o’ which are run or partly owned by the state. Those that are not still have informal ties to state and Communist Party o¾cials and face strong incentives to behave as the state wishes even without direct pressure from the government. Because the Chinese market and the state are intertwined in this way, Chinese companies that partner with foreign ones are highly likely to pass along operational and technological developments to the Chinese government and military, including in ways that could advance Beijing’s emerging surveillance state and accelerate its ability to spread its model o’ digital authori- tarianism around the world. These challenges are particularly clear in the case o’ ³°, as commer- cial innovations in that ¥eld can also have military implications. Under Beijing’s doctrine o’ “civil-military fusion,” Chinese researchers and private companies are working ever more closely with the government

March/April 2020 117

Book 1.indb 117 1/17/20 9:27 PM Ganesh Sitaraman

and the military, which means that technological innovations that may have originated with a foreign company active in China can ¥nd their way to supporting the People’s Liberation Army. “I’ you’re working in China,” Ashton Carter, a former U.S. defense secretary, has said, “you don’t know whether you’re working on a project for the military or not.” In addition to widely known concerns about Chinese espionage and surveillance, integration with the Chinese market also opens Big Tech—and the United States—to pressure from China, which can use that in“uence to hurt U.S. interests. Scholars refer to this tac- tic—turning economic interdependence into political leverage—by a variety o’ terms, including “geoeco- nomics,” “reverse entanglement,” and To claim that the likes of “weaponized interdependence.” What- Amazon are helping ever it’s called, China has a long track counter China’s rise makes record o’ doing it, across countries and industries. To retaliate against South little sense. Korea’s adoption o’ a U.S. missile de- fense system in 2017, China blocked Chinese travel agencies from oering trips to the country. And after the dissident Liu Xiaobo was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2010, China temporarily blocked imports from Norway. To avoid oending Chinese o¾cials and potentially losing access to the country’s large market, companies are adapting their behavior even outside China’s borders. Hollywood studios have been accused o’ rewriting scripts and editing scenes for that purpose: choosing to blow up the Taj Mahal instead o’ the Great Wall o’ China in the movie Pixels, according to Reuters, and replacing China with North Korea as the main adversary in the 2012 remake o’ Red Dawn, ac- cording to the Los Angeles Times. In 2019, Daryl Morey, the general manager o’ the ²Æ³ basketball team the Houston Rockets, tweeted in support o’ pro-democracy protesters in Hong Kong; soon thereafter, he deleted the post. In the days that followed, the owner o’ the Rock- ets wrote that Morey did “NOT speak” for the team, and the ²Æ³ said it was “regrettable” that Morey’s views had “deeply oended many o’ our friends in China.” (After a public outcry, the ²Æ³ clari- ¥ed that it would not censor or ¥re Morey.) A year earlier, Mercedes- Benz had posted a quote from the Dalai Lama on Instagram. After an online backlash in China, the automaker quickly erased the quote, and its parent company, Daimler, said that the post had contained

118 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 118 1/17/20 9:27 PM Too Big to Prevail

Don’t be evil: a security guard at Google oces in Shanghai, April 2016 an “erroneous message” and had “hurt the feelings o people” in China. The People’s Daily, China’s largest newspaper, later branded Mercedes-Benz as an “enemy o the people.” Such conduct by Western companies illustrates a broader point: they act based on their commercial interests, not in the name o abstract democratic principles or for the cause o U.S. national security. The same is true when these companies try to in uence government policy. The potential stakes are high. The U.S. Department o Commerce, for instance, has the power to set export restrictions on some sensitive tech- nologies, including „ ; those restrictions may be important from a na- tional security standpoint, even i they negatively a‡ect some companies’ bottom lines. Yet the dominant ideology among corporate lawyers today holds that the sole aim o managers is to maximize shareholder pro‰ts, and corporate lobbyists are thus likely to advocate public policies that support those pro‰ts even i they run counter to U.S. national interests. ALY

SONG Practically all U.S. companies active in China are subject to such pressures to one degree or another, and how to address that predica- / REUTERS ment is another question altogether. But the size and dominance o American technology companies are part o the problem. As the U.S. technology sector becomes more concentrated and the few players in it

March/April 2020 119

15_Sitaraman_pp3_Blues.indd 119 1/20/20 7:24 PM Ganesh Sitaraman

become more dependent on the Chinese market for consumers and pro¥ts, these ¥rms—and, by extension, the United States—become more vulnerable to pressure from Beijing. Antimonopoly policies could help remedy this problem: in a fractured market with many players, the sheer number o¤ ¥rms would all but guarantee that some would build supply chains that circumvented China, or build their products wholly in the United States, or simply choose not to engage in the Chinese market—whether because o’ idiosyncratic preferences, competitive dy- namics, product dierentiation, higher costs, or other factors. Consider another industry whose structure resembles that o¤ Big Tech: Hollywood. Like the technology industry, today’s entertain- ment sector consists o’ a handful o’ studios that are increasingly dom- inant at the box o¾ce and able to pressure theaters to give their content preferential treatment. I’ these big, integrated companies comply with Chinese censors out o’ a concern for market access, then U.S. consumers will not see content that oends the Chinese govern- ment. By contrast, in a system with a large number o’ small studios and competitive distribution channels, many companies would lack the size, scope, or desire to cater to the Chinese market, let alone be dependent on it. Nor would they have the power or scale to lock out new competitors through vertical integration. The result would be a market in which Americans had a range o’ content choices, including entertainment that might not accord with the views o¤ foreign censors. O’ course, in theory, it is possible that a small number o‘ big U.S. technology ¥rms, each with monopoly-like power, might be so pro¥t- able as to have no need for the Chinese market, whereas small compa- nies with razor-thin pro¥t margins might depend more on that market for consumers and pro¥ts. But this hypothesis has not been borne out. The current technology sector is already highly concentrated, and yet today’s technology companies are not forsaking the Chinese market; instead, they are desperate to expand their business there. As they do so, they will likely be subject to the same pressures bearing down on Hollywood, the ²Æ³, Mercedes, and other entities that want to operate in China. Companies such as Amazon and Google, which both produce their own content and distribute it through their platforms, may over time be tempted to make that con- tent palatable to Chinese censors. And because those ¥rms have im- mense market power within the United States, American consumers will be left with no serious, scalable alternatives.

120 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 120 1/17/20 9:27 PM A Belgian Perspective on International Affairs Gilbert Doctorow

Essays address the technical and equipment disparities between the United States military and its NATO allies that put in question the soundness of the alliance, the prospects of an emerging arms race, the identification of an ideological dimension which makes the U.S.-Russian confrontation look ever more like a full-blown cold war, the global significance of the Russian-Chinese strategic alignment.

“Doctorow’s essays are a needed corrective to the widespread distortions peddled by much of the mass media in the U.S. and Europe.” — Jack Matlock, US Ambassador to the Soviet Union, 1987-91

“Mr. Doctorow is a lucid observer. As someone who knows very well what is going on in Russia and what plans are being hatched in Europe, he relates and comments intelligently on what is evolving before our eyes every day in these troubled times.” — Michel Carlier, Belgian career diplomat Available at Amazon and BN.com

e First Political Order How Sex Shapes Governance and National Security Worldwide VALERIE M. HUDSON, DONNA LEE BOWEN, AND PERPETUA LYNNE NIELSEN

“Thanks to Valerie Hudson and her team of global researchers, we have a long, practical, intimate way of diminishing violence and increasing democracy.”

—Gloria Steinem

COLU MBIA U NIVERSITY P RESS

CUP.COLUMBIA.EDU

FA 121_ads.indd 1 1/17/20 10:38 AM Ganesh Sitaraman

A more competitive technology sector, with many smaller players, would also mitigate the ill eects o‘ lobbying, for much the same rea- sons. Fewer companies would be dependent on the Chinese market, and those that were would be dierentiated enough to often end up on dif- ferent sides o’ policy debates. Their lobbying eorts would be less likely to cut in a single direction and thus less likely to capture government.

THE VIRTUE OF MONOPOLY Big Tech’s market dominance, some will argue, has bene¥ts: free o’ constant worries about vicious competition, technology giants can fo- cus on the big questions. They have the time and resources to invest copiously in cutting-edge research, where success is rare but the po- tential payo—for technological innovation and thus for U.S. com- petitiveness and national security—is massive. Whether or not they say it explicitly, those who want to protect Big Tech from antitrust laws and other regulations are advocating a “na- tional champions” model—a system in which the state shields a few select big companies from competition, allowing them to spend on research and development. But there is strong evidence that this ap- proach is imperfect, at times even counterproductive. As the legal scholar Tim Wu has noted, it is usually competition, not consolida- tion, that fosters innovation. Competitors have to ¥nd ways to dif- ferentiate themselves in order to survive and expand. Large, protected ¥rms become lethargic, are slow to innovate, and rest on their laurels. Recall the race for supremacy in the electronics industry that played out between the United States and Japan in the 1980s. Japan, according to Wu, chose to protect its national champions, giving direct government support to such powerhouses as ²¯Å, Panasonic, and Toshiba. The United States took the opposite tack. Its largest electronics ¥rm at the time, °ÆÌ, came under antitrust scrutiny by U.S. authorities, and the ensuing decade long legal battle discouraged the company from engaging in con- duct that might run afoul o’ antitrust laws. That created the space for a variety o’ other hardware and software companies, among them Apple, Lotus, and Microsoft, to “ourish. Competition led to innovation and the creation o’ some o’ the most forward-looking companies o’ the era. National champions also have an incentive to hide breakthroughs that might undermine their market power. Bell Labs, one o’ the pillars o’ AT&T’s telecommunications empire, has long been celebrated for its role as an “ideas factory.” But Bell Labs and AT&T also suppressed

122 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 122 1/17/20 9:27 PM Too Big to Prevail

innovations that threatened their business model. Starting in the 1930s, for example, AT&T’s management sat on recording inventions that could have been used for answering machines, for fear this inno- vation might jeopardize the use o’ the telephone. Skeptics might argue that this time is dierent—that today’s next- generation technologies are so resource-intensive that smaller compa- nies in a competitive environment couldn’t aord the necessary investments. But even i‘ broken up and regulated, Big Tech’s main players would have considerable money left to spend on ³°, robotics, quantum computing, and other next-generation technologies. Face- book would still have billions o’ users without Instagram and Whats- App. Amazon’s platform would still have enormous market power in online sales even i’ it wasn’t allowed to produce its own products. Whatever resource constraints did arise could be oset by greater public investment in R & D. As the economist Mariana Mazzucato has argued, such government spending has historically been a signi¥- cant driver o’ innovation; the Internet, for example, began as a U.S. Defense Department network. There is no reason the government could not play the same role today. Unlike research by national-champion ¥rms, research funded by public investment would not be tied to the pro¥t motive. It could therefore cover a wider range o’ subjects, extend to basic research that does not have immediate or foreseeable commercial applications, and include research that might challenge the incumbency and business models o’ existing companies. Public research could also de-emphasize areas o’ inquiry that may be pro¥table but are socially undesirable. For many o’ the biggest technology companies, surveillance, personalized targeting, and the eliciting o’ particular behavioral responses lie at the heart o’ their business models, which means that their eorts to in- novate are geared in no trivial way toward improving those tactics. An authoritarian country may see those as valuable public goals, but it is not at all clear why a free and democratic society should. Public investment in R & D also has the potential to spread the ben- e¥ts o’ technology, innovation, and industry throughout the United States. At present, much o’ the country’s technological and innovative prowess is concentrated in a few hubs—the most prominent being Northern California, Seattle, and Boston. This is not surprising, as un- like the government, technology companies have no reason to want to spread development evenly. Amazon’s competition to decide the location

March/April 2020 123

Book 1.indb 123 1/17/20 9:27 PM Ganesh Sitaraman

o’ its second headquarters is a good example. After inviting countless pitches from cities across the country and much public attention, the company settled on New York and Washington, D.C.—two cities that hardly need an economic boost. Public investment, as the economists Jonathan Gruber and Simon Johnson have argued, could remedy these geographic imbalances and spur successful economies in dozens o’ mid- size cities all over the country, with spillover bene¥ts for their regions. Mountains o’ data are needed to improve ³°’s precision and accuracy, and some might think that only Big Tech can collect and handle data in such vast quantities. But this need not be the case, either. The United States could create a public data commons with data collected from a va- riety o’ government sources (and regulate it with strict rules about per- sonal privacy), for use by businesses, local governments, and nonpro¥ts to train machines. Any new data would be fed back into the data commons, allowing the quality and quantity o’ the information to improve over time. Alternatively, the government could require technology companies to make their data available in interoperable formats. I’ those companies eectively have monopoly power over data, then they could be regulated as monopolies—with public access to the data sets as a condition for their continued protection as monopolies. No legal obstacles stand in the way o’ these options, and both would enable innovation and expand the number o’ players working on important technological developments.

SQUEEZING THE GOVERNMENT For the moment, such public initiatives exist only as proposals. Big technology companies have considerable market power, and the U.S. government increasingly relies on their services, including to run its national security apparatus. Technology is, o’ course, a crucial aspect o’ warfare, and ¥rms such as Amazon and Microsoft have contracts to provide cloud services to U.S. defense and intelligence agencies. These technology companies are fast becoming part o’ the United States’ defense industrial base—the collection o’ industries that are indispensable for U.S. military equipment. As they do so, the curse o’ monopoly capitalism that already aects the country’s overconsoli- dated defense sector—causing higher costs, lower quality, reduced in- novation, and even corruption and fraud—will likely grow worse. To see the challenge ahead, consider the present state o’ the U.S. weapons industry, which is already remarkably uncompetitive. In 2019, the Government Accountability O¾ce found that 67 percent o’ 183

124 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 124 1/17/20 9:27 PM Too Big to Prevail

contracts for major weapons systems did not have a competitive bid- ding process. Almost hal’ the contracts went to one o¤ ¥ve compa- nies—a stunning testament to the dominance o’ a handful o¤ ¥rms. And in 2018, the Defense Department released a report on the mili- tary’s supply chain that listed numerous items for which only one or two domestic companies (and in some cases none) produced the essential goods. Competition and public Perhaps most striking o’ all, the report found that the United States no longer investment, not had the capacity to build submarines consolidation, provide the on a rapid timetable because o’ single path to innovation. suppliers and declining competition. Unsurprisingly, as Frank Kendall, a former head o’ acquisitions at the Pentagon, has pointed out, large defense contractors “are not hesitant to use this power for corporate advantage.” In a recent arti- cle in The American Conservative, the researchers Matt Stoller and Lucas Kunce argue that contractors with de facto monopoly at the heart o’ their business models threaten national security. They write that one such contractor, TransDigm Group, buys up companies that supply the government with rare but essential airplane parts and then hikes up the prices, eectively holding the government “hos- tage.” They also point to L3 Technologies, a defense contractor with ambitions, in the words o’ its one-time ů¬, to become “the Home Depot o’ the defense industry.” According to Stoller and Kunce, L3’s de facto monopoly over certain products means that it continues to receive lucrative government contracts even after it admitted in the settlement o’ a 2015 civil fraud lawsuit that it had knowingly sup- plied defective weapons sights to U.S. forces. As technology becomes more integral to the future o’ U.S. national security, Big Tech’s market power will likely lead to much the same prob- lems. Technology behemoths will amass defense contracts, and the Pen- tagon will be locked into a state o’ dependence, just as it is currently with large defense contractors. Instead o‘ healthy innovation, the government will have created what Michael Cherto, a former homeland security secretary, has called a “technological monoculture,” which is unwieldy and vulnerable to outside attack. The cost to taxpayers will increase, whether due to higher prices or fraud and corruption, and much o’ their money—funding that could have been available for innovation—will become monopoly pro¥ts for technology executives and shareholders.

March/April 2020 125

Book 1.indb 125 1/17/20 9:27 PM Ganesh Sitaraman

A WAY FORWARD That technology companies do not want to be broken up is unsurpris- ing. They are pro¥table, growing, and powerful. Nor is it a mystery why they try to play the trump card o’ invoking national security in their defense. But even from the viewpoint o’ national security, the case for shielding Big Tech from competition is weak. Technology companies are not competing with China so much as integrating with it, at signi¥cant risk to U.S. interests. In the United States, competi- tion and public investment in R & D, not today’s consolidated tech- nology sector, will provide the best path forward to innovation. Policymakers should embrace proposals to break up and regulate big technology companies: to unwind mergers and acquisitions such as Facebook’s decision to buy the social networking and messaging services Instagram and WhatsApp. They should require technology platforms such as Amazon to separate from businesses that operate on their platforms. They should apply nondiscrimination principles drawn from public utilities and common carrier laws to digital plat- forms. And they should adopt stringent privacy regulations. In this era o’ great-power competition, the best way to remain competitive and innovative is through market competition, smart reg- ulations, and public spending on R & D. Breaking up Big Tech won’t threaten national security; it will bolster it.∂

126 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 126 1/17/20 9:27 PM Saving America’s Alliances The United States Still Needs the System That Put It on Top Mira Rapp-Hooper

n his three years in o¾ce, U.S. President Donald Trump has aimed his trademark vitriol at a wide range o’ targets, both for- Ieign and domestic. Perhaps the most consequential o’ these is the United States’ 70-year-old alliance system. The 45th president has balked at upholding the country’s ²³µ¬ commitments, de- manded massive increases in defense spending from such long- standing allies as Japan and South Korea, and suggested that underpaying allies should be left to ¥ght their own wars with shared adversaries. Trump’s ire has been so relentless and damaging that U.S. allies in Asia and Europe now question the United States’ abil- ity to restore itsel’ as a credible security guarantor, even after a dif- ferent president is in the White House. But the tattered state o’ the alliance system is not Trump’s doing alone. After decades o’ triumph, the United States’ alliances have become victims o’ their own steady success and are now in peril. In the early years o’ the Cold War, the United States created the alli- ance system to establish and preserve the balance o’ power in Asia and Europe. To adapt the phrase o’ the commentator Walter Lippmann, alliances became the shields o’ the republic. These pacts and partnerships preserved an uneasy peace among the major indus- trialized countries until the end o’ the twentieth century. And they came with far fewer ¥nancial and political costs than Trump and some international relations scholars have claimed. When the Soviet Union collapsed, American policymakers wisely preserved this trusty tool o’ statecraft. But because the United States had no real

MIRA RAPP HOOPER is Stephen A. Schwarzman Senior Fellow for Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and a Senior Fellow at Yale Law School’s Paul Tsai China Center. She is the author of the forthcoming book Shields of the Republic: The Triumph and Peril of America’s Alliances.

March/April 2020 127

Book 1.indb 127 1/17/20 9:27 PM Mira Rapp-Hooper

peer competitors, the alliance system was repurposed for a world o’ American primacy and lost its focus on defense and deterrence. Nearly 30 years later, an undeniably powerful China and a revan- chist Russia have developed military and nonmilitary strategies that seek to unravel the system entirely. Trump’s antagonistic instincts are certainly destructive, but the changing nature o’ con“ict is the true hazard. Faced with cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, economic coercion, and more, Washington needs its alliance system to preserve order. I’ the pacts are to be saved, however, they must be renovated for the world they confront: one in which most threats to security and prosperity pass just below the military threshold.

