The ANSO Report (16-31 July 2011)

The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office Issue: 78 16-31 July 2011

ANSO and our donors accept no liability for the results of any activity conducted or omitted on the basis of this report. THE ANSO REPORT -Not for copy or sale-

Inside this Issue COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 2 The assassination of a key sharp increases in theirs. leadership’s efforts to ex- Northern Region 8 Uruzgan powerbroker, and The SOUTH was character- pand its area of influence. Western Region 15 advisor to the president, in a ised this period by two ra- In Ghor, the apparent mi- coordinated attack occurred gration of AOG elements Eastern Region 18 ther rare occurrences, mul- in Kabul City of CENTRAL tiple NGO incidents and a beyond its usual areas in Southern Region 24 this period. As is typical in large scale complex attack the south into the central these cases, the reasons be- areas of the province has ANSO Info Page 30 within the provincial capital hind such attacks are not of Uruzgan. The first lead to an increasing fre- always clear as they represent NGO incident, from Ghaz- quency of incident report- a convergence of numerous ni, was reflective of the nu- ing, a fact reflected in the YOU NEED TO KNOW motivations, both from the merous mass abductions 2 NGO incidents reported conflict and political spheres. involving demining staff from this area. The first, • 10 NGO incidents this In addition, the reporting of recorded this year. This an NGO staff encounter period 2 IMF ‘escalation of force’ case differs however in that with an AOG (similar to shootings in Kapisa that re- Herat) was less concerning • NGO staff fatality in Kan- it involved only a temporary dahar sulted in numerous civilian detention (under 1 hour) than the apparent case of casualties represent the after- and all were released un- mistaken targeting of an • Increase in criminality effects of a lethal suicide at- harmed. The second inci- IED against an NGO vehi- within Jalalabad City tack last period. Lastly, the dent ended more tragically cle. Fortunately there was theft of demining equipment when an NGO national minimal damage and no • Recurrent mass abduction from an NGO in Logar casualties resulting. events in Farah staff member was killed by marks 1 of the 10 NGO inci- small arms fire in Kandahar The EAST recorded the dents recorded countrywide City under circumstances period’s final NGO inci- this period (see graph on p. that are still unclear. This dent in what appears to be ANSO is supported by 17 for monthly volumes). marks the 19th NGO staff a clear case of criminal rob- The reporting of 2 NGO death recorded this year. bery of a money transfer. abductions from Faryab in The extended coordinated Due to the intervention of the NORTH this period pro- assault on multiple targets locals, the funds were re- vides echoes of a trend well within Tirin Kot is reminis- covered, a fact that speaks established last year, though cent of similar efforts noted volumes to the effects of not necessarily representing a in Kandahar recently and is solid local acceptance strat- return to previous levels of the first attack of its type to egies, though the case also frequency. The third NGO occur there. reflects the challenges of incident for this region ap- The WEST once again ac- cash for work type pro- pears to be a case of intimi- counted for numerous gramming. Indirect fire dation by weapons fire NGO incidents this period, events continue to plague against an NGO vehicle with with 2 from Ghor and a the border areas and while no casualties resulting. While third in Herat. In Herat conflict related incidents Kunduz recorded a signifi- NGO staff in transit had a have decreased in Jalalabad, cant drop in incident vol- direct encounter with an there has been a concomi- umes this period Baghlan and AOG element, apparently tant increase in criminality Takhar in return marked the result of the groups within the city. THE ANSO REPORT Page 2

C ENTRAL REGION

NGO Incidents KABUL KABUL Year to Date 5 50 This Report Period 0 Although the majority of reported 40 incidents continue to be initiated tack was apparently sanctioned by 30 by ANSF/IMF, sporadic attacks AOG though the exact motiva- 20 against high profile and security tion for the killing, given the vic- 10 tim’s profile as a power-broker in targets remain a distinctive feature 0 of the security paradigm in Kabul. Uruzgan, remains unclear. None- Whereas early July had not wit- theless, the assault appears to fit within the pattern of attacks on nessed significant incidents, this KABUL AOG KABUL Crime reporting period a coordinated high profile targets that are rela- attack involving several armed tively easily accessed and offer the possibility to conduct prior recon- curred on July 15th in Uzbin Valley when an operatives took place on July 17th IED detonated against an ANA vehicle travel- (Karte Char area, District 3). naissance (as at least one of the attackers was known to the family ling along the highway at around 7AM. The During the night, three attackers explosion was followed by a SAF attack which armed with AK-47s, RPGs and and was allowed inside the house prior to the assault). injured one ANA soldier. The later incident is hand grenades, assaulted the resi- worth noting, as IED related incidents along dence of Jan Mohammad Khan - In regards to the province as a the highway are extremely rare, with the last an aide to the President and a whole, ANSF/IMF were behind occurring on May 1st when an IED was locat- prominent power-broker in more than 60% of all reported ed in the Puli Khaki area. Uruzgan. The ensuing fire fight incidents, while AOG activity de- claimed the lives of the official creased in comparison to the pre- ANSF/IMF came to the fore in Musayi this and another Uruzgan MP, as well vious period (with only 5 corrobo- cycle, where in addition to the discovery of an as all three attackers (in addition rated events). In the last fort- RCIED on the main district road in Qalai Ab- to several ANSF casualties). The night, Surobi District bore the dul Raouf area, security forces conducted op- attack occurred five days after the brunt of AOG activity with three erations on five separate occasions, mainly in killing of the Head of the Kanda- direct attacks (one of them initiat- Gumbaza, Qeshlaq and Alam Khan. har Provincial Council-Ahmad ed with an IED strike) and an Lastly, tensions between locals and Kuchis Wali Karzai. Whereas these two IDF assault. In the last two weeks were reported from Qarabagh, wounding 2 killings do not appear to be there were no recorded attacks on locals, and in Paghman, where a demonstration linked, and the modus operandi as IMF-contracted fuel tankers in over a land dispute blocked the Kabul-Wardak well as circumstances of both inci- Surobi, however Tangi Abreshum Highway for several hours in Chawki Arghandi dents are distinct, it is noteworthy remained a ‘hotspot’ along the (July 26). This incident turned violent and re- that both victims were very close highway, with an AOG attack on sulted in one Kuchi being killed with another to the President and both were an ANA check post that occurred wounded, but there have been no further inci- playing an important role in the in the early morning hours of July dents (despite the issue not being settled). Southern Region. While similar to 18th. the killing of AWK the latest at- Another notable incident oc- THE ANSO REPORT Page 3

NGO Incidents LOGAR Year to Date 5 LOGAR This Report Period 1 50 This reporting period Logar rec- 40 orded its’ 5th NGO direct inci- level of security incidents re- mained relatively consistent with 30 dent this year. On July 23rd, in 20 the late morning hours, two gun- the previous cycle. A total of 25 men riding on a motorcycle ap- incidents were recorded across the 10 proached the work site of an province with 14 attributed to 0 NGO de-mining agency in Maz- AOGs. This reporting period gin village of Muhammad Agha AOG activity were focused on District. The individuals took one Baraki Barak, Charkh, Muham- LOGAR AOG LOGAR Crime mine detector from the team by mad Agha and, in particular, on Puli Alam. This activity mainly worthy incident occurred two days later in Mu- force before leaving the area, but hammad Agha (Qalai Wazir area) where an did not harm the NGO staff. It is took the form of direct attacks and IED strikes. As has frequent- IED detonation injured three IMF soldier worth noting that the incident along the Puli Alam-Khushi main road. Ex- marks the third armed robbery ly been the case in the province, the core of AOG attacks focused cepting one IED which exploded at around targeting an NGO de-mining 1000hrs on a district road in Charkh, the tim- agency to be reported in the prov- on close-range assaults on ANSF/ IMF static and moving targets, ing of all other IED strikes occurred before ince this year. The previous inci- 0900hrs, indicating the risk of early morning dents were recorded in Puli Alam and occurred on seven separate occasions respectively in Puli road missions (as IED emplacement usually and Muhammad Agha (Zarghun occurs overnight). Shar area), and both consisted of Alam (4), Baraki Barak (2) and the stealing of various equipment, Azra (1). ANSF/IMF operations continued in Charkh, including VHF radios. In all these In addition, Logar saw six IED Muhammad Agha, Khushi and Azra. recorded robberies, the attackers strikes which accounted for the In the latter district, Osmankhel area, ANP did not express any objections to majority of casualties reported this and ALP clashed with an AOG during an op- the NGO programs in the areas, period. For instance, on July eration on July 15th, killing 15 AOG members but were more likely attracted by 17th, in Shash Qala area of Puli (including a prominent AOG commander) and the NGO’s equipment, which Alam, an RCIED detonated injuring an additional 5 fighters. The casualty could be perceived as valuable in against an ANA convoy travelling account on ANP/ALP side was also im- remote areas. on the Kabul-Logar highway, kill- portant, as 1 ALP was killed and 5 ANP re- In the last two weeks the overall ing one civilian. Another note- ceived injuries.

GRAPH INFORMATION: The graphs provided in this report are accurate as of the 27th of July 2011. In addition, the NGO Incidents/Year to Date figures include Criminal and AOG attributed events only. Incidents attributed to other actors (i.e. ANSF) are not captured in this data. THE ANSO REPORT Page 4

NGO Incidents KAPISA KAPISA Year to Date 1 50 This Report Period 0 40 After an ‘active’ and deadly (specifically for the IMF) previous incident that occurred in 30 cycle, the overall volume of inci- Manokhel area of Tagab. On July 20 dents in Kapisa decreased. This 18th, an AOG attacked an IMF 10 convoy with SAF as it was travel- cycle witnessed 8 recorded inci- 0 dents—2 AOG-initiated—while ling on the main Tagab-Alasay civilians bore the brunt of the Road. In the ensuing fire fight, casualties. Whereas last reporting two AOG members were killed, KAPISA AOG KAPISA Crime period saw 7 AOG attacks and two civilian fatalities were reported along with six other civil- (1BBIED, 2 IED strikes and 5 er, for unknown reasons, did not stop upon close-range attacks), the past two ians who sustained injuries. Four days later, on the 22nd, Sherkhel receiving warning signals. As a result of the weeks recorded 1 AOG direct shooting, the car’s driver was killed and the attack and 3 IED related inci- area of Tagab saw further civilian casualties when, at around remaining five occupants were injured. The dents. Consistent with previously second incident also involved the IMF, howev- observed patterns, Tagab District 0700hrs, a pressure plate IED detonated against an ANA vehicle er it resulted in even more civilian casualties. remained the focal area for AOG In Nijrab District, on the 27th, the IMF activities. on the main Tagab-Nijran Road. This latter incident resulted in the opened fire on a private vehicle in Afghanya Disregarding the overall low level killing of two local civilians and village, killing 3 occupants (including a woman of incidents, in kinetic provinces wounds to one ANA soldier. and a child) and wounding seven others. such as Kapisa, the risk of collat- Although reports of similar incidents have, so eral exposure from the ongoing Another element that contributed to the high number of civilian far, been rare in Kapisa, such incidents are un- conflict remained important for fortunately a part of the security environment the local population. In addition, casualties this period were two “escalation of force” incidents. in kinetic areas. In addition, regarding past safe passage for civilians in the practices, periods that follow a significant and province is often compromised as The first occurred on July 22nd (also in Tagab, Sherkhel area) lethal attack against ANSF/IMF (as it was re- clashes revolve around main ac- cently a case in Kapisa) are particularly prone cess roads and populated areas. when an IMF convoy opened fire on a civilian vehicle after the driv- to an increased likelihood in the use of force This was highlighted during an escalation shootings.

