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Graham Allison Into One, by the Overwhelming Fact O’ U.S 1/17/20 8:34 PM MARCH/APRIL 2020 MARCH/APRIL FOREIGNAFFAIRS.COM DIGITAL DICTATOR DIGITAL America? OF THE Come Home, Come THE RISE THE / • • • , ? FA_MA20_cover.indd All Pages DOWNLOAD CSS Notes, Books, MCQs, Magazines www.thecsspoint.com Download CSS Notes Download CSS Books Download CSS Magazines Download CSS MCQs Download CSS Past Papers The CSS Point, Pakistan’s The Best Online FREE Web source for All CSS Aspirants. Email: [email protected] BUY CSS / PMS / NTS & GENERAL KNOWLEDGE BOOKS ONLINE CASH ON DELIVERY ALL OVER PAKISTAN Visit Now: WWW.CSSBOOKS.NET For Oder & Inquiry Call/SMS/WhatsApp 0333 6042057 – 0726 540316 Brush Up Your English By S T Imam Call/SMS 0726540141 - 03336042057 English Literature MCQs By Nawaz Khalid Emporium Publishers Order Now Call/SMS 03336042057 - 0726540141 International law SK Kapoor & LN Tandon Call/SMS 0726540141 - 03336042057 BUY CSS SOLVED MCQs BOOKS ONLINE CASH ON DELIVERY CALL/SMS 03336042057 | Visit: http://cssbooks.net Volume 99, Number 2 COME HOME, AMERICA? The Folly of Retrenchment 10 Why America Can’t Withdraw From the World Thomas Wright The Price of Primacy 19 Why America Shouldn’t Dominate the World Stephen Wertheim The New Spheres of Influence 30 Sharing the Globe With Other Great Powers Graham Allison Reality Check 41 American Power in an Age o Constraints Jennifer Lind and Daryl G. Press Learning to Live With Despots 49 COVER: EMMANUEL POLANCO EMMANUEL COVER: The Limits o Democracy Promotion Stephen D. Krasner Getting to Less 56 The Truth About Defense Spending Kathleen Hicks March/April 2020 Book 1.indb 1 1/17/20 9:26 PM ESSAYS Why America Must Lead Again 64 Rescuing U.S. Foreign Policy After Trump Joseph R. Biden, Jr. How the Good War Went Bad 77 America’s Slow-Motion Failure in Afghanistan Carter Malkasian The Epidemic of Despair 92 Will America’s Mortality Crisis Spread to the Rest o the World? Anne Case and Angus Deaton The Digital Dictators 103 How Technology Strengthens Autocracy Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Erica Frantz, and Joseph Wright Too Big to Prevail 116 The National Security Case for Breaking Up Big Tech Ganesh Sitaraman Saving America’s Alliances 127 The United States Still Needs the System That Put It on Top Mira Rapp-Hooper Mean Streets 141 The Global Trac Death Crisis Janette Sadik-Khan and Seth Solomonow ON FOREIGNAFFAIRS.COM Maysam Behravesh Amaka Anku and Michael Carpenter on on Iran’s Quds Force Tochi Eni-Kalu on Ukrainian oligarchs in after Soleimani. African urbanization. the Trump era. March/April 2020 Book 1.indb 3 1/17/20 9:26 PM REVIEWS & RESPONSES The Dismal Kingdom 150 Do Economists Have Too Much Power? Paul Romer The Wily Country 158 Understanding Putin’s Russia Michael Kimmage Recent Books 165 “Foreign Aairs . will tolerate wide dierences of opinion. Its articles will not represent any consensus of beliefs. What is demanded of them is that they shall be competent and well informed, representing honest opinions seriously held and convincingly expressed. It does not accept responsibility for the views in any articles, signed or unsigned, which appear in its pages. What it does accept is the responsibility for giving them a chance to appear.” Archibald Cary Coolidge, Founding Editor Volume 1, Number 1 • September 1922 March/April 2020 Book 1.indb 5 1/17/20 9:26 PM March/April 2020 · Volume 99, Number 2 Published by the Council on Foreign Relations Editor, Peter G. 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No part o the magazine may be reproduced, hosted or distributed in any form or by any means without prior written permission from Foreign A airs. To obtain permission, visit ForeignA airs.com/permissions Foreign A airs is a member o the Alliance for Audited Media and the Association o­ Magazine Media. GST Number 127686483RT Canada Post Customer #4015177 Publication #40035310 02_TOC_Blues.indd 6 1/20/20 4:22 PM CONTRIBUTORS KATHLEEN HICKS is a leading scholar-practitioner o U.S. defense policy. As a top Pentagon ocial in the Obama administration, she led the Defense Department’s eorts to pivot to Asia and helped devise contingency plans for crises the U.S. military might face in the decades ahead. In “Getting to Less” (page 56), Hicks, now a senior vice president and director o the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, argues that although it