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Norwegian Defence and Security Industries Association (Fsi) 1/2017 Kr 48,- INTERPRESS 1098-01 NORWEGIAN DEFENCE And 9 770806 615906 SECURITY IndUSTRIES AssOCIATION RETURUKE vv 1222 EXTENDED AWARENESS The GIRAFFE 8A is a recent extension to Saab’s world-class With our more than 60 years of innovative radar development line-up of surface radar systems. This 3D long-range air you can rely on Saab’s thinking edge to provide the capabilities surveillance radar system is designed for the highest level of needed to meet future threats and requirements. situational awareness and ballistic missile defence – in any climate. The GIRAFFE 8A provides exceptional range and www.saab.com multi-role capabilities, combined with operational flexibility that allows you to virtually look into the future. GIRAFFE 8A – a member of Saab’s world-class line-up of Surface Radar Solutions. CONTENTS CONTENTS: SUBMARINES FOR NORWAY 2 Germany to be partner for new Editor-in-Chief: submarines to Norway M.Sc. Bjørn Domaas Josefsen 4 Naval strike missiles for 10 billion NOK KNM MAUD 8 New logistics and support vessel delayed FSI HACKING WILL KILL 11 Norwegian defence and The recent information about Russian hacking into the security industries association US Democratic Party’s computer systems, interfering with BULLETIN BOARD FOR DEFENCE, their presidential election campaign, has sent shockwaves INDUSTRY AND TRADE 17 Updates Gripen lease agreement with Hungary into political parties and organizations all over the world. 18 Long range flight for Joint Strike Missile The obvious consequence is of course that if someone 20 Patria Nemo Container introduced can hack into the US Democratic Party´s computers, it is 21 UMS SKELDAR for Indonesia probably possible to hack into most computer systems in COAST GUARD VESSELS use by political parties or organizations around the world. 24 Norway to buy three new coast guard ships This has of course created a great deal of concern MINE HUNTING among politicians and leaders, because this might directly 26 Unmanned mine hunting at sea in preparation interfere in the political work of elected leaders and CBRN representatives. 28 In-mission decontamination A foreign agent’s interference in any country´s M113 democratic processes is of course a severe reason for 29 The army gets new armoured concern, but concern about hacking into computer systems transport vehicles should run deeper. DANISH DEFENCE INDUSTRY Today a vast number of computer systems runs and 30 “Be patient and go local” controls crucial infrastructure in every country in the GROUND BASED AIR DEFENCE world. If it is possible for unauthorized persons to get 32 Army to receive mobile ground based access into computers interfering with political processes, air defence system it is possible to break into and interfere with computer systems operating vital infrastructures, like transport systems, telecom and communication systems, hospital Coverphoto: and healthcare, water and power supply and in worst The Norwegian army will purchase ground based air defence systems from Kongsberg. case, police and defence systems. The photo displays test firing with AMRAAM We must recognize that the knowledge of how to missiles in Vidsel test range in northern Sweden. Photo: Torbjørn Kjosvold/FMS break into our computer systems is out there. So far, we have every reason to believe that this knowledge is concentrated within government agencies in some countries. And so far, the use of this knowledge has been focused on political processes, technology and business sensitive information etc. But we are not in control of this knowledge, and this knowledge can easily be spread to people and groups that have a far more threatening agenda than influencing political processes or gaining business sensitive information. At some point, we will see that terror groups will hit us through internet and computer technology. And inevitably, this will lead to people getting killed. MILITÆRTEKNIKK 1/2017 1 SUBMARINES FOR NORWAY GERMANY TO BE PARTNER FOR NEW SUBMARINES TO NORWAY In early February this year the Norwegian Government The Norwegian Ministry of Defence has practised equal treatment de cided on Germany as strategic partner for new submarines. of the suppliers and their nations. The The partnership is based on a German-Norwegian common same amount of time and effort has been purchase and lifetime management agreement on identical, spent towards France and Germany, and new submarines. the activities towards both have been balanced. It has been clearly communicat- ed on all levels that it is the totality of the he decision involves a broad capabilities and are of great significance offers that will be the determining factor. and long-term Navy-to-Navy co- for our ability to protect Norway’s mari- Both France and Germany offer excellent Toperation encompassing sub- time interests. It is important that we submarines that meet Norwegian needs, marines and other naval capabilities. The have found a strategic partner that we can and both nations have been given good cooperation will include