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Home , Anthony Synnot, De Havilland Sea Venom, Fleet Air Arm (RAN), Fleet carrier, HMAS Albatross (1928), HMAS Australia (D84)

FROM CRADLE TO GRAVE?

The Place of the in 's post-war Defence Force

Subthesis submitted for the degree of

MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIES

at the

University College

The University of

Australian Defence Force Academy

1996

by

ALLAN DU TOIT

ACADEMY LIBRARy UNSW AT ADFA

437104 HMAS , 1973. Trackers are parked to port and Skyhawks to starboard Declaration by Candidate

I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, it contains no material previously published or written by another person nor material which to a substantial extent has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma of a university or other institute of higher learning, except where due acknowledgment is made in the text of the thesis.

Allan du Toit , October 1996 Ill

Abstract

This subthesis sets out to study the place of the aircraft carrier in Australia's post-war defence force.

Few changes in have been as all embracing as the role played by the aircraft carrier, which is, without doubt, the most impressive, and at the same time the most controversial, manifestation of sea power. From 1948 until 1983 the aircraft carrier formed a significant component of the and the place of an aircraft carrier in defence strategy and the force structure seemed relatively secure.

Although cost, especially in comparison to, and in competition with, other defence projects, was probably the major issue in the demise of the aircraft carrier and an organic fixed-wing naval air capability in the Australian Defence Force, cost alone can obscure the ftindamental reordering of Australia's defence posture and strategic thinking, which significantly contributed to the decision not to replace HMAS Melbourne. Chapter 1 consequently reviews the evolution of Australia's post-war maritime strategic thinking in order to provide the necessary strategic framework against which this study is set.

Chapter 2 traces Australian carrier aviation from 1947 when the decision was taken to acquire an aircraft carrier capability; through to the demise of this useftil capability in 1983 after one of the most protracted debates on the structure of the Australian Defence Force.

This bitter debate, which was steeped in intense inter-service rivalry between the RAN and RAAF, is examined in Chapter 3. This 'water-shed' controversy, which dramatically altered the character of the RAN, is important, as it undoubtedly contributed to a significant reordering of Australia's defence priorities and the development, in many respects, of more realistic national defence policies in Australia.

The final chapter of this subthesis discusses how the RAN was forced to come to grips with effectively operating and developing a fleet without a carrier and how this 'carrier-less' force has embarked down the path of self-reliance as part of the sweeping reorientation of Australia's defence posture and priorities.

This subthesis concludes by arguing that the significant decision to introduce naval air power in 1947 was made without any real consideration of other force structure implications, which was ultimately distort the RAN force structure, and that in retrospect, the long battle to maintain a carrier force was always the victim of a tendency to attempt too much with inadequate finances. IV

Contents

Acknowledgments v

Acronyms and abbreviations vi

Introduction vii

Chapter 1 From Alliance to Self-Reliance? The evolution of Australia's

post-war maritime strategic thinking 1

Chapter 2 Wings at Sea: Australian carrier aviation, 1948-1983 23

Chapter 3 Bitter Rivalry: The carrier debate of the 1970s and early 1980s 48

Chapter 4 Clipped Wings: Defending Australia without a carrier 75

Conclusions 90

Bibliography 95 Acknowledgments

I wish to acknowledge with gratitude the assistance, advice and support I received in preparing this subthesis from the following people:

My supervisor, Dr Graeme Cheeseman, Department of Politics at University College who provided regular and valuable advice on the overall direction of the subthesis.

Captain Mervyn Davis who understanding^ allowed me to 'disappear' from work, and not return, until I had completed my subthesis.

Hector Donohue who generously gave of his time and encouragement to discuss issues and offer positive criticism.

Joe Straczek, Senior Naval Historical and Archives , who was always happy to find, in his own time, many elusive facts and obscure source papers.

Last but by no means least, my wife Tessa and two young sons Tristan and Rowan, who tolerated the considerable commitment of my time and who gave me much support and encouragement as I researched and wrote this subthesis.

Furthermore, a work of this nature necessarily builds on the work of others, and the many sources consulted in researching and writing this subthesis are acknowledged in the text, footnotes and in the bibliography. I recognise the importance of the invaluable background and references obtained from these sources and the contribution of the authors concerned.

Finally, the views expressed in this subthesis were arrived at by the Author in the course of academic research, and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing official opinion within the ADF, Department of Defence or the Australian Government.

Allan du Toit Canberra, October 1996 VI

Acronyms and Abbreviations

ADAWS Action Data Automated Weapon System ADF Australian Defence Force ANZAM Australia, and Malayan Area ANZUS Australia, New Zealand and Treaty ARA Armada Repulic de Argentina ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations ASP 90 Australia's Strategic Planning in the 1990s ASW Anti- Warfare CAS Chief of Air Staff CGS Chief of the Staff COSC Chiefs of Staff Committee CSE Central Studies Establishment CVA Aircraft Carrier DDG Guided Missile DFDC Defence Force Development Committee DOA 87 The Defence of Australia 1987 ESM Electronic Support Measures FAA FFG Guided Missile FPDA Five Power Defence Arrangements FSR Force Structure Review HMAS His/Her Majesty's Australian HMS His/Her Majesty's Ship HSS Support Ship ITR Invitation to Register Interest LPA Landing Platform Amphibious LPD Landing Platform Dock LPH Landing Platform Helicopter LSL LSI Landing Ship Tank MAD Magnetic Anomaly Detector MM&S Movement and Support NAP Naval Air Power Study NAP/TAWS Naval Air Power Study/ Tactical Air Weapons System Study NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NCDS Naval Combat Data System ODF Operational Deployment Force RAAF Royal Australian Air Force Vll

RAN Royal Australian RN SAGW Surface-to-Air Guided Weapons SAP Seaborne Aircraft Platform SCS SEATO South East Asian Treaty Organisation SR 93 Strategic Review 1993 SSM Surface-to-Surface Missile STOVL Short Take-off and Vertical Landing TAWS Tactical Air Weapons System Study THSS Training and Helicopter Support Ship UK US United States USAF United States Air Force USN USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Vlll

Introduction

Australia, which lies between three great oceans, possesses one of the world's longest coastlines, the second largest continental shelf and the fourth largest Exclusive Economic

Zone (EEZ). From the early days of settlement the sea has been Australia's vital link with the rest of the world, and today, Australia's future continues to be closely tied to the sea in terms of defence, trade, oil and gas production, fishing, tourism and leisure. For this reason, an effective maritime strategy and force structure are central to Australia's national security and economic well-being.

From 1948 until 1983 - when the Government finally decided not to replace HMAS

Melbourne - the aircraft carrier formed a significant component of the Australian Defence

Force and the place of an aircraft carrier capability in defence strategy and the force structure seemed relatively secure. Although cost, especially in comparison to, and in competition with, other major defence projects, was probably the major issue in the demise of an organic fixed-wing naval air capability in the Australian Defence Force, cost alone can obscure the fundamental reordering of Australia's defence posture and strategic thinking, which significantly contributed to the decision not to repldice Melbourne}

^ Ray Jones, 'Aircraft Carriers and Australian Defence Policy', Defence Force Journal, No.61, November/December 1986, p.50. IX

As the place of the aircraft carrier in Australia's post-war defence force was dominated by changes in strategic thinking and defence policy, it is necessary, at the outset of this study, to have a broad understanding of the evolution of Australia's post-war strategic thinking, particularly within the maritime context. This is essential, as it provides the necessary strategic framework and context against which a carrier force was acquired in the years immediately following World War II; through to the demise of this useful capability in 1983 following one of the most bitter and protracted debates on the structure of the Australian

Defence Force. Furthermore, an understanding of current Australian strategic thinking will provide the necessary background to the final chapter of this subthesis which will discuss the defence of Australia without an aircraft carrier and the resurgence of a capability in the contemporary fleet. CHAPTER 1

From Alliance to Self-Reliance? The evolution of Australia's post-war maritime strategic thinking

Our future must be that of a maritime state . . . In Australia our seamen are our frontiersmen.

Vice William Rouke Creswell ^

Since federation in 1901, Australian strategic planning has been based upon some form of aUiance with a great power and Australian maritime strategic thinking and the capabilities of the , which, for much of its history was designed to fight in distant waters in high intensity conflict integrated with the superior naval forces of the two great powers, has been fundamentally shaped by the powerful and dominant influences of both

British and United States sea power.

Prior to Federation and for the first half of this century, Australia was linked politically and emotionally to the British Empire and contributed to imperial defence. In return, Britain which was universally recognised as the world's dominant sea power, offered Australia

^ William Rouke Creswell, quoted in Frances McGuire, The Royal Australian Navy, , Melbourne, 1948, p.3. protection. Although the view that Australia should concentrate its attention and resources on local rather than regional or imperial defence was advanced by various Australian politicians and prominent defence strategists since colonial times, ^ their calls were consistently drowned out by the much stronger call to empire and the rationale that

Australia's geography and small population meant that it could not protect itself from within its own resources.

Australia's commitment to imperial defence after the Great War was consequently provided by the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), which, in almost every sense, was a component of the

Royal Navy (RN). In a corporate sense the Australian naval leadership took it for granted that the navy should be maintained to fight alongside the RN and the degree of standardisation between the RAN and RN was therefore extensive, the RAN's training and operating procedures closely mirroring British practice. The jibe that the RAN was merely the antipodean fleet of the Royal Navy was therefore based upon a strong element of truth, noting the RN's degree of influence on RAN strategic and operational planning.^

Australia's deep seated and willing dependence on Britain - which extended much further than the tangible influences of imperial defence - was, however, disturbed in December 1941 when Britain proved incapable of defending Australia against Japanese aggression, and the

Australian Government sought help from the United States as Australia faced the gravest

^ The latter included Generals Monash and, in particular, Chauvel who, as Chief of the General Staff in the mid-1920s, continually warned that in the event of war in Europe and the Pacific, Britain may not be able to honour its pledge to send the Royal Navy to Australia's defence. ^ A.J.W. Cooper, At the Crossroads: Anglo-Australian Naval Relations 1945-1970, BA Hons thesis, University College, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, 1991, p. 10. hour in its history. Although Australia realigned itself with Britain towards the end of the war, the fall of Singapore and the war in the Pacific forced a reappraisal of some of the fundamental assumptions which underpinned Australian defence, specifically about the capability of the Empire to cater for Australian defence needs adequately, and thereafter began a long term reorientation of Australia's defence planning in response to the gradual

British withdrawal from its Far Eastern empire.

In the postwar period the influence of imperial defence and British sea power on Australia, and the intimate naval relationship between the two nations, slowly dissolved as a result of various factors: Australian nationalism; Britain's loss of power and increasing occupation with European affairs - which resulted in its gradual withdrawal from its Far Eastern empire; and, perhaps most significantly of all, the desire by Australian politicians and strategic planners for an alliance with the new dominant power in the Asia-Pacific region, the United

States.'

The movement in Australian defence policy towards dependence on the US was not, however, homogeneous, with strategic planning leading the trend. In some respects maritime strategy lagged behind the overall movement because of the RAN's deep ties with

Britain, which remained close until the final disbandment of the RN's Far East Fleet in

October 1971.

Coral Bell, Dependent Ally: A Study in Australian Foreign Policy, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1988, passim. The evolution of post-war Australian strategic thinking has been described by Hector

Donohue. He outlines five periods since 1945: Empire defence in the early post-war years; the era of forward defence in the fifties; the demise of forward defence in the sixties; the growth of a self-reliant strategy and a new era in strategic thinking in the 1970s; and the defence of Australia in the 1980s. ^ To these should be added the return to a new form of forward defence in the 1990s, which is manifested in Australia's increasing strategic engagement with regional nations and contributions to both regional and far-distant United

Nations operations.

Following World War II, the Chiefly Labor Government was seeking a more assertive role in the Pacific and it judged that Australia needed a strong navy to fight battles far at sea defending Australia and its vital sea lines of communication in ill defined, but large, parts of the Indian and Pacific Oceans whilst providing the shield behind which the Army and Air

Force could be mobilised in time of need. As a result, it determined that the Navy had to be kept at a high level of readiness with the most modern equipment available. Naval development, particularly the provision of an aircraft carrier capability, was, therefore, considered to be the highest post-war defence priority. ^

During the first two decades after World War II, Australia's security was committed to collective defence with the United Kingdom in the Australia, New Zealand and Malaya

^ H.J. Donohue, 'The Evolution of Australian Strategic Defence Thinking', in D. Laves (Ed), Evolving Pacific Basin Strategies, NDU Press, Washington, 1990, pp.281-289. ® Ray Jones, 'Aircraft Carriers and Australian Defence Policy', in Defence Force Journal No.6f November/December 1986, p.50. (ANZAM) arrangements and the United States in the 1951 Australia, New Zealand and

United States (ANZUS) alliance, both of which greatly increased the Navy's responsibilities in comparison to the pre-war era. In addition, Australia, together with the United Kingdom and the United States became members of the South East Asian Treaty Organisation

(SEATO) when it was formed in 1954/ As a result of these commitments, the Australian government's foreign policy was conditioned by the need to reconcile its strategic interests with those of the United Kingdom as well as the United States. As far as fundamental security interests were concerned, however, the United States was expected to provide the ultimate guarantee, and notwithstanding the sentiment of Prime Minister Robert Menzies that 'we are all Queen's men', it was the American Alliance that counted. ^

Unlike NATO, the ANZUS alliance was demonstrably a maritime alliance which tied the

United States to Australia's security. At the political-diplomatic level the ANZUS naval relationship provided a needed capability 'to meet the common danger'. ^ At the operational- technical level, ANZUS and, to a greater extent, the associated Radford-Collins agreement - which was also signed between the two nations in 1951 - authorised the coordination of operational activities and the establishment of areas of maritime responsibility for surveillance and reconnaissance in peacetime and the control and protection of allied shipping in the Western Pacific and East Indian Oceans, in the event of rising tension or war with the Soviet Union or its allies.

^ The members of SEATO were: Australia, , New Zealand, Pakistan, the , and the United States. ^ Alan Watt, The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy. 1938-1956, Cambridge University Press, 1967, p. 109. ^ Thomas-Durell Young, 'ANZUS Naval Relations, 1951-1985', Eighth Naval History Symposium, Department of History, United States Naval Academy Annapolis, Maryland, 24-25 September 1987, p.5. The ANZUS Treaty did nothing, however, to reduce the Australian area of defence planning or to replace plans for Anglo-Australian wartime co-operation in South East Asia and in the

Middle East. Long-standing interest in sending forces to the Middle East in time of war was taken a step further when Cabinet decided in December 1951 to participate in garrisoning the Middle East ^^ and Australian air force personnel were sent to to man Royal Air

Force fighter squadrons. ^^ The Navy's responsibility expanded to include the protection of convoys carrying army or air force units from Australia to the Middle East as a high priority wartime task. At that time Government decision-making was dominated by the conviction that global war was imminent and that Australia must be prepared to co-operate with its allies in the coming war. ^^

The fear of imminent war faded after 1952 and defence expansion stopped as the

Government tried to reduce spending on national development. ^^ The basis of defence policy altered from urgent preparation for imminent, wide-ranging, war to long-term preparation for emergencies in the South East Asian region. ^^ The Treaty, signed in

September 1954, expressed this fundamental shift in Australian strategy. Menzies explained the new delimitation of Australia's defence area in August 1954 when he said that SEATO

Robert O'Neill, Australia in the 1950-53. Volume I: Strategy and Diplomacy, Canberra, 1981, pp.213, 227-232, 235. ^^ R.G. Menzies, Prime Minister, House of Representatives, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Vol.216, 5 March 1952, p.280. ^^ Jones, op.cit., p.52. ^^ Australia in Facts and Figures, Australian News and Information Bureau, Canberra, Canberra, September 1952, p.33. P. A. McBride, Minister for Defence, House of Representatives, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Vol 5, 28 September 1954, p. 1629. would . . define our task. It will give a clarified direction to our defence organisation. It will mark our zone of possible operations. We will know not generally, but specifically, the nature and extent of the forces we need, the character of the equipment they will require . .

15

During the 1950s, the maritime strategic interests of the United Kingdom, the United States and Australia were largely complementary and this was reflected in Australia's naval force posture and maritime strategy which were determined by the naval leadership whose training, outlooks, assumptions and judgements were very similar to their fellow officers in the United States Navy (USN) and especially in the Royal Navy. It was agreed that the Soviet submarine threat to sea lines of communication, on which Allied forward defence depended, was the greatest danger and the RAN - with its emphasis on anti-submarine warfare - was mainly intended to work in conjunction with other, larger , principally the RN. The primary task of the RAN, whose concept of operations and doctrine firmly remained British, was consequently considered to be the protection of shipping from attack by , and the Australian fleet in the mid-1950s was therefore centred around a light fleet aircraft carrier, escorted by and .