ANSO STAFF EMAIL CHANGES: Please note that all ANSO staff email addresses have been changed. The previous domain of ‘@afgnso.org’ is no longer functioning and has been changed to ‘@ngosafety.org’. There has also been other changes to the email addresses so please refer to the last page of this report for a listing of the new email addresses of key ANSO staff. THE ANSO REPORT Page 5

NGO Incidents WARDAK Year to Date 1 WARDAK 100 This Report Period 0 AOG activity in Wardak has de- 80 creased with 22 AOG authored In addition to these direct attacks, 60 10 IED related incidents were incidents in comparison to the 27 40 which were recorded previously. recorded in the province. Apart 20 Despite this drop, the overall inci- from one premature detonation, dent volume has remained rela- AOGs conducted 9 effective IED 0 tively consistent. In line with the strikes with a focus again on the highway which saw 4 of these previous reports, AOGs focused WARDAK AOG WARDAK Crime on Saydabad (which experienced though one of these strikes was 50 % of all AOG initiated inci- particularly lethal. On July 26th at around 8AM, a PSC vehicle struck Similar to the incidents reported in Kapisa, this dents), followed by Jalrez, Maydan reporting period Wardak saw an “escalation of Shahr and Nirkh districts. This an IED in Shashgow area. The detonation killed 4 PSC guards force” incident which resulted in civilian fatali- period witnessed 10 AOG close ties. On July 22nd in the afternoon, IMF ele- range assaults reported through- and injured 3. Besides the high- way, another area of concern re- ments opened fire on a private car after the out the province, with Saydabad driver failed to heed the IMF warnings to stop experiencing 6 of them. lated to IED emplacement was Jalrez District, which experienced in Zarnay area of Saydabad. As a result, three In the said district, AOG contin- 3 incidents. In addition to a occupants, including a woman and a child were ued their efforts to disturb premature detonation on the main killed, and another two were wounded. An- ANSF/IMF vehicular movement road in Puli Meharab, an IED other civilian (a minibus driver) was killed at an along the Kabul-Ghazni Highway, detonated against an ALP vehicle ALP check post in Jalrez, Zawalat area. Re- where the majority of close range in Ismail Khel area (Maydan-Jalrez portedly, ALP personnel mistakenly opened attacks (as well as IEDs) took road). Another device (an fire while the victim approached the check place. These attacks were con- RCIED) struck an ANA vehicle post seeking assistance because his vehicle had ducted against IMF-contracted in Kharwalang area, along Kabul- broken down. supply convoys on 2 separate oc- Bamyan Highway, in the after- On a different note, tensions persist in Nirkh casions (during one of them 3 fuel noon (at 1300hrs) injuring 4 between HIG and the IEA. During the first tankers were burned in Sheikha- ANA. An interesting diversifica- week of this reporting period, IEA operatives bad area). The remaining close tion of IED deployment was ob- attacked the residence of a local HIG com- range assaults were carried out served in the bazaar area of Day mander in Sadmorda area. The commander against other typical AOG targets Mirard District, where an RCIED escaped unharmed while 3 IEA attackers were along the highway such as ANP being carried by a donkey deto- killed. Hostility between IEA and HIG is a checkpoints and ANA/PSC con- nated while an ANP vehicle was recurring theme in Nirkh, and has already led voys. passing by (killing the animal and to numerous open confrontations beyond this injuring 1 ANP). latest event. THE ANSO REPORT Page 6

NGO Incidents BAMYAN Year to Date 0 BAMYAN 50 This Report Period 0 Typically Bamyan experiences a 40 very low level of incidents, with IMF patrol in the same area. The 30 this period being no exception. latest incident will certainly rein- 20 force the reputation of Do Ab The province continues to be one 10 Mikh Zarin as the area of AOG of the most secure environments 0 in the country for NGO activities, presence/operations (albeit spo- with AOG presence in the prov- radic) within the province. At this ince extremely limited. Nonethe- time, IED detonations such as BAMYAN AOG BAMYAN Crime less, on July 18th of this reporting this one remain outliers to the existing security paradigm in period the province witnessed the districts (with the development of the QRF in second IED detonation recorded Bamyan, and do not represent any notable shift. Kahmard and Shibar being noteworthy). The this year. The detonation oc- transition process raised more questions for curred around 1800hrs in Do Ab On July 17th of the reporting pe- the local population than providing answers, as riod, an official ceremony took Mikh Zarin area of Kahmard Dis- IMF are widely considered the main deterrent place indicating the transition of trict. Although, the detonation against AOG expansion in the province. It is security in the province to ANSF, took place on the main district yet to be seen whether the ANSF—with their road, frequently used by security which as expected passed without recently increased capacities—will be able to incident. In Bamyan the transi- forces or GOA vehicles, the ab- alleviate the public’s uncertainty linked to re- tion process remained largely a sence of any potential target in the cent developments in the Ghorband Valley political gesture, as AOG initiated vicinity and the timing of the inci- and the anticipated (yet postponed) departure dent indicates that the device det- incidents are minimal and the of IMF. As has been underlined previously, IMF continues its limited pres- onated prematurely. It is worth the main concern for NGOs in the area re- ence in the area. A concrete result noting that the first IED strike mains road access to Bamyan from Kabul, of the process is the development reported this year was the result with AOG activity in the Ghorband Valley of of a small device that detonated of local ANP/NDS forces in Parwan and along the road in Jalrez, Wardak. on the 28th of April targeting an Kahmard, Shibar, and Sayghan

NGO Incidents linked to a criminal activity. In Paryan District, PANJSHIR Year to Date 1 an unknown individual threw a hand grenade This Report Period 0 On July 24th, during a high- inside a Toyota Corolla vehicle parked in the profile ceremony, Panjshir be- vealed some fears amongst the vicinity of a private residence in Nawdakan came the sixth location where the local population, who worry about area. The owner of the car and the residence responsibility of security was offi- the future of the province and its’ indicated that the likely motive is related to a cially handed over to ANSF. In ability to preserve the current qui- vendetta between his and another family. Fol- Panjshir (frequently cited as the et environment, there is no indica- lowing this incident, ANP arrested one mem- model area for transition) the tions that the process will have ber of the rival family for investigation. These event was even more symbolic any actual change on the existent types of incidents, in particular involving inter- than in other areas chosen for security paradigm. In addition to personal or family disputes, are a common transition, as in fact the ANSF the aforementioned reasons, the feature of the security environment in the had never ceded control of the province remains under the con- province, and although they may go mostly province. Moreover, unlike in oth- trol of local power-circles who are unnoticed elsewhere, they stand out in the usu- er provinces, the security role of strongly opposed to the AOG ally quiet province of Panjshir. Such incidents IMF was mainly limited to ena- agenda. rarely impact NGO activities and the organiza- bling the activities of the PRT. On the security side, the sole inci- tions operating in the area have thus far rarely Although the transition has re- dent recorded this period was been affected by such dynamics. THE ANSO REPORT Page 7

NGO Incidents PARWAN Year to Date 1 PARWAN This Report Period 0 50 Incident levels in Parwan have 40 ANSF/IMF do not deploy troops generally remained consistently 30 low, and this reporting cycle fol- into the area on a permanent ba- 20 lowed the same pattern. Only 9 sis, this decrease will be only tem- security incidents were reported porary and AOGs are likely to 10 throughout the province, with 3 follow established patterns and 0 of them initiated by AOGs. return to the ‘cleared areas’ after the troops withdraw. After two AOG attacks were rec- orded in Ghorband Valley during Despite a decrease in AOG direct PARWAN AOG PARWAN Crime the previous cycle, an RCIED was attacks the pattern of IDF assaults discovered in Shinwari, Kajakan continued across the province. mountains are often used as a staging point for Payeen area (a locality on the On 24 July, a rocket (BM-1) was IDF attacks against the PRT base. Statistics Bamyan Road). The device fired towards the ANP HQ in the reveal that so far this year, 13 such attacks (constructed of a 120mm mortar) DAC area of Kohi Safi. The pro- have been recorded in Chaharikar, accounting was eventually defused by an IMF jectile missed the target and deto- for 80% of all incidents attributed to AOGs in EOD team, but the road was nated in an open area. However, the district. It should be noted that the rec- blocked for almost 6 hours. Re- the most notable incident oc- ords for 2006-2010 display only 1-2 rocket/ gional trends have demonstrated curred in Chaharikar (DAC area), mortar attacks province-wide each year. This that an increase in AOG activity, where AOG fired (allegedly from increase in the rate of IDF attacks is quite like- especially around strategic areas the Jangal Bagh mountain) two ly a reflection of the maturing AOG structures (such as the Ghorband Valley), BM1 rockets towards the com- in Parwan (the IEA in particular), as attested often leads to sporadic military pound of the Provincial Gover- by the recent appointment of the IEA Shadow operations. This was underlined nor’s Office. The projectiles im- Provincial Governor (alongside new Shadow on July 26th when ANA/ANP pacted in a residential area and District Governors in Kohi Safi, Shinwari, launched an operation in Qoli Hir injured 3 civilians. Ghorband-Siyagerd and in Baraki Barak). On area and clashed with an AOG. It As observed in previous reports, the other hand, attacks in Jangal Bagh are is likely that following this opera- IDF strikes have become an es- sometimes attributed to local power networks, tion (which was still ongoing at sential part of the security para- which do not necessarily question the legitima- the time of this report), a decrease digm in Parwan, particularly in cy of the GOA, but are intent on pressuring in AOG activities will be ob- locations which host IMF and their rivals inside the ANSF and GOA leader- served. Nonetheless, as long as ANSF bases. The Jangal Bagh ship. THE ANSO REPORT Page 8

N ORTHERN REGION

NGO Incidents BALKH Year to Date 9 BALKH 50 This Report Period 0 An IED detonation in the north- 40 ern part of Mazar City (Dashti which appears to have detonated 30 Shor area) that killed 5 and injured prematurely—was being carried 20 by a man riding a bicycle when it 12 was the most notable incident 10 detonated. The detonation took to occur in Balkh this reporting 0 period. It marked the 3rd IED place with no obvious target in detonation to occur in Mazar over the vicinity, and was far more the last 2 months, and the 4th this deadly than the prior two, alt- BALKH AOG BALKH Crime year. The relative spike in IED hough the increased number of related incidents inside the city is a casualties may be partially due to saw other notable changes. The hold phase notable departure from the single the locality of the detonation ra- has begun along the main Mazar-Shibirghan IED detonation that occurred ther than the strength of the ex- road, with ANSF forces supplying most of the over the entire previous year. plosives. Multiple reports suggest hold forces as IMF seeks to embrace a mentor- When analyzing the level of activi- that this IED carrier was traced ing role. In the 2 districts in Balkh that have ty over this 2 month period, it is back to the AOG stronghold of seen the most insecurity along this road, Cha- worth noting that a grenade rigged Chahar Bolak District. har Bolak saw little activity outside of an IMF to explode was also found in the Of further note, the incident oc- operation which took place on the last day of city on July 13th, and on the even- curred on the 20th of July, which the PRP (the 15th) and the ANSF arrest of an ing of the 29th, a man was arrest- was the same day as the trial for AOG commander, while Chimtal saw 2 am- ed with a large amount of explo- the 20 individuals who had been bushes on ANSF patrols, an attack on an ANP sives as he tried to enter Mazar arrested during the April 1st checkpoint, a joint IMF/ANSF operation, and city through the western gate. demonstration violence against an IED discovery. Insecurity along the Mazar- Although the shift in day-to-day UNAMA, as well as just 3 days Shibirghan road has decreased significantly security is not severe, it appears prior to the transition. Although with the onset of Operation Ebtekar 2, but has that despite the fact that the 23rd no direct correlation can be prov- historically resurfaced after the completion of of July—the date of the ceremoni- en between these 3 events, it is ANSF/IMF hold phases. al transition of security in likely that the IED detonation was Another district that continues to show in- Mazar—came and past without an attempt to make a statement creased insecurity is Nahri Shahi, where in incident (other than traffic issues against one of the other 2 inci- Sharak Turkmania, an IED detonated near a due to the noted boost in security dents (or both). Tangential to mosque and—in a separate incident—an AOG around the city), Mazar and Balkh this, 3 of the individuals tried on attacked the private residence of a village rep- are witnessing subtle shifts to the 20th were given maximum resentative. Nahri Shahi witnessed 4 incidents their overall security paradigms. sentences, while the other 17 re- this reporting period and 7 over the course of The IED detonation in Mazar ceived between 6 months and 16 July. This total stands in stark contrast to the appears to represent the further years. In a twist, 3 of the sen- 12 which had taken place all year prior to July development of a trend. The 2 tenced individuals had come (with none in June). Completing the 4 in IED detonations in Mazar just through the APRP process. Nahri Shahi, unknown armed men opened fire prior to this one were mostly mi- Although the IED detonation and on a taxi, and 4 members of an ACG wearing nor and targeted obvious GOA the transition received the most ANA uniforms stopped and robbed civilian targets (an ANA shuttle and an attention, other districts demon- vehicles along the Nahri Shahi- Chahar Kint ANP Ranger). The most recent— strated significant insecurity or road. THE ANSO REPORT Page 9

