DOCSLIB.ORG

Naval Postgraduate School Thesis

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Naval Postgraduate School Thesis NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS A STUDY OF THE RUSSIAN ACQUISITION OF THE FRENCH MISTRAL AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT WARSHIPS by Patrick Thomas Baker June 2011 Thesis Advisor: Mikhail Tsypkin Second Reader: Douglas Porch Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED June 2011 Master‘s Thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS A Study of the Russian Acquisition of the French Mistral Amphibious Assault Warships 6. AUTHOR(S) Patrick Thomas Baker 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School REPORT NUMBER Monterey, CA 93943-5000 9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING N/A AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number: N/A. 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) In 2009, Moscow opened negotiations with Paris to purchase the Mistral class amphibious assault ship. In December 2010, Russia indicated that it was prepared to move forward with an agreement to buy two Mistral class warships, with the option of building two more jointly at a Russian shipyard. Neither Russia, nor the Soviet Union ever possessed a vessel with the capabilities of the Mistral class. An amphibious assault ship would be a new addition to the Soviet/Russian naval arsenal. The fact that Russia must turn to foreign suppliers to modernize its fleet capabilities indicates that Russia‘s domestic arms industry lacks the capability to produce a range of modern warships. The Mistral is the first significant arms sale of a major NATO power (France) to a country that some still see as a threat. For this reason, the sale has raised fears among the smaller NATO members, who charge that Paris has brushed aside their security concerns for national and economic reasons. This thesis argues that the Mistral sale is driven by Russia‘s need to acquire modern command and control and shipbuilding technologies, rather than increase its amphibious assault capabilities per se. 14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF Mistral, Russian Navy, Russian Naval Modernization, Amphibious Assault Warships, Helicopter PAGES Carriers, NATO Arms sales, NATO solidarity, NATO Baltic relations 152 16. PRICE CODE 17. SECURITY 18. SECURITY 19. SECURITY 20. LIMITATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT REPORT PAGE ABSTRACT Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UU NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 i THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ii Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited A STUDY OF THE RUSSIAN ACQUISITION OF THE FRENCH MISTRAL AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT WARSHIPS Patrick Thomas Baker Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy B.S., United States Naval Academy, 2000 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES (EUROPE AND EURASIA) from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL June 2011 Author: Patrick T. Baker Approved by: Mikhail Tsypkin, PhD Thesis Advisor Douglas Porch, PhD Second Reader Harold Trinkunas, PhD Chair, Department of National Security Affairs iii THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK iv ABSTRACT In 2009, Moscow opened negotiations with Paris to purchase the Mistral class amphibious assault ship. In December 2010, Russia indicated that it was prepared to move forward with an agreement to buy two Mistral class warships, with the option of building two more jointly at a Russian shipyard. Neither Russia, nor the Soviet Union ever possessed a vessel with the capabilities of the Mistral class. An amphibious assault ship would be a new addition to the Soviet/Russian naval arsenal. The fact that Russia must turn to foreign suppliers to modernize its fleet capabilities indicates that Russia‘s domestic arms industry lacks the capability to produce a range of modern warships. The Mistral is the first significant arms sale of a major NATO power (France) to a country that some still see as a threat. For this reason, the sale has raised fears among the smaller NATO members, who charge that Paris has brushed aside their security concerns for national and economic reasons. This thesis argues that the Mistral sale is driven by Russia‘s need to acquire modern command and control and shipbuilding technologies, rather than increase its amphibious assault capabilities per se. v THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK vi TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION................................................................1 B. IMPORTANCE ................................................................................................1 C. PROBLEM AND HYPOTHESIS ...................................................................2 D. LITERATURE REVIEW ...............................................................................4 II. RUSSIAN PLANNING AND REASONS BEHIND THE SELECTION OF THE MISTRAL .........................................................................................................15 A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................15 B. RUSSIAN PLANNING DOCUMENTS .......................................................15 C. RUSSIAN STATE ARMAMENTS PROGRAM (GVP) ............................17 D. WHAT STARTED THE TREND TOWARD MISTRAL? .......................19 1. Russian Defense Industry ..................................................................20 2. Outdated Shipbuilding Facilities ......................................................24 3. Further Arguments Against Domestic Design and Production Only .....................................................................................................30 4. Tirpitz Plan Redux .............................................................................31 5. Lessons Learned From Georgia Conflict .........................................33 E. CURRENT RUSSIAN AMPHIBIOUS WARSHIPS ..................................37 F. NEW RUSSIAN AMPHIBIOUS WARSHIPS BESIDES THE MISTRAL ........................................................................................................40 G. CURRENT RUSSIAN AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITY ..............................41 H. OTHER COMPARABLE AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT WARSHIPS TO THE MISTRAL ........................................................................................44 I. MISTRAL CAPABILITIES .........................................................................49 