A BRAVE NEW WORLD World War II transformed the scope and lethality o’ con“ict. The United States had long bene¥ted from its relatively isolated geo- graphic location, but the spread o‘ long-range airpower, missile tech- nology, and nuclear weapons meant that its security was no longer guaranteed. Newly exposed, the United States sought a strategy that would allow it to secure the international balance o’ power from afar, averting con“icts on its territory and preventing the only other super- power left standing after the war, the Soviet Union, from dominating Asia and Europe. The United States created a network o’ alliances precisely with these goals in mind. U.S. policymakers reasoned that by acquiring allies and building overseas bases on those countries’ ter- ritory, Washington would be able to confront crises before they reached the homeland. What’s more, with this forceful presence, the United States could practice so-called extended deterrence, dissuad- ing adversaries from starting wars in the ¥rst place. Unlike the alliance systems o’ the past, the U.S. system was in- tended to prosecute or deter not a single war but all wars, and to do so inde¥nitely. The novelty—and the gamble—was that i’ the new security system worked, the world would see little evidence o’ its power. This new approach was a radical departure from the pre– Cold War norm, when the United States considered itsel‘ largely self-su¾cient and pursued few foreign entanglements; it had no for- mal allies between the Revolutionary War and World War II. Be- tween 1949 and 1955, in contrast, the United States extended security guarantees to 23 countries in Asia and Europe. By the end o’ the twentieth century, it had alliances with 37.

128 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 128 1/17/20 9:27 PM Saving America’s Alliances

Friends in need: U.S.–South Korean joint military drills in South Korea, March 2016 The United States’ Cold War alliances were successful in meeting the goals that strategists had set out for them. For the duration o’ the Cold War, no U.S. treaty ally was ever the victim o’ a major attack. And until the 9/11 attacks, no ²³µ¬ member had ever invoked the treaty’s Article 5 guarantee, which obligates the allies to assist any member state that comes under assault. O’ course, Washington had intervened at times to support allies in a ¥x—helping Taiwan manage Chinese aggression during two crises in 1954–55 and 1958, for exam- ple—but it did so chie“y when it saw its own interests at risk and of- ten with the explicit aim o’ preventing war. In addition to maintaining the balance o’ power in Asia and Europe, the system contributed to the “ourishing o’ the United States’ allies, most notably Japan and West Germany, which became close military partners, consolidated themselves as democracies with vibrant economies, and eventually emerged as leading regional powers. KIM HONGÍJI The alliance system also lowered the cost o’ U.S. military and po- litical action worldwide. Since the early 1950s, U.S. treaty allies have joined every major war the United States has fought, despite the fact / REUTERS that for almost all these con“icts, they were not required to do so by the terms o’ their alliances. What’s more, the system ensured that the allies’ foreign policies supported, rather than undermined, Washington’s.

March/April 2020 129

Book 1.indb 129 1/17/20 9:27 PM Mira Rapp-Hooper

The United States used security guarantees to convince South Korea, Taiwan, and West Germany to abandon illicit programs to develop their own nuclear weapons. Other states that, i€ they had not been included in U.S. alliances, would surely have sought their own mili- tary protection—building state-of-the-art armies, navies, and air forces—chose instead to rely on the United States’ military might. And by maintaining close defense relationships with a number o€ those states, the United States also gained support in international institutions for everything from peacekeeping missions to sanctions— support that would otherwise have been much harder to secure. These contributions were crucial, as they allowed the United States to pro- ject its power without becoming overstretched.

LONELY AT THE TOP The alliance system continued to function smoothly until 1991, when the adversary for which the United States’ entire security posture had been designed suddenly disintegrated. The Soviet Union van- ished, and with it, so did the logic o€ American security guarantees. Notable international relations scholars—primarily those o€ a realist orientation—believed that in a unipolar world, U.S. alliances had become outmoded. But U.S. policymakers were unpersuaded. The Cold War system had performed so admirably that they decided it should be retained and repurposed for new objectives. Because the United States was now utterly unmatched in its military and political power, however, their alliance reforms did not focus on defense or deterrence as traditionally understood. U.S. President Bill Clinton’s administration supported the entry o€ former Eastern-bloc states (such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland) into ˜ in the belie€ that an expanded Atlantic alliance would help spread democracy and promote stability in post-Soviet eastern Europe—an urgent task given the humanitarian crisis that seized the Balkans with the breakup oš Yugoslavia in 1991 and 1992. In other words, Clinton decided to expand the alliance in the aftermath o€ the Cold War rather than dismantle it. Far from treating Russia as a vanquished adversary, his administration sought to gain Moscow’s acquiescence to ˜ enlargement. And through the Partnership for Peace—a ˜-backed military-cooperation program designed to build trust with post-Soviet states without o£cially including them in the alliance—Clinton sought to give eastern European countries ways

130   

16_Rapp-Hooper_pp_Blues.indd 130 1/20/20 5:04 PM Mira Rapp-Hooper

to associate with ²³µ¬ without spooking the Russians. For most o’ the 1990s, as the alliance pushed eastward, this approach appeared to be working: in private, Russian o¾cials even “oated the idea that their country might someday join ²³µ¬. But by extending ²³µ¬ to the Baltic states—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—in 2004, U.S. military planners inadvertently made the alliance much harder to defend. Russia still sought a buer zone that would keep it safe from western Europe Trump’s alliance and the United States and saw the coun- shakedown is almost tries on its western border as its ¥rst line o’ defense. The United States’ old certain to backžre. rival, preoccupied by its failing econ- omy, was not deeply troubled by the earlier rounds o’ ²³µ¬ expansion. But the situation quickly changed after the Baltic states entered the alliance. Russia invaded Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 to ensure that neither country would join ²³µ¬. Along the way, it developed a military strategy designed to demonstrate the United States’ inability to defend the Baltics, relying on the prospect o’ a rapid invasion that would leave Washington with the painful choice between escalation and surrender. In the meantime, an ascendant China has sought to corrode U.S. alliances in the Paci¥c. Beginning in the early 1990s, Beijing has in- vested in missiles and other military technology that would deter the United States from intervening in a con“ict close to China’s shores— namely, one over Taiwan. By making it costlier for Washington to enter a war, China’s leaders have attempted to undermine U.S. secu- rity guarantees and demonstrate to U.S. allies in the Paci¥c that the United States’ ability to protect them is waning. After years o’ dizzy- ing growth that fueled huge increases in military spending, Chinese President Xi Jinping has set his sights higher than his predecessors, seeking to reestablish China as a great power. Beijing and Moscow have also developed nonmilitary means—eco- nomic coercion, cyberwarfare, and political interference—to advance their objectives. China and Russia use these tactics in very dierent ways, but the underlying logic is the same: to achieve their goals with- out activating U.S. security guarantees or violating laws against the use o¤ force. In 2007, for instance, Russian cyberattacks paralyzed Estonia, taking down bank and government websites. And between 2014 and 2016, China initiated a massive island-building campaign in

132 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 132 1/17/20 9:27 PM Saving America’s Alliances

the South China Sea, transforming former reefs and rocks into mili- tary bases, upending the balance o’ power, and threatening U.S. allies—namely, the Philippines. In both cases, the transgressions un- dermined the security o’ U.S. treaty partners and demonstrated that the pacts were powerless to stop nonmilitary aggression. To make matters worse, the Trump administration is deeply crit- ical o’ ²³µ¬ members and other U.S. allies, a hostility that acts as an accelerant to the geopolitical forces that were already weakening the system o’ pacts. Unlike previous presidents, who privately pressed U.S. allies to contribute more to the security relationship, Trump engages in the public and arbitrary coercion o’ U.S. allies, making extravagant spending demands and stating that the United States will abandon them i’ they do not pay up. (Asked i’ the United States would defend the Baltics against a Russian attack, for exam- ple, Trump replied, “I’ they ful¥ll their obligations to us.”) In gen- eral, Trump views the protection o’ the American homeland as his near-exclusive national security objective and places little value on the U.S. military presence abroad, instead ¥xating on border secu- rity. This view is at odds with the United States’ long-standing reli- ance on forward defense and deterrence, which was based on the belie’ that the homeland is best protected through a network o’ al- liances and overseas bases that keep war from starting. Trump’s alliance shakedown is almost certain to back¥re. Some o’ the costs are already on display: South Korea, for instance, has tilted toward China by using diplomacy to mend previously strained ties and to establish military hotlines. Meanwhile, French President Emmanuel Macron has bemoaned the “brain death” o’ ²³µ¬, and German Chancellor Angela Merkel has questioned whether U.S. allies can trust the United States. I’ U.S. allies do eventually devote more to defense because o’ slackened American leadership, they are likely to do so in ways disadvantageous to the United States, spend- ing more on independent forces and strategies rather than assuming protection from and partnership with the United States. U.S. inter- ests may fall by the wayside as a result. For instance, the Trump administration has declared competition with China to be the United States’ highest national security priority, and leaders in both political parties agree that the challenge is momentous. To date, however, Washington has found little support among its allies for its campaign against Beijing. The United States can steady the shift-

March/April 2020 133

Book 1.indb 133 1/17/20 9:27 PM Mira Rapp-Hooper

ing twenty-¥rst-century balance o’ power only in tandem with its allies in Asia and Europe. Otherwise, it will be a feeble and lonely competition, indeed.

THE PRICE OF POWER Both the Trump administration and notable international relations scholars worry that the United States’ alliances lead to chronic free- riding, allowing U.S. allies to bene¥t from American security guaran- tees and military cooperation even though they add comparatively little to the relationship. Nearly every U.S. president has wished that the country’s allies would spend more on defense, and there is little doubt that the United States has generally outspent most o’ its treaty allies in Asia and Europe. The imbalance persists even today: the United States spends over three percent o’ its ±½Ä on defense; the next-highest spenders among the United States’ allies spend 2.5 per- cent, and many others spend 1.5–2.0 percent. But these numbers are deceptive. The United States, after all, maintains a global defense posture, whereas its partners generally spend on security in their im- mediate neighborhoods. What’s more, U.S. military spending in such countries as Germany and Japan is largely devoted to a regional de- fense strategy, as opposed to the defense o’ a single host ally. There is no reason to expect those countries’ defense budgets to be comparable to that o’ the United States. U.S. allies also contribute to their alliances with the United States in ways that aren’t captured by their defense expenditures—such as by granting low-cost leases for U.S. bases and constructing facilities for use by U.S. troops. Contrary to common perceptions, alliances themselves cost nothing: it is the spending on deployments and in- frastructure that results in high costs. And Washington’s allies often assume part o’ the burden. Moreover, the price o’ the American alli- ance system has, historically, been an acceptable portion o’ the U.S. national budget. There is little evidence that alliance-related spend- ing has forced other major tradeos or has been a drag on economic growth. And the asymmetry between Washington’s spending and that o’ its allies is a feature o’ the alliance system, not a bug: it gives the United States more in“uence over its partners, who depend on American strength for their security. There is also relatively little evidence that the United States’ al- liances have imposed major political costs. International relations

134 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 134 1/17/20 9:27 PM Saving America’s Alliances

scholars often fret about “alliance entrapment,” which would occur i’ the United States intervened in crises or con“icts that it might have ignored i’ it did not have obligations to another state. Yet there is almost no proo’ o’ that phenomenon. U.S. allies are no more likely to become involved in con“icts than other states, and although the United States has waged some ill- advised wars—such as the Vietnam The United States has War and the Iraq war—no ally was re- never found itself in an sponsible for those decisions. Instead, when Washington has backed its allies alliance arrangement that in crises, it has done so because it has it was unable to exit. also had a clear national interest at stake. Moreover, the United States has never found itsel’ in an alli- ance arrangement that it was unable to exit. In the few cases in which alliances became politically inconvenient, as with the under- performing Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, Washington was able to disentangle itsel’ easily. Entrapment is uncommon because the United States designed its alliance system to reduce its exposure to risky commitments. Take Taiwan, for instance. In 1955, the United States allied with Chiang Kai-shek, the brash Taiwanese president who still hoped to retake the Chinese mainland. In their negotiations with Chiang over the alliance, U.S. o¾cials took special care to impress on him that he did not have U.S. backing to attack the People’s Republic o’ China, and they made clear that the treaty they were to sign with him did not apply to the oshore islands that were still in dispute between Tai- wan and China. So in 1958, when the two came to loggerheads over those same islands, the United States had the freedom to support its ally only as it saw ¥t—in this case, by oering diplomatic support and by helping supply the islands. Washington has also been selec- tive in its choice o’ partners, rejecting requests for security pacts when the associated commitments were too dangerous. Despite a close relationship, the United States has declined to extend formal security guarantees to Israel, for example, calculating that the risk o’ an unwanted war is too high. It is no easier to ¥nd examples o’ U.S. allies that have reneged on their commitments to Washington. From the formation o’ the alli- ance system until the 9/11 attacks, neither the United States nor any o’ its partners had been the victim o’ an unprovoked assault, so there

March/April 2020 135

Book 1.indb 135 1/17/20 9:27 PM Mira Rapp-Hooper

have ultimately been few opportunities for an ally to jilt Washington on the brink o’ a con“ict. This is not to say that the United States has never faced downsides from its alliance system. Chronic, i’ modest, allied free-riding on U.S. defense spending is surely an annoyance. On rare occasions, moreover, an ally has reneged on its commitments in costlier ways, as French President Charles de Gaulle did when he pulled France out o’ ²³µ¬’s military structure but not the alliance al- together. And once the alliance system was put in place, it may have encouraged the United States to de¥ne its security needs more expan- sively than it might have without the pacts. Nevertheless, the system’s drawbacks have been far fewer, both in number and in intensity, than some scholars and policymakers would have people believe.

RECALIBRATING ALLIANCES Despite the U.S. alliance system’s manageable cost and incredible success, the United States’ ties to its allies are under more scrutiny now than at any time in recent memory. The American public re- mains broadly supportive o’ international coalitions, yet for the ¥rst time since World War II, U.S. alliances have become deeply politi- cized. Although foreign policy experts from both political parties defend the system, the Trump administration’s core supporters ab- hor it. With Congress and the public polarized on all manner o’ is- sues, the country’s alliances could remain objects o’ controversy even under new leadership. International forces have not been any kinder to the postwar alli- ance system. In Asia, relative power is shifting in China’s favor. Rus- sia is stagnant but remains a force to be reckoned with. And overall, the United States and its allies together hold a smaller share o’ global ±½Ä and military spending than they did at the end o’ the Cold War. Nevertheless, they also have highly developed, technologically so- phisticated economies, and their combined defense spending dwarfs that o’ their rivals. This all suggests that the United States can sal- vage its wildly successful but badly bruised alliance system, so long as it does so on entirely new terms. Over the second hal’ o’ the twentieth century, the nature o’ con- “ict changed dramatically. The spread o’ nuclear weapons and the growth o’ economic interdependence raised the cost o’ great-power war to such heights that challengers now seek to avoid it. Although it remains possible that U.S. allies will face major military attacks, this

136 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 136 1/17/20 9:27 PM Saving America’s Alliances

is not terribly likely. China and Russia prefer nonmilitary coercion that will not trigger ²³µ¬’s Article 5 guarantee. But the United States and its allies need not wait for the United Nations or any other inter- national body to sanction new forms o’ collective self-defense. Inter- national law already allows them to fashion joint responses to actions The United States’ ties to deemed threatening to their political its allies are under more independence—the very sorts o’ inju- ries that result from cyberattacks, elec- scrutiny now than at any tion meddling, and extreme economic time in recent memory. pressure. Washington and its partners have all the power they need to reform the system, but to succeed, they will have to focus on the challenges to security and prosperity that stop just short o’ the military threshold. The United States and its allies must start by rebalancing their re- spective responsibilities. Although Washington’s alliance strategy was aordable during the Cold War, the Trump administration’s heavy- handed demand that U.S. allies assume greater costs does contain a kernel o’ sanity. When the treaty system was formed, the United States’ main allies were war-torn states teetering on the brink o’ col- lapse. They are now thriving democracies with developed economies capable o’ contributing to a more symmetric defense eort. Many U.S. allies have trouble increasing their defense budgets for domestic political reasons—their citizens are accustomed to relatively low de- fense spending and resist budget hikes. The allies can, however, con- tribute to nonmilitary defense and deterrence, as most o’ this spending does not show up in military budgets; rather, it appears on foreign aairs, intelligence, and homeland security ledgers. Moreover, com- pared with the United States’ rivals, American treaty allies are leaders in covert information gathering, public diplomacy, and technological research and development. They can also spend more easily in these areas. Like them, the United States will need to reorganize its secu- rity expenditures, spending less on the military in favor o’ the nonde- fense national security tools necessary to lead alliances. Even so, the United States will need to keep primary responsibil- ity for high-end military defense, as its allies focus on other mis- sions. Now that the Baltic states are ¥rmly ensconced in ²³µ¬, Washington will have to guide its partners toward their credible defense. In particular, ²³µ¬ allies must improve their military read-

March/April 2020 137

Book 1.indb 137 1/17/20 9:27 PM Mira Rapp-Hooper

iness and deter Russian aggression by demonstrating their ability to quickly reach and secure ²³µ¬’s eastern “ank. The military picture in Asia is far more urgent: U.S. partners will have no chance o’ countering China’s growing power without American assistance. Asia must therefore be the United States’ primary military theater, with Europe an important but clear second. U.S. spending and pres- ence should re“ect those priorities, with more dollars spent on plat- forms that are intended to deter China and more deployments directed toward the western Paci¥c. Despite continued security guarantees, U.S. allies must take pri- mary responsibility for lower-end defense and deterrence. This is only appropriate: China and Russia each use coercion to the greatest eect in their immediate neighborhoods, so such geographically exposed al- lies as Japan and the Baltics are the frontline states at greatest risk. U.S. allies must assume ¥nancial and political leadership roles that place them in charge o’ speci¥c countercoercion eorts. And they must take the lead in crafting responses that are tailored to their speci¥c needs. After Estonia became the victim o’ a massive cyberattack alleg- edly carried out by Russia, for example, it expanded its capabilities in cyberspace and pioneered resilience eorts that will blunt the power o’ Moscow’s cyberwarfare in the future. But the allies must go further than self-defense: they must devise regional responses to the threats in their respective parts o’ the world. Australia and Japan, for example, should build up the allies’ capabili- ties in Southeast Asia, to ensure that the assistance that they and the United States give to China’s maritime counterclaimants is used e¾- ciently and eectively. And because security issues are no longer clearly bounded by geography, U.S. allies should set up cross-regional working groups to address questions that aect them all, such as cy- berthreats and foreign investment. The United States should remain an enthusiastic participant in and contributor to these eorts, but the choice o’ strategies and the development o’ alliance infrastructure must be subject to the regional partners’ initiatives and funded by their investments. The United States cannot credibly claim to expand its defense guarantees to these domains by itself; new deterrence ef- forts will succeed only i’ they are truly collective. Washington and its allies must also acknowledge that they do not always see threats from shared rivals in the same way, and that even when they understand the situation similarly, they may still have

138 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 138 1/17/20 9:27 PM Saving America’s Alliances

disproportionate stakes. Even when the allies might share threat as- sessments—such as the United States and Japan’s common view o’ China’s assertiveness in the East China Sea—the regional ally may have a greater incentive to act, given its proximity to the threat. Ja- pan has indeed taken primary responsibility for the handling o’ the dispute over the Senkaku Islands (known as the Diaoyu Islands in China), conducting its own coast guard patrols to counter Chinese pressure. Simply by equipping themselves with better information about coercive threats, the United States and its allies can improve their deterrence and their ability to respond, even i’ they do not view the challenges identically. To be sure, Chinese and Russian nonmilitary aggression will not usually call for a conventional military response. Hence, the alliance members must work together in a multiyear eort to determine how each pact will confront nonmilitary coercion. Each type o’ attack may require a dierent type o’ response: for instance, cyberspace may be more responsive to deterrence measures than economic co- ercion. What’s more, Washington must commit more concretely to its allies and accept some additional risk o’ entrapment in new areas i’ it seeks to strengthen deterrence.