By the early 1960s the political leadership was beginning to appreciate the need for more autonomous defence and security policies, less dependent on Britain and the United States, and strategic assessments suggested a more balanced fleet capable of operations in support

^^ R.G. Menzies, Prime Minister, House of Representatives, Commonwealth Parliamentaiy Debates, Vol.4, 5 August 1954, p.68. of land forces in regional conflict and counter-insurgency warfare as well as wider open

ocean conflicts in coordination with the RN and USN. ^^ Given the strategic reach required, a 'blue water' capability was still needed, and the first post-war naval re-armament programme (1961-1967) included the acquisition of four Oberon class submarines from

Britain, and major US aircraft and ship purchases, notably Tracker and Skyhawk aircraft for

Melbourne and the Charles F. Adams class guided missile destroyers (DDG).

The years following the Korean War were characterised by continuous Australian military involvement in South East Asian wars which included the , a role in the

Indonesian Confrontation of the Federation of , and the .^^ Whilst

RAN had been placed on station in Malayan waters from 1955 and had participated in the Indonesian Confrontation as part of the British Commonwealth forces, the participation

of RAN destroyers in the Vietnam War between 1967 and 1971 heralded the beginning of

closer operational links with the USN and a shift in the navy's concept of operations from the Royal Navy to the US Navy.

The long tradition of'forward defence' started to falter in the late 1960s, largely because of the policies and priorities of Australia's major allies. Firstly, the British Government

announced the withdrawal of most of its military forces deployed East of Suez, which

heralded the demise of the large British military presence in Malaysia and Singapore. Then,

in a statement to the press at in July 1969, the United States President Richard Nixon

16 Donohue, op.cit., p.282. ^^ Jeffrey GxQy, A Military Histoiy of Australia, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 1990, p.215. made it clear that American ground forces would not again be deployed into the Asia-Pacific and that the United States' friends and allies in the region would henceforth be required to conduct their own defence, at least against future regional adversaries.^^ In parallel with these withdrawals some indigenous navies were growing into significant forces which would soon be capable of meeting their own maritime defence needs.

Although it can be argued that these changes had largely been anticipated/^ and that

Australia was slowly beginning to move in the direction of self-reliance, this movement was undoubtedly considerably accelerated by these fundamental developments. Britain's withdrawal from East of Suez together with the so-called 'Guam Doctrine', which removed the central pillar of Australia's long-standing policy of 'forward defence', consequently had major implications for Australian security policy and forced Australian decision-makers to finally acknowledge that Australia could no longer rely on its 'great and powerful friends' for protection. As a result, a fundamental review of Australia's defence thinking and security policy was clearly necessary and the direct defence of Australia consequently became the priority national security theme.

The 1972 defence White Paper, the Australian Defence Review, was the first public indication of a change in strategic thinking and focus. Although this paper acknowledged

^^ Graeme Cheeseman, The Search for Self-Reliance: Australian Defence Since Vietnam, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1993, p.xv. ^^ The 1956 Strategic Basis argued, for example, that there could be future regional conflicts in which direct assistance would not be forthcoming and that Australia should prepare for this possibility, whilst the 1967 Strategic Basis argued that 'irrespective of [its] primary reliance on collective security arrangements, Australia must be prepared to deal with situations which directly threaten our territorial interests and which we could not reasonably rely on receiving help from our allies'. 10

that Australia should assume the primary responsibility for its own conventional defence, it however, continued to define Australia's fiature defence interests primarily in terms of the security of our neighbours and our lines of communications running through these areas. As a result, the White Paper postulated no great changes to Australia's force structure, although it did suggest that the existing balance between 'essentially defensive capabilities and weapons of attack' be adjusted in favour of the latter, largely by improving Australia's naval and air forces. ^^

Efforts to establish a more independent and self-reliant defence posture gained fresh impetus with the election of the Whitlam Labor government in December 1972 and the ending of

Australia's participation in the Vietnam War. The subsequent 1973 Strategic Basis paper, which heralded a new era in strategic thinking, gave increased emphasis to the requirements of local defence and sought to replace the 'expeditionary force' notion, which had driven force structure planning in the past, with a more defensively-oriented 'expansion base' concept noting that there were no major threats to the country or its maritime interests outside of the unlikely contingency of global war. ^^

In the wake of the 1973 Strategic Guidance Paper the Chief of Naval staff argued that the document demanded a credible naval force that was capable of sustained naval operations including power projection. Navy saw the core of the requirement as a 'seaborne aircraft platform (SAP)' with strike aircraft, supported by destroyers in its defence against air.

Cheeseman, op.cit., pp.4-5. ^^ ibid., pp.5-6. 11

surface and sub-surface threats, whilst afloat support would allow sustained operations. The bottom line in the Navy's force structure plans was a on both the east and west coasts of Australia, each having a carrier as its nucleus.

This was a bold plan which was faithftil to the doctrine of sea power. But it inevitably attracted opposition. Within Defence the Navy plan was seen more as an argument for a larger Fleet rather than improved capabilities, whilst from the political standpoint the Labor

Government was not attracted to a RAN built around strike carriers. The power projection aspect in particular was not in keeping with its election platform based on ending Australian involvement in Vietnam and reducing defence spending.

The Whitlam Government planned to ensure Australia's security by developing . . well organised defence forces which are structured for expansion . . .' but favoured '. . . programmes of political conciliation and co-operation rather than military intervention . . .'.

^^ Whilst the need for continued defence preparedness and for defence associations with

South East Asian nations was acknowledged, the interest expressed by previous

Governments in a relatively high degree of readiness was not maintained. Furthermore, whilst 'blue water' operations were nor ruled out, they were given a lower priority.^'^

^^ L.H. Barnard, Minister for Defence, House of Representatives, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Vol.84, 30May 1973,p.2868. ^Mbid.,p.2871. This was manifested in the cancellation of the multi-purpose destroyer project which was replaced by a less capable ship and a replenishment ship which would have extended the effective range of by providing fuel and stores far at sea was cancelled as unnecessary. 12

The ADF consequently began concentrating more on continental defence while defence spending was reduced in favour of social expenditure. ^^ The guiding philosophy became that of maintaining a core force containing a range of skills which could be selectively expanded to suit situations as they developed in future. ^^ The nature of the core force was not defined but there was so much new and nearly new equipment in service after the 1960s expansion that the hard decisions concerning capabilities needed in the core force could be deferred. ^^

The political manifestation of self-reliance was expressed in the 1976 Defence White Paper

Australian Defence which had been commissioned by the Whitlam government but which was eventually released by the newly elected Fraser government. This White Paper confirmed that Australia's armed forces would no longer be developed and trained to be sent abroad to fight as part of some other nations force, although it did not rule out future contributions to allied operations overseas if the requirement arose and the forces could be spared.

As far as tasks were concerned, Australia was to maintain a 'substantial' force-in-being which would be capable, firstly, of independently performing current and foreseeable tasks - including exercising with allies and regional associates, maritime surveillance, 'display' in areas of Australian interest, and United Nations peacekeeping operations - and dealing with

^^ L.H. Barnard, Minister for Defence, House of Representatives, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Vol.85, 22 August 1973, p.240. ^^ibid. 27 Jones, op.cit, p.55. 13

'selected shorter-term contingencies' such as the harassment of coastal shipping. Secondly, the 'core force', would be required to 'possess or have under development or acquisition the structure, equipment and professional skills adequate for timely expansion against a range of

[higher order] contingencies'• • . 28

The naval core force articulated in the 1976 White Paper consisted of the carrier HMAS

Melbourne and its selected mix of fleet aircraft which could provide a naval strike capability against maritime or land targets together with a sea control capability for air defence, reconnaissance, surveillance and anti-submarine warfare missions. The main naval general purpose warfare element consisted of eleven destroyers, whilst the four conventional Oberon class submarines in the inventory were considered to be a 'potent deterrent' and 'the only means of sustained interdiction in areas where local air superiority [could] not be established'.^^

The incentive for Australia to safely turn to the question of how best to defend itself, rather than the region, did not only stem from changes in American foreign and defence policies.

By the second half of the 1970s, tension between the two superpowers had declined, was no longer considered as an expansionist power, and the only wars of any significance being fought in the Asia-Pacific region were between communist states. All this changed, however, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979. The communist

'threat' had again materialised and, in a statement to Parliament in February 1980, the prime

^^Cheeseman, op.cit., p.8. ^^ Department of Dcftnct, Australian Defence, AGPS, Canberra, 1976, pp. 19-20. 14

minister, Malcolm Fraser, declared that the world was 'facing probably its most dangerous international crisis since World War IF.^^

Australia consequently proved willing to provide logistics and staging facilities to a revitalised American naval presence in the Indian Ocean, which provided security for

Australia's vital maritime interests, and Australian naval units, including the carrier

Melbourne, operated regularly with US carrier task groups in the West Indian Ocean and

Arabian Sea during the early 1980s. Furthermore, agreement was reached with the governments of Malaysia and Singapore for the resumption of multi-national exercises under the existing Five-Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) concluded between Australia, New

Zealand, the United Kingdom, Malaysia and Singapore in 1971, and a detachment of

Australian P3 Orion long-range were deployed to Butterworth in

Malaysia to help conduct surveillance operations in the Eastern Indian Ocean and South

China Sea. ^^

As a result of the revitalised 'soviet threat' and the return to the rhetoric of 'forward defence', further progress towards the development and articulation of a more focussed and self-reliant defence posture was delayed until after the election of the Hawke Labor government in 1983.^^ The new government, which initially appeared to signal a return to the policies of Whitlam, conducted a number of reviews early in its term, including a review

House of Representatives, Hansard, 19 February 1980, p. 17. ^^ Fred Crickard, A Tale of two Navies: United States Security and Canadian and Australian Naval Policy during the , MA thesis, Dalhousie University, Halifax, 1993, pp. 195-197. ^^ Cheeseman, op.cit., pp. 10-11. 'Mbid, pp. 11-12. 15

into the importance of the ANZUS Treaty and the joint US-Australian defence facilities to

Australian national security, and in 1985, the then Defence Minister, , commissioned Paul Dibb to prepare a report on Australia's defence capabilities.

The subsequent publication in March 1986 of the Review of Australia's Defence

Capabilities ^^ or 'Dibb Review' as it came to be known, breathed new life into what for some years had been a rather desultory defence debate. Although it did have its deficiencies,

Dibb was able, for the first time, to devise and place on the public record a coherent nationalist strategy for defending the Australian continent and its immediate surrounds against future military threats. ^^

Dibb argued that Australia's principal national interests were: firstly, the avoidance of global conflict; secondly, the maintenance of a favourable strategic situation in South East Asia and the South Pacific; third, the promotion of a sense of strategic community between Australia and those countries located within its so called 'area of direct military interest'; fourth, the defence of Australian territory and society from the threat of military attack; and fifth, the protection of Australian interests in the surrounding maritime environment - including

Australia's proximate sea lines of communication and focal points. Because of Australia's limited resources, Dibb, however, argued that Australia's defence policy should only be concerned with the last three of these basic interests, and that it should rely on non-military means for addressing the first two. The defence strategy chosen by Dibb was that of 'denial'

Paul Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities, Report to the Minister for Defence, AGPS, Canberra, 1986. ^^ Cheeseman, op.cit., p. 16. 16

which advocated that Australia's defence activities be confined to the Australian continent, its territories and its maritime approaches. ^^

Although the Dibb Report was initially viewed with concern by Navy, it was destined to considerably boost Navy's subsequent force structure endeavours and dispel any notions of the RAN becoming a 'brown water' navy. Firstly, the Dibb Report took a fundamental look at Australia's maritime requirements. Secondly, it assessed that based on mission requirements in the air-sea gap, a force of between 6-9 high capability destroyers and up to ten light frigates would be required.

Dibb's report was followed a year later by an official Policy Information Paper The Defence of Australia 1987 (DOA 87). The fundamental defence objectives articulated in this White

Paper, in order of priority, were:

to develop and maintain capabilities for the independent defence of Australia and its

interests;

to promote strategic stability and security in our region; and

as a member of the Western strategic community, to work for a reduction in the level of

tension between the superpowers and to limit the spread of influences in our region

inimical to Western •interests . 37

36 ibid., pp. 12-14. 17

Armed with this basic guidance, the defence establishment began the task of acquiring the additional capabilities and developing the new structures and operational doctrines needed for the Australian Defence Force's more focussed role.

As far as naval forces were concerned, DO A 87 firstly confirmed the requirement for six new submarines and, more importantly, as a result of Dibb's recommendations, increased the

Navy's fleet of major surface combat ships from twelve to sixteen or seventeen destroyers/frigates by endorsing the requirement for eight new Anzac frigates. It also announced the establishment of a two ocean Navy, stating that 'for the first time in peacetime a major portion of the Navy's surface and submarine fleet will be based in

Western Australia'.^^

Although DO A 87 accepted Dibb's recommendation that Australia give priority to defending the Australian mainland and its immediate maritime surrounds, Australia's defence activities were not to end there, in line with what Cheeseman describes as 'the Hawke governments move back to a position of regional engagement not dissimilar to that of its conservative predecessors'. ^^ This was plainly evident in the Government's decision to

^^ Department of Defence, The Defence of Australia 1987, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1987, p. 10. ^^ Department of Defence, The Defence of Australia 1987: An Introduction by the Minister for Defence, AGPS, Canberra, 1987, p.3. ^^ Graeme Cheeseman, 'Defence Policy and Organisation: the Search for Self-Reliance', in P.J. Boyce and J.R. Angel (Ed), Diplomacy in the Marketplace, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1992, p.64. 18

deploy a naval task force to the South Pacific following the military takeover in in May

1987 which will be discussed further in Chapter

Articulation of Australia's interest in its region was subsequently expressed on a number occasions during the ensuing few years. In a speech in Singapore in November 1987, the then defence Minister, Mr Beazley, informed his audience that 'the security of South East

Asia is as important to Australia today as it has ever been . . . Australia cannot be secure in an insecure region' and that the capabilities being developed to defend Australia 'are also ideally suited to fulfilling our responsibilities to cooperate in maintaining regional security'.

^^ Furthermore, the release, in December 1989, of a ministerial statement on Australia's

Regional Security by the Foreign Minister Gareth Evans,'^^ spelt out a regional security doctrine for Australia of 'comprehensive engagement' with the nations of both the South

Pacific and South East Asia, and sought to increase Australia's bilateral military and related links with the countries of ASEAN.

Another important development, although not immediately affecting the defence of

Australia's national territory, was the deployment of an Australian naval task group, in

August 1990, to participate in the blockade of and the subsequent . This commitment was particularly important symbolically as it provided evidence that the government was prepared to commit the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to military

Cheeseman, The Search for Self-Reliance, p. 19. Hon. Kim C. Beazley, MP, 'Australian Perspectives on Regional Security Issues', speech to the Alumni International, Singapore, 19 November 1987, cited in Cheeseman, op.cit., p.20. ^^ Australia's Regional Security, Ministerial Statement by Senator the Hon. Gareth Evans QC, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, December 1989. 19

operations in support of its major ally in locations beyond Australia's 'area of direct military interest'.

Both The Defence of Australia 1987 and Australia's Regional Security were statements prepared in a strategic climate that was dramatically different from that existing today. In less than twelve months the world witnessed the total collapse of the bipolar global structure which resulted in fundamental changes to the international security order and made

Australia's strategic environment increasingly more complex. These global and regional sentiments were articulated in Australia's Strategic Planning in the 1990s (ASP 90) which confirmed the movement towards a policy of 'self-reliance plus' and put a lot more flesh on such concepts as the sea-air gap and regional responses. ASP 90 also informed a major

Defence Department review, conducted between May 1990 and May 1991, of Australia's existing and projected military force structure to meet Australia's defence and regional security priorities over the next ten to fifteen years. The Force Structure Review (FSR) confirmed the basic capabilities contained in the 1987 defence White Paper, with one important addition: a strategic lift capacity to respond to requests for assistance from regional nations. In order to carry out this new role, the review recommended that the government acquire a helicopter support ship and a number of utility to transport and lodge troops and supplies ashore. ^^

A further important step was the release of the Strategic Review 1993 (SR 93), which reinforced the primary importance of the Defence of Australia and self-reliance, but went

43 Department of Defence, Force Structure Review 1991, AGPS, Canberra, 1991, pp.28-29. 20

further than previous documents in linking the defence of Australia and the increasing strategic partnership with regional nations across the whole sphere of national activity.

SR 93 also articulated the continuing importance of the US alliance and Australia's interest in the effectiveness of global security mechanisms and its commitment to operations that contribute to a more secure global environment.

The most recent defence planning document to be released was the 1994 defence White

Paper Defending Australia, which provided a comprehensive review of Australian defence policy and explained the basis of Australian defence planning for the following 15 years.

Defending Australia, which took into account the many changes in world and regional affairs that had occurred since The Defence of Australia 1987 was published, maintained the fundamental commitment to the self-reliant defence of Australia and increasing strategic engagement with regional nations, and built upon the results of the important policy changes introduced in statements and reviews during the preceding few years.

With respect to Australia's alliance with the United States, Defending Australia and in particular, recent Coalition Government statements, continue to emphasise that the maintenance, and indeed strengthening, of this close alliance remains important for

Australia's national strategic posture, and that continuation of a US strategic role in the

Asia-Pacific region is of major importance for both regional and wider global security.