J. RUSSIAN NAVAL CAPABILITY GAPS ...................................................54 1. Command and Control ......................................................................55 2. Hospital Ship or Disaster Relief Warship ........................................57 3. Long Range Cruises to Show the Flag .............................................58 4. Amphibious Assault ...........................................................................59 K. GENERAL PLACEMENT OF RUSSIAN MISTRALS .............................61 1. Pacific Fleet.........................................................................................62 2. Baltic Fleet ..........................................................................................68 3. Northern Fleet ....................................................................................69 4. Black Sea Fleet ...................................................................................70 L. RUSSIAN NAVAL INFRASTRUCTURE ..................................................72 M. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................78 III. EFFECTS OF MISTRAL SALE ON NATO ALLIANCE ....................................81 A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................81 B. BALTIC AND POLISH CONCERNS .........................................................81 C. EU COUNCIL/PARLIAMENT REACTIONS ...........................................87 vii D. NATO RESPONSE BEFORE OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF SALE ...............................................................................................................89 E. LISBON SUMMIT RESULTS .....................................................................96 F. NATO REACTIONS POST FORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT ...................98 G. BALTIC REACTIONS POST-OFFICAL ANNOUNCEMENT...............99
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Navy Columbia-Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program
    Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress Updated September 14, 2021 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R41129 Navy Columbia (SSBN-826) Class Ballistic Missile Submarine Program Summary The Navy’s Columbia (SSBN-826) class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) program is a program to design and build a class of 12 new SSBNs to replace the Navy’s current force of 14 aging Ohio-class SSBNs. Since 2013, the Navy has consistently identified the Columbia-class program as the Navy’s top priority program. The Navy procured the first Columbia-class boat in FY2021 and wants to procure the second boat in the class in FY2024. The Navy’s proposed FY2022 budget requests $3,003.0 (i.e., $3.0 billion) in procurement funding for the first Columbia-class boat and $1,644.0 million (i.e., about $1.6 billion) in advance procurement (AP) funding for the second boat, for a combined FY2022 procurement and AP funding request of $4,647.0 million (i.e., about $4.6 billion). The Navy’s FY2022 budget submission estimates the procurement cost of the first Columbia- class boat at $15,030.5 million (i.e., about $15.0 billion) in then-year dollars, including $6,557.6 million (i.e., about $6.60 billion) in costs for plans, meaning (essentially) the detail design/nonrecurring engineering (DD/NRE) costs for the Columbia class. (It is a long-standing Navy budgetary practice to incorporate the DD/NRE costs for a new class of ship into the total procurement cost of the first ship in the class.) Excluding costs for plans, the estimated hands-on construction cost of the first ship is $8,473.0 million (i.e., about $8.5 billion).
    [Show full text]
  • Alternative Naval Force Structure
    Alternative Naval Force Structure A compendium by CIMSEC Articles By Steve Wills · Javier Gonzalez · Tom Meyer · Bob Hein · Eric Beaty Chuck Hill · Jan Musil · Wayne P. Hughes Jr. Edited By Dmitry Filipoff · David Van Dyk · John Stryker 1 Contents Preface ................................................................................................................................ 3 The Perils of Alternative Force Structure ................................................... 4 By Steve Wills Unmanned­Centric Force Structure ............................................................... 8 By Javier Gonzalez Proposing A Modern High Speed Transport – The Long Range Patrol Vessel ................................................................................................... 11 By Tom Meyer No Time To Spare: Drawing on History to Inspire Capability Innovation in Today’s Navy ................................................................................. 15 By Bob Hein Enhancing Existing Force Structure by Optimizing Maritime Service Specialization .............................................................................................. 18 By Eric Beaty Augment Naval Force Structure By Upgunning The Coast Guard .......................................................................................................... 21 By Chuck Hill A Fleet Plan for 2045: The Navy the U.S. Ought to be Building ..... 25 By Jan Musil Closing Remarks on Changing Naval Force Structure ....................... 31 By Wayne P. Hughes Jr. CIMSEC 22 www.cimsec.org
    [Show full text]
  • A New Carrier Race? Yoji Koda
    Naval War College Review Volume 64 Article 4 Number 3 Summer 2011 A New Carrier Race? Yoji Koda Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review Recommended Citation Koda, Yoji (2011) "A New Carrier Race?," Naval War College Review: Vol. 64 : No. 3 , Article 4. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss3/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile Composite Default screen Koda: A New Carrier Race? A NEW CARRIER RACE? Strategy, Force Planning, and JS Hyuga Vice Admiral Yoji Koda, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (Retired) n 18 March 2009 JS Hyuga (DDH 181) was commissioned and delivered to Othe Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF). The unique characteris- tic of this ship is its aircraft-carrier-like design, with a “through” flight deck and an island on the starboard side. Hyuga was planned in the five-year Midterm De- fense Buildup Plan (MTDBP) of 2001 and funded in Japanese fiscal year (JFY) 2004 as the replacement for the aging first-generation helicopter-carrying de- stroyer (DDH), JS Haruna (DDH 141), which was to reach the end of its service life of thirty-five years in 2009. The second ship of the new class, JS Ise (DDH 182), of the JFY 2006 program, was commissioned 16 March 2011.
