Alternative Naval Force Structure

A compendium by CIMSEC

Articles By Steve Wills · Javier Gonzalez · Tom Meyer · Bob Hein · Eric Beaty

Chuck Hill · Jan Musil · Wayne P. Hughes Jr.

Edited By

Dmitry Filipoff · David Van Dyk · John Stryker

1 Contents

Preface ...... 3

The Perils of Alternative Force Structure ...... 4 By Steve Wills

Unmanned­Centric Force Structure ...... 8 By Javier Gonzalez

Proposing A Modern High Speed Transport – The Long Range Patrol Vessel ...... 11 By Tom Meyer

No Time To Spare: Drawing on History to Inspire Capability Innovation in Today’s Navy ...... 15 By Bob Hein

Enhancing Existing Force Structure by Optimizing Maritime Service Specialization ...... 18 By Eric Beaty

Augment Naval Force Structure By Upgunning The Coast Guard ...... 21 By Chuck Hill

A Fleet Plan for 2045: The Navy the U.S. Ought to be Building ..... 25 By Jan Musil

Closing Remarks on Changing Naval Force Structure ...... 31 By Wayne P. Hughes Jr.

CIMSEC 22 www.cimsec.org Preface By Dmitry Filipoff

From October 3 to October 7, 2016, CIMSEC ran a topic week where contributors proposed alternative naval force structures to spur thinking on how the threat environment is evolving, what opportunities for enhancing capability can be seized, and how navies should adapt accordingly. Contributors had the option to write about any nation’s navy across a variety of political contexts, budgetary environments, and time frames.

Relevant questions include asking what is the right mix of platforms for a next­generation fleet, how should those platforms be employed together, and why will their capabilities endure? All of these decisions reflect a budgetary context that involves competing demands and where strategic imperatives are reflected in the warships a nation builds. These decisions guide the evolution of navies.

In a modern age defined by rapid change and proliferation, we must ask whether choices made decades ago about the structure of fleets remain credible in today’s environment. Navies will be especially challenged to remain relevant in such an unpredictable era. A system where an average of ten years of development precedes the construction of a lead vessel, where ships are expected to serve for decades, and where classes of vessels are expected to serve through most of a century is more challenged than ever before.

Dmitry Filipoff is CIMSEC’s Director of Online Content. Contact him at [email protected].

About Us

The Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC) is a 501(c)3 non­partisan think tank incorporated as a non­profit in the state of Maryland. CIMSEC was formed in 2012, and as of 2015 has members and chapters in more than 30 countries. CIMSEC does not take organizational positions, and encourages a diversity of views in the belief that a broad range of perspectives strengthens our understanding of the challenges and opportunities in the maritime domain.

If you are interested in forwarding the discussion on safeguarding prosperity on the sea, consider becoming more involved in our organization at www.cimsec.org.

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COVER PHOTO: The guided­missile cruiser USS Gettysburg fires a Harpoon anti­ship missile at the ex­ USNS Saturn during a sinking exercise October 27, 2010. (Navy Visual News Service/Photo by Seaman Apprentice Leonard Adams)

CIMSEC 33 www.cimsec.org The Perils of Alternative Force Structure By Steve Wills

Navies have historically sought alternative comparison to both the Federal fleet’s force structures in response to changes in current force structure and other their nation’s grand strategy, rising costs of experimental craft. The success of Ericsson’s maintaining existing force structure, craft against the Virginia spawned over 60 advances in technology, and combinations of other low freeboard armored vessels with these conditions. While initially appealing in one, two, and even three turrets. Despite terms of meeting new strategic needs, saving several losses, including that of the money, and gaining offensive and defensive namesake ship, to weather conditions, and superiority over an opponent, such changes one (USS Tecumseh) to a torpedo (mine) hit, are fraught with danger if undertaken too the monitor type ships had a remarkable quickly, are too radical in tone, or do not record of combat success in coastal and account for the possibility of further change. riverine environments during the Civil War. Some are built “from the bottom up” on ideal tactical combat conditions, but do not Unfortunately, the return of peace and the support wider strategic needs. Even the best need to maintain overseas naval squadrons alternative force structure that meets to protect U.S. economic interests spelled an strategic needs, is more affordable than end to the dominance of the monitor in U.S. previous capabilities, and outguns the enemy naval force structure. One conducted a high­ could be subject to obsolescence before most profile overseas visit to Europe while a of its units are launched. These case studies second managed to sail around Cape Horn in alternative force structure suggest efforts only to be immediately decommissioned are often less than successful in application. upon arrival in San Francisco. Monitor­type ships had poor seakeeping capabilities The American Civil War Ironclads outside coastal waters and did not carry enough coal for extended operations. The One of the most familiar alternative force U.S. had not developed the high­freeboard structures was that of the United States Navy sail and steam warships that other powers in response to the revolutions in steam had constructed, and in any case U.S. power, armor, and rifled cannon in the late strategic interests had changed to where 1850s. The impending appearance of the monitors were no longer necessary rebel warship CSS Virginia (the former components of naval force structure. Nearly steam frigate USS Merrimac) during the all were decommissioned and scrapped or American Civil War triggered a crash course laid up in long­term reserve by 1874. in ironclad warship experimentation in the Federal Navy. When Virginia did appear, the The “Jeune Ecole” (Young School) only one of these experiments ready for Torpedo Craft and Commerce Raiders battle was Swedish engineer John Ericsson’s USS Monitor, a revolutionary craft in The “Jeune Ecole” (Young School) of French

CIMSEC 4 www.cimsec.org naval strategy was the brainchild of Vice raiding once radio communications reported Admiral Hyacinthe­Laurent­Theophile Aube their positions. Raiders disguised as and developed in the mid to late 19th century merchant ships persisted into the Second in response to the growing battleship fleet of World War, but submarines that could France’s primary adversary, Great Britain. submerge and operate undetected became Rather than build a competing battlefleet, much more effective commerce raiders. French strategists derived an alternative force structure designed to offset British The Jeune Ecole was also in effect a tactical battleship superiority and attack a perceived concept elevated to the rank of strategy. weakness in Britain’s global maritime trade While torpedo attacks might sink British network. French designers planned for battleships attacking French coastal waters masses of small, torpedo­armed craft to and commerce raiders might weaken British launch large salvos of underwater weapons commerce, how did the force structure at the exposed, unarmored lower sides of promote French strategic goals? How would British battleships. Torpedo craft were much these formations protect France’s own far­ cheaper and easier to build in numbers as flung possessions; a colonial amalgamate opposed to battleships. They also had a that was second in size only to that of Great successful combat record with spar­mounted Britain’s? How would lightly armed and weapons in the American Civil War, and armored commerce raiders and generally later successes in the Russo­Turkish War, unseaworthy torpedo boats carry the fight to South American conflicts, and in the Russo­ British shores if needed? The Jeune Ecole Japanese War. did not answer these questions of strategic employment of French naval forces. Commerce raiding conducted by fast cruisers, as conduced by rebel naval forces France also reached a political settlement during the American Civil War, was also with Great Britain in the early 20th century seen as an asymmetric tool for combating and the French fleet of raiding cruisers and global maritime powers with vulnerable torpedo boats was left without an enemy. trade routes. Defending naval forces could France would likely have benefited from a not be everywhere and took time to assemble more balanced fleet in the First World War in areas threatened by a surface raider. and struggled to catch up in the dreadnought building race that commenced shortly after Unfortunately, the march of technological its “Entente Cordiale” agreement with Great advance that supported the tenets of the Britain. Jeune Ecole also served to undermine them. Nations whose battleships were threatened Jackie Fisher’s Fleet by torpedo boats developed the larger and more capable torpedo boat destroyer to Great Britain experimented with its own escort their battleships, destroy enemy alternative fleet force structure at the outset torpedo boats, and launch their own torpedo of the 20th century. This was the “fleet that attacks against opposing forces. Advances in Jack built;” the pre­World War 1 fleet of battleship gunnery in the first decade of the battlecruisers, large destroyers, submarines, 20th century allowed capital ships to open and other revolutionary warships that fire at ranges greater than that of the sprang from the fertile mind of British torpedo, making daylight attacks suicidal for Admiral Sir John Fisher. The fiery Fisher, torpedo craft. who in U.S. service might have resembled a combination of Admirals Hyman G. Rickover Surface commerce raiding also ran up and Arthur Cebrowski, was selected to be against new technologies that made it largely First Sea Lord (British equivalent of the U.S. ineffective. First, undersea communication Chief of Naval Operations) in 1904 with a cables and later radio allowed for long­range mandate to cut costs and increase combat communication between naval leaders at capability. Fisher’s answer to this problem home and their forces deployed around the partially involved a revolutionary new force world. Commerce raiders that had to stop to structure of hybrid ships that combined take on coal and provisions would have their existing classes in order to meet British locations reported much more rapidly than strategic needs while lowering naval in past centuries, allowing naval forces to estimates. The battlecruiser that combined concentrate and destroy them. Radio the firepower of a battleship with the speed intercepts also allowed pursuing forces to and range of armored cruiser would speed to track surface raiders. British naval forces threatened areas of the globe and destroy quickly identified and eliminated German slower, less well­armed enemies at long cruiser formations engaged in commerce range. Defense of the United Kingdom itself

