and fueled fears of losing influence in the There is little consensus over who was gia to the membership in the alliance, as Caucuses. At the time, intervention was actually making the decisions among the well as to bringing the NATO military in- cited as necessary for humanitarian rea- Russian elite. Many are now saying that frastructure closer to the Russian borders sons: to stop the mass genocide and eth- Putin was in control, although he should on the whole…” Thus, Russia was high- nic cleansing that was occurring. Russia not have been involved in foreign policy ly committed to keeping Georgia from Decision-Making in a Declining Superpower utilized this precedent of Western inter- as the Prime Minister. A new documen- gaining membership in NATO. RationalRussia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia demonstrates that Putin’s stateRussia still behaves rationally | J. Haley Tucker vention when legitimizing the decision to tary entitled “The Lost Day” was released invade Georgia. on YouTube accusing Medvedev of slow- This goal ties in closely with the contin- ly responding to the war praised Putin ued objective of Russia to maintain influ- In August of 2008, Russia invad- ducted patrols along the border of In reference to humanitarian concerns, for his assertiveness and leadership skills. ence and control over the regions along ed Georgia in a military move that Georgia beginning on July 15. These Putin also compared the overnight Speculation indicates that perhaps this the border. Maintaining Russian influ- shocked the globe. The “Five Day exercises were intended to prepare bombing of Tskhinvali to the Srebrenica film is purely political to support Putin ence over the Caucuses, as well as de- War,” as it has been named, proved to the Russian 58th army for an “oper- genocide in 1995. The Kremlin accused in the upcoming election. Putin made terring a Western advancement towards be a short, but bloody war. Although ation of peace enforcement” in either Georgia of attempting genocide against several comments while he was still pres- the border, has been a major goal of provoked by fighting in South Osse- South Ossetia or Abkhazia. Although South Ossetians, claiming that over two ident regarding his policies of supporting Russia since the dissolution of the Soviet tia, the Russian invasion appeared to these operations ended on August thousand civilian citizens had died and South Ossetia and Abkhazia through Union. Russia sees itself as a global pow- be somewhat random and much more 2, these troops continued to be sta- insinuating that by taking action, Rus- “not declarative, but material support.” er, and desires to maintain this position, extensive than the world expected. tioned at the border until the war sia would just be following suit with the especially regionally. These interests pro- This article utilizes Graham Allison’s started on the 8th. West. This indicates that it was well within Pu- vide clarity when thinking about Russia’s rational model of decision making to tin’s intentions to fully support separatist perspective on the importance of Georgia wade through the propaganda and All of these events came to a head In addition, the ability of Russia to claim interests. Putin was also quoted as saying, and its influence in the region. ascertain the thinking behind this when Mikheil Saakashvili, the Pres- that South Ossetians and Abkhazians are “There was a plan in place, and I think it move by Russia, as well as the after- ident of Georgia, ordered troops to Russian citizens came from a policy of is no secret that Russia’s forces acted in Another of Russia’s goals concerning math of the decision. Through the restore constitutional order in South “passportization,” which began in 2002. accordance with this plan […] The Gen- Georgia was to continue supporting the lens of the rational model, it is clear Ossetia late on August 7th. Saakash- This streamlined process allowed citizens eral Staff drew up this plan somewhere in separatist forces in South Ossetia and that the decision by Russia to invade vili had been given intelligence by of surrounding countries to easily gain late 2006 or early 2007. I approved it.” Not Abkhazia, in hopes of absorbing the re- in a limited war provided the most Georgian soldiers that Russian troops Russian citizenship. Though controver- only does this indicate that the invasion gions into Russia or at least maintain benefits with the least amount of risk. were moving through the Roki Tun- sial, passportization allowed Russia to into Georgia may have been pre-planned, regional influence. More than gaining nel in force, presumably intending attempt to legitimize impinging upon a but also that it was predominantly Putin’s these regions, Russia desired to prevent The Kremlin’s hand was forced to a to invade. There is much debate over neighboring country’s sovereignty. De- plan. Despite whose plan it actually was, Georgia from regaining full control, thus decision during the night of August whether the Russians invaded first spite this attempt, the international com- the decision to invade was made by the increasing Western influence in the re- 7, 2008. The events of the previous or the Georgians attacked South munity has not recognized these citizen- state of Russia and executed