    [Show full text]
  • Navy Ship Names: Background for Congress
    Navy Ship Names: Background for Congress (name redacted) Specialist in Naval Affairs December 13, 2017 Congressional Research Service 7-.... www.crs.gov RS22478 Navy Ship Names: Background for Congress Summary Names for Navy ships traditionally have been chosen and announced by the Secretary of the Navy, under the direction of the President and in accordance with rules prescribed by Congress. Rules for giving certain types of names to certain types of Navy ships have evolved over time. There have been exceptions to the Navy’s ship-naming rules, particularly for the purpose of naming a ship for a person when the rule for that type of ship would have called for it to be named for something else. Some observers have perceived a breakdown in, or corruption of, the rules for naming Navy ships. On July 13, 2012, the Navy submitted to Congress a 73-page report on the Navy’s policies and practices for naming ships. For ship types now being procured for the Navy, or recently procured for the Navy, naming rules can be summarized as follows: The first Ohio replacement ballistic missile submarine (SBNX) has been named Columbia in honor of the District of Columbia, but the Navy has not stated what the naming rule for these ships will be. Virginia (SSN-774) class attack submarines are being named for states. Aircraft carriers are generally named for past U.S. Presidents. Of the past 14, 10 were named for past U.S. Presidents, and 2 for Members of Congress. Destroyers are being named for deceased members of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, including Secretaries of the Navy.
    [Show full text]
  • Development of Modern Control Laws for the AH-64D in Hover/Low Speed Flight
    Development of Modern Control Laws for the AH-64D in Hover/Low Speed Flight Jeffrey W. Harding 1 Scott J. Moody Geoffrey J. Jeram 2 Aviation Engineering Directorate U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Research, Development, and Engineering Center Redstone Arsenal, Alabama M. Hossein Mansur 3 Mark B. Tischler Aeroflightdynamics Directorate U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Research, Development, and Engineering Center Moffet Field, California ABSTRACT Modern control laws are developed for the AH-64D Longbow Apache to provide improved handling qualities for hover and low speed flight in a degraded visual environment. The control laws use a model following approach to generate commands for the existing partial authority stability augmentation system (SAS) to provide both attitude command attitude hold and translational rate command response types based on the requirements in ADS-33E. Integrated analysis tools are used to support the design process including system identification of aircraft and actuator dynamics and optimization of design parameters based on military handling qualities and control system specifications. The purpose is to demonstrate the potential for improving the low speed handling qualities of existing Army helicopters with partial authority SAS actuators through flight control law modifications as an alternative to a full authority, fly-by-wire, control system upgrade. NOTATION INTRODUCTION ACAH attitude command attitude hold The AH-64 Apache was designed in the late 70’s and went DH direction hold into service as the US Army’s most advanced day, night DVE degraded visual environment and adverse weather attack helicopter in 1986. The flight HH height hold control system was designed to meet the relevant handling HQ handling qualities qualities requirements based on MIL-F-8501 (Ref.
    [Show full text]
  • Assessment of Navy Heavy-Lift Aircraft Options
    THE ARTS This PDF document was made available from www.rand.org as a public CHILD POLICY service of the RAND Corporation. CIVIL JUSTICE EDUCATION Jump down to document ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT 6 HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research NATIONAL SECURITY POPULATION AND AGING organization providing objective analysis and effective PUBLIC SAFETY solutions that address the challenges facing the public SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY and private sectors around the world. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE Support RAND WORKFORCE AND WORKPLACE Purchase this document Browse Books & Publications Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore RAND National Defense Research Institute View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non- commercial use only. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. This product is part of the RAND Corporation documented briefing series. RAND documented briefings are based on research briefed to a client, sponsor, or targeted au- dience and provide additional information on a specific topic. Although documented briefings have been peer reviewed, they are not expected to be comprehensive and may present preliminary findings. Assessment of Navy Heavy-Lift Aircraft Options John Gordon IV, Peter A. Wilson, Jon Grossman, Dan Deamon, Mark Edwards, Darryl Lenhardt, Dan Norton, William Sollfrey Prepared for the United States Navy Approved for public release; unlimited distribution The research described in this report was prepared for the United States Navy.