CIMSEC 55 www.cimsec.org would be left to torpedo­armed large due to the costs of the unpopular Boer War destroyers and submarines. Fisher was a and a rising welfare state, Zumwalt also had strong advocate of new technologies and to contend with a U.S. naval budget limited supported naval aviation, steam powered­ by the expenditures for the Vietnam War and submarines, director firing of warship guns, for President Johnson’s social welfare and cleaner, more efficient oil fuel for programs. In response, Zumwalt conceived warships in place of coal. of a high/low concept for U.S. naval force structure where, in the words of retired naval Despite being innovative and well connected officer and Hoover Institute scholar Captain to British grand strategy, Fisher’s fleet was Paul Ryan, “A few high­performance ships largely obsolete in less than ten years. and many low­performance ones would Britain’s primary enemy changed from avoid wrecking the budget but not expose France and its Jeune Ecole­based trade the nation to risks represented by large warfare fleet to Germany that built a similar emerging fleets of small, fast, cruise missile­ fleet of battleships and battlecruisers for armed combatants.” operations in European waters. Apparently, Fisher never expected anyone to create a Zumwalt’s program included reduced mirror image of his battlecruiser fleet. funding for large, nuclear aircraft carriers Fisher’s big ships were instead assigned as and guided missile escorts, but greater heavy scouts for a British fleet expecting a support for a number of low­end vessels fleet battle in the close confines of the North including the Sea Control Ship, the patrol Sea. frigate (which later became the FFG 7 Perry class frigate), and the Pegasus class hydrofoil Technology also advanced beyond Fisher’s combatant. Zumwalt intended that the low­ initial concepts. The fast battleship, which end ships would operate in support of carried heavy guns, was well armored and general sea control in low threat areas rather had a decent turn of speed obviated the need than focus on the Navy’s power projection for the specialized battlecruisers. Fisher’s concept developed after the Second World steam­powered submarines were ahead of War. their time, but plagued by technological issues that limited their effectiveness. The Zumwalt’s program found favor with those German surface fleet only made rare in Congress who were happy to spend less on appearances and Germany’s merchant fleet the fleet, but met stiff opposition from within was largely interned or destroyed by the end the Navy’s own ranks, especially from carrier of the first year of war, leaving few targets aviators unhappy with reduced investment for Fisher’s submersibles. The Battle of in carriers. Strategy­minded individuals also Jutland, the one great naval encounter of the opposed the high/low force structure as they war, did not offer proof that Fisher’s force felt it failed to appreciate the Navy’s vital, structure was right or wrong. Instead, poor carrier­based strike capability as the real war tactical doctrine (not a lack of armor) caused winning capability fielded by the fleet. Naval significant casualties among Fisher’s historian Norman Friedman, for example, battlecruisers. The less than satisfactory labeled high/low as, “An un­Mahanian results left the Royal Navy with a haunting excursion,” and former 6th Fleet experience of frustration and regret that Commander Vice Admiral Gerald E. Miller would not be extirpated until the Second remarked that, “the Sea Control ship might World War. He was out of power and office deny the Soviets access to the Chesapeake by 1916 due to his repeated clashes with his Bay,” but that its effective use ended there. protégé Winston Churchill over the conduct of the Dardanelles campaign. Fisher’s Zumwalt’s low­end ships had faults of their revolution achieved much for the Royal Navy own that were difficult to overcome. In in its first five years, but was effectively over addition to the operational limitations of the after the first two years of the First World Sea Control Ship, the patrol frigate (Perry) War. class went from a $50 million dollar combatant to an average cost of $193 million Zumwalt’s High/Low Mix dollars by the end of the 51­ship program. The patrol hydrofoils were short­ranged and Finally, there is the 1970s era U.S. Navy were focused more toward offensive action attempt at an alternative force structure than the peacetime patrol and presence launched by revolutionary Chief of Naval operations the Navy required. Estimates on Operations Admiral Elmo Zumwalt Jr. Like their operating costs vary, but only 6 of the Fisher who faced reduced naval estimates intended 30 were completed with Zumwalt’s

CIMSEC 66 www.cimsec.org successors. Alternative force structures can also meet Changes in the strategic situation challenges from within their host navies. confronting the U.S. across the 1970s served Admiral Zumwalt’s high/low mix faced to bring the high/low alternative force considerable opposition from carrier structure to an end by 1980. Intelligence aviators within the U.S. Navy hierarchy. The gathered from taps on Soviet Navy low costs with Zumwalt’s low­end ships were underwater communications cables much greater than first estimated and the suggested the USSR was not planning a 3rd strategic situation changed as in past cases Battle of the Atlantic where Zumwalt’s force making the alternative force structure much would have been most useful. The less attractive. The U.S. LCS design, Communist superpower instead intended to conceived as a low­ end combatant in a keep its submarines close to the homeland to period of lower threats and fiscal austerity, protect its ballistic missile submarines and faces similar challenges in ensuring attack U.S. carriers threatening Soviet bases. relevance in a new period of Cold War­like Response to this plan called for more high­ peer/near peer competition. end warships such as large aircraft carriers and their escorts. While ultimately not Conclusion successful, Zumwalt’s efforts did lead to better armament for U.S. Navy surface ships Alternative force structures offer the promise such as the Harpoon missile. of harnessing new technology, overcoming a specific opponent platform, and cost savings Modern Parallels in defense procurement. Naval leaders should be wary in their adoption. Periods of These case studies suggest that alternative rapid technology as those that occurred in force structures are born from a desire to the second half of the 19th century and those achieve strategic advantage over an occurring in the present can rapidly opponent, take advantage of technological condemn today’s alternative force to an early advances, and save costs in the execution of reserve fleet or scrapyard. High costs strategic policy. Current proposals for incurred in the construction and fielding of a alternative force structures follow similar rapidly obsolete alternative force are not pathways. Concepts for arming a new easily recouped. Alternative forces inspired generation of warships with directed energy by tactical requirements may find weapons and railguns, thereby capturing the themselves at odds with current and future high ground of advanced technology, are strategies. Finally, even the best alternative similar to the U.S. Navy’s monitor program force crafted to meet current strategic of the Civil War. Like the monitors of the requirements can be reduced to irrelevance 1860s, current designs for railgun and with the stroke of a pen in a diplomatic directed energy weapons are in their infancy agreement. Historically, balanced fleets of but potentially very powerful. Initial versions mixed capabilities have fared better in naval will be expensive and likely to be rapidly battles and maintained relevance through outmoded by technological advance. evolving threat environments. Navies should consider all of these points before embarking Proposals for large fleets of smaller, more on the perilous quest for the perfect expendable warships that can be built at low alternative force structure. cost mirror the French Jeune Ecole. Those same proposals are also an attempt to build Steve Wills is a retired surface warfare a strategic plan from a tactical or operational officer and a PhD candidate in military concept. history at Ohio University. His focus areas are modern U.S. naval and military Hybrid warships that combine the reorganization efforts and British naval capabilities of multiple ships on a common strategy and policy from 1889­1941. hull, like the U.S. littoral combat ship (LCS) are reminiscent of John Fisher’s ­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­ battlecruisers. Fisher’s later entrants into the battlecruiser category later found gainful Featured Image: The USS Zumwalt (DDG 1000) is employment in the Second World War as underway for the first time conducting at­sea tests refitted fast capital ships or as aircraft and trials in the Atlantic Ocean Dec. 7, 2015. (U.S. carriers. The long­term success of the LCS Navy photo courtesy of General Dynamics Bath Iron may also depend on its ability to adapt to Works/Released) new missions.

CIMSEC 77 www.cimsec.org Unmanned­Centric Force Structure By Javier Gonzalez The U.S. Navy is currently working on a new clearly identify which options will provide Fleet Structure Assessment, the results of the best ability to achieve this “asymmetric which will eventually help inform the long­ upside.” Systems such as the vertical launch term force structure goals of the Navy’s 30­ system provide a certain degree of flexibility year shipbuilding plan. This ongoing analysis by allowing for the rapid fielding of any was generated due to the realization that weapons that fit inside a missile. In addition, some of the assumptions used to develop the the concepts of modularity (Littoral Combat current goal of 308 ships have changed Ship program), modular hulls, containers significantly since its proposal in 2014. The interfaces, flexible infrastructures, and Russian resurgence and China’s rapid electronic modular enclosures are other military buildup defied expectations, and a examples of the Navy’s explicit efforts to add review of the Navy’s force structure was flexibility and adaptability into the fleet. The absolutely warranted. The conundrum and upsides of adding flexibility are self­ implied assumption, with this or similar evident—by having options added early in future force structure analyses, is that the the design process, the Navy can quickly and Navy must have at least a vague affordably react to new geo­political understanding of an uncertain future. situations and adjust to technological However, there is a better way to build a innovations. However, adding optionality is superior and more capable fleet—by not an easy proposition, especially because continuing to build manned ships based on today’s capabilities fielding process values current and available capabilities while also optimization, affordability, and a discernable fully embracing optionality (aka flexibility return on investment over adaptability and and adaptability) in unmanned systems. flexibility. Additionally, and perhaps the better argument, is that a new, unmanned­centric Optimization is contrary to optionality, but it fleet can be more affordable while is a main factor in today’s ship design. For maintaining its relevance over the expected instance, space optimization is intuitive—the service life. better optimized a space, given today’s capabilities, the smaller the ship needs to be Optionality and, consequently, the more affordable it should be. However, this approach infers a A relevant fleet is one that is robust, flexible, level of certainty and inflexibility to change, and adaptable—one that embraces contrary to optionality. The reality is that optionality to anticipate uncertain and optimization is at times necessary on a changing requirements. The author Nassim manned warship. However, new unmanned Taleb describes optionality as “the property system designs can provide a canvas to shift of asymmetric upside with correspondingly this focus to one that values optionality and limited downside.” The implication here is to takes advantage of uncertainty. The

CIMSEC 88 www.cimsec.org suggestion is to make the long­term Additionaly, long­term shipbuilding is investment on the unmanned “bus,” not the inherently expensive and dependent on capabilities. These new unmanned buses current and mature capabilities. Trying to must be designed to maximize power build a ship with immature technologies can generation, cooling, and space availability. result in unnaceptable acquisition blunders. The design also needs a robust command For instance, the Navy’s next­generation and control system to enable the nuclear carrier, CVN­78 Gerard P. Ford, has employment of multiple unmanned systems resulted in massive cost overruns due in in a cooperative environment. great part to the risk incurred in trying to include new and immature technologies into Affordable Fleet the shipbuilding plan. An unmanned­centric fleet provides the flexibility to value building The affordability of the fleet is not simply a manned ships based on current and function of budget availability. In 2014, the available capabilities while also fully Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Jonathan embracing optionality in unmanned systems. Greenert, testified to Congress that the Navy needed a 450 ship fleet to meet the global An added benefit of having optionality demands by the Combatant Commanders. combined with unmanned systems is that it This 450 ship number is likely better allows for prospective capabilities to be more equipped to meet future Combatant rapidly prototyped while offering a robust Commanders’ needs than the current means for experimentation both for proposal of a 308 ship Navy. At a minimum, technology and future concept of operations a 450 ship Navy provides more options to development. Unmanned systems could fulfill future requirements. However, the function similarly to a smartphone and its current and expected future fiscal many applications. The benefit of this environment suggests that building more approach is that it provides an environment ships is not an option unless a radical change with stressors that will allow new technology occurs. Also, the enemy has a crucial vote on to fail early and facilitate rapid change, the affordability of the fleet. The fall of the evolution, and dramatically quicken the USRR can be traced back to the U.S. research and capabilities fielding cycles. The strategy, in the 1970s and 1980s, to impose next Fleet Structure Assessment should also great costs on the Soviets by making embrace optionality by finding the optimal investments to render their warfighting mix of manned and unmanned vessels that systems obsolete. This obsolescence created will yield an asymmetric upside. an incentive for the Soviets to make costly investments in an attempt to match the Unmanned­Centric technology introductions by the United States. This strategy’s success was achieved An unmanned­centric force structure will be in great part due to the apparent U.S. dramatically different than today’s Navy, and technological advantage over the Soviets. it will require a departure from the 450 ship manned Navy ideal or the current 308 ship Today, the United States finds itself in a goal. The right mix of manned versus similar predicament as the Soviets in the unmanned systems can be derived from a Cold War, where technology is leaping in concept of operations that promotes new and unexpected ways and China, in judicious force structure discussions. The particular, is fielding systems that make basis of this new concept is a fleet with more many U.S. systems obsolete. The rapid unmanned systems than manned systems fielding of “game changing” technology by where these platforms are fully integrated. China, such as the first quantum For instance, instead of having a Surface communications satellite or the DF­21D Action Group (SAG) comprised of three missile, results in a predictable reaction by manned ships, new SAGs could be the DoD to invest in more capable and comprised of a manned ship and at least two expensive advancements to counter their unmanned surface vehicles. Incorporating efforts. If the Soviets are any indication of vehicles like DARPA’s ASW Continuous Trail the dangers of this strategy, especially if the Unmanned Vessel or General Dynamics’ United States acknowledges that the Fleet­class unmanned surface vessel could technological edge over near competitors in add capabilities that will immediately the 20th century will no longer be assured, increase lethality and adaptability. In the then the United States needs to shift its amphibious realm, the Navy could leverage competitive model to one flexible enough to unmanned platforms as resupply rapidly and affordably adjust to unforeseen distribution systems for Marines on the challenges. beach. This could be of particular

