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Severe Accidents in the Energy Sector First Edition

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Severe Accidents in the Energy Sector First Edition <o 00 CH9900025 PSI Bericht Nr. 98-16 m PAUL SCHERRER INSTITUT November 1998 CO ISSN 1019-0643 o. Project GaBE: Comprehensive Assessment of Energy Systems Severe Accidents in the Energy Sector First edition Hirschberg S., Spiekerman G. and Dones R. Paul Scherrer Institut CH - 5232 Villigen PSI Telefon 056 310 21 11 Telefax 056 310 21 99 0 PAUL SCHERRER INSTITUT November 1998 Project GaBE: Comprehensive Assessment of Energy Systems Severe Accidents in the Energy Sector First edition Hirschberg S., Spiekerman G. and Dones R. Paul Scherrer Institut CH-5232 Villigen PSI Telefon 056/310 21 11 Telefax 056/310 2199 Comprehensive Assessment of Energy Systems Severe Accidents in the Energy Sector First edition Hirschberg S., Spiekerman G. and Dones R. This report was commissioned by the Swiss Federal Office of Energy November 1998 -1 - Table of Contents List of Tables vii List of Figures xi Abstract xvii Acknowledgements xxi 1. INTRODUCTION 1 1.1 Context of the Study 1 1.2 Severe Accidents Issue 1 1.3 Potential Users of Severe Accident Information 2 1.4 Report Organisation 4 1.5 Dissemination of Project Results 5 1.6 References 5 2. OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE OF WORK 9 2.1 Project Objectives 9 2.2 Scope of Work 9 2.3 References 13 3. GENERAL ANALYSIS APPROACH AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 15 3.1 Background 15 3.2 User-dependent Restrictions 15 3.3 Implementation 16 3.4 Some Methodological Issues 18 3.5 Overall Analysis Strategy 19 3.6 References 20 4. INFORMATION SOURCES 21 4.1 Introduction 21 4.2 Overview 21 4.3 Review of Selected Databases and Sources 22 4.3.1 Databases and some additional sources used in ENS AD 22 4.3.1.1 The OFDA disaster history database 22 4.3.1.2 The Fatal Hazardous Materials Accidents Database 23 4.3.1.3 The Major Hazards Incidence Data Service (MHIDAS) 24 4.3.1.4 The industrial safety database FACTS 25 4.3.1.5 The WOAD Offshore Database 28 4.3.1.6 The Major Accident Reporting System 29 4.3.1.7 The accident handbook "Materialien 5/83 " 30 4.3.1.8 The "SIGMA" publication of the Schweizer Ruck (reinsurance) company 31 4.3.1.9 Encyclopaedia Britannica 31 -11 - 4.3.1.10 The ICOLD catalogues of dam disasters 31 4.3.1.11 The "Catalog of Dam Disasters, Failures and Accidents " 32 4.3.1.12 Marsh & McLennan Study on Gas and Electricity Utilities 32 4.3.2 Examples of some other databases not used in ENSAD 32 4.3.2.1 The Casualties and Demolition Database 32 4.3.2.2 Minerals Management Service Accident Database 33 4.3.2.3 Acute Hazardous Events Database 33 4.3.2.4 SONATA 34 4.3.2.5 The VARO database 35 4.3.3 Additional potential sources of severe-accident related information 36 4.3.3.1 OSH-ROM 36 4.3.3.2 HSELINE 36 4.3.3.3 NIOSHTIC 37 4.3.3.4 CISDOC 37 4.3.3.5 The ETDE Energy Database 37 4.4 Summary 37 4.5 References 39 5. STRUCTURE AND CONTENT OF ENSAD 41 5.1 Actual versus Reported Accidents 41 5.2 Severe Accident Definitions 41 5.3 Data Presentation in ENSAD 43 5.3.1 Identification number 43 5.3.2 Timing information and accident site specification 46 5.3.3 Technological characteristics of the accident 48 5.3.3.1 Energy production 48 5.3.3.2 Coal 48 5.3.3.3 Oil 48 5.3.3.4 Gas 48 5.3.3.5 Nuclear 48 5.3.3.6 Hydro 48 5.3.3.7 Activity data 48 5.3.3.8 Transport mode information 49 5.3.3.9 Information on the damaged facility 49 5.3.3.10 Information on general causes 49 5.3.3.11 Information on specific causes 49 5.3.3.12 Chemicals involved 53 5.3.4 Accident analysis 53 5.3.5 Damages 57 5.4 Some Facts about ENSAD 57 5.4.1 Overall statistical information of ENSAD 57 5.4.2 Source composition of energy-related accidents in ENSAD 59 5.4.3 Source composition of non-energy-related accidents in ENSAD 60 5.4.4 Distribution of energy-related accidents by years 61 5.4.5 Distribution of non-energy-related accidents by years 63 5.4.6 Distribution of severe energy-related accidents by country and continent 66 - Ill - 5.4.7 Distribution of severe non-energy-related accidents by country and continent 67 5.5 Comparison ENSAD with Other Databases 69 5.6 