DOCSLIB.ORG

Dry Spell Rapid Needs Assessment INDIA

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Dry Spell Rapid Needs Assessment INDIA AFGHANISTAN CRS AFGHANISTAN | APRIL 2018 IRAN PAKISTAN Dry Spell Rapid Needs Assessment INDIA A farmer with his family. When crops fail, families cope by reducing the size and number of their meals. Photo by Nikki Gamer/CRS Introduction In early 2018, CRS1 became concerned about and Agriculture Cluster—indicated rainfall to date the potential impact of a prolonged dry spell on was 30 percent of normal. Satellite data showed that communities in which it conducts activities in the almost all provinces were experiencing a precipitation provinces of Bamyan, Daykundi, Ghor and Herat. deficit when compared to data from the same period A review of secondary data from key sources—including in the previous decade. With significant deficits, the the Famine Early Warning Systems Network, and four provinces are particularly at risk: Bamyan (30% of accumulated precipitation maps from the Food Security average) Daykundi (25%), Ghor (27%) and Herat (24%). DATA FROM KEY SOURCES—INCLUDING THE FAMINE EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS NETWORK AND THE FOOD SECURITY AND AGRICULTURE 30% CLUSTER—INDICATES RAINFALL TO DATE IS 30 PERCENT OF NORMAL. 1. Since 2006, CRS has helped vulnerable families in Afghanistan meet their food and income needs through agricultural livelihoods programming. CRS implements livelihoods programming across four provinces: Bamyan, Daykundi, Ghor and Herat. With the goal of enhancing food and financial security, CRS implements interventions that focus on improving natural resource management, water quality and management, agricultural production and livestock management, as well as harnessing market opportunities. CRS also supports Savings and Internal Lending Communities (SILC) for men and women. Major rapid needs assessment findings The dry spell will impact pastureland and, The impact of the dry spell on irrigated consequently, livestock—both critical crops will depend on the type of water assets. Even good future rain will provide source a village has access to and when only a few months of grass and cannot the source of irrigated water will fail. compensate for fodder loss. The few sporadic spring rains to date have Rainfed crops are entirely ? not penetrated the ground. The severity of dependent on future rainfall. the dry spell will depend on whether there are good rains between March and June. 93% of households 100% of households believe they will run believe they will run 93% out of food 100% out of water Methodology Lal district is at 2,800 meters (9,200 feet). Results CRS conducted a rapid needs assessment (RNA) that remain mostly disaggregated to account for the included 18 key informant interviews (mostly shura heterogeneity of the districts surveyed. members and water mayors) and 156 household surveys in the following locations: Due to climate, Herat farmers do not grow Bamyan Province potatoes, opting to mostly plant irrigation-fed wheat and/or vegetables. Central Highlands • Yakawlang District • Dar-e Chast District farmers in Bamyan and Chaghcharan are more Daykundi Province likely to grow potatoes (the major cash crop) • Sang-e Takht District and rainfed wheat (the major staple), while those in Daykundi prefer to plant potatoes and Ghor Province irrigated wheat. While all surveyed communities • Lal District • Chaghcharan District predominantly maintain their livelihoods through a combination of livestock and crop production, Herat Province surveyed districts tended to depend more on • Adraskan District crops, with the exception of Adraskan, which • Karukh District depended more on livestock. In these districts, the assessment considered proximity to water source (near versus far) and In Daykundi, respondents and CRS staff indicated slope position (north-facing versus south-facing) to that at least a portion of the province was already capture the influence of agroecological differences facing food insecurity due to crop and animal on potential drought impact. The assessment focused fodder/feed failure in 2017. If spring rains come, on farmer perception of the dry spell’s progress to livestock farmers here will be better positioned for date and the impact it may have on water supply, the coming months; yet, with over half the district’s principal crops (wheat in Herat, wheat and potatoes wheat dependent on irrigation, and the need for in the Central Highlands) and livestock, as well as the irrigated water for potatoes and fruit trees, there is perceived future implications of the dry spell on the a current and acute need to improve food security. next wheat harvest (August 2018). Additionally, Herat districts may be in a state of crisis as early as late April or May. At a much Notably, the assessment did not distinguish between lower elevation and largely dependent on irrigated wheat varieties (spring versus