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1303E Land II CS Feb 2013.Indd Land,Land, People,People, andand thethe StateState inin Afghanistan:Afghanistan 20022002 -- 20122012 Liz Alden Wily Liz Alden Wily European Commission Case Study Series Land, People, and the State in Afghanistan: 2002 - 2012 Liz Alden Wily Funding for this research was provided by the United States Institute of Peace February 2013 2013 Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit Editing: Sradda Thapa Layout: Sradda Thapa and Nader Jalali Cover Photography: Village representatives from Deh Naw, Nishar, and Zohrab meet and agree to close pastures to commercial bush cutters in Yakawlang District, Bamyan Province, by Liz Alden Wily. AREU Publication Code: 1303E AREU Publication Type: Case Study © 2013 Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. Some rights reserved. This publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted only for non-commercial purposes and with written credit to AREU and the author. Where this publication is reproduced, stored or transmitted electronically, a link to AREU’s website (www.areu.org.af) should be provided. Any use of this publication falling outside of these permissions requires prior written permission of the publisher, the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. Permission can be sought by emailing [email protected] or by calling +93 (0) 799 608 548. iv Alden Wily Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit 2013 About the Author Liz Alden Wily (PhD) is a political economist specialising in land tenure and land administration reform in non-industrial states. She combines advisory work for governments, international agencies, non-government organisations and think tanks, with development work, leading transformational land projects in the field, and undertaking research. She has worked on land issues in Afghanistan on a recurrent basis since 2002, including for AREU. About the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) is an independent research institute based in Kabul. AREU’s mission is to inform and influence policy and practice through conducting high- quality, policy-relevant research, and actively disseminating the results, and to promote a culture of research and learning. To achieve its mission AREU engages with policymakers, civil society, researchers and students to promote their use of AREU’s research and its library, to strengthen their research capacity, and to create opportunities for analysis, reflection, and debate. AREU was established in 2002 by the assistance community working in Afghanistan and has a board of directors with representation from donors, the United Nations and other multilateral agencies, and non-governmental organisations. AREU currently receives core funds from the governments of Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland. Specific projects in 2012 were funded by the European Commission (EC), the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UN Women, and the United States Institute of Peace (USIP). The embassies of the Netherlands, Sweden, and Finland also supported research projects in 2012. Land, People, and the State in Afghanistan: 2002 - 2012 v 2013 Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit Acknowledgements I am grateful to AREU, and to USIP as donor, for the opportunity to undertake this study. I am profoundly grateful to Haji Mohammad Yasin Safar, the former head of the Cadastral Survey Department, who helped me to collect information in Kabul, including data, which is otherwise difficult to secure. Haji Safar is well known and has been an invaluable guide to land researchers and other actors in the sector since the 1960s. Haji Safar has also provided indispensable assistance to several donor-funded projects since 2003. Without his efforts, land documents would not have been systematised in the Court Archives, nor would have key changes been made to the land titling procedure. Since 2002, Haji Safar and I have shared a keen interest in seeing more popularly based land governance evolve. The knowledge, contributions and reflections of Haji Safar have greatly enriched this review. I also thank Royce Wiles who worked at AREU as the Coordinator of Information Resources for many years setting up an extraordinary archive and library of Afghanistan materials. In supervising this research, Royce provided unstinting support. I am deeply grateful for his professionalism and friendship. I also thank Mir Ahmad Joyenda, Deputy Director of Communications and Advocacy, who I first met in AREU in 2002. Joyenda continues to smooth the way for researchers struggling to get access to officials and politicians. Warm thanks are also due to Sradda Thapa, Senior Publications Officer, who has laboured tirelessly to bring this paper into publication. Finally, I thank the reviewers for their helpful comments, all of which I hope have been adequately taken into account in this paper. Liz Alden Wily December 2012 vi Alden Wily Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit 2013 Table of Contents Executive Summary ......................................................................................3 1. Introduction ........................................................................................ 10 1.1 Purpose ..................................................................................... 10 1.2 Bias and Focus ............................................................................ 10 2. Land Relations in 2001 ........................................................................... 12 2.1 The land resource ....................................................................... 12 2.2 Farm distribution ........................................................................ 15 2.3 Land administration ..................................................................... 17 2.4 Land law .................................................................................. 23 2.5 Land policy ............................................................................... 24 2.6 Land confl ict in 2001 .................................................................... 28 3. The Early Years: 2002-2004 ..................................................................... 29 3.1 Restitution as focal strategy ........................................................... 30 3.2 Asserting presidential control .......................................................... 32 3.3 Making land available to investors .....................................................34 3.4 Looking back, not forward .............................................................. 35 3.5 External infl uence ....................................................................... 36 4. Towards Reform: 2005-2012 ......................................................................38 4.1 Donor-driven Change .....................................................................38 4.2 Keeping track ............................................................................. 38 4.3 New National Land Policy ............................................................... 39 4.4 New land law ............................................................................. 41 4.5 The Land Management Law ............................................................. 43 4.6 The Land Expropriation Law ............................................................ 46 5. Governing Land..................................................................................... 53 5.1 A focus on the commercial land sector ............................................... 53 5.2 From AMLAK to ARAZI ....................................................................55 5.3 Uncertain steps towards devolutionary land governance ..........................57 5.4 Regularisation of informal urban settlements ....................................... 60 5.5 Community based land governance in rural areas .................................. 62 6. The Rangeland Issue ...............................................................................70 6.1 Rangeland tenure ........................................................................ 70 6.2 Letting the Kuchi-Hazara issue fester ................................................. 76 6.3 Back to sedentarisation ................................................................ 79 6.4 Lands for returnees and IDPs ...........................................................80 6.5 Poised for minor tenure reform ..................................................... 83 7. The State, Land Grabbing, and Land Confl icts ................................................ 87 7.1 Use and abuse of power .................................................................87 7.2 Self-interest and land grabbing ........................................................ 87 7.3 The possibly rising tide of land disputes .............................................. 89 Land, People, and the State in Afghanistan: 2002 - 2012 vii 2013 Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit 8. So what changed during the decade? ...........................................................93 8.1 Looking on the bright side .............................................................. 93 8.2 The harsher realities ..................................................................... 94 8.3 Structural failures ........................................................................95 8.4 Demise of social responsibility .........................................................97 8.5 A failure of democratisation ............................................................97
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