    [Show full text]
  • China Naval Modernization: Implications for US Navy Capabilities
    China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress Updated May 21, 2020 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov RL33153 China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities Summary In an era of renewed great power competition, China’s military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, has become the top focus of U.S. defense planning and budgeting. China’s navy, which China has been steadily modernizing for more than 25 years, since the early to mid-1990s, has become a formidable military force within China’s near-seas region, and it is conducting a growing number of operations in more-distant waters, including the broader waters of the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and waters around Europe. China’s navy is viewed as posing a major challenge to the U.S. Navy’s ability to achieve and maintain wartime control of blue-water ocean areas in the Western Pacific—the first such challenge the U.S. Navy has faced since the end of the Cold War—and forms a key element of a Chinese challenge to the long- standing status of the United States as the leading military power in the Western Pacific. China’s naval modernization effort encompasses a wide array of platform and weapon acquisition programs, including anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), submarines, surface ships, aircraft, unmanned vehicles (UVs), and supporting C4ISR (command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) systems. China’s naval modernization effort also includes improvements in maintenance and logistics, doctrine, personnel quality, education and training, and exercises.
    [Show full text]
  • 23. Baltic Perspectives on the European Security and Defence Policy
    23. Baltic perspectives on the European Security and Defence Policy Elzbieta Tromer I. Introduction Given the choice between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Euro- pean Security and Defence Policy as providers of their national security, the Baltic states—Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania—look to the USA. One reason is their perception of Russia as a source of instability. Another is their lack of con- fidence in the ability of the ESDP to deal with present-day threats. Although these three states are eager to be ‘normal’ members of the European Union and thus to join in its initiatives, their enthusiasm for the EU’s development of its own military muscle is lukewarm. An EU with some military capability but without the USA’s military strength and leadership holds little promise for them. Since the ESDP vehicle is already on the move, the Baltic states see their main function as ensuring coordination between the ESDP and NATO. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania want to be ‘Atlanticists from within the ESDP’.1 The Baltic states see themselves as exposed to challenges similar to those confronting the Nordic countries: notably the challenge of the new transatlantic dynamic, which makes it almost impossible to avoid taking sides between the US and Europe on an increasing range of global and specific issues. Being torn in this way is bound to be especially painful for Scandinavian [and Baltic] societies which have strong ties of history, culture and values with both sides of the Atlantic, and which in strategic terms are relatively dependent both on American military and European economic strength.2 The Nordic countries are seen by the Baltic states as allies in this context.
    [Show full text]
  • Dlgn-38 Nuclear Guided Missile Frigate
    U. S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFFICE STAFF STUDY GN-38 NUCLEAR GUIDED MISSILE FRIGATE > DEPARTMENTOF THE NAVY Contents Page SUMMARY 1 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION System description Status of acquisition Reduction in quantity Scope 2 WEAPONSYSTEM STATUS System cost experience Appropriated and obligated funds System schedule experience System performance experience Selected acquisition reporting 3 COST ESTIMATING AND PROGRESSMEASUREMENT 10 Establishment of baseline 10 Cost estimate 10 Basic construction 11 Change orders 12 Government furnished equipment 12 Future characteristic changes 13 Escalation 13 Target to ceiling 13 Schedule estimate 13 Performance estimate 14 Progress measurement 14 Shipbuildimg contract 15 cost 16 Schedule and performance 20 Progress payments 20 Revised budget and cost control system 20 Project Manager’s use of reports and meetings 21 Government furnished equipment 21 Conclusion 23 ABBREVIATIONS CGN Nuclear-Powered Guided Missile Cruiser DLGN Nuclear-Powered Guided Missile Frigate DOD Department of Defense GAO General Accounting Office GFE Government Furnished Equipment NAVSHIPS Naval Ship Systems Command Newport News Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company, Newport News, Virginia PERT Program Evaluation Review Technique SAR Selected Acquisition Report SPD Ship Project Directive SUPSHIP Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair, Newport News, Virginia , 1 , . SUMMARY DLGN-38 NUCLEAR GUIDED MISSILE FRIGATE SYSTEM DESCRIPTION-- The DLGN-38 class is a nuclear guided missile frigate which will operate offensively in the presence of air, surface, or subsurface threat. This class ship will operate either independently or with nuclear or conventional strike forces and provide protection to these forces and other naval forces or convoys. The currently approved DLGN-38 class consists of three ships, DLGNs-38, 39, and 40.