winter) or type (irrigated wheat, the lack of precipitation has resulted in versus rainfed); therefore, all responses align to the many farmers opting out of this planting season. crop most commonly grown by those communities. The higher altitude provinces of Bamyan and Demographic differences among respondents Daykundi perceived themselves to be most The districts in which CRS conducted its assessment insulated from the lack of rainfall and snowmelt. vary markedly, particularly in terms of topography and In contrast to the Herat farmers, farmers in the elevation: the two Herat districts are at an altitude of Central Highlands were preparing their fields, as 920 meters (3,000 feet), whereas the mountainous usual, in anticipation of the spring rains. 2 CRS AFGHANISTAN | DRY SPELL RAPID NEEDS ASSESSMENT Farmer perceptions of the probability of a complete or partial failure of major crops during 2018 harvest Potato crop failure Wheat crop failure Complete Partial % failure Complete Partial % failure failure failure if partial failure failure if partial Bamyan 11% 89% 52% Bamyan 6% 94% 46% Daykundi 25% 75% 48% Daykundi 17% 83% 56% Ghor 38% 56% 57% Ghor 21% 77% 60% Herat NA NA NA Herat 50% 50% 55% Potato is a very water-intensive crop. Wheat is less Coping mechanisms demanding, but requires water at critical times. Afghanistan has been affected by many dry spells Therefore, CRS sought to understand whether and droughts in its recent history. Unsurprisingly, respondents were planning to plant alternative respondents identified several potential coping crops in case potato or wheat failed or was not mechanisms they might employ if their harvests feasible. Preference for various crops seemed are lower than expected. The most common were: to differ widely across provinces and elevations. reduce feed to livestock (87% of respondents); sell Barley, for example, was the most prevalent choice assets (87%); take loans (86%); reduce the size in the lower altitude districts in Herat, and in of meals (81%); migration (62%); and withdraw Chaghcharan. Vetch, used for fodder, and mung children from school (53%). bean, were more commonly selected at higher altitudes. As surveyed communities were on average located far from markets and producing Results of water shortage primarily for household consumption, proximity When asked how they thought the lack of water to markets was not seen to have influenced the would affect their household, the most common alternative crop preference. answers were: malnutrition, particularly among children; migration of the male household head to If enough spring rain doesn’t fall, find work (increasing the likelihood of a vulnerable head of household); food shortages; an increase the water necessary for a successful in illnesses; shortages of water for drinking and harvest of irrigated crops will be farming/livestock; and children forced to leave insufficient in most locations. school or sent to work. Percentage of alternative crop preferences, by district 100% 50% 0% Adraskan Karukh Chaghcharan Lal Sang-e Takht Yakawlang Dar-e Chast (Herat) (Herat) (Ghor) (Ghor) (Daykundi) (Bamyan) (Bamyan) Barley Clover Mung bean Vetch 3 CRS AFGHANISTAN | DRY SPELL RAPID NEEDS ASSESSMENT Prognoses Scenario 1: If adequate spring rains occur as usual Scenario 2: If spring rains do not occur as usual • The dry spell will impact livestock and irrigated crops. • Afghanistan will likely enter a period of official drought, with grave impacts on livestock, crop production, and • There will be less livestock pasture than is usually food and water security. available and likely be insufficient fodder for the winter months. Animals will need to forage farther and • Livestock will likely run out of pastureland within households travel farther to collect winter fodder and 2 months on south-facing slopes and within 4 months on fuel wood, increasing rangeland degradation. north-facing slopes. • Fodder prices should normalize in the short to medium • As market prices for animal feed and livestock are term, but market prices will likely revert to being higher reportedly already distorted, these will likely persist in a for fodder and lower for livestock as pasture diminishes way that is disadvantageous to herders, and households later in the year. These changes could result in livestock will likely need to sell animals at extremely low prices. owners being forced to sell their animals at lower prices. • The water necessary for a successful harvest of irrigated crops will be insufficient in most locations. CRS estimates • All rainfed crops should be fine. that, except for communities near a large water source, • Even with rain, irrigated wheat crops in Herat are not there will be total failure or significantly lower crop likely
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Progress in Afghanistan Bucharest Summit2-4 April 2008 Progress in Afghanistan