NGO Incidents KUNDUZ KUNDUZ Year to Date 1 50 This Report Period 0 Kunduz witnessed 38 security 40 incidents this month. This repre- significant percentage of the inse- 30 sents a significant decrease in the curity in the province, accounting 20 usual level of reporting volume. for 8 of the incidents this month, 10 It amounts to a little more than and 4 this period. In light of re- 0 half of the 71 incidents that were cent inter-Pro Government Militia recorded in June or the 69 in May. (PGM) issues, a security Jurga was Although 1 month does not de- called in the district on the 13th. KUNDUZ AOG KUNDUZ Crime It has been postured that after the note a sustained shift, this is a sions—multiple sources confirm that this was Jurga, the District Governor asked significant development in the a legitimate AOG-initiated attack. As noted various PGMs to turn in their most volatile province in the above, 1 of the 8 IMF operations conducted heavy weapons (which only 1 of North, taking place during what this reporting period also took place in Khana- them did, for which it was strong- has historically been one of the bad, and resulted in injuries to 1 AOG mem- ly financially compensated). De- more active months of the year. ber and the arrest of 12 others—including an spite this failure to acquiesce, fur- The shift may be partially due to AOG commander. heavy IMF operations, which ther GOA/PGM issues have not Chahar Dara was also a focal point this report- could potentially be forcing yet surfaced, although anecdotal ing period, notching 5 of the recorded inci- AOGs to temporarily relocate reports suggest that the GOA met dents, including 2 IMF operations, an IED (perhaps to Takhar or Baghlan, with 10 PGMs again on the 31st detonation, an IED discovery, and an AOG both of which saw notable in- to further discuss their displeasure attack on an ANP CP that went awry when an creases in security reporting this with the PGMs activities in the RPG round impacted and detonated on a civil- month). district. ian residence. The RPG round resulted in the Amongst the 4 incidents that oc- Although Kunduz still witnessed deaths of 3 children and injuries to 4 others. curred in Khanabad this reporting 5 IED detonations this reporting This was the most civilian casualties in a non- period, the most notable was an period, 8 of the 21 total security IED related, AOG-attributed incident in IED detonation on an ANP con- incidents were IMF operations, Kunduz Province this year. Sources from the voy which included the Deputy with 2 of those taking place in community claim that the area where this hap- Provincial Governor. Although 3 Chahar Dara, and 1 in Khanabad. pened does not support AOG activity, but that ANP were wounded the Deputy This volume was consistent over there is unlikely to be any follow up civil un- Governor escaped unharmed. the month, which saw IMF opera- rest, as the community remains largely intimi- While externally it appeared possi- tions account for 16 of the 38 dated. It should be noted that ANSO consid- ble that this incident could have total incidents. ers this information subjective and subject to been PGM-initiated—in light of Khanabad continues to host a change. the recent PGM/GOA ten-

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation and context in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly. Contact details of ANSO staff are provided on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..” THE ANSO REPORT Page 10

NGO Incidents FARYAB Year to Date 4 FARYAB This Report Period 2 50 In a exceptional deviation to the 40 existing security paradigm in the armed individuals—believed to be 30 North this year, two separate members of an AOG. 1 of the 4, 20 NGO abductions took place this a female staff member, was imme- 10 reporting period in Faryab, 1 on diately released to the care of a 0 the 28th in Almar, and 1 on the religious elder in Baloch Village of the same district, but the other 3 31st in Pashtun Kot. FARYAB AOG FARYAB Crime remain at large. It is likely that in In the first incident, two staff this latter incident, the AOG be- members of a national demining about their organizations activities and having lieved the NGO staff members NGO were abducted along the local elders negotiate on their behalf, and 1 were GOA employees due to the Maymana –Almar road at 1100 incident (Almar) where a ransom was paid. In nature of their vehicle. hours. Initial reports suggest that all 6 incidents, the NGO staff members were armed men stopped and abducted To put these incidents in context, released in under 3 weeks. the two while they were travelling they mark only the second and It is noteworthy that the first of these 2 abduc- in a rented black Toyota Surf, third NGO abductions for the tions (in Almar) came in the midst of high vol- headed to survey an area in Almar Northern Region this year, a sig- ume security reporting in Qaysar and Almar District. The 2 remained at large nificant decrease from the 6 that Districts. The 2 districts combined for 9 secu- for only 2 days, as on the 30th, 1 took place over the first 7 months rity incidents this reporting period, and 25 this of them managed to escape during of 2010. All 3 incidents took month. This represents the highest total-per- the confusion caused by a nearby place in Faryab in districts directly month for the 2 districts this year. Aside from security operation, while the other adjacent of Maymana, and all 3 the NGO abduction, the Almar District Gov- was subsequently rescued by an involved Pashtun Kot District ernor and District Chief of Police had their IMF mission mandated to find the (where the first abduction took convoy ambushed by AOGs as they returned 2 abductees. The rescue mission place in early June, with the NGO from Qaraee village, where they had travelled took place in Khwaja Namusa staff member released approxi- to try and solve a dispute between 2 local com- area of Pashtun Kot district, mately 10 days later with no ran- munities. Like the abduction, the ambush oc- where they had been moved and som demands). Looking back at curred in the middle of the day (1100 hours), were being held. At the time of 2010, out of 19 NGO-related ab- but resulted in injuries to neither official. Of this report, it was still uncon- ductions that took place in the note in Qaysar District, in 2 separate occasions firmed as to whether the 2 had North, only 2 of them were ACG IEDs detonated with no known GOA/IMF been abducted by an AOG or an driven and involved the payment target in the vicinity. 1 of these detonated on a ACG. of ransoms, while the other 17 private vehicle (killing 3 civilians and injuring 2 were AOG attributed. In Faryab In the second occurrence, which others) while the other injured a civilian. (where 6 of these took place, 5 also took place during daytime This—in conjunction with 2 illegal check- AOG attributed, and 1 ACG at- hours, but in Kaarez area along points that occurred at the end of the previous tributed), that resulted in 5 inci- the Maymana- Sorkh Ab road reporting period, but were not recorded till this dents where the NGO staff were (Pashtun Kot), 4 NGO staff one—demonstrates the strong existent threat released without ransom pay- members in a GOA ambulance to civilians that continues in these 2 contested ments after being questioned were stopped and abducted by districts. THE ANSO REPORT Page 11

NGO Incidents BAGHLAN Year to Date 1 BAGHLAN 50 This Report Period 0 A total of 39 security incidents 40 were recorded in Baghlan this past 2 months combined (4 in 30 July, with 19 of them occurring June and 2 in May). 20 this reporting period. This vol- July also witnessed an increase in 10

ume marks not only a significant the targeting of fuel tankers, with 0 increase over the 21 recorded in 2 of the 4 incidents to occur this

June, but accounts for a greater month taking place this reporting BAGHLAN AOG BAGHLAN Crime sum than the total of the last 2 period (a SAF attack on a fuel months combined (36). Although tanker at night along the main this year), whereas the mountainous district of Balkh, Faryab, and— Kabul – Puli Khumri road, and Burka often records less activity, but is widely uncharacteristically—Takhar all the discovery of an IED in the considered one of the primary AOG safe ha- recorded higher volumes than cabin of a fuel tanker in Puli vens of the North. this, Baghlan recorded more inci- Khumri City). The insecurity in the province is further nota- dents than Kunduz, and had a In fact, the increased volume of ble because it is manifesting in such a way significantly higher total than any insecurity has manifested in a where it could potentially affect NGOs and/or other month this year, with Janu- number of ways. Setting aside civilians. This is noticeable in incidents such ary being the only other to accu- incident type trending, the majori- as the IED detonation around the DAC in mulate more than 30 (34). ty of incidents transpired in tradi- Burka (mentioned above), the discovery of an While it remains to be seen tionally insecure districts such as IED along the often travelled Puli Khumri – whether this volume will continue Baghlani Jadid, Burka, and Puli Kunduz main road in Charshanab Tepa area for any sustained period, the Khumri, which together com- (Baghlani Jadid), and most obviously, in an change was not just cosmetic. bined for 25 of the 38 incidents incident in Baghlan New City (Baghlani Jadid) Incident recording was marked by this month. Baglhani Jadid, a where individuals opened fire on a wedding IED detonations and attacks on contested district with a historical- party, killing 3 and injuring 7. fuel tankers. Especially significant ly strong AOG presence, saw an Outside of the IED and fuel tanker trends not- was the notable increase in the exceptional percentage of these ed above, IMF operations accounted for 5 in- volume of IED detonations and (11 of 38, with 6 this reporting cidents this month, with 3 them taking place discoveries, with 11 such incidents period). Baghlan has often been this reporting period. 2 of those from this in July—4 this reporting period— considered the stronghold of cycle occurred in Baghlani Jadid, while all the including an IED detonation just AOGs in the Northeast— others in July were conducted in Burka. After outside of the District Center although operations have often a significant level of sustained IMF operations (DAC) in Burka and an RCIED focused on Kunduz—with earlier in the year (including 9 in May), it ap- detonation on a construction Baghlani Jadid and Puli Khumri pears AOGs in the province are making a con- company vehicle along the Tala historically witnessing the highest certed effort to re-establish their presence— Wa Barak – Dushi road. Con- volume of incident reporting (for especially in areas which they have previously sistent with the month’s spike in instance, these 2 districts com- maintained a strong influence—and it is likely general insecurity, the total num- bined for 253 of the 364 recorded that a similar level of activity will continue for ber of IED related incidents in in 2010, and have already account- the foreseeable future. July nearly doubled that of the ed for 104 of the 188 recorded THE ANSO REPORT Page 12

NGO Incidents JAWZJAN Year to Date 3 JAWZJAN 50 This Report Period 1 Shotgun rounds that shattered the 40 rear windows of an NGO vehicle area remains mostly devoid of 30 just north of Shibirghan City AOG activity, and that this was an 20 marked the third NGO related outlier rather than a new trend or 10 escalation. security incident in Jawzjan Prov- 0 ince this year. The incident, Further information also arose which took place in the vicinity of concerning the last NGO incident JAWZJAN AOG JAWZJAN Crime Boba Ali village, originally ap- to take place in the province. On peared to be the work of an ACG June 16th an INGO vehicle—a the playing out off an interpersonal dispute. trying to stop and potentially rob red Toyota pick-up—was blown The incident occurred along the Mardyan – the vehicle, but upon further in- up by an RCIED in Aqcha in Aqcha road. vestigation is likely attributed to a what appeared to be the active In the Tri-Provincial Area, Qush Tepa saw 3 well known AOG commander targeting of the NGO. This inci- incidents, with 2 notable ones that play into from the district. This AOG usu- dent was previously discussed in developing trends. On the 24th in Gardan ally conducts operations south of the late June biweekly. However, Village, members of a Pro-Government Militia Shibirghan City, but anecdotal the reason for the active targeting (PGM) deserted their checkpoint after not be- reports suggest that the com- of an NGO with strong ties to the ing paid. Although this was the only recorded mander may have been in the vi- province remained unknown. incident of this in the Northern Region this cinity and wanted to intimidate— Recent information has surfaced month, anecdotal reports from multiple but not injure—the national suggesting that NDS had con- sources suggest it may be taking place in multi- NGO, which was working as an ducted operations in that area just ple locations elsewhere as well. Should this implementing partner for an IO. prior to this incident operating in become a trend, it has the potential to destabi- Witnesses from the area claim that similar multi-colored low profile lize the areas where it is happening (mostly in 2 AOG members on motorcycles vehicles. This suggests—in claims Sar-e Pul and Jawzjan currently). While PGMs came to the area and made a con- supported by locals from the ar- have not always successfully stabilized their scious decision to intimidate the ea—that perhaps the NGO vehi- areas of operation (and often accomplish the NGO, which they accomplished cle was mistakenly identified as exact opposite), if they are antagonized they by shooting out the back window belonging to NDS. Although this could potentially seek to actively destabilize of the Toyota corolla with a shot- hasn’t been confirmed, it is con- areas even further, or attempt to get the pay- gun, but not injuring anyone. current with the assessment of ments they believe they are owed through ille- These same reports suggest that multiple sources and would de- gal means (taxation, intimidation, robbery, the commander is rarely in Shibir- note a better fit within known etc.). Adding to this, PGMs continue to be ghan these days, and that while AOG targeting patterns. This targeted region wide. In Beksar Village (also in the NGO was directly targeted— reporting period also saw a target- Qush Tepa) 2 of the family members of a perhaps for their affiliation with ed killing occur in the same dis- PGM member were killed when the PGM the IO—it may have been more trict (Aqcha), when armed men member refused to quit his job. Following the incidental than anything resem- stopped a rickshaw carrying 7 ci- attacks, he quit the position and joined an bling a planned operation. In vilians, pulled one man out and AOG. As mentioned in previous reports, at- terms of the security paradigm, executed him, letting the others tacks on civilians who are related to PGMs/ multiple sources attest that the go, in what appears to have been GOA or accused of working with or spying for them, are becoming continually more frequent. THE ANSO REPORT Page 13