unitarily, as gion. Russian regional hegemony has lost six months had culminated in a his- Ossetia. The Georgians assert that ships unless the citizens have renounced per the rational model of decision mak- much of its potency since the collapse of toric moment. In February, Koso- Russia invaded and forced Saakash- Georgian citizenship officially. Therefore, ing. the Soviet Union. The loss of territory vo had declared independence, and vili to return fire. The Russians argue Russia uses passportization as legitimacy, and power that occurred has left Russia the world watched as genocide and Saakashvili attacked South Osse- but it is ineffective. However, the Koso- Another key concept in the rational deeply concerned about increased West- conflict ensued. Two months later, tia randomly in the night to regain vo precedent provided Russia with nec- model is the idea that the action chosen ern influence and control over the region. Ukraine and Georgia were denied control of the provinces. Regardless essary legitimation for the decision the is the value-maximizing option, given There is quite a bit of evidence, in fact, a Membership Action Plan (MAP) of which occurred first, Russia was Kremlin was about to make. the state’s goals. Russia’s goals regarding that Russia had intended to intervene in with the North Atlantic Treaty Orga- forced to make a decision in response Georgia cannot be separated from the Georgia much earlier than August. In late nization (NATO) following intense to Saakashvili’s military action in The rational model of decision making, Kremlin’s general foreign policy strate- May, Russian troops had entered Abkha- debate. Although denied, Georgia South Ossetia. outlined by Graham Allison, contains gies. Russia is highly concerned about zia in order to repair railroad tracks that was promised a MAP “at some point” several basic tenets. One of these is the NATO enlargement and understanding were not functional. The railroad direct- in the future if they still desired. Skir- In order to fully understand this de- precept that the principal actor is a na- this helps to clarify both the intentions ly linked Georgia and Russia, allowing mishes, bombings, and other military cision, the in-depth factors that pre- tional government or state. In this case, and the timing of the conflict. Georgia’s troops and equipment to move much fast- conflicts were ongoing in the regions cipitated the decision and provided the principal actor is Russia. Russia acts attempts to enter NATO in April sparked er during the invasion. This, along with of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the rationale for the Kremlin’s po- unitarily in this decision, despite reports renewed fervor and fueled Russia’s inten- repeated skirmishes and provocations of Georgia. The two regions under dis- sition must be assessed. The first is of disagreement and discord between tions. According to the 2008 Foreign Pol- the Georgian government, indicates that pute hosted Russian peacekeepers, as the Kosovo precedent. When Kosovo Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin icy Concept of the Russian Federation, perhaps Russia was pre-planning an in- well as Russian military bases, who declared its independence in Febru- (president and prime minister, respec- “Russia maintains its negative attitude to- vasion in order to regain predominance worked alongside separatist forces in ary of 2008, intervention by NATO tively, at the time of the war). wards the expansion of NATO, notably to in the region. each area. The Russian military con- and the United States angered Russia the plans of admitting Ukraine and Geor-

43 | Ex-Patt Magazine of Foreign Affairs Fall 2013 | 44 With these goals in mind, utilizing the ra- provinces, and then cease. Russia accom- ment of the war in Georgia. As a result, Rus- tional model, one must consider the options plished this task within five days, although sia has succeeded in achieving many of its re- available to Russia at the time of the decision. some sources state that forces did not leave gional goals with very few real consequences. Hans Mouritzen and Anders Wivel have until much later. After international calls for described four possible options that Russia a ceasefire and much diplomatic negotiation, The aftermath of the Five Day War remains could have taken. First, Russia could have a ceasefire agreement was signed which end- to be fully revealed. Not only did Georgia remained passive and simply supported the ed the war. During the five days of conflict, lose the war, but as noted earlier, it also sus- separatist forces, as they had been doing by French President Nicolas Sarkozy and other tained a much higher degree of casualties. providing arms and peacekeepers, and avoid European Union leaders met with President The impact on Georgians, both in the heart further engagement. Second, Russia could Medvedev and President Saakashvili. Sar- of the country and in the separatist regions, have initiated a large-scale, short-term inter- kozy drafted a peace plan, which was even- was profound. As of this writing, NATO has vention, in which troops fully engage militar- tually agreed upon after much diplomatic yet to offer Georgia a MAP. Although initial- ily to defend the separatists, but return back