    © MOD NL © MOD Canada © MOD Canada Progress in Afghanistan Progress in Bucharest Summit 2-4 April 2008 Bucharest Summit2-4 Progress in Afghanistan Contents page 1. Foreword by Assistant Secretary General for Public Diplomacy, ..........................1 Jean-François Bureau, and NATO Spokesman, James Appathurai 2. Executive summary .........................................................................................................................................2 3. Security ..................................................................................................................................................................... 4 • IED attacks and Counter-IED efforts 4 • Musa Qala 5 • Operations Medusa successes - Highlights Panjwayi and Zhari 6 • Afghan National Army 8 • Afghan National Police 10 • ISAF growth 10 4. Reconstruction and Development ............................................................................................... 12 • Snapshots of PRT activities 14 • Afghanistan’s aviation sector: taking off 16 • NATO-Japan Grant Assistance for Grassroots Projects 17 • ISAF Post-Operations Humanitarian Relief Fund 18 • Humanitarian Assistance - Winterisation 18 5. Governance ....................................................................................................................................................... 19 • Counter-Narcotics 20 © MOD Canada Foreword The NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission is approaching five years of operations in Afghanistan. This report is a
    [Show full text]
  • 26 August 2010
    SIOC – Afghanistan: UNITED NATIONS CONFIDENTIAL UN Department of Safety and Security, Afghanistan Security Situation Report, Week 34, 20 – 26 August 2010 JOINT WEEKLY SECURITY ANALYSIS Countrywide security incidents continued to increase compared to the previous week with the NER, NR, SR and SER, recording higher levels of security incidents. In the ER a minor downward trend continues to be observed over the last three weeks, in the WR and CR records dropped. The dynamics along the south and south-eastern belt of the country vary again with the SR reasserting as the most volatile area. Security incidents were more widespread countrywide with the following provinces being the focus of the week: Kunduz, Baghlan in the NER; Faryab in the NR, Hirat in the WR, Kandahar and Helmand in the SR; Ghazni and Paktika in the SER and Kunar in the ER. Overall the majority of the incidents are initiated by insurgents and those related to armed conflict – armed clashes, IED attacks and stand off attacks - continue to account for the bulk of incidents. Reports of insurgents’ infiltration, re-supply and propaganda are recorded in the NR, SR, SER, ER and CR. These reports might corroborate assumptions that insurgents would profit from the Ramadan time to build up for an escalation into the election and pre-election days. The end of the week was dominated by the reporting of the violent demonstration against the IM base in Qala-i-Naw city following a shoot out at the entrance of the base. Potential for manipulation by the local Taliban and the vicinity of the UN compound to the affected area raised concerns on the security of the UN staff and resulted in the evacuation of the UN building.
    [Show full text]
  • Afghanistan Agricultural Strategy
    TC:TCP/AFG/4552 FINAL DRAFT TECHNICAL COOPERATION PROGRAMME PROMOTION OF AGRICULTURAL REHABILITATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES FOR AFGHANISTAN AFGHANISTAN AGRICULTURAL STRATEGY THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN prepared by FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS Rome January 1997 AFGHANISTAN VERSITY I NR II II I I II 111111 3 ACKU 00006806 3 TC:TCP/AFG/4552 FINAL DRAFT TECHNICAL COOPERATION PROGRAMME PROMOTION OF AGRICULTURAL REHABILITATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES FOR AFGHANISTAN AFGHANISTAN AGRICULTURAL STRATEGY THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN prepared by FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS Rome January 1997 Printed at: PanGraphics (Pvt) Ltd. Islamabad. CONTENTS Page FOREWORD 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 1. INTRODUCTION 5 1.1 Background 5 1.2 Assistance to Agriculture 6 1.3 Strategy Development 6 1.4 Constraints 8 1.5 Assumptions 9 1.6 Timing 10 1.7 Strategy Framework 11 2. THE STRATEGY 12 2.1 National Goal 12 2.2 Agricultural Sector Goal 12 2.3 Strategic Priorities 12 2.4 Development Profiles 16 2.4.1 Creating Food Security 16 2.4.2 Increasing Economic and Social Development 21 2.4.3 Raising Skills and Employment 25 2.4.4 Developing Natural Resource Management 29 3. ISSUES 32 3.1 Role of Government 32 3.2 Resource Utilisation 34 3.3 Creating Capacity 35 3.4 Credit 36 3.6 Sustainability 37 4. IMPLEMENTATION 38 4.1 Accurate Data 38 4.2 Delivering Services 38 4.3 Input Supply 39 4.4 Research 39 4.5 Extension and Training 40 4.6 Monitoring and Evaluation 40 4.7 Project Outlines 41 ANNEX 1.