The importance of a strong, modern navy has been clearly stated in successive White Papers and planning documents since the release of DOA 87 which recognised that capable. 21

balanced, maritime forces are the basic requirement for the effective defence of Australia, its maritime interests and increasing strategic partnership with regional nations. The current self-reliant defence-in-depth strategy - which is accepted by politicians and opinion-makers as being fundamental to Australia's maritime sovereignty and defence - consequently places a high priority on maritime forces capable of forward operations in the sea-air gap in the north and north-west together with the need for surveillance and response in proximate waters.

Furthermore, the use of maritime forces as instruments of regional security policy, aimed at encouraging stability and orderly oceans management in the South West Pacific and South

East Asia - where Australia has a strategic interest in the maintenance of a stable maritime regime that permits freedom of navigation through important focal areas and choke points"*"* - is now clearly understood.

Australia has consequently developed and articulated an autonomous maritime defence strategy in recent years which not only supports the defence of Australia, but also Australia's security and foreign policy objectives in the Asia-Pacific region.This strategy, which is based on sea control is described as "... a complex interdependency of geographical, economic, technical and human factors as well as military capabilities". Moreover

Australian operational concepts, capability requirements and its sea-air force mix - which is capable of asserting sea control along with a significant local power projection capability -

'"•ibid, pp. 12-13. Crickard, op.cit., p.219. W.S.G. Bateman and R.J. Sherwood, Principles of Australian Maritime Operations, Working Paper No 265, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1992, p.2. 22

are designed to implement this strategy. As W.S.G. Bateman and

R.J. Sherwood wrote in 1992:

A maritime defence force posture is emerging in Australia today. This is apparent from capital equipment projects in the pipeline (primarily the Anzac frigates and the Collins class submarines), from the provision of maritime strike capabilities for Royal Australian Air Force aircraft ... the two-ocean naval basing policy . . . and the acquisition of over-the-horizon are the core of the national maritime surveillance system ... In other words, Australia's security policy must be able to establish control of the sea in areas where Australian interests are at stake.

Although Australia's recent search for self-reliance has been complicated and at times constrained by changing circumstances, perceptions, personalities and most recently governments, the objectives of the 1987 White Paper have largely remained unaltered, except for the increased attention given to the regional and global dimensions of defence policy. Whilst the strategic alliance with the US remains the enabling factor in securing

Australia's security and its continuing place in the Western alliance, Australia's policies on regional security and the protection of its territory and vital maritime interests are indigenous. The ADF and RAN have consequently developed an autonomous maritime defence posture which not only supports the defence of Australia, but also Australia's security and foreign policy objectives in the Asia-Pacific region.

'' ibid, p. 12. Graeme Cheeseman, 'An Effective and Affordable Defence for Australia' in Gary Smith and St John Kettle (Ed), Threats without Enemies, Pluto Press, Leichhardt, 1992, p.295. ^^ Crickard, op.cit., p.219. 23

CHAPTER 2

Wings at Sea: Australian carrier aviation, 1948-1983

The aircraft carrier is the most complete projection of maritime power yet devised. It has an excellent strategic value and as well as reconnaissance, early warning and fighter defence, it can provide a flexible anti-submarine force; it also has the capability to support land forces.

Hector Donohue ^

Few changes in naval warfare have been as all embracing as the role played by the aircraft carrier, which is, without doubt, the most impressive, and at the same time the most controversial, manifestation of sea power. ^ From experiments conducted by Britain before

1914 the aircraft carrier rose to pre-eminence during and after World War II following its eclipse of the as the principal in the world's navies. Although the fiindamentals of sea power remained unaltered, the use of air weapons transformed the nature of war at sea by extending naval power well beyond the range of surface gunfire. Sea battles, instead of encompassing tens of miles, took place over hundreds of miles, and the aircraft carrier and her aircraft, when combined with the submarine, for the first time forced naval strategists and tacticians to think in three, rather than two dimensions. This in turn,

^ H.J. Donohue, 'Naval Air Power and the RAN' 'm Journal of the Australian Naval Institute, Vol.1, No. 2, November 1975, p. 16. ^ Norman Friedman, Carrier Air Power, Conway Maritime Press, Greenwich, 1981, p.7. 24

forced nations defending their territory to make their first line of defence hundreds of miles

offshore. ^

These lessons, which were aptly demonstrated in all theatres of naval operations during

World War II, particularly in the Pacific, were not lost on the RAN. Before the war ended the Australian Defence Committee made it clear, on strategic grounds, that a balanced

Australian naval fleet should be moulded around aircraft carriers - which were ideally suited to sea control missions in the protection of Australia's sea lines of communication - and that provision should be made for this type of ship in the RAN. ^

The RAN's dalliance with the aeroplane dates as far back as 1917 when the light

HMAS embarked a Sopwith for use in the hunt for a German armed merchant-cruiser in the Indian Ocean. Later that same year, and early in 1918, both the battle cruiser HMAS Australia and the HMAS successfully launched aircraft, whilst the cruiser HMAS Melbourne was also fitted to carry an aircraft. Following these experiments, all three ships maintained the capability to operate aircraft until the end of hostilities. In 1923, the Naval Board, adopting a policy similar to that of the Royal Navy, instituted an Observer branch in which some personnel were selected for pilot training with the Royal Australian Air Force,^ whilst two years later the decision was taken to construct a purpose-built seaplane carrier in Australia. ^

^ Robert Gardiner (Ed), Navies in the Nuclear Age: Warships since 1945, Conway Maritime Press, Greenwich, 1993, p. 14. , Navy Australia, National Book Distributors, Sydney, 1993, p. 157. ^ After obtaining a pilot's certificate, personnel wore RAAF uniform on service and naval uniform on all occasions when field dress was not worn. This was to cause considerable service identity problems. ^ Alun Evans, vl Navy for Australia, ABC Enterprises, Sydney, 1986, p. 124. Seagull III A9-2 makes a slow approach to HMAS ALBATROSS prior to being recovered aboard. Note the raised aircraft wheel on the side of the fuselage and the pilot in his sunken bow cockpit.

Bow view of HMAS A LB A TR OSS. The three cranes are mounted, two to starboard and one to port. 25

This seaplane carrier was commissioned as HMAS Alhcitvoss in January 1929, and a month

later embarked Number 101 Flight of the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), flying

Supermarine Seagulls. Although the Albatross performed usefully, she was prematurely

paid-ofF after only four years service as a consequence of the and was

subsequently handed over to the British Admiralty in part payment for the new cruiser

HMAS . So ended the Navy's first active participation in the arcane and stimulating

art of operating aircraft from purpose-built ships, although individual continued to

operate largely flown and maintained by RAAF or Royal Navy personnel, with

some RAN observers. ^

Although Winston Churchill made the offer of an aircraft carrier to the Australian

Government in May 1944, the War Cabinet decided against taking it up, being influenced in its decision by British and American naval superiority in the Pacific at the time. In mid-1945 the War Cabinet again deferred the question of aircraft carriers for the RAN until post-war

defence policy pointed the way to the nature, strength and organisation of the Australian armed forces as a whole. The RAN with three ageing cruisers was now obsolescent by modern standards and the navy pressed for a program of re-equipment strongly emphasising that the acquisition of aircraft carriers and the formation of a Naval Air Branch was essential to enable the navy to conduct aerial anti-submarine warfare operations and provide air

' ibid. 26

defence for the Fleet. The Secretary, Department of the Navy, Mr A.R. Nankervis, warned that without an air arm the navy would virtually cease to exist as a first-line naval force. ^

In 1945 Commander V.A.T. Smith (later Admiral Sir ) was asked to prepare an outline paper for the formation of a RAN Fleet Air Arm.^ The plan was well received by the Naval Board, and in April 1946 the Prime Minister, Mr Chifley, authorised the Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Sir Louis Hamilton, to open discussions with the

Admiralty on the acquisition of aircraft carriers and the establishment of a Fleet Air Arm

(FAA). The Admiralty offered to transfer two light fleet carriers to the RAN for the price of one and recommended that the carriers should be equipped with the same type of aircraft as those used by the Royal Navy Fleet Air Arm (Fireflies and Sea Furies). It also advised that to maintain two operational carriers, three carrier air groups would be required as well as a minimum of one naval air station equipped to provide all maintenance short of major repairs. ^^

Although the Admiralty pressed for an early decision, it was not until mid-1947, when the

Government made major decisions on post-war defence policy involving all three services, that the navy was authorised to implement its plan to provide the RAN with a modern, balanced fleet, capable of operating as an independent force. ^^ As a result the Five Year

^ Odgers, op.cit., p. 157. ^ Department of Defence, Background Information to the Decision to purchase a new Aircraft Carrier for the Royal Australian Navy, Directorate of Public Relations, Canberra, 25 February 1982, p.32. ^Sbid. The lack of afloat support, however, meant that the RAN remained dependent on the RN and US Navy to deploy its ships operationally. This remained the case until the commissioning of the fleet oiler HMAS Supply in 1962. 27

Defence Plan introduced in June 1947 made provision for the acquisition of two light fleet carriers and their aircraft together with the establishment of the necessary shore infrastructure to support operations. ^^ The fact that the Admiralty's naval aviation proposal was accepted without question clearly shows the strong RN influence on

RAN force structure planning at the time.

In announcing the defence decisions in Parliament, the Minister for Defence, Mr J.J.

Dedman, said that the Australian experience in the recent war had fully demonstrated the fundamental importance of sea power to Australian defence. 'Aircraft,' Mr Dedman said,

'having become integral elements of a naval force, and, as the modern fleet is built around aircraft carriers, the main feature of the naval programme is the provision of two light fleet carriers each with a wartime complement of 36 aircraft.' ^^

The aircraft carriers being acquired reflected Australia's naval ambitions. At the time, aircraft carriers were categorised as fleet carriers or as light fleet carriers. Fleet carriers, which shared the ability of pre-war to strategically dominate their surroundings, were large, fast ships carrying as many as 100 aircraft of several different types. The light was a smaller ship carrying about 30 aircraft, usually of two types including reconnaissance aircraft for control of the surrounding ocean and fighters for defence against attacking aircraft. The large and expensive fleet carrier was beyond Australia's aspirations

^^Odgers, op.cit., p. 157. ^^ House of Representatives, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, 4 June 1947, pp.3335-3339. 28

and budget while the light fleet carrier, which was intended to exercise 'sea control', met

Australia's perceived need and financial capacity.

At the time of this announcement it had not been decided whether the RAN or the RAAF would provide the air component of the Naval Air Branch. The navy view was that an efficient ship depended primarily on the welding together of her company to provide a single unit and this could be achieved only with personnel trained in and owing a single allegiance to the naval service. The upshot was that the Defence Council accepted the navy plan and on 3 July 1947 the Prime Minister, Mr Chifley, gave Government approval (later endorsed by Cabinet) for the control of the naval air branch to follow the proposals of the navy plan.^^

The decision to acquire aircraft carriers added a new dimension to the RAN capability and was one of the most significant developments in its history. Orders were quickly placed in

Britain for two 15 700 ton light fleet carriers of the Majestic class. Six of these carriers had been laid down during World War II but work had been suspended in May 1946.

Australia's first aircraft carrier, HMAS Sydney, commissioned in on 16 December

1948, only 19 months after the Government decided to proceed with the establishment of a

Fleet Air Arm. Sydney arrived in Australian waters the following May with the 20th Carrier

Air Group comprising 805 Squadron with 12 Hawker Sea Furies and 816 Squadron with 12

^^ A.R. Pedder, 'Aircraft Carriers and Their Aircraft', ^/rcrq/?, October 1951, pp.20-21, 62, cited in Ray Jones, "Aircraft Carriers and Australian Defence Policy', Defence Force Journal No.61, November/December 1986, p.50. ^^ Odgers, op.cit., p. 158. MAS Sydney, Firefly and Sea Fury aircraft are parked aft starboar^^d port res^ctively. 29

Fairey Fireflies embarked/^ Sea Furies were fighters and the Fireflies triple-purpose aircraft for use on bombing, reconnaissance and anti-submarine missions. Pilots in the group included both RAN members and experienced RN pilots who were to provide essential background and experience until RAN air crew were fully trained. In the meantime, on 31

August 1948, the RAN had commissioned a naval air station at Nowra as HMAS Albatross, whilst a second shore station was established at Schofields, near Sydney, in 1951. ^^

After the arrival of Sydney, the development of the RAN's naval aviation capabilities became the RAN's highest priority until the Korean War intervened. From the outset of this war both British and US aircraft carriers were involved in maintaining the blockade of North

Korea and supporting United Nations' operations in South . Although Australian destroyers and frigates served in Korean waters from the outbreak of hostilities in June

1950, Sydney was not involved, principally because the Menzies government was reluctant to lose direct control over Australia's only aircraft carrier. ^^

In April 1951, however, the British Government requested that Sydney be made available to relieve the Royal Navy carrier then serving in Korean waters while it completed a much needed refit. As this would only be for a short period, the Government agreed to the British request, ^^ and in October 1951 Sydney began her first patrol off the Korean coast.

^^ Background Information to the Decision to purchase a new Aircraft Carrier for the Royal Australian A^av>',op.cit., p.33. ^^ Odgers, op.cit, p. 158. ^^ Robert O'l^dW, Australia in the Korea War 1950-53, Volume II: Combat Operations, Canberra, 1985, p.466. ibid, p.467. 30

The war Sydney waged in Korean waters demonstrated the versatility of an aircraft carrier beyond the sea control role for which she had been acquired and involved the RAN in naval

• • 20 power projection operations. As well as providing support to naval surface forces, daily raids were made against enemy supply areas, troop concentrations and bridges far removed from the sea.^^ Sydney also provided close support for United Nations forces in contact with the enemy. ^^ The Australian Naval Board consequently had every reason to be delighted, and possibly a little surprised, at the carrier's effectiveness as the flexibility of carrier air power was brought home to the RAN. ^^

The commitment of a carrier to the Korean War gave Australia the distinction of being the third nation, after the United States and Britain, to gain operational experience with aircraft carriers in the post-war period. From a political perspective the carrier's visible participation assisted Menzies in meeting Truman's pressure for more support for the Korean War, whilst simultaneously freeing an American carrier for duties elsewhere in the world noting the widely held belief that the Korean War was the opening move in a Soviet global offensive. ^^

The term 'power projection' has two meanings dependent on the maritime or continental standpoint of the user: usage here is the maritime one of projecting naval power from sea onto the land. Stansfield Turner, 'Designing a Modern Navy', Power at Sea, Adelphi Paper No. 123, pp.25-32. ^^ According to Robert Jackson, in his book^/r War over Korea, London, 1973, chapter 11, one third of Sydney's daily flying was devoted to ensuring control of her immediate vicinity whilst the remaining two thirds of her flying was devoted to attacks on land targets. ^^ Department of Defence (Navy),^/? Outline of Australian Naval History, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1976, p.51. ^^ Ray Jones, "Aircraft Carriers and Australian Defence Policy', in Defence Force Journal No.61, November/December 1986, p.51. Robert O'Neill, Australia in the Korean War 1950-53, Volume I: Strategy and Diplomacy, Canberra, 1981,p.251. 31

While the Korean War was being fought naval aviation was undergoing fundamental changes, the operation of jet aircraft at sea being the most significant development. This was followed by the introduction of three crucial devices by the Royal Navy - the steam catapult, the angled and the mirror landing aid - which made it possible for relatively small carriers to operate modern high-performance jet aircraft and thus remain competitive with land-based air forces. ^^ The angle deck, in particular, was such a valuable concept that introduction was swift and by the mid-1950s the Royal Navy decreed that jet aircraft would no longer operate from straight deck, World War II design, carriers such as

Sydney. ^^

As a result of these fundamental developments and the Australian Government's determination that the Fleet Air Arm should be as modern as possible, HMAS Melbourne, which had been expected to in 1952, was significantly delayed while these improvements in aircraft carrier design were incorporated. As the Government was gravely concerned at this delay in completing its naval aviation plan, because of the belief that global war was imminent, it sought a temporary substitute from the British government which lent the light fleet carrier HMS VengeancQ to Australia in 1952 to provide a second operational carrier. ^^ She was commissioned into the RAN as HMAS Vengeance at Devonport on 13

November 1952 and reverted to Royal Navy control in 1955 when Melbourne was commissioned into the RAN. ^^

^^ Norman Friedman, British Carrier Aviation, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1988, p.7. ^^ Norman Polmar, Aircraft Carriers, London, 1969, pp.573-575. ^^ Australia in Facts and Figures, Australian News and Information Bureau, Canberra, March 1952, p.28. ^^ Odgers, op.cit., p.l59. Below: Starboard bow view of HMAS Melbourne. The aircraft on deck include Gannets and Sea Venoms. 32

y^hQn Melbourne finally commissioned in the United Kingdom on 28 October 1955 she was one of the most modern aircraft carriers in the World. Considerable RAN pride in the ship, and in her capable new aircraft, was, however, offset by the realisation that Sydney and her aircraft, had entered premature obsolescence because the rapid progress in carrier design had left her behind. Although she had been in service for less than ten years, and some aircraft bought to equip her squadrons had flown only a few hours, Sydney - without an angled- deck, steam catapult and mirror landing aid - was now obsolete. Although arrangements had earlier been made to return her to Britain to be modernised to operate jet aircraft, well before she was due to leave Australia, defence strategy shifted, naval aviation lost its pride of place and Sydney's planned modernisation was cancelled to save money.^^

By the mid-1950s the fear of imminent war had faded and Australian attention was firmly fixed on the SEATO region, aircraft carriers were less relevant to defence strategy and the

Government was less willing to allocate more fiinds to naval aviation. As a result, the two carrier plan was abandoned and the decision made that the un-modernised Sydney would be relegated to a non-flying training role following the arrival of Melbourne. ^^ From that time on a single carrier was retained in a navy which primarily concentrated on operating surface warships for anti-submarine operations.