REFORM, NOT RESTORATION The contemporary debate over the U.S. alliance system has de- volved into a false choice between the positions o’ two camps: an- tagonists who would prefer to let the system crumble and nostalgic champions who hope to restore it to its post–Cold War zenith. Nei- ther o’ those positions represents a path forward. I’ the United States continues to reprimand its allies for underspending as it pur- sues rapprochement with its adversaries, the system will surely col- lapse. But a restoration o’ the old alliance network is no longer on the table: nostalgists ignore the fact that continued domestic volatil- ity, inexorable power shifts, and the changing nature o’ con“ict it- sel’ will make such a return impossible. The stakes o¤ failing to reform the alliance system could scarcely be higher. I‘ Washington does not act, it will miss the opportunity to protect its dearest interests on relatively favorable terms, before China’s growing power and Russia’s revanchism undermine the sys- tem’s proven guarantees. The reform agenda recommended here is vast, but it is far less burdensome than a U.S. foreign policy that

March/April 2020 139

Book 1.indb 139 1/17/20 9:27 PM Mira Rapp-Hooper

cannot rely on allies. The United States can no more go it alone now than it could in the immediate postwar years. Whether the United States has alliances or not, American security and prosperity will still require an open and independent Asia and Europe. Even i’ Washington pulled back from both theaters, the United States would still face cyberattacks, ¥nancial and infrastructural disruptions, and assaults on its democratic institutions. And by retrenching, Wash- ington would lose whatever readiness for con“ict it currently has. I’ the country later joined a war abroad, it would have to do so only after signi¥cant time delays and without the allied cooperation that might have allowed it to prevail. Put simply, the United States might fall into a con“ict that it could have instead deterred—one now waged with hypersonic speed and destruction. The United States’ alliance system endured because it advanced the country’s security and prosperity at a reasonable cost. The net- work outlasted the Soviet Union, the foe that it was meant to combat, and weathered drastic changes in the nature o’ con“ict. I’ reformed, this remarkable system can again serve as the fulcrum o’ U.S. grand strategy and provide defense and deterrence for decades to come. I’ neglected, it will become irrelevant, just when it is needed most.∂

140 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 140 1/17/20 9:27 PM Mean Streets The Global Tra¾c Death Crisis Janette Sadik-Khan and Seth Solomonow

ome causes o’ death have little trouble catching the public’s at- tention. Avian “u, Ebola, and Zika have dominated news cycles Sand prompted international travel advisories. Plane crashes in- terrupt broadcasts and lead to thorough government investigations. Cancer, heart disease, and ΰÏ/³°½´ now attract billions o’ dollars o’ research. But one o’ the biggest killers o’ all gets little attention from governments, the media, or the general public. Car crashes killed 1.35 million people in 2016—the last year for which World Health Organ- ization data are available—a grisly 3,698 deaths a day. Tra¾c injuries are now the top killer o’ people aged ¥ve to 29 globally, outpacing any illness and exceeding the combined annual casualties o’ all o’ the world’s armed con“icts. And the toll continues to rise: it grew by 100,000 in just three years, from 2013 to 2016. This does not include the up to 50 million people who are hit and injured by motor vehicles each year, some grievously, but who nonetheless survive. The eco- nomic losses are estimated at three percent o’ global ±½Ä. In many high-income countries, the per capita tra¾c death rate has dropped over the last 50 years, in part thanks to advances in car safety and stricter drunk-driving laws. In the United States, tra¾c fatalities have fallen by nearly a third since the middle o’ the twenti- eth century. But even so, 36,560 Americans died in car crashes in 2018—about as many as were killed by guns. Moreover, the news is getting worse for people not in a vehicle. In 2018, the number o’ Americans killed by cars while walking or riding a bike reached

JANETTE SADIK KHAN is a Principal at Bloomberg Associates. From 2007 to 2013, she was Commissioner of the New York City Department of Transportation.

SETH SOLOMONOW is a Manager at Bloomberg Associates. From 2007 to 2013, he was Deputy Commissioner for External A“airs at the New York City Department of Transportation. They are the authors of Streetfight: Handbook for an Urban Revolution.

March/April 2020 141

Book 1.indb 141 1/17/20 9:27 PM Janette Sadik-Khan and Seth Solomonow

7,140—the highest since 1990, according to the National Highway Tra¾c Safety Administration, and a 41 percent increase since 2008. Globally, the absolute number o’ tra¾c deaths has crept upward as ever-greater numbers o’ people make more trips. Low-income coun- tries, with lax safety standards and poorly designed roads, fare the worst: they boast just one percent o’ the world’s motor vehicles but suer 13 percent o’ total tra¾c deaths. Ethiopia, for instance, had 26.7 tra¾c deaths per 100,000 residents in 2016, almost ten times the rate in Sweden and double that in the United States. To the extent that policymakers have reacted to this crisis, they have tended to do so through incremental measures: passing universal seat- belt laws, mandating air bags and antilock brakes, lowering speed limits, and raising penalties for drunk driving. These are valuable steps, but they are nowhere near enough. That’s because the root cause o’ tra¾c danger isn’t defective cars or unruly drivers. It’s the roads themselves.

DANGEROUS BY DESIGN At the turn o’ the twentieth century, city streets were largely shared spaces, where people on foot mixed in the street with vendors, street- cars, cyclists, and carriages. The arrival o’ the motor vehicle was ini- tially viewed with horror, as U.S. tra¾c deaths climbed from just 26 in 1899 to 29,592 in 1929. To increase speed and safety, streets were wid- ened and cleared o’ obstacles. Engineers and public o¾cials jammed multilane roads, highways, and bridges into previously quiet neighbor- hoods in order to move as many cars as quickly as possible through cities. Many cities didn’t even bother to build new sidewalks since destinations were so far away from one another that it was not feasible to walk. When the widened roads became just as congested and dan- gerous as the ones they replaced, engineers responded with still more construction, turning streets into automotive monocultures, where the mere idea o’ walking, biking, or taking public transit was viewed as foolish. But the multilane roads did not solve tra¾c congestion; they only enabled more and more drivers to take to the streets. In 1955, the urbanist Lewis Mumford noted that widening roads to solve tra¾c congestion was like loosening one’s belt to solve obesity—it temporar- ily eased constraints but did not solve the underlying problem. The result o’ a century o’ car-focused design is that on every con- tinent, roads and lanes tend to be wider than is necessary or safe. Although this keeps cars farther apart, bigger lanes—usually around

142 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 142 1/17/20 9:27 PM Mean Streets

12 feet wide—reduce what tra¾c planners call “friction,” a healthy interaction among drivers, pedestrians, cyclists, and others that in- duces safer behavior. Inevitably, roads designed for speed are deadlier. Psychology plays a role—oversize lanes encourage drivers to drive at dangerous speeds and to view everyone else on the street as obstacles—but so Widening roads to solve does physics. A pedestrian struck by a congestion is like loosening car moving at 25 miles per hour has a 90 percent chance o’ surviving. I’ that one’s belt to solve obesity— car is moving at 40 miles per hour, the it eases constraints but does odds drop to 50 percent. not solve the problem. Compare the tra¾c death statistics for four sprawling cities—Charlotte, Dallas, Jacksonville, and Phoenix—to those for New York City. Al- though New York City’s tra¾c-choked streets might not seem safe, its pedestrian death rate in 2017 was no more than a third o’ that in each o’ those cities, and the overall tra¾c death rate was a mere ¥fth. That’s not because the residents o’ those cities are worse driv- ers but because those cities’ roads were built for fast driving and without safeguards for pedestrians. In the United States, federal and state street-design guidelines explicitly promote wider lanes, even though they are known to be deadlier. In other words, far from being “accidents”—and indeed, the World Health Organization and other tra¾c-safety proponents have shunned that term—tra¾c deaths are caused by roads that are operating exactly as designed. Tra¾c segregation is another principle that dominated twentieth- century road design, to the detriment o’ safety. The idea is that pedes- trians (and everyone else) should be kept safely out o’ drivers’ ways. In London and Tokyo, pedestrian fences force the walking public onto the sidewalk. Meanwhile, Hong Kong posts bright blue signs: “Beware o’ Tra¾c.” But segregation isn’t always possible. Streets throughout Af- rica, the Americas, and Asia have poor or no sidewalks. Many cities in the developing world have seen pedestrian spaces taken over by parked cars, motorcycles, and vendors, forcing people to walk into the street. Even though the root o’ the problem is the way the streets were designed, the trend has been to blame the victim. In many places, news reports o’ crashes tend to repeat claims (often dubious) that injured pedestrians or cyclists were distracted, delinquent, or insu¾ciently

March/April 2020 143

Book 1.indb 143 1/17/20 9:27 PM Janette Sadik-Khan and Seth Solomonow

visible. In 2017, Honolulu criminalized texting while walking across the street despite having no evidence that it was a serious safety is- sue. Other American cities, such as Salt Lake City, implore pedes- trians to carry high-visibility “ags when crossing the street. In cities as dierent as Chicago and Los Angeles, there is frequent talk o‘ licensing bike riders or requiring them to wear bike helmets. Although bike helmets are a reasonable precaution, legally requiring them for all riders only reduces the number o’ cyclists on the street and thus the tra¾c-calming eect that they bring. In many Austra- lian cities, for example, helmet laws have not lowered tra¾c deaths; instead, they have merely hobbled public bike-share systems, whose riders don’t want to carry a helmet wherever they go. Helmets aren’t what make biking safer. There are no helmet requirements in Den- mark, the Netherlands, or Norway—countries where bikes are widely used for transportation and that nonetheless report fewer bike deaths per mile ridden than the United States. As well meaning as most tra¾c-safety laws tend to be, they aren’t enough. Many societies have already had a century o’ practice train- ing better drivers and writing better safety laws. Despite the laws on the books, vast numbers o’ crashes involve excessive speed, a failure to yield to pedestrians in crosswalks, or drinking and drug use. In 2017, 29 percent o’ tra¾c deaths on American roads involved alcohol. An estimated ten percent o’ crashes involved distracted drivers, many o’ whom were using cell phones. Instead o’ trying to legislate safety, a more eective approach is to design it.

PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE The process can and should begin in cities. Although a 2018 study o’ 26 countries by the International Transport Forum found that most tra¾c deaths occur in rural areas, where speeding is common and where there is no space on the road for pedestrians, cyclists, or motorcyclists, the pat- tern is shifting as urbanization continues across the world. (By 2050, city dwellers are expected to compose 68 percent o’ the global population.) In city after city, a new generation o’ urban planners is ¥nding new ways to reduce tra¾c deaths by retro¥tting roads, sometimes dramatically. Although the average transportation agency con¥nes itsel’ to repair- ing potholes, repaving roads, maintaining signs, and so on, there is much more that municipal governments can do. From 2007 to 2013, both o’ us worked in the New York City Department o‘ Transportation

144 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 144 1/17/20 9:27 PM Mean Streets

Unsafe at any speed: a trac jam in New Delhi, January 2008 under Mayor Michael Bloomberg. Our approach to tra c safety was simple and cost eective. Instead o dreaming up megaprojects, we took a long, hard look at the streets we already had, this time from the perspective o the most vulnerable people. Between 2007 and 2013, the Department o€ Transportation rede- signed lengthy portions o 137 streets and revamped 113 intersections— expanding the space to walk, decreasing crossing distances for pedestrians, and making streets navigable enough for children, senior citizens, and people with physical disabilities to cross. By narrowing

TOMAS lanes and putting drivers in closer contact with pedestrians and cyclists, the redesigns forced drivers to proceed, turn, and change lanes more MUNITA slowly and predictably. We also collaborated with the New York City Police Department to implement reduced speed limits, using cameras / THE to catch cars speeding, running red lights, or intruding in bus lanes.

NEW What’s more, we converted 180 acres o‘ New York City road space

YORK into bike lanes, bus lanes, and new pedestrian space. This included making 2.5 acres in Times Square car free: Broadway was transformed TIMES from a taxi-choked corridor into a walkable haven. Instead o€ being forced by crowds to venture into the street, pedestrians now amble

March/April 2020 145

17_Sadik-Khan_Solomonow_pp_Blues.indd 145 1/20/20 7:25 PM Janette Sadik-Khan and Seth Solomonow

through the iconic destination at their leisure. We also introduced the ¥rst parking-protected bike lanes in the United States. In many cities, i’ a bike lane even exists, it is sandwiched between a lane o’ parked cars and a lane o’ moving tra¾c. Parking-protected bike lanes, by contrast, run alongside the curb and push the parking zone for cars a full lane into the street. This means cy- Transportation o§cials clists don’t have to ride within arm’s can’t wait for driverless reach o’ passing cars. The results were visible in every bor- cars to make streets safe. ough—in the crowded avenues o¤ Man- hattan, the residential side streets o’ Brooklyn, the commercial centers o’ Queens, and the busy boulevards o’ the Bronx and Staten Island, many o’ which hadn’t changed in gen- erations. From 2001 to 2019, tra¾c deaths along all o¤ New York City’s 6,000 miles o’ roadway dropped by over 44 percent—from 394 to just 219—even as the number o’ pedestrians on the city’s streets increased and bike ridership tripled. The city saw a 37 percent drop in pedestrian deaths and similar reductions for those injured in a car. This people-focused strategy has worked for some o’ the world’s most unforgiving streets, including in several cities where we worked with Bloomberg Associates and the Global Designing Cities Initia- tive to apply many o’ the designs pioneered in New York City. Mex- ico City was once one o’ the world’s most dangerous cities, with some 1,000 tra¾c deaths a year. But between 2015 and 2017, Mayor Miguel Ángel Mancera had 171 intersections redesigned so that there were clearly de¥ned lanes, pedestrian medians, and crosswalks. He also reduced the citywide speed limit and ramped up tra¾c enforcement by using speed cameras. The redesigns helped lead to an 18 percent reduction in tra¾c deaths, including a 24 percent drop in pedestrian deaths. The number o‘ bike riders killed fell by 78 percent. Halfway around the world, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, o¾cials introduced shortened crosswalks for pedestrians at a busy intersec- tion in the city center, modi¥cations that made it easier to cross the street while also forcing vehicles to slow down signi¥cantly in order to turn. The number o’ serious injuries fell by hal’ in the six months after the project, and the number o’ deaths went down from one before the change to zero after. In Mumbai in 2017, a tra¾c-safety project at the menacing Mithchowki intersection reclaimed 17,760 square feet o’ roadway

146 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 146 1/17/20 9:27 PM Mean Streets

from cars and redesigned them for crowds o’ pedestrians. Using brightly painted movable barriers, a road-safety team created safe waiting spaces and simpli¥ed the process o’ crossing the street. After the modi¥cations, o¾cials noticed a 53 percent increase in sidewalk use. More important, 81 percent o’ people surveyed said they felt safer at the location as a result o’ the project. Similarly, between 2018 and 2020, Milan under Mayor Giuseppe Sala transformed ten squares that were once clogged with parked cars into community-friendly spaces, with benches, tables, and plant- ers. Where cars once roamed, children now play ping pong and neighbors greet one another. Most o’ the time, urban planners do not have to reinvent the wheel. They have the experience and testimony o’ others to draw on. For instance, the Global Street Design Guide synthesizes the real-world ex- perience and practices o’ experts from 72 cities spanning 42 countries. The guide has now been adopted by 100 cities and several nongovern- mental organizations focused on tra¾c safety. It represents a sea change for street design, putting pedestrians and cyclists, rather than freight and private vehicles, at the top o’ the street hierarchy. Often, all it takes to make streets safer is paint, planters, and basic materials already in stock in city depots, such as stones, signs, and “exible tra¾c posts. Even so, given the scale o’ the changes, munici- pal governments will require sustained investment to expand on these proven safety practices and turn the tide on tra¾c deaths.

THE ROAD AHEAD I‘ low-tech solutions can have such a tremendous impact on human health, what about high-end technologies? The driverless-car industry contends that it is at the forefront o’ the tra¾c-safety charge—prom- ising that autonomous vehicles could be programmed to maintain safe speeds no matter the environment. They point out that a combination o’ ±Ä´ data and sign-recognition cameras in cars can limit a vehicle to the posted or o¾cial speed limits. It’s all well and good to claim that driverless cars operating in a closed, connected system would be safer. But everything is dierent on the open road, where those cars would need to drive alongside hun- dreds o’ millions o‘ human-driven vehicles, whose operators are still speeding, cutting one another o, and jockeying for position. There has been only one death involving an autonomous car, but even one

March/April 2020 147

Book 1.indb 147 1/17/20 9:27 PM Janette Sadik-Khan and Seth Solomonow

death doesn’t speak well o’ the technology’s capabilities in city centers alive with thousands o‘ human actors—a jumble o’ people walking, biking, making deliveries, panhandling, and so on. Transportation o¾cials can’t wait for driverless cars to make streets safe. Sidewalks won’t extend themselves; crosswalks won’t magically appear. Countries can’t bet their futures on the promise that better cars or better drivers will reverse the damage caused by a century o’ car-obsessed roadway design. I’ cities want infrastructure that ac- commodates all users, they need to lead by example and reclaim, re- design, and reconstruct their roads. Government and public health o¾cials routinely face problems that exceed their capacities and powers. Tra¾c deaths are not one o’ them. Indeed, tra¾c-related fatalities are unusual in that their causes are as straightforward as their solutions. Eliminating most health hazards on the roadway doesn’t require new technologies or unsustainable invest- ments. It requires changing how we view tra¾c deaths and injuries, treating them as avoidable byproducts o’ a crisis in urban design rather than an inevitable feature o’ modern life. There is already a revolution underway to redesign city streets to a new standard. But there is still much work to be done and a growing population that needs protection.∂

148 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 148 1/17/20 9:27 PM would bring scienti¥c precision and The Dismal rigor to government interventions. For a while, this approach seemed a Kingdom sure bet for steady progress. But several decades on, the picture is less encourag- ing. Consider, for example, the most basic Do Economists Have Too quantitative indicator o’ well-being: the Much Power? average length o’ a life. For much o’ the last century, life expectancy in the United Paul Romer States increased roughly in tandem with that in western Europe. But over the last four decades, the United States has been falling further and further behind. The Economists’ Hour: False Prophets, Free In 1980, the average American life was a Markets, and the Fracture of Society year longer than the average European BY BINYAMIN APPELBAUM. Little, one. Today, it is two years shorter. For a Brown, 2019, 448 pp. long time, U.S. life expectancy was still rising but more slowly than in Europe; Transaction Man: The Rise of the Deal in recent years, it has been falling. A and the Decline of the American Dream society is hardly making progress when BY NICHOLAS LEMANN. Farrar, its people are dying younger. Straus and Giroux, 2019, 320 pp. Binyamin Appelbaum makes this point in his new book, The Economists’ ver the past 60 years, the Hour. That book and another recent United States has run what one—Transaction Man, by Nicholas Oamounts to a natural experi- Lemann—converge on the conclusion ment designed to answer a simple that the economists at the helm are question: What happens when a gov- doing more harm than good. ernment starts conducting its business Both books are compelling and well in the foreign language o’ economists? reported, and both were written by After 1960, anyone who wanted to journalists—outsiders who bring histori- discuss almost any aspect o’ U.S. public cal perspective to the changing role o’ policy—from how to make cars safer to economists in American society. Appel- whether to abolish the draft, from how baum tracks their in“uence across a wide to support the housing market to range o’ policy questions since the whether to regulate the ¥nancial sec- 1960s. The language and the concepts o’ tor—had to speak economics. Econo- economics helped shape debates about mists, the thinking went, promised unemployment and taxation, as one expertise and fact-based analysis. They would expect. But they also in“uenced how the state handled military conscrip- PAUL ROMER is Professor of Economics at tion, how it regulated airplane and New York University and former Chief Econo- railway travel, and how its courts inter- mist at the World Bank. He was a co-recipient, with William Nordhaus, of the 2018 Nobel preted laws limiting corporate power. Prize in Economics. Together, Appelbaum writes, economists’

