TEN CONFLICTS TO WORRY ABOUT IN 2021

The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)

February 2021 TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOREWORD 2

ETHIOPIA: At risk of multiplying conflicts stretching the capacity of the state 3

INDIA AND PAKISTAN: At risk of increased cross-border violence in Kashmir 7

MYANMAR: At risk of dormant conflicts reigniting 11 HAITI: High risk of increased gang violence amid rising authoritarianism 14 BELARUS: High risk of destabilization as regime, demonstrator, and Russian interests clash 18 COLOMBIA: High risk of rising violence targeting social leaders and vulnerable groups 21

ARMENIA AND AZERBAIJAN: High risk of cross-border violence in Nagorno-Karabakh 24 despite ceasefire YEMEN: High risk of humanitarian fallout amidst the offensive on Marib 27 MOZAMBIQUE: No end in sight for the Cabo Delgado insurgency 30 THE SAHEL: Insurgency and fragile politics at the center of an unabated crisis 33

EDITED BY: Elliott Bynum, Roudabeh Kishi, Sogand Afkari, and Sam Jones GRAPHICS BY: Adam Miller, Curtis Goos, and Josh Satre

LAYOUT BY: Sogand Afkari

WITH CONTRIBUTIONS BY: Clionadh Raleigh and Braden Fuller (Ethiopia) Danyal Kamal and Katerina Bozhinova (India and Pakistan) Elliott Bynum (Myanmar) Sandra Pellegrini (Haiti) Franklin Holcomb (Belarus) Bhavani Castro (Colombia) Vardan Ghaplanyan (Armenia and Azerbaijan) Matthias J. Sulz (Yemen) Timothy Lay and Jasmine Opperman (Mozambique) Héni Nsaibia (The Sahel)

ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 1 FOREWORD

Conflict levels in 2020 slightly decreased from 2019 in all regions except Africa. Still, many conflicts continued unabated despite the global COVID-19 pandemic, and several took on new dimensions as actors responded to the health crisis. Because the pandemic is a unique development, we expect global conflict levels, loca- tions, and agents to increase significantly in 2021 — ultimately to a higher point than both 2019 and 2020.

Each year, ACLED identifies 10 conflicts or crisis situations around the world that are likely to worsen or evolve in the coming months. Not just hotspots, these 10 cases represent areas where new directions and patterns of violence are becoming clear, where there have been major shifts in conflict dynamics, and where there is a significant risk of conflict diffusion. This year’s report reviews key trends in Ethiopia; India and Pakistan; Myanmar; Haiti; Belarus; Colombia; Armenia and Azerbaijan; Yemen; Mozambique; and the Sahel. Ethiopia, Yemen, and the Sahel were previously highlighted in our 2020 series, and their re-inclusion here underscores how these conflicts have changed substantially in the preceding year, and how new risks contin- ue to emerge.

All 10 conflicts are expected to evolve in 2021. They do not fit the standard narratives of state failure, exclu- sive politics, grievances, or resource competition. Each is shaped by the decisions governments have made in order to exert or retract their control and strength, as well as the ramifications, opposition, and vulnerabilities exposed by those decisions. While many world leaders stole the spotlight with political antics and by inflaming dangerous domestic fault lines, state actors in these 10 conflicts exploited global distractions to repress, attack, and subjugate their citizens. Others took advantage of rising radicalism and populism to sustain their leadership, ultimately resulting in scapegoating and further violence. As a result, violent and brutal governance is on the rise in many of these countries, while multiple powers compete for control in others.

Each case also illustrates the wide range of different political violence patterns currently affecting states: Haiti’s gangs have arisen in a context of highly politicized ‘law and order’ campaigns; the Sahel’s jihadi threat is reinforced by pastoralist populism and poor international coordination; Mozambique’s conflict was initially viewed by its government as a local revolt, but reached unprecedented levels of sophistication in 2020. Russian interests are a growing and determining factor in Belarus, Armenia, and Azerbaijan; and the violent indirect effects of incomplete peace agreements are felt in Yemen and Colombia.

2020 was a sobering year, and one in which politics has failed the vast majority around the world. In 2021, we may be forced to reap what has been sown: the coming year is likely to be a dangerous and violent period leading to more uncertainty and less peace, especially for the countries embroiled in these 10 conflicts.