CIMSEC 9 www.cimsec.org importance in a contested environment Conclusion while supporting multiple fronts in an archipelago­like scenario. Further in the The most important attributes for future future, instead of having eleven 100,000­ton force structures are relevance and aircraft carriers, a mix of eight traditional affordability. This goal can be achieved by carriers with eight to ten smaller (~40,000 pivoting from the traditional to place the ton) all­unmanned combat air vehicle emphasis on developing unmanned capable carriers will provide the flexibility and buses that can accommodate all current presence that all Combatant Commanders technologies and have the capacity to flex are desperately seeking. and adapt to future technologies. Optionality to ship­building and unmanned systems Presence is about having the right capability, integration can provide the flexibility and in the right place, at the right time. To adaptability the Navy requires to remain accomplish this the Navy will essentially relevant in an uncertain future. The result is need more assets. A plausible solution could a force structure that is more capable and be a force structure where the main conceptually more affordable. All great plans employment of unmanned systems will be start with the end in mind – the upcoming around unmanned­centric Surface Action Fleet Structure Assessment needs to Groups as the smallest force package to showcase what the end of the Navy’s 30­year fulfill theater needs. The current 308 ship vision looks like. The suggestion is an Navy plan is structured as follows: unmanned­centric, man­led fleet. CVN LSC SSC SSN SSGN SSBN Commander Javier Gonzalez is a Navy 11 88 52 48 0 12 Federal Executive Fellow at the John Hopkins University Applied Physics AWS CLF SUPT TOTAL Laboratory and a career Surface Warfare 34 29 34 308 Officer. These are his personal views and do not reflect those of John Hopkins University (CVN – Carrier, LSC – Large Surface or the Department of the Navy. Combatants, SSC – Small Surface Combatants, USV – Unmanned Surface ­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­ Vessel, SSN – Fast attack submarines, SSBN – Ballistics Submarines, AWS – Featured Image: Rear Adm. Mat Winter, then­chief of Amphibious Warfare Ships, CLF – Combat naval research, offers remarks during a christening Logistic Force, SUPT – Support vessels.) ceremony for Sea Hunter, an entirely new class of unmanned ocean­going vessel during a ceremony A future force structure could start with held in Portland, Oregon, April 7, 2016. The Defense trading large and small surface combatants Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in for a new fleet of Unmanned Vessels. The conjunction with the Office of Naval Research (ONR) affordability comes from the added presence is working to fully test the capabilities of the vessel afforded by the nature of an unmanned which is able to travel thousands of miles over the autonomous system and the need for fewer open seas for months at a time without a crew, and personnel to support their operations. The with a high degree of autonomy in operation. (U.S. added capability comes from the Navy photo by John F. Williams/Released) introduction of 19 capable Surface Action Groups comprised of a manned ship with two unmanned vessels as depicted below: CVN LSC SSC USV SSN SSBN 11 84 50 38 48 12 AWS CLF SUPT TOTAL 34 29 34 340 (CVN – Carrier, LSC – Large Surface Combatants, SSC – Small Surface Combatants, USV – Unmanned Surface Vessel, SSN – Fast attack submarines, SSBN – Ballistics Submarines, AWS – Amphibious Warfare Ships, CLF – Combat Logistic Force, SUPT – Support vessels.)

CIMSEC 10 www.cimsec.org Proposing A Modern High Speed Transport – The Long Range Patrol Vessel By Tom Meyer

The U.S. Navy achieved extraordinary Historical Connections success in the 20th century – playing key roles in winning WWII and the Cold War. During WWII and the Korean War, Crosley­ The U.S. Navy earned these class APDs based on the Rudderrow class of accomplishments with forces structured destroyer escorts were pressed into a variety around an exceptional fleet of of roles and performed missions including technologically superior ships and aircraft. amphibious assault, UDT operations and The U.S. Navy’s “ships of the line” during raids, ASW, long­range patrolling, and this era represented the height of our search and rescue– i.e. rescue of USS technological and industrial capabilities – Indianapolis survivors. and no expense was spared to create, construct, and operate this world­leading The ability to successfully complete these fleet. various missions resulted from the inherently flexible design of the APDs. To As the United States and the U.S. Navy move begin with, the designers of the Crosley class into the 21st century, the United States faces APD’s provided these ships with a strong the duel challenge of engaging in a “long organic armament, including one 5″/38 dual war” against Islamofacism and meeting the purpose gun mount, three twin 40 mm gun threat of emerging “peer competitors” in a mounts, six single 20 mm gun mounts, and period of economic and fiscal constraints. two depth charge tracks. The Crosley class Meeting these dichotomous challenges APD’s were equipped to carry and support 12 requires a fundamental rethink of the nature officers and 150 enlisted men. Furthermore, of naval forces and their roles. Is the U.S. the Crosley’s were equipped with 4 LCVPs to Navy moving from an era of exceptional convey troops and equipment ashore. “ships of the line” – including LHA’s & LPD’s, FFG’s, CG’s, DDG’s, SSN’s and CVN’s Finally, the Crosley APD’s could carry a – to one filled with USV’s, UAV’s, LCS’s, combination of the following material on CV’s, SSK’s and perhaps something new – board: Long Range Patrol Vessels (LRPV’s)? But what exactly is an LRPV? 6 x 1/4 ton trucks 2 x 1 ton trucks The LRPV represents the 21st century 4 x ammunition carts version of the WWII APD – High Speed 4 x pack howitzers Transports. To better understand the 21st 6,000 cubic feet ammunition century LRPV, let’s take a look at the history 3,500 cubic feet general cargo and capabilities of the 20th century APDs. 1,000 cubic feet gasoline

CIMSEC 11 www.cimsec.org The capabilities and flexibility of the APD’s support the program is based on a projected are the inspiration for a new line of vessels – need to support at least 4 regionally­focused the Long Range Patrol Vessels (LRPVs). LRPV SAGs plus their training and maintenance requirements. In addition to The LRPV Concept carrying a USMC COLT or U.S. Army equivalent formation, the LRPV SAGs could The modern LRPV would build upon and carry a composite unit tailored to suit patrol­ update the concept of High Speed Transport specific planned interactions with local for the 21st century. The LRPV would national military forces. combine new technologies, capabilities, and processes to create regionally­focused LRPV For example, the afloat forces for a LRPV surface action groups (SAGs) supporting SAG deployment to multiple countries over a U.S. national and U.S. Navy strategic goals 6­8 month period within the SOUTHCOM and objectives. AOR could consist of: The modern LRPV would operate as a 2 platoons of U.S. Army Infantry (plus their member of a two ship LRPV sag. The SAG Stryker vehicles) would leverage recent innovative work by the 2 platoons of U.S. Army Engineers (and their U.S. Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory heavy equipment) to design, create, and test a new Combat A contingent of U.S. Army Medical Landing Team organizational model – personnel COLT. An air contingent of 3­4 UH­60’s plus UAV’s drawn from U.S. Army Aviation The COLT organizational model creates a unique USMC amphibious landing team An anti­piracy patrol off of East Africa could consisting of three infantry platoons, one see the LRPV Squadron deploy with: weapons platoon, an enhanced scout section, and an enhanced command element. 2 U.S. Coast Guard LEDET detachments plus several container configured as The specific Concept of Operations (ConOps) detention facilities would be two LRPVs operating together 4 CB 90H or 25′ Response boat­small while jointly carrying one USMC COLT (or (Defender­Class) or 25′ Transportable Port U.S. Army equivalent) and their organic Security Boat (TPSB) or 23′ Over the horizon vehicles while conducting extended patrols (OTH) boat or 23′ USCG Short Range in specific geographic areas (i.e. South Prosecutor (SRP) (See Small Boat America, Africa or SE Asia). These patrols Capabilities in LRPV Characteristics section) would provide the opportunity for these 3­4 USCG HH­60 or HH­65 Dolphin LRPVs to operate in close, sustained helicopters plus several small UAVs partnerships with local maritime forces by conducting numerous extended joint In addition to carrying out these types of operations, exercises, and security long­duration, presence missions, the cooperation engagements. flexibility of the LRPV design would enable additional missions to be undertaken, To meet the challenges emerging in the 21st including: short term “summer cruises” to century, LRPV SAGs would focus on specific support training missions, rapid response to geographic regions including South America, humanitarian crisis, sanctions/blockade Africa, SE Asia, and the Middle East. enforcement, convoy escort, and search and Forward presence could be enhanced by rescue. conducting crew swaps in forward operating locations, including Guam, Japan, LRPVs would not be amphibious warfare Singapore, Diego Garcia, Bahrain, Naples, ships per se but are intended to sustain long­ Guantanamo Bay, and other locations yet to range, forward presence patrols supporting be identified. U.S. national interests. However, when necessary, LRPV SAGs could conduct Through the use of long­term forward counter­terrorism or counter­proliferation deployments, regionally­based crew­ raids at the direction of the NCA or could swapping, and the strong organic capabilities support an ESG by providing additional of the LRPVs, the specific numeric raiding or striking capabilities during a crisis requirements for the LRPV construction – thereby increasing the level of difficulty program could be limited to 30­34 confronting an adversary of the United individual ships to support regional LRPV States. By combining the right mix of squadrons. The number of ships required to technology, capabilities, organizational