^^ Jones, op.cit., p.52. Sydney remained in commission as a until 1958. She subsequently recommissioned as a Fast Troop Transport in March 1962 and undertook 23 voyages to South Vietnam between 1965 and 1972. Sydney paid off for disposal in November 1973 and finally left Sydney under tow for Korean breakers in December 1975. 33

HMAS Melbourne sailed from Glasgow on 11 March 1956 after conducting sea trials with

her embarked Sea Venom jet fighters and turbo-prop anti-

submarine aircraft. When she reached Australia in April 1956 she became flagship,^^ and before the year was over, had completed her first annual deployment to South East Asia as

part of Australia's commitment to the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve. The Strategic

Reserve, established in Malaya by Australia, Britain and New Zealand contributed forces

ready to defend Malaya and for SEATO activities. ^^ As well as two destroyers or frigates

stationed in the region an annual visit by Australia's aircraft carrier had been promised.

Providing an aircraft carrier for SEATO exercises each year enhanced Australia's regional

status but this significant contribution to the defence of South East Asia became increasingly

difficult to maintain in the later 1950s as the ftill effects of Government policy were felt.^^

The pressing issue for the then Minister for the Navy, Senator and the First

Naval Member Vice Admiral Sir , as the Navy came to the end of the 1950s, was the future of Melbourne and the fixed wing element of the Fleet Air Arm. The crux of the problem was encapsulated in a letter Burrell wrote to his American counterpart, the

Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh Burke. It said in part:

We in Australia are having to face up to the need for a big re-equipment programme and the number one problem from the Navy's point of view is whether our Fleet Air Arm continues after 1963-64 when our Sea Venoms and Gannets reach the end of the road. The first question which has to be answered is 'can be afford it?' and that is being thrashed out at

^^ Odgers, op.cit., pp. 158-9. ^^ T.B. Mi\\2ir, Australia in Peace and War, Canberra, 1978, p.240. ^^ Jones, op.cit., p.53. 34

present. If the answer, which I hope to have from the government in July is that we can, then we hope to find a suitable aircraft (at a price we can pay) and a carrier to put it in as our Melbourne won't be able to take any new generation aircraft.^"^

The RAN was therefore faced with three options, the first to pay-off Melbourne and disband the fixed wing elements of the FAA; secondly, retain Melbourne as a helicopter carrier or finally, replace Melbourne and acquire new generation aircraft. However, the Navy was soon faced with a fait-accompli. On 26 November 1959 the Menzies Government announced that naval fixed wing aviation would end in 1963 when the Sea Venoms and Gannets would reach the end of their service lives and that Melbourne would be retained in reserve to serve as a helicopter carrier in time of war. In announcing this decision, the Minister for Defence, Mr Athol Townley said that:

A replacement carrier of a more modem type, that would be suitable to our requirements and within our Budget, is not available from any likely sources. The construction of a new carrier . . . could not be seriously considered; the cost would be completely prohibitive, and the time required for new construction would not meet our needs. In any case, the position is that naval aviation is now a complex and costly enterprise, both in respect of carrier and aircraft. It is therefore extremely doubtful if it is possible for a small navy such as the Royal Australian Navy to keep pace with modem developments in this field, without unduly prejudicing other defence activities . . . ^^

R.N. Wallace, The Australian Purchase of Three United States Guided Missile Destroyers: A Study of the Defence Aspect of Australian-American Relations, PliD Thesis, Tufts University, 1980, p. 140. ^^ A.G. Townley, Minister for Defence, House of Representatives, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Vol.25, 26 November 1959, p.3184. 35

By the beginning of 1960 there was a growing concern amongst Australian Defence planners of the increasing submarine threat in the Pacific. The USSR had over 450 nuclear and conventional boats, China had a rapidly growing fleet of over 25 boats, while had two former Soviet submarines with more on the way.^^ As a result of this situation, the Naval Board, in June 1960, considered whether to press for Melbourne to be kept in commission as an anti-submarine helicopter carrier. Although the feeling of the Board was that the cost of 3 million pounds a year to keep the ship in service was best spent elsewhere, Gorton argued persuasively that Melbourne should be kept in commission, and being familiar with the financial aspects of his portfolio, convinced the Board that it could be achieved for less than this amount. As a result Gorton took his strong advocacy to the Minister for Defence and stated:

a decision to put her [Melbourne] in reserve, on the temis proposed, involves having a helicopter wing at Nowra which never goes to sea or operates with other navies, a carrier tied up in Sydney manned by a crew which never goes to sea, and a reduction in naval manpower which will be required as the SAGW [surface-to-air guided weapons] ships, or other ships come into service.^^

As a result of this submission , the Government altered its position on the disposal of Melbourne and decided to retain the ship in the new role of an anti-submarine helicopter carrier. To this end twelve Mk 31A anti-submarine helicopters were

^^Raymond V.B. Blackman (Ed), Jane's Fighting Ships 1960-61, Sampson, Low, Marston & Co., London, 1960, pp.118, 186 and 408. ^^ Minister for Defence, Submission to Cabinet, Summaiy of Recommendations for the Navy Programme, Submission No. 898, 25 October 1960, p.7. 36

ordered from the United Kingdom. Helicopters using dipping sonar to detect submerged

submarines had been introduced in leading navies in the 1950s and had rapidly become an integral and essential part of a modern balanced anti-submarine warfare (ASW) force. The

ASW helicopter had the unique capability of being able to deploy an active sonar of similar capability to that fitted in a destroyer whilst being able to move from one search position to another at a speed some four times faster than a nuclear submarine.^^ Using Australia's aircraft carrier for anti-submarine helicopter operations would make effective use of

Melbourne's remaining service life and significantly contribute to the Fleet's ASW capability.^^

By 1962, when these helicopters entered service with the RAN, Government assessments of instability in Australia's region had prompted a return to a policy of maintaining well equipped, readily available, permanent forces with the mobility to deal with limited war crises; at least until help from powerftil friends arrived. As a result, Menzies announced substantial increases in defence expenditure'^^ and major equipment programmes were implemented to repair the neglect of the 1950s. This new defence effort included revived interest in freedom to use the ocean and Menzies was now speaking of a Navy ready to escort an division overseas and for forces which provided '. . . a capacity

^^ N.E. Lee, 'Sea King - An introduction', in Navy Quarterly, Vol 1, No.4, October 1972, p.20. ^^ Jones, op.cit., p.53. A.G. Townley, Minister for Defence, House of Representatives, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Vol.26, 29 March 1960, pp.648-649. ^^ ibid. 37 for independent action to meet the initial shock of any emergency with which we may in the future find ourselves faced . . .'

The flexibility and extended range capability of naval aviation met this aim. As a result, it was announced that the fixed wing element of naval aviation would continue beyond the previously stated 1963 deadline pending a decision on replacement aircraft and that Melbourne would consequently not be employed solely as a helicopter carrier. ^^ As a result, Navy proposed that Melbourne be fully modernised to take American Grumman S-2 Tracker anti-submarine aircraft as replacements for the ship's Gannet aircraft. Furthermore, as it was estimated that the additional modifications required to make the ship a 'major air defence ship' would cost only an additional 500,000 pounds, Navy proposed acquiring Douglas A-4 Skyhawk fighter/ from the US as replacements for the carrier's Sea Venoms for both air defence and strike roles. It was the latter role that received the most resistance, and there was considerable opposition to this proposal from Townley and the other services. As a result. Cabinet only approved the purchase of Tracker aircraft and the limited modification of Melbourne to an AS W carrier.

Gorton was, however, persistent in his quest to maintain Navy's air defence and strike capabilities. He unsuccessfully tried again in late 1963. This time he gave Townley a revised plan for the acquisition of a modernised replacement carrier able to take strike and

R.G. Menzies, Prime Minister, House of Representatives, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Vol.38, 22May 1963,p.l671. 43 ibid, p. 1670. 38

ASW aircraft. The ship would come from the US Navy and would cost around 150 million

pounds.

The push for a strike capability illustrated the differing interpretation of the Forward

Defence Policy within Defence. Navy saw maritime strike as a logical adjunct to its

capabilities and in keeping with the broad thrust of Defence policy. It was also consistent with the Naval Board's notions of sea power and its efforts to build up a balanced Fleet.

Another key aspect, and one that was perhaps not pushed as forcefully as it might have been, was the need for adequate organic fighter protection for the Fleet. To the RAAF, however, the Skyhawk was seen as a direct competitor to funds for the F-111 and they were at pains to highlight the inferior subsonic performance of the Skyhawk.

By 1965, Navy's persistence for an air defence and strike capability for Melbourne paid

dividends with Government approval being given to the acquisition of ten A-4G Skyhawk fighter/attack aircraft from the US as replacements for the carrier's Sea Venoms. In addition to their strike role, these aircraft would enhance sea control during convoy operations by thwarting enemy reconnaissance aircraft and could drive off enemy warships threatening the convoy. ^^ This turn-around in fortunes was in part due to the strong argument made that the Skyhawk would be very effective in countering the new naval weapon of the sixties, the

'The Defence Row', The Bulletin, 26 October 1963, p. 17. F.C. Chaney, Minister for the Navy, House of Representatives, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Vol.48, 26 October 1965, p.2167. 39

fast missile boat;"^^ with Indonesia having received her final batch of Komar class missile boats from the USSR the previous year.'^^

These modern aircraft, which embarked m Melbourne in 1969, stretched the World War II- built ship to her limits. The margins for error were extremely narrow, and it is a tribute to the professionalism of all concerned that operations were carried out as successfiilly as they were for the remainder oiMelbourne's service in the RAN. As Jones points out, three types of aircraft in a light fleet carrier was a squeeze, especially when each type was larger, had more extensive workshop requirements, and demanded more personnel for maintenance and operation than the World War II aircraft for which the ship had been designed. But none of the three types (dipping sonar helicopters, fighters and anti-submarine aircraft) could be omitted if the sea control capability the Government sought was to be maintained.

By 1970 the Government had developed even greater expectations and wanted forces which were . . versatile and flexible and capable of rapid deployment over a wide range of situations . . .' and '. . . capable of a rapid response, with an offensive capability that would be an effective deterrent because it would enable us to reach out to an enemy . . .' The geographic scope of this ability was described as . .the waters around Australia, the

Pacific and Indian Oceans and the seas to our north . . .'. ^^

^^ The dawning of this new phase in war at sea was to be dramatically brought home to the world's navies by the sinking of the Israeli destroyer Eilat in 1967 by a Russian made Styx missile fired from an Egyptian Osa class . Raymond V.B. Blackman (Ed), Jane's Fighting Ships J969-70, Sampson, Low, Marston & Co., London, 1969, p. 154. Jones, op.cit., p.54. J.M. Eraser, Minister for Defence, House of Representatives, Coimnonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Vol.66, 10 Mar 1970, pp.236, 242. 40

As in the past, an aircraft carrier fitted well with these aims and consideration of new Fleet

Air Arm equipment for both sea control and power projection operations reflected

Government interest. As Melbourne had at least ten years of life left ^^ her capabilities were

expanded by acquiring additional Skyhawks to provide an alternative aircraft mix. In this way Australia's only capital ship became a light attack rather than a purely ASW carrier with

Melbourne now able to operate a general purpose (or sea control) air group of helicopters, anti-submarine aircraft and strike/fighters or alternatively 14 Skyhawks to fill the role of a

small attack carrier. ^^ Furthermore, as Jones points out, the air group composition could be altered while the carrier remained at sea. This was demonstrated in 1970 two Skyhawks from Nowra flew across Australia, refuelling in flight from other Skyhawks enroute, and landed on Melbourne in the Indian Ocean. ^^

According to Jones, the option of using Melbourne in the power projection role, especially using in-flight refiielling to extend the range over which targets could be attacked, gave

Australia a small, but potent, capability not previously available." RAAF F-llls were nominally Australia's strategic strike weapon but, while operating from Australian airfields, their range limited them to targets in Indonesia or Papua New Guinea. ^^ F-llls operating from RAAF Butterworth in Malaysia would have a wider choice of targets but considerable

Department of Defence, Defence Report 1972, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1972, p. 10. Department of Defence, Defence Report 1971, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1971, p.22. ^^ Jones, op.cit., p.54. '' ibid. ^^ Current Affairs Bulletin, November 1969, Vol.44, pp.203-205. 41

political problems were to be expected operating from Malaysia. Melbourne was not,

however, limited by basing considerations and filled the Government's desire for a capability to project Australian power beyond the Australian continent into the Indian Ocean and to help friends in South East Asia. ^^

A further development in 1970 was the selection of the British Mk50

anti-submarine helicopter as the replacement for Melbourne's, Wessex helicopters. ^^ This

steady flow of new equipment generated confidence in the future within the Fleet Air Arm but underlying this optimism was the knowledge that Melbourne was approaching the end of her life and a replacement decision was badly needed. This growing urgency coincided with

a period of great change in maritime warfare in general and in Australia's strategic situation

in particular."

The advent and rapid spread of long-range anti-ship homing missiles, which eclipsed the gun as the standard method of engagement between surface ships,^^ meant that defensive measures had to extend out to much greater distances from ships being protected. This meant that navies such as the RAN, seeking sea control, had to expand the area of ocean which they controlled around a convoy. Since missile launch platforms could be aircraft,

ships or submarines the problem was immense and generated demands for more aircraft to survey the air, surface and sub-surface around a convoy to find and, if necessary, attack

^^ D.E. Fairbairn, Minister for Defence, House of Representatives, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Vol.77, 28 March 1972, pp. 1247-1256. ^^ D.E. Fairbairn, Minister for Defence, House of Representatives, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Vol.79, 16 August 1972, pp.205, 207. Jones, op.cit., p.54. ^^ Anthony J. Watts (Ed), Warships and Navies 1973, Ian Allan, London, 1972, p.55. 42

missile launch platforms. As shore based aircraft could not reach much of Australia's

oceanic area of interest the aircraft had to be carrier-borne. But a new carrier was needed if the RAN was expected to implement existing defence policy in this new technological

environment.^^

Changes in the regional power balance were equally as important. In the 1970s, when the replacement of Melbourne become urgent because of the carrier's age, defence attitudes had altered again in response to external changes. As discussed in Chapter 1, the withdrawal of

British forces from east of Suez, the defeat of the United States in Vietnam, the Guam

Doctrine and the election of the Whitlam Government all led to important changes in

defence and naval policy, whilst the Navy's long term force structure plans were

experiencing considerable difficulty. However, as the Government did not perceive aircraft carrier capabilities as being important to Australia, naval plans to replace Melbourne made little progress while Whitlam was in power.^^

The Fraser government on the other hand, initially reverted to a more outward looking defence policy and, after most RAN Tracker aircraft were destroyed in a fire ashore in 1976, that Government quickly obtained replacement Trackers from the US and ensured that Melbourne continued operating the three types of aircraft needed to assure sea control.

But a new sense of geographic limit not present in coalition government policy in the 1960s was expressed in the 1976 White Paper. Whilst the need for strategic deterrence over longer

^^ Jones, op.cit., p.55. ^^ibid.. 43

ranges was clear, it placed a definite restriction on the distance out to sea Australia was

prepared to defend maritime trade.^^

The main forces to deter attack on Australia were land-based F-llls, submarines, and the

Skyhawks \n Melbourne. After a survey of her condition the carrier's expected life had been

extended to 1985 and her aircraft could useftjlly remain in service well beyond 1985. ^^ The

carrier's remaining life was used to justify deferring a replacement decision and naval

aviation plans in the succeeding Five Year Defence Program. Although escalating costs pushing against reluctance to increase defence spending forced reductions in the 1976 re-

equipment plans^^ the Government remained committed to the core force concept. But the

capabilities needed in that force were not decided and the policy tended, in practice, to lock the Government into replacing equipment solely to avoid losing a capability from the core force regardless of its relevance to Australia's ftiture needs. This attitude, however, meant that the Government was favourably disposed towards buying another aircraft carrier to avoid losing expertise in naval aviation.^"^

After a world-wide issue of an invitation to register interest in participating in the aircraft carrier project, much deliberation and numerous in house and ftinded studies to assist the

Government judgements whether to acquire a carrier or not, the Federal Government announced in September 1980 its intention to replace Melbourne with a new purpose-

^^ Department oiX^QftncQ, Australian Defence, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, November 1976, p.6., para.24. ^^ ibid., p.20, para.48. ^^ D.J. Killen, Minister for Defence, House of Representatives, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Vol.111, 24 October 1978, p.2193. Jones, op.cit., p.55. 44 designed helicopter carrier with the potential to operate short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) aircraft. Although advances in technology meant that the embarked helicopters and planned STOVL fighters (if procured) would have nearly the same capabilities as the three aircraft types in Melbourne, the brief announcement did not explain Australia's need for the ship nor how an aircraft carrier would fit in Australia's defence strategy or force structure for the 1980s and beyond.^^

The decision to proceed with the acquisition of a new purpose built carrier was, however, reconsidered in mid-1981 following an offer from Britain to sell the relatively new British carrier HMS Invincible to Australia at a substantially reduced price as a resuh of UK defence cuts which made the ship surplus to British requirements.