NGO Incidents SAR- E PUL Year to Date 4 SAR‐E PUL This Report Period 0 50 Sar-e Pul has seen a gradual rise in 40 incident reporting over the last 4 not irregular, as these 2 districts 30 months. A total of 24 security consistently account for the ma- 20 incidents were recorded in July, jority of incident reporting in the 10 which marks a significant province. 0 (although not dramatic) increase In regards to civilian targeting, the

over the 18 recorded in April most notable occurred in Ganda SAR‐E PUL AOG SAR‐E PUL Crime (with incremental steps each Village and Qara Khawal Village month between). While the most (both in Sayyad), where civilians City to the Sayyad District Center (technically relevant incidents to NGOs have were accused of working or spy- in Sar-e Pul). The road between the city and been the illegal checkpoints and ing for ANSF and subsequently District Center of Sayyad is relatively short and abductions along the Sar-e Pul – tortured by AOGs. The relation- rarely sees activity, but it must be assumed that Shibirghan road thus far (along ship between AOGs and the com- AOGs operating deeper in the district regularly with an attack that took place in munities in Sayyad remains com- use and monitor traffic along this important Zaka Village just off this road plicated, as AOGs are focused on road. when an NGO was present), none maintaining control over much of Anecdotal reports suggest that GOA rein- of these took place this reporting the district and its’ population. forcements have been routed to Sar-e Pul City period. However, the further de- While it is likely that much of the to help maintain security in the province. This velopment of other noteworthy population does support the information has been confirmed by a number trends included the targeting of AOGs residing there (either by of sources, but the exact number and arrival civilians in different capacities, choice or necessity), AOGs have date of these varies widely. Security in Sar-e and 2 attacks on IMF units at—or shown a fierce drive to intimidate Pul has been assessed as strongly deteriorating, around—the main Sar-e Pul – or injure civilians who contem- despite a volume of incident reporting below Shibirghan road. Of the 10 inci- plate working with the GOA. In that witnessed in more kinetic provinces. How dents recorded in the district this another incident related to Sayyad, this influx of security forces may shift this re- period, 3 of them took place in an IED was discovered along the mains to be seen. Sayyad and 3 in Sar-e Pul. This is main road leading from Sar-e Pul

NGO Incidents TAKHAR Year to Date 1 TAKHAR 50 This Report Period 0 26 incidents this reporting peri- 40 od—with 44 over the entire where 3 individuals—reportedly 30 month of July—denote a signifi- of some standing within AOGs— 20 cant spike in security reporting, were arrested. This is consistent 10 and a trend similar to that which with the majority of incidents in 0 is occurring in Takhar’s north- Taloqan, which mostly involved eastern neighbour Baghlan. ACGs or IMF/GOA forces. TAKHAR AOG TAKHAR Crime Takhar had been witnessing a These also include 2 incidents consistent, albeit gradual, increase where civilians were harmed by detonations, including a detonation in Ish- in security reporting for the last 5 the ANP, 1 escalation of force kamish that killed an NDS officer who was on months; however this month’s incident and another where an his way to the Mosque after work, and a prem- jump was exceptional. Between ANP accidentally shot a civilian ature IED detonation on an ANBP vehicle in March and June, incident report- while clearing his weapon. Darqad District. Also of note, in Ishkamish, a ing jumped exactly 5 incidents Similar to this, no significant crim- previous AOG member who had surrendered each month though this month inal or AOG based trends arose in to the GOA was shot and killed in Tarsak vil- marks a 50% increase over the Baharak District, despite the fact lage. This keeps with ongoing trends concern- previous month’s. However, un- that it recorded 5 incidents—one ing the targeting of those individuals who leave like in Baghlan, incident reporting of which was demonstration relat- AOGs or agree to work with Pro-Government hasn’t seen an equal jump in IED ed to a local issue. Militias (PGMs) and the GOA though it attacks. Although not showing the IED should be noted that in this instance the indi- Of note, there was an IMF opera- related numbers that Baghlan did, vidual shot was not in fact working with a tion in Taluqan on the 30th/31st, Takhar did witness notable IED PGM. THE ANSO REPORT Page 14

NGO Incidents BADAKHSHAN Year to Date 7 BADAKHSHAN 50 This Report Period 0 Badakhshan recorded a relatively 40 quiet 8 security incidents this re- District, and an AOG attack on 30 porting period, and 19 total for an ANP checkpoint in Warduj. 20 the month. Although this number The third incident was a conflict 10 is likely to marginally increase due in Darayim Distroct between an 0 to late reporting, it represents a AOG that had surrendered to the GOA and an AOG from that sur- relatively low volume of insecuri- BADAKHSHAN AOG BADAKHSHAN Crime ty. This is a decrease of approxi- rendered group’s previous area of operations, and the last was an mately 17% from the previous dakhshan. Warduj has seen significant increas- armed clash between the ANP month (23 in June), and slightly es to incident reporting since the drug harvest- and an AOG in Khame Mirzar of less than the 21 that occurred the ing season began, and Baharak has been—and Kishim. Putting these 4 incidents previous July. remains—the most volatile district in the prov- in context, Kishim has a known Although no new trends surfaced ince, particularly around the district center AOG presence, Warduj continues this period, 4 AOG incidents oc- (DAC), where an ACG led by a former ANP to see AOG influence despite the curred in 4 different districts, ac- officer has continued to destabilize the district large scale ANSF operation that counting for exactly half of the with random violence in a bid for greater influ- took place in Bashund area last manifested insecurity. Unsurpris- ence. However, reporting suggests that the cycle, Baharak has seen consistent ingly, 2 of these occurred in the most recent attack in Dasht Farhad was not insecurity throughout the year, eastern portion of the province the actions of the mentioned ACG, but rather and out of the 16 incidents that within districts that lay along the the work of AOGs loyal to a commander that have occurred in Darayim this often discussed drug trafficking had been arrested during an attack on the Pro- year, 9 of them have been at- route to Tajikistan. These includ- vincial Governor’s convoy that took place in tributed to or related to AOGs. ed an RPG fired towards the Warduj June 20th. Dasht Farhad area in Baharak Warduj and Baharak in particular remain relative hot spots in Ba-

NGO Incidents SAMANGAN Year to Date 0 SAMANGAN This Report Period 0 50 Only 4 security incidents were 40 recorded in Samangan this report- with none of the previous ones 30 ing period—a characteristically directly—or indirectly—attributed 20 low volume of insecurity—with to AOG activities. 10 the most notable being the am- Looking more closely at this at- 0 bush of an ANP patrol by 3 tack, anecdotal reports from the armed men (believed to be mem- area tell a slightly different story. SAMANGAN AOG SAMANGAN Crime bers of an AOG) in Langar Vil- It has been suggested that these lage of Khuram Wa Sarbagh Dis- are the actions of a local ACG, al is, and know—in a general manner—where trict. Although ambushes on commanded by a criminal who he is hiding. Under this interpretation, this ANP patrols are a common AOG spent time in jail for assaulting a appears to fall somewhere between an ACG tactic region wide, Khuram Wa girl, and then got out and started and an AOG attributed incident, but does not Sarbagh had seen only 2 security an ACG (which currently consists indicate that a new AOG is conducting opera- incidents this year prior to this of less than 10 people, and fosters tions in the district, and the general security one, and neither of them were unconfirmed claims of allegiance paradigm for the district—and Samangan attributed to an AOG. In fact, to AOG politics). The same Province—remains largely unchanged. ANSO has only recorded 6 inci- sources suggest that the ANP are dents in this district since 2006, aware of exactly who the individu- THE ANSO REPORT Page 15

W ESTERN REGION

HERAT NGO Incidents HERAT Year to Date 5 50 This Report Period 1 Herat City’s security transition 40 took place on the 21st of July, in a prominent commander that has 30 what was a largely ceremonial been increasing its sphere of influ- 20

event, as the GOA security forces ence in the eastern part of the 10 have held the primary responsibil- district, temporarily stopped and 0 ity for security within the city for detained an NGO staff member an extended period already. due to a personal dispute while in HERAT AOG HERAT Crime There was only one AOG, and no transit (he was released unharmed ACG, incident recorded since the following negotiations held by na) is another noteworthy security trend this ceremony was held, and it is likely elders). In the second incident, an reporting period. Of note, the number of that the security transition from AOG unit under the same com- AOG incidents in Gulran District has in- ISAF to the GOA will not cause a mander attacked a local transpor- creased (from 1 to 4) in comparison with the significant change in the security tation company’s convoy of 13 first two weeks of the July. In Kushk and context of the city in the short commercial trucks under ANP Kushki Kuhna, by contrast, the volume of term. escort, one of which was trans- AOG incidents and the tactics employed porting commodities for an At the provincial level, AOG con- (SAF/RPGs or IEDs against convoys and NGO, before escaping the scene centrated their activity in the east- ANSF/IMF patrols) have remained consistent upon the arrival of ANP rein- ern districts (Pashtun Zarghun & with longer term trends. Reportedly, an IEA forcements. The profile of these Obe) during this reporting period. member originating from Gulran has recently two incidents suggests that the Among the 6 AOG incidents that pushed AOG to be more active and may have NGOs involved were not explicit- happened in both districts (30% caused some disputes with members of the ly targeted, and were rather affect- of total AOG incidents in the local community, as an armed clash between ed by the AOG’s broader efforts province), it is important to note AOG and villagers and the abduction of sever- at exerting its presence in the area. that two NGO incidents (one di- al locals were registered during the period. rect and the other indirect) oc- The concentration of AOG activi- curred in Pashtun Zarghun. In ty in the northern districts the first case, an AOG unit under (Kushk, Gulran, and Kushki Kuh- THE ANSO REPORT Page 16

NGO Incidents FARAH FARAH Year to Date 3 50 This Report Period 0 40 During this month alone, three 30 mass abduction events were re- including 4 beheaded, the situa- ported in Farah, 2 of which affect- tion was finally concluded with 20 ed NGO staff. The most signifi- the remaining 12 abductees being 10 cant of them was the mass abduc- released after negotiations held by 0 tion of 31 demining NGO staff local elders. According to the statement made by the AOG, all members which occurred in Bala FARAH AOG FARAH Crime Buluk District on the 6th of July abductees killed were associated 2011. The AOG killed 4 abduc- with the GOA. Anecdotal reports the AOG claimed that the abductees are col- tees (targeting the leadership of indicated that 5 of the murdered laborators with the GOA, and alleged associa- the group for this treatment), abductees previously worked for a tion with the GOA thus appears to be the while the remaining ones were PSC, and that the other 2 were a main motive behind this incident. teacher and an ANP officer’s son. released in Bakwa District a few The geographical pattern of AOG presence in Furthermore, it appears that the days later. While the exact mo- the province may shed some light on these commander who was involved in tives behind this case are unclear abduction cases. The number of AOG inci- the first case was also responsible at this moment, the responsible dents in both Bala Buluk (9 AOG incidents for this incident, demonstrating a are thought to have been dissatis- recorded) and Bakwa districts (8 AOG inci- particular propensity by this group fied with some element of the dent recorded) remain highest in the province to use abduction tactics as part of organization’s activity; this is a during this month. In the case of Gulistan and their opposition activities. relatively common feature of the Pur Chaman, AOG has reportedly maintained AOG-demining sector relation- The third mass abduction event a strong presence due to the weak government ship. In the second case, the mass occurred in Pur Chaman District presence and a little or no presence of IMF/ abduction of 35 locals, which in- on the 28th of July and involved ANSF operations. While these three events volved an NGO staff member (he 15 locals. AOG members be- alone are not sufficient to establish security was released after AOG con- headed two abductees and 13 ab- trends, it does suggest that risk of abduction in firmed that he does not work with ductees still remain in captivity at these districts will remain an important consid- the GOA). After 7 were killed, the time of writing. Reportedly, eration in the short term.