CIMSEC 12 www.cimsec.org structures and sound processes, the LRPV 1×5” Gun would support key U.S. national interests 2x25MM Remote EO­controlled mounts and provide a visible expression to the 4­6 .50cal manned weapons – as concept of a “1000 ship navy” previously operationally required expressed by the U.S. Navy and the OSD. Missiles: Ship Characteristics 1 Mk 41 VLS system with 48 launch tubes (or What specific attributes and capabilities 2×24) which could include: would a LRPV have? Here are some key 24 Standard Mk 2/3 SAM’s characteristics: 6 Harpoons 6 VLA (Vertical Launch ASROC’s) Weight: 7,000­9,000 tons 48 ESSMs (12×4) Use of VLS enables the introduction of new Length: 450­500ft missiles over the life of the LRPV. Beam: 50­60ft ASW Torpedoes: 2×2 Mk 32 Mod 9 mounts Draft: 10­16ft Aircraft: Propulsion: CODAG (minimum 4 LM­2500s Landing Spots: Operation of 2 helicopters or 2 LM­6000s) plus 2 diesel engines – some simultaneously (4 would be a stretch goal) thought should be given to alternate Hangar Space: 4 medium helicopters (SH­ propulsion systems (i.e. Podded Electric 60’s specifically 2 SH­60R & 2 SH­60S). propulsion?) – commercial standards Ability to provide hangar space for 3 SH­60 perhaps? size helicopters plus 2 additional Fire Scouts would be a stretch goal Speed: Max 28 knots (stretch 32 knots) – cruise speed – 14­16 knots (stretch 18­20 Flex Deck: knots) Square Footage: 16,800 Sq Feet per ship Range: 10,000 NM – Stretch 12,000 at Weight Capacity: Reinforced to support up cruising speed to M1A2 tank (Up to 70 Tons) Suggested vehicle load across two LRPVs Combat Systems: Aegis SPY­1F(V), could include a reinforced Light Armored (proposed for export­version of LCS) or even Reconnaissance Platoon (or comparable U.S. the SPY­5 proposed for lighter warships; 2 Army Stryker unit): illuminators (1 fore & 1 aft); CEC­enabled; open architecture networks & C3I systems 8 LAV­25’s/M­1126 Strykers allow “plug & play” of new weapons and 2 LAV/R or M­1132, sensors. 2 LAV­C or M­1130, 2 LAV/M or M­1129 2 LAV(TOW Launcher) or 2 M­1134 Stryker ESM/ECM: SQS­32V or newer version Anti­Tank Guide Missile Vehicle 14 Humvees Sonar: Bow­mounted sonar standard; Towed 14 10 5­7 Ton FMTV’s including 2­3 Tankers Array – optional 3 155MM Towed Artillery Guns plus Movers (Stretch) Communications: High­bandwidth satellite 6 Additional 40’ Containers – Supplies & communications Training Simulators Crew: Notes on Flex Deck: 140­180 (190 is acceptable) Flight deck access would be ideal with either Additional berthing (permanently installed): ramp or elevator (Ramp is preferred due to 120 Marine (1/2 of USMC COLT insert link) simplicity) Additional crew considerations: SOF, Ability to load LCM or LCVP via 30 ton humanitarian personnel, noncombatant crane is required evacuation, search and rescue. Ro/Ro capability is required (via a ramp or a mexeflote style ramp at stern and ramp to Weapons port or starboard) – with 100 ton carrying capacity Guns: Flex deck must support the installation of

CIMSEC 13 www.cimsec.org habitability containers to support additional almost 10 years for a major troops or temporary medical facilities Telecommunications company in various Flex deck must provide electrical and roles. Home is Atlanta, GA. You can follow communication network interfaces across Tom on Twitter at @tkmeyer0524. entire flex deck floor space – both high­ speed direct connectivity and wireless ­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­ connection Featured Image: USS Crosley (APD­87) anchored off Small boat capabilities: Philadelphia Navy Yard, 30 October 1944. US Naval History and Heritage Command photo #NH 91584. 2 x LCM­6s – LCM would be able to carry 25 Courtesy of A.D. Baker III. tonnes (30 tonnes stretch goal) – this will enable carriage of LAVs or Strykers 2 x LCVPs or 2 x DOCKSTAVARVET AB CB90Hs – Carried in separate davits from LCM­6s Note: The LCVPs must be capable of carrying Uparmored Humvees, an example of a possible LCVP which could be used is the Royal Navy LCVP Mk5. The Mk5 is 15.5 meters long and 4.4 meters wide and capable of carrying a company of 30 fully equipped troops or vehicles such as: BV206, JCB410, ATV’s and towed artillery. The Mk5 can travel up to 25 knots and has a range of over 210 nautical miles. Note: LCM davits must be flexible enough to support LCVPs, RHIBs, CB 90Hs, CSSCs or USCG small craft. LCVP davits must be flexible enough to accommodate RIB’s, CH 90Hs, CSSCs or USCG small craft. 2 x RHIBs – Standard ship’s complement – separate from landing craft listed above. Additional capabilities: Excess fresh water production capacity Strong organic, on­board medical facilities Excess toilet and showering facilities to support combined baseline ship complement, USMC/U.S. Army/other additional complement plus additional personnel house in habability containers on flex deck Onboard synthetic training facilities for COLT team members including infantry & tankers (Perhaps 2×20 or 40 foot containers configured to provide simulation facilities on Flex Deck) With a lifelong interest in aviation, naval and all manner of military affairs, Tom Meyer graduated from Florida State University with a BA in Political Science & International Relations and an MS in Political Science. He spent over a decade with Top 3 US Airline working in Ops, Technology, the Low Cost Carrier unit and Employee Relations. Tom has now worked

CIMSEC 14 www.cimsec.org No Time To Spare: Drawing on History to Inspire Capability Innovation in Today’s Navy By Bob Hein

Imagine a day sometime in the near future shoot future arrows at him and his where tensions between the United States compatriots. and Russia are high and ships are at sea, ready to strike each other at a moment’s Ten years ago, this scenario would have been notice if given the word. As his ship glides to a work of pure fiction, unimaginable to most the surface of the ocean, the enemy national security experts and military submarine commander raises his periscope leaders. But today, the rapid spread of and with it the electronic surveillance technology, the rise of near peer antennae. It picks up multiple signals of U.S. competitors, and the proliferation of aircraft in the immediate vicinity. But the advanced weapons make this scenario more commander is not worried. These aircraft, plausible than ever. If the Navy is to counter their radar, and their weapons are optimized the above scenario, it must start emphasizing for attacks against land targets; they won’t sea control while retaining power projection see his periscope, and even if they did, they capability. That change will require the Navy wouldn’t have the weapons to do much about to accelerate its approach to this mission set, it. As long as he can avoid U.S. ships and both in strategic terms of shifting mental submarines, which are spread out and in focus and in more tactical terms of rapid short supply, he knows he and his comrades repurposing of current platforms and have the upper hand in gaining control of the payloads. While the Navy works to sea. As he leaves the surface, he works determine its future force structure, it must unimpeded toward his target, the American innovate beyond the traditional roles that aircraft carrier. ships and aircraft currently play. Designing and building new naval platforms takes time At the same time, hundreds of miles away, a we don’t have, and there is still abundant U.S. submarine commander is moving opportunity to make the most of existing toward the enemy’s surface action group. He force structure. Fortunately for the Navy, knows if he can get close enough and sink histories of previous wars are a good guide these ships, he can help ensure control of the for future action. World War II is an sea for the rest of the force. Suddenly, the excellent model in particular, but the Navy sound of weapons dropped from enemy must first recognize the historical context of helicopters fills the ship. He runs deep and its current predicament. aggressively, maneuvering to negate the threat. But in doing so, he loses contact with Bringing the Navy Back to the Sea the group. And without an ability to shoot the helicopter, he misses an opportunity to Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote extensively on take down an archer, who will now be able to how nations throughout history have used

CIMSEC 15 www.cimsec.org control of the seas to spread national power not have its current luxury of safely by ensuring freedom of trade and access. traversing the world’s oceans and projecting Over the course of the last century, the power. The rise of foreign capability could Navy’s primary focus of force application has threaten carrier strike groups when they shifted from sea control to power projection. leave their harbors. The Navy must expand its focus from the last 25 years of projecting Arguably, the battle for control of the seas power, and strengthen its historic mission of culminated in WWII, when massive navy­ sea control. on­navy engagements raged in enormous clashes such as the Battles of the Atlantic, Make the Old New Again Midway, and Leyte Gulf. Navy strike groups were challenged by Axis Powers throughout When trying to convert this shift in focus to the world’s oceans. the platforms that will execute sea control, it is time to heed the old dictum, “If you want a Following WWII, the U.S. had a massive new idea, read an old book.” Just as the Navy navy and no real threat to its control of the had to do in WWII, it is time to focus on oceans. The Navy and the nation were now repurposing platforms it already has rather unsure of the Navy’s role in this new world. than relying on new platforms. The Navy received assistance from a 27­year­ old theorist, Samuel Huntington. Writing in Looking back to its height of sea control 1954, he had a clear vision for how the Navy capability, the Battle of Midway in WWII, should evolve in the second half of the 20th carrier air wings (at the time known as century: “Its purpose is not to acquire carrier air groups) consisted of about 72 command of the sea, but rather to utilize its aircraft, one squadron each of dive bombers, command of the sea to achieve supremacy of fighters, torpedo bombers, and scout planes the land.” The Navy began shifting its focus (which could also carry bombs). Compare to power projection, refining amphibious that with today’s air wing. While the number warfare techniques, developing a long range of aircraft is about the same, its composition land attack missile, and building generations has changed dramatically, with four of air wings capable of delivering ordnance fighter/attack squadrons, one electronic ashore. Even so, as the Cold War intensified attack squadron, one command and control and the Soviet Navy grew throughout the squadron, and two helicopter squadrons. 50’s and 60’s, this focus ashore was balanced The biggest difference is the shift in focus of by the continuing requirement of the air wing from fighting other navies for maintaining control afloat. control of the seas to a focus on delivering power ashore. Following the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Navy, the U.S. At over 40 years old, the USS Nimitz is the Navy’s focus on sea control diminished and oldest carrier in the U.S. inventory. The the pendulum swung squarely over to power reason she has survived is due to upgrades to projection. Anti­surface missiles were her air wing. There is debate currently over removed from ships, Trident missile whether the Nimitz, and follow on carriers submarines were converted to fire are still valid in a world of anti­access and Tomahawks, and the carrier’s S­3 Viking area denial. This debate centers on the anti­submarine aircraft were stripped of Navy’s role in power projection but speaks much of their anti­submarine warfare gear little to its return to sea control. While the and were later retired. Major force structure carriers are still the best platform for investments were made in ships geared delivering power without the need for towards littoral power projection such as the foreign basing permissions, adding an anti­ LCS and Zumwalt­class destroyer. submarine and anti­surface role to its newest Generations of Sailors during the Cold War fighters is necessary. Similar to efforts by the were trained to achieve sea control – it was surface warfare community to modify the part of their DNA. When the Cold War SM­6 anti­air missile for strikes against ended, and with it the Soviet Navy, that DNA ships, the Navy should modify those ASW withered away. and ASUW weapons currently used by the MH­60R helicopter for use by its fighter­ As Bob Dylan tells us, once again, the times attack jets. Just as in WWII, not all aircraft they are a changin’. The world is returning to would be configured for surface or a period of great power competition, and subsurface missions, but providing that other nations’ desire to influence the world latent capability will certainly ensure enemy stage is forcing the Navy to rethink its focus. ships and subs will think twice when they see In the coming decades, the U.S. Navy may the radar signature of a U.S. fighter.