    [Show full text]
  • Pdf | 364.18 Kb
    AFGHANISTAN Weekly Humanitarian Update (28 December 2020 – 3 January 2021) KEY FIGURES IDPs IN 2020 (AS OF 3 JANUARY) 344,750 People displaced by conflict 237,670 Received assistance NATURAL DISASTERS IN 2020 (AS OF 3 JANUARY) 104,470 Number of people affected by natural disasters UNDOCUMENTED RETURNEES Conflict incident IN 2020 (AS OF 19 DECEMBER) Internal displacement 832,630 Returnees from Iran Disruption of services 7,590 Returnees from Pakistan 3,260 Returnees from other South: 8,898 people recommended to receive countries HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE humanitarian assistance PLAN (HRP) REQUIREMENTS & Fighting between Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and a non-state armed FUNDING group (NSAG) continued in Hilmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan and Zabul provinces. 1.13B Sporadic armed clashes continued in Shah Joi, Tarnak Wa Jaldak, Mizan and Requirements (US$) – HRP Arghandab districts in Zabul province. 2020 In Hilmand province, fighting between the ANSF and an NSAG was reported in 554.4M Nahr-e-Saraj, Lashkargah, Nad-e-Ali and Nawa-e-Barakzaiy districts. Airstrikes 49% funded (US$) in 2020 were also reported in Nawa-e-Barakzaiy and Nahr-e-Saraj and clearing operations of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in the same districts are reportedly AFGHANISTAN ongoing. HUMANITARIAN FUND (AHF) 2021 In Kandahar province, the security situation remained volatile mainly in Zheray, Panjwayi, Arghandab, Shah Wali Kot, Arghestan and Shorabak districts. Several 0M roadside IEDs were reportedly discovered and diffused in the Zala Khan area, Contributions (US$) Panjwayi district. The overall presence of IEDs continued to hinder civilian movements. 17.50M In Uruzgan province, the security situation deteriorated in Gizab district with Pledges (US$) ongoing clashes between an NSAG and ANSF.
    [Show full text]
  • AFGHANISTAN: Humanitarian Operational Presence (3W) Western Region (October to December 2018)
    AFGHANISTAN: Humanitarian Operational Presence (3W) Western Region (October to December 2018) All Clusters Ghormach 1 Number of organisations reported Bala per district Murghab 4 1 - 2 Gulran Kushk-e-Kuhna 1 3 - 10 2 Muqur Badghis Ab Charsadra Kushk 6 11 - 20 Kamari 7 > 20 Kohsan 5 5 Jawand 9 Qadis 2 No organisation reported Qala-e-Naw 3 Injil 15 Feroz Koh Karukh Lal Wa 25 5 Dawlatyar 8 Sarjangal Hirat Hirat 5 Obe Chisht-e-Sharif 5 28 2 Ghoryan Pashtun 2 Shahrak 3 Guzara Zarghun Zindajan 5 Ghor 7 11 2 Tolak DoLayna 4 6 Farsi Adraskan 2 3 Saghar Pasaband 1 1 Taywarah 2 Shindand 1 Pur Chaman Khak-e-Safed 1 1 Anar Dara Bala Buluk 2 2 Qala-e-Kah Pushtrod Farah Gulistan 1 1 1 Farah Kabul Shibkoh 9 Bakwa 2 1 Lash-e-Juwayn 2 46 organisations Delivering humanitarian services in October, November and December 2018. Emergency Shelter and Non-Food Items Food Security Health 1 2 2 1 1 3 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 3 5 2 2 1 3 1 1 1 3 1 8 5 4 2 3 1 3 2 2 3 3 4 1 1 1 8 2 4 8 2 1 1 6 1 2 3 1 5 1 2 4 5 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 3 2 2 1 2 13 organisations 19 organisations 6 organisations Nutrition Protection Water, Sanitation and Hygiene 1 1 1 1 4 1 2 2 2 4 7 1 1 2 1 1 6 1 6 9 3 1 4 1 3 1 1 1 1 16 2 1 3 3 2 1 2 2 2 5 1 20 1 1 1 2 6 2 1 1 1 1 5 3 10 organisations 26 organisations 10 organisations Operational Presence is defined as: Organisations with a physical presence on the ground and active in delivering humanitarian assistance in the districts during October, November and December 2018.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 USIP –ADST Afghan Experience Project Interviwe #1 Executive
    USIP –ADST Afghan Experience Project Interviwe #1 Executive Summary The interviewee is a Farsi speaker and retired FSO who has had prior Afghan experience, including working with refugees during the period the Taliban was fighting to take over the country in 1995. He returned to Kabul in 2002 as chief of the political section, although retired, for seven months. He returned in 2003 and worked at the U.S. civil affairs mission in Herat for 6 months. He came back later in 2003 to Afghanistan working for the Asia Foundation. He worked on a PRT for approximately three months in late 2004 in Herat. The American presence was minimal when he got there. Security was excellent and the local warlord, Ismael Khan, was using revenues he siphoned from customs houses into development projects. Shortly after subject arrived in Herat, Khan was ousted in a brief battle by forces loyal to Kabul and with the threat of unrest U.S. forces were increased in the area. Our subject suggested to Khan that he make peace with the Kabul government, and he did, perhaps in part on the advice of subject. The Herat PRT had about one hundred American uniformed troops with three civilians, State, AID, Agriculture. Subject was the political advisor to the civil affairs staff, a reserve unit from Minnesota. But much of their work was soon taken over or undercut by the U.S. military task force commander brought in in response to the ouster of Khan. According to subject, the task force commander in the region saw himself as the political expert.