NGO Incidents BADGHIS Year to Date 0 BADGHIS This Report Period 0 50 During this reporting period the 40 volume of AOG incidents, largely AOG members who intended to 30 concentrated in four districts join the GOA – there has been no 20 (Murghab, Ghormach, Muqur, incident related to ALP and 10 and Qadis), has remained con- APRP since the initiation of these 0 sistent with longer term trends. programs this April. Of note, While Qadis has hosted a sharp though 30 AOG members and increase in AOG activity this year, three commanders surrendered BADGHIS AOG BADGHIS Crime in part because increases in IMF/ their weapons and joined the GOA this month, no AOG ef- May (though ALP has not been officially an- ANSF operations this year in nounced in this district). Reportedly, ALP Muqur pushed AOGs into Qadis, forts to target former AOG mem- bers was reported this period. belonging to one of the sub-tribes in Murghab the effect of ALP and APRP on has been involved in offensive operations sup- security trends remains uncertain. In contrast, Murghab registered ported by IMF/ANSF, while ALP belonging Apart from 2 major incidents re- three incidents related to ALP this to one major tribe in Qadis remains mainly in a lated to ALP and APRP that oc- July, and the number of total ALP defensive role; this may help explain their dif- curred this June – AOG with -related incidents has been in- fering positions in their respective districts’ SAF/RPGs attacked an ALP CP, creasing since the initiation of security environments recently. and later attacked a group of 20 these programs at the end of this THE ANSO REPORT Page 17

NGO Incidents GHOR Year to Date 9 GHOR 50 This Report Period 2 During this reporting period there 40 were 2 incidents directly involving caused no casualties or losses and 30 NGOs in Ghor Province. In the indicate that there was no direct 20 first case, an AOG detonated an intent on the part of the AOG to 10 RCIED in front of an NGO vehi- target NGOs, but rather they 0 cle (causing minor damage to the were incidentally involved. car) when two on duty NGO na- At the provincial level, these two GHOR AOG GHOR Crime tional staff members were in NGO incidents appear to reflect, transit in Du Layna District. Un- and partially be a result of, the However, it is not certain whether or not the confirmed information indicated reported migration of AOG ele- recent movement of AOG elements expanding that a high profile GOA official ments from the southern areas northwards could also have a link with the in- intended to travel along this same into those more central as both cident of night letter distribution in Chagh- route in a vehicle of similar make occurred in central districts (Du charan City that occurred during this reporting and colour around the time of the Layna & Shahrak). These AOG period. Night letters are often used by AOG incident, suggesting that this was elements were previously located in communities where they have not gained the likely target of the attack lead- further south (Taywara & Passa- sufficient local support and use them as a tool ing to the assessment that this band) and are expressing this new for gaining influence and examining the reac- incident was a case of mistaken presence through recent actions. tion of the population. However, the authen- identity. In the second case, ap- Among the 15 total AOG inci- ticity of the letter has been brought into ques- prox. 20 AOG members stopped dents in these two central districts tion from various observers due to its lack of an NGO vehicle while an NGO recorded up to this point in 2011, standard AOG ‘signatures’. While AOG have staff member was in transit in 93% (6 incidents in Du Layna and gradually been expanding a sphere of influence Shahrak District to transport 8 incidents in Shahrak) have oc- from the southern districts (Passaband and equipment to their office in Shah- curred in June and July alone Taywara) into the central districts (Shahrak and rak City. The AOG let him con- while in contrast, the number of Du Layna) of the province this year, their pres- tinue his journey after he stated he incidents in other districts has ence in the northern districts are still limited, was transporting equipment be- remained constantly low during and it is possible that this night letter distribu- longing to a businessman in Cha- the same period (between 1 and 3 tion could be the manifestation of a local dis- ghcharan City. Both incidents incidents per district). pute instead.

COMBINED (AOG/Criminal) NGO INCIDENTS : 2006-2011 (the numbers provided on the graph indicate yearly peaks) 30 27 25 25 24

20 17 17 15 15

10

5

0 JUL JUL JUL JUL JUL JUL JAN JAN JAN JAN JAN JAN JUN JUN JUN JUN JUN JUN FEB FEB FEB FEB FEB FEB APR APR APR APR APR APR OCT OCT OCT OCT OCT DEC DEC DEC DEC DEC MAR MAR MAR MAR MAR MAR AUG AUG AUG AUG AUG MAY MAY MAY MAY MAY MAY NOV NOV NOV NOV NOV SEPT SEPT SEPT SEPT SEPT 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 THE ANSO REPORT Page 18

E ASTERN REGION

NGO Incidents NANGARHAR Year to Date 9 NANGARHAR This Report Period 0 100 The security environment in 80 Nangarhar in the second half of attack on the main gate of JAF on the 25th, which itself only in- 60 July was again characterised by a 40 decreased number of AOG opera- volved 2 AOG fighters. A num- 20 tions, but also by a further growth ber of possibilities exist for why 0 in the number of serious incidents such an ineffectual attack may of armed criminality, focused on have been carried out, but one important option to consider is Jalalabad city. After a number of NANGARHAR AOG NANGARHAR Crime robberies of private residences in that it represents an attempt to the city by groups of 6-8 gunmen draw attention towards expecta- In the southwestern districts, while Sherzad in the past 2 months, this period tions of further targeting of such was quiet and Khogyani played home to just 1 saw 5 separate armed abductions large facilities, thereby allowing IED and 1 direct attack on IMF, significant in the capital, with 2 occurring in AOGs to unexpectedly attack an- numbers of fresh AOG units were reported to the money exchange market in other target in the coming weeks. have arrived in Pachir wa Agam from Kurram Zone 1. Worryingly, in at least Beyond the capital area, the only Agency, although the only AOG incident rec- one case the armed men responsi- mass-casualty conflict event was orded there was the shooting dead of two civil- ble for the abductions were the IMF assault on a unit of AOG ians in a private vehicle, and neighbouring dressed in NDS uniforms, and fighters sheltering in a school near Chaparhar did not register a single incident. In executed their kidnapping during to the Kuz Kunar DAC. The Hesarak, the only AOG incident was a firefight daylight hours in the centre of the commander of the group, a for- between two rival AOG commanders, killing city. Furthermore, on the out- mer ANP commander (previously one of them. skirts of the city, in the Muqam in charge of security on the JAA- Achin saw further inter-tribal hostilities, alt- Khan area, gunmen robbed a pri- ASD highway) who flipped to the hough in 4 separate exchanges of fire between vate residence of almost $100,000, AOG side and became the chief the two sides only one led to a casualty, namely and killed the owner of the house. commander in charge of generat- that of a child accidentally injured. While fur- The profile of these robberies and ing insecurity on the highway, was ther efforts have been made at the provincial abductions, which all appear sole- also present when IMF engaged level to resolve it recently, these have again ly financially motivated, indicates the group during the night of the failed and it remains an outstanding political that one or more local powerbro- 17th. He and 14 other fighters, of issue, with clear security implications. Howev- kers that enjoy provincial political a total of roughly 60, were killed er, at present, there is a certain status quo pre- protection from arrest and prose- in the airstrikes and exchanges of sent, and while firefights have again broken cution are likely responsible, mak- fire. The incidents was an unusual out, it has been more than a month since these ing it difficult for the security one, as the commander’s AO was led to fatalities. forces to combat. As a result of Nurgal and the highway and he these recent kidnappings, the was therefore considerably out of As such, relative calm continued to prevail in money exchange market was area, and while it is thought they Nangarhar with regard to opposition activities, closed by its merchants on July were planning a large attack on but the increasingly serious criminal activity in 30th, and is expected to remain the DAC, after briefly attacking it Jalalabad city is a cause for concern, though it closed for at least 5 days. the previous day, it remains un- may quieten during Ramazan. However, the end of Ramazan may see the resumption of However, the city again saw an clear why they were doing so giv- en their primary focus on attack- major AOG activities in Nangarhar as they almost complete absence of AOG start this year’s winter push. incidents, with the only one of ing IMF convoys. significance being the small, short THE ANSO REPORT Page 19

NGO Incidents KUNAR Year to Date 8 KUNAR 150 This Report Period 0 While the first half of July saw a 100 notable decrease in Kunar’s con- by AOGs, on one occasion killing two ANA soldiers. In one nota- flict intensity, this period saw a 50 substantial AOG operational re- ble instance, AOG fighters at- tacked an IMF helicopter with escalation, thus making July over- 0 all a more violent month than rocket fire as it was landing at the June, although still down on the 3 Nangalam ANA facility and months from March to May. Of- claimed to have brought it down KUNAR AOG KUNAR Crime fensive AOG operations remained also though this was not con- overwhelmingly defined by direct firmed from the IMF side. What tinued to impact Afghan territory, with uncon- SAF and RPG attacks on security is known is that in the consequent firmed reports that IMF had engaged in coun- forces, with slightly more than 50 firefight, 3 AOG fighters were ter mortar fire on at least one occasion; if true, such incidents recorded across the killed, including an important field this implies an important escalation in cross- province in all the traditional are- commander in the area. border tension similar to that registered in as. Security force and AOG casu- Also in Manogai, two separate but Khost during this fortnight. In Khas Kunar alties were relatively low from similar instances were registered also, another noteworthy development oc- these direct kinetic engagements, of local community firefights with curred. On the 30th, a BBIED operative was with no mass-casualty events rec- local AOG units. In the first, in shot dead by ANP as he was transiting out of orded; in all, 3 ANSF were killed Barkundi Bazaar, local residents the district towards the western bank of the and 6 injured, and 4 AOG killed attacked and disarmed 3 AOG Kunar river. This is interesting as it indicates and 2 arrested. As is common in fighters as they were physically that the district’s dominant AOG, an anti- Kunar, civilians bore the brunt of assaulting a young child. The se- Pakistan branch of the TTP based in the casualties, with 1 killed and a cond instance occurred in Kolak, Mohmand Agency, may be increasing their total of 22 collaterally injured in where local residents came to the offensive operations in Kunar, rather than fo- these attacks. Standout incidents rescue of a local man that AOG cusing on criminal activity and localised attacks included a large ambush of a con- fighters were attempting to ab- on IMF and ANSF in Khas Kunar. voy of container trucks in Nari, in duct, shooting one dead and injur- which 10 were damaged and a ing two others. This comes as it Finally, IMF continued to abstain from major driver killed, and ambushes of appears that elements within the clearing operations, with just two airstrikes ANSF convoys in Manogai and diverse mix of AOGs operating in against AOG locations in Wata Pur recorded – Shegal that killed or wounded na- the Wata Pur-Manogai corridor one of which killed 3 AOG fighters and the tional security force members. are becoming more predatory other 2 civilians. As such, the overall dynamic in Kunar during for the second half of July was IDF incidents registered an above with regard to local communities, one of a re-intensification of AOG efforts to -average level of casualties during with other reports registered of target ANSF in the key contested districts, the period, with ANA facilities in abductions of locals in the area. with little concomitant pushback from either Manogai and Wata Pur in particu- In Dangam, Shegal and Khas the ANSF or the IMF. lar coming under repeated attack Kunar, cross-border shelling con- THE ANSO REPORT Page 20