With the Australian economy in trouble and a Labor opposition strongly opposed to another carrier, the RAN faced a dilemma. Should it take up this opportunity purchase, or should it continue with the new ship project and run the risk of a change of government or government policy? Arguing in favour of the lower cost and availability of Invincible, the RAN chose the former course of action, and on 25 February 1982 the Defence Minister Mr Jim Killen announced that the British Government had offered to sell Invincible to Australia at a bargain price which the Government intended to accept. ^^ The Minister, however, also announced that the Australian Government was not committed to the early acquisition of

ibid., p.56. J.A. Boutilier, 'Get Big or Get Out', in Reflections on the Royal Australian Navy, Kenthurst, 1991, p.400. 45

STOVL fighters for the ship, and that in the interim, Invincible would only operate Sea King anti-submarine helicopters.

For the Fleet Arm Arm it appeared that someone had turned the clock back some 23 years to 1959 when the then Government decreed that all fixed wing flying in the RAN would halt in 1963. As a helicopter carrier without for air defence, long-range reconnaissance or surface strikes on enemy sea and land targets, the new carrier could not provide the fiill sea control capability that was required, but which the Government no longer appeared to list among its defence priorities. Despite naval enthusiasm for the new ship she did not comfortably fit in the framework of Australia's developing defence strategy and force structure which, as argued in Chapter 1, was increasingly concentrating on the defence of Australia with the attendant emphasis on shore based aircraft. ^^

To help pay for the new carrier, the refit planned for Melbourne was cancelled and she was paid-off into contingency reserve almost immediately to enable personnel to be made available for training for Invincible which would commission in 1983 and be renamed HMAS Australia. Much of Melbourne's equipment was soon removed, and she quickly became a shell of her former self Furthermore, as the Australia could not fly fixed wing aircraft, the decision was also made to withdraw Melbourne's Tracker and Skyhawk aircraft from front-line service as soon as practicable. As an interim measure, all Fleet Air Arm

67 Jones, op.cit., p.56. 46

front-line fixed-wing squadrons would be amalgamated with second-line training squadrons,

and the number of aircraft to be retained in use would be reduced.^^

Arrangements to take over Invincible had scarcely begun when the Falklands conflict occurred in the South Atlantic. By this time, the Australian Government was experiencing great difficulty in maintaining the ill-defined core force within the low defence budget, and with some relief offered to forego the purchase of Invincibh if the Royal Navy wished to retain the ship. This offer was quickly accepted by the British Government in mid-1982 and the proposed purchase was cancelled, which further worked against plans to replace

Melbourne and hastened the RAN's transformation from a carrier navy able to influence events at a distance from the continent into a navy tied to shore bases.

Following this unexpected setback, the search for a replacement for Melbourne resumed, with the support of the Fraser Government, which in theory remained committed to a replacement aircraft carrier. After further deliberation and the examination of alternative options, which included consideration of a British offer to sell or lease HMS Hermes to

Australia while a new Invincible class ship was built in the United Kingdom for the RAN, the

Minister for Defence, Mr Ian Sinclair announced on 9 February 1983 that the decision on a replacement for Melbourne had been temporarily deferred. This was essentially because of the Federal election set for early the following month; which the Coalition was destined to lose.

68 Ross Gillett, Wings Across the Sea, Aerospace Publications, Sydney, 1988, p. 150. 47

One of the first moves of the incoming Hawke Labor Government, which firmly believed

that the capability represented by an aircraft carrier to apply power at points remote from the

Australian continent was not needed, was the announcement that Melbourne would not be

replaced. This was a traumatic moment for the RAN, which had not really contemplated a

navy without a carrier.

Consideration of a replacement for Melbourne, therefore, ceased abruptly, the naval air

squadrons still operating fixed-wing aircraft were disbanded and the Fleet Air Arm

predominantly became a helicopter force for operation from FFGs.^^ This brought to an end

an important era in the Navy's recent history and ended one of the most bitter and long- running debates on the structure of the Australian Defence Force. This 'watershed' debate, that was the subject of official and public dispute for over a quarter of a century, will be

examined in more detail in the following Chapter.

69 Jones, op.cit., p.56. 48

CHAPTER 3

Bitter Rivalry: The carrier debate of the 1970s and early 1980s

The Royal Navy invented the aircraft carrier before and during . ... A cynic might add that Britain also invented the carriers ultimate enemy, the independent air force . . .

Norman Friedman ^

The bitter and protracted debate on whether or not to replace HMAS Melbourne, which was

steeped in intense inter-service rivalry between the RAN and RAAF, is worth closer examination as it gave rise to a host of formal and informal studies and threat analyses, detailed public enquiry and stimulated intense and prolonged parliamentary debate.

Furthermore, this 'water-shed' controversy, which dramatically altered the character of the

RAN, undoubtedly contributed to a significant reordering of Australia's defence priorities and the development, in many respects, of more realistic national defence policies in

Australia.

Although the genesis of the carrier debate can be traced back to 1970, the question of what to do when Melbourne came to the end of her useful life, was first addressed as far back as

^Norman Friedman, British Carrier Aviation, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1988, p.7. 49

1956 - only a year di^tr Melbourne's arrival in Australian waters. Concerned that because of her relatively small size, it would not be long before Melbourne was incapable of operating the next generation of naval fighter and strike aircraft, the Australian Chief of Naval Staff sought Royal Navy advice on the future of the Fleet Air Arm and the possibility of borrowing the larger 22,000 ton Hermes class light fleet carrier HMS Bulwark as an interim replacement iov Melbourne during the 1960s. ^ Although the Admiralty agreed in principal that Bulwark would be a suitable replacement for Melbourne, and that she could be made available sometime after 1961, nothing further came of this proposal. ^

As discussed in Chapter 2, the future of Melbourne and the fixed wing element of the FAA was a particularly vexed issue for both the Minister of the Navy and First Naval Member during the early 1960s, and it was only through the persuasive arguing and strong advocacy of Senator Gorton that Melbourne and the fixed wing element of the Fleet Air Arm was saved from being disbanded in 1963. Furthermore, Navy's subsequent push for the ship be modernised to take Skyhawk fighters for air defence and strike roles received considerable opposition from the Minister for Defence and the other services, particularly the RAAF, which saw the Skyhawk employed in a strike role as a direct competitor to funds for the F-

111. Although Navy received its Skyhawks, largely through the persistence of Senator

Gorton who was determined to maintain Navy's air defence and strike capabilities, the long standing rivalry between the RAN and RAAF, which reluctantly tolerated carriers as long as they were confined to naval roles, had once again come to the fore.

^ Letter Dowling to Mountbatten, 25 July 1956, ADM 205/110, Public Record Office. ^ Minute Director Naval Plans to First Sea Lord, 10 August 1956, ADM 205/110, Public Record Office. An excellent "action "photograph of HMAS SYDNEY at anchor in Vietnamese waters. Three Iroquois helicopters occupy the flight deck forward and aft, while a mobile moves containers from the port side onto an adjacent lighter. Army personnel have mustered near the after elevator. 50

Examination of the efficacy of acquiring a new air capable ship commenced in late 1966, not, as a replacement for Melbourne^ but rather for the capabilities of her ageing sister ship

Sydney, which had been employed as a fast troop transport and helicopter carrier since

1962/ The decision to convert Sydney to a fast troop transport had proved a great success.

During her service as the 'Vung Tau Ferry' Sydney undertook twenty three voyages to

Vietnam and carried nearly 15,000 troops and a significant proportion of heavy equipment.

This capability proved to be the linchpin of Australia's Forward Defence Policy as the RAAF could only manage a limited airlift capability at the time.

By January 1968 the Naval board had decided that the US Navy Iwo Jima class Landing

Platform Helicopter (LPH) was the most suitable replacement vessel to meet the RAN's requirements. Although the Board investigated building a modified variant of the ship in

Australia, it was estimated that this would cost an additional $40 million and that it would add three years to the ship's construction time.^ The decision was therefore taken to develop the project on the premise that the ship would be built in the US with minimum design changes. Navy's helicopter carrier proposal was subsequently supported by the

Chiefs of Staff Committee on 21 April 1967. It was, however, thought that the cargo capacity of the Iwo Jima class was too small, and that a logistic ship would also be needed.

^ NSR 34/66 File 1626/202/94, DGFE Minute 21 October 1966. ^ Australian Naval Board Minutes, 28 November 1968. HMS HERMES departing Sydney- after her 1968 visit. 51

Shortly afterwards, the Royal Navy indicated to the RAN that the relatively new aircraft

carrier HMS Hermes would become surplus to British requirements in the wake of

forthcoming defence cuts in the United Kingdom. In view of the limited modernisation that

Melbourne was receiving at the time, Hermes was a most attractive option. Hermes was larger, faster and younger ih?in Melbourne and was regarded by the Naval Board as being an

'ideal replacement'.^ It was envisaged that with the acquisition of Hermes, Melbourne would be able to replace Sydney as a troop transport and helicopter carrier, which would then mean that the proposed Iwo Jima class vessel could be deleted from the Naval

Program. Hermes was inspected during a convenient port visit to Sydney towards the end

of 1968, however, the manpower burden of an extra 500 men combined with technical

considerations led the Naval Board to recommend against the offer. This was a great

disappointment to Navy as Hermes had the potential to serve until the late-1980s and

additionally had the scope to operate larger and more aircraft Xhm Melbourne.

As a consequence of this decision. Navy reverted to the option of acquiring an Iwo Jima class vessel from the US and in 1970 the newly formed Central Studies Establishment (CSE) within the Department of Defence was tasked with conducting a study of helicopter and troop carrying ship requirements. There were two aspects to this Landing Platform

Helicopter (LPH) study: firstly military movement and support (MM & S); and secondly

anti-submarine warfare (ASW). This study, which completed in February 1973, found that whilst an LPH would provide useftil additional ASW capability, acquisition of one or more

Landing Ship Logistics (LSL) would be the cheapest option for the primary MM & S role.

^ Australian Naval Board Minutes, 23 January 1968. 52

noting that Australia did not have a requirement for the tactical movements of troops. The

outcome of this study influenced the subsequent decision to build a unit of the British Sir

Bedivere class LSL, HMAS Tobruk, in Australia.

In 1971 the LPH study developed into the far wider Na\^al Air Power (NAP) study to establish the requirement for an aircraft carrier in the ADF. This study was designed to demonstrate the relative merits of land-based and sea going air power and the likely

scenarios in which carriers might be employed by the RAN in the future.^ It went on for four years, and was soon expanded to take in the Tactical Air Weapons System (TAWS) study which was aimed at determining the aircraft type or types to replace the RAAF's Mirage fighters.^

The Naval Air Power/Tactical Air Weapons System (NAP/TAWS) study was conducted by a team of scientists assisted by officers from each of the services, and was supported by the

Joint Intelligence Organisation which devised the force structures for the hypothetical

enemy. The method adopted was to develop a range of scenarios, from minor surveillance tasks to a ftill-scale war in the island chain. The aim was to establish the most cost-effective force structures capable of meeting the requirements of the various scenario groupings, and

also whether different groupings of scenarios would require a major shift in force structure.^

^ J. A. Boutilier, 'Get Big or Get Out', in Reflections on the Royal Australian Navy, Kangaroo Press, Kenthurst, 1991, p.397. ^ David Evans, A Fatal Rivalry: Australia's Defence at Risk, MacMillan Australia, Melbourne, 1990, p. 102. ^ ibid., p. 103. 53

As Boutilier observed, 'the RAN was particularly unprepared for NAP/TAWS'.^^ In the

first instance, carrier power seemed axiomatic, and the RAN now found itself in the unexpected and uncomfortable position of having to justify the existence of carriers. To make matters worse, the RAN tended to believe somewhat naively that once it had done its

staff work logic would prevail in what was, in the final analysis, a political realm. ^^

The other difficulty that Navy faced was that at the end of the day the carrier issue was going to be settled on the colour of uniforms on the various committees. On that count

Navy was always going to find it difficult. In the Chiefs of Staff Committee for example, although Navy might be lucky to have a Navy chairman, a carrier was always going to be

opposed by the Chief of the Air Staff (CAS), and for financial reasons by the Secretary.

Furthermore, whilst the army would benefit from its troop carrying capacity and close air

support capability, the Chief of the General Staff (CGS) was more likely to oppose a carrier because of its significant potential to impact on Army projects. Navy could, therefore, have been in no doubt how difficult it was going to be to get a new carrier at the end of the decade whon Melbourne reached the end of her useful life.

NAP/TAWS was a high stakes game for the RAAF, which was much more adept at working the corridors of power than was Navy. The RAAF consequently ensured that the initial premises, on which a study like NAP/TAWS stood or fell, favoured the air force. ^^ There had been a relatively comfortable budgetary cycle in the 1960s which had seen the Australian

Boutilier, op.cit., p.397. ^^ ibid, ^^ibid. 54

Army get its Centurion tanks, the RAAF its Mirage jet fighters and the RAN its DDGs. It was, however, obvious in the 1970s that the Mirages would need to be replaced by aircraft two or three times as expensive. The stage was therefore set for a concerted campaign to

destroy the Navy's case for a replacement for Melbourne, which was reminiscent of the mortal struggle between the USAF and the USN in the late 1940s over the continued worth

of carriers and the intense inter-service controversy surrounding carrier air power which raged in Britain in the mid-1960s. ^^

The multimillion-dollar NAP/TAWS study concluded in 1975 that an aircraft carrier was not a cost-effective solution to the scenarios that had been considered. Land-based aircraft emerged as the preferred solution, with the only task requiring an 'at sea' capability, according to Evans, being dunking sonar equipped ASW helicopters, which could be carried on frigates or destroyers. ^^ The study also concluded that the major force structure elements appropriate to the RAN in the defence of Australia were submarines and capable fast patrol boats.

While the RAN was able to discredit the NAPTAWS findings on the basis of incorrect assumptions and by arguing that the scenarios were out of date by the time that the report was finalised, the damage had been done. What was, in the eyes of the public and media, a

'scientific' analysis had come out against carriers.^^ Furthermore, the Navy exacerbated the

^^ ibid, p.398. '' ibid. Evans, op.cit., p. 103. ^^Boutilier, op.cit., p.398. 55

situation, in Robertson's opinion, by displaying a dangerous degree of supineness: 'It

appears that after failure to get the result it had confidently expected ... the Navy simply

gave up the struggle and resigned itself to its inability to convince the department and government to maintain an organic tactical naval aviation capability except for helicopters flown from FFGs'.^^

This situation, however, changed dramatically in December 1976 when Vice Admiral

Anthony Synnot became the Chief of Naval Staff. Believing that the loss of a carrier capability would weaken the balance of Australia's maritime force structure and indicate a weakening of the national resolve to contribute to regional security, he boldly established the

Aircraft Carrier Project in January 1977 and by the late 1970s, replacing Melbourne had become a major Australian defence issue under his shrewd patronage.

Although Synnot was prepared to do battle with his opponents, he realised that the RAN would have to succeed politically rather than analytically.^^ This was a position borne out by the experience of the Royal Navy a decade earlier which had highlighted the fact that the game was for 'players not gentlemen'.^^ Although the odds were considerable, Synnot, who later went on to become the Chief of Defence Staff, had the right political connections.

After gaining Defence Force Development Committee (DFDC) approval in June 1977, he successftilly convinced the Fraser Government to approve design investigations and the

^^ A.J. Robertson, The Need for an Australian Aircraft Carrier Capability, Working Paper No.59, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, September 1982, p. 14. Boutilier, op.cit., p.398. ^^ Eric Grove, Vanguard to Trident: British Naval Policy Since World War II, The Bodley Head, London, 1987, p.275. 56

worldwide issue of an Invitation to Register Interest (ITR) calling for 'no obligation' proposals for a STOVL and/or helicopter carrier.^® The DFDC, however, specifically eliminated a conventional carrier from investigation.^^

Following the release of this ITR in September 1977, Navy made a replacement carrier its highest priority and planned on commissioning a new ship in 1985 when Melbourne would reach the end of her useful life. By February 1978, responses had been received from 16 companies from five different countries, covering 21 proposals. These included proposals for existing designs or those under development, to 'paper ships', through to proposals to develop a design.

The RAN required a ship of conventional type of about 20,000 tonnes full load which was to be capable of operating a mix of helicopters and STOVL aircraft.

