The ANSO Report (16-30 June 2012)
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
CONFIDENTIAL— NGO use only No copy, forward or sale © INSO 2012 Issue 100 REPORT 16‐30 June 2012 Index COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 1-5 Amidst sustained AOG activity country-wide, targets, and an additional 8% consisting of Northern Region 6-10 an infantry team of seven AOG operatives - roadside IED detonations and/or premature 11-13 including two with BBIED vests - attacked a detonations that were likely intended to target Western Region leisure hotel on Lake Qargha (Kabul), killing 15 the same. However, the inherent nature of Eastern Region 14-18 civilians in the process, and taking over 60 hos- increased AOG activity that occurs each sum- tages. The incident appeared to perform a mer directly correlates with an increased possi- Southern Region 19-22 number of important functions for the AOG, bility that civilians will find themselves collater- 23 firstly it demonstrated that AOG have the abil- ally involved in a kinetic event, and this period ANSO Info Page ity to strike anytime and anywhere, secondly it demonstrated that the NGO community is not nurtured perceptions of insecurity in the capital immune to that dynamic. – consistent with the “do less but accomplish The total volume of NGO incidents this period HIGHLIGHTS enough” strategy that AOG have employed doubled from that of the previous cycle, result- country-wide, and lastly it served as a live fire ing in a total of 15 for the month. While signif- Complex AOG Attack hostage taking exercise – albeit against a soft icant, this number demonstrated no increase at Lake Qargha in Ka- target - to observe IMF/ANSF tactical proce- from the total recorded in May, and remained bul dures. considerably below that of June 2011 Despite this, AOG initiated activity in June (27). This pattern mirrors the reported vol- Sustained AOG activi- 2012 remained significantly below that of 2011, umes of AOG authored incidents between the ty country-wide with the 996 AOG authored incidents approxi- three compared periods (May 2012, June 2012, mately equal to that of May, but contrasting 10 NGO-Direct Inci- and June 2011) as noted above. This is logical, significantly to the 1744 recorded in June as NGO incidents commonly plateau during dents including 3 in 2011. However, the percentage of AOG at- Ghor the summer months due to increased NGO tacks involving BBIEDs, SVBIEDs, and com- exposure to conflict and crime. To that point, plex attacks—which combine to represent one seven of the 10 NGO incidents recorded this way of considering how AOG deploy signifi- period were attributed to the armed opposi- cant assets—almost doubled that of June 2011. tion. While the most notable involved two This month, those three tactics combined to ANSO is supported by INGO compounds that got caught up in an account for 1.5% of all AOG authored inci- AOG attack on the DAC in Ghor, and were dents, whereas in June 2011, the nearly identi- subsequently looted, most of the AOG au- cal 12 incidents accounted for only 0.7%. The thored incidents involved intimidation, with fact that the deployment of such attacks have IEDs detonating near NGO vehicles or NGO not decreased in equal proportion to the de- staff approached, stopped, or called to be ques- crease in overall AOG activity illustrates an tioned about their programming and/or affilia- economy of military effort, and that AOGs tions. The data support the analysis that such understand the weighted importance of occa- AOG stance towards NGOs is context-specific sional spectacular attacks in creating a strong and most commonly mirrors local AOG at- narrative of sustained opposition activity. tempts at shaping their areas of operations ra- The deployment of AOG assets against a pri- ther than being an expression of an active marily soft target in Qargha does not detract AOG stance against NGO presence. Balancing from the fact that the vast majority of AOG NGO exposure against risk-benefit thresholds authored incidents expressly engage hard tar- becomes of critical importance during the sum- gets, with over 85% of all AOG operations this mer months as further violence on NGOs can month directly targeting GOA, IMF, or ANSF be expected to correlate with the peak of kinet- ic activity in the field. ANSO is a project of the International NGO Safety Organisation (INSO), a registered charity in England & Wales no.1140276 and a company limited by guarantee no.7496737 THE ANSO REPORT Page 1 C ENTRAL REGION NGO Incidents KABUL K ABUL Year to Date 9 50 This Report Period 1 Kabul City was home to the only 40 NGO incident in the central re- executing just over a dozen men 30 gion during the second half of inside as they took control of the 20 June, an incident which was con- hotel. This also involved the sei- 10 zure of roughly 60 hostages, be- sistent with the primary threat 0 profile faced by the NGO com- fore the remaining five operatives munity in the national capital. As (the two BBIEDs having killed an international NGO staff mem- themselves on the approach) ber was waiting outside her guest- holed up in preparation for the KABUL AOG KABUL Crime house during the daytime of the ANSF response, which arrived decade’. While real levels of both foreign at- 24th, a man approached her and roughly 20 minutes later. forcibly pulled her bag from her At 0900 hrs. the morning after the tendance and such activities at Qargha are sig- shoulder, before running to a col- attack, approximately 21 hostages nificantly lower than implied in the IEA’s league waiting on a nearby motor- escaped via the lake, although one statement, the inclusion of NGOs in their bike, who helped the thief escape hostage who could not swim statement, and their willingness to conduct from the scene. A similar incident drowned. The security forces such an attack against an ultimately social tar- occurred in December 2011, just a managed to kill the last of the get, is concerning. few streets away in Kart-e Seh, AOG operatives by roughly 1130 and more widely, such motorcy- hrs., before clearing the hotel to However, some qualifications to this are im- cle-bound robberies are a com- ensure that none had remained portant to note. First, such anti-NGO state- mon tactic used by petty crimi- alive. ments are inconsistent with the general ac- nals, whether they are targeting Some days later, the IEA issued ceptance of NGOs at the field level across pedestrians or vehicles, and most an uncharacteristically long writ- most of the country, and are more about indi- often occur to individuals openly displaying assets that appear valu- ten justification for the attack; in cating their opposition to the specific practice able. it, they stated that they had carried of proselytizing than about NGOs per se, While not affecting the NGO out surveillance on Qargha more whose programs and projects are often actively community directly, the complex generally, and had seen Afghans, welcomed by the armed opposition (see attack that took place at Lake both civilian and governmental, Nangarhar in this report for an example). Fur- Qargha on the 21st/22nd was far engaged in what they perceived to thermore, such targeting is likely to remain and away the most violent security be immoral activities, such as al- very rare, as the armed opposition remains event of the fortnight. A total of seven AOG infantry operatives, cohol consumption and prostitu- sensitive to popular backlash against their including two BBIED operatives, tion. Moreover, they asserted that more civilian casualty-heavy attacks; one such stormed the Spogmai Hotel, the many foreigners had also been attack over the medium term is enough to largest such hotel at Qargha, late seen engaged in these activities – make their point, and as such the next complex on Thursday night during the cel- including NGO employees they attack in the national capital is likely to focus ebration of a wedding. The team claimed to be ‘spreading Christi- on an exclusively military/GOA target. killed three armed guards before anity in the country over the past THE ANSO REPORT Page 2 NGO Incidents WARDAK W ARDAK Year to Date 1 60 This Report Period 0 50 Insecurity in Wardak continued along the same vein as the previ- BBIED operative approaching the 40 ous period, with conflict incidents facility was identified and then 30 focused on the Kabul-Ghazni shot and killed by Afghan soldiers 20 highway, the Jalrez district road before he could detonate his vest. 10 and the Chak district center and This was only the second instance 0 surrounding area. However, what of a BBIED attack in Wardak’s was noticeable was not the form conflict history, and like the first it of incidents, but rather their vol- failed; this indicates that such at- WARDAK AOG WARDAK Crime ume; total opposition-authored tacks are most likely operational But most tangibly, a pressure plate IED kinetic events more than doubled spillover from the Ghazni conflict (PPIED) detonated against an ANA vehicle on over the previous period, with next door - where it was later con- a secondary road in the Ambokhak area, killing particular expansion in Chak and firmed that the operative was sent two soldiers, in the latest in a series of deadly Jaghatu. As such, while Wardak from. IED strikes across the province – whose continues to be secondary to Also significant was an armed armed opposition has a particularly effective Ghazni in terms of AOG strategic attack on the provincial gover- level of IED expertise. In Jalrez, a PPIED focus, the lower-than-average inci- nor’s convoy in Nirkh’s Sur Pul struck an ANA vehicle in the Ismail Khel area dent volumes seen so far this year area, which failed in its objective on the main district road, injuring two soldiers, are starting to give way to a more to sustain any casualties, while the while in Mullah Khel, just west of Maidan typical conflict dynamic in the most casualty-heavy incident was Shahr, an ambush of an ANP convoy killed a province.