NGO Incidents NURISTAN Year to Date 0 NURISTAN 50 This Report Period 0 With Waygal held by the IEA and 40 Parun enjoying an uneasy quiet, future, indications of which exist 30 eastern Nuristan continued to play in the significant infiltration of 20 home to the province’s most dy- Arab and Pakistani AOG fighters 10 namic political and security devel- into the district and neighbouring 0 opments. First, the reconciled Bargi Matal in the past 2 weeks. Kamdesh District Govenor, HIG However, it appears that the most strongman Mullah Sadeq, called immediate target in the sights of NURISTAN AOG NURISTAN Crime for more forces and resources to these newly arrived AOG cadres allow him to effectively defend is Bargi Matal, which has already recent AOG attacks, including the sheltering the district centre and surround- come very close to falling into of important local government officials, and as ing villages under his authority their hands this year. On July such his assassination represents the elimina- from attacks and pressure from 18th, AOG fighters attacked an tion of an important obstacle to AOG consoli- the IEA and allied AOGs. After ANP CP in the district centre area dation in the district. last period’s major assault on in which one policeman was In Nurgaram, to the west of the province, one ANBP positions in the key infil- killed, and it is likely that further tration valley of Gawardesh by the multiple rocket attack against the DAC was such attacks will be recorded in recorded, with two projectiles hitting the ba- IEA and their allies, in which the coming weeks. Moreover, an some of Sadeq’s civilian relatives zaar, two landing outside the PRT compound important mullah was also abduct- – absent a permanent IMF presence now – were killed, the IEA-HIG agree- ed and executed by AOG fighters ment to leave each other alone is and one inside it. For the moment, however, from the Pategal area on the 16th, Nurgaram remains relatively permissive; it is reported to have ended. As such, his body being found a few days Sadeq now appears to be seeking the Alingar road that represents the primary later. He had been critical in as- concern. support in defending his position sisting the local government in from potential assault in the near THE ANSO REPORT Page 21

NGO Incidents KHOST Year to Date 4 KHOST This Report Period 1 150 The only NGO incident recorded during this period in Khost was incidents from June, and moreo- 100 an indirect one, in which a mon- ver continues the downward trend eychanger was transporting recorded with relative consistent 50

roughly $45,000 in cash through since March. One noteworthy 0 Tani, on behalf of an NGO to pay aspect of this period’s develop- a local community for one of its ment was the partial re-emergence cash-for-work projects, was of the conflict in Sabari, with 5 KHOST AOG KHOST Crime stopped by 3 gunmen. The mon- direct attacks on security forces, ey was stolen, but the money- and 9 recorded IMF operations, in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border saw an escala- changer and an associate were left which a total of 26 AOG mem- tion in Khost province this period. In other unharmed, and within a week the bers were detained – although border provinces in which this conflict pattern money had been recovered by none were killed, indicating the has been registered (such as Kunar) the PakMil community intervention. Khost ongoing lower level of blood- have asserted that their objective is anti-AOG remains a highly hostile environ- letting from IMF operations there. in nature, although this is not entirely clear. ment for NGO operations gener- There was, however, a BBIED However, in Khost, the 5 such incidents that ally, because of the intensity of the attack on the ANA in Sabari to- were recorded, in Tani and Tere Zayi, involved armed conflict there and the con- wards the end of the period, the clear and direct targeting of IMF, ANSF sequent vulnerability to collateral which killed 1 ANA officer and a and the SOF-run “campaign forces,” – alt- involvement in NGO incidents. civilian alongside the bomber. In hough it remains unconfirmed if the IDF did Yet this incident is a positive re- other rural districts, the most sig- indeed come from PakMil forces. However, minder that non-state armed ac- nificant events were an IED most significant is that in all incidents, IMF, tors, who may interfere with against an ANBP vehicle in Gur- ANSF and the campaign forces responded NGO operations out of either buz, killing 2 policemen, and an with IDF fire of their own. While many of the principled or predatory motives, IED against an ANA vehicle in details of and motivations behind this conflict can often be reasoned by through Shamal, killing 2 soldiers and dynamic along the border region are opaque local stakeholder communities. wounding another. and open to interpretation, one thing is clear However, it is also important to Khost city remained relatively from what has happened in Khost this period: be sensitive to the different posi- quiet, with just 4 IDF attacks on we have seen an increase in clear, recorded tions that various AOGs maintain Camp Salerno comprising the ex- cross-border exchanges of fire. on this subject, with the prov- tent of the kinetic incidents rec- However, some of these attacks may have ince’s main AOG, the HQN, orded. There were also 9 IED much less well-disposed to the been initiated by AOGs instead, exploiting the discoveries, but the absence of operational restrictions IMF fall under with presence of NGOs than other any detonations continues to opposition groups. regard to cross-border actions. Such a tactic demonstrate the relative effective- was confirmed to have occurred in Spera, More broadly, after the relative ness of ANP capabilities in this where IMF and ANSF came under mortar fire calm of the first half of July AOG direction. Finally in the city, NDS from AOG fighters positioned across the bor- -initiated conflict incidents rose detained 3 Pakistani AOG sus- der to which the security forces responded considerably during this period, pects after an operation at the with machine gun fire. As such, it may well up by 100% and mirroring devel- Gurbuz bus station area. also be true that AOGs are exploiting tensions opments in Paktya. However, this The ongoing issue of cross-border between security forces on either side of the still signifies a one third drop in IDF incidents along the length of border for their own purposes. overall AOG-initiated conflict THE ANSO REPORT Page 22

NGO Incidents LAGHMAN Year to Date 1 LAGHMAN 50 This Report Period 0 Laghman’s most significant devel- 40 opment during the second half of Still, the formal handover is a sig- 30 nificant step, as IMF in Laghman July was the ‘transition’ to ANSF 20 authority in Mehtarlam City on now turned their attention to- the 19th, which led to the closure wards the much more challenging 10 of all vehicular access to the city problems of a wider provincial 0 36 hours, as the security forces transition. This is of particular ensured a smooth handover with- relevance now, given that it comes out incident. Prior to this hando- at a time when Alingar continues LAGHMAN AOG LAGHMAN Crime ver, the NDS had been particular- to be home to a growing AOG ons to the former, leading to the death of one ly active rounding up and arrest- presence, and in some ways slip- AOG and two of the community’s cattle. ing local AOG members in the ping further from GOA and IMF From both of these incidents, it can also be city and its environs, in many cas- grasp. Salafi AOG fighters, con- seen that many in the local community in Alin- es doing so after having been sidered by locals the most danger- gar are broadly unsympathetic to the AOG alerted to their presence months ous of armed actors, have newly cause, even if they also maintain little willing- before by concerned locals com- arrived from Kunar in the past ness to overtly side with the GOA. As such, munities. After the handover, month, and significant IEA and the extent of AOG authority in the district will escalated numbers of ANSF were HIG cadres continue to operate depend primarily on their numbers and powers deployed to the streets of the city, and strengthen their presence in of coercion, but it is clear they are actively vy- and remain in place at the time of the district, particularly in Sangar ing for it at present. The final incident of note writing. However, while ANSF and Parwayi, but also in the Nu- in Alingar was the successful escape of the Do are officially in charge, the ralam Sahib area. A primary focus Ab Police Chief, kidnapped there in early June, ‘transition’ remains academic in of the activities of these groups is who did so after killing a captor while on a some respects. Firstly, although it to warn locals away from working toilet trip. However, his brother, who had also is expected to be shut by 2014, with the GOA or IMF, and then been detained with him, was executed in re- the PRT in Metharlam remains in to target them for killing if they sponse. place, and IMF vehicle and foot refuse: the killing of the NDS of- patrols have continued to operate ficial in Kandai Rajaee in an IED Elsewhere, Qarghayi was the other location through the city, thus not giving blast was believed to be his se- recording significant conflict. While Torghar the impression that IMF presence cond warning. Similarly, AOG remained quiet, attacks in the Tangi Abrisham has diminished or changed in a fighters attacked an ANP officer area resumed after a brief period of absence, significant way. Secondly, in an with SAF in Parwayi, killing him with 3 attacks in that area occurred during the emergency such as a major attack and two other civilians with him, period. Moreover, some concerns were seen in the provincial capital, an IMF with one AOG fighter also dying in the Charbagh area, with a small AOG cell response if highly likely even were in the firefight after local commu- operating locally and likely responsible for the the ANSF response deemed to be nity came to the officer’s assis- IED that struck an IMF vehicle in the area on sufficient. Indeed this may also tance. In another incident in the the 26th. However, the previous night, IMF be a point that locally active same area, a firefight broke out and ANSF raided a residence in the Pacha vil- AOGs are considering in an at- between AOG members and the lage, near Charbagh, in which a man, his wife tempt to demonstrate the contin- local community after the latter and son were killed, and three others wounded. ued ‘reality’ of IMF authority. refused to hand over their weap- It remains a matter of debate whether the man killed was an AOG member. THE ANSO REPORT Page 23

NGO Incidents PAKTYA Year to Date 6 PAKTYA 100 This Report Period 0 After the precipitous drop in 80 AOG-initiated incidents last peri- man. 60 od, levels rose again by about Further south, the recently noted 40 100% during the second half of effort to target GOA officials in 20 the month, with most of the prov- Sayid Karam continued, with an 0 ince’s districts recording signifi- assault on the house of the head cant incidences of violence. How- of the district council, leading to ever, this level remained a third the injury of him and four other PAKTYA AOG PAKTYA Crime lower than the June peak, similar members of his household, in- to the pattern registered in Khost cluding women and children. In tional NGO staff during the daytime, with the over the same 2 month period. Gardez district, insecurity was Logar section providing the greatest risk. Starting on the northern border focused on roadways, with the city with Kurram Agency, in which itself quiet except for a small In southern Paktya, the Zurmat conflict picked Pakistani military operations are number of IED discoveries and up from last period, with a dozen AOG- ongoing, conflict incidents re- ANP arrests. The AOG cell oper- initiated incidents, mostly in the form of IED mained characteristically focused ating in Ibrahim Khel continued and direct attacks on IMF and ANP. Most on ANSF and IMF. Chamkanay to be active, conducting two at- significantly, in one IED attack on the 29th, 2 recorded two IED blasts causing tacks on the main secondary road IMF and 5 ANA soldiers were killed, a particu- fatalities – the first against an ALP in the area, against a fuel tanker larly high death toll for a single incident. This vehicle killing 1 and injuring 3 of and then an IMF convoy. On the district continues to be highly insecure. And in the Local Police onboard, with the main Gardez-Khost road, one Shwak, an AOG fighter shot at an IMF heli- second striking an ANP vehicle IED detonated injuring a civilian, copter with an RPG, a relatively rare tactic in killing 1 and injuring 2 more and 2 while in the Tandan area, AOG the conflict but one seen in two other provinc- civilians in addition. In its north- fighters established an illegal CP es this period. In this instance, a subsequent ern neighbour Jaji, the IMF base and searched for those working IMF search of the area led to the death of a there was attacked three times to with the GOA or IMF, not re- civilian, although 7 suspected AOG fighters no effect, while in Dand wa Patan, portedly finding anyone. Of note, were also detained. two ANBP CPs were targeted by however, this occurred the day As such, while the conflict in Paktya generally rockets from across the border, in after an NDS operation in the re-intensified in the second half of July, no a tactic often seen before. In Jani same area arrested an AOG com- significant developments were recorded – par- Khel, where the weak GOA pres- mander and 6 of his men. Finally, ticularly as the IMF have substantially reduced ence is concentrated in the DAC on the Gardez-Kabul highway in the intensity and frequency of their operations area, all incidents were recorded Ghafor Khel, AOG fighters recently – and the balance of power between there, with six assaults on the burned a truck carrying IMF sup- security forces and the opposition did not DAC, and one IED striking an plies; however, the highway con- change in any significant way. ANP vehicle killing one police- tinues to be relatively safe for na-

NOTICE: The graphs provided in the report are accurate as of the 27th of July 2011. THE ANSO REPORT Page 24