CIMSEC 16 www.cimsec.org Submarines are very effective at what they America (CV­66), on 6 May 1982. (W. M. Welch, do – sinking other submarines and attacking USN) surface ships – but many potential adversaries have fleets of helicopters designed to hunt them. Simply giving subs a basic anti­air warfare capability against these platforms would certainly give adversaries cause for concern. This system already exists in the German Navy. The Interactive Defense and Attack System for Submarines (IDAS) is currently being built for the German Type 212 submarine. With a 12­mile range, it will certainly make helicopters think twice as they drop their buoy search patterns. Submarine attacks against aircraft are not a new concept. In WWII, 120 Allied aircraft were shot down by German U­Boats. Military Sealift Command (MSC) is experiencing great success in expanding the role of its fleet, and has been a leader in creatively repurposing existing platforms. MSC has added intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and command and control capabilities to platforms such as the Expeditionary Fast Transport (formerly Joint High Speed Vessel) and the dry­ cargo/ammunition ships (T­AKE). Marine Forces Pacific has experimented with the T­ AKE extensively, using the ship for low­end operations, and even as a potential command and control platform. The MSC has shown there is a lot of opportunity in our current fleet. We just have to be creative. Conclusion As the challenges on the world’s oceans continue to rise, the challenge of sea control rises with them. With rapid repurposing of various platforms and payloads, the Navy can quickly adapt and overcome if and when required to fight and win this nation’s wars. By looking back at history, sometimes we can find the tools for the future. Captain Robert N. Hein is a career Surface Warfare Officer. He previously commanded the U.S.S Gettysburg (CG­64) and the U.S.S Nitze (DDG­94). You can follow him on Twitter @the_sailor_dog. The views and opinions expressed are his own and do not reflect those of the Navy or the Department of Defense. ­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­

Featured Image: A U.S. Navy Lockheed S­3A Viking aircraft (BuNo 159755) assigned to anti­submarine squadron VS­32Maulers on the aircraft carrier USS

CIMSEC 17 www.cimsec.org Enhancing Existing Force Structure by Optimizing Maritime Service Specialization By Eric Beaty

The factors which color our view of the world to task an interested party to advocate for have changed significantly since the end of them, and each of the maritime services has the Cold War. That overarching conflict missions they are most passionate about. polarized the world’s politics and drove the United States to build a naval force focused The naval force of the future would see a on blue­water combat against a peer Navy endorsement of the territorial patrol competitor, but the demise of the Soviet missions of the Coast Guard and expanding Union left a much more complex world the role of the Navy­Marine Corps where the United States must be prepared to amphibious team, but there would be no simultaneously counter myriad threats at radical course corrections. Instead, naval multiple levels. There is not a uniform missions would be assigned to “centers of solution to every problem and there is not a excellence” within the services to manage the uniform fleet for every theater. Luckily, the organization, training, and tactics of the joint United States has three maritime forces which would execute such missions. services—the Navy, Coast Guard, and Marine Corps—with different core competencies Navy – Combat on the High Seas covering a broad range of naval missions. Current investments in force structure can The U.S. Navy would manage the missions of be maximized by focusing the maritime blue­water combat: submarine and services on their preferred missions. antisubmarine warfare, carrier aviation, surface warfare, air defense, and sealift. Some missions have historically been These missions are already clearly within the assigned according to service and platform, Navy aegis, so there would be no major rather than warfare areas, which has led to change in their execution. By focusing on small, orphaned communities in some these core mission sets, and shedding the services. These communities are too small to remainder which the Navy has been have many high­ranking alumni in overall unenthusiastic about, the leadership would service leadership. The resulting be refocused on areas where Navy doctrine, consequences include them being often tactics, and procurement have been most misunderstood and undervalued, poor refined. As such, the platforms of the blue­ funding, poor career opportunities, few if water Navy would not deviate much from any champions in service leadership, and so their present and planned configurations. on. Even when they are appreciated and funded, niche communities lack economies Coast Guard – Patrolling Offshore of scale. Therefore, the way to ensure missions are properly funded and manned is The U.S. Coast Guard would be the mission

CIMSEC 18 www.cimsec.org manager for coastal and offshore patrol provisions, spare parts, and a base for the operations, for both law enforcement and flotilla’s command element. By performing maritime safety. Under the umbrella of lower­threat missions economically, these muscular law enforcement, the Coast Guard frigates would free up the destroyers, would manage not only patrols of the cruisers, and carriers to concentrate in high­ American coast, but also patrols off South threat theaters, thereby maximizing combat America and Africa as well. Most of these power. vessels would be frigates, both U.S. Navy and allied, rather than white­hull Coast Guard Marine Corps – Seizing the Littorals cutters, but all would be dedicated to low­ intensity constabulary missions. By keeping While the Navy prepares to fight wars on the the peace along much of the world’s high seas and the Coast Guard leads patrol coastline, the Coast Guard­led maritime efforts in more stable theaters, the Marine patrol enterprise would free up high­ Corps would manage naval missions across capability vessels to deter peer competitors. coastal seas and coastal lands. As the service tasked with crossing from sea to land, the The worldwide maritime patrol enterprise Marine Corps is concerned with anything would be led by the United States, with the which could affect or impede an amphibious nonjudgmental aim of maintaining the action, including the obvious amphibious world’s seaways under the control of tasks, but should now focus on missions like accepted and functional governments, mine countermeasures and small boat because even reticent governments make operations. Afloat Marine forces are carried easier negotiating partners than ungoverned to battle by Navy amphibious assault ships chaos. The simplest way to lead such an and delivered to the beach by Navy landing enterprise is to help equip and train it, so the craft, so there would remain a substantial United States Navy and Coast Guard would Navy influence in certain elements, but the have extensive foreign military sales, Marines would be the lead advocates for partnership programs, and personnel coastal mission capabilities. exchange programs with allied maritime nations. Navy destroyers, cruisers, and carrier battle groups would be responsible for clearing a To make such a broad endeavor more path to the coastal area for the amphibious practical, the Coast Guard’s offshore cutters, train, but the amphibious ships and their the Navy’s patrol frigates, and allied nations’ direct escorts would be responsible for warships would need to be common. The fighting their way to the beach and enabling principal requirements would be low cost, the landing force to cross it. To defeat small ease of maintenance, and margins for boat threats and provide fire support until growth. The basic warship would have a the Marine landing force could establish simple power plant, enough systems to artillery ashore, the amphibious train would operate as a minimalist patrol ship, and be escorted by frigates (based on the substantial space and weight left available common hull introduced above) specialized for additions. Buyers could add additional with the maximum number of naval guns fuel tanks and provisions storage, a variety of possible. With these frigates, the amphibious weapons, helicopter or boat facilities, or a force would be able to defeat enemy forces in host of other standardized modifications. waters too constricted for the blue­water While these frigates would be too small to warships to operate effectively. add all options to every vessel, they would also be inexpensive enough that customers Closer to the beach, mines would be the next of modest means could still purchase them, threat to an amphibious landing. Rather and customers like the United States could than operate a separate fleet of purchase lots of them. minesweepers and mine countermeasures support ships, the Marine Corps­centered Built cheaply and in large numbers, flotillas littoral force would base countermine of these semi­modular ships would patrol for detachments aboard the same amphibious pirates off Africa, drug smugglers in the Gulf assault ships carrying the landing force. of Mexico, or vessels in distress off North Assault ships are designed with large well America. For patrol locations far from decks, copious storage, and substantial suitable ports, the Navy would reawaken the berthing space, making them best­suited to concept of tender vessels; using operate divers and unmanned countermine replenishment ships to establish at­sea bases vehicles of all sizes. Furthermore, they have to extend the on­station time of frigates and the flight decks to operate the CH­53K King cutters. These tenders would provide fuel, Stallions that would take the airborne

CIMSEC 19 www.cimsec.org minesweeping mission from the Navy’s MH­ amphibious vehicles while traveling from amphibious 53E Sea Dragons as these aging helicopters assault ship USS America (LHA 6) to Royal Australian are retired. Saving the Navy the purchase of Navy Canberra class amphibious ship HMAS new mine countermeasures ships would pay Canberra (L02). (U.S. Marine Corps photo by SSgt. off in funding for extra amphibious landing Christopher Giannetti/Released) ships and CH­53Ks, a doubly effective reorganization for the amphibious mission. The Marine Corps would also take overall responsibility for the related riverine mission set. Outside of port security missions (which would fall under Coast Guard leadership), all coastal and riverine boat operations would become part of the permanent Navy­Marine Corps amphibious enterprise. Effective riverine operations include the same elements as amphibious landings—afloat mobility, fire support, and power projection ashore—so consolidation of the riverine and amphibious communities would create a deeper and more diverse base of experience for both missions. Integration with Marine Corps infantry, aviation, and artillery would make the riverine squadrons more effective in combat than they could be alone. Also, increased small­boat landing and raiding capability would increase the Marines’ naval presence and take advantage of their unique maritime capabilities. The Joint Naval Force in Action This joint naval force of the future would perform in a very similar fashion to the present­day and historical naval forces, insofar as the various forces have capabilities available. Where the future naval force would excel is in peacetime administration and presence: more efficient management of missions would reduce redundancy and increase the number of forces available when and where they were needed for combat and deterrence. Transitory advantages like technology or brilliant leadership would come and go, but the future naval force would be organized to make the most efficient use of these advantages on the seas to achieve America’s long­term goals. LT Eric Beaty is an E­2C/D Hawkeye Naval Flight Officer, presently working ashore in D.C. The views express herein are solely those of the author and are presented in a personal capacity on his own initiative. They do not reflect the official positions of the Department of Defense. ­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­

