FROM CRADLE TO GRAVE? The Place of the Aircraft Carrier in Australia's post-war Defence Force Subthesis submitted for the degree of MASTER OF DEFENCE STUDIES at the University College The University of New South Wales Australian Defence Force Academy 1996 by ALLAN DU TOIT ACADEMY LIBRARy UNSW AT ADFA 437104 HMAS Melbourne, 1973. Trackers are parked to port and Skyhawks to starboard Declaration by Candidate I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, it contains no material previously published or written by another person nor material which to a substantial extent has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma of a university or other institute of higher learning, except where due acknowledgment is made in the text of the thesis. Allan du Toit Canberra, October 1996 Ill Abstract This subthesis sets out to study the place of the aircraft carrier in Australia's post-war defence force. Few changes in naval warfare have been as all embracing as the role played by the aircraft carrier, which is, without doubt, the most impressive, and at the same time the most controversial, manifestation of sea power. From 1948 until 1983 the aircraft carrier formed a significant component of the Australian Defence Force and the place of an aircraft carrier in defence strategy and the force structure seemed relatively secure. Although cost, especially in comparison to, and in competition with, other major defence projects, was probably the major issue in the demise of the aircraft carrier and an organic fixed-wing naval air capability in the Australian Defence Force, cost alone can obscure the ftindamental reordering of Australia's defence posture and strategic thinking, which significantly contributed to the decision not to replace HMAS Melbourne. Chapter 1 consequently reviews the evolution of Australia's post-war maritime strategic thinking in order to provide the necessary strategic framework against which this study is set. Chapter 2 traces Australian carrier aviation from 1947 when the decision was taken to acquire an aircraft carrier capability; through to the demise of this useftil capability in 1983 after one of the most protracted debates on the structure of the Australian Defence Force. This bitter debate, which was steeped in intense inter-service rivalry between the RAN and RAAF, is examined in Chapter 3. This 'water-shed' controversy, which dramatically altered the character of the RAN, is important, as it undoubtedly contributed to a significant reordering of Australia's defence priorities and the development, in many respects, of more realistic national defence policies in Australia. The final chapter of this subthesis discusses how the RAN was forced to come to grips with effectively operating and developing a fleet without a carrier and how this 'carrier-less' force has embarked down the path of self-reliance as part of the sweeping reorientation of Australia's defence posture and priorities. This subthesis concludes by arguing that the significant decision to introduce naval air power in 1947 was made without any real consideration of other force structure implications, which was ultimately distort the RAN force structure, and that in retrospect, the long battle to maintain a carrier force was always the victim of a tendency to attempt too much with inadequate finances. IV Contents Acknowledgments v Acronyms and abbreviations vi Introduction vii Chapter 1 From Alliance to Self-Reliance? The evolution of Australia's post-war maritime strategic thinking 1 Chapter 2 Wings at Sea: Australian carrier aviation, 1948-1983 23 Chapter 3 Bitter Rivalry: The carrier debate of the 1970s and early 1980s 48 Chapter 4 Clipped Wings: Defending Australia without a carrier 75 Conclusions 90 Bibliography 95 Acknowledgments I wish to acknowledge with gratitude the assistance, advice and support I received in preparing this subthesis from the following people: My supervisor, Dr Graeme Cheeseman, Department of Politics at University College who provided regular and valuable advice on the overall direction of the subthesis. Captain Mervyn Davis who understanding^ allowed me to 'disappear' from work, and not return, until I had completed my subthesis. Hector Donohue who generously gave of his time and encouragement to discuss issues and offer positive criticism. Joe Straczek, Senior Naval Historical and Archives Officer, who was always happy to find, in his own time, many elusive facts and obscure source papers. Last but by no means least, my wife Tessa and two young sons Tristan and Rowan, who tolerated the considerable commitment of my time and who gave me much support and encouragement as I researched and wrote this subthesis. Furthermore, a work of this nature necessarily builds on the work of others, and the many sources consulted in researching and writing this subthesis are acknowledged in the text, footnotes and in the bibliography. I recognise the importance of the invaluable background and references obtained from these sources and the contribution of the authors concerned. Finally, the views expressed in this subthesis were arrived at by the Author in the course