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EASO Country of Origin Information Report Afghanistan Security Situation

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EASO Country of Origin Information Report Afghanistan Security Situation European Asylum Support Office EASO Country of Origin Information Report Afghanistan Security Situation - Update May 2018 SUPPORT IS OUR MISSION European Asylum Support Office EASO Country of Origin Information Report Afghanistan Security Situation - Update May 2018 More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (http://europa.eu). ISBN : 978-92-9494-860-1 doi: 10.2847/248967 © European Asylum Support Office 2018 Reproduction is authorised, provided the source is acknowledged, unless otherwise stated. For third-party materials reproduced in this publication, reference is made to the copyrights statements of the respective third parties. Neither EASO nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use which may be made of the information contained herein. EASO COI REPORT AFGHANISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION – UPDATE — 3 Acknowledgements This report was largely based on information provided by the Austrian COI Department and EASO would like to acknowledge the Austrian Federal Office for Immigration and Asylum for this. Furthermore, the following national asylum and migration departments have contributed by reviewing the report: Belgium, Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons, Cedoca - Center for Documentation and Research, Denmark, The Danish Immigration Service, Section Country of Origin Information, France, Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless persons (OFPRA), Information, Documentation and Research Division, Italy, Ministry of the Interior, National Commission for the Right of Asylum International and EU Affairs, COI unit, Slovakia, Migration Office, Department of Documentation and Foreign Cooperation, Sweden, Swedish Migration Agency, Lifos – Centre for Country of Origin Information and Analysis. Reference is made to the Disclaimer regarding the responsibility of reviewers. 4 — EASO COI REPORT AFGHANISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION – UPDATE Contents Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................... 3 Contents .................................................................................................................................... 4 Disclaimer .................................................................................................................................. 7 Glossary and Abbreviations ....................................................................................................... 8 Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 15 Map.......................................................................................................................................... 19 1. Short update of the general description of the security situation in Afghanistan .............. 20 1.1 Security related incidents ............................................................................................. 20 1.2 Civilian casualties .......................................................................................................... 22 1.3 Conflict Severity ............................................................................................................ 23 2. Regional description of the security situation in Afghanistan ............................................ 25 2.1 Kabul.............................................................................................................................. 25 2.1.1 Actors in the conflict .............................................................................................. 25 2.1.2 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population .............................. 26 2.2 Badakhshan ................................................................................................................... 34 2.2.1 Actors in the conflict .............................................................................................. 34 2.2.2 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population .............................. 36 2.3 Badghis .......................................................................................................................... 39 2.3.1 Actors in the conflict .............................................................................................. 39 2.3.2 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population .............................. 40 2.4 Baghlan .......................................................................................................................... 43 2.4.1 Actors in the conflict .............................................................................................. 43 2.4.2 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population .............................. 44 2.5 Balkh .............................................................................................................................. 47 2.5.1 Actors in the conflict .............................................................................................. 47 2.5.2 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population .............................. 48 2.6 Bamyan/Bamian ............................................................................................................ 51 2.6.1 Actors in the conflict .............................................................................................. 51 2.6.2 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population .............................. 51 2.7 Daykundi / Daikundi / Day Kundi .................................................................................. 52 2.7.1 Actors in the conflict .............................................................................................. 52 2.7.2 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population .............................. 53 2.8 Farah ............................................................................................................................. 54 2.8.1 Actors in the conflict .............................................................................................. 54 2.8.2 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population .............................. 55 2.9 Faryab ............................................................................................................................ 59 2.9.1 Actors in the conflict .............................................................................................. 59 2.9.2 Recent security trends and impact on civilians ..................................................... 61 Further impact of the conflict on services and law and order ....................................... 63 Displacement .................................................................................................................. 64 2.10 Ghazni ......................................................................................................................... 65 2.10.1 Actors in the conflict ............................................................................................ 65 2.10.2 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ............................ 66 2.11 Ghor/Ghowr ................................................................................................................ 68 2.11.1 Actors in the conflict ............................................................................................ 68 2.11.2 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ............................ 69 2.12 Helmand ...................................................................................................................... 71 EASO COI REPORT AFGHANISTAN: SECURITY SITUATION – UPDATE — 5 2.12.1 Actors in the conflict ............................................................................................ 71 2.12.2 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ............................ 73 2.13 Herat ........................................................................................................................... 77 2.13.1 Actors in the conflict ............................................................................................ 77 2.13.2 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ............................ 78 2.14 Jawzjan/Jowzjan .......................................................................................................... 81 2.14.1 Actors in the conflict ............................................................................................ 81 2.14.2 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ............................ 83 2.15 Kandahar ..................................................................................................................... 85 2.15.1 Actors in the conflict ............................................................................................ 85 2.15.2 Recent security trends and impact on the civilian population ............................ 86 2.16 Kapisa .......................................................................................................................... 90 2.16.1 Actors in the conflict ............................................................................................ 90 2.16.2 General security trends and impact on the civilian population .......................... 91 2.17 Khost ..........................................................................................................................
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