Featured Image: PACIFIC OCEAN (July 18, 2016) ­ Cpl. Ryan Dills communicates with other assault

CIMSEC 20 www.cimsec.org Augment Naval Force Structure By Upgunning The Coast Guard By Chuck Hill The Navy has been talking a lot about Very few of our allies have a fleet of similar distributed lethality lately, and “if it floats, it size. fights.” There is even talk of mounting cruise missiles on Military Sealift Command (MSC) Coast Guard vessels routinely operate with ships, even though it might compromise U.S. Navy vessels. The ships have common their primary mission. But so far there has equipment and their crews share common been little or no discussion of extending this training. The U.S. Navy has no closer ally. initiative to include the Coast Guard. The Because of their extremely long range, Navy should consider investing high­end cutters can operate for extended periods in warfighting capability in the Coast Guard to remote theaters where there are few or even augment existing force structure and provide no underway replenishment assets. The a force multiplier in times of conflict. A more Coast Guard also operates in places the USN capable Coast Guard will also be better able does not. For example, how often do Navy to defend the nation from asymmetrical surface ships go into the Arctic? The Coast threats. Guard operates there routinely. Virtually all U.S. vessels operating with the Fourth Fleet Why Include the Coast Guard? are Coast Guard. There are also no U.S. Navy surface warships home based north of the A future conflict may not be limited to a Chesapeake Bay in the Atlantic, none single adversary. We may be fighting another between San Diego and Puget Sound in the world war, against a coalition, perhaps both Pacific, and none in the Gulf of Mexico with China and Russia, with possible side shows the exception of mine warfare ships. in Africa, the Near East, South Asia, and/or Latin America. If so, we are going to need In the initial phase of a conflict, there will be numbers. The Navy has quality, but it does a need to round­up all the adversaries’ not have numbers. Count all the Navy CGs, merchant ships and keep them from doing DDGs, LCSs, PCs and PBs and other patrol mischief. Otherwise they might lay mines, boats and it totals a little over a hundred. scout for or resupply submarines, put agents The Coast Guard currently has over 40 ashore, or even launch cruise missiles from patrol ships over 1,000 tons and over 110 containers. This is not the kind of work we patrol craft. The current modernization want DDGs doing. It is exactly the type of program of record will provide at least 33 work appropriate for Coast Guard cutters. large cutters, and 58 patrol craft of 353 tons, Coast Guard ships enjoy a relatively low in addition to 73 patrol boats of 91 tons profile. Unlike a Carrier Strike Group or currently in the fleet, a total of 164 units. Navy SAG, they are less likely to be tracked

CIMSEC 21 www.cimsec.org by an adversary. Standard missiles, or Evolved Sea Sparrow missiles (ESSM). Using the Mk41 VLS would If we fight China in ten to twenty years, the allow a mix of cruise missiles and ESSM with conflict will likely open with China enjoying four ESSMs replacing each cruise missile, for local superiority in the Western Pacific and example eight cells could contain four cruise perhaps in the Pacific in general. If we fight missiles and 16 ESSM, since ESSM can be both China and Russia it may be too close to “quad packed” by placing four missiles in call. each cell. Development of an active homing ESSM is expected to obviate the need for Coast Guard Platforms illuminating radars that are required for the semi­active homing missiles. Still, simpler National Security Cutter (NSC) deck mounted launchers might actually offer some advantages, in addition to their lower This class of at least nine and possibly ten, installation cost, at least in peacetime. 418 foot long, CODAG powered, 28 knot ships, at 4,500 tons full load, are slightly Cutters often visit ports where the larger than Perry­class frigates. Additionally, population is sensitive to a history of U.S. they have a 12,000 nautical mile cruising interference in their internal affairs. In some range. As built they are already equipped cases, Coast Guard cutters are welcome, with: while U.S. Navy ships are not. For this reason, we might want to make it easy for ­ Navy certified helicopter facilities and even a casual observer to know that the hangar space to support two H­60 cutter is not armed with powerful offensive helicopters weapons. Deck mounted launchers can ­ A 57 mm Mk110 gun provide this assurance, in that it is ­ SPQ­9B Fire Control Radar immediately obvious if missile canisters are, ­ Phalanx 20mm Close in Weapon System or are not, mounted. The pictures below (CIWS) show potential VLS to be considered. ­ 2 SRBOC/ 2 x NULKA countermeasures chaff/rapid decoy launcher Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) ­ AN/SLQ­32 Electronic Warfare System ­ EADS 3D TRS­16 AN/SPS­75 Air Search The OPC program of record provides for 25 Radar of these ships. A contract has been awarded ­ A combat system that uses Aegis Baseline 9 to Eastern Shipbuilding Group for detail software design and construction of the first ship, ­ A Sensitive Compartmented Intelligence with options for eight more. The notional Facility (SCIF) design is 360 feet long, with a beam of 54 feet and a draft of 17 feet. The OPCs will have In short, they are already equipped with a sustained speed of 22.5 knots, a range of virtually everything needed for a missile 10,200 nautical miles (at 14 knots), and an armed combatant except the specific missile endurance of 60 days. Its hangar will related equipment. They are in many accommodate one MH­60 or an MH­65 and respects superior to the Littoral Combat an Unmanned Air System (UAS). Ships. Adding Cooperative Engagement Capability might even allow a Mk41 It will have a space for a SCIF but it is not equipped cutter to effectively launch expected to be initially installed. As built, it Standard missiles targeted by a third party. will have a Mk38 stabilized 25 mm gun in lieu of the Phalanx carried by the NSC. The ships were designed to accept 12 Mk56 Otherwise, the Offshore Patrol Cutter will be VLS which launch only the Evolved Sea equipped similarly to the National Security Sparrow missiles (ESSM). Additionally, the Cutter. It will likely have the same Lockheed builder, Huntington Ingalls, has shown Martin COMBATSS­21 combat management versions of the class equipped with eight system as the LCS derived frigates. They Mk41 VLS (located between the gun and could be fitted with cruise missiles and superstructure) plus eight Harpoon, and possibly Mk56 VLS for ESSM as well. These Mk32 torpedo tubes (located on the stern). ships will be ice strengthened, taking surface Adding missiles to the existing hulls should launched cruise missiles into the Arctic. not be too difficult. Fast Response Cutter (FRC) The Mk41 VLS are more flexible in that they can accommodate cruise missiles, rocket The FRC program of record is to build 58 of boosted antisubmarine torpedoes (ASROC), these 158 foot, 28 knot, 365 ton vessels. 19

CIMSEC 22 www.cimsec.org have been delivered and they are being built Small Precision Guided Weapons at a rate of four to six per year. All 58 are now either built, building, contracted, or It is not unlikely that Fast Response Cutters optioned. They are essentially the same will replace the six 110 foot patrol boats displacement as the Cyclone class PCs albeit currently based in Bahrain. If cutters are to a little slower, but with better seakeeping be placed in an area where they face a and a longer range. Even these small ships swarming threat they will need the same have a range of 2,950 nm. They are armed types of weapons carried or planned for with Mk 38 mod2 25 mm guns and four .50 Navy combatants to address this threat. caliber M2 machine guns. These might include the Sea Griffin used on Navy’s Cyclone­class PCs or Longbow They are already better equipped than the Hellfires planned for the LCS. Coast Guard 82 foot patrol boats that were used for interdiction of covert coastal traffic Additionally, a small number of these during the Vietnam War. If they were to be missiles on Coast Guard patrol craft would used to enforce a blockade against larger enhance their ability to deal with small, fast, vessels, they would need weapons that highly maneuverable threats along the U.S. could effectively stop medium to large coast and elsewhere. vessels. Light Weight Anti­Surface Torpedoes Marine Protector Class If Coast Guard units, particularly smaller There are 73 of these 87 foot, 91 ton, 26 knot ones, were required to forcibly stop patrol boats. Four were funded by the Navy potentially hostile merchant ships for the and provide force protection services for purposes of a blockade, quarantine, submarines transiting on the surface in and embargo, etc. they would need something out of King Bay, GA and Bangor, WA. more than the guns currently installed. If use of these vessels for force protection The U.S. does not currently have a light were to be expanded to a more hostile weight anti­surface torpedo capable of environment, they would likely need more targeting a ship’s propellers, but with Elon than the two .50 caliber M2 machine guns Musk building a battery factory that will currently carried. The four currently double the worlds current capacity and cars assigned to force protection units are that accelerate faster than Ferraris, building currently equipped with an additional a modern electric small anti­surface torpedo stabilized remote weapon station. should be easy and relatively inexpensive. Weapons Assuming they have the same attributes of ASW torpedoes, at about 500 pounds these Cruise Missiles weapons take up relatively little space. Such a torpedo would also allow small Coast The U.S. Navy currently has or is considering Guard units to remain relevant against a four different surface launched cruise variety of threats. missiles: Harpoon, Naval Strike Missile (NSM), Long Range Anti­Ship Missile Conclusion (LRASM), and Tomahawk. Of these, LRASM appears most promising for Coast Guard Adding cruise missiles to the Coast Guard use. Tomahawk is the largest of the four and National Security Cutters and Offshore both Harpoon and NSM would be workable, Patrol Cutters would increase the number of but they do not have the range of LRASM. cruise missile­equipped U.S .surface ships by The intelligence and range claimed for the about 40 percent. LRASM not only makes it deadlier in wartime, it also means only a couple of these Coast Guard Patrol craft (WPCs) and patrol missiles on each of the Coast Guard’s largest boats (WPBs) significantly outnumber their cutters would allow the Coast Guard’s small Navy counterparts. They could significantly but widely distributed force to rapidly and increase the capability to deal with effectively respond to asymmetric threats interdiction of covert coastal traffic, act as a over virtually the entire U.S. coast as well as force multiplier in conventional conflict, and compliment the U.S. Navy’s efforts to allow larger USN ships to focus on high­end complicate the calculus of a near­peer threats provided they are properly equipped adversary abroad. to deal with the threats. More effective, longer ranged, and particularly more precise