A minimum of fourteen aircraft was to be accommodated for normal peacetime operations, with the capacity for embarking up to 22 aircraft if required; whilst growth margins were to be provided for later generation aircraft. In addition, the ship was to have the necessary command, control and communications equipment to allow a task group commander to carry out all of his flinctions.^^ It was stated that the ship, with its aircraft, would need to be capable of carrying out some or all of the following missions:

Boutilier, op.cit., p.399. ^^ Two monthly report of Progress of Capital Equipment for Period ending 31 July 1977. ^^ Department of Defence, Background Information to the Decision to purchase a new Aircraft Carrier for the Royal Australian Na\>y, Directorate of Public Relations, Canberra, 25 February 1982, p.9. 57

• Tactical reconnaissance and surveillance

• Maritime strike and interdiction

• Fleet air defence

• Anti-submarine warfare

• Mining

• Command and Control

• Strategic strike

• Close air support for ground forces

• Deployment and lodgement of combat troops

• Afloat support to destroyers

• Evacuation and disaster relief ^^

In view of the stated requirement, the search for a suitable replacement was restricted to a purpose-designed ship, and following examination of the responses received, the RAN was able to refine its requirements, and narrow the proposals down to five, including the British

Invincible class design. In may 1978, the DFDC postponed specific consideration of the carrier, but requested that a fiirther justification paper for consideration by the Chiefs of

Staff Committee (COSC) should be prepared. According to Francis, this implied reservations about a replacement carrier within the DFDC.^"^ The resulting Melbourne

Replacement - Strategic and Associated Factors paper was considered by COSC in early

^^ The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, An Aircraft Carrier for the Australian Defence Force, AGPS, Canberra, 1982, p. 18. D.A. Francis, 'Ashes to Ashes: The Rise and Fall of the RAN Aircraft Carrier Project', in Journal of the Australian naval Institute, Vol.11, No.2, May 1985, p. 11. 58

1979 and approval given for funded investigations of three ship designs.^^ These were a

variant of the United States Navy Iwo Jima class LPH, a US designed Sea Control Ship

(SCS) similar to the type being built in Spain for the , and the Italian Garibaldi

class helicopter carrier being constructed in for the Italian Navy.^^ The Invincible class

design, which had remained in the initial short-listing, was set-aside principally because of its

high cost,^^ whilst there was also the issue of the lack of commonality of its Action Data

Automated Weapon System (ADAWS), electronics and anti-air missile system with the US sourced Naval Combat Data System (NCDS) and other systems fitted in the

RANs DDGs and new FFGs.^^

In May 1979, the DFDC commissioned the RAN and Defence Central to carry out a further

study entitled the Seaborne Air Capability Review. ^^ By this time. Admiral Synnot had become the Chief of Defence Staff, and it was clear that support in favour of the acquisition

of a carrier was growing. The output from this study, together with that from the fiinded

design studies and two other separate studies on anti-submarine warfare and naval anti-air warfare, was evaluated during the early part of 1980. It was concluded that whilst one or two anti-submarine helicopters could be operated from smaller ships, there were many

'' ibid. ^^ ibid., p. 10. ^^ At the time the estimated sail-away cost of the Invincible class was the highest of all contenders and approximately twice as expensive as other likely options. ^^ The incompatibility of the ADAWS system would have, in particular, precluded the ship from performing the function of fleet command and control ship without the system being entirely replaced at significant additional cost. Bruce Swain, 'Right Idea, Wrong Ship, Wrong Time', in The Navy, Vol. 44, No.3, July 1982, pp. 13-16. ^^ This review was supported by the efforts of the Seaborne Air Capabilities Special Group (SACSG) which had been formed within Navy in 1976, and which subsequently carried out a number of specialised studies as part of the process of justifying a carrier. 59

advantages to be obtained from concentrating these aircraft on a larger central platform which would also make possible the provision of extensive and highly sophisticated task group command and control facilities. Furthermore, if in the future Australia's security were considered by the Government of the day to warrant the deployment of fixed wing air defence and strike aircraft at sea, this vessel would be capable of carrying and supporting a number of STOVL aircraft.^® The DFDC, subsequently, concluded that the Australian

Defence Force needed an aircraft carrier on strategic grounds, that helicopters were essential for ASW and that fixed wing aircraft would be important or essential to the success of many maritime operations.^^

As a result of this advice, the Minister for Defence, Mr D.J. Killen, informed the House of

Representatives on 9 September 1980 that:

The Government has decided to replace HMAS Melbourne with a purpose designed ship to be equipped with helicopters for ASW, but with a potential for operating also short take-off and vertical landing STOVL aircraft. The Government will not make a decision on the actual acquisition of STOVL aircraft until 1983.1 should emphasise at this stage that there is no commitment to acquire STOVL aircraft. ^^

In announcing the Government's decision, the Minister also gave the assurance that ftirther definition of the carrier details would be undertaken and that these would be finalised during the ensuing financial year. As stated in the previous chapter, this brief announcement did not

Background Information to the Decision to purchase a new Aircraft Carrier for the Royal Australian Navy, op.cit., pp.7-15. ^^ G. Evans, 'The Carrier Switch', in The Navy, Vol. 45, No. 1, January 1983, p.21. ^^ D.J. Killen, Hansard, House of Representatives, Vol 119, 9 September 1980, p. 996. 60

explain Australia's need for the ship nor how an aircraft carrier would fit in Australia's defence strategy or force structure for the 1980s and beyond.

In the course of further evaluation, it was decided that the Italian Garibaldi class design could be eliminated as it did not meet the space requirements as a STOVL carrier^^ whilst fiirther funded studies into changes to the two remaining designs would be necessary before a recommendation could be made to Government on a single source selection. As a result of this decision, contracts for funded design studies were let in early 1981 with the US naval design firm of Gibbs and Cox in respect of the Sea Control Ship, and with Ingalls Ship

Building Division in respect of the LPH variant; the latter being Navy's preferred option at the time. The assistance of the US Navy was also sought to ensure that the information on which source selection was based would be the most comprehensive that could be gathered.

A jointly manned project office was established for this purpose within the US Navy Sea

Systems Command in Washington DC.^"^

However, on 24 September 1981 it was announced that the British Invincible class aircraft carrier design was to be evaluated along with the two designs already under study. This change of direction was a direct result of the British Government's offer to sell a ship of the

Invincible class to Australia at a substantially reduced price following budgetary cutbacks in the UK. These defence cuts had resulted in the British Government deciding to retain only two of the three new Invincible class carriers for the Royal Navy; a decision that was not

^^ CNSAC 7 May 1980. Background Information to the Decision to purchase a new Aircraft Carrier for the Royal Australian Navy, op.cit., pp. 10-11. 61

well received by that Service. Likely cost and the ready availability of a ship from Britain,

therefore, became the important factors influencing the decision to evaluate this class

further.''

With the decision to re-evaluate the Invincible design approved, it was decided that the ship would be assessed as it was with no modifications to its essential characteristics, except in the weapons suite. As the ship was already in service its specifications were readily available.

Detailed design development that had been necessary with other two contenders was not, therefore, required to be carried out. It also meant that the overall project cost of acquiring

Invincible could be accurately determined.'^

The re-evaluation of the Invincible design in comparison with the other two contenders

determined that cost and availability were significant and decisive advantages. An analysis

of the operating costs of all three contenders over a ten year cycle showed that, while

Invincible would cost more to operate, the additional figure was more than offset by the much lower total project cost of the British ship. Furthermore, whilst Invincible would certainly have less commonality with other RAN units than would be achieved in a new ship outfitted to RAN specifications, the associated penalties were expected to be more than outweighed by the very much lower purchase price of the ship and the logistic support advantages to be gained by operating a ship with two British sister ships. Cost and availability, at a time when the Defence budget was coming under increasing pressure,

^^ ibid., p. 11. ^^ ibid., p. 18. 62

therefore, became the major drivers in the decision to go ahead with the recommendation to

Cabinet to approve the purchase of Invincible.^^

Following Cabinet consideration and endorsement of the proposal, the Minister for Defence,

Mr Killen, announced on 25 February 1982, that Australia would purchase the aircraft carrier HMS Invincible from the United Kingdom and that Melbourne would be paid off.

The cost of the ship, which was expected to be delivered late in September 1983, was $285 million, whilst the total project cost, including modifications to suit Australian conditions, spares, test and training equipment, but not including aircraft, was estimated at $478 million at August 1981 prices. This was substantially less than the proposed Sea Control Ship and modified LPH which would have cost well over $700 million.^^

After his presentation of the proposal in the House, Mr Killen revealed that because most of the payment for Invincible would be in the 1983/84 time-frame, some of the non-fiinded capital equipment items in the current five-year defence program would have to be deferred to accommodate the carrier purchase. At the same time, he also announced that no early decision was to be made on STOVL aircraft^^ to operate from the ship for possibly ten years, and that Invincible would consequently only operate Sea King anti-submarine helicopters for the foreseeable future.^^

ibid., pp.20-21. Ross Gillett, Wings Across the Sea, Aerospace Publications, Sydney, 1988, p. 145. ^^ Estimates at the time for the procurement of STOVL aircraft for the RAN were in the order of $460 million. '^Gillett, op.cit.,p.l45. HMS ILLUSTRIOUS with the guided missile destroyer HMAS HOB ART, September 1986. The RN task group was conducting a world cruise and visiting Sydney to celebrate the RAN's 75th Anniversary. 63

The decision to purchase Invincible encountered heavy weather almost immediately. During

debates on defence policy in the House of Representatives on 29 April 1982, the Leader of

the Opposition, Mr Hayden, launched a scathing attack on the Government's 'cockeyed

priorities'. 'The centrepiece of the Government's defence program', he observed, 'was a

half billion dollar aircraft carrier which will carry between four and five helicopters. That

represents a $100m parking spot for each of the ASW helicopters'. Kim Beazley followed

Hayden's contemptuous allusions to HMAS 'Spurious' with an assault on the Government's failure to live up to its 1976 defence commitments, its muddled defence priorities, and its total lack of strategic vision.Mr Scholes underscored this lack of vision and observed that the failure to provide fixed-wing aircraft meant that Invincible would be little more than 'a very expensive toy which [would] add little to the defence capabilities of Australia but which

[would] reduce the other capabilities significantly'."*^

In the face of these and other attacks the Government agreed to have a sub-committee of the

Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, under the chairmanship of R.C. Katter, undertake a review of the carrier issue. This sub-committee had already been engaged in an examination of the structure of the Australian defence Force and took up its new mandate on 20 April 1982.^^

Criticism of the carrier tended to focus on its alleged vulnerability, its cost, the inadequacy of a single carrier, the paucity of aircraft, the reported ability of land-based aircraft to

"•^K.Beazley, Hansard, House of Representatives, Vol 127, 29 April 1982, p.2171. ^^ G. Scholes, ibid, p.2182. Boutilier, op.cit., p.401. 64

perform maritime tasks and the distorting effect the Invincible purchase was likely to have on the defence budget.

Whilst a detailed discussion of these arguments is beyond the scope of this subthesis, a few observations are necessary. Just as the Katter Committee was convening the reached its climax. The torpedoing of the Argentinian cruiser ARA General Belgrano and the loss of the British destroyer HMS Sheffield by a single anti-ship missile fuelled widespread and ill-informed speculation about the vulnerability of major warships.

Opponents of the carrier drew upon arguments which their British counterparts had used to attack the proposed CVA-01 carrier in Britain during the 1960s. Invincible, it was argued, was simply a case of two many eggs in a very vulnerable basket. Few sought to analyse the historical evidence dispassionately and, more importantly, the RAN, with the apparent exception of retired Commodore Alan Robertson, failed to rebut the allegations of vulnerability with sufficient vigour.

Whilst cost was probably the major issue in the carrier debate, several points are worth noting. Firstly, while the carrier decision at $478 million was subject to detailed scrutiny, the RAAF's F/A-18 purchase, with upfront costs five times as great, was not. The question in the RAAF's case was not whether to get new aircraft, but which aircraft to acquire - the

F-16 or F/A-18. Thus, while the media and politicians had a field day with Melbourne and

Invincible, the much larger F/A-18 purchase slipped through almost unnoticed. Secondly, a

^Mbid. ^^ ibid, pp.401-402. 65

single acquisition of $478 million was an expensive investment, regardless of its versatility, mobility and effectiveness. As a result, Invincible again attracted the greatest amount of attention. Thirdly, Invincible had an awkward funding profile. Whereas the LPH would have cost twice as much as Invincible, these costs would have been incurred in a bell curve over approximately eight years, as opposed to half as much money for the Invincible package but over only two years. As a result, critics of the carrier were able to point at the dislocating impact of the Invincible acquisition despite the fact that over the life of the vessel the carrier would have amounted to only about 1.8% of the total defence budget.'^^

Furthermore, no-one appears to have considered whether or not other major defence acquisitions like the F/A-18s - the cost of which was expected substantially increase over that initially budgeted for - were likely to dislocate the defence budget.

The inadequacy of a single carrier was an argument that the RAN failed to adequately refute.

Whilst one carrier would not be sufficient to carry out all the roles ascribed to it, because the area it would be expected to cover would be too vast, and because of the danger of the threat developing while it was undergoing maintenance in port, it would, never-the-less, have been sufficient to maintain the 'state of the art' so that if a threat arose, Australia could expand its maritime air capabilities at relatively short notice through converting suitable merchant ships into carriers.'^^ By not vigorously arguing this point, Navy consequently faced an uphill struggle when it came to arguing against the 75 F/A-18 land-based aircraft which the RAAF misleadingly announced it could bring to bear; albeit that they could not

Robertson, op.cit., p.25. Boutilier, op.cit., p.402. 48 An Aircraft Carrier for the Australian Defence Force, op.cit, pp.32-33. 66

provide the immediate and continuous close-in air support required for maritime operations, particularly at any distance from the shore.

What the debate does tell us, according to Boutilier, is that the RAN repeatedly failed to develop a consistent and coherent set of strategic arguments justifying the need for a carrier.^^ As a consequence, it never succeeded in articulating a convincing position.

Instead, as its critics sniped away from the sidelines, the RAN displayed a fatal consistency, falling back from one position to another. First it argued that it needed an ASW carrier, then that it would be nice to have fixed-wing aircraft when none were likely to be forthcoming, then that the carrier could defend sea lines of communication, and then that

Invincible would be able to guard merchant shipping focal points close to shore.^^

The absence of a firm commitment to acquire STOVL aircraft was another fundamental error on the part of both the Government and RAN. Whilst there were good technical grounds for delaying the decision with a new generation of maritime STOVL aircraft in the ofFing, this decision was a political disaster. Sensing competition for scarce funds and realising that the Opposition and media were hostile to carriers, the RAN allowed itself to champion an option which sacrificed the air defence and strike capability which would have enabled it to exploit the carrier's true versatility. Instead, it ended up with an ASW carrier with capabilities too limited, in its opponents' eyes, to justify its existence.

''ibid. ^®ibid.,p.403. ^^ ibid. 67

By 1 June 1982 most of this was a matter of academic interest only. On that date the Australian Prime Minister advised his British counterpart, Mrs Margaret Thatcher, that despite the British government's commitment to sell Invincible to Australia, his Government was willing to waive the purchase of the ship in view of the crisis in the South Atlantic and the consequent public emotion that could be aroused in England by the sale of the ship that had played such a prominent role in the Falklands War. By the end of the month, Melbourne, which had already been destored in anticipation of Invincible's acquisition, was placed in contingency reserve, whilst a fortnight later the British Government announced that it would retain Invincibh. Although the search for a replacement for Melbourne resumed, the writing was already on the wall.

With the Invincible deal off, the re-examination of available options commenced. There was the option, much more costly than the Invincible deal, of building a follow-on Invincible class carrier for Australia, or an offer the British pressed, of buying or leasing the refurbished carrier Hermes either as a replacement for Melbourne or as an interim capability whilst a new carrier was being built. Alternatively, the two originally shortlisted US designs, which were now estimated to cost close to $1,000 million, could be revived and progressed, or a suitable merchant ship could be acquired and converted into a carrier. The final option was not to acquire a carrier at all.

On 28 July 1983, while these various options were being examined by the Government, Defence bureaucracy and Navy, Brown and Woolner, who were on the staff of the Defence Research Group in the Parliamentary Library, and who no doubt assisted the Katter 68

Committee in its review, issued a comprehensive report entitled A New Aircraft Carrier for the Australian Navy, under the aegis of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the

Australian National University in Canberra. This is not the place to criticise their report though it is difficult to avoid agreeing with Boutilier's conclusion that 'they lacked an adequate grasp of the realities of naval warfare and that [a] number of their arguments were flawed'.^^ Nevertheless, they came down on the side of the anti-carrier forces, concluding that the strategic justification for another carrier was 'not proven', 'that the operational characteristics of available contenders [did] not satisfy assessed requirements, and that the

Australian defence budget [could not] support both planned outlays and carrier associated costs'. ^^

Meanwhile, the Katter Committee report was finally completed and was presented to the

House on 26 August 1982 in only six minutes, much to the Chairman's dismay.^'^ In the report, the Committee acknowledged that an aircraft carrier could provide many of the functions which would be valuable in the defence of Australia, including strategic strike and interdiction. It, however, concluded that the total project cost of a fully operational aircraft carrier would be prohibitive and that it would result in other more desirable defence acquisitions being curtailed or delayed unacceptably. Moreover, the Committee considered that many of the functions performed by a carrier could be performed as effectively, or at least acceptably, by other elements of the ADF's air and maritime forces. The Committee

^^ibid. 53 Gary Brown and Derek Woolner, A New Aircraft Carrier for the Royal Australian Navy, Working Paper No. 57, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, July 1982, pp.iii-iv. Boutilier, op.cit., p.401. 69

Stated, however, that if 'future Defence expenditure of a much higher order were to be

contemplated, a carrier could be included in the capital expenditure program without necessarily distorting the shape and balance of the Defence Force.