of academic research, and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing official opinion within the ADF, Department of Defence or the Australian Government. Allan du Toit Canberra, October 1996 VI Acronyms and Abbreviations ADAWS Action Data Automated Weapon System ADF Australian Defence Force ANZAM Australia, New Zealand and Malayan Area ANZUS Australia, New Zealand and United States Treaty ARA Armada Repulic de Argentina ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations ASP 90 Australia's Strategic Planning in the 1990s ASW Anti-submarine Warfare CAS Chief of Air Staff CGS Chief of the General Staff COSC Chiefs of Staff Committee CSE Central Studies Establishment CVA Aircraft Carrier DDG Guided Missile Destroyer DFDC Defence Force Development Committee DOA 87 The Defence of Australia 1987 ESM Electronic Support Measures FAA Fleet Air Arm FFG Guided Missile Frigate FPDA Five Power Defence Arrangements FSR Force Structure Review HMAS His/Her Majesty's Australian Ship HMS His/Her Majesty's Ship HSS Helicopter Support Ship ITR Invitation to Register Interest LPA Landing Platform Amphibious LPD Landing Platform Dock LPH Landing Platform Helicopter LSL Landing Ship Logistics LSI Landing Ship Tank MAD Magnetic Anomaly Detector MM&S Military Movement and Support NAP Naval Air Power Study NAP/TAWS Naval Air Power Study/ Tactical Air Weapons System Study NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NCDS Naval Combat Data System ODF Operational Deployment Force RAAF Royal Australian Air Force Vll RAN Royal Australian Navy RN Royal Navy SAGW Surface-to-Air Guided Weapons SAP Seaborne Aircraft Platform SCS Sea Control Ship SEATO South East Asian Treaty Organisation SR 93 Strategic Review 1993 SSM Surface-to-Surface Missile STOVL Short Take-off and Vertical Landing TAWS Tactical Air Weapons System Study THSS Training and Helicopter Support Ship UK United Kingdom US United States USAF United States Air Force USN United States Navy USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Vlll Introduction Australia, which lies between three great oceans, possesses one of the world's longest coastlines, the second largest continental shelf and the fourth largest Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). From the early days of settlement the sea has been Australia's vital link with the rest of the world, and today, Australia's future continues to be closely tied to the sea in terms of defence, trade, oil and gas production, fishing, tourism and leisure. For this reason, an effective maritime strategy and force structure are central to Australia's national security and economic well-being. From 1948 until 1983 - when the Government finally decided not to replace HMAS Melbourne - the aircraft carrier formed a significant component of the Australian Defence Force and the place of an aircraft carrier capability in defence strategy and the force structure seemed relatively secure. Although cost, especially in comparison to, and in competition with, other major defence projects, was probably the major issue in the demise of an organic fixed-wing naval air capability in the Australian Defence Force, cost alone can obscure the fundamental reordering of Australia's defence posture and strategic thinking, which significantly contributed to the decision not to repldice Melbourne} ^ Ray Jones, 'Aircraft Carriers and Australian Defence Policy', Defence Force Journal, No.61, November/December 1986, p.50. IX As the place of the aircraft carrier in Australia's post-war defence force was dominated by changes in strategic thinking and defence policy, it is necessary, at the outset of this study, to have a broad understanding of the evolution of Australia's post-war strategic thinking, particularly within the maritime context. This is essential, as it provides the necessary strategic framework and context against which a carrier force was acquired in the years immediately following World War II; through to the demise of this useful capability in 1983 following one of the most bitter and protracted debates on the structure of the Australian Defence Force. Furthermore, an understanding of current Australian strategic thinking will provide the necessary background to the final chapter of this subthesis which will discuss the defence of Australia without an aircraft carrier and the resurgence of a helicopter carrier capability in the contemporary fleet. CHAPTER 1 From Alliance to Self-Reliance? The evolution of Australia's post-war maritime strategic thinking Our future must be that of a maritime state . In Australia our seamen are our frontiersmen. Vice Admiral William Rouke Creswell ^ Since federation in 1901, Australian strategic planning has been based upon some form of aUiance with a great power and Australian maritime strategic thinking and the capabilities of the Royal Australian Navy, which, for much of its history was designed to fight in distant waters in high intensity conflict integrated with the superior naval forces of the two great powers, has been fundamentally shaped by the powerful and dominant influences of both British and United States sea power.