Looting After a Disaster: a Myth Or Reality?
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Volume XXXI • Number 4 March 2007 Disaster Myths...Fourth in a Series Looting After a Disaster: A Myth or Reality? his special article in the Disaster Myths series pres- among those concerned with public safety and response Tents a point-counterpoint on the signifi cance and in disasters. prevalence of looting a� er disasters. Both authors were The fi rst author, E.L. Quarantelli, provides a his- asked to answer, independently, a series of questions, torical overview of looting in disaster research to help including whether looting a� er disasters is a myth, elucidate the myth. The fi ndings of previous disaster what evidence supports that opinion, what previous research are used to support the argument that looting, research has established about looting, and how the in fact, is not prevalent a� er disasters. In the end, there myths (and realities) about looting infl uence disaster is a lack of evidence showing that this behavior is com- planning and response. While the previous articles in monplace. This article can be found on page 2. this series were meant to help dispel disaster myths, As a counterpoint, Kelly Frailing focuses on the this article demonstrates the debate surrounding the events following Hurricane Katrina as evidence that controversial issue of looting and explores it in greater looting is not a myth, but a reality of disasters. This po- depth. Together these positions reveal the arguments sition is also supported by experience during previous and evidence for both sides of the debate. The editors events, such as Hurricane Betsy, and by crime statistics. hope that this point-counterpoint will provoke thought Turn to page 3 to read this article. The Myth and the Realities: Keeping the “Looting” Myth in Perspective all picture that researchers had earlier developed. Mostly ot all fi ndings about looting reported by disaster N anecdotal reports in other developed countries were researchers have been correctly understood. Important consistent with the American experience. This view was distinctions and qualifi cations about the phenomena have later generalized to the proposition that looting was not a sometimes been ignored. Thus some demythologization problem in modern, developed countries and that in the of the looting myth is necessary. rare instances when it occurred it had the distinct social The word “looting,” which comes from Sanskrit (lut, characteristics found by the pioneer disaster researchers. to rob) entered into European languages centuries ago to However, absent systematic studies in developing coun- refer to the plundering undertaken by invading armies. tries to this day, and using mostly anecdotal accounts and But until recently, contemporary and historical accounts mass media reports, the best that can be said is that major of disasters have not used the term. The fi rst systematic looting in developing countries sometimes appears on a professional use of the word appears to have been in a massive scale, such as a� er the recent earthquake in Paki- well-known National Opinion Research Center (NORC) stan, but that at other times, such as a� er the 1985 Mexico study of the 1952 Arkansas tornado. City earthquake, looting is an infrequent problem. This modern usage probably developed because the Furthermore, from the 1970s to the present day there U.S. military, which initially sponsored social science have been occasional large-scale community crises a� er studies of disasters in the early 1950s, was concerned that, which researchers studied mass looting. One was the 1977 in the face of atomic bombing, America would socially New York City blackout during which selective neigh- disintegrate and people would engage in antisocial be- borhoods experienced massive looting illustrating the havior. This ignored the fi ndings of the strategic bombing distinctive confl ict situation pa� ern found in the 1960s. surveys of wartime Germany and Japan, as well as of Brit- However, before “obvious” implications are drawn, one ish studies of their civilian populations, which showed should note that similar blackouts in 1968 and in 2003 did that looting was not a serious problem a� er massive air not generate mass looting. bombings. Crucial to any discussion of looting is what happened Although no formal defi nition of looting was ever in St. Croix in the U.S. Virgin Islands when that city advanced by the earliest researchers, the NORC studies, was hit by Hurricane Hugo in 1985. A� er that event, the fi eld work by Harry Moore, and research supported by University of Delaware’s Disaster Research Center under- the National Academy of Sciences did look at looting phe- took three diff erent fi eld studies, including a systematic nomena, generally viewed informally as the illegal taking quantitative survey of all businesses in the major shop- of property. The conceptual problem of studying looting ping centers. The looting in St. Croix was massive. Not has been compounded by the fact that “looting” is not