On the same day that the Katter Report was released, the Minister for Defence, Mr Sinclair,

stated in Parliament that 'the needs that led to the Government's decision to buy HMS

Invincible remain' and that 'the Government [was] therefore re-examining a range of options' including 'the defence implications of not acquiring a carrier'. He also revealed that

depending on the outcome of all of these considerations, that 'it [might] be necessary to

review the need for interim solutions such as the re-commissioning of Melbourne', the

acquisition of a carrier from overseas 'such as HMS Hermes' or indeed the conversion of a

suitable merchant ship.

In September 1982, retired Navy Commodore, Alan Robertson produced a paper entitled

The Need for an Australian Aircraft Carrier Capability,^^ which like Brown and Woolner's paper, was published under the aegis of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the

Australian National University. Robertson's paper was diametrically opposite to that of

Brown and Woolner, and strongly argued that the case for an aircraft carrier capability was

driven by Australia's strategic environment and the nation's unavoidable need to use the sea, which meant that 'Naval aviation - for air defence, anti-submarine warfare, strike and

^^ The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, An Aircraft Carrier for the Australian Defence Force, AGPS, Canberra, 1982, p.51. ^^ Alan Robertson, The need for an Australian Aircraft Carrier Capability, Working Paper No.59, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, September 1982. 70

reconnaissance purposes - [would] remain an essential core element in the force structure of

an island nation to which an independent sea assertion capability is a vital strategic interest'." It was Robertson's belief that no existing or projected technology could

substitute for an aircraft carrier and, furthermore, that the necessary capital resources to fund and operate an aircraft carrier could be provided in different ways.

In October 1992, after examining all available options. Navy endorsed a proposal to have a follow-on unit of the Invincible class built for the RAN in the United Kingdom, for delivery in late 1989, at a total project cost of $759 million.^^ Furthermore, because of the delay in

getting the ship into service. Navy also endorsed a proposal to take up the British offer to lease HMS Hermes for a nominal amount as an interim carrier in order to fill the immediate

capability gap. The possibility of retaining Melbourne in contingent reserve, and of not having an interim carrier due to the favourable strategic outlook was also countenanced, but

dismissed. This course of action would undoubtedly have weakened Navy's argument for a replacement carrier.

By this time, however, the dynamics within the Defence hirachry had altered considerably.

This fact, together with the rising cost of the project, was to further confound Navy's efforts to replace Melbourne and undoubtedly sealed the fate of a new carrier for the ADF

regardless of strategic justification. With the retirement of Admiral Synnot in April 1982,

Air Chief Marshal Sir Neville McNamara, the former CAS - who undoubtedly had his own

^^ ibid., pp.41-42. ^^ In order to keep the price as low as possible, the UK Ministry of Defence agreed to waive design royalties amounting to some $54 million. 71 firm views on a replacement carrier - had assumed the appointment of Chief of Defence Force Staff. Furthermore, a new Chief of the General Staff had also taken up his appointment in February 1982. Navy was consequently left floundering on its own in the senior committees.

According to Evans - who was CAS at the time - the then Secretary of the Department of Defence, 'aware of the emotion of this lingering debate . . . was meticulous in examining every facet of every situation, giving Navy every possible opportunity to state its case and to offer dissenting views'.^^ Although Evans contends that the DFDC was clear in its view that there were preferred alternatives to the acquisition of either an aircraft carrier or helicopter carrier and that this view should be put to the Government, the Secretary, nevertheless, referred the issue to the Defence Committee, the senior advisory committee, comprising the permanent heads of Treasury, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Prime Minister and Cabinet and Defence plus the Chief of Defence Force Staff and the Chiefs of Staff The result was according to Evans 'unequivocally' the same: the recommendation to Government not to replace Melbourne ^^

After much discussion in the media and Parliament on the question of a new aircraft carrier, and after preliminary consideration of the recommendations put to the Government by Defence, the Minister for Defence, Mr Ian Sinclair, announced on 9 February 1993 that the decision on a replacement for Melbourne had been temporarily deferred 'until after the

^^ Evans, op.cit., p.l09. ibid., pp. 109-110. 72

forthcoming general election' which had been called earlier in the month, and that 'while no final decisions [had] been taken regarding fixed-wing aviation, rotary wing operations

[would] certainly continue and expand in the Australian fleet'.

In March 1983, the Liberal-National Party Coalition, led by Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser was defeated by the Hawke Labor Government. In one of the new Government's first moves, the new Minister for Defence, Mr Scholes, announced on 14 March, that Cabinet had decided not to acquire an aircraft carrier to replace Melbourne, which would be passed to the Department of Administrative Services for disposal. In making this announcement Mr

Scholes said:

The Defence Force either has or is programming to acquire weapons systems that can effectively, indeed usually more effectively, discharge the roles in which an aircraft carrier might have contributed. There is, therefore, no justification for spending huge sums of the taxpayers' money on a purchase that is not really necessary, and that would, moreover, also constitute such a high risk investment. ^^

As a result of this decision, the phasing out of fixed-wing aircraft in the Fleet Air Arm ensued, with the Minister for Defence making the announcement on 3 May 1983 that whilst helicopter operations would continue at the Naval air Station, Nowra, 'fiiture, fixed-wing air

support for the Fleet [would] be provided by the Royal Australian Air Force'.

61 Defence News Release No 30/83. 73

Much controversy raged in the national media; why was the heart of an effective Fleet Air

Arm being dismantled? Why were the years of training and dedication by Fleet Air Arm

personnel being literally thrown away in a blatant waste of taxpayers money? However, the

Government's decision was final, which brought to an end an important era in the Navy's

history.^^ Furthermore, there can be little doubt that the Liberal-National Party coalition,

despite rhetoric to the contrary, would have accepted the Defence recommendation not to

replace Melbourne and the subsequent decision to dispose of the carrier fixed-wing aircraft:, had it been returned to power in the 1983 election.^^ In exactly the same way as the formation of the RAN Fleet Air Arm had been a response to Government perception that

Australia needed a maritime sea control capability the ending of aircraft carrier operations by

Australia resulted from Government perceptions that this capability was no longer relevant.^"^

What does this tell us about strategic thinking and defence decision making in Australia? On

a macro-scale the carrier was a victim of a fiandamental and sweeping reordering of strategic thinking and consequently national security posture. The decision to abandon replacing

Melbourne came in the midst of the move towards a 'home-grown' defence posture.

Australia's ability to do so was reinforced by a greater confidence in its ability to defend itself and a vision of an increasingly benign world. That world contained few imaginable threats and certainly none calling for long range carrier operations which consequently made it difficult to justify useful, but costly 'offensive' weapons systems.^^

^^ Gillett, op.cit., p. 154. ^^ Evans, op.cit., pp. 110-111. 64 Ray Jones, "Aircraft Carriers and Australian Defence Policy', in Defence Force Journal No.61, November/December 1986, p.58. ^^ Boutilier, op.cit., p.403. 74

At the micro-level, cost was the major contributor with the fierce competition for scarce dollars in Canberra during the early 1980s undoubtedly boding ill for a carrier replacement.

Furthermore, the RAN - which had never really addressed the situation of an RAN without a carrier - was singularly unsuccessful at arguing its case for carriers convincingly and was, according to Boutilier, 'ill-suited for the cut and thrust of the carrier debate' and 'ruthlessly undermined by the RAAF which proved much more adept at playing the political game'. ^^

The extensive parliamentary debate and multitude of studies on a new aircraft carrier undoubtedly did much to bring the issue of naval force structure before the public, whilst the bitter inter service battle over the carrier emphasised the need for a more centralised control over defence policy, especially as it was becoming clear that the defence budget could not easily sustain existing commitments with proposed levels of capability. Although the loss of the aircraft carrier had a profound effect on the Royal Australian Navy, it was to result in considerable soul searching, which, in turn, would significantly contribute to the development of an autonomous Australian maritime strategy in the post-carrier RAN.

66 ibid., p.404. 75

CHAPTER 4

Clipped Wings: Defending Australia without a carrier

My concern is that the naval profession needs to focus on why it exists and for what purposes. It is essential for the Navy to play an integral part in the development of the maritime strategies which will be required as a contribution to our overall defence and security postures.

Kim Beazley ^

Following the painful loss of Melbourne, the RAN was forced to come to grips with

effectively operating and developing a fleet without a carrier and shifting its emphasis from fixed wing aviation to helicopters operating predominantly from frigates. As a result,

Australia's maritime strategy and force structure was examined in detail and by the mid-

1980s the growing centralisation and sophistication of defence policy formulation, improvements in the nation's industrial infrastructure and a rejuvenation of Navy leadership led to a change in fortunes which firmly set the 'carrier-less' RAN down the path of self-

reliance as part of the sweeping reorientation of Australia's defence posture and priorities.

As Commander has noted, although the loss of the carrier 'seemed to strike

at the heart of the RAN's operational doctrine', advanced technologies offered a new

^ Kim Beazley, 'The Development of Australian Maritime Strategy' in Selected Speeches 1985-1989 by the Hon. Kim C. Beazley, MP, Minister for Defence, Department of Defence, Canberra, 1989, p. 184. 76

answer. The submarine force armed with the Mk 48 , the surface-to- surface missile (SSM) and the integration of over-the-horizon capable, shipborne helicopters in SSM-carrying frigates were to replace the potential loss of strike and air defence capability promised in the carrier replacement program, whilst the development of the

Jindalee over-the-horizon radar network and the planned procurement of towed acoustic arrays for surface ships promised improved surveillance capabilities for the Fleet in the future.

With the demise of the aircraft carrier and its fixed-wing air component, Australia's maritime force structure was centred around six Oberon class submarines and a destroyer force consisting of three guided missile destroyers, four guided missile frigates and six destroyer escorts, whilst two additional Australian built guided missile frigates were on order. Of these ships, only the new guided missile frigates were air capable, although a suitable anti- submarine helicopter had yet to be acquired to operate from these vessels. ^

As far as strategic strike and interdiction was concerned, Australia's capabilities were based on the submarines fitted with Mk 48 torpedoes and encapsulated Harpoon SSMs together with the RAAF's 24 F-11IC medium-range aircraft and to a lesser extent the 75 new F/A-

18 Hornet multi-role fighter aircraft which were progressively entering service. The F-

^ James Goldrick, 'The Role of the Royal Australian Navy in Australian Defence Policy, 1945-85', Shared Perspectives: Australia, and New Zealand Pacific Defence and Security, University of Victoria, Victoria, 1992, p.25. ^ Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, The Australian Defence Force: Its Structure and Capabilities, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1984, pp. 100-101. ' ibid. 77

1 lie is able to conduct selective strike operations against both land and maritime targets at

up to 1,000 nautical miles from mainland Australia, without air-to-air refuelling, whilst the

F/A-18 is able to complement the F-11IC with lesser payloads at shorter ranges.^ For long-

range maritime interdiction of enemy naval forces, these assets could also be augmented by

the RAAF's P3C Orion long range maritime patrol aircraft and the RAN's guided missile

destroyers and frigates.^

The major perceived weakness following the decommissioning of Melbourne was that

Australia's fleet units could no longer be guaranteed air cover or adequate protection against

submarines, particularly in areas remote from Australia's mainland. Without a carrier, the

air defence capabilities of the RAN was limited to the short and medium range weapons

fitted onboard ships and the land-based fighter aircraft of the RAAF which could only

provide limited cover out to approximately 500 miles from the shore. Navy consequently

argued that, in view of the major increase in flying hours for the RAAF and the long transit times involved, it had serious doubts about the RAAF's ability to provide air defence

support to the Fleet even within range of the mainland. The Air Force, for its part, however, maintained the position that it had consistently argued throughout the carrier debate; that it

could indeed meet the additional requirements to provide air defence for the Fleet, although it now admitted for the first time that this may mean reducing some existing operational capabilities elsewhere.^

^ Department of Defence, Force Structure Review 1991, AGPS, Canberra, 1991, p.27. ^ The Australian Defence Force: Its Structure and Capabilities, op.cit., pp. 100-101. ^ibid.,p.l01. 78

Navy considered the more serious weakness to be the lack of an effective, medium-range

anti-submarine capability. Following the paying-off of Melbourne the RAN was unable to effectively use its only remaining anti-submarine air asset, the Sea King helicopter, which could operate up to 200 miles from their parent ship and use sensors and Mk 46 torpedoes to locate and destroy submarines before they could get within missile or torpedo range of

Australian ships.^ The Sea King also had the capability to assume control of the Ikara anti- submarine missiles carried on the RAN's guided missile destroyers and destroyer escorts, thereby extending their range. Although the RAN was able to deploy one or two Sea King helicopters in the destroyer tender YQsAASStalwart, and for limited periods in the amphibious

ship HMAS Tohruk, this limited ability to get the dunking sonar equipped Sea King

consequently left the RAN with a serious capability gap.

Despite the RAAFs assurances, the question of providing adequate air cover for the fleet in the air-sea-gap has never been satisfactorily resolved, noting the long transit times involved,

extensive flying hours required and limited air assets and crews available. Furthermore, it is

doubtful that this problem will be satisfactorily resolved for the foreseeable future, short of the unlikely option of once again providing the RAN with its own integral combat air

support capability at sea. The RAN is consequently reliant on the medium-range area

defence anti-air missile systems fitted in its guided missile destroyers and frigates for the protection of naval task groups whilst out of range of RAAF air cover (or when such

defence cannot be provided), together with short-range self-defence systems fitted in

^ Although the air capable FFG guided missile frigates were progressively entering service, they could not operate the Sea King. 79

individual ships. Ironically, the RAN has leased back six former RAN A-4 Skyhawks which were sold to New Zealand following the disposal of Melbourne, in order to meet its operational training requirements. These aircraft, which are flown and maintained by

RNZAF personnel, operate from their former home at the naval air station in Nowra.

As far as the lack of a medium range anti-submarine capability was concerned, as the announcements were being made on the demise of the carrier and fixed wing aviation, the

short list of potential new helicopters to equip the guided missile frigates was announced - a procurement activity which was well underway prior to the carrier decision. By October

1983 a flirther short list of two helicopters - one from the United Kingdom and the other from the United States - had been selected as final contenders. A year later, in October

1984, eight S-70B-2 Seahawk anti-submarine helicopters were ordered from Sikorsky in the

United States for delivery from 1988, while twelve months later an additional eight were

ordered to satisfy the full needs of the four operational FFGs and two further ships on order. ^

The first pair of Seahawks were delivered to the RAN during early 1988 for test and trials and the remainder were progressively delivered over the ensuing two years, with this aircraft finally being accepted into operational service in 1993 after experiencing combat system integration problems. Although the integrated Sonobuoy and Magnetic Anomaly Detector

(MAD) equipped Seahawk, which does not have a dunking sonar, has not completely replaced the capability provided by the Sea King, it has none the less proven to be a very

Ross Gillett, Wings Across the Sea, Aerospace Publications, Sydney, 1988, p. 155. 80

capable anti-submarine aircraft. Furthermore, the Seahawk, which forms an integral part of the FFG's weapons and sensor systems, is also extensively utilised for conducting surface surveillance and targeting tasks. In addition, the Seahawk is to be modernised with new

Electronic Support Measures (ESM) and forward-looking infrared sensors, and at a later date it is hoped to add a lightweight dipping sonar and anti-ship missile launching capability, which will further enhance its capabilities and completely replace the dunking sonar capability of the Sea King which is predominantly being converted to a utility role. ^^

Although new and advanced technologies largely replaced the strike and anti-submarine roles of the carrier, and to a lesser extent the air defence capabilities of the fleet, it was the less considered strategic lift capability of the carrier that was to be sorely missed. This became very apparent in the first major test for the 'carrier-less' RAN, little more than four years di^er Melbourne's demise, with the military takeover in Fiji in May 1987. In response to this crisis, the Australian Government quickly deployed a naval task force with an embarked rifle company from the Operational Deployment Force (ODF) to the vicinity of

Fiji in order to be ready to evacuate Australian nationals from the islands in the event that the crisis worsened. Fortunately the situation in Fiji stabilised and this somewhat stretched force departed from Fijian waters without the need to evacuate any Australians from the islands.^^ What the operation, code-named 'Morris Dance', did, however, reveal, was that

A.D. Baker, Combat Fleets of the World 1995, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1995, p. 15. " Graeme Cheeseman, The Search for Self-Reliance: Australian Defence Since Vietnam, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1993, p. 18. 81

with the loss of a carrier, the ADF no longer had suitable platform for operating a number of

helicopters simultaneously in support of such a contingency/^

As a result of this deficiency an embryo project was established within Navy soon afterwards to investigate acquiring a helicopter support ship (HSS) to improve Australia's ability to transport and lodge troops from the sea by helicopter in an effort to essentially restore the

capability lost with the scrapping of the helicopter carrying troop transport Sydney in the

early 1970s and the later disposal oiMelbourne which subsequently provided this capability

as a secondary mission until its decommissioning.^^ The establishment of this project ironically meant that the ADF had effectively returned to the same position that it had been in at the commencement of the previously discussed LPH study in the early 1970s.