150 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 150 1/17/20 9:27 PM The Dismal Kingdom

countless interventions in U.S. public Economists should take that outcome policy have amounted to no less than a as an admonition warranting a major “revolution”—well intentioned but course change. Writing in 2018, the with unanticipated consequences that economists David Colander and Craig were far from benign. Freedman proposed one such correction. Lemann chronicles another, related Over the course o the twentieth century, revolution. In the rst hal o the twenti- they contended, economists had built eth century, especially after the calamity more and more sophisticated models to o the Great Depression, the conven- guide public policy, and many succumbed tional wisdom held that the power o to hubris in the process. To regain the corporations must be held in check by public’s trust, economists should return to other comparably sized organizations— the humility o their nineteenth-century churches, unions, and, above all, a strong forebears, who emphasized the limits o national government. But in the decades their knowledge and welcomed others— that followed, a new generation o experts, political leaders, and voters—to economists argued that tweaks to how ll in the gaps. Economists today should companies operated—more hostile recommit to that approach, even i it takeovers, more reliance on corporate requires them to publicly expel from debt, bigger bonuses for executives when their ranks any member o the commu- stock prices increased—would enable the nity who habitually overreaches. market to regulate itself, obviating the need for stringent government oversight. ESCAPE FROM THE BASEMENT Their suggestions soon became reality, Appelbaum’s book begins with a reveal- especially in a newly deregulated nan- ing anecdote from the 1950s about Paul cial sector, where they precipitated the Volcker, at the time a young economist emergence o junk bonds and other ques- working in the bowels o the Federal tionable innovations. Like Appelbaum, Reserve System and disillusioned about Lemann concludes that economists’ his career prospects. Among the Fed’s uncritical embrace o the market changed national leadership were bankers, U.S. society for the worse. lawyers, and a hog farmer from Iowa— Voters, too, have their doubts, in the but no economists. In 1970, William United States and beyond. In the run-up McChesney Martin, Jr., then chair o to the 2016 Brexit vote, Michael Gove, the Federal Reserve’s Board o Gover- then the British justice secretary, was nors, could still explain to a visitor that asked to name economists who supported although economists asked good ques- his position that the United Kingdom tions, they worked from the basement should leave the European Union. He because “they don’t know their own refused. “People in this country have had limitations, and they have a far greater enough o experts,” he snapped. “I’m not sense o con dence in their analyses asking the public to trust me. I’m asking than I have found to be warranted.” the public to trust themselves.” A major- But Martin was on his way out, and ity o the British electorate followed his as Appelbaum shows in the chapters cue and voted to leave the Ÿ¡, the warn- that follow, economists were emerging ings o countless economists be damned. from the basement—not just at the Fed

March/April 2020 151

19_Romer_pp_Blues.indd 151 1/20/20 5:08 PM Paul Romer

but also across the government. To take can use evidence and logic to answer the just one example, consider the rapid ¥rst question. But there is no factual or spread o’ cost-bene¥t analysis as the logical argument that can answer the tool o’ choice for assessing health and second one. In truth, the answer lies in safety regulations. When the U.S. beliefs about right and wrong, which Congress created the Department o’ dier from one individual to the next Transportation in 1966 and told it to and evolve over time, much like people’s make motor vehicles safer, lawmakers political views. did not ask regulators to weigh the In principle, it is possible to main- potential costs and bene¥ts o’ proposed tain a clear separation between these new rules: after all, no one could two types o’ questions. Economists can possibly determine the value o’ a answer such empirical questions as how human life. The economists Thomas much it would cost i’ the government Schelling and W. Kip Viscusi dis- required Mans¥eld bars. It is up to agreed, arguing that people did in fact o¾cials—and, by extension, up to the place a dollar value on human life, voters who put them in o¾ce—to albeit implicitly, and that economists answer the corresponding normative could calculate it. question: What cost should society bear Regulators initially rejected this to save a life in any particular context? approach, but as complaints about In practice, however, voters can burdensome safety regulations grew provide only so much in the way o’ louder, some began to waver. In 1974, quanti¥able directives. People may the Department o‘ Transportation used vote for an administration that prom- a cost-bene¥t analysis to reject a pro- ises safer cars, but that mandate alone posed requirement that trucks be ¥tted is not speci¥c enough to guide deci- with so-called Mans¥eld bars, designed sions such as whether to require Mans- to prevent the type o’ accident that had ¥eld bars. Lacking clear guidance from killed the actress Jayne Mans¥eld in voters, legislators, regulators, and 1967. The cost o’ installing the bars on judges turned to economists, who every truck, regulators calculated, would resolved the uncertainty by claiming to exceed the combined value o’ the lives have found an empirical answer to the that the bars would save. Soon, every normative question at hand. In eect, participant in the conversation about by taking on the responsibility to safety regulations was expected to state determine for everyone the amount and defend a speci¥c dollar value for a that society should spend to save a life, life lost or saved. economists had agreed to play the role Unfortunately, asking economists to o’ the philosopher-king. set a value for human life obscured the In Appelbaum’s account, this ar- fundamental distinction between the rangement seems to have worked out two questions that feed into every policy surprisingly well in setting standards for decision. One is empirical: What will automobile safety. Economists in the happen i’ the government adopts this mold o’ Schelling and Viscusi seem to policy? The other is normative: Should have channeled as best they could the the government adopt it? Economists moral beliefs o’ the median voter.

152 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 152 1/17/20 9:27 PM Paul Romer

When regulators ¥rst rejected Mans¥eld yield many reasonable decisions when bars, in 1974, they put the value o’ a life the stakes are low, but it will fail and at $200,000, but in response to pressure cause enormous damage when powerful from voters demanding fewer tra¾c industries are brought into the mix. And fatalities, economists and regulators it takes only a few huge failures to oset gradually adjusted that number upward. whatever positive dierence smaller, Eventually, as the estimated value o’ the successful interventions have made. human lives lost to car accidents began to One such failure is prescription drug exceed the cost o’ installing Mans¥eld regulation. In the United States in bars, regulators made the bars mandatory, 1990, overdoses on legal and illegal drugs and voters got the outcome they wanted. accounted for four deaths per 100,000. Unfortunately, this outcome may By 2017, they were causing 20 deaths have been possible only because, al- per 100,000. A little math reveals that though the moral stakes were high, the this increase is a major reason why ¥nancial stakes were not. No ¥rm faced average life expectancy in the United billions o’ dollars in gains or losses States lags so far behind that in western depending on whether the government Europe today. A recent paper by four mandated Mans¥eld bars. As a result, economists—Abby Alpert, William none had an incentive to use its massive Evans, Ethan Lieber, and David Pow- ¥nancial resources to corrupt the ell—concluded that OxyContin, the regulatory process and bias its decisions, opioid-based painkiller that generated and the “don’t ask, don’t tell” system o’ billions in revenue for the U.S. pharma- using economists as philosopher-kings ceutical giant Purdue Pharma, was worked reasonably well. responsible for a substantial fraction o’ The trouble arose when the stakes those new drug overdoses. were higher—when the potential gains Imagine making the following or losses extended into the tens o’ proposal in the 1950s: Give for-pro¥t billions or hundreds o‘ billions o’ dollars, ¥rms the freedom to develop highly as they do in decisions about regulating addictive painkillers and to promote the ¥nancial sector, preventing dominant them via sophisticated, aggressive, and ¥rms from sti“ing competition, or very eective marketing campaigns stopping a pharmaceutical ¥rm from targeted at doctors. Had one made this getting people addicted to painkillers. In pitch to the bankers, the lawyers, and such circumstances, it is all too easy for a the hog farmer on the Board o’ Gover- ¥rm that has a lot riding on the outcome nors o’ the Federal Reserve back then, to arrange for a pliant pretend economist they would have rejected it outright. I’ to assume the role o’ the philosopher- pressed to justify their decision, they king—someone willing to protect the surely would not have been able to ¥rm’s reckless behavior from government oer a cost-bene¥t analysis to back up interference and to do so with a veneer their reasoning, nor would they have o’ objectivity and scienti¥c expertise. felt any need to. To know that it is Simply put, a system that delegates morally wrong to let a company make a to economists the responsibility for pro¥t by killing people would have answering normative questions may been enough.

154 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 154 1/17/20 9:27 PM The Dismal Kingdom

By the 1990s, such arguments were regulations on many sectors. “Unfettered out o‘ bounds, because the language markets create a degree o’ wealth that and elaborate concepts o’ economists fosters a more civilized existence,” left no opening for more practically Greenspan told a group o‘ business minded people to express their values economists in 2002. “I have always found plainly. And when the Drug Enforce- that insight compelling.” ment Administration ¥nally tried to Greenspan was hardly alone in this limit the distribution o’ these painkill- conviction, and the most damaging forms ers, pharmaceutical companies o’ deregulation were those that removed launched a massive lobbying eort in constraints on ¥nancial ¥rms, as Lemann favor o’ a bill in Congress that would reveals in his account o’ the career o’ strip the ½¯³ o’ the power to freeze Michael Jensen, an economist who suspicious narcotics shipments by drug helped reshape the U.S. ¥nancial sector companies. It is a safe bet that these in the late twentieth century. Jensen lobbyists made their arguments to Con- rightly worried about several problems gress in the language o’ growth, incen- that bedeviled the market, including tives, and the danger o’ innovation- how to keep corporate executives from killing regulations. The push promoting their own interests at the succeeded, and the ½¯³ lost one o’ its expense o’ shareholders. His proposed most powerful tools for saving lives. solutions—hostile takeovers, debt, and O’ course, during earlier eras, executive bonuses that tracked the share regulators allowed many industries to price o’ a ¥rm, among other changes— pro¥t massively from products known were widely adopted. to be harmful; Big Tobacco is the most Corporate shareholders saw their obvious example. But until the 1980s, earnings skyrocket, but the main eect the overarching trend was toward o’ the changes was to empower the restrictions that reined in these abuses. ¥nancial sector, which Greenspan, for Progress was painfully slow, but it was his part, worked doggedly to unfetter. progress nonetheless, and life expectancy As Lemann writes, Jensen’s ideas also increased. The dierence today is that helped chip away at the power o’ the the United States is going backward, and traditional Corporate Man—the sort o’ in many cases, economists—even those executive whose pursuit o’ pro¥t was acting in good faith—have provided the tempered somewhat by a commitment intellectual cover for this retreat. to noneconomic norms, among them a belie’ in the need to foster trust and THE COST OF DEREGULATION build long-term relationships across Perhaps no one has captured the mind- company lines. Taking his place was set that made possible such a massive Transaction Man, who focused on little regulatory failure—the mindset that more than driving up share prices by economists really are philosopher-kings, any means necessary. who can instruct the public on right and Deregulation, coupled with the new wrong—better than Alan Greenspan, ethos o‘ Transaction Man, invited who was chair o’ the Federal Reserve at immensely destructive behavior. One the time when Washington was easing particularly egregious example occurred

March/April 2020 155

Book 1.indb 155 1/17/20 9:27 PM Paul Romer

in 2007. That year, Paulson & Com- career preaching the gospel o’ corporate pany, a hedge fund led by the investor integrity to empty pews. John Paulson, paid Goldman Sachs Lemann balances his account o’ approximately $15 million to structure Jensen’s career with the story o’ people and market a bundle o’ mortgage- whose lives were damaged by a deregu- backed securities. According to a civil lated ¥nancial system that let a new lawsuit later ¥led against Goldman (but breed o’ mortgage broker mimic the not against Paulson & Company) by the predatory practices o’ payday lenders U.S. Securities and Exchange Commis- with impunity. In the 1990s, so many o’ sion, Goldman had included in the those brokers opened storefront o¾ces investment product mortgages that on Pulaski Road, on Chicago’s South Paulson & Company believed were Side, that residents came to refer to it as likely to end in default. In a 2010 settle- “Mortgage Row.” Lemann describes the ment with the ´¯Å, Goldman conceded eect these lenders had on one nearby that in marketing the product to clients, neighborhood, Chicago Lawn. Teaser rates it had omitted both the role o¤ Paulson & kept mortgage payments low for the Company in designing the product and ¥rst 24 months o’ a loan, but then they the hedge fund’s bet against it. Accord- increased dramatically to levels that ing to the ´¯Å, investors soon lost over many borrowers could not possibly $1 billion; Paulson & Company, by aord. Like clockwork, two years after taking the opposite position, earned being purchased, houses went into approximately the same amount. foreclosure. Many were abandoned. Jensen quickly realized that Gold- Neighborhood activists tried to stop man’s behavior was cause for concern, the destruction o‘ human capital caused and he inveighed against the cultural by debt that overwhelmed the tenuous changes that had eroded the ¥rm’s lives o’ the working poor, the destruc- erstwhile commitment to integrity in its tion o’ physical capital caused by long-term relationships with its clients. thieves who stripped water heaters and Banks were, Lemann quotes him as copper pipe from abandoned houses, saying, “lying, cheating, stealing.” It and the destruction o’ social capital “sickened” Jensen that senior executives caused by abandoned houses that turned had avoided jail time in the wake o’ the into crime hot spots. On top o’ these ¥nancial crisis that followed. visible injuries, the people o’ Chicago It is not clear whether Jensen has Lawn had to bear the insult o’ o¾cial ever considered the possibility that by indierence. A decade before the promoting a system that relied on collapse o’ the U.S. housing market transactions instead o’ relationships, he rocked the global ¥nancial system, the himsel’ may have contributed to the damage done by subprime lending was erosion o’ trust and integrity in the U.S. already evident in their neighborhood. ¥nancial sector. He seems not to have But in 1998, the Federal Reserve, under lost his faith that one more adjustment Greenspan, refused requests from to the system might restore the miracle o’ alarmed consumer advocates that it the market. But he has not found that examine the subprime-lending activities adjustment. He ended his professional o’ the banks it regulated.

156 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 156 1/17/20 9:27 PM The Dismal Kingdom

After more than a decade o’ damage institutions more leeway and in doing so to their neighborhood, the citizens o’ helped create the conditions that led to Chicago Lawn watched as the o¾cials the ¥nancial crisis. He did so in the name who would not even look into that o’ economics—indeed, in the public damage saved the banks that had caused consciousness, he came to personify the it. No amount o’ econosplaining could ¥eld. But his opposition to regulation change the message this conveyed: was invulnerable to evidence. Until he everybody has to accept what the took control at the Fed, he was a hired market gives them—except the people gun, ready to defend ¥rms in the who work in the ¥nancial sector. To- ¥nancial sector from regulators who day’s record-low unemployment rate tried to protect the public. In this role, shows that ten years on, the most direct he reportedly said that he had “never harm from the ¥nancial crisis has seen a constructive regulation yet.” I’ healed. But deeper wounds remain. economists continue to let people like Wage growth for workers has been slow, him de¥ne their discipline, the public and the crisis caused a massive and will send them back to the basement, long-lasting reduction in incomes across and for good reason. the world—and perhaps an even longer- The alternative is to make honesty lasting populist backlash against the and humility prerequisites for member- political institutions o’ many countries. ship in the community o’ economists. The easy part is to challenge the pre- A NEW HUMILITY tenders. The hard part is to say no when In their attempt to answer normative government o¾cials look to economists questions that the science o’ economics for an answer to a normative question. could not address, economists opened the Scienti¥c authority never conveys moral door to economic ideologues who lacked authority. No economist has a privi- any commitment to scienti¥c integrity. leged insight into questions o’ right and Among these pretend economists, the wrong, and none deserves a special say ones who prized supposed freedom in fundamental decisions about how (especially freedom from regulation) over society should operate. Economists who all other concerns proved most useful— argue otherwise and exert undue not to society at large but to companies in“uence in public debates about right that wanted the leeway to generate a and wrong should be exposed for what pro¥t even i’ they did pervasive harm in they are: frauds.∂ the process. When the stakes were high, ¥rms sought out these ideologues to act as their representatives and further their agenda. And just like their more repu- table peers, these pretend economists used the unfamiliar language o’ eco- nomics to obscure the moral judgments that undergirded their advice. Throughout his entire career, Greenspan worked to give ¥nancial

March/April 2020 157

Book 1.indb 157 1/17/20 9:27 PM has been writing about Russia for The The Wily Country New Yorker, ¥ling articles on politics, diplomacy, and culture not only from the country’s big cities but also from Understanding Putin’s Russia Russia’s many far-“ung regions; he has also written some o’ the most penetrat- Michael Kimmage ing and well-researched essays on U.S.-Ukrainian relations in the Trump era. His in-depth reporting consistently Between Two Fires: Truth, Ambition, and allows him to move beyond the head- Compromise in Putin’s Russia lines, revealing the deeper historical BY JOSHUA YAFFA. Tim Duggan and sociological patterns that underpin Books, 2020, 368 pp. that notoriously contradictory country. Yaa’s excellent new book, Between ot since the McCarthy era has Two Fires, traces the lives o’ a group o’ Russia been so present in the ambitious Russians who lived through NAmerican psyche and so close the transition from the Soviet era to the to the fevered core o’ American poli- post-Soviet one. Each is aware o’ a tics. But being present is not the same certain truth about the Russian world, as being known. Russia’s recent ubiquity and each must navigate a political in U.S. politics has coincided with a system that runs less on tyranny than precipitous decline in contact between on carefully calibrated compromises. A the two countries: among diplomats (a few o’ them succeed because they learn result o’ U.S. eorts to isolate Russia the dance. Others bear the burden o’ for its misdeeds in Ukraine and else- being principled. where), among heads o’ state and politi- And yet as ¥nely tuned to compli- cal elites, among scholars, and among cated Russian realities as Yaa is, ordinary citizens. U.S. academic work on Between Two Fires is ultimately a missed Russia has been steadily diminishing opportunity. Like many other books since the end o’ the Cold War. Very few written by Westerners about contempo- Americans now learn the Russian language rary Russia, it takes as its baseline the or study Russian history, and a great intelligentsia o¤ Moscow and St. deal o’ U.S. journalism on Russia suers Petersburg, exploring their dreams o’ from hyperbole, paranoia, and clichés. liberty and wondering whether they In this milieu, the journalist Joshua will ever come true. That is an old and Yaa has distinguished himsel’ with his venerable subject, one that Russian rigor, his acumen, and his nuanced and foreign observers alike have voice. Since 2013, Yaa (who earlier in speculated about extensively since the his career was an editor at this magazine) early nineteenth century. But focusing on it obscures the more basic and MICHAEL KIMMAGE is Professor of History at more consequential task o’ evaluating the Catholic University of America and the post-Soviet Russia as it is, rather than author of the forthcoming book The Abandon- ment of the West: The History of an Idea in as it should be—or should be from an American Foreign Policy. American point o’ view.