CIMSEC 23 www.cimsec.org weapons could also improve the Coast Guard’s ability to do its homeland security mission. Thanks to OS2 Michael A. Milburn for starting the conversation that lead to this article. Chuck retired from the Coast Guard after 22 years service. Assignments included four ships, Rescue Coordination Center New Orleans, CG HQ, Fleet Training Group San Diego, Naval War College, and Maritime Defense Zone Pacific/Pacific Area Ops/Readiness/Plans. Along the way he became the first Coast Guard officer to complete the Tactical Action Officer (TAO) course and also completed the Naval Control of Shipping course. He has had a life­long interest in naval ships and history. Chuck writes for his blog, Chuck Hill’s CG blog. ­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­

Featured Image: Photo: The U.S. Coast Guard high endurance cutter USCGC Mellon (WHEC­717) launching a RGM­84 Harpoon missile during tests off Oxnard, California (USA), in January 1990. by PAC Ken Freeze, USCG

CIMSEC 24 www.cimsec.org A Fleet Plan for 2045: The Navy the U.S. Ought to be Building By Jan Musil

Rather than the usual discussion of what the be expressly built to operate effectively in the U.S. Navy has and how to get Congress to high sea states the North Atlantic and North fund more and better ships and systems, this Pacific are notorious for generating at article concentrates on the fleet we ought to regular intervals. be constructing in the decades ahead. 2045 is a useful target date, as there will be very Using the larger turbine engine already in few of our Cold War era ships left by then, use with the LCS in the new design is therefore that fleet will reflect what we are expensive, both in construction and building today and will build in the future. operating costs, but not so much more that it This article proposes several new ship makes sense to retain two support and designs and highlights enduring challenges maintenance trails in the fleet and shipyards. posed by the threat environment. Yes, the extra speed will be nice, but in reality is not really necessary. But with the A New Transoceanic Frigate Design larger engine already baked into the Navy’s operating budget it is better to stick with it The retirement of the Oliver Hazard Perry­ even if the operating advantages of more class frigates has left a substantial hole, both speed in deep blue waters are marginal. in terms of surface ship numbers and ASW capability in the U.S. Navy’s warfighting Foremost is the wider beam the bigger capabilities. This is an understandable move turbine will force on the designers. Make a on our part given recent budget pressures, virtue of this fact by making the focus of the but this author is convinced we are going to new frigate design its helicopter deck, have to replace the transoceanic escort and hanger, assigned Seahawk, two Fire Scouts, ASW capability the class provided to the and ten to twelve TFS buoys. This ship class fleet. will exist to provide ASW escort to the CSGs, ARGs and transoceanic convoys operating in Perry Replacement the deep blue. Building a class of frigates that are 21st There will be a 5″ gun to put aboard, the century versions of the Perry class is an basics of AAW self­defense and plenty of obvious alternative for us to consider. I VLS capability for ASW, AAW and the suggest designing a slightly larger version, developing distributed long­range strike say 3800 tons, with a fighting ability heavily abilities the Navy has decided it requires. focused on the ASW mission. Since the Navy Other than those modifications, this ship is building plenty of littoral capability in the exists primarily to screen against and/or various LCS classes, this new design should hunt submarines.

CIMSEC 25 www.cimsec.org Those concerned over such a design’s lack of Ticonderoga class CGs now in service. We more substantial AAW and offensive should look to a flexible new cruiser design capabilities should understand the same that can be adapted for varying purposes argument used to defend the purchase of the through the mid­21st century. original Perrys. Neither the Navy nor the nation can afford to put all three capabilities By using a basic class design incorporating in substantial measure aboard this small the same propulsion plant installed across ship build. We couldn’t afford it with a fifty­ various adopted designs we will generate six ship build against the Soviet Union and very substantial lifetime cost savings. we cannot afford it with the thirty plus Additional lifetime savings can be gained by frigates we need to build of this new design using the same bow and forecastle steel in the decades ahead. framework across the ship classes. A third, smaller, but still meaningful set of savings Hull Design Opportunity can be derived from using the same bridge and AAW working spaces layout. This will This author shares in the lack of enthusiasm provide a great deal of flexibility in what for the use of aluminum in the hulls of the types of guns, radars, VLS loadouts, Independence class. But the potential helicopter deck and hangar layout details are capabilities of the trimaran portion of that selected to serve the purposes of a particular class’s design are intriguing. cruiser class. Whether made of steel or the still­to­be­ Size proven aluminum, a trimaran hull properly designed could provide substantial To meet the substantial electrical power improvements in stability for helicopter needs of the fleet of the future, energize a operations in high sea states. single railgun if installed, provide plenty of length and beam for the radars of today and Traditionally Mediterranean navies, the tomorrow, enough space to house computers Italians in particular, turned to trimaran and operators and adequate AAW warfare designs for speed to use against heavier capability, something from 15,000 to gunned opponents. With the U.S. Navy, 20,0000 tons is needed. Since every ton speed is never going to be first on a skippers added adds significant construction and mind in heavily rolling waters, but safely maintenance costs, this author suggests operating the ships ASW equipment, considering a 17,000 ton modern version of helicopters, and buoys, frequently will be. the Baltimore­class cruisers built during WW2. Utilizing a proven sea going design So let’s take the time in the design phase to like the Baltimore’s for a proven bow and see what can be designed into the new class forecastle design for all of the cruiser classes by utilizing a wide beam trimaran design, will provide a cost effective way of providing possibly a few more missile tubes and AAW ships with good sea keeping abilities, with assets can be squeezed in topside if the extra fewer design­from­scratch headaches and beam is available forward of the hangar lower lifetime costs. deck, even if merely above the waterline. Finally, the offshore oil industry has had Engine Room some recent success reducing instability in their workboats by moving the bridge all the A non­nuclear electric power system such as way forward to the very front of the ship. The the permanent magnet motor (PMM) result is a vertical, or nearly vertical bow originally planned for the Zumwalt class is topside with the amidships area given over another important design parameter that to work, or in the Navy’s case, fighting space. needs to considered and decided upon from the very beginning of the design process. This frigate should cost the taxpayers under Whatever the power plant settled on, it 400 million dollars, probably well under that needs to provide enough electrical power to figure, making the construction of thirty plus operate one railgun and associated radars, or ships over the years ahead an affordable the extensive radars, computers and investment for the Navy in both the number refrigerated working space required by the of ships and our ASW fighting capabilities. CGs of tomorrow, or the power needs of a long range ballistic radar if installed. All that A Flexible New Cruiser Design generation and conversion equipment needs the space provided by a 17,000 ton sized In the decade ahead, the U.S. Navy is facing design. the need to extend and eventually replace the

CIMSEC 26 www.cimsec.org Bridge, CIC, and Working Spaces CIC and electronic room space for the computers and sailors aboard, and as many This issue comes to the forefront for the VLS as practical and this ship class is ready AAW class of cruiser that will replace the to go. Ticonderogas. Computers are wonderful tools, capable of providing multiple ways to CBD – Ballistic Missile Defense Cruiser enable a fighting sailor. They are also demanding pieces of equipment that simply This author is far from convinced that ‘just have to be’ at the right temperature, putting a long range ballistic missile radar to humidity level, amount of electrical power sea is a wise and prudent idea. It almost provided and discharged, and are highly certainly is not when in close proximity to a intolerant of any variation in these CSG, ARG, SSG or transoceanic convoy, at conditions. Sailors are much easier to least on a routine basis. provide working space for. That said, the majority of the world's seas But to be effective, the CGs of the future will are, almost by definition, not in close also need plenty of thoroughly refrigerated proximity to our primary ocean going assets. space in the bridge, CIC, electronic There very well may be occasions in the equipment spaces, and working space for the future when the U.S. Navy can provide a cost sailors operating and maintaining all of this effective alternative for the president to gear. And let us not forget the multiple consider making use of by building three radars that will be installed, ever growing in CBD class cruisers. size and number, that also require space, power, and cooling inside the hull. This cruiser design is obviously dominated by the enormous radar mast mounted Therefore, designing a large, as uniform as amidships. It is unlikely that a non­nuclear possible set of working spaces behind the power plant will generate enough power for forward gun and before the ventilation stack, both radar and a railgun, so it will go to sea helicopter deck, and hangar is strongly with our standard 5” weapon, as much of the recommended as a third set of crucial design base bridge, CIC, and electronic working criteria. spaces that can be accommodated once the huge ballistic radar requirements are met. It This author suggests applying the will also include as many VLS tubes that can suggestions above in the cruiser classes be squeezed in, and a standard, one listed and briefly described in the following Seahawk­sized helicopter deck and hangar. sections. The reader can easily come up with CS – Scout Cruiser alternative cruiser class designs of their own, whether improvements on the three Putting one railgun on a scout cruiser, with suggestions above or for other mission plenty of VLS and helicopter space for requirements not considered in this article. needed ISR drones, ASW oriented Seahawk, But having a flexible base cruiser design on two Fire Scouts, and ten TFS buoys while hand, available for development or completely independent of a CSG is a very alternation as the world changes around us useful addition to NATO we can make at a seems to be an excellent investment in far lower cost than any aviation oriented capabilities for the decades ahead. asset. Particularly since there is a very useful mission for the cruiser class to perform, CVLN, AORH, and CARN namely Backfire and Bear hunting in the North Atlantic, North Sea, or potentially The author has explored a variety of other even the Barents Sea. ship designs in previous articles that form a part of the fleet design described here. CG – AAW Cruiser The CVLN (carrier aviation light, nuclear The Navy is going to need fifteen plus AAW powered) is intended to operate with carrier cruisers as replacements for the task forces, providing a home for the many Ticonderoga­class as those Cold War ISR drones, UUVs, UAVs and buoys needed veterans wear out. This class design is easily in the increasingly dangerous A2/AD described as simply upsizing the environment and to prosecute ASW. Ticonderoga to 17,000 tons. Give the class the space and power the radars of today and The AORH (auxiliary oiler replenishment tomorrow demand to be effective, plenty of helicopter) is a ship class based on a