Summary 71 5.7 References 71 6. EVALUATIONS FOR SPECIFIC ENERGY CHAINS 73 6.1 Principles and Assumptions for Evaluation 73 6.1.1 Energy chain stages 73 6.1.2 LPG chain 74 6.1.3 Allocation of damages to energy and non-energy uses of energy carriers 74 6.1.4 Allocation of damages to countries exporting of importing energy carriers 76 6.1.5 References 78 6.2 Coal chain 80 6.2.1 Trends in severe accidents in the coal chain 80 6.2.2 Breakdown into coal chain stages 83 6.2.2.1 The "Exploration" and "Extraction" stages 83 6.2.2.2 The "Transport" stage 84 6.2.2.3 The "Conversion Plant" stage 85 6.2.2.4 The "Heating" & "Power Station" stage 85 6.2.2.5 "Waste storage and disposal" stages 86 6.2.3 Causes of coal accidents 87 6.2.4 Some highlights 89 6.2.5 References 89 6.3 Oil Chain 91 6.3.1 Crude oil products and trends in consumption 91 6.3.2 Breakdown of the oil chain into stages 93 6.3.3 Accidents in the oil chain 94 6.3.3.1 Severe oil accidents involving fatalities 94 6.3.3.2 Severe oil accidents involving injured 97 6.3.4 Fatal accidents in different oil chain stages 98 6.3.4.1 "Exploration" and "Extraction" stages 100 6.3.4.2 "Transport to Refinery" and "Regional Distribution" stages 103 6.3.4.3 "Refinery" stage 104 6.3.4.4 "Power plant" and "Heating" stages 105 6.3.5 Cost of oil accidents 105 6.3.5.1 "Exploration" and "Extraction" stages 106 6.3.5.2 "Transport to Refinery" stage 107 6.3.5.3 "Refinery" stage 109 6.3.5.4 "Regional Distribution" stage 110 6.3.5.5 "Heating/Power Plant" stage 110 6.3.6 Oil products involved in accidents 111 6.3.7 Oil spills 112 6.3.7.1 Oil spilled in "Exploration/Extraction" and "Transport to "Refinery" stages 112 - IV - 6.3.7.2 Claimed and awarded costs of oil spills 113 6.3.7.3 Oil spills and ecological impacts 115 6.3.8 Some highlights 118 6.3.9 References 119 6.4. Gas chain 120 6.4.1 Gas chain structure 120 6.4.2 World-wide consumption and trends for combustible gases 122 6.4.3 Non-energy uses of various gases 125 6.4.4 Accidents, fatalities and injured in the gas chain 125 6.4.4.1 Severe natural gas and LPG accidents involving fatalities 125 6.4.4.2 Severe natural gas and LPG accidents involving injured 127 6.4.4.3 Severe natural gas and LPG accidents involving evacuations 128 6.4.5 Breakdown into natural gas and LPG chain stages 130 6.4.5.1 Natural gas chain 130 6.4.5.2 LPG chain 132 6.4.6 Country-specific distribution of severe natural gas and LPG accidents 134 6.4.7 Some highlights 136 6.4.8 References 136 6.5 Nuclear Chain 137 6.5.1 Trends in nuclear-based electricity production 137 6.5.2 Historical nuclear accidents 137 6.5.3 Consequences and external costs of severe nuclear reactor accidents 143 6.5.3.1 The concept of externalities and its implications 143 6.5.3.2 External Costs and Electricity Generation 145 6.5.3.3 Studies of External Costs of Nuclear Reactor Accidents 149 6.5.3.4 State-of-the-art Methodology and its Limitations 160 6.5.4 Some highlights 175 6.5.5 References 176 6.6 Hydro Chain 183 6.6.1 Trends in the production of electricity by hydro power 183 6.6.2 Trends in the construction of hydro power dams by type 183 6.6.3 Dam accidents and dam failure rates 186 6.6.3.1 Risk of accidents during the construction of dams 186 6.6.3.2 Evaluation of dam failure rates on the basis of historical data 186 6.6.3.3 Earlier dam failure studies based on historical records 188 6.6.3.4 Boundaries in the evaluation of dam accident rates on the basis of historical data 189 6.6.3.5 Failure rates and years between failures for different dam types, time periods and times of failure 192 6.6.3.6 Summary of the study of dam failures in the Western World 215 6.6.4 Characteristics of and accidents at Swiss dams 216 6.6.4.1 Supervision 216 6.6.4.2 Dam types at Swiss reservoirs 217 6.6.4.3 Heights of Swiss dams 218 6.6.4.4 Capacities and influxes of Swiss reservoirs 219 6.6.4.5 Dam incidents and accidents in Switzerland 220 - V - 6.6.4.6 Applicability of historical data to the Swiss conditions 220 6.6.5 Frequency-consequence curves for dam accidents 223 6.6.5.1 Fatalities 223 6.6.5.2 Costs of dam failures 226 6.6.6 Are hydro power dams safer than dams with other purposes? 227 6.6.7 Some highlights 228 6.6.8 References 230 7.
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