    [Show full text]
  • Cvf) Programme
    CHILD POLICY This PDF document was made available CIVIL JUSTICE from www.rand.org as a public service of EDUCATION the RAND Corporation. ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE Jump down to document6 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS NATIONAL SECURITY The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit POPULATION AND AGING research organization providing PUBLIC SAFETY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY objective analysis and effective SUBSTANCE ABUSE solutions that address the challenges TERRORISM AND facing the public and private sectors HOMELAND SECURITY TRANSPORTATION AND around the world. INFRASTRUCTURE Support RAND Purchase this document Browse Books & Publications Make a charitable contribution For More Information Visit RAND at www.rand.org Explore RAND Europe View document details Limited Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non- commercial use only. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents. This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND mono- graphs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity. Options for Reducing Costs in the United Kingdom’s Future Aircraft Carrier (cvf) Programme John F. Schank | Roland Yardley Jessie Riposo | Harry Thie | Edward Keating Mark V. Arena | Hans Pung John Birkler | James R. Chiesa Prepared for the UK Ministry of Defence Approved for public release; distribution unlimited The research described in this report was sponsored by the United King- dom’s Ministry of Defence.
    [Show full text]
  • Boeing's Mesa Site Is Humming with Apache Production—And That's Not
    Boeing’s Mesa site is humming with Apache production—and that’s not all By Eric Fetters-Walp and photos by Bob Ferguson PHOTO: Boeing and U.S. Army aviators put two AH-64D Apache Longbow attack helicopters through their paces over the Arizona desert. NOVEMBER 2011 BOEING FRONTIERS / COVER STORY 21 byMesa the numbers 1 ranking of Boeing Mesa’s business among all Arizona manufacturers 382 acres (155 hectares) comprising the Mesa site 576 number of Boeing suppliers or vendors in Arizona 1982 year Mesa site was established by Hughes Helicopters 4,500 approximate number of employees 8,300 hours volunteered by employees in 2010 he hot desert air above Mesa, making a growing array of components Ariz., frequently pulses with the for multiple Boeing aircraft. 1,900,000 T sound of Apache attack helicop- “We’ve gone from producing Block II ters as the intimidating machines are put Apaches two years ago to having three dollars given by Boeing Mesa and through their paces after emerging from and soon four production lines here today,” employees in charitable contributions the Boeing production line. first of the next-generation Apache Block III said Dave Koopersmith, Boeing Military during 2010 It’s a sound that’s become familiar over production models this fall. The U.S. Army Aircraft’s vice president of Attack Helicopter the nearly 30 years that the Mesa site has plans to order nearly 700 newly built or Programs and Mesa senior site executive, built Apaches for the U.S. Army and a remanufactured Block III helicopters, which referring to the two Apache production 2,000,000 growing number of international customers.
    [Show full text]
  • World News Agencies and Their Countries
    World News Agencies and their Countries World News Agencies and their Countries Here, you will read about the World News Agencies and their Countries World News Agencies and their Countries 1. Bakhtar News Agency is located in which Country? – Afghanistan 2. Where is the Xinhua (New China News Agency) located? – China 3. Agencia de Noticias Fides (ANF) is the News agency located in which Country? – Bolivia 4. Albanian Telegraphic Agency (ATA) is located in which Country? – Albania 5. Where is the Cuban News Agency (ACN) located? – Cuba 6. Angola Press (Angop) is located in which Country? – Angola 7. Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) located in which Country? – Iran 8. Telam is the News agency located in which Country? – Argentina 9. Novinite is the News agency located in which Country? – Bulgaria 10. Armenpress is the News agency located in which Country? – Armenia 11. Agencia Estado is the News agency located in which Country? – Brazil 12. Where is the Agence Djiboutienne d’Information News Agency located? – Djibouti 13. Oe24 News is the News website located in which Country? – Austria 14. Azartac is the News agency located in which Country? – Azerbaijan 15. Mediapool is the News agency located in which Country? – Bulgaria 16. Where is the Agencia Globo Press Agency located? – Brazil 17. Where is the Bahrain News Agency (BNA) located? – Bahrain 18. Where is the Bangladesh Sangbad Sangstha (BSS) News Agency (BNA) located? – Bangladesh 19. Where is the Belta News Agency (BNA) located? – Belarus 20. Where is the Walta Information Centre (WIC) News Agency located? – Ethiopia 21. Where is the Belga Press Agency located? – Belgium 22.
    [Show full text]