    [Show full text]
  • “Poppy Free” Provinces: a Measure Or a Target?
    Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit Case Study Series WATER MANAGEMENT, LIVESTOCK AND THE OPIUM ECONOMY “Poppy Free” Provinces: A Measure or a Target? This report is one of seven multi-site case studies undertaken during the second stage of AREU’s three-year study “Applied Thematic Research into Water Management, Livestock and the Opium Economy” (WOL). David Mansfield Funding for this research was provided by the European Commission. May 2009 Editor: Emily Winterbotham Layout: AREU Publications Team © 2009 Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, recording or otherwise without prior written permission of the publisher, the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. Permission can be obtained by emailing [email protected] or by calling (+93)(0)799 608 548. “Poppy Free” Provinces: A Measure or a Target? About the Author David Mansfield is a specialist on development in drugs-producing environments. He has spent 17 years working in coca- and opium-producing countries, with over ten years experience conducting research into the role of opium in rural livelihood strategies in Afghanistan. About the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) is an independent research organisation based in Kabul. AREU’s mission is to conduct high-quality research that informs and influences policy and practice. AREU also actively promotes a culture of research and learning by strengthening analytical capacity in Afghanistan and facilitating reflection and debate. Fundamental to AREU’s vision is that its work should improve Afghan lives.
    [Show full text]
  • (2): Delivering Public Services in Insurgency-Affected Obeh District of Herat Province
    One Land, Two Rules (2): Delivering public services in insurgency-affected Obeh district of Herat province Author : S Reza Kazemi Published: 9 December 2018 Downloaded: 8 December 2018 Download URL: https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/wp-admin/post.php The matter of who governs the district of Obeh in the east of Herat province is complicated: control of the district is divided between the Afghan government and the Taleban, and shifts in unpredictable ways. The inhabitants of the district, usually via the mediation of elders, have had to learn how to deal with both sides. The dual nature of authority in Obeh is exemplified by public service delivery; it is always financed through and administered by the Afghan state but, in areas under Taleban control, it is the insurgents who supervise and monitor delivery. In this, the first of a series of case studies looking at the delivery of services in districts over which the Taleban have control or influence, AAN researcher Said Reza Kazemi investigates the provision of governance and security, education, health, electricity, telecommunications and development projects, and unpacks a dual form of governance. Service Delivery in Insurgent-Affected Areas is a joint research project by the Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN) and the United States Institute of Peace (USIP). For the methodology and literature review, see here. Obeh district: the context 1 / 22 Approximately 100 km to the east of Herat city, linked by mainly non-asphalted roads; mountainous, cut through by fertile Harirud River valley
    [Show full text]
  • THE ANSO REPORT -Not for Copy Or Sale
    The Afghanistan NGO Safety Office Issue: 72 16-30 April 2011 ANSO and our donors accept no liability for the results of any activity conducted or omitted on the basis of this report. THE ANSO REPORT -Not for copy or sale- Inside this Issue COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 2 The IEA announced the ini- salary lines, banks, demon- A second, equally lethal 5 Northern Region tiation of their ‘Spring Offen- stration, arbakai shura and effective trend that has Western Region 10 sive’ on April 29th, an event meetings and shops but we developed in line with the that occurs an a yearly basis will need to monitor the previous, is the surgical Eastern Region 14 and is generally intended as a target pattern closely to targeting of key leadership Southern Region 20 strategic statement regarding fully understand this scope (military, political, and ci- their goals, methodology, as of this term. When taken in vilian) with suicide attacks. 27 ANSO Info Page well as guidance to their lead- conjunction with the in- Of note, this trend, when ership though is also an ele- struction to deliver coupled with the above, ment of their wider infor- “meticulous military plans” proves to be particular dif- YOU NEED TO KNOW mation operations plan. The however we would stop ficult to mitigate for the operation, known as ‘Badar’, short of seeing it as carte target groups, as seen in • IEA announces spring offen- while short on tactical details, blanche to attack any place the penetration of the sive, Operation Badar contains a few comments of that targets recreate or gath- MoD this period in Kabul.