the purchase build a broad and long lasting cooperation opportunities to come up with a total offer of identical submarines and cooperation with. This lays a good foundation for the on new submarines and cooperation. on training, exercises, spare parts, main- long-term relations we need to maintain a Norway will now enter into final tenance and lifetime management of the credible submarine capability in the future. negotiations with German authorities. new submarines. The submarines will be Submarine cooperation with Germany When a government-to-government agree- based on the 212-design already in service will ensure that Norway gets the sub- ment is in place, a German-Norwegian in Germany and Italy. The cooperation also marines we require, and at the same time negotiation towards the German sub- includes cooperation between Norwegian contributing to Smart defence and more marine supplier thyssenkrupp Marine and German industry. efficient defence materiel cooperation in Systems (tkMS) will commence. tkMS – Submarines are amongst the NATO, says the Minister of Defence Ine is the largest producer of conventional Norwegian Armed Forces’ most important Eriksen Søreide. submarines in Western Europe. The 2 MILITÆRTEKNIKK 1/2017 SUBMARINES FOR NORWAY shipyard has extensive experience with building advanced submarines and a large DCNS DISAPPOINTED production capability. The plan is to sign a common In a press release, DCNS states that the company takes contract for new submarines in 2019. This note of the choice of Norway to interrupt the compe- will enable delivery of new sub marines from the mid-2020’s to 2030. This time- titive process before its conclusion in order to choose line ensures a continuous Norwegian an alternative solution in the framework of a joint inter- sub marine capability as the Ula-class sub- governmental procurement with another European country. marines reach their end of life and enter the decommissioning stage. e regret this sovereign decision French Navy as well as its Norwegian – The submarines Norway and Weven if we respect it. We remain and French industrial partners. They Germany will procure, ensure a sub- convinced that our offer was superior, in accompanied and supported the Group marine service for the future. Norway has particular in the anti-submarine warfare to build up this solid and top-level an evolutionary approach to new sub- area, crucial for operations and patrols in technological and industrial offer which marines, and will base the procurement the High North. meets the Royal Norwegian Navy’s on an existing submarine design. This way We remain at Norway’s disposal ambitions. we avoid an extensive development project to re-engage the discussion, especially DCNS’ future conventional with the risks and costs this would involve. if the cooperation planned with the submarine programmes will benefit from In addition, together with Germany, we German Government would not reach excellent work and the Scorpene teams’ will get a larger scale in the production, an agreement. mobilization to precisely meet the Royal says the Minister of Defence. DCNS thanks the departments Norwegian Navy’s requirements, with Independent of this decision, the of the Defence Minister and the very ambitious target costs. work to establish further cooperation with other nations continue in order to achieve even greater synergies and eco nomies of scale. Norway has for several years worked closely towards the Netherlands and Poland to create a broad submarine co- LITHIUM IRON BATTERIES operation. This work will continue. AS AN ALTERNATIVE A German Type 212 submarine. Norway and Thyssenkrupp Marine Systems offers Lithium Iron Germany have agreed to sign a common contract for six identical submarines based on the Type batteries for the new Norwegian submarines, as an 212 design. Norway will purchase four of the sub­ optional alternative to traditional lead acid batteries. marines, and Germany two. Photo: tkMS he lithium iron phosphate (LiFe- discharged more that 80%; in fact, most TPO4) battery, also called LFP lead acid batteries are recommended not battery is a type of lithium-ion battery. to exceed 50% depth of discharge. LFP batteries have somewhat lower But despite all benefits of energy density (the amount of energy Lithium ion batteries compared to lead stored per unit volume or mass) than acid batteries, the lead acid batteries are the more common lithium cobalt oxide significantly more safe. We have all read (LiCoO2) battery found in consumer the stories of smart phones with lithium electronics. But compared to other Ion batteries catching fire onairplanes. Lithium-ion batteries, the LFP battery A similar battery fire in a several are inherently safer, and this if of course hundred kilos battery package on board a crucial characteristic for a battery a submerged submarine, would of planned for use in a submarine. course be a total disaster. This is why Compared to a traditional lead all submarines today are equipped with acid battery a lithium ion battery offers traditional lead acid batteries.
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