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LAND RELATIONS in BAMYAN PROVINCE Findings from a 15 Village Case Study

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LAND RELATIONS in BAMYAN PROVINCE Findings from a 15 Village Case Study View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Research Papers in Economics Case Studies Series LAND RELATIONS IN BAMYAN PROVINCE Findings from a 15 village case study Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit By Liz Alden Wily February 2004 Funding for this study was provided by the European Commission, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and the governments of Sweden and Switzerland. © 2004 The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU). All rights reserved. This case study report was prepared by an independent consultant. The views and opinions expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of AREU. About the Author Liz Alden Wily is an independent political economist specialising in rural property issues and in the promotion of common property rights and devolved systems for land administration in particular. She gained her PhD in the political economy of land tenure in 1988 from the University of East Anglia, United Kingdom. Since the 1970s, she has worked for ten third world governments, variously providing research, project design, implementation and policy guidance. Dr. Alden Wily has been closely involved in recent years in the strategic and legal reform of land and forest administration in a number of African states. In 2002 the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit invited Dr. Alden Wily to examine land ownership problems in Afghanistan, and she continues to return to follow up on particular concerns. About the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) is an independent research organisation that conducts and facilitates action-oriented research and learning that informs and influences policy and practice. AREU also actively promotes a culture of research and learning by strengthening analytical capacity in Afghanistan and by creating opportunities for analysis, thought and debate. Fundamental to AREU’s vision is that its work should improve Afghan lives. AREU was established by the assistance community working in Afghanistan and has a board of directors with representation from donors, UN and multilateral organisation agencies and non- governmental organisations (NGOs). Current funding for the AREU has been provided by the European Commission (EC), the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the governments of Sweden and Switzerland. Acknowledgements In Afghanistan, no fieldwork is undertaken without the support of non-government organisations, often the only external actors at the community level and highly knowledgeable as to local situations. This author is particularly grateful to the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN) in Bamyan; to Oxfam, in Panjab District; and to Solidarités, also operating in the province. These agencies were extremely generous with their hospitality and guidance. I wish to express my gratitude to their staff and give special thanks to the local directors of their operations, Karim Merchant of AKDN and Shah Wali of Oxfam. I am also very grateful for the excellent assistance of Said Mohammad Azam as interpreter and who, together with our driver, Haji Aman of AREU, served as very amicable travel companions in the Hindu Kush. Warm thanks are also due to AREU staff Kathleen Campbell for excellent backup, and to Christina Bennett, Tom Muller and Brandy Bauer for their editorial inputs. Table of Contents MAP OF AFGHANISTAN: LOCATION OF BAMYAN PROVINCE ............................ i GLOSSARY....................................................................................... ii I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 1 METHODOLOGY ...........................................................................................2 II. BACKGROUND ............................................................................. 4 GENERAL INFORMATION ...................................................................................4 Bamyan as the Centre of Hazarajat.............................................................7 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW....................................................................................8 1880-1901: The Dispossession of the Hazara ..................................................8 1901-1978: Barely Making Amends ............................................................ 10 1979-1995: The Resurgence of Hazarajat .................................................... 11 1995-2001: The Taliban Arrive................................................................. 12 LAND ISSUES ............................................................................................ 14 Occupation of Government Properties ....................................................... 14 Failure of the State to Pay Compensation ................................................... 15 Occupation of Private Properties.............................................................. 15 Weak and Corrupted Land Administration and Dispute Resolution Systems ........... 16 III. FINDINGS FROM THE VILLAGES.......................................................20 BAMYAN DISTRICT: THE FOLADY VALLEY ............................................................... 20 Siya Khar Bolaq ................................................................................... 20 Alibeg .............................................................................................. 22 Borghaso ........................................................................................... 23 BAMYAN DISTRICT: THE PERI-URBAN DESERT .......................................................... 26 Dasht-e-Borsianas ................................................................................ 26 SHIBAR DISTRICT: THE KALO VALLEY................................................................... 28 SHIBAR DISTRICT: THE ERAQ VALLEY................................................................... 32 Kafshandaz ........................................................................................ 37 Ashoor.............................................................................................. 38 Khoshkak........................................................................................... 39 PANJAB DISTRICT: THE NARGAS VALLEY ............................................................... 42 PANJAB DISTRICT: THE GUDAR VALLEY ................................................................ 47 PANJAB DISTRICT: THE KHDAK TAKHTA VALLEY........................................................ 49 Deh Pioetab ....................................................................................... 50 Kachari ............................................................................................. 52 PANJAB DISTRICT: THE GHOR GHORI VALLEY ......................................................... 52 Joi Hawdz.......................................................................................... 56 The Disputed Lawn............................................................................... 57 Rashak.............................................................................................. 58 THE KUCHI ISSUE: LOOKING AT THE OTHER SIDE ....................................................... 59 III. CONCLUSION .............................................................................62 1. The size of farms may be becoming more even......................................... 62 2. Landlessness is substantial and may be increasing. .................................... 63 3. The poor are actually destitute. .......................................................... 66 4. Homelessness is a serious problem among the landless. .............................. 67 5. The landless are exploited. ................................................................ 67 6. Livestock is the main capital asset........................................................ 67 7. The scope for land distribution is limited. ............................................... 68 8. Improving labour terms is necessary to creating fairer wages and job security. ........................................................................................... 69 9. Mortgaging practice needs reform. ....................................................... 69 10. Poppy production is a reality to be dealt with......................................... 70 11. Women’s land ownership is not a live issue............................................. 70 12. Kuchi-Hazara relations deeply concern the Hazara.................................... 71 WAYS FORWARD ........................................................................................ 74 BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................74 APPENDIX A: Persons Interviewed in Bamyan ..........................................76 APPENDIX B: Sources of Evidence for Land Ownership ..............................77 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ..........................................................80 PUBLICATIONS FROM AREU Land Relations in Bamyan Province MAP OF AFGHANISTAN: LOCATION OF BAMYAN PROVINCE Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit i Land Relations in Bamyan Province 1 GLOSSARY Abi irrigated land farming Afghani (or Af) the official Afghan currency (one dollar= 48 Afs) Aigal customary practice of conservation on hillsides Ailoq or sargol upland pasture Amir king Amlak property (land) Arbab appointed local leader Asha communal work Beg leader, clan head Chalma
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