158 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 158 1/17/20 9:27 PM The Wily Country

For more than two decades after the public memory, an instance o’ civil Soviet collapse, U.S. analysts and policy- society in action, and a chance to link an makers saw Russia as predisposed to honest discussion o‘ history with the mirror the United States in political new directions o¤ Russian political life. economy and culture. Russia, however, For a while, the museum did its job, stubbornly refused to do so. In 2014, hosting exhibitions that authorities when Russian President Vladimir Putin sometimes saw as unwelcome provoca- invaded and annexed Crimea, the tions. Then, around 2014, the di¾culties U.S.-Russian divergence was complete. began. State control supplanted indepen- In the years since, Washington’s anger and dent leadership, and a museum that had disappointment over Russia’s course registered criticism o’ the Soviet regime have boiled over, especially after Moscow yielded to one that celebrated victory in meddled in the 2016 U.S. presidential World War II. It was an emblematic election. According to a view common transition: in Putin’s Russia, either the among American pundits, Russia has institutions o’ civil society are absorbed become a rogue state, an unnatural entity into the regime or they cease to exist. more akin to a criminal enterprise than a The second act begins in 2000, when nation-state. And yet after a long series Putin took power, which Yaa recalls as o’ dashed expectations, many still believe “a moment between the abject chaos that one day the rogue will vanish and and hardship o’ the nineties and the the “real” Russia will ¥nally emerge. This routinized, top-down strictures o’ the is a fantasy. The sober intellectual chore o’ vertical o’ power that would descend in U.S. policymakers and Russia watchers the years to come.” Putin bestowed is to understand Russian recalcitrance and prosperity with one hand and dished out tease out the non-Western trajectory o’ repression with the other, not depriving this sprawling country on Europe’s edge. Russians o’ their newfound freedoms so much as forcing those freedoms into THE STORY SO FAR the margins, where they would not Yaa’s book unfolds in three acts. The disrupt the government’s hold on power. ¥rst act chronicles a phase o’ relative Some Russians stood to bene¥t from openness in Russian society during the the relative stability o’ early Putinism. 1990s, when personal freedom was To do so, they had to make their peace palpable; both the Soviet past and the with the Kremlin’s imperatives, assisting Russian future were bracingly uncer- when requested and avoiding criticism tain, both susceptible to interpretation that might have proved destabilizing. and reinterpretation. But this period In Yaa’s telling, the system depends was shadowed by the chaotic shift from on more than run-of-the-mill opportun- one form o’ government to another, in ism and coercion. He probes the which executive authority expanded in evolution o’ the human rights advocate direct proportion to the loss o’ demo- Heda Saratova, who is not motivated cratic agency. In a poignant chapter set by money or personal gain but whose partly during this time, Yaa details the work is made easier by government construction o’ a gulag museum in support. Over time, she starts to cooper- Siberia. Opened in 1996, it was a site o’ ate with Chechnya’s strongman ruler,

March/April 2020 159

Book 1.indb 159 1/17/20 9:27 PM Michael Kimmage

Ramzan Kadyrov, a relationship that mechanism” evolved into an ethos: helps her with her day-to-day projects and “citizen and state subconsciously worked helps Kadyrov with his public image. together to ensure that the individual The coils o’ co-optation are not necessar- took agency in sti“ing his own freedom ily chains. They can be worn lightly and chances for self-realization.” and, at times, in the name o’ doing good. Putin has cultivated the Russian In the past few years, Yaa relates, talent for wiliness, Yaa explains. Putin the early Putin period has faded into an constructed a regime that is knowingly ongoing third act, in which “things begin arbitrary in its depredations, forcing to look a lot more fragile.” Inequality is any ambitious person to ¥gure out the rising, the middle class is under pres- rules o’ engagement and decide how sure, and Putin is getting old. Russians much personal freedom and initiative to today are “open, curious, and ambitious, carve out and how opportunistic to be. but not—at least not yet—desperate This compromising balance o’ reward and and insurrectionary,” Yaa writes. Their punishment, o‘ liberty and state con- quiescence or their rage will set the stage trol, describes “the future contours o’ for the fourth act, post-Putin. Yaa Russian society,” in Yaa’s words. devotes an intriguing chapter to the sad Yaa wisely avoids prophecy, yet he is story o¤ Pavel Adelgeim, a Russian convinced that wiliness has an enduring Orthodox priest who suered for his faith appeal in Russia. I¤ Putin can continue during the Soviet era and who, until his harnessing it, he will go forward. I’ the death in 2013, refused to align himsel’ wily Russian mind starts to see diminish- with the hierarchy o’ the Russian ing returns in the house that Putin built, Orthodox Church in post-Soviet Russia the social contract will unravel, and and supported protests against Putin. Putin will become a politician in search Adelgeim personi¥es a regime-critical o’ a constituency. Christianity that could ¥t into a future Wiliness is a universal trait, and for pro-democracy movement, one in which Yaa, it serves as a reasonable enough dissent would be a vehicle o’ patriotism bridge between the Soviet past and the and empathy would act as a social glue. Russian present. It’s debatable whether Russia is a country where “venal self- SURVIVAL OF THE WILIEST interest had long become the norm” and Although Yaa’s three acts coincide is therefore especially prone to wiliness, with periods in Putin’s rise and rule, as Yaa asserts. But his beautifully Between Two Fires does not put the wrought portraiture more than proves the Russian leader at the center o’ the residual nature o’ wiliness in Russian drama. Yaa contends that Putin is “less society. As an explanation for why con- the country’s captor than a manifesta- temporary Russians think and act as they tion o’ its collective subconscious.” And do, the persistence o’ wiliness is more the wellspring o’ the collective Russian convincing than the return o’ a totalitar- subconscious, according to Yaa, is ian political culture, which many Putin wiliness. Soviet citizens were reliant on critics allege has taken place. “Most the state. They had to adjust to its people are neither Stalin nor Solzhenit- demands, and in the process, a “survival syn,” Yaa writes, “but, in their own way,

160 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 160 1/17/20 9:27 PM The Wily Country

empire had been robustly multiethnic. Not all o’ its leaders were ethnic Rus- sians, whereas ethnic Russians ¥gured promi- nently among the victims o’ Soviet rule. The Russian Federation that crawled out from the Soviet Union was by no means homogeneous. Today’s Russia is a patch- work o‘ languages, reli- gions, and peoples, and because o’ shifting borders (and Soviet population moves), many who con- sider themselves Russian live outside Russia’s borders—especially in Ukraine. Yet the realign- ment o‘ borders in 1991 also yielded the most coherently Russian state in wily.” In o¾ce, Putin has burnished Russian history. In particular, the the reputations o’ the Soviet leader and top-down project o’ mapping a Russian the Soviet dissident and has embraced identity onto an internationalist Soviet the iconography o’ the Soviet Union and identity died with the Soviet Union, and that o’ the Russian Orthodox Church. for the ¥rst time since 1917, it was As the wiliest o’ them all, Putin is no possible to contemplate an explicitly stranger to such contradictions. Russian polity in Russia, under a single However, by reaching back to wiliness Russian “ag, even though the Russian and an attitude that is so indigenously language continues to have two dierent Soviet, Yaa understates the distinctive- terms for a¾liation with the Russian ness o’ post-Soviet Russia. The Soviet Federation: russkii (ethnic Russian) and ILLUSTRATION Union fell apart not only because the rossiiskii (adhering to the Russian state). Georgians, the Lithuanians, the Ukrai- For Russians, acquiring a country nians, and other non-Russians rose up was the pivotal consequence o’ the 1991 against it but also because the Russians revolution. Boris Yeltsin’s presidency BY

BRIAN CRONIN themselves did. The aspirations o’ “owed directly from his challenge to independence-minded Russians in 1991 the scrupulously communist and were similar to those o’ the Soviet internationalist Mikhail Gorbachev, a Union’s other separatist populations. They widely disliked ¥gure in post-Soviet wanted a country o’ their own. The Soviet Russia. Putin’s popularity stems not just

March/April 2020 161

Book 1.indb 161 1/17/20 9:27 PM Michael Kimmage

from the stability that he imposed on friendly yet sophisticated. He is a talented the country after the messy 1990s, and and obedient operator, but even this not just from the wealth that gave some Kremlin insider displays sentiments that Russians an incentive to carry out wily cannot be reduced to wiliness. In Yaa’s service to the state, but also from the fact observation, Ernst approved o¤ Russian that most Russians have judged Putin policy toward Ukraine circa 2014, an eective advocate for Russian nation- sensing in it “a moment o’ geopolitical hood. A key part o’ this advocacy has score-settling, o’ upending a post–Cold been a willingness to confront the West, War order that Ernst—like Putin, the which Putin began doing long before rest o’ the Kremlin elite, and millions o’ the Ukraine crisis. What Russians want Russians—felt had treated Russia harshly.” more than a liberal country—a goal that Ernst is a sincere propagandist, free o’ galvanizes relatively few people outside the implacable cynicism that dominated Moscow and St. Petersburg—is an the Soviet Union in its ¥nal decades. autonomous country. Putin has arranged One explanation for the pronounced Russian politics to enable such autonomy. wiliness o‘ Yaa’s subjects is that almost Yaa is aware o’ this dynamic. He all o’ them were born long before the writes that “the two forces [in Russia]— breakup o’ the Soviet Union. They were state and citizen—speak in dialogue, a forced to move as best they could conversational timbre often missed by the between the two “¥res” o’ the book’s foreign ear.” But only by reading between title: the Soviet Union and the Russian the lines o’ Between Two Fires can one Federation. In the ¥nal chapter o’ the discern that dialogue. One o‘ Yaa’s book, however, Yaa writes about a subjects, Oleg Zubkov, is a zookeeper and younger Russian, and the results suggest entrepreneur living in Crimea. Zubkov that he should have devoted far more is a free spirit and a bon vivant, and Yaa attention to Russians born in the 1970s relishes his antiauthoritarian spirit. In or later. Danila Prilepa captured Yaa’s the referendum that Putin conducted to interest when he asked a question on a decide Crimea’s future after the Russian 2017 televised call-in show with Putin. invasion in 2014, Zubkov happily voted Prilepa, who was 16 at the time, con- for the territory to join Russia, although fronted Putin about corruption, asking he later found himsel’ in con“ict with him what he planned to do about it and the Russian legal system. In the sincerity about the mounting loss o¤ faith in the o‘ his patriotism and his independence government. Some time later, Yaa o’ mind, Zubkov ends up demonstrating visited Prilepa at his family’s home in a lack o’ wily gamesmanship—“at least Nefteyugansk, far from Moscow. In the way the game is played in the Putin conversation, Prilepa revealed himsel’ to era,” as Yaa notes. be very critical o’ the Russian govern- Another o‘ Yaa’s main characters is ment, but to Yaa’s surprise, he was not the television producer Konstantin Ernst, alienated from it. Yaa asked Prilepa i‘ he who achieves wealth and status through “saw a di¾culty in serving a state he his profession, assisting the powerful while had begun to sour on. ‘No,’ he said, ‘I’m retaining the sensibility o’ an aesthete. planning to serve my homeland, not a Ernst produces television that is regime- certain circle o’ people.’” This comment

162 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 162 1/17/20 9:27 PM contains multitudes. Perhaps in another book, Ya a will bring his ample journal- istic talent to bear in eshing it out. I so, he would be doing a great service to A SUPERBUG his non-Russian readers.

BIRTH OF A NATION American assessments, journalistic and GIRLS’ EDUCATION otherwise, must do more to address Russian nationhood. It is one o Putin’s crucial sources o legitimacy. His gov- A KILLER ROBOT ernment is corrupt and ine­cient. It does not grant Russian citizens real rights, and there is no freedom in Russia that the SPACE JUNK Kremlin does not have the power to curtail. Russians know these downsides o the Putin system. They tolerate them THE NUCLEAR BUTTON not only because they are wily and capable o pro ting from the status quo. They tolerate the authoritarianism and the TRASH corruption because in some crucial sense the Russian government is theirs. It is the product o the state-citizen dialogue A WOOLY MAMMOTH Ya a identi es as inaudible to non- Russian ears. And in no domain is the Russian government so much the posses- sion o Russians as in foreign policy. Russia’s actions in Ukraine and in Syria since 2014 may bring few tangible A podcast that brings bene ts to the country’s citizens, and they the world home. certainly incur costs, but they are the visible proo o Russian autonomy. Achieving autonomy is the goal o Russian foreign policy far more than an abstrac- tion such as regaining great-power status, which is what Western policymakers usually de ne as the desired end state o Russian strategy. The Russian hunger for national autonomy presents a conundrum for U.S. policy. For Moscow, the easiest way to Produced by: demonstrate Russia’s autonomy is to defy the United States, whatever the United States is doing. Washington and Moscow

March/April 2020 163

FA 163_rev.indd 1 1/20/20 9:51 AM Book 1.indb 163 1/17/20 9:27 PM Michael Kimmage

have been engaged in geopolitical compe- impossibility o’ decent relations with the tition since 1945 (at least), with Moscow West. This message can be delivered having already once been a spectacular through speeches and cultural diplomacy loser in this contest. The American directed at the Russian public—a form superpower is the single greatest obstacle o’ communication that high-level U.S. to Russian autonomy. Consequently, politicians have long neglected—and the United States has the potential to through a public willingness to engage in inspire immense enmity in Russia, and a bilateral strategic dialogue Moscow, as its ability to generate goodwill is highly Washington regularly does with Beijing. circumscribed. The Trump administra- The familiar story o¤ Russian liberty tion, which speaks a language o’ assertive lost or unachieved—o’ which Between nationalism at home and abroad, has Two Fires is a superb example—can help allowed U.S.-Russian relations to dete- inform a better U.S. approach to Russia. riorate from the low point it inherited in But much more helpful would be the less January 2017. Meanwhile, Donald frequently told story o¤ Russian nation- Trump’s Democratic opponents have hood and o’ its development along lines expressed horror at his slavish “attery o’ very dierent from those that led to Putin but have failed to articulate a American or western European nation- coherent Russia strategy o’ their own. hood. In this time o¤ fervid preoccupa- In conceptualizing a workable ap- tion with Russia, that is not a narrative in proach to Russia, the ¥rst thing Ameri- search o’ an audience. It is a narrative can policymakers should do is acknowl- in search o’ an author.∂ edge Russian nationhood as the key factor in the post-Soviet world. Putin has sought, with some success, to nudge the international system away from the ideals o’ democracy and sustained multilateralism and toward the impera- tives o’ national power, prestige, and in“uence. The goal o’ projecting autono- mous nationhood outward will guide Russian foreign policy long after Putin chooses to retire or is pushed aside. Washington can seek out ways o‘ bend- ing this Russian goal to U.S. interests by stipulating redlines (such as ²³µ¬’s inviolability and the integrity o’ the U.S. democratic process), exploring potential points o’ cooperation on counterterror- ism and climate change, and signaling to the Russian people that a European security architecture and Russian nation- hood are not mutually exclusive, what- ever the Kremlin might say about the

164 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 164 1/17/20 9:27 PM munist countries has less to do with the Recent Books reassertion o’ primordial nationalist and illiberal identities than with a perceived need on the part o’ citizens in those Political and Legal places for independence, recognition, and dignity. The authors argue that, especially G. John Ikenberry after the long wake o’ the 2008 ¥nancial crisis, Western defenders o‘ liberal democracy need to oer a more realistic The Light That Failed: Why the West Is vision o’ world order, making room for Losing the Fight for Democracy alternative models while maintaining faith BY IVAN KRASTEV AND STEPHEN in the resilience o‘ liberalism. HOLMES. Pegasus Books, 2020, 256 pp. Worldmaking After Empire: The Rise and n this original and deeply thought- Fall of Self-Determination provoking study, Krastev and BY ADOM GETACHEW. Princeton IHolmes argue that the retreat from University Press, 2019, 288 pp. liberal democracy in eastern Europe and elsewhere is rooted in liberalism’s post- In the mid-twentieth century, empires 1989 global triumph. With the collapse o’ collapsed and postcolonial peoples communism, Western liberalism had no around the world struggled for self-rule. rival. U.S. unipolarity set the stage, In this important book, Getachew and liberal democracy became an all- presents a sweeping new account o’ the encompassing model o’ modernity. What global visions o’ the activists who led followed was “copycat Westernization,” in this charge. Scholars have typically seen which countries all over the world found the post-1945 decolonization movement themselves pressured to mimic the as a story o’ nation building as post- institutions, values, and ways o‘ life o’ the colonial leaders in Africa and Asia United States and western Europe. In embraced Western norms o’ sovereignty eastern Europe and the former Soviet and self-determination. Looking closely Union, this mimicry was all the more at the political ideas o¤ ¥gures such as painful because these same countries had W. E. B. Du Bois, Kwame Nkrumah, just been released from the ideological Julius Nyerere, and Michael Manley, and institutional impositions o’ the Soviet Getachew identi¥es a more revolution- era; now, they were again adopting the ary project aimed at pushing the world ideas and identities o’ a superpower, in a more egalitarian and anti-imperial albeit under less duress. The result has direction. She explores this new thinking been a deep and festering resentment in as it appeared in three domains—the those societies, a collective “psychological push for self-determination at the stress” that has culminated in a wide- United Nations, the building o’ pan- spread political backlash against liberal- African and pan-Asian regional federa- ism. In Krastev and Holmes’s account, the tions, and the calls to adopt the New right-wing politics coming to the fore in International Economic Order (a trade Hungary, Poland, and other postcom- agenda launched by some º² member

March/April 2020 165

Book 1.indb 165 1/17/20 9:27 PM Recent Books

states to bolster the interests o develop- 2007, and the £ interventions in Chad ing countries). In each instance, post- and the Central African Republic in colonial leaders were not simply seeking 2008. Henke ¥nds that building to renegotiate relations between former coalitions requires “embedded imperial masters and newly liberated diplomacy”—a pivotal state’s complex peoples. They o€ered a more far-reaching array o institutional connections and critique o prevailing geopolitical and networks o relations with other states— racial hierarchies, emphasizing cosmo- which creates ways for o¨cials to make politan solidarities and principled commitments, bargain, exchange infor- mechanisms for the redistribution o mation, and broaden the scope o nego- wealth and power. Getachew traces tiations to include other issues. Henke these ideas into the 1970s, when, in the demonstrates the importance o diplo- face o a powerful Westphalian global macy and leadership in building a success- order, anticolonial world-making gave ful coalition but does not try to determine way to more traditional political strug- in which circumstances the use o military gles that reinforced the nation-state. force was (or would be) wise or just.

Constructing Allied Cooperation: The Arc of Protection: Reforming the Diplomacy, Payments, and Power in International Refugee Regime Multilateral Military Coalitions BY T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF BY MARINA E. HENKE. Cornell AND LEAH ZAMORE. Stanford University Press, 2019, 258 pp. University Press, 2019, 184 pp.