S OUTHERN REGION

NGO Incidents KANDAHAR Year to Date 2 KANDAHAR 200 This Report Period 1 Following the previous reporting 150 unharmed, an incident that had period, which had seen significant 100 incidents including the killing of the hallmarks of an AOG attack. the Head of the Provincial Coun- As remarked in the last report, the 50 cil, Ahmed Wali Karzai, and the death of Ahmad Wali Karzai 0 aftermath BBIED attack against marks a significant change in the the Red Mosque, the targeted kill- political landscape of Kandahar ing of high profile personalities due to the resultant power vacu- KANDAHAR AOG KANDAHAR Crime appears to continue. In addition, um. At this stage it is too early to the killing of an NGO staff mem- evaluate whether the subsequent mon target of AOG efforts throughout the ber was also reported. appointment of Shah Wali Khan region. On the 27th of July, Ghulam Karzai as a replacement Head of The province also saw 2 other (non NGO- Haider Hamidi, the Mayor of Provincial Council will avert any related) targeted killings by AOGs this period, Kandahar City, was killed in his follow up issues. As already stat- when two separate AOG “Hit Teams” on mo- office in the Municipality com- ed in the last reporting cycle, torcycles killed an ANP in Shah Wali Kot dis- pound by a BBIED attacker, who NGOs should be vigilant to the trict on the 21st and a tribal elder and a mem- carried the device under his tur- possible changes in security dy- ber of the local shura in Arghandab District ban. It seems that the attacker namics in their areas of opera- the following day. infiltrated into the Municipality tions. office within a group of people In the NGO sphere, a significant Generally speaking, AOG initiated incidents who wanted to discuss and solve a incident was reported on July 24th remained consistent with the prior reporting dispute over the destruction of in Kandahar City, District 4. Two cycle. In the present period, 53 AOG initiated houses in District 9. Two days unknown armed individuals riding incidents occurred across the province, with before, the Mayor had ordered to on a motorbike shot and killed a RCIEDs and IEDs deployed extensively, re- tear down old houses in that dis- female NGO national staff mem- sulting in a total of 20 effective strikes. Within trict on the basis that they were ber in the vicinity of her house. Kandahar City, District 2, 3, 9 and 4 were host illegal. Efforts to demolish these While the motivation remains un- to IED detonations, resulting in injuries to 7 houses resulted in deaths to 2 known, it appears possible that civilians and 2 ANA. It was further reported children and 1 woman, but it is the shooting may be the conse- that a child died when a motorcycle-mounted not clear whether both events— quence of a family or personal RCIED detonated against a passing ANP vehi- the mentioned dispute and the dispute, though further assess- cle. However, province wide it was Zhari and killing of the mayor—are in any ment is required to complete the Panjwayi that bore the majority of AOG activi- way linked as AOG quickly analysis. The last reported inci- ties. These consisted primarily of IEDs and claimed responsibility for the kill- dent in 2011 involving an NGO direct AOG attacks, mainly against ANP CPs. ing of the mayor. Potential expla- in Kandahar was reported in Finally, ANSF carried out a nightraid on a local nations include the high profile of March, when 3 NGO staff mem- house in District 9 of the capital on the 19th. the casualty and his close relations bers from the same organization After surrounding the house a fire fight broke to Ahmad Wali Karzai, who were killed while at an NGO sup- out that lasted through the night, killing 5 in- picked Hamidi 2006 for the post ported road construction site in cluding 2 AOG members, 1 of whom was re- as mayor. Having said this, assas- Arghandab District. It would ap- portedly a prominent AOG commander. This sins had already targeted the pear that in this latter case the incident represents efforts by ANSF to prevent mayor in March 2009 in an type of program the organisation AOGs conducting operations in Kandahar RCIED strike, although in that was implementing played a role in City, as both ANSF/ IMF operations and instance he managed to escape the targeting of this event as road AOG activities remain relatively common construction efforts are a com- there. THE ANSO REPORT Page 25

NGO Incidents PAKTIKA Year to Date 0 PAKTIKA 150 This Report Period 0 The stand-out incident in Paktika 100 in the second half of July was un- (and partially achieved) at the dis- doubtedly the protracted and vio- trict level in Nuristan earlier in the 50 lent IMF operation against a large year. HQN complex of bunkers and It may also indicate that, alterna- 0 caves in Sar Hawza. During a tively, in recent weeks and months combined air and ground opera- at least the HQN has come to tion, which began in the early consider certain locations in Af- PAKTIKA AOG PAKTIKA Crime hours of July 21st and lasted for ghanistan to be safer than its so- roughly 40 hours, 80-100 AOG called ‘safe havens’ in the FATA, sponsible for initiating the attack. In contrast fighters were killed, with roughly due to the intensive drone cam- to IDF incidents, direct fire incidents fell 35 local Afghans recognised and paign there and the PakMil’s on- slightly, with just 4 of the 16 total incidents the remaining 45-65 a mixture of going operations in Kurram leading to security force casualties (in all, 4 Pakistani Pashtuns and Punjabis, Agency, into which HQN recently AOG deaths, 2 ANA deaths and 12 ANA inju- as well as an unconfirmed small expanded its presence. That this ries). number of Arabs. One IMF ser- may be the case was reinforced by There was a slight increase in total IED inci- vice member, an SOF operative, another incident a week prior to dents (detonations and discoveries), again re- was also killed in the protracted the above incident, this time in maining concentrated in DAC areas where the fighting, which started with the Urgun, where 20 AOG fighters GOA and IMF concentrate their presence. clearing of a compound and then were killed in an IMF airstrike in Just two of these led to casualties, the first kill- continued as the IMF were at- the Pirkoti area. However, after ing an IMF soldier and wounding another in tacked from other, concealed fa- the large casualty figures from Sharan’s Kari Khel area, and the second cilities. It is extremely rare for these incidents, it is likely that wounding an IMF soldier in Khushamand such a large number of AOG AOG leadership will prevent such DAC. In the western district of Yahya Khel, fighters to be located in just one large numbers of men from con- ANP discovered two VBIEDs in storage in a compound, even in a province gregating in one place at one time bazaar and arrested one suspect – the third such as Paktika where the GOA in the near term. VBIED incident this year, after a premature presence is functionally non- In the wider conflict, the number detonation in Barmal in April and the massive existent in a number of districts. of AOG-initiated conflict inci- VBIED complex attack against a Barmal PSC Its presence, only 25 kilometres dents rose by a third over last pe- compound before that, which killed 24. from the provincial capital, there- riod, with a near doubling in IDF Finally, in Gomal IMF and ANA disarmed the fore opens up a number of signifi- attacks, almost entirely concen- cant questions and potential impli- entire district ANP force for allegedly selling trated in the northeastern districts their weapons to AOGs, adding to the view cations about the nature of the of Ziruk, Nika, Gayan and Bar- conflict in the southeastern re- that Paktika remains the most dangerous and mal, the last of which accounted lawless province in the eastern and southeast- gion. Perhaps mostly importantly, for half of all incidents – exclu- local governmental sources sug- ern border region. While such mass-casualty sively focused on the Shkin, Mar- events as seen during the period are rare and gest that the intention of the gha and Malik Shay areas. Nota- amassed fighters was to seize Sha- unlikely to be seen again soon, the overall pic- ble IDF incidents included an ture strongly suggests that the situation in the rana after decapitating the provin- unsuccessful attempt to bring cial government there, in a more province will remain characterised by a confi- down an IMF helicopter in Sar dent and extensive AOG presence across the extreme example of what hap- Hawza, and two occasions where pened in Uruzgan during this peri- province and a high level of AOG-IMF con- IMF counterfire managed to kill flict for the foreseeable future. od, and what has been attempted some of the AOG fighters re- THE ANSO REPORT Page 26

NGO Incidents URUZGAN Year to Date 0 URUZGAN This Report Period 0 100 This reporting period, the geo- 80

graphical distribution of AOG BBIED devices were utilized in 60 related incidents in Uruzgan fo- the attack, as attackers (veiled un- 40 cused on 3 districts: Tirin Kot, der burqas) entered the radio sta- Dihrawud and Khas Uruzgan. tion and the highway police sta- 20 AOG initiated incidents remained tion to detonate their devices. In 0 relatively consistent with the pre- addition to this, 1 VBIED deto- vious reporting cycle, with 42% of nated at the entrance of the gover- URUZGAN AOG URUZGAN Crime the incidents initiated by AOGs nor’s office, followed by 3 individ- related to effective IED explo- uals—equipped with BBIEDs and profile personalities by AOGs is consistent sions (mainly in the abovemen- firearms—who engaged the com- with trends occurring in other parts of the tioned districts). The volume of pound’s security forces. The fight southern region. direct attacks also remained con- lasted for approximately 5 hours, A second noteworthy incident occurred on sistent with the previous reporting resulting in 24 (including the at- July 27th when 2 unidentified men on a motor period. Direct attacks were car- tackers) killed—with 13 civilians bike shot and wounded the Head of the Haj ried out on 6 occasions, with a and an Afghan journalist amongst and Religious Affairs Department in Tirin Kot noteworthy incident occurring on them—and 37 wounded City, in Kalacha Bazaar area. The motivation July 19th in Khas Uruzgan, when (including 25 civilians and the behind the attempted killing remains unknown, AOG attacked an ALP post. In Governor’s speaker). The targets but the incident marks the third attack of this that incident, 3 ALPs were killed were clearly the governor’s office, nature over the month. In two separate at- and 2 wounded. the police station and also a third tacks conducted by AOG mobile “hit teams,” The burial ceremony of Jan Mo- office beside the radio station a GOA employee was shot and wounded on hammad Khan, the close advisor which was used by the command- the 28th of June and in a second attack, 2 ANP to the Afghan president who was er of a large provincial militia. were wounded on July 1st by another AOG killed on July 17th in Kabul, took AOG members apparently at- mobile team on a motorbike. Targeted killings place on July 18th in Tirin Kot. tempted to access the latter office in this fashion have become a striking feature While the ceremony passed with- through the radio station, during of the security environment in the southern out incident, 2 significant events which several staff from the radio region. occurred at other times demon- station were killed, along with the On a final note, IMF conducted at least 4 doc- strating the determination of mentioned Afghan reporter. Alt- umented operations—occurring in Tirin Kot, AOGs to make a strong impact in hough the militia commander and Khas Uruzgan and Chora—resulting in 6 the province. The more deadly of the Governor were the main tar- AOG killed, 2 wounded and 17 arrested, and these was recorded on July 28th in gets, reports indicate that both elsewhere, numerous ALPs surrendered with Tirin Kot City, in the area of the escaped unharmed. This marked their weapons to AOGs on 2 separate occa- Governor’s office, the Highway the first large-scale attack of this sions in Khas Uruzgan. Police station and the Radio/TV nature, targeting multiple high station. A total of 7 VBIED and profile targets, in Tirin Kot. However, the targeting of high THE ANSO REPORT Page 27

