The National Interest

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Number 83 • Spring 2006

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Honorary Chairman Henry A. Kissinger Chairman, Advisory Council James Schlesinger Publisher Dimitri K. Simes Associate Publisher Paul J. Saunders Contributing Editors Ian Bremmer Ted Galen Carpenter • Alexis Debat • John Hulsman • David B. Rivkin, Jr. • Ray Takeyh • Aluf Benn • Alexey Pushkov Advisory Board Morton Abramowitz • Graham Allison • Brian Beedham • Conrad Black • Robert F. Ellsworth • Mar- tin Feldstein • Fred C. Iklé • Daniel Pipes • Helmut Sonnenfeldt • Ruth Wedgwood • J. Robinson West • Dov Zakheim In Brief

A Nuclear Terrorism Report Card Graham Allison

n the first debate of the 2004 criminals that might sell them on the Ipresidential campaign, the mod- black market. Hard as it is to believe, erator asked the two candidates: “What is fewer potential nuclear weapons were the single most serious threat to Ameri- secured in Russia in the two years after can national security?” Both answered: the 9/11 wake-up call than in the two nuclear terrorism. Vice President Dick years prior to that attack. Although the Cheney followed up, arguing that “the administration launched a global clean- biggest threat we face now as a nation out initiative that removed some highly is the possibility of terrorists ending up enriched uranium from eight countries, in the middle of one of our cities with the makings for nuclear bombs remain deadlier weapons than have ever been today in forty developing and transitional used against us—nuclear weapons—able countries. Performance worthy of an “A” to threaten the lives of hundreds of thou- in securing “loose nukes” requires lock- sands of Americans.” Cheney concluded: ing down all nuclear material in twelve to “That’s the ultimate threat. For us to 18 months—not mañana. have a strategy that is capable of defeat- “No new nascent nukes” means no ing that threat, you’ve got to get your mind new national capabilities to enrich ura- around that concept.” (Emphasis mine.) nium or reprocess plutonium, the essen- Given these strong words, the ques- tial elements in creating nuclear weapons. tion is: How has the administration acted The international security community has to address this threat? Success in pre- slowly come to recognize this red line: venting a nuclear 9/11 requires imple- Highly enriched uranium and plutonium menting a “Doctrine of Three Nos”: no are bombs just about to hatch. On this loose nukes, no new nascent nukes and front, the Bush Administration earned a no new nuclear weapons states. On all “D minus.” While its attention was con- three fronts, the administration’s first- sumed by Iraq, Iran advanced from years term performance can be summed up by to only months away from completing one word: unacceptable. the infrastructure for its nuclear bomb. “No loose nukes” means securing all “No new nuclear weapons states” rec- nuclear weapons and weapons-usable ma- ognizes the reality that we have now eight terial beyond the reach of terrorists and nuclear powers but says unambiguously:

The National Interest––Spring 2006 63 1st Term 2nd Term Grade Grade Trend Trend

No Loose Nukes m D+ i ?

No New Nascent Nukes m D– ok ?

No New Nuclear Weapons States m F i ?

Shades of Yale?

“No more.” Sharply reducing Cold War to be “getting its mind around the con- arsenals and devaluing nuclear weapons cept” of a nuclear bomb exploding in an in international relations are long-term American city. In confronting the threat goals, but the urgent challenge is to stop of nuclear terrorism, the administration further bleeding. Here the president has moved beyond ideological principles clearly failed. When he entered office, to a new pragmatism. North Korea had two bombs-worth of In February 2005, at a summit in plutonium (acquired in the final years of Bratislava, Presidents Bush and Putin put his father’s administration). At the end of nuclear security at the top of the agen- his first term, according to cia estimates, da. For the first time, the two presidents North Korea’s nuclear arsenal had grown accepted personal responsibility for ad- to eight bombs-worth of plutonium. dressing the issue and assuring that their Beginning in early 2003, North Korea governments act urgently. They agreed crossed every line the United States has on a work plan that assigned responsibil- drawn. Specifically, it withdrew from the ity to Secretary of Energy Samuel Bod- Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty—with man and his Russian counterpart; estab- impunity. It kicked out the Internation- lished specific working groups on best al Atomic Energy Agency inspectors— practices in nuclear security and security with impunity. It turned off the video culture; and required the secretaries to cameras that were watching 8,000 fuel oversee implementation of these efforts rods containing enough plutonium for and brief them regularly. six additional bombs—with impunity. It On Iran, the administration has got- trucked those fuel rods off to reprocess- ten off the sidelines where it was carp- ing factories, claimed to have manufac- ing at the eu-3 initiative and has begun tured nuclear weapons with the material, actively building consensus among the and restarted its reactor to make more major parties—the eu-3, the United plutonium—with impunity. Today, North States, Russia and China—on the neces- Korea stands alone as a self-declared but sity of preventing Iran from complet- unrecognized nuclear power. ing its nuclear weapons infrastructure. In In contrast to the first term, the good contrast to futile attempts to stop con- news is that in the past year the reconfig- struction of the nuclear power plant at ured Bush national security team appears Bushehr or deny Iran’s asserted right to

64 The National Interest––Spring 2006 a full fuel cycle, it now focuses on per- of a thousand steps, many steeper and suading the Iranian government to forgo more slippery than the first. The fact that specific actions at its Natanz and Isfahan China, the state with the greatest leverage facilities. Moreover, the United States is over North Korea, has become an active showing a willingness to bring additional player in this process holds great promise. carrots to the table, from airplane parts to Across the nuclear front, the adminis- promises of non-aggression. tration currently confronts challenges as It would be a grand irony—and in- difficult as those faced by any American deed a tragedy—if the United States and government since the Cuban Missile Cri- Iran reverse roles. After a term in which sis. We can be grateful for the recogni- American ideology scotched a denuclear- tion of Secretary of State Condoleezza ization deal that Iran’s government might Rice and her colleagues of the reality have accepted, the new Iranian president, of nuclear danger and their determina- Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, could prove un- tion to mobilize all the sticks and carrots willing to accept any offer the interna- in the American arsenal to combat the tional community can assemble. threat. Where the stakes could mean ter- Addressing the North Korean threat, rorists exploding a nuclear weapon in an the administration has transcended the American city, Churchill’s counsel to col- paralysis of the first term to develop a co- leagues in World War Two surely applies. herent strategy. The first-term policy was “It is not enough”, he said, “to do one’s summarized in Vice President Cheney’s best. What is required is rather that one maxim: “We don’t negotiate with evil; do what is necessary for success.” n we defeat it.” The administration is now actively negotiating. Significant financial Graham Allison, author of Nuclear Terrorism: The inducements from Japan, South Korea Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe (2004), is di- and China, and a guarantee from the U.S. rector of the Belfer Center for Science and government that it will not attack North International Affairs at Harvard University’s Korea to change its regime by force, per- Kennedy School of Government. A former suaded Pyongyang to agree last Septem- assistant secretary of defense who has twice ber that it would “abandon all nuclear received the Defense Department’s Distin- weapons and existing nuclear programs.” guished Public Service Medal, his teaching Between that pledge and the reality of a and research focuses on American foreign and non-nuclear North Korea lies a journey defense policy and mega-terrorism.

Thinking Beyond States Ian Bremmer

hen government offi- They coordinate policy with some states Wcials formulate foreign policy, in order to overcome resistance from oth- they tend to focus their analytical re- ers. Officials at the State Department, for sources on the opportunities and chal- example, may soon be working to per- lenges created by other governments: suade allied countries to join the United

In Brief 65