This impressive study provides one o This short book takes a sobering look at the best e€orts yet to understand how today’s global refugee crisis and presents and why states have built coalitions to an ambitious agenda for action. A record pursue military operations in the face 70 million refugees have ²ed con²icts in oœ human atrocities, terrorism, and the their homelands in recent decades. Most threat o weapons o mass destruction. o these displaced people have crossed Surveying dozens o military operations international borders and are now trapped since the end oœ World War II, Henke in semipermanent camps or are seeking shows that coalitions rarely emerge asylum in countries increasingly hostile to naturally in response to shared percep- refugees. Aleiniko€ and Zamore recog- tions o threats, through a convergence nize a few positive developments, such as o momentary interests, or from the the 2018 Global Compact on Refugees, a coercive e€orts o a hegemonic power. £ agreement that calls for rich states and They need to be built by “pivotal states” international ¥nancial institutions to that can overcome obstacles to collec- provide more funding to those developing tive action and orchestrate complex countries that predominantly shoulder military operations. Henke looks closely the refugee burden. But they argue that at the coalition-building processes the refugee regime is broken and propose around the Korean War in the 1950s, the sweeping reforms, starting with the Australian-led operation in East Timor in expansion o refugee rights and protec- 1999, the £ deployment in Darfur in tions. The keystone o their approach is

166   

21_Recent Books_Blues.indd 166 1/20/20 5:09 PM Recent Books

the establishment o’ a global system o’ not sparked a clear-cut con“ict over the “responsibility sharing” that would be fundamental principles o’ global order. hammered out in a worldwide gathering Instead, a contest is underway in which o’ donor and host states, international states vie for authority and status primar- organizations, and civil society groups. ily within speci¥c international institu- Aware o’ the political obstacles to such tions. Rising states do not want to action, the authors argue that the ¥rst extinguish the liberal character o’ the step would be to build consensus global system as much as reform exist- around the principles that must guide ing intergovernmental institutions to the global response to forced displace- better advance and protect their socie- ment—social justice, human solidarity, ties and political regimes. and proportional and fair contributions from outside powers. Economic, Social, and Contested World Orders: Rising Powers, Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations, and the Politics of Authority Beyond the Nation-State Richard N. Cooper EDITED BY MATTHEW D. STEPHEN AND MICHAEL ZURN. Oxford University Press, 2019, 416 pp. Good Economics for Hard Times In this impressive collection, political BY ABHIJIT V. BANERJEE AND theorists map the contours o’ today’s ESTHER DUFLO. PublicAairs, 2019, unsettled global order. Stephen and Zurn 432 pp. argue that the current struggle over world order is unlike past great-power collisions, his book, published shortly when the terms o’ the global order were before the authors both won decided in a contest between a rising Tthe Nobel Prize in Economics, power and a declining one. In this era, the in October 2019, covers a wide swath global system is so densely institutional- o’ structural and policy issues in both ized that competition is more complex advanced and developing countries. and decentralized, with a multitude o’ They write that the discipline o’ eco- states, international organizations, and nomics has much to oer but that it transnational groups aligning and clashing needs to stretch well beyond the models over the reform o’ rules and regimes. In that modern economists favor. They assessing the health o’ the liberal interna- emphasize the importance o’ dignity for tional order and the demands for reform- people from all walks o‘ life, something ing its old norms and institutions, the the economics profession struggles to contributors focus on a wide variety o’ consider in its analysis. The authors’ global institutions, including the World own research is mainly in developing Trade Organization, the G-7, and the º² countries, especially India, where their Human Rights Council. Stephen and observations are subtle and nuanced. Zurn conclude that the rise o’ China and Their analysis is less nuanced when it other non-Western developing states has comes to rich countries but valuable

March/April 2020 167

Book 1.indb 167 1/17/20 9:27 PM Recent Books

nonetheless, particularly in making enriches American lives and creates economics readily accessible to nonex- better jobs. He examines six familiar perts through many stories and examples. products—taco salad, automobiles (the Honda Odyssey incorporates the Revolutionizing World Trade: How highest share o’ U.S. labor o’ any car), Disruptive Technologies Open Opportunities bananas (the most consumed fruit by for All far), iPhones, college education, and BY KATI SUOMINEN. Stanford entertainment (especially the µÏ show University Press, 2019, 360 pp. Game of Thrones)—to demonstrate how foreign trade is a pervasive and invalu- Suominen examines the opportunities able part o’ modern life. He eec- that new technologies will open up in tively debunks many myths about world trade, ushering in what she calls trade, including the misguided belie’ “globalization 4.0” within a decade. This that bilateral trade de¥cits are harm- future is already apparent, in an incipient ful. His book is an easy and enjoyable form. It involves the digitization o’ read, drawing predominately on buying and selling (e-commerce), additive American examples but applicable to manufacturing (3D printing), the use o’ many other countries, as well. blockchain technology in various business practices, and the greater availability o’ Don’t Be Evil: How Big Tech Betrayed Its credit thanks to direct lending by savers Founding Principles—and All of Us to borrowers. Such changes could enable BY RANA FOROOHAR. Currency, small and medium-sized enterprises to 2019, 368 pp. engage in cross-border trade through e-commerce, in eect becoming mini- Foroohar, a business journalist and associ- multinationals, a prospect o’ particular ate editor at the Financial Times, launches interest to the author. Suominen ¥nds a trenchant critique o’ the world’s largest many ine¾ciencies in today’s outdated technology ¥rms, including Google and practices, which she believes can be its parent company, Alphabet. The book’s overcome through international digital title borrows the original motto o’ standards not only for e-commerce but Google—now belied by its actual behav- also for customs processes and for digital ior, in the author’s view. Foroohar writes services that transmit data across borders. in an easy-to-read journalistic style, citing many speeches and interviews with Trade Is Not a Four-Letter Word: How numerous tech titans. She suggests a Six Everyday Products Make the Case for variety o’ ways to rein in the technology Trade giants, including breaking up the ¥rms BY FRED P. HOCHBERG. Avid (or at least limiting their growth), making Reader Press, 2020, 336 pp. clear that individuals (and not companies) own their personal data, and ensuring Hochberg, a former president o’ the that highly pro¥table technology ¥rms U.S. Export-Import Bank, makes a are properly taxed, mainly by closing vigorous case for foreign trade in both egregious loopholes brought about and goods and services, which he claims preserved by political lobbying.

168 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 168 1/17/20 9:27 PM Recent Books

A Question of Power: Electricity and the ideas. The epic struggle between France Wealth of Nations and its European competitors rocked the BY ROBERT BRYCE. PublicAairs, international system with constant 2020, 352 pp. warfare until 1815, when the British and the Prussians defeated Napoleon at This informative and highly readable Waterloo. The monarchies survived, and a book explains the basic physics o’ electric- sort o’ order emerged. Nonetheless, the ity, the modern history o’ electric power repercussions o’ these wars were felt for since the 1880s, the role that electricity the rest o’ the century. Most books on plays today in both production and this period concentrate on the famous consumption, and the costs in“icted on a battles, from Austerlitz and Jena to society when its electrical grid is badly Borodino and Waterloo, or on the ¥gure damaged, as Iraq’s was by U.S. bombing o¤ Napoleon himself, delving into his in 2003 and as Lebanon’s was by Israeli reformist politics and how he transformed bombing in 2006. Bryce persuasively the practice o’ war. Mikaberidze goes claims that world electricity demand will much further, providing vital context, double between 2015 and 2040, despite illuminating the social and political forces big improvements in the e¾ciency o’ unleashed by the revolution, revealing the generating and distributing electric impact o’ technological advances, and power. In his view, there is no way that analyzing the complex interactions among climate change can be arrested by the use domestic politics, commercial interests, o’ renewable fuels alone. Nuclear power alliance diplomacy, and imperial endeav- (along with natural gas) will be required ors. The global consequences o’ the i’ the world is serious about greatly Napoleonic Wars—often neglected in slashing coal consumption. such studies—also occupy much o’ the book. Mikaberidze shows, for instance, how Spain’s struggles aected its ability to Military, Scienti¥c, and hold on to its South American colonies Technological and how the United States saw the chaos on the European continent as an opportu- nity to invade Canada. This is an extraor- Lawrence D. Freedman dinary work o’ scholarship. Despite the book’s length, scope, and detail, the narrative never “ags. It is hard to see how The Napoleonic Wars: A Global History anyone will improve on this account. BY ALEXANDER MIKABERIDZE. Oxford University Press, 2020, 960 pp. All Hell Breaking Loose: The Pentagon’s Perspective on Climate Change he regime that came to power BY MICHAEL T. KLARE. Metropolitan in the wake o’ the French Books, 2019, 304 pp. TRevolution posed a unique threat to its rivals in Europe. Other Although the Trump administration has European powers feared both its military embraced an o¾cial policy o’ denial, the strength and the spread o’ republican reality o’ climate change—manifested in

170 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 170 1/17/20 9:27 PM Recent Books

¥res, “oods, droughts, and hurricanes—is in the later stages o’ the war in Afghani- becoming hard to avoid. The administra- stan. Although mercenaries tend to be the tion’s stance has placed U.S. o¾cials focus o’ research on private contractors, charged with preparing for future only a relatively small number o’ these military contingencies in an absurd posi- contractors serve in armed roles. Still, tion. Thousands o’ military installations logistical work can be hazardous and on U.S. soil are vulnerable to extreme deadly. Moore has undertaken detailed weather events. Rising water levels and research, including interviews with temperatures may have dire eects on workers, to explore the labor force key allies and aggravate con“icts within buttressing the U.S. military. He traces and between states. Klare has cleverly patterns o’ recruitment (especially in used the Pentagon’s continuing assess- Bosnia and the Philippines), ¥nds ments o’ the impact o’ climate change and evidence o’ exploitative and discrimina- the military’s experience o’ dealing with tory labor practices, and explores how its eects to illuminate not only the folly the military’s recruitment o‘ legions o’ o’ denialism but also the seriousness o’ workers aects their countries o’ origin. the potential climate threats. He traces a “ladder o’ escalation,” climbing from The Fire and the Darkness: The Bombing humanitarian disasters, to oil shocks, to of Dresden, 1945 disrupted supply chains, to collapsing BY SINCLAIR M CKAY. St. Martin’s states, to major-power con“icts (perhaps Press, 2020, 400 pp. over water disputes). The book’s title is derived from a scenario in which the U.S. On February 13, 1945, two days o’ air military must confront multiple warming- raids on the German city o¤ Dresden related crises abroad after ¥res and rising began with 796 British bombers drop- sea levels have immobilized it. ping blockbuster bombs and incendiar- ies, setting o a ¥restorm that left the Empire’s Labor: The Global Army That city gutted and at least 25,000 dead. Supports U.S. Wars With Germany on the edge o’ defeat BY ADAM MOORE. Cornell University and Soviet troops closing in, there was Press, 2019, 264 pp. little strategic need for this exercise in destruction. But years o’ war had Coverage o’ U.S. military operations blunted moral sensibilities. The Royal often focuses on the “ashier areas o’ Air Force embraced the doctrine o’ city combat and technology, ignoring the bombing with the conviction that extraordinary logistical eorts required to killing huge numbers o’ civilians was sustain these operations. Moore avoids worthwhile i’ it brought the war to a this trap in this useful survey o’ the army speedier end. Dresden had a rich o’ workers who support the U.S. military. artistic and cosmopolitan heritage, but Private contractors maintain a global it had already lost its Jews to the network o‘ bases. In some cases, more Holocaust, and its dogmatic Nazi foreign workers than U.S. military leadership was still committed to the personnel are engaged in servicing U.S. war eort. In this evocative and poign- military campaigns—four times as many ant account, McKay describes the

March/April 2020 171

Book 1.indb 171 1/17/20 9:27 PM Recent Books

bombing and its aftermath through the experiences o’ many o’ those involved, The United States including the writers Victor Klemperer and Kurt Vonnegut, who had recently Jessica T. Mathews been taken prisoner by the Germans in the Battle o’ the Bulge. McKay ends on a positive note, describing the recon- struction o’ the city and its more recent The Ambassadors: America’s Diplomats on role in eorts at reconciliation. the Front Lines BY PAUL RICHTER. Simon & The Taliban at War, 2001–2018 Schuster, 2019, 352 pp. BY ANTONIO GIUSTOZZI. Hurst, 2019, 384 pp. n a book that straddles history and biography, Richter follows the Giustozzi provides a detailed and dense Icareers o¤ four extraordinary U.S. account o’ the Taliban’s resilience. He diplomats: Ryan Crocker, Robert shows how the group persevered and Ford, Anne Patterson, and J. Christo- regrouped after both the U.S.-led pher Stevens, who between them held invasion o’ Afghanistan in 2001 and the 14 ambassadorships and deputy chie’ “surge” o’ U.S. troops in 2009, under o’ mission posts in the greater Middle the Obama administration. Based on East. They served mostly in war-torn many conversations with former and states, such as Afghanistan, Iraq, current members o’ the organization, Libya (where Stevens was killed in an this study is an important contribution attack on the U.S. mission in Ben- to the history o’ the American-led war ghazi in 2012), and Syria. Both the in Afghanistan. Giustozzi explores how George W. Bush and the Obama the Taliban ¥nanced their campaigns, administrations recognized the unique raised the morale o’ their members, and knowledge and abilities o’ these managed the tensions among a variety diplomats, asking them to return again o’ distinct factions within the group. and again to dangerous, chaotic situations in the region. The ambassa- dors practiced what Richter calls a “new diplomacy o’ the front lines,” working closely with their military counterparts. Even so, all four fre- quently had to decide whether to continue working in service o’ what they considered “disastrous policy blunders,” and as o¾cials in Washing- ton often ignored their advice. Richter embeds the stories o’ the four diplo- mats in a broader narrative that follows “oundering U.S. policies in the Middle East. His book is at once

172 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 172 1/17/20 9:27 PM Recent Books

inspiring, infuriating, and, as a chroni- not take his oath o’ o¾ce sincerely. cle o’ U.S. involvement in the region, The authors dread a collapse o’ norms deeply sad. and the transformation o‘ laws into “paper tigers.” Unmaking the Presidency: Donald Trump’s War on the World’s Most Powerful O§ce The Heartbeat of Wounded Knee: Native BY SUSAN HENNESSEY AND America From 1890 to the Present BENJAMIN WITTES. Farrar, Straus BY DAVID TREUER. Riverhead Books, and Giroux, 2020, 432 pp. 2019, 528 pp.

Hennessey and Wittes track the Dee Brown’s Bury My Heart at Wounded evolution o’ the powers o’ the U.S. Knee, still in print hal’ a century after presidency and how President Donald its original publication, presented the Trump has used, abused, and changed story o¤ Native Americans as one o’ those powers. Their understated tragic decline. Treuer’s counternarra- description o‘ Trump as conducting an tive is destined to last at least as long “expressive presidency” doesn’t begin as Brown’s classic. Its story o’ resilience to do justice to the extent o‘ his and cultural, economic, and political wrongdoing: his propensity to lie, his renaissance among native communities routinely unethical behavior, his will be revelatory for most readers who devotion to the use o‘ law enforcement are not Native American. Treuer, who as “an instrument o’ power against grew up on an Ojibwe reservation in enemies,” and, tellingly, his refusal to Minnesota, combines interviews, endure scrutiny o‘ his own conduct. personal memoir, history, and litera- Unfortunately, the authors’ discussion ture to vividly trace the last 40 years o’ the Nixon and Clinton impeach- o¤ Native American history, including ment processes and o’ the Mueller many positive developments. There is report does not compensate for the fact plenty o’ tragedy in the story o’ that the book was completed before Native Americans’ relationship with Trump’s impeachment in December the U.S. government, most o’ which 2019. Still, the authors deliver a stems from Washington’s various chilling analysis o’ the damage that has eorts to subdue or wipe out the been done to the o¾ce o’ the presi- tribes. But there are also glimmers o’ dent. Even i’ Congress can rouse itsel’ hope. For example, U.S. military to reinforce the separation o’ powers, service has provided a positive sense o’ the record o’ the past few years reveals belonging for many Native Americans, that those powers o’ the presidency even though their heroism has often over which Congress has little or no gone unrecognized. Continuing legal jurisdiction—including the president’s battles have righted some past wrongs. independence in foreign policy and Treuer interweaves his analysis with law enforcement, his power o’ the intimate tales o’ “becoming Indian” in a pardon, and his capacity to mislead the context in which that identity can public—are immensely in“uential bring empowerment and personal success when abused by a president who does rather than victimization.

March/April 2020 173

Book 1.indb 173 1/17/20 9:27 PM Recent Books

How the South Won the Civil War: immigration at his rallies, the ground- Oligarchy, Democracy, and the Continuing work was laid for immigration policy to Fight for the Soul of America become the “beating heart” o‘ Trump’s BY HEATHER COX RICHARDSON. presidency. The Muslim travel ban, the Oxford University Press, 2020, 264 pp. crackdown on undocumented immi- grants, the cuts in the number o’ refu- Richardson draws a straight line from the gees accepted, the much-invoked wall, radical inequality o’ the pre–Civil War the inveighing against caravans o’ South to its resurrection a century later migrants, and the calculated cruelty o’ in the modern conservative movement in the family-separation policy have the West. There, “Confederate ideology dominated news cycles for almost three took on a new life.” An oligarchic econ- years. Davis and Shear, New York Times omy emerged in the region, centered on reporters who have long covered these mining, oil extraction, and railroads, which, subjects, wisely saved much o’ their best like the cotton economy o’ the South, material for this book. They have depended on lots o’ capital and masses o’ assembled here a view from within the unskilled workers. In the late nineteenth White House, including through ac- century, the protections o’ the 14th counts o’ interactions with the president Amendment (adopted in 1868) did not that verge on the surreal. Trump’s apply to Native Americans and were also immigration policies stem from impulse, interpreted in the West to exclude ignorance about substance and legality, Chinese and other immigrants, leading to deep bigotry, and—their saving grace— what eectively amounted to what bureaucratic chaos and incredible Richardson terms “the shadow o‘ legal ineptitude. The book reveals much about slavery.” Forgetting the federal govern- how Trump thinks, why he instinctively ment’s role in giving land to homestead- “grasped for the solution that looked ers and investing in irrigation, so-called toughest,” and, in hair-raising insider movement conservatives in the West detail, how he governs from day to day. embraced the myth that all a true Ameri- I’ journalism is the ¥rst draft o‘ history, can needed from the government was to this volume is a solid second draft. be left alone. As re“ected in Barry Goldwater’s Stetson and Ronald Reagan’s broad-brimmed hat, the free-roaming cowboy became the movement’s emblem.

Border Wars: Inside Trump’s Assault on Immigration BY JULIE HIRSCHFELD DAVIS AND MICHAEL D. SHEAR. Simon & Schuster, 2019, 480 pp.

Ever since a staer hit on the idea o’ “build a fence” as a mnemonic to remind candidate Donald Trump to talk about

174 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 174 1/17/20 9:27 PM Recent Books

sense to produce just one product line to Western Europe the highest standard in the world, which is, almost inevitably, that o¤ Europe. Andrew Moravcsik Even big technology ¥rms, such as Google and Microsoft, must toe the line o’ ¯º antitrust and cartel policy.

The Brussels EŠect: How the European For the Record Union Rules the World BY DAVID CAMERON. Harper, 2019, BY ANU BRADFORD. Oxford 752 pp. University Press, 2020, 424 pp. Politics is an ugly game, and few who his may well be the single most play it are self-re“ective. So memoirs by important book on Europe’s leading politicians almost always disap- Tglobal in“uence to appear in a point. Even when they avoid outright decade. Many believe that Europe’s lies, most mislead by omission, revealing international standing is declining in a little backroom maneuvering and world dominated by China and the evading personal responsibility for United States and in which the forces o’ errors. This book is no exception: the globalization are creating a race to the former British prime minister, aware bottom that undermines the European that history will remember him primar- model o‘ high regulation and social ily for his disastrous choice to hold the protection. Bradford demolishes these ill-fated Brexit referendum, oers a myths by showing how the European retrospective self-justi¥cation. Through- Union’s stringent regulations raise the out, he claims, unconvincingly, that his standards o’ producers in China, the hands were tied. The referendum was United States, and other countries inescapable because the ¯º had mis- across the globe. The ¯º manages to treated the United Kingdom and be- wield this in“uence by conditioning cause sincerely Euroskeptical British access to its market, the world’s second citizens deserved to have their voices largest, on compliance with its stan- heard. Cameron denies that he was ever dards. Bradford illustrates this “Brussels pressured by parliamentary backbench- eect”—modeled on a similar “Califor- ers to hold the Brexit vote. The victory nia eect,” which intensi¥es regulations o’ the Leave campaign, he claims, was at within the United States—with detailed once impossible to predict and inevi- case studies o’ ¯º policies in a range o’ table, due to the lack o’ the ¯º’s willing- areas, including food safety, data ness to reform; the per¥dy o’ the then privacy, and environmental protection. recently departed mayor o¤ London, Farmers in Nebraska, for instance, grow Boris Johnson; and the dynamics o’ pesticide-free products so that they modern media campaigns. Cameron meet ¯º standards. Globally integrated comes across as a sincere and decent producers o’ goods as various as chemi- fellow severely lacking in the Machiavel- cals, automobiles, and banking services lian foresight, ruthlessness, and savvy ¥nd that it often makes more business required for political success.