wrangling. After the ceasefire was signed by ly seen as the victims of the war, the Geor- to Russian territory after. Third, Russia could both parties, debates continued concerning gian government has begun losing support engage in limited war to fully control South whether Russia would follow through with as the media has focused on discovering the Ossetia and Abkhazia. The last option was to plans to evacuate troops and abide by the initiators of the conflict, rather than its full invade completely and occupy either security ceasefire. Much pressure from the interna- context. The Saakashvili government also zones or the whole of Georgia. tional community led to an eventual retreat sustained damage, as Western countries are and subsequent ending of war. now less convinced of Georgia’s ability to If Russia had chosen to remain passive, it maintain law and order. The aftermath of the would have been inconsistent with the Rus- Russia had successfully met the majority of war for Russia, aside from meeting the goals sian Foreign Policy Concept, as well as with its goals in the conflict, with the exception previously discussed, has been comparative- history. This option also would have under- of completely ending Georgia’s control over ly less damaging. Russia announced its rec- mined Russia’s support of the separatists be- the separatists. In a statement highlighting ognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as cause it would be clear that they did not have Russia’s success in goals regarding NATO, independent states. Despite this announce- the full backing of the Russian government. Medvedev illuminated, “For some of our ment by Medvedev, very few other states The second option of short-term interven- partners, including NATO, it was a signal have followed suit, indicating that perhaps Global Issues. tion accomplishes many of the goals of lim- that they must think about geopolitical sta- Russia overstepped its bounds. ited war at similar cost, but does not provide bility before making a decision to expand the the maximum benefits. Full invasion and alliance.” In other words, the war in Georgia Russian foreign policy towards Georgia con- occupation of Georgia provides maximum warned NATO of the potential consequences tinues to be ambiguous yet frosty. While benefits to Russia, but with increased cost. of expansion towards Russia. there has yet to be another full-fledged war Occupying Georgia would require much between the two states, much of the ten- more military involvement and an exponen- The costs of the war were minimal for Russia, sion remains. When one regards this con- Local Prespective. tially higher cost, due to the cost of installing with Georgia suffering the majority of the ca- flict through the lens of the rational model, Your passport to unique insights in foreign affairs - brought to you by the a puppet government and maintaining order sualties. The Independent Fact-Finding Mis- however, one can ascertain the thinking of long-term. There would also have been major sion on the Conflict of Georgia found that Russian policymakers and leaders. Clear students of the Patterson School of Diplomacy & International Commerce. repercussions to Russia’s international rep- Russia lost 67 servicemen, while Georgia lost links exist between Russia’s decisions and the utation. Even in the limited war that Russia 170 servicemen, 14 policemen, and 228 civil- statements and policies available on public waged in Georgia, the West detected echoes ians, with many more injured. In addition to record. Without question, Russia operates as of a resurgent Cold War Russia. A complete human cost discrepancies, the Russian gov- a rational actor in the foreign policy world. invasion and occupation of Georgia would ernment did not suffer many political casu- Decisions are made based upon pragmatism have rekindled anti-Russian sentiment akin alties. Public opinion in Russia greatly sup- and the selection of the value-maximizing to that of the Cold War era. These costs were ported the war due in part to governmental option. All of these factors lead to the conclu- too substantial to be chosen rationally. control and censorship of media in Russia. sion that the decision to go to war with Geor- Western response to the war also demon- gia in the summer of 2008 was a rational and Within the rational model, the principal strated that Russia would face very little con- calculated decision based upon an assess- actor makes the decision that is value-max- sequence for their actions. The West refused ment of the potential options. It will certainly imizing. Russia chose the option of limited to choose sides between Russia and Georgia be interesting to see how Russia implements And don’t forget to take Ex-Patt with you! war because it accomplished the most goals during the war, instead calling for a ceasefire. future foreign policy objectives regarding the Connect with us on your favorite social media sites. at the least cost. Limited war meant that Rus- Since 2008, President Obama has pursued a state of Georgia. sia would invade, defeat Georgian forces, in- policy to “reset” relations with Russia. This crease and maintain control of the separatist policy has not included any form of indict-

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