Man-Made Hazard Disaster Risk Management – Understanding Prevention and Preparedness in contributing to the Sendai Framework
MARK HAILWOOD
SECTION 31 – AIR POLLUTION CONTROL, ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY Disaster Risk Management
. Man-Made Hazards are part of the Sendai Framework . For the first time: Natural disaster risks Humanitarian disaster risks, and Man-Made disaster risks are covered in one Disaster Risk Management Framework! Challenges for Success
. For Disaster Risk Management to be successful across all disaster fields there is a need to develop common understandings and appreciation of differences for: Terminology Concepts associated with the use of the terminology Approaches to effective Disaster Risk Management.
. Currently there are differences in approaches and differences in concepts. This can lead to misunderstanding and failure to communicate effectively. Natural and Humanitarian Disasters
. Mitigation of consequences towards reduction of magnitude: e.g. pumping strategies and sand sack deployment to defend a location against flooding
. Response to needs occurring as a result of particular consequences: e.g. temporary accommodation, heavy lifting equipment, emergency drinking water supplies, emergency health care facilities
. Planning and strategies to be able to fulfil these two requirements: National, regional planning, international networks, lists and databases of resources, structures to trigger activities and activate resources Major Chemical Accident Risk Management
. Major Chemical Accident Risk Management (part of the field of Man-Made Hazards): Has existed for over 40 years. Has developed extensive experience at local, national and international level. Experience is documented in policies, regulations, standards, as well as research published in journals and shared at conferences.
. However major chemical accidents still happen.
01.01.2013 -> Datum über
Feyzin, France 1966 Fire and explosion of an LPG storage in a refinery,
Flixborough, UK 1974 Fire and explosion of a 30 t release of cyclohexane, 28 killed, 89 injured
Seveso, Italy 1976 Release of contents of a chemical reactor, contamination of several km² with contents including ca. 2 kg TCDD (Dioxin), evacuation of 5700 people, numerous cases of chlor-acne Bhopal, India 1984 Release of a toxic cloud of methyl isocyanate from a storage tank, > 3000 killed, > 170000 injured, the site is still contaminated Schweizerhalle, 1986 Fire in a warehouse storing pesticides. 10000 Basle, CH m³ contaminated fire-fighting water containing 30 tonnes of chemicals released to Rhine. Major disruption to drinking water supply, ecological damage over 500 km. Major Chemical Accidents / Disasters (2)
Baia Mare, 2000 Collapse of a dam at a tailings pond released Romania 100000 m³ liquid conatinin 50 – 100 tonnes of cyanides and heavy metals to the Somes, Tisza and Danube rivers (ca 2000 km river pollution) Enschede, 2000 A stock of ca. 100 t of explosives was Netherlands detonated by a smaller fire. This led to a massive explosion and fireball which destroyed and damaged property over a wide area, 21 killed, > 900 injured. Toulouse, France 2001 An explosion in an ammonium nitrate and fertiliser factory destroyed the facility and caused widespread damage in the surrounding area, 29 killed, ca. 2500 injured Buncefield, UK 2005 The massive overfilling of a petroleum storage tank by pipeline at a fuel storage depot led to several explosions and a fire which engulfed 22 storage tanks, substantial property damage Major Chemical Accidents / Disasters (3)
Viareggio, Italy 2009 5 of 14 rail tank wagons carrying LPG derailed close to the railway station of Viareggio before midnight. Release of LPG ignited and railcars exploded, 32 killed, 26 injured, several houses destroyed Evangelos 2011 Explosion of confiscated munitions at a naval Florakis, Cyprus base destroyed a neighbouring power plant, 13 killed, 62 injured, widespread power-cuts, economic costs ca. 10% GDP. Sant'Angelo, Italy 2013 Explosion at a pyrotechnics factory, 5 killed
Gorni Lom, 2014 Munitions factory dismantling anti-personnel Bulgaria mines. An explosion killed 15 (10% workforce), 3 injured, huge craters – buildings “disappeared”, debris flew up to 1 km. Modugno, Italy 2015 Explosion at a pyrotechnics factory, 6 killed Stakeholders in Major Chemical Accident Risk Management . Industry: primary responsibility to take all measures necessary to prevent the occurrence of major accidents and to limit their effects should they occur. . Public authorities: responsible for the inspection and enforcement activities to ensure that operators comply with their responsibilities. Also responsible for land-use planning. . International co-operation: exists between EU, OECD, UN-ECE, UNEP, ILO, WHO, ICCA (industry associations) to share experience and exchange good practice and lessons learned. Bow-Tie Diagram
Preventative measures Limiting measures
Initiator Consequence
Initiator
Initiator Effects Incident* Consequence
Hazards Initiator
Consequence
Initiator
Barrier * Release of energy or hazardous substance Major Chemical Accident Prevention & Preparedness . Prevention of Loss of Primary Containment (LOPC) Understanding the inherent risks in the chemicals and their reactions Principles of inherent safety Design and construction of the plant and equipment Control and alarm systems Qualification and training of personnel Planing and execution of maintenance and inspection . Limiting the effects Secondary and tertiary containment Fire protection systems including fire-fighting crews Physical barriers to protect against fire & blast . Land-use planning and siting of facilities Relationship between the risk management principles, framework and processes (ISO 31000:2009) Tools for Risk Management from the Major Chemical Accident Context . Systematic Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment Dow Fire & Explosion Index Hazard and operability Study (HAZOP) Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA) . Safety Management System Responsibilities, Processes and Procedures Management of Change (MoC) Continual Control Process, Senior Management Review . Land-Use Planning . Accident Reporting and Lessons Learned How can we work together to improve Disaster Risk Management? Bow-Tie Diagram for DRM
Preventative measures Limiting measures
Initiator Consequence
Initiator
Initiator Effects Incident* Consequence
Hazards Initiator
Consequence
Initiator * Potential for impact Barrier on people, property or environment „Bow-tie” diagram technical effects
Sudden snow melt Damage to the defenses/dam cut
Using reservoirs Strengthening of defenses (dam)
Flooding/isolation of settlement Using sand bags Exceptional amount of precipitation
Dam cut Dam cut Damage to buildings FLOOD
Using sand bags Water level rise in TOP EVENT neighbouring countries Damage to critical infrastructures
Safety barriers Safety barriers
causes consequences
Source: Hungarian DRA by ZGyenes Exchange of Knowledge and Experience
. What can be done to reduce or prevent exposure to a disaster hazard? . How can “Management of Change” but built in to Disaster Risk Management systems to provide robustness? Data and information exchange between authorities to be able to “discover change” . How can engineers be encouraged to “think the unthinkable” and support the planning for disasters? – Recognising that systems will fail. Exchange of Knowledge and Experience (2)
. How can disasters be better documented to understand causal chains and develop lessons learned? Which disasters / major accidents / hazardous incidents should we be recording? What should the data look like, e.g. Loss Data Initiative? What is the natural & humanitarian disaster equivalent to eMARS? Conclusions
. Man-made hazards, including major chemical accidents, are part of the disaster risk management framework (Sendai) . There is over 40 years of experience in the field of major chemical accident risk management. . Accidents still happen! . Disaster Risk Management needs to recognise that measures to prevent exposure to hazards are an effective step in preventing loss of life, damage to property and the environment. . The fields of engineering need to recognise that engineered systems can and will fail and strategic planning is necessary. . Communication and sharing amongst practioners is essential. Thank you for your attention