March/April 2020 175

Book 1.indb 175 1/17/20 9:27 PM Recent Books

Learning From the Germans: Race and the After the Berlin Wall: Memory and the Memory of Evil Making of the New Germany, 1989 to the BY SUSAN NEIMAN. Farrar, Straus Present and Giroux, 2019, 432 pp. BY HOPE M. HARRISON. Cambridge University Press, 2019, 478 pp. Firmly convinced o’ the exceptional nature o’ their country, many Ameri- How should Germans feel about the cans resist opportunities to learn from Berlin Wall? During the Cold War, East the history o’ others. They interrogate German leaders insisted that it was a the history and legacy o’ American defensive and stabilizing barrier, slavery, imperialism, genocide, and whereas their counterparts in West other mass evils without considering Germany denounced it as a humanitar- how other countries have dealt with ian outrage that revealed the bank- similar misdeeds. Neiman, a Jewish ruptcy o’ communist ideology. This American philosopher who grew up in carefully researched and superbly the American South and now lives in readable book explores the wall’s place Berlin, has written a corrective. She in Germany’s collective memory. After compares the German response to the 30 years, the events o’ 1989, seemingly Holocaust since World War II to the so clear at the time, have become the southern response to slavery and subject o‘ heated debate. Who in the segregation in that same period. Both East was responsible for the wall’s fall: societies went through decades o’ Protesters on the streets o¤ East Ger- denial: for 25 years after World War II, many? Tens o’ thousands o’ their fellow the Germans argued that everyday citizens who snuck through the Hun- citizens neither knew about nor sup- garian border? The guards who opened ported the Holocaust; American south- the gates on their own? The top Com- erners during that same time main- munist politicians who refused to order tained myths that slavery and a violent clampdown? Or the Soviet segregation were bene¥cial and that the leader Mikhail Gorbachev, who declined Civil War was really about states’ to back the government in Berlin? rights. Starting in the 1960s, however, Today, the wall has become a contested Germany o¾cially apologized, paid political symbol. Critics o’ continuing reparations, banned the glori¥cation o’ economic disparities between eastern the perpetrators o’ the Holocaust, and and western Germany see commemora- memorialized the victims. By contrast, tions o’ the fall o’ the wall as opportu- Neiman argues, many southerners and nities to criticize the current order. their conservative defenders elsewhere Some in the former East Germany in the United States continue to sup- view Berlin’s current policy o‘ blocking press the record o’ the past. They defend Mediterranean migrants, instituted monuments and symbols celebrating after the Syrian refugee crisis o’ 2015, those who took up arms to defend slavery, as evidence that stern international bar- label o¾cial apologies as treasonous, resist riers are normal and legitimate. reparations, and applaud politicians who employ coded racist language.

176 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 176 1/17/20 9:27 PM European Disintegration? The Politics of Crisis in the European Union BY DOUGLAS WEBBER. Red Globe Press, 2018, 278 pp.

Over the past decade, many observers have written about the four large crises facing the European Union: the eco- nomic instability o† countries in the eurozone, Russian aggression toward Ukraine, mass migration, and Brexit. O† course, the Š‹ has surmounted crises in the past, but Webber suggests that the breadth, depth, and length o† these recent ones render them more threatening. This approachable textbook-style treatment o† the topic summarizes existing research and compares Š‹ responses in each area. It rejects the conventional view that Š‹ We don't break policy grows out o† managing the tension between the interdependence o† member the news; states and the domestic calculus o† nationalist politicians. Instead, Webber we break it down. argues, Š‹ policies today mostly re’ect the power o† Germany and, in particu- Educate your employees and lar, the idiosyncratic beliefs and motiva- customers about the most tions o† German Chancellor Angela pressing global issues o today Merkel. Although it is hard to deny that with a Foreign Aairs Foreign the leader o• Europe’s most powerful Policy Brieng. Bring us to country plays a critical role, one won- your oce or event space to ders i— her actions are as separate from the broader forces shaping the Š‹ as provide expert perspective on Webber seems to believe. the forces shaping your world and your business. Braver, Greener, Fairer: Memos to the EU Leadership, 2019–2024 EDITED BY MARIA DEMERTZIS For inquiries about events AND GUNTRAM B. WOLFF. Bruegel, 2019, 269 pp. at your organization, please contact us at Every žve years, the European Union events@foreigna airs.com elects a new parliament, appoints a new commission, and replaces the president o† the council and its high representa-

March/April 2020 177

FA 177_rev.indd 1 1/20/20 9:52 AM Book 1.indb 177 1/17/20 9:27 PM Recent Books

tive for foreign policy. Traditionally, this turnover is also a moment for ¯º Western Hemisphere o¾cials to establish new priorities and a budgetary framework to pay for them. Richard Feinberg Just such a transition is occurring now. In this collection, analysts from Brue- gel, one o¤ Brussels’s most respected think tanks, review 11 issues and oer Unfulžlled Promises: Latin America Today concrete policy recommendations for EDITED BY MICHAEL SHIFTER ¯º leaders. Each chapter constitutes a AND BRUNO BINETTI. Inter- concise memo to the relevant o¾cials. American Dialogue, 2019, 166 pp. There are limitations: the chapters focus almost exclusively on industrial his eclectic collection brings regulation, ¥nancial and digital services, together leading scholars o’ competition policy, and other economic Teconomics, social policy, public matters, areas in which Bruegel special- security, and international relations in izes; foreign policy, migration, Russian sketching the progress and frustrations subversion, homeland security, and o¤ Latin American development. The other important issues go neglected. contributors generally advocate incre- The market-oriented recommendations mental approaches that build on are too numerous and idealistic, focus- previous progress, rather than root- ing on what would increase aggregate and-branch upheaval. The separate welfare rather than what is politically chapters advance sound, i’ at times viable. The writing is jargon laden. exacting, policy recommendations: Nonetheless, those who seek a succinct countries should diversify their higher- overview o’ the ¯º’s potential course o’ quality exports, raise their labor pro- action over the next ¥ve years are ductivity, enlarge their ¥scal capacity, unlikely to ¥nd a better starting point. target pockets o’ poverty, bolster their social safety nets to safeguard their emerging middle classes, make their governance and regulatory structures more eective and transparent, and adopt comprehensive crime-¥ghting strategies. The contributors underplay the overwhelming pressures o’ popula- tion growth and rapid urbanization in some parts o¤ Latin America, as well as the growing aspirations o’ middle classes that current growth rates will not soon satisfy. In highlighting the short- comings o¤ Latin American develop- ment, some essays inadvertently feed the notion, employed by authoritarian demagogues, that the region’s “unful-

178 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 178 1/17/20 9:27 PM Recent Books

›lled promises” are reason enough to inuence o the European Union—all dismantle open, democratic capitalist conditions largely absent from Cuba. systems. Hard-pressed democratic The animosity o Washington doesn’t governments will have to judiciously help: subject to prolonged U.S. select their priorities, leaving a lot for hostility, many Cubans view liberal future generations to accomplish. democracy and free-market capitalism with deep mistrust. Paths for Cuba: Reforming Communism in Comparative Perspective Ghosts of Sheridan Circle: How a EDITED BY SCOTT Washington Assassination Brought MORGENSTERN, JORGE PÉREZ£ Pinochet’s Terror State to Justice LÓPEZ, AND JEROME BRANCHE. BY ALAN M CPHERSON. University o University oš Pittsburgh Press, 2019, North Carolina Press, 2019, 392 pp. 408 pp. On September 21, 1976, the secret Revolutionary Cuba is ironically police o the Chilean dictator Augusto among the more static political sys- Pinochet assassinated Orlando Letelier, tems on earth. To imagine what a new a former ambassador and a leader o Cuba might eventually look like, the the opposition in exile, and his col- contributors to this thoughtful collec- league, Ronni Mo–tt, in broad day- tion examine the factors that have light on Embassy Row, in Washington, driven change in other one-party D.C. Drawing heavily on previously authoritarian systems. They paint a published accounts, McPherson re- rather melancholy picture. Cuba has traces the many twists and turns o the some advantages: an educated and lengthy joint U.S.-Chilean investiga- low-wage workforce, a capable state, tion to identify and prosecute the and proximity to dynamic economies, perpetrators. The brazen violation o nearby democracies, and a prosperous American national sovereignty, Cuban diaspora in the United States. McPherson argues, as much as the But Cuba seems unlikely to follow the violation o human rights, shook the path o China and Vietnam, commu- U.S. government. The Letelier case nist countries that found prosperity in established important precedents in opening up their closed markets. The international human rights law. There economies o China and Vietnam only are many heroes in this account, blossomed once elites agreed to including tenacious U.S. government programs o reform; Cuban conserva- attorneys, alert U.S. diplomats, and tives have resisted even the most dogged pro bono lawyers, but Letelier’s modest market-oriented measures. widow, Isabel, stands out for her The relative success stories oš for- intrepid, relentless activism. Arguably, merly communist countries in eastern the strong U.S. response served as a Europe demonstrate the bene›t o deterrent to other would-be political having a historical tradition o democ- assassins: the killing oš Letelier remains racy, an independent civil society, and, the only state-sponsored assassination most important, the liberalizing o a foreign diplomat on U.S. soil.

March/April 2020 179

21_Recent Books_Blues.indd 179 1/20/20 5:11 PM Recent Books

Del centenario a los chilennials: 100 años The Second American Revolution: The de transformaciones y 25 tendencias que Civil War–Era Struggle Over Cuba and cambiaron Chile (From 1910 to the the Rebirth of the American Republic Chilennials: 100 Years o’ BY GREGORY P. DOWNS. University Transformations and 25 Trends That o¤ North Carolina Press, 2019, 232 pp. Changed Chile) BY PEDRO DOSQUE AND JOSÉ Drawing on existing scholarship, Downs TOMÁS VALENTE. Ediciones UC, argues that the era o¤ Reconstruction that 2019, 274 pp. followed the U.S. Civil War amounted to a second foundational moment in the A recent wave o’ antigovernment history o’ the United States, when the protests in Chile that called for more government in Washington employed aordable public education and health military force and other measures to care, greater economic mobility, and a radically transform labor and property more inclusive democracy was spear- relations in the American South and headed by high school and university fundamentally revise the U.S. Constitu- students—the chilennials (millennial tion. With graceful and forceful prose, Chileans) o’ this book’s title. But older Downs links the mid-nineteenth-century generations reminded these young history o’ the United States to that o’ the people that their current living standards broader Atlantic world—in particular, to are far superior to those o’ their grand- Cuba and Mexico in their struggles parents. This timely, readable study against European powers to end slavery documents Chile’s sweeping transforma- and establish anti-imperialist democra- tion over the last 100 years from a dirt cies. The U.S. example was powerful, poor, semifeudal agricultural society into spreading revolutionary impulses and a modern, educated, and urbanized promising, however brie“y, to produce a nation. These days, Chileans compare network o’ “free-trading antislavery themselves not to their Latin American republics” on either side o’ the Atlantic. neighbors but rather to the developed Extending his historical interpretations nations o’ the Organization for Eco- to today’s politics, Downs suggests that nomic Cooperation and Development, Americans could bene¥t from reexamin- o’ which Chile is a proud member. ing the bold measures o’ nineteenth- Dosque and Valente beseech their fellow century Republicans: the carving out o’ Chileans to “feel very proud and thank- new states, the passing o’ constitutional ful” for these achievements and for the amendments, and the introduction o’ century o’ social struggles that made federal oversight o’ elections. them possible, even as they warn against complacency. The authors fear that a lack o’ appreciation for the nation’s history might lead to a misdiagnosis o’ its current troubles that could jeopardize hard-won progress. This valuable, persua- sive text should be required reading in all Chilean high schools.

180 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 180 1/17/20 9:27 PM Recent Books

solace in the fact that Russia’s top Eastern Europe and Former leaders do not seek to reinstate across- Soviet Republics the-board state ownership or return to a Soviet-style totalitarian past. Maria Lipman Stuck on Communism: Memoir of a Russian Historian BY LEWIS H. SIEGELBAUM. The Tragedy of Property: Private Life, Northern Illinois University Press, Ownership, and the Russian State 2019, 216 pp. BY MAXIM TRUDOLYUBOV. TRANSLATED BY ARCH TAIT. Polity, Remembering Leningrad: The Story of a 2018, 216 pp. Generation BY MARY M CAULEY. University o’ rudolyubov traces the roots o’ Wisconsin Press, 2019, 256 pp. what he sees as the tragedy o’ TRussia: its failure to establish These two memoirs are both written by democratic institutions that would respected left-wing scholars o¤ Russia, defend its citizens against the whims o’ but they dier in the extent to which their rulers. With concision and clarity, their authors immersed themselves in he blames Russia’s historical lack o’ Russian life. Siegelbaum entered Co- robust property rights. Through much lumbia University in 1966 and chose to o¤ Russian history, the ruler dispensed study the Soviet Union because o‘ his private property—and especially real communist leanings. His memoir reads estate—as a “privilege” to the upper like a bildungsroman: Siegelbaum class. In western Europe, by contrast, describes his early years as a child o’ “a property rights emerged in the course Red” (his father joined the U.S. Com- o‘ long social battles and were closely munist Party in 1939), his participation associated with the development o’ as a young Marxist in the 1967–68 common law and the liberal tradition. student protests, and his subsequent Anxious to maintain the state’s unchal- development into a Russian labor lenged supremacy, Russian rulers at all historian schooled in Marxist theory. times were wary o’ private property. As labor history receded in importance, The Bolsheviks outlawed it altogether; his somewhat reluctant shift toward for decades, the state was the sole cultural and material history proved owner and distributor o’ all land and fortunate: his history o’ the Soviet urban housing. Today’s Russians may automobile was awarded two presti- own their apartments and have better gious prizes. Siegelbaum’s memoir is opportunities for a private life than also a chronicle o’ the trends and earlier generations, but the state retains debates in his ¥eld from the 1970s until discretionary power over large proper- his retirement in 2018, with a special ties, and the threat o’ sudden redistri- focus on the new research opportunities bution remains. Although he draws a that followed the collapse o’ the Soviet bleak picture, Trudolyubov ¥nds some Union, as archives were opened and

March/April 2020 181

Book 1.indb 181 1/17/20 9:27 PM Recent Books

collaboration with Russian colleagues The StuŠ of Soldiers: A History of the Red became possible. Apart from Russian Army in World War II Through Objects historians, informants, and landlords, BY BRANDON M. SCHECHTER. however, Siegelbaum mentions almost no Cornell University Press, 2019, 344 pp. encounters with the people o’ contempo- rary Russia. A Russia that had “shed its Schechter looks at the Great Patriotic War Sovietness and other-worldness” appar- (as World War II is referred to in Russia) ently lost its attraction for him. through Soviet soldiers’ everyday objects McAuley’s memoir, by contrast, is (spoons, spades, knapsacks, uniforms, strongly focused on the Russian people weapons, war trophies), with the aid o’ and mentions her academic career only their letters and diaries, wartime manu- in passing. When she came to Lenin- als, and postwar ¥ction and memoirs. grad as an Oxford student in the early With this original approach—in itsel’ an 1960s to write a thesis on the settlement amazing achievement given the immense o‘ labor disputes in industrial enter- literature in this historical ¥eld—Schech- prises, she immersed hersel’ deeply in ter uses the material culture o’ the Red Soviet life and personal friendships. Army to trace the makeover o’ Soviet life She spent a lot o’ time in conversation and politics brought about by the war. The with her Russian friends, shared the story o’ pogony (shoulder boards) is a good hardships o’ daily Soviet life, went example o’ Schechter’s nimble analysis. camping, and attended drunken parties. This feature o’ the military uniform was In the early 1990s, she ventured into discarded initially as a trapping o’ the buying an apartment—just as the Soviet ancien régime, only to be reintroduced housing system was opening up to during World War II. In Schechter’s view, private real estate. She tells the story o’ this shift illustrates the transformation o’ the Soviet Union and modern Russia the Soviet Union from a project o’ global through the experiences o‘ her close proletarian revolution into a nation friends: the hopes and dreams o’ the drawing on its history in defending the thaw that took place under Nikita motherland from a foreign enemy. For Khrushchev, the dullness and demoral- the many millions o¤ Red Army soldiers ization o’ stagnation under Leonid o’ dierent cultures and nationalities, Brezhnev, the enthusiasm o¤ Mikhail the everyday reliance on the same Gorbachev’s perestroika, and the government-issued gear was a unifying sweeping and often shocking transfor- experience, one that came to de¥ne the mations o’ post-Soviet Russia. Her Soviet Union until its eventual implosion. deep embeddedness in Russian life has never interfered with her position as a The Siberian Dilemma shrewd outside observer: in the early BY MARTIN CRUZ SMITH. Simon & 1990s, when so many ¥rmly believed Schuster, 2019, 288 pp. that Russia was on the way to democ- racy, she noted the low interest in Back in 1981, Smith’s mystery novel politics, the lack o’ political language, Gorky Park, set in the contemporary the naive belie’ in the market, and the Soviet Union, won him great success: it persistence o’ Soviet practices. became a bestseller and was later made

182 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 182 1/17/20 9:27 PM Recent Books

into a movie. Gorky Park’s protagonist, the criminal investigator Arkady Middle East Renko, has since proceeded to solve crimes in an ongoing series o„ novels John Waterbury that now take place in modern Russia. The Siberian Dilemma, the latest in this series, unfolds in 2019 and refers to real events, such as Russian President Islam, Authoritarianism, and Vladimir Putin’s reelection the previ- Underdevelopment: A Global and ous year. Renko, however, has not aged Historical Comparison one bit and remains as astute and BY AHMET T. KURU. Cambridge battle seasoned as ever. He faces a University Press, 2019, 316 pp. deadly dilemma as he Œnds himsel„ personally implicated in the events he uru, a political scientist, under- happens to be investigating, and he takes an ambitious and, on narrowly escapes death in the Siberian K balance, successful analysis o„ the taiga. Those drawn to Smith’s mysteri- ills o„ the authoritarianism, economic ous Russian settings will be fully backwardness, and religious violence rewarded by the depictions o„ vast and that plague 49 Muslim-majority states. cold Siberian expanses, monstrous bears, He rejects the essentialist notion that and precious sables (Smith appears to the fault for the struggles o„ these states have a special feeling for the last: a lies in Islamic doctrine, but he also sable-smuggling operation was central dismisses apologias that point to the to the plot o„ Gorky Park), as well as lingering eŠects o‹ European colonial small-time mobsters, big-time oil ty- domination. Kuru traces a longer arc o„ coons, dirty politics, banyas, and vodka. decline. He describes a period o‹ Islamic Russian readers, however, might smile scientiŒc and cultural eŽorescence from at the book’s small cultural inaccuracies. roughly the eighth to the eleventh century, in which a dynamic mercantile bourgeoisie allied with a vibrant intel- ligentsia. That golden age came to an end thanks to the rise o„ a conservative and anti-intellectual alliance o„ religious scholars and state o‘cials. Despite covering a vast amount o„ secondary literature, he does not adequately explain why the clergy failed to see the bourgeoisie as potential partners. He more convincingly makes the case that Muslim societies inherited the model o„ the powerful military-theocratic state— composed o„ warrior-rulers, religious authorities, and their subjects—from Persian tradition, not the Koran.

