Challenge of Constructing Legitimacy in Peacebuilding: Case of Afghanistan

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Challenge of Constructing Legitimacy in Peacebuilding: Case of Afghanistan Challenge of Constructing Legitimacy in Peacebuilding: Case of Afghanistan Final Report Daisaku Higashi September 2008 The Author Daisaku Higashi is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of British Columbia (UBC) in Canada. He is currently conducting research in Afghanistan and Timor Leste that seeks effective policies that would create domestic legitimacy of peacebuilders in the eyes of local people and leaders. From 1993 to 2004, he worked as a TV program director specializing in political analysis of international conflicts and produced numerous documentaries on international affairs, such as the Vietnam War, the Middle East peace negotiations, the North Korean nuclear crisis, and nation building in Iraq. The documentary that he directed titled ―Rebuilding Iraq: Challenge of the United Nations‖ received the silver medal from the UN Correspondents Association in 2004, acknowledging it as the second-best report on the UN in the world. He also published several books, which have been used in many Japanese universities as references. As a fellow of the Toyota Foundation, he has been conducting research on peacebuilding at the UN Headquarters and in post-conflict regions since 2006. Preface and Acknowledgments Legitimacy in world politics has been the focus of both global attention and scholarly study in recent years, yet its role in peacebuilding has not been well studied. It is often remarked in both public and scholarly discourse that legitimacy is critical for success in creating sustainable peace in war-torn states; Larry Diamond, a political scientist who worked as a political advisor to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, asserts, ―the first lesson of America‘s experience in Iraq is that… any effort at administration and reconstruction of the post-conflict state must mobilize legitimacy, both internally in the post-conflict country as well as internationally.‖1 It appears to be a widely shared understanding that it is imperative for peacebuilders to obtain or construct legitimacy in the eyes of local people and leaders. Surprisingly, however, the concrete methods or policies to obtain this ―local legitimacy‖ in the host states have not been fully examined. The objective of this report is to address this critical question by examining key policies regarding legitimacy construction in the specific context of Afghan peacebuilding. I plan to conduct research with the same question in different peacebuilding cases; accumulated case studies, I believe, will demonstrate policy implications for both ongoing and future peacebuilding efforts. I wish to thank Carolyn McAskie, former Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support, who introduced me and my research proposal to numerous UN peacebuilders and key officials in UN missions. In her letter, she endorsed my project as research ―which will shed much-needed light on an issue which perhaps more than any other affects the success or failure of international peacebuilding efforts.‖ 1 Diamond 2006, 34. Emphasis added. i Yukio Takasu, the Permanent Representative of the Japanese Mission at the UN, and Kenzou Oshima, the former Permanent Representative of the Japanese Mission at the UN, also supported my research with written endorsements. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in Afghanistan, and the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) in Afghanistan gave me special cooperation to accomplish this research. I also appreciate cooperation by Japan embassy in Kabul, including Hideo Sato, the Japanese ambassador in Afghanistan. I sincerely thank precious advice from Fatemeh Ziai, the former acting director of the best practices unit at the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and current director of the integrated training unit at DPKO. I am also extremely grateful to Dr. Richard Price, Dr. Katharina Coleman, and Dr. Brian Job for their academic supports and advice at UBC. Financially I deeply appreciate the Toyota Foundation, which funded my field research in Afghanistan and Timor Leste. I also would like to send my many thanks to all UN officials, officials in ISAF, and all Afghans who cooperated with my interviews. Thanks to their cooperation, I conducted individual interviews with over 50 international officials, several cabinet members of the Afghan government, 20 central government officials, over 40 local political leaders (such as provincial governors, members of provincial councils, local commanders), and 260 ordinary Afghan citizens who responded to my opinion survey. This paper reflects the views of the author and does not represent the policies of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations or of the United Nations or the Government of Japan. I hope that my research and reports can make some contribution to ongoing efforts for peacebuilding in Afghanistan as well as future peacebuilding efforts in the world. ii Table of Contents Preface and Acknowledgments .................................................................................................. i Executive Summary .................................................................................................................. 1 Introduction (Hypothesis and Methods) Key Recommendations Lessons From the Past Conclusion Chapter 1: How to Assess Legitimacy Construction in Peacebuilding ................................... 10 What is Legitimacy? Its Application to Peacebuilding What are Critical Factors in Constructing Legitimacy? What Are Processes to Establish Legitimate Governments or Erode Them? What Should Be Investigated? Examining Afghan Peacebuilding How General Are the Research Findings? Chapter 2: Why Comply or Not Comply? Analysis of Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups ................................................................................................................................... 19 Background: DDR and DIAG in Afghanistan Reasons for Compliance: Examining DIAG in Kapisa Province Reasons for Noncompliance: Examining Jalrez District in Wardak Province Recommendations for DIAG Chapter 3: Reconciliation ........................................................................................................ 33 Background: Worsening Security and Hope for Reconciliation Who Are the Taliban? Two Different Views Who Can Be Targets for the Reconciliation? The Problems of the Current Reconciliation Program Recommendations for Reconciliation Chapter 4: Resource Distribution (Government Service) and Local Ownership .................... 43 Background: Request for Local Ownership and Concern About Corruption Examining the Community Development Council (CDC) Projects and Their Impacts Problem of CDC Projects Recommendations Chapter 5: Lesson from the Past in Afghanistan: Missed Opportunities? .............................. 49 Reconciliation With the Taliban in 2002 or 2003 Massive Economic Projects to Improve Living Conditions in the First 6 Months Creating a Much Simpler Electoral System iii Role of the UN: UN Peacekeepers in Afghanistan? Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 56 Appendix 1: Results of Opinion Survey in Afghanistan in June 2008 ................................... 58 Appendix 2: Graphs: Hypothesis on Constructing Domestic Legitimacy in Peacebuilding .. 68 Appendix 3: Acronyms ........................................................................................................... 69 Bibliography ............................................................................................................................ 70 iv Executive Summary Introduction (Hypothesis and Methods) The purpose of this research is to address the question, ―what are effective policies for international and domestic peacebuilders to create domestic legitimacy in the process of peacebuilding?‖ In other words, the research seeks effective policies for peacebuilders to create ―legitimate governments,‖ under which a majority of people comply with the rules of government in voluntary mode. Legitimacy is defined as power to pull compliance in a voluntary mode, not by coercion.2 In order to examine this question, I hypothesize five key factors that might have critical impacts on constructing the legitimacy of newly created governments in war-torn states; those five factors can be largely influenced by international actors who are involved in peacebuilding activities. (1) Role of the UN (2) Inclusiveness (Reconciliation) (3) Local ownership (4) Resource distribution (Peace dividend) (5) Use of force The hypothesis of my research is that these five factors influence the compliance or noncompliance with key political developments, such as elections, constitutions, and disarmament of military factions, which are key components in the peacebuilding process. And repeated compliance with these political developments will enhance the creation of legitimate governments; on the other hand, repeated noncompliance will erode the legitimacy of governments (see Appendix 2). In my hypothesis, there is one intermediate factor between these five factors and compliance behaviors: the “credibility as impartial,” which peacebuilders should create and enhance. For example, when domestic factions perceive that peacebuilders are credible, fair, and impartial, it is more likely that domestic factions will participate in elections and accept their results, as they
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