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Air Force Incident Management Guidance for Major Accidents and Natural Disasters

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BY ORDER OF THE AIR FORCE MANUAL 10-2504 SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE 1 DECEMBER 2009 Operations AIR FORCE INCIDENT MANAGEMENT GUIDANCE FOR MAJOR ACCIDENTS AND NATURAL DISASTERS COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY ACCESSIBILITY: Publications and forms are available for downloading or ordering on the e- Publishing website at www.e-publishing.af.mil. RELEASABILITY: There are no releasability restrictions on this publication. OPR: HQ AFCESA/CEXR Certified by: HQ USAF/A7CX (Col Curt A. Van De Walle) Pages: 89 This manual implements Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 10-2, Readiness; AFPD 10-25, Emergency Management; and Air Force Instruction (AFI) 10-2501, Air Force Emergency Management Program Planning and Operations. It also aligns the Air Force Emergency Management Program with Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5), the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the National Response Framework (NRF). This manual also supplements the Air Force Incident Management System (AFIMS) based on the NIMS methodology and aligns Air Force Emergency Management (EM) planning and response with the NRF as directed by HSPD-5. This manual integrates major accident and natural disaster procedures and standards for planning, logistical requirements, emergency response actions, emergency response organizational guidelines, exercises and evaluations, personnel training, detection, identification, warning and notification actions. Establishes responsibilities, procedures and standards for prevention, preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation resulting from major accidents or natural disasters within the continental United States (CONUS) and Outside the Continental United States (OCONUS). It prescribes the planning process to help responders achieve unity of effort, allocate and use resources effectively and identify shortfalls in response capabilities. This publication applies to Active Duty, Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) and Air National Guard (ANG) units. Consult cited policy directives, instructions, manuals and their supplements for specific policies, procedures and requirements. Send recommended changes and major command (MAJCOM) supplements to this publication to HQ AFCESA/CEXR, 139 Barnes Drive, Tyndall AFB, FL 32403-5319. Use AF IMT 847, Recommendation for Change of Publication for recommended changes. Ensure that all records created as a result of processes prescribed in this publication are maintained in accordance with Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 33-363, Management of Records, and disposed of in accordance 2 AFMAN10-2504 1 DECEMBER 2009 with the Air Force Records Disposition Schedule (RDS) located at https://www.my.af.mil/gcss- af61a/afrims/afrims/. Chapter 1—OVERVIEW AND POLICY 5 1.1. Purpose. .................................................................................................................. 5 1.2. Mission. .................................................................................................................. 5 1.3. Policies. .................................................................................................................. 5 Chapter 2—PREVENTION AND PREPAREDNESS 7 2.1. Prevention and Preparedness Overview. ................................................................ 7 2.2. Prevention. ............................................................................................................. 7 Table 2.1. HAZMAT Response Levels. ................................................................................. 8 Table 2.2. Typical Hazardous Materials on Air Bases. ........................................................... 9 Table 2.3. Elements of Hurricane and Typhoon Development. .............................................. 12 Table 2.4. Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale Categories. ......................................................... 13 Table 2.5. Hurricane Conditions and Tropical Cyclone Conditions of Readiness. ................ 14 Table 2.6. 2007 Enhanced Fujita Tornado Scale. ................................................................... 15 Table 2.7. Extreme Cold Considerations. ............................................................................... 18 Table 2.8. Extreme Heat Considerations. ............................................................................... 19 Table 2.9. Snowfall Intensities. ............................................................................................... 20 2.3. Preparedness. ......................................................................................................... 23 Table 2.10. Incident Types. ....................................................................................................... 24 Table 2.11. Hazard Assessment Steps. ..................................................................................... 26 Table 2.12. Capabilities Assessment Steps. .............................................................................. 26 Table 2.13. Considerations for Major Accident and Natural Disaster Response Planning. ..... 29 Table 2.14. Base-Wide and Targeted Notification. .................................................................. 30 Chapter 3—RESPONSE 33 3.1. Response Overview. .............................................................................................. 33 3.2. Notification. ........................................................................................................... 33 3.3. Response Actions. .................................................................................................. 34 Table 3.1. Initial Response Governing Principles. .................................................................. 34 Table 3.2. Zone Boundary Criteria. ........................................................................................ 37 3.4. Withdrawal or Evacuation. .................................................................................... 39 AFMAN10-2504 1 DECEMBER 2009 3 3.5. Command and Control (C2). .................................................................................. 40 Table 3.3. Crisis Action Team Primary Functions. ................................................................. 41 Table 3.4. Unit Control Center Responsibilities. .................................................................... 44 Chapter 4—RECOVERY 45 4.1. Recovery Overview. .............................................................................................. 45 Table 4.1. Unit Log (ICS Form 214-CG) Instructions. ........................................................... 47 Table 4.2. Rapid Field Damage Assessment Impact Issues. ................................................... 48 Table 4.3. Actions Prior to Ending Disaster Operations. ........................................................ 49 4.2. Mission Continuation. ............................................................................................ 49 4.3. Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) in Recovery Operations. .............. 50 4.4. Response Task Force Support (RTF). .................................................................... 50 4.5. Joint Task Force (JTF) Support. ............................................................................ 50 Table 4.4. AF Installations Selected as FEMA BSI Lessons Learned. ................................... 51 4.6. Restoration. ............................................................................................................ 52 Chapter 5—MITIGATION 53 5.1. Mitigation Overview. ............................................................................................. 53 5.2. Preparing and Exercising Plans. ............................................................................ 53 5.3. Hazard Analysis. .................................................................................................... 53 5.4. Protection of Critical Facilities. ............................................................................. 54 Table 5.1. Critical Facilities Protection Criteria. .................................................................... 54 Chapter 6—INFORMATION COLLECTION, RECORDS, AND FORMS 55 6.1. Information Collections. ........................................................................................ 55 6.2. Records. ................................................................................................................. 55 6.3. Prescribed and Adopted Forms. ............................................................................. 55 Attachment 1—GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION 56 Attachment 2—TYPICAL INCIDENT SITE SETUP 74 Attachment 3—PROTECTIVE ACTIONS TO MINIMIZE EXPOSURE 75 Attachment 4—PROTECTIVE ACTIONS TO AVOID FATALITIES 76 Attachment 5—INCIDENT COMMANDER’S GUIDE TO FIRST AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE MISSIONS 77 Attachment 6—SAMPLE INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM EVENT LOG 80 Attachment 7—NUCLEAR WEAPONS ACCIDENT/INCIDENT RESPONSE FLOWCHART 82 4 AFMAN10-2504 1 DECEMBER 2009 Attachment 8—NUCLEAR WEAPONS ACCIDENT ON-SCENE SETUP 83 Attachment 9—NUCLEAR WEAPONS ACCIDENT/INCIDENT RECOVERY (NWAIR) 84 Attachment 10—AIR FORCE VISUAL AID 10-2510, US AIR FORCE EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION SIGNALS 89 AFMAN10-2504 1 DECEMBER 2009 5 Chapter 1 OVERVIEW AND POLICY 1.1. Purpose. This manual provides Emergency Management (EM) Program guidance on major accident and natural disaster prevention, preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation for higher headquarters, installation commanders, unit commanders, first responders and emergency responders.
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