NGO Incidents HELMAND Year to Date 2 HELMAND This Report Period 0 350 Helmand hosted a large number 300 of AOG initiated incidents this ing IEDs along the outskirts, oc- 250 reporting period, with the geo- casional IDF attacks, and some 200 150 graphical distribution of AOG attacks against police checkpoints. However, 2 noteworthy incidents 100 activities remaining similar to that 50 of the previous reporting cycle. were reported from the city this 0 The majority of these took place reporting period. The first was in the consistently most affected reported on the 18th of July, HELMAND AOG HELMAND Crime districts; Nahri Sarraj, Sangin, when 7 ANP were poisoned and Marja, Musa Qala and Nad Ali. subsequently shot and killed. The result in any major structural changes within The province saw AOGs conduct perpetrator, an ANP official, man- the composition of forces assigned to the city. a large number of attacks and aged to evade capture by fleeing Considering the fact that ANSF had long held IED strikes (at least 50, not the scene in an ANP vehicle (with the responsibility for security within the city, it counting IED discoveries) against some equipment stolen from the is unlikely to create any serious changes in the IMF/ANSF/ANP security tar- ANP post). In this incident, the overall security paradigm there. The transition gets. motivation remains unclear; how- was carried out with a large number of officials ever, reports suggest that the per- It is worth noting that in several and VIPs in the Governor’s compound, which petrator may have links with of these IED strikes, civilians corresponded with significantly heightened AOGs. were hit causing a large number of security measures throughout the city. No casualties. Helmand witnessed 3 In the second significant incident relevant security incident occurred during the exceptional incidents of this na- in Lashkar Gah City (July 31st), a ceremony. ture. In Naw Zad, a roadside SVBIED detonated against a joint IMF/ANSF carried out a large number of op- IED detonated against a civilian ANP/ANA patrol. As a result, 9 erations outside of Lashkar Gah against AOG vehicle, resulting in the deaths of ANP/ANA and 1 civilian were over the past 2 weeks, launching a total of at 4 civilians. On July 14th in Sangin killed, and 6 ANP and 3 civilians least 22 operations which were centred on District, another roadside IED hit were wounded. Such suicide at- Nahri Sarraj, Sangin, Nad Ali, Musa Qala, a civilian car, resulting in the tacks are quite rare in Lashkar Garmser and Baghran District. These were deaths of 6 civilians, and in the Gah City, and initial assessments reported to result in a high number of AOG most deadly and significant IED indicate that this attack should not killed (35), and a large volume of detentions. strike involving civilians, on July be seen as relating specifically to However, the biggest strike was carried out in 29th a mini bus was hit by an the recent transition in Lashkar a night raid in Baghran, where 16 AOG mem- RCIED in Nahri Sarraj District Gah but should be viewed as part bers were reportedly killed, and the seizure of a (Sarakala area). This blast killed of the broader AOG campaign. huge drug cache long with IED making mate- 16 civilians, including at least 2 In fact, an incident of similar na- rials, took place. Incidents in Baghran are women and 2 children. In terms ture occurred once prior to this in quite rare, with 3 IMF operations having been of targeting, it was reported that 2011, when in April an attempt at reported there thus far this year. The last in the latter, an ANP vehicle had a two-fold suicide attack was car- noteworthy incident was reported on June passed through the same area just ried out against the Governor’s 18th when IMF engaged an AOG, resulting in prior to the IED detonation, sug- compound. In that incident, one 25 AOG members killed (and no reported gesting that the bus was not the of the BBIED attackers was shot IMF casualties). In June 2011, IMF/ANP primary target. However, the risk and killed by ANSF before he seized 70 AP mines, an unknown number of related to IED detonations re- could enter the office of the Gov- RPG launchers, IED detonators and assorted mains one of the highest risk fac- ernor, and the second detonated ammunition during a joint operation. Howev- tors for civilians, especially when his device before he could gain er, despite these outliers, Baghran District is a travelling along heavily contested entry to the Supreme Court relatively calm district in Helmand that rarely roads. (wounding 3). witnesses insecurity. The one addendum to In Lashkar Gah City, the ability of Of note, the transition ceremony this is that the district is often assessed as a AOGs to strike within the city has for Lashkar Gah took place on gathering place for AOGs from the province, typically been limited, and AOGs the 20th of July. The official tran- who occasionally infiltrate into Ghor or have generally resorted to emplac- sition remained a mostly political Daykundi. handover to ANSF and does not THE ANSO REPORT Page 28

NGO Incidents ZABUL Year to Date 0 ZABUL 100 This Report Period 0 37 AOG initiated incidents were 80 recorded this reporting period. of the director of a local construc- 60 tion company, who escaped un- This marks a slight increase when 40 harmed, with the car only slightly compared to the previous report- 20 ing cycle. The main threats in the damaged. Of further note—in area are identified as IED deploy- Tarnak Wa Jaldak on the 24th—a 0 ments and direct attacks, mainly roadside IED hit an ANA vehicle, causing the deaths of 2 ANA sol- targeting IMF or the ANP. 40% ZABUL AOG ZABUL Crime of the AOG initiated incidents diers, and injuries to an additional this period were related to one. AOG attack in Daychopan and Athgar Dis- IED’s—including 15 effective Along with the IED incidents, 19 tricts. IED related events across the direct attacks were reported over It should be noted that IMF/ANSF units province—with incidents occur- the past two weeks. 15 of these maintained their tempo of operations during ring mainly in Qalat, Shinkay and direct attacks were carried out this reporting period as well. Their activities Shahjoy. Amongst these, note- against ANP posts across the were concentrated on Shahjoy and Qalat Dis- worthy incidents were reported in province, with the majority in tricts, and consisted of the seizure of weapons, Arghandab District, when on July Qalat and Shajoy Districts. ammunition and material, as well as several 25th an IED detonated on a AOGs attacked IMF logistical detentions of suspected AOG members. It group of civilians out walking, convoys 3 times in Qalat, Shinkay was also reported that IMF/ANSF had several killing 2 women and wounding 2 and Tarnak Wa Jaldak, and IMF/ operations—specifically in Shahjoy—which children. In a second incident, an ANA bases came twice under resulted in the killing of numerous AOG RCIED detonated against the car members.

NGO Incidents NIMROZ Year to Date 0 NIMROZ This Report Period 0 100 The overall volume of incident 80 reporting in Nimroz has been lim- ments in Helmand Province. 60 ited, both this period and histori- IED strikes were recorded in 3 cally, with this cycle remaining occurrences over the last two 40 relatively consistent with the pre- weeks. Despite the limited pres- 20 vious reporting period. During ence of IMF in Nimroz, 2 of the 0 the present reporting period 10 IEDs detonated against patrolling incidents were reported, with IMF vehicles, with the third oc- NIMROZ AOG NIMROZ Crime Khash Rod District hosting all 10 curred while the IED was in the of them. This is not unexpected, process of being emplaced. This an attack on an ANA convoy, which lasted 30 due to the district’s proximity to last resulted in the deaths of 2 minutes. Helmand Province. AOG ele- AOG members, including a mid- Lastly, ANP activities remained limited over ments, active in Helmand, have level commander. Other AOG been known to use Khash Rod as the present reporting cycle, however, ANP initiated activities included an as- carried out one search operation, where they a safe haven in order to reorgan- sault—which included the in- ize when necessary, and the secu- discovered and seized 2,000 parcels of poppy volvement of heavy weapons—on seeds and 50 kg of drugs in a truck. 2 suspects rity situation in the district is usu- an ANP post in Delaram area and ally directly linked to develop- were arrested in connection with the event. THE ANSO REPORT Page 29

NGO Incidents GHAZNI Year to Date 1 GHAZNI This Report Period 1 250 The first NGO incident reported 200 for Ghazni this year (and one of ber of AOG were reportedly the most significant for the re- killed or detained, with a variety 150 gion) occurred this period in- of weapons and explosives seized 100 volved the temporary detention of AOG activities also showed no 50 40 staff members from a local signs of decline over the current 0 demining NGO by an AOG, cycle, with the number of AOG though all 40 were released un- attributed incidents (83) largely GHAZNI AOG GHAZNI Crime harmed just 1 hour later following consistent with that of the previ- negotiations by local community ous reporting period. AOG activ- religious elder while he was teaching girls in representatives. The demining ities in Ghazni continue to follow the local mosque. In this latter attack, 3 of the NGO is reported to enjoy a high relatively standard established girls were also wounded. Although the moti- level of acceptance among the trends, including IED detonations vations behind these incidents are not clear, it local community and did not re- and direct attacks against logistical appears likely that both were attempts to set an port receiving any prior threats. supply convoys on Highway 1 and example to the local community in order to These were crucial elements, as it secondary routes. In these latter intimidate them. appears that this local acceptance instances, PSC escorts have borne and the involvement of the com- the brunt of attacks (with 6 as- A double explosion in Ghazni City, Mandi Gor munity were the main factors in- saults on PSCs, 4 of them against area, was reported on the 19th, which is con- volved in their safe release. Put- convoys moving IMF contracted sistent with existent trends towards AOG as- ting this incident in context, the goods). The past two weeks also sassination attempts against GoA officials. In mass abduction of NGO witnessed a concentration of at- this incident, a handbag with an explosive de- demining staff has been previous- tacks against ANP check posts; vice inside (most likely an RCIED) was placed ly reported twice in the Eastern with a notable 6 reported assaults near the entrance of the Head of Ghazni City Region, both times in May, with 1 in Ghazni District, 1 each in Court’s personal living compound. The subse- incident in Paktya and another in Qarabagh and Ajristan Districts, quent detonation wounded the official, his son Khost. A third mass abduction of and 1 against an ANP convoy in and an ANP. When locals had gathered to demining NGO workers was re- Jaghatu District. Further AOG transport the victims, a second device went off ported in the Western Region in direct attacks were carried out that killed 4 civilians and wounded 15 others. Farah (July) when 31 demining against district centers (DACs) The incident marks the first attack targeting a NGO staff members were abduct- across the province, some of them GOA official in Ghazni City since June 26th, ed by an AOG (with 4 of them receiving multiple attacks, such as when an RCIED attached to a bicycle detonat- subsequently killed). While the in Ajristan DAC (4 direct attacks) ed in Qala-e-Sabz area while the vehicle of the profile and relative exposure of and Waghaz DAC (2). former District Governor of Khwaja Umari was passing by. demining efforts are likely con- Other noteworthy incidents re- tributing factors it should be not- ported included AOG efforts to The risk linked to AOG direct attacks against ed that the very nature of intimidate and/or targeted kill- DAC’s and subject villages, the positioning of demining activities (in certain are- ings. These included the killing of IEDs and the inaccuracy of indirect fire target- as) may be perceived by AOGs as a civilian on July 25th in Waghaz ing the DAC’s and the military bases—which contrary to their efforts. District. In this incident, an AOG are installed mainly in urban centres—remain Ghazni Province remains one of shot and killed a civilian whom the highest risk factors in Ghazni to the civil- the most kinetic in the South, se- was accused of spying for IMF ian population, along with those NGO’s oper- cond only to Helmand. While and ANSF, while in another inci- ating or living there. Attempts to intimidate IMF and ANSF maintained their dent in Arzo Village (Ghazni) on and/or target locals suspected of supporting pace of operations as a large num- the 23rd, an AOG killed a local the Government represent an additional—but THE AFGHANISTAN NGO SAFETY OFFICE - CONTACTS AND INFORMATION

CONTACT ANSO MISSING This report ANSO could not provide analysis for the prov- CENTRAL REGION OFFICE (KABUL) inces of: ANSO is hosted by the Tomas Muzik - [email protected] - 0799 323 792 International NGO Safety Organisation Mukhtar - [email protected] - 0799 322 116 (INSO) Daykundi

NORTH REGION OFFICE (MAZAR) This is because we Brian Laguardia - [email protected] - 0799 404 617 do not know enough Firoz - [email protected] - 0799 408 252 To register with ANSO contact: about the area to [email protected] comment on the sig- EAST REGION OFFICE (JALALABAD) nificance of the inci- Rory Brown - [email protected] - 0799 248 362 dents occurring Naseer - [email protected] - 077 2546 242 there. ANSO is managed by an NGO Board. If you have any SOUTH REGION OFFICE (KANDAHAR) If you can help us feedback, good or bad, let Volker Lankow- [email protected] 0796 688 416 understand the prov- them know on: Noori - [email protected] - 0700 492 550 ince better, please [email protected] contact us. ANSO ACRONYMS WEST REGION OFFICE (HERAT) Taro Yamagata- [email protected] - 0799 322 192 ACG-Armed Criminal Group / Sayed Karim- [email protected] - 0707 474 135 AEF-Afghan Eradication Forces / ANA-Afghan National Army / ANBP-Afghan National Border COUNTRY MANAGEMENT (KABUL) Police / ANP-Afghan National Nic Lee - [email protected] - 0799 325 349 Police / AOG-Armed Opposition Group / APPF-Afghan Public Nathan Ronaldson - [email protected] - 0797 165 017 Protection Forces (local depu- Patrick Malach - [email protected] - 0793 230 118 tised militias) / DC-District Centre / GOA-Government of Afghanistan / IDF-Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / IED-Improvised Explosive Device / IMF- International Military Forces / Placement of New RSAs NDS-National Directorate of Security (Intelligence) / PRP- As many of you are already aware we now have new RSAs in place for our West and Previous Reporting Period / South offices. Mr Taro Yamagata recently took over the West and will be based in PSC-Private Security Company Herat (responsible for Ghor, Farah, Badghis and Herat Provinces) and Mr Volker Lan- / RPG-Rocket Propelled Gre- kow will be managing the South. He will be based in Kandahar and will be responsible nade / SAF-Small Arms Fire / for the provinces of Nimroz, Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Zabul, Ghazni and Pakti- VBIED-Vehicle Borne Impro- vised Explosive Device / PDO- ka. Private Development Organisa- We encourage members of the community to actively engage them in regards to both tion / ALP-Afghan Local Police ANSO service delivery as well as to meet with them and share your impressions and / LDI-Local Defence Initiative / IEA-Islamic Emirate of Afghani- analysis of the operational contexts you are operating in. We are sure they would wel- stan (Taliban) / PSG-Provincial come any such inputs. Shadow Governor (IEA) / DSG- Their contact details are provided above. District Shadow Governor (IEA) / PGM-Pro-Government Militia Regards, The ANSO Management Team