CIMSEC 27 www.cimsec.org modified AOR­sized and double hulled enormous difference between Moscow’s design without a full flight deck, perceived military needs and her ability to approximately 25,000 tons and oil powered. fund them. This will remain true far into the This class is intended to provide very 21st century, regardless of how much or little substantial helicopter and VTOL launching change Putin manages to introduce as a and servicing capabilities for ASW, response to sanctions and the fall in the amphibious, special­ops or other missions price of oil. and then executing these missions alongside a large variety of allied nation navies; hence That said, Russian naval ambitions and the built in patrol boat capabilities as well as intentions have been clearly stated and at least one UNREP station port and certainly include creating and maintaining a starboard. substantial nuclear powered attack submarine force to be deployed in the North The CARN (cruiser gun armor, nuclear Pacific, North Atlantic, and Arctic as needed. powered) will accompany the fleet’s capital In addition, Moscow clearly intends to ships to provide defensive AAW capabilities continue fielding enough A2/AD protected with a primary armament of twelve railguns assets in the Eastern Mediterranean. in order to realize favorable cost exchanges. China Strategic Demands of the Threat Environment China has been consistently and thoughtfully expanding the PLANs capabilities and For discussion purposes, this author mission choices for years now. This assumes the usual conventional wisdom expansion has been quite focused, foremost about the strategic intentions, announced on improving China’s home defense and anticipated fleet construction plans and situation. The PLAN has also established patrol utilization patterns of the various abilities to protect and pursue her interests major Eurasian major powers are mostly in and around the two island chains. Finally, true and applicable. China has developed modest naval expeditionary capability for ongoing use in Russia the Indian Ocean. Russia has been consistent in describing her To date there does not seem to be any intentions in fleet building and disposition. interest in creating additional substantial Given her need to disperse naval assets to capabilities in order to operate far from four widely separate parts of the world, home waters, much less on the global scale establish and maintain her strategic ballistic like the U.S. Navy. missile force, and meet the need for substantial littoral forces, there is only Unlike Russia, China does have the financial limited Russian ability to impact U.S. capability to expand the PLAN if desired, interests far from her shores, certainly both today and in the decades to come. This nothing like in Soviet days. capability, if exercised to construct substantial additional surface and attack The Russians have been quite open in their submarine assets that could be targeted far intent to field enough attack submarines to out into the Central Pacific, beyond the reestablish a 21st century version of the old Second Island Chain, would be the single Soviet anti­convoy abilities in the North greatest change in world conditions Atlantic. They also are aware of the requiring a revision of the fleet building plan opportunities that present themselves in presented here. disrupting trade and generating geopolitical influence in Northeastern Asian waters as Ships, and mission requirements, are flexible well as the North Pacific; though they are and can easily be targeted in different areas, frank that pursuing such a strategy in Pacific and the waters from Taiwan/Okinawa to waters is some distance down their priority Guam to Hawaii are an obvious alternative list. Given the many needs the Russian fleet for PLAN planners to study for has, having enough assets to operate opportunities. This author is not especially effectively in the North Pacific may always concerned about China’s current fleet in this remain a hope and intent rather than a regard, but if future PLAN submarine reality. building includes plentiful nuclear attack submarines beyond current needs and As always with Russia, from the days of Ivan tasking, then the U.S. needs to seriously IV or Peter the Great onward, there is an reassess how it will get fuel and munitions

CIMSEC 28 www.cimsec.org delivered to Guam or Okinawa. handful of U.S. or other NATO nation frigates in the North Atlantic or North Sea as The interlinked issues that Taiwan and Backfire and Bear hunters would be a China’s substantial A2/AD capabilities raise powerful way to reinforce NATO, and at a far can be largely mitigated by adding the lower cost than deploying already very busy suggested CVLN and CARN assets on an CVN assets. ongoing basis to the CSG operating in the Western Pacific. A significant amount of Convincing the German Navy to build and deterrence can be obtained by making the operate two or three ships similar in design necessary additional investment in these two as an AORH in Baltic waters or around the new ship classes and the associated North Cape of Norway would also equipment and doctrine adjustments. substantially improve NATO’s ability to deal with the challenge Russia presents. Other challenges presented by China’s increasing presence and differing intentions Ever Expanding A2/AD Threat in the region should be manageable, at least from the Navy’s point of view, by appropriate Threats posed elsewhere, which will almost deployment of the AORH, LCS, and other always be less powerful than what China has smaller ship classes that need to be built. built, will have to be met with a mixture of the new anti­drone, anti­missile weapon Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean systems under discussion, the assistance of shore based assets or wide dispersal when The many complicated rivalries that rend operating in deep blue waters. All of our new this part of the world show no sign of assets should be built with the ability to dissipating, meaning that the U.S. Navy will flexibly add or subtract as needed new need to operate substantial assets on an weapon systems as they are developed over ongoing basis in the area for decades to the decades to come. come. Suggested Fleet The increasingly difficult challenges presented by the rise of Al Qaeda, Islamic The following fleet should be able to handle State, and Iran’s threats to close the Strait of these challenges and threats well into the Hormuz suggest the need for routine middle of the 21st century. deployment of a task force operating independently of the CSG, centered on a SHIP TYPE CURRENT PROPOSED AORH, one to two LCS, a LSD, and whatever SSBN 13 12 associated or Allied assets are locally present SSGN 4 6 at any given time for years to come. SSN 3 0 SSN 12 24 NATO SSN 0 12 SSN 38 0 The renewed challenge to NATO that is SSN 0 24 being made by Russia should be met with a CVN 11 11 different set of assets than were deployed CVLN 0 6 during the Cold War. Modern day challenges AORH 0 9 in A2/AD capabilities, a more substantive AORH 0 2 Eastern Mediterranean presence, resumed CARN 0 9 Backfire and Bear patrols, and the intent to CS 0 3 resume routine attack submarine patrols in CBD 0 3 the North Atlantic require a different set of CG 22 15 fleet assets now and in the future. DDG 3 3 DDG 66 57 Much of these changes will have to come FF 0 30 ashore in various locations across Europe. As FF 0 5 always the substantial littoral assets needed FP 16 16 should be provided by our allies in NATO. FM 12 12 FM 12 12 We do have unique abilities to provide, EPF 12 12 particularly the Aegis system whether at sea LHA/LHD 11 12 or installed ashore, and the new railgun. LCC 2 2 Establishing a routine task force centered on LPD/LXR 9 18 the suggested scout cruiser (CS) class and a LSD 12 18

CIMSEC 29 www.cimsec.org ESD 2 4 ESB 2 4 T­AO 15 17 T­AKE 12 12 AS 2 2

Conclusion At just over 340 ships, this suggested fleet plan provides the U.S. Navy with an adequate number of vessels, while simultaneously adding needed new high­end surface ship designs and providing the numbers of smaller ships the nation needs now and will need into the future. As always, the time to start planning ahead is now. Jan Musil is a Vietnam era Navy veteran, disenchanted ex­corporate middle manager, and long time entrepreneur currently working as an author of science fiction novels. He is also a long­standing student of navies in general, post­1930 ship construction thinking, design hopes versus actual results, and fleet composition debates of the twentieth century. ­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­

Featured Image: PACIFIC OCEAN (July 22, 2016) ­ The Nimitz­class aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74) conducts a vertical replenishment with the Military Sealift Command fast combat support ship USNS Rainier (T­AOE 7) during Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2016. (U.S. Navy photo by MC2 Ryan J. Batchelder/Released)

CIMSEC 30 www.cimsec.org Closing Remarks on Changing Naval Force Structure By Wayne P. Hughes Jr.

The biggest deficiencies in reformulating the CVN wing is more than is needed for long U. S. Navy’s force structure are (1) a failure term littoral operations. Thus, there were to take the shrinking defense budget into enough billets to more widely distribute account which (2) allows every critic or across the NPS fleet. proponent to be like the blind men who formulated their description of an elephant Those who haven’t thought about all the by touching only his trunk, tail, leg, or tusk. elements of a 600­ship navy will have a lot of To get an appreciation of the size of the questions about logistics, flying off smaller problem you have to describe the whole carriers, new tactics to accompany the new beast, and what is even harder, to get him to technologies, procedures to deal with change direction by hitting him over the warships damaged from missile attacks, and head repeatedly. so forth. The Navy must confront its budget crunch while needing to buy more expensive A good thesis to make the point is by LT missiles in greater numbers, restoring the Juan L. Carrasco, published in 2009, titled SSBN fleet, sustaining the APN dollars to "A Manpower Comparison of Three U. S. buy ever­more expensive aircraft, supporting Navies: The Current Fleet, a Projected 313 Marine expeditionary operations, Ship Fleet, and a More Distributed Bimodal structuring an offensively capable surface Alternative." It explores the number of fleet ship fleet, building up—or merely billets in (1) the then current 285 ship fleet sustaining—our increasingly valuable (2) the proposed, now defunct, 313 ship submarine forces, and maintaining enough Navy, and (3) a new fleet of over 650 vessels CLF ships to take some losses and continue designed by nine members of the NPS to maintain the fleet forward. This will take a faculty that included more than 260 smaller lot more original thinking about the role of coastal warships. Carrasco showed, unmanned and robotic vehicles of many remarkably enough, the NPS­designed fleet kinds, more teaming with partner nations, required the fewest afloat billets. Looking at forward bases that support our friends in the details reveal why. One major reason was East Asia and Europe, applications of that the then­current Navy’s eleven CVNs offensive cyber warfare, achieving more took 46% of all fleet billets in 285 ship navy, stealthy C2 ways to attack effectively first, all so when the NPS­designed fleet cut the to achieve the end goal of building a more number of CVNs to six and added more than distributable, combat ready 21st century a dozen small sea­based air platforms, then U. S. Navy. they were more distributable 100,000 ton carriers. The smaller ones, more like a CVL Captain Hughes is a designated professor in in size, can operate in littoral waters where a the Department of Operations Research at

CIMSEC 31 www.cimsec.org the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. He is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy and holds a master of science degree in operations research from the Naval Postgraduate School. On active duty he commanded a minesweeper and a destroyer, directed a large training command, served as deputy director of Systems Analysis (OP­96), and was aide to Under Secretary of the Navy R. James Woolsey. At the Naval Postgraduate School for twenty­six years, he has served in the Chair of Applied Systems Analysis, as the first incumbent of the Chair of Tactical Analysis, and as dean of the Graduate School of Operational and Information Sciences. Captain Hughes is author of Military Modeling (1984), Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice (1986), Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat (2000), and he is a coauthor of A Concise Theory of Combat (1997). He served as a member of the Naval War College Press Advisory Board for over twenty­five years, until 2012. ­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­

Featured Image: PHILIPPINE SEA (Sept. 23, 2016) The forward­deployed Arleigh Burke­class guided­ missile destroyer USS Barry (DDG 52) steams in formation with, from left to right, the amphibious transport dock ship USS Green Bay (LPD 20), the amphibious assault ship USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6), the amphibious dock landing ship USS Germantown (LSD 42), USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76), the Arleigh Burke­class guided­missile destroyer USS Benfold (DDG 65), the Ticonderoga­class guided­missile cruiser USS Chancellorsville (CG 62), and the Arleigh Burke­class guided­missile destroyer USS Stethem (DDG 63) during a photo exercise during Valiant Shield 2016. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Kevin V. Cunningham/Released)

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