a only were all consumer goods in sight taken, but there criminal category in American penal codes, except in a was even stripping of electrical and wall fi xtures and of handful of states that have legally formalized the term carpets. The largest mall (with about 150 shops) and two relatively recently. others were heavily hit, with less than 10% of the busi- A consistent observation of the early studies was that nesses reporting they were not totally looted. instances of looting in the disasters examined (few of The looting was initiated by pre-impact organized which occurred in metropolitan areas) were nonexistent gangs of delinquent youths who fi rst targeted stores with or numerically very rare. This contrasted with a parallel large quantities of consumer goods. A second stage oc- observation that stories about looting were widespread curred when other participants with noncriminal life- in mass media accounts and among aff ected popula- styles began looting other kinds of stores (e.g., hardware tions (58% reported hearing such stories and 6% thought stores). Finally, an even larger number of people joined, they had been looted in the Arkansas disaster—a fi nding targeting stores with basic necessities (e.g., food super- repeated over and over again in other studies). markets) and generally not looting items taken by the fi rst In the 1960s, the many civil disturbances in large two categories. Overall, the looting pa� ern was what ear- American cities were studied by disaster researchers. lier researchers had found in civil disturbances. However, While to this day there is no agreement that riots should contrary to widespread rumors, there was not a single be conceptualized as confl ict or willful disasters, the authenticated case of the looting of private residences, researchers found that looting was very pervasive in the schools, hotels, the one industrial complex with valuable riots studied and that the pa� ern of the looting behavior equipment, or even resort restaurants. The looters used signifi cantly diff ered. In natural disasters looting was no physical force and, at worst, made only unfulfi lled very rare, covertly undertaken in opportunistic se� ings, verbal threats. done by isolated individuals or very small groups, and A possible explanation for this atypical occasion of socially condemned. In contrast, looting in the riots was mass looting was that it involved a major catastrophe frequent, overtly undertaken, aimed at specifi c targets, rather than a lesser disaster—with a concentration of participated in by very large numbers of individuals o� en disadvantaged persons exposed to everyday perceptions in social networks, and was socially supported. of major diff erences in lifestyles; a subculture tolerant of Semi-systematic studies of looting that continued into everyday minor stealing along with everyday organized the 1970s in the United States did not challenge the over- 2 Natural Hazards Observer • March 2007 youth gangs engaged in serious crime, such as drug pa� ern of mass looting, as well as the social conditions dealing; and a local police force widely seen as corrupt generating it, were the same in both cases. and ineffi cient (early in the event, offi cers themselves had To conclude, looting of any kind is rare in certain openly engaged in looting—not the usual pa� ern in civil kinds of disasters in certain types of societies. The pa� ern disturbances). of looting in natural disasters is diff erent from what oc- A case can be made that what happened in New Or- curs in civil disturbances. There are occasional atypical leans a� er Hurricane Katrina repeated, on a smaller scale, instances of mass lootings that only emerge if a complex what had happened in St. Croix. The New Orleans event set of prior social conditions exist. was smaller because in St. Croix a majority of the popula- tion probably participated in the looting, the looting did E.L. Quarantelli, [email protected] not last as long in New Orleans, and percentage-wise, Disaster Research Center, University of Delaware far more stores were looted in St. Croix. But the overall The Myth of a Disaster Myth: Potential Looting Should Be Part of Disaster Plans being inescapable. Newspapers, the Internet, and espe- urricane Katrina was an unprecedented disaster that H cially 24-hour cable news networks reported widespread will have long-lasting eff ects on the people and the city of looting beginning shortly a� er Katrina’s landfall. In a New Orleans. There are valuable lessons to be learned by study of the emergent behavior that followed the storm, emergency personnel, offi cials, and researchers that can researchers acknowledge that antisocial behavior occurred aid planning for future disasters, whether natural or in New Orleans. However, they take care to characterize human-induced. Because of Katrina’s unique place in Katrina and its a� ermath not as a “natural disaster,” but American disaster history, it is the main focus of the fol- as a“catastrophe”—an overwhelmingly devastating event, lowing discussion of the looting controversy.