March/April 2020 183

21_Recent Books_Blues.indd 183 1/20/20 5:12 PM Recent Books

Owners of the Republic: An Anatomy of structural liberalization programs forced Egypt’s Military Economy by international ¥nancial institutions and BY YEZID SAYIGH. Carnegie Middle private creditors on the autocracies o’ the East Center, 2019, 360 pp. region in the 1980s and 1990s produced a grand bargain between political and Sayigh brilliantly dissects the Egyptian business elites. Well-connected ¥rms military’s dominance o¤ Egypt’s econ- accepted limited market reforms in omy. The tentacular reach o’ the Minis- exchange for special bene¥ts that boosted try o¤ Defense into the economy is their pro¥ts. The authors contend that almost seven decades old, but its growth today’s autocrats have an inveterate accelerated under the 30-year rule o’ suspicion o’ their own private sectors and Hosni Mubarak and has increased even fear that greater market reforms would more under President Abdel Fattah shift power to assertive business elites. el-Sisi, who came to power in 2013. The This hypothesis seems to ¥t the observed military may control as much as 20 facts in the region, but there’s no evi- percent o’ total public spending. At the dence that the compromise was an same time, it is not subject to external explicit state strategy. Moreover, it is not audit or parliamentary oversight. It is a clear why incumbent autocrats should rent-making machine, controlling the fear their private sectors given how easily commercial use o’ most o¤ Egypt’s land. business interests were swept aside in the It imports and manufactures drugs and populist era o’ the 1950s and 1960s. food staples, labeling these commodities as strategic. It has a bevy o’ private- City of Black Gold: Oil, Ethnicity, and the sector allies. It is exempt from taxes and Making of Modern Kirkuk import duties on most o’ its activities. BY ARBELLA BETÍSHLIMON. And it bene¥ts from the silence o’ the Stanford University Press, 2019, 296 pp. International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the United States. All that can This ¥ne social history o’ the city o’ check its hold over the economy is its Kirkuk, in northern Iraq, traces a century own drag on Egypt’s potential growth. o’ political upheaval. Bet-Shlimon was born in the United States but hails from Crony Capitalism in the Middle East: an Assyrian family with roots in Kirkuk. Business and Politics From Liberalization The ancient, polyglot city was trans- to the Arab Spring formed in 1927 by the discovery o’ oil EDITED BY ISHAC DIWAN, ADEEL nearby. Kirkuk had long been dominated MALIK, AND IZAK ATIYAS. Oxford by its Turkish-speaking Turkmen popula- University Press, 2019, 464 pp. tion, but the oil boom drew in a large population o’ poor, rural Kurds to work in The contributors to this important collec- the oil ¥elds. With them came Iraq’s tion parse the variety o’ crony-capitalist Communist Party, which sought to arrangements in the Middle East. They organize the workers. The Iraq Petroleum cover Egypt, Iran, Lebanon, Morocco, Company helped build a middle class in Tunisia, Turkey, and the Palestinian the city but neglected the mostly Kurdish territories. The book proposes that the lower class. The 1958 revolution that

184 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 184 1/17/20 9:27 PM Recent Books

toppled the Iraqi monarchy exposed the fault lines created during the oil era. Asia and Paci¥c Kurds and Turkmens chose opposite sides in Iraq’s national-level struggles. The rise Andrew J. Nathan o’ Saddam Hussein added the force o’ Arabization and anti-Kurdish animus to the volatile politics o’ the city. The book criticizes essentialist explanations o’ Democracy in China: The Coming Crisis ethnicity, but the massacres that rocked BY JIWEI CI. Harvard University Kirkuk in the late 1950s smack o’ visceral Press, 2019, 432 pp. enmities. In this case, essentialist and contingent explanations can both be true. here is a Chinese saying about the audacity o’ negotiating with Sunnis and Shi’a: A Political History Ta tiger for its pelt. In this BY LAURENCE LOUËR. closely argued book, Ci, a Hong Kong– TRANSLATED BY ETHAN based philosophy professor, embarks on RUNDELL. Princeton University Press, a similar enterprise. He directs what he 2019, 240 pp. calls a “prudential” argument at the Chinese Communist Party: it should In this succinct, probing survey o’ a give up its dictatorship in order to save major divide in the Muslim world, China from impending chaos. He Louër explores relations between the argues that authoritarian rule no longer Shiites and the Sunnis in seven dier- suits a Chinese society that is sophisti- ent countries in the Middle East and cated, egalitarian, and dissatis¥ed with South Asia. She does not tap new mere material comforts. In reaction to sources or make many new interpreta- the spread o‘ liberal values, the regime tions, but she compellingly mingles is cracking down harder, but this only analysis o’ Shiite and Sunni doctrine accelerates the weakening o’ what Ci calls and an examination o’ the political its “teleological-revolutionary legiti- dynamics between the sects. Neither macy.” By his reckoning, even outstand- camp fully accepts the legitimacy o’ the ing economic performance can keep the other—although coexistence and regime in power no more than another cooperation have occurred, as in Mu- ten or 20 years before a major crisis will ghal India. A major watershed was the trigger its collapse. He says the party advent o’ the Safavid dynasty in Persia should get ahead o’ events by opening in the sixteenth century, which wed Chinese politics up to dissenting Shiism to a geopolitical entity wedged views—something liberals in China have between the Ottoman and Mughal hoped for ever since Mao Zedong’s empires. Ever since, the rivalry has death, only to be disappointed by each become as much geopolitical as doctri- new leader. Ci oers shrewd insights nal and is more prone to militant and into the contradictions in the party’s violent forms o’ confrontation (as ideology, the mentality o’ China’s middle exempli¥ed by the evolution o‘ Yemen’s class, and the various ways the party Houthis, a Zaydi Shiite group). sustains its legitimacy. But his argument

March/April 2020 185

Book 1.indb 185 1/17/20 9:27 PM Recent Books

is more philosophical than empirical: leaders to the International Criminal the book ošers no assessment either o Court. In 2005, China used an absten- the level o popular support for the tion to allow a referral o the Sudanese regime or o the looming challenges to leader Omar al-Bashir to the ­­, and in the regime’s performance. 2007, it voted for a peace-enforcement operation in Darfur; in 2011, it voted Last Days of the Mighty Mekong for an ­­ referral o the Libyan leader BY BRIAN EYLER. Zed Books, 2019, Muammar al-QaddaŒ and refrained 384 pp. from vetoing the no-‘y zone that led to his fall from power. But between 2012 Eyler’s vivid travelogue and elegy to and 2014, China vetoed a series o the Mekong River explores the threats resolutions that would have authorized to the river’s diversity. The Mekong interventions against Bashar al-Assad in supports more Œsh species, more Syria. What explains these carefully livelihoods, and more distinct ethnic modulated choices, in Fung’s view, is groups than any other river system. But Beijing’s ešort to balance its commit- dams, roads, railways, and tourists are ment to the principle o sovereignty changing all that—so quickly that Eyler with its desire to play a major role on was able to observe the process o the international stage alongside West- destruction personally during the 15 ern powers while also maintaining years in which he led study tours solidarity with key regional actors, such through the region. China is a prime as the African Union and the Arab driver o the changes, with its scores o League. She thinks that in the future, upstream hydropower dams and swarms Beijing will mostly resist what it sees o newly rich tourists. But governments as Washington’s fetish for regime and developers all along the water- change. But her analysis also suggests course are scrambling to exploit its natural that Beijing would more willingly and social resources. It seems too late authorize ž interventions i it saw for them to repair the resulting damage: them as serving its own interests mass displacement, reduced Œsh catches, instead oŸ Washington’s. stunted agricultural yields, and the loss oŸ local cultures as young people leave Migration in the Time of Revolution: the highlands “to melt into emerging China, Indonesia, and the Cold War modern lifestyles.” BY TAOMO ZHOU. Cornell University Press, 2019, 318 pp. China and Intervention at the UN Security Council: Reconciling Status This impressively researched study o BY COURTNEY J. FUNG. Oxford Sino-Indonesian relations from 1945 to University Press, 2019, 304 pp. 1967 links three levels o diplomacy: state-to-state relations between China Fung makes sense o China’s seemingly and Indonesia’s leftist leader Sukarno, confused voting record at the ž party-to-party relations between the Security Council on issues involving Chinese Communist Party and the armed interventions and the referral o Indonesian Communist Party, and the

186   

21_Recent Books_Blues.indd 186 1/20/20 5:12 PM Recent Books

struggle between the rival regimes in phy, promoting India as a “world guru” Beijing and Taipei for in“uence over that can solve global problems with its Indonesia’s ethnic Chinese community. civilizational wisdom o’ “happiness, Chinese and Indonesian archives show peace, and harmony.” He has sought more how Beijing and Jakarta cooperated in foreign investment but still protected the “uid politics o’ the global anti-impe- Indian manufacturers from foreign rialist movement, siding in 1963–64 imports. And he has adopted a muscular against what they viewed as a British security stance, building up naval and imperialist plot to create Malaysia, a missile forces and responding forcefully new state formed by the merger o’ to provocations from Pakistan. Identify- Malaya, Sabah, Sarawak, and Singa- ing China as India’s main rival, Modi has pore. The book dispels the myth that tightened India’s strategic partnerships China directed the attempted coup in with other countries worried about China 1965 that led to the rise o’ the anticom- and sponsored infrastructure projects to munist strongman General Suharto, a prevent India’s South Asian neighbors break in Sino-Indonesian relations, and from falling totally under Beijing’s a massacre o’ suspected Communists, economic in“uence. Hall acknowledges many o’ them ethnic Chinese. The that Modi has brought his characteristic Beijing-Taipei contest for in“uence in energy to promoting India as a major the ethnic Chinese community exacer- power but judges that the results have bated the suspicion that the Chinese shown more continuity than change. represented a ¥fth column. Throughout India remains more protectionist than the turbulent politics o’ the time, globalist, distrusted by its neighbors, and Chinese Indonesians were victims o’ wary o’ aligning too clearly with other discrimination and violence, paradoxi- powers against China. cally accused both o’ capitalist exploi- tation and o’ pro-Beijing loyalties— Model City: Pyongyang suspicions that persist even today, when BY CRISTIANO BIANCHI AND the two countries have full diplomatic KRISTINA DRAPIĆ. MIT Press, 2019, and economic ties. 224 pp.

Modi and the Reinvention of Indian I’ you can’t visit Pyongyang, this is the Foreign Policy next best thing: a book ¥lled with photo- BY IAN HALL. Bristol University graphs o’ its weirdly shaped and oddly Press, 2019, 236 pp. colored buildings. Under the Dear Leader (Kim Jong Il) and the current supreme Hall oers a lucid account o¤ Indian leader (Kim Jong Un), North Korean foreign policy since 2014, when Narendra architects over the past quarter century Modi became prime minister. Modi reversed an earlier trend o’ copying promised a foreign policy revolution, has Soviet styles. The un¥nished, 105-story gathered decision-making power to Ryugyong Hotel is built in the shape o’ a himself, and has traveled abroad more rocket ship. The City o’ Sports complex often than his predecessors. He has boasts 12 huge buildings, each devoted articulated a Hindu nationalist philoso- to a particular game. The two-and-a-

March/April 2020 187

Book 1.indb 187 1/17/20 9:27 PM Recent Books

half-mile-long, 400-foot-wide Kwang- bok Street is lined with 30- to 42-story Africa residential towers, each built on one o’ seven designs. Every edi¥ce, every cluster Nicolas van de Walle o‘ buildings, and the city plan as a whole make ideological statements o¤ fealty to the leader, national power, and ultra- modernity. Vast spaces and long vistas Legislative Development in Africa: Politics overwhelm the visitor’s sense o’ individu- and Postcolonial Legacies ality. Pyongyang is designed as a people’s BY KEN OCHIENG’ OPALO. paradise—one with mostly empty streets. Cambridge University Press, 2019, 290 pp.

China and Japan: Facing History his ¥ne study o’ the role that BY EZRA F. VOGEL. Harvard African legislatures play in University Press, 2019, 536 pp. Tpromoting democracy and govern- ment accountability deserves to be widely Vogel uses the powerful lens o’ the past read. Opalo’s well-informed general to frame contemporary Chinese-Japanese history o’ the development o‘ legislatures relations. He does not begin with the in the region shows how the origins o’ horrors o‘ World War II; instead, he parliaments in the waning days o’ takes the reader back over 1,500 years colonial rule—as well as their evolution to examine the contentious dynamics in the ensuing postcolonial authoritarian that shaped how these two Asian giants regimes—ensured their institutional view each other. With scholarly care weaknesses relative to the executive and an eye on contemporary policy, branch, an imbalance that continues in Vogel suggests that over the centuries— some countries. Two well-researched case across both the imperial and the mod- studies in Kenya and Zambia oer ern eras—friction has always dominated contrasting examples o‘ how an authori- their relations. China and Japan are tarian past can produce dierent kinds o’ now rich, powerful societies that were legislatures. In Kenya, the executive transformed both by Western imperial- branch o’ the colonial and early postcolo- ism and by the ravages o’ war in the nial governments centralized power, twentieth century. But they have granting the legislature only a modicum struggled to overcome past hostilities, o’ procedural autonomy. But in the in particular the memory o’ the Japa- democratic era, the legislature has nese invasion o’ China between 1937 emerged as a relatively strong institution; and 1945. Vogel insists that the Chinese being left to its own devices allowed it to must better understand Japan’s unique develop organically over time. In Zam- strategic challenges and that the Japa- bia, on the other hand, the regime micro- nese must better address China’s desire managed the legislature and thus pre- to right past wrongs. Asia’s future vented it from developing its own depends on their ability to build a more mechanisms o’ accommodation and forgiving relationship. compromise. The result in Zambia, Opalo ´Î¯°Ö³ ³. ´Ì°µÎ argues, is a much weaker institution.

188 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 188 1/17/20 9:27 PM Recent Books

The Quality of Growth in Africa agent o’ the West; in others, he comes EDITED BY RAVI KANBUR, AKBAR across as a noble idealist who tried to NOMAN, AND JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ. defend the interests o’ the less developed Columbia University Press, 2019, 480 pp. countries and facilitate decolonization. Melber, director emeritus o’ the Dag This solid collection o’ essays assesses Hammarskjold Foundation, clearly agrees sub-Saharan Africa’s economic perfor- with the latter portrait and has produced mance during the last two decades. a nuanced defense o¤ Hammarskjold’s Recent growth has neither delivered tenure at the º². The core o’ the book is adequate improvements in individual concerned with the 1960 º² intervention welfare nor produced more dynamism in in the Republic o’ the Congo, launched to African economies. The book’s best defend the new postcolonial government chapters carefully parse and interpret the against Belgian-backed secessionists, and recent growth record and its achieve- Hammarskjold’s death in a mysterious ments. High commodity prices have plane crash in 1961 in what is today played a big role in the region’s overall Zambia. On the former, Melber argues growth. Political instability helps explain that the secretary-general struggled to the persistence o’ economic volatility. ful¥ll his ambition o’ carving out greater Although economic growth has had a real operational autonomy for both his o¾ce (i‘ limited) impact on reducing poverty, and the º² in general; by 1961, Ham- it has also contributed to a rise in in- marskjold’s prickly independence and equality. The authors lament the poor sometimes sanctimonious eloquence made quality o’ the available data. One abiding him useful to virtually none o’ the main puzzle remains Africa’s persistently high actors in the process o’ decolonization in unemployment rates and the seeming sub-Saharan Africa. Regarding the plane failure o’ economic growth to produce crash—about which there are many more high-quality jobs, a problem several conspiracy theories—Melber’s summary chapters link to the limited development o’ the multiple, inconclusive investiga- o’ export-oriented manufacturing sectors tions breaks little new ground, but he in the region. The essays are weaker in suggests convincingly that forces hostile their prescriptions; it may be right to call to decolonization, including southern for more considered industrial policies, African white settlers, caused the crash. for example, but that suggestion is too vague and aspirational to be useful. South Sudan’s Injustice System: Law and Activism on the Frontline Dag Hammarskjöld, the United Nations, BY RACHEL IBRECK. Zed Books, and the Decolonisation of Africa 2019, 264 pp. BY HENNING MELBER. Hurst, 2019, 184 pp. South Sudan has been at war for much o’ the last several decades. In her analysis The second º² secretary-general remains o’ the South Sudanese legal system, a controversial ¥gure in the history o’ the Ibreck claims with great optimism that Cold War. In some accounts, Dag Ham- insecurity and violence have pushed marskjold appears as a Machiavellian the population to depend on the law to

March/April 2020 189

Book 1.indb 189 1/17/20 9:27 PM Recent Books

improve its security and welfare. Her have strong civil societies and, especially study o’ the South Sudanese legal in the case o’ Zimbabwe, political system—and the small band o’ activists oppositions. Informative chapters who work in sometimes extremely examine the evolution o’ each o’ these di¾cult conditions to support it—is often six states. Are these enough states to inspiring: what is taken for granted in add up to a continental trend toward peaceful countries becomes more explic- totalitarianism? Since the return o’ itly important and worth ¥ghting for in multiparty electoral politics in the early war-torn countries such as South Sudan. 1990s, the most typical kind o’ regime The book describes the workings o’ the in Africa seems to be an electoral country’s formal legal system and ana- autocracy, a system that combines many lyzes the largely failed attempts to put in authoritarian practices with regular place stronger legal mechanisms to elections. Peterson recognizes that this protect individual rights. Enlivened by kind o’ system cannot be de¥ned as fascinating case studies, her book gives a totalitarian but argues that totalitarian voice to the lawyers, volunteers, and tendencies continue to appeal to auto- activists (such as hersel‘) who, in tough crats in the region. He worries that the circumstances, have tried to make the developmental success o¤ Ethiopia and system work better for average citizens. Rwanda will make a harder-edged authoritarianism attractive to both Africa’s Totalitarian Temptation: The international donors in search o’ eco- Evolution of Autocratic Regimes nomic e¾ciency and budding autocrats BY DAVE PETERSON. Lynne Rienner, who wish to entrench their power.∂ 2020, 279 pp.

In a lively and wide-ranging study o’ authoritarianism in Africa, Peterson de¥nes as “totalitarian” any regime that creates political institutions to dominate society, espouses an all-encompassing utopian ideology, and attempts to mobilize its citizens on a mass scale. He identi¥es three contemporary African countries as totalitarian (Eritrea, Ethio- pia, and Rwanda) and another three as having strong totalitarian tendencies (Equatorial Guinea, Sudan, and Zim- babwe). The latter set o’ regimes are not viewed as totalitarian because they often

Foreign AŠairs (ISSN 00157120), March/April 2020, Volume 99, Number 2. Published six times annually (January, March, May, July, September, November) at 58 East 68th Street, New York, NY 10065. Print subscriptions: U.S., $54.95; Canada, $66.95; other countries via air, $89.95 per year. Canadian Publication Mail–Mail # 1572121. Periodicals postage paid in New York, NY, and at additional mailing o¾ces. š›œžŸ¡œž¢£: Send address changes to Foreign AŠairs, P.O. Box 324, Congers, NY 10920. From time to time, we permit certain carefully screened companies to send our subscribers information about products or services that we believe will be o’ interest. I’ you prefer not to receive such information, please contact us at the Congers, NY, address indicated above.

190 «¬®¯°±² ³««³°®´

Book 1.indb 190 1/17/20 9:27 PM