As a further measure, the training ship HMAS , which doubled as a logistic support ship, was equipped with a helicopter deck capable of operating a Sea King helicopter in order to supplement the capabilities provided by the amphibious ship Tobruk until a HSS capability entered service.

As the memory of the Fijian operation faded, the push for the HSS rapidly receded and nothing came of this project. The concept was, however, revived in the 1991 Force

Structure Review which confirmed the basic capabilities contained in the 1987 defence

^^ Although Tobruk, with the ODF force embarked, took part in the operation, she was only equipped with two flight decks. An essential requirement in an operation of this nature is the ability to have six medium sized utility helicopters depart the naval force at the same time and simultaneously land a company sized force ashore in order to establish a landing zone. ^^ Some early planning documents envisaged a Helicopter Support Ship (HSS) force of up to three vessels. 82

White Paper, with one important addition: a strategic lift capability to improve the ADF's ability to respond to regional requests for assistance noting that such requests 'could arise with little warning and [that] the speed and direction of developments might be unpredictable'.^"^

In order to carry out this role, the review recommended that the Government acquire a helicopter support ship and a number of utility helicopters to transport troops and supplies ashore. The FSR argued that whilst 'all naval vessels can contribute to regional operations by transporting equipment, stores and personnel' the ADF did not have '[a] single vessel capable of operating a number of helicopters simultaneously'. Furthermore, the FSR made provision for the acquisition of six suitably equipped utility helicopters for this requirement later in the decade, noting the limitations on the Sea King's life, and the unsuitability of the

Army's Black Hawk helicopter for this role without extensive modifications.^^

As far as reponses to incursions onto Australian territory were concerned, the FSR additionally noted that whilst a HSS had a low priority for northern operations, it 'could be useful as a base for operations in inhospitable coastal regions, particularly during the wet season'. ^^

^^ FSR, op.cit., p.28. ^^ These expensive modifications would include provision of folding rotor blades and marinisation to prevent corrosion. FSR, op.cit., p.25. 83

The FSR consequently recommended that the training ship acquired to replace HMASJervis

Bay later in the decade should have the dual role and capability of a helicopter support ship, and that this capability 'might also be considered as a replacement in part for the capability provided by Tobruk, which reaches the end of her life in about 2010'/^

As a result of this recommendation, active Defence consideration into the need for maritime assets to support at-sea training of naval personnel and amphibious support for Army units commenced in July 1992. Initial studies focused on two key areas; the priority and justification for the capability within strategic guidance and the options available to meet the requirement. These studies concluded that in addition to a training requirement to replace the capabilities of Jenns Bay by 1998, there was justification for a capability to embark and lodge ashore by helicopters and an Army battalion group. Furthermore, the latter requirement progressively began to attract more importance as it became increasing

1 fi apparent that the combined capabilities of Tobruk and the ageing Jenns Bay fell short of the ADF's strategic lift requirements.

Several options for providing the so called Training and Helicopter Support Ship (THSS)

capability were considered, including the purchase and conversion of a merchant ship, the

conversion of a second-hand and the construction of a new mission-specific vessel. ^^

Over the ensuing twelve months key activities included a consultancy on the conversion of a

^^ ibid, p.28. ^^ Furthermore, Jervis Bay suffered a major propulsion casualty during mid-1993 which fiirther hastened the requirement to find a replacement for her. ^^ David White, 'The Navy's New Ships HMAS and Manoora' in Australia's Navy 1995, AGPS, Canberra, 1995, p.47. 84

merchant ship to the role together with a consultancy on a generic new-build THSS. At the

same time, a complementary amphibious capability study was undertaken. A team from the

ADF also visited various overseas countries to study various HSS developments and designs, including the new British Aviation Support Ship HMS Ocean, which was a smaller derivative of the earlier Invincible class carrier.

At that stage the requirement called for a single ship of approximately 12,000 tonnes capable of embarking and lodging a battalion sized group of soldiers (approximately 900 men) and their associated equipment by a combination of helicopter and landing craft into a non- developed port or lodgement site, the simultaneous operation of at least six medium-sized utility helicopters, and the ability to embark 150 trainees when not involved in troop transport duties. It also called for the capability to carry two army medium landing craft in

davits.^'

By this time, estimated costs to meet the capability ranged from $250 million for a converted merchant ship to over $500 million for an austere new construction ship based on a mix of military and commercial standards, which was shaping-up to be the preferred option. It was

at this juncture, that the then Minister for Defence, Senator Robert Ray became concerned

at the escalating cost of a THSS (that was increasingly starting to resemble a carrier in

appearance if not role) and made it clear that the Government was not prepared to spend

$500 million for this capability.

20 Baker, op.cit., p.24. 85

Although there was a strong push within the Department of Defence to return to an austere

$60 million training ship, the ADF maintained the requirement for a THSS as articulated in the FSR with the Minister consequently agreeing to a $1 million 12 month study to examine the construction of a new ship, conversion of a merchant vessel or procurement of a second- hand military ship for a cost of no more than $250 million.

By mid-1993, however, in a move reminiscent of the carrier decision in 1982, the required level of funding required for a THSS could not be sustained by the Defence program. As a result, funding for a THSS was removed from the five year defence program in the context of the August 1993 Budget and the Minister for Defence announced that a new construction

THSS would no longer be acquired. The possibility, however, of acquiring a second hand

amphibious ship as an opportunity buy remained a possibility.

Following this development, the ADF commenced an examination of likely second-hand

ships that might be available to meet the extant THSS requirement. At the time the US

armed forces were being down-sized following the end of the Cold War, and Australia was

offered a number of 'opportunity buys' including USAF F-lllG aircraft, guided missile

destroyers and amphibious ships. As a result, an Australian mission visited the US in

October 1993 to look at three classes of surplus US Navy amphibious ships on offer to

Australia. These were the Austin class dock landing ships (LPDs), Newport class tank

landing ships (LSTs) and interestingly enough, the Iwo Jima class LPH, a variant of which

(as discussed in Chapter 3) had been the preferred option to firstly replace Sydney, and later,

Melbourne, before the decision was taken to acquire Invincible. 86

Although an Iwo Jima class vessel would have met the THSS requirements and would undoubtedly have provided the ADF with a very flexible helicopter carrier, its biggest drawback was the fact that it was propelled by steam turbines which made it particularly manpower intensive to operate.^^ This would have required a crew of close to 750 to operate it, as opposed to the 120 personnel that the manpower stretched ADF was prepared or able to provide for the THSS. Furthermore, there can be some doubt as to whether the then Labor Government would have approved the purchase of a 'flat-top' THSS that looked remarkably like an aircraft carrier observing the controversy that it could have generated both within its party and with the Opposition and general public.

After also discounting the propelled Austin class as being unsuitable, the

Newport class LST was assessed as being the most viable option due to its diesel propulsion

system, inherent helicopter capability, large cargo capacity and accommodation suitable for embarking trainees or Army personnel.^^ What was, however, clear, was that the required amphibious capability could not be achieved by only acquiring and converting one LST. As a result, a recommendation was made to Government shortly afterwards recommending the purchase of two US Navy Newport class LSTs as a replacement not only for Jervis Bay, but

also for Tobruk, it being argued that operation of two modified ships of the same class, each with the ability to carry 450 troops and simultaneously operate three helicopters, would best meet the ADF's THSS requirement as well as effecting economies in through life logistic

^^ The variant of the Iwo Jima class proposed as a replacement fox Melbourne in the early 1980s featured propulsion. ^^ White, op.cit., p.47. 87

support and operation at a level of capability far superior to that which was in the ADF at the time.

With force development in the ADF centralised and this joint project well supported by

Army, no opposition was encountered within Defence in getting the project endorsed, and this recommendation was subsequently accepted by the Government in December 1993. As

a result, the USN LSTs USS Saginaw and USS Fairfax County were selected for transfer to the RAN in 1994 at a total acquisition cost of some $60 million. The sale was, however,

held up in mid-1994 through objections in the US Senate to the perceived loss of

amphibious lift capability for the US Marine Corps, until a Senate vote on 7 August 1994

allowed the sale to proceed.^^

Saginaw was subsequently commissioned into the RAN as HMAS Kanimbla on 29 August

1994. Fully crewed by Australian personnel (many of whom had come from the

decommissioned Jenns Bay) she departed in October 1994 and arrived in Australia

on 18 November 1994. Her sister ship, the USS Fairfax County, was delivered to Australia by its American crew, arriving in Sydney on 18 September 1994. She was recommissioned

as HMAS Manoora on 25 November 1994.^*^

Tenders for the modification of the ships to meet the ADF's THSS requirements were called

for in December 1994 and a $62 million contract was finally awarded to Forgacs

^^ David Foxwell, 'Australia's THSS Programme: Built-in Capability' mJam 's Defence Systems Modernisation, May 1995, p.35. 24 ibid. Alongside together at the Fleet Base for the first time. The new Training and Helicopter Support ships, HMAS KANIMBLA (left) and HMAS 88

Engineering of Newcastle in April 1996. These modifications, which will see the ships gain significant operational enhancements and upgrades, include the deletion of the bow derrick arms and associated equipment on the foredeck to make way for a helicopter deck suitable for a Black Hawk or Sea King helicopter, the fitting of a 70-tonne crane forward of the bridge for handling two LCM8 landing craft which can be stowed on the forward flight deck if required, erection of a hangar amidships capable of accommodating four Army Black

Hawk helicopters, provision of a two-spot helicopter flight deck aft for use by helicopters up to and including the re-introduced Army Chinook helicopter. Future consideration will also be given to fitting a flight deck elevator to allow the movement of helicopters, vehicles and cargo between the tank deck and flight deck thereby ftirther increasing the number of helicopters that can be carried.^^

After modification in 1997, the two ships, which have recently been redesignated Landing

Platforms Amphibious (LPA), will provide the ADF with a potent transportation, lodgement and sustainment capability for an Army battalion group while also providing a most usefiil and necessary training platform to train tomorrow's naval officers and sailors.^^

Furthermore, these converted ships, which are intended to serve the ADF for at least 15 years, will also provide valuable medical facilities for initial wound surgery and intensive care for both warlike and humanitarian operations. As a consequence of these modifications, the LP As will herald a new and exciting era in Australia's post-war maritime capability and provide the ADF with a much enhanced amphibious and helicopter carrying

^^ White, op.cit., pp.49-50. ibid, p.50. 89 capability that has not been available to the Australia since the paying-off of Melbourne in 1982. The new helicopter support ship HMAS KANIMBLA, working with an RAN Sea King helicopter during early 1995. Pronle drawing ot the modified THSS. The final design will depend on the detailed design developed by the chosen contractor. (Drawing: RANI 90

Conclusions

A continuum exists in Australia's security and defence policy from the colonial era to the present. Couched in different terms at various times the themes are collective defence, the direct defence of Australia, regional threats or challenges, and the protection of seaborne trade. Until the 1970s, the first two were seen as one in the minds of most Australian leaders. The strategy was to extend the defence perimeter as far away from Australia's shores as possible, largely by integrating Australia's armed forces with those of the great powers.

It was against this strategic background that the Chiefly Government decided to acquire an aircraft carrier capability in 1947 to defend Australia's interests in large, but poorly defined parts of the Indian and Pacific Oceans in conjunction with its Allies. The decision to introduce naval air power had a long gestation, and the value of the aircraft carrier had been amply demonstrated during the war in the Pacific. However, as Donohue, argues, the significant decision to introduce naval air power was made without any real consideration of other force structure implications, and was ultimately to distort the RAN force structure by reducing the number of destroyers, frigates and afloat support ships which were affordable.^

^ Hector Donohue, From Empire Defence to the Long Haul: Post-War Defence Policy and its Impact on Naval Force Structure Planning, 1945-1955, MA Thesis, University College, University of New South Wales, 1994,pp.210-211. 91

It was not long before the centrepiece of the Fleet, its new carrier force, was found to be unsustainable for a number of reasons. Firstly cost. About the cheapest aspect of

Australia's aircraft carrier force was its initial price. Sydney was acquired for less than three million pounds. It soon became very apparent that support of the carrier capability was tremendously draining on the RAN's limited manpower and financial resources, which was to become an enduring theme. This was particularly the case with the rapid changes in

aircraft technology which meant that there was simply insufficient fiinds to support two

state-of-the-art ships. Secondly, by the mid-1950s, with Australia's attention firmly focussed on the SEATO region, aircraft carriers were less relevant to Australia's defence

strategy. For these reasons, the two-carrier navy plan was dropped to save money and a

single carrier was retained in a navy which concentrated on operating anti-submarine ships for convoying Australian troops to help allies.

By 1959, even the fiature of Australia's only remaining operational carrier, the Melbourne, was looking bleak, with the Menzies Government's decision to phase-our fixed wing naval aviation altogether by 1963. This decision was, again, largely based on cost considerations, it being considered that it was extremely doubtftil that a small navy such as the RAN could keep pace with the costly modern developments in naval aviation without unduly prejudicing other defence activities.

By the beginning of the 1960s there was a growing concern amongst Australian Defence planners that Australia urgently needed a capability for independent operations in defence of

Australian interests; at least until help from powerfijl friends arrived. As a result, the 92

Government agreed to major equipment programs to repair the neglect of the 1950s whilst, in keeping with this thrust, the decision to disband naval aviation and pay o^Melbourne was reversed

The 1960s were consequently characterised by steady growth in Australia's independent maritime capability which included the acquisition of new naval aircraft for both sea control and power projection missions. PAihou^ Melbourne, in her new role of light attack carrier, was considered to be a valuable and flexible asset, the surge of new equipment programs did not include provision for a new aircraft carrier as Melbourne together with her new aircraft had at least a decade of service life remaining.

It was not until the 1970s that the long struggle to put in place an independent, nationalist

defence posture finally came to fruition after the United States, like Great Britain before it, made it clear that Australia had to look after itself As a consequence of these

developments, Navy argued that strategic guidance demanded credibility in the maintenance

of a naval presence, the conduct of sustained naval operations and a shift of force balance towards naval offensive capability. It consequently saw the core of the required naval force

as being based around two carriers with offensive aircraft capability, with one ship and its

destroyer support based on the east coast and the other in Western Australia in order to

provide adequate forces for simultaneous operations in both the Indian and Pacific oceans.

This was, however, at odds with the new Whitlam government's policy of minimising

defence expenditure and concentrating on defending continental Australia. 93

The Fraser Government on the other hand, reverted to a more outward looking defence policy, and was favourably disposed towards acquiring a new carrier to replace Melbourne which was rapidly nearing the end of her useful life. After much deliberation, extensive and bitter inter service rivalry and numerous in house and ftinded studies to assist the

Government in deciding whether to acquire a carrier or not, the Federal Government made the decision in 1980 to YQpXsLce Melbourne with a new purpose-designed helicopter carrier with the potential to operate STOVL aircraft.

This decision was, however, greeted by much resistance and the replacement of Melbourne stimulated detailed public enquiry and intense and prolonged parliamentary debate. No other element of the Australian Defence inventory has ever been, or is ever likely to be, subjected to such drawn out and detailed critical scrutiny as was the case with the carrier replacement.

Support for a replacement carrier within the RAN was, however, universal. To speak against it was heretical. Although criticism from the Press, Politicians and the RAAF was commonplace at the time, it was only the brave or foolhardy member of the Navy who would even contemplate the RAN without a carrier if the unthinkable happened. Of course the unthinkable did happen with the newly elected 's decision in March

1983 not to xQ^XdiCQ Melbourne and to disband fixed-wing naval aviation which was to close an important chapter in the Navy's recent history and dramatically alter the character of the

RAN.

In retrospect, the long battle to maintain a carrier force was always the victim of a tendency to attempt too much with inadequate finances. Following the painfiil loss of Melbourne, the 94

RAN was forced to come to grips with effectively operating and developing a fleet without a carrier and shifting its emphasis from fixed wing aviation to helicopters operating predominantly from frigates. As a result, Australia's maritime strategy and force structure was examined in detail and by the mid-1980s the growing centralisation and sophistication of defence policy formulation, improvements in the nation's industrial infrastructure and a rejuvenation of Navy leadership led to a change in fortunes which firmly set the 'carrier-less' RAN down the path of self-reliance as part of the sweeping reorientation of Australia's defence posture and priorities. 95

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