    [Show full text]
  • Afghan Opiate Trade 2009.Indb
    ADDICTION, CRIME AND INSURGENCY The transnational threat of Afghan opium UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME Vienna ADDICTION, CRIME AND INSURGENCY The transnational threat of Afghan opium Copyright © United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), October 2009 Acknowledgements This report was prepared by the UNODC Studies and Threat Analysis Section (STAS), in the framework of the UNODC Trends Monitoring and Analysis Programme/Afghan Opiate Trade sub-Programme, and with the collaboration of the UNODC Country Office in Afghanistan and the UNODC Regional Office for Central Asia. UNODC field offices for East Asia and the Pacific, the Middle East and North Africa, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, Southern Africa, South Asia and South Eastern Europe also provided feedback and support. A number of UNODC colleagues gave valuable inputs and comments, including, in particular, Thomas Pietschmann (Statistics and Surveys Section) who reviewed all the opiate statistics and flow estimates presented in this report. UNODC is grateful to the national and international institutions which shared their knowledge and data with the report team, including, in particular, the Anti Narcotics Force of Pakistan, the Afghan Border Police, the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan and the World Customs Organization. Thanks also go to the staff of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and of the United Nations Department of Safety and Security, Afghanistan. Report Team Research and report preparation: Hakan Demirbüken (Lead researcher, Afghan
    [Show full text]
  • Report 2013–1124
    Prepared in cooperation with the Afghan Geological Survey under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Defense Task Force for Business and Stability Operations Topographic and Hydrographic GIS Datasets for the Afghan Geological Survey and U.S. Geological Survey 2013 Mineral Areas of Interest Open-File Report 2013–1124 U.S. Department of the Interior U.S. Geological Survey Cover: Photo showing mountainous terrain and the alluvial floodplain of a small tributary in the upper reaches of the Kabul River Basin located northeast of Kabul Afghanistan, 2004 (Photograph by Peter G. Chirico, U.S. Geological Survey). Topographic and Hydrographic GIS Datasets for the Afghan Geological Survey and U.S. Geological Survey 2013 Mineral Areas of Interest By Brittany N. Casey and Peter G. Chirico Open-File Report 2013–1124 U.S. Department of the Interior U.S. Geological Survey U.S. Department of the Interior SALLY JEWELL, Secretary U.S. Geological Survey Suzette M. Kimball, Acting Director U.S. Geological Survey, Reston, Virginia: 2013 For more information on the USGS—the Federal source for science about the Earth, its natural and living resources, natural hazards, and the environment, visit http://www.usgs.gov or call 1–888–ASK–USGS. For an overview of USGS information products, including maps, imagery, and publications, visit http://www.usgs.gov/pubprod To order this and other USGS information products, visit http://store.usgs.gov Any use of trade, product, or firm names is for descriptive purposes only and does not imply endorsement by the U.S. Government. Although this report is in the public domain, permission must be secured from the individual copyright owners to reproduce any copyrighted materials contained within this report.
    [Show full text]
  • LAND RELATIONS in BAMYAN PROVINCE Findings from a 15 Village Case Study
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Research Papers in Economics Case Studies Series LAND RELATIONS IN BAMYAN PROVINCE Findings from a 15 village case study Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit By Liz Alden Wily February 2004 Funding for this study was provided by the European Commission, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and the governments of Sweden and Switzerland. © 2004 The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU). All rights reserved. This case study report was prepared by an independent consultant. The views and opinions expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of AREU. About the Author Liz Alden Wily is an independent political economist specialising in rural property issues and in the promotion of common property rights and devolved systems for land administration in particular. She gained her PhD in the political economy of land tenure in 1988 from the University of East Anglia, United Kingdom. Since the 1970s, she has worked for ten third world governments, variously providing research, project design, implementation and policy guidance. Dr. Alden Wily has been closely involved in recent years in the strategic and legal reform of land and forest administration in a number of African states. In 2002 the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit invited Dr. Alden Wily to examine land ownership problems in Afghanistan, and she continues to return to follow up on particular concerns. About the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) is an independent research organisation that conducts and facilitates action-oriented research and learning that informs and influences policy and practice.
    [Show full text]