is possible to decrease U.S. defense spending, drastic cuts would require dangerous shifts in strategy. A uent Pashto speaker, CARTER MALKASIAN spent two years in Afghanistan as a U.S. State Department ocial, working mostly in the war-torn district o Garmser, often traveling without a security detail to meet with village leaders. He reected on that work in War Comes to Garmser, one o the best books yet written about the U.S. war in Afghanistan, before going on to become an adviser to the chairman o the Joint Chiefs o Sta, General Joseph Dunford, from 2015 to 2019. In “How the Good War Went Bad” (page 77), Malkasian explores the factors that have made U.S. success in Afghanistan unlikely—and the decisions that have made it impossible. ANNE CASE AND ANGUS DEATON have dedicated their careers to studying the economic issues that shape the lives o everyday people. Since receiving her Ph.D. in economics from Princeton, Case has focused her research on human health outcomes, examining, among other things, how childhood circumstances aect health and economic status in adulthood. Deaton, raised in Edinburgh and educated at the University o Cambridge, has shed light on people’s saving and consumption choices, both in the aggregate and at the level o individual households—work for which he was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2015. Today, both live in Princeton, where they have con- ducted groundbreaking research on the rise in deaths from drug abuse, alcohol-related illnesses, and suicide in the United States. In “The Epidemic o Despair” (page 92), Case and Deaton warn that other countries could succumb to this American disease. 02_TOC_Blues.indd 7 1/20/20 6:23 PM COME HOME, AMERICA? ealth and power breed Three tough-minded pieces oer ambition, in countries as in dierent ways Washington could lower Wpeople. Nations on the rise its sights. Graham Allison suggests dream big, dare greatly, and see failure as dealing with the loss o hegemony by a challenge to be overcome. The same accepting spheres o inuence. Jennifer process works in reverse: nations on the Lind and Daryl Press favor limiting wane scale back their ambitions, cut losses, U.S. objectives to whatever the domes- and see failure as a portent to be heeded. tic and international markets will bear. Feeling down these days, the United And Stephen Krasner advises settling States is questioning the global role it for good enough governance in the once embraced. The empire that Wash- world. Lastly, Kathleen Hicks throws ington absent-mindedly acquired during cold water on hopes (or fears) o any usher times now seems to cost more dramatic defense cuts, explaining what than it’s worth, and many want to shed it would actually take to reduce mili- the burden. What that might involve is tary spending and why it’s so much the subject o this issue’s lead package. easier said than done. Thomas Wright and Stephen Wert- Similar calls for retrenchment were heim kick o the debate with strong heard hal a century ago, when the statements o the central arguments on United States was at another low ebb in each side. In general, Wright notes, its global fortunes—facing declining American alliances, security guarantees, relative power, increasing isolationism, and international economic leadership a lost war in the periphery, a scandal- over recent generations have been a ridden president under siege. But just a great success. It makes sense to prune few years later, after some creative lesser commitments, but certainly not to strategy and diplomacy, the country had abandon Washington’s essential global extricated itsel¤ from Vietnam, re- role. On the contrary, says Wertheim: it shaped the global balance o power, is precisely the notion o American reestablished its position in Asia, and primacy that needs to go. Instead o become the dominant force in the policing the world with endless military Middle East. And although it took a interventions, Washington should while, the U.S. economy ultimately rose withdraw from much o the greater to the challenge posed by increased Middle East, rein in the “war on terror,” international competition and came out rely on diplomacy instead o¤ force, and stronger for it. Could such miracles concentrate its attention on trying to repeat themselves, or is it ¥nally time steer the global economy toward fairer for America to come home? and greener pastures.
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