In our mid-year update to this special report, we will revisit these conflicts to assess our analysis and determine if our expectations were accurate. Prof. Clionadh Raleigh February 2021

ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 2 ANALYSIS conflicts conflicts state ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 3 ACLEDDATA.COM | ANALYSIS ACLED of opposition movements, marking a regression regression a marking movements, opposition of space political opening for hailed first was Abiy since tenure. his of beginning the at in occurring simultaneously are conflicts Several and Tigray, Gujji, Wollega, Kelem and West Konso, resulted have All area. border Oromo/Somali the of displacement the and hundreds of death the in region border Sudan the in violence Recent millions. common ). The 2021 (BBC, 3 January list the to adds ‘administrative the are conflicts linking these thread by driven groups as emerged have that contests’ recognition, formal seek nationalism ethno-regional recognition Administrative territory. and authority, that conflicts most of basis the are dominance and been have which confronts, government Abiy the alter try to may Abiy that suggestions by incentivized to claims territorial ethno-nationalist of basis the parties political ethnic year, past the Over authority. become generally have regions various the from self-determination for claims their in radical more Nations, Southern the in Wolayta example for — (SNNPR) (Addis Region People's and Nationalities, (Al Tigray TPLF in the 2020), or 10 August Standard, ethno-na- rising 2020). Further, 30 October Jazeera, long-running transformed have sentiments tionalist and bigger into resources over squabbles territorial members all include potentially that conflicts wider Somali/ the include Examples group. ethnic an of Oromo/ 2020), the 29 October (Reuters, border Afar and Zone, Metekel Tigray, Western border, Somali zone). special (Oromo Kemise IN 2021: FOR WATCH TO WHAT Shifts Authority from troops by fought TPLF was the with war The from militias regional of host a and forces federal the from action considerable and — country the across of the of multiplying multiplying capacity capacity risk of the At Raleigh and Braden Fuller Braden and Raleigh

Clionadh In addition to a costly occupation and the task of re- of task the and occupation costly a to addition In region, Tigray the of leadership political placing the faces administration Ahmed’s Abiy Minister Prime many in security establishing of daunting task the the across conflicts many The country. the of areas international the in acknowledged less are state associated are threats these of each media, but deaths, of thousands including outcomes, dire with of levels variable and displacements, of millions development. political and economic to disruptions future the as slowed has investment Economically, farms large-scale and uncertain is country the of of subjects the been have projects development and has development Political groups. rioting by attacks of repression the through curtailed been likewise The conflict in Ethiopia between the federal govern- federal the between Ethiopia in conflict The northern the of administration former the and ment Front Liberation People’s Tigray the region, Tigray be- clashes since headlines dominated (TPLF), has intense of weeks 2020. Four November early in gan decisive a be to appears what in resulted fighting in- recent but government, federal the for victory challenges local scattered that suggests formation creating is emergency humanitarian massive a and ex- still resistance of Pockets occupation. costly a some and occur, to continue clashes some and ist Eritrean troops, government federal of combination have to claim militias regional Amhara and soldiers towns major all over control established successfully distorted and disjointed the Given region. the in questions conflict, this planning of and reporting actors national and international by asked being are Ethio- in broadly more patterns conflict about alike 2021. into going is state the secure how pia, and With national elections scheduled for 5 June 2021, 2021, 5 June for scheduled elections national With co-occurring several by gripped country the and tumultuous a towards headed is Ethiopia conflicts, year.

stretching stretching Ethiopia: from Eritrea. The neighboring Amhara region sup- Political Bargaining plied significant troops for this effort. They have since been associated with securing territory in the The deployment of federal forces into the regions Tigray region and administrating subregions for the of Ethiopia is a costly intervention. Each operation transition. These patterns are pronounced in West- both strengthens and weakens the government’s ern Tigray, where Amhara nationalists claim owner- hand: by gaining the control of territory and overtak- ship based on historical and ethnic ties (Africa News, ing the political structure, concessions are made to 8 February 2016). those agents who will hold the areas for the gov- ernment and in line with central directives. These The Amhara political elites have sought to extract decisions, and the overall costs of securing territory, significant concessions for their actions in Tigray and are long-term transactions by the government that for their ongoing support for Abiy. In particular, the trade some risks (e.g. direct violence) for others (e.g. Amhara police and the National Movement of the the rise of local subnational autocrats and associat- Amhara (NAMA) have engaged in an overt campaign ed violence). to overtake territory that they believe was illegally taken from their region — a move that was largely This dynamic is especially visible in the Oromia advocated by the TPLF when they were in power. region, where high levels of violence throughout the They likewise seek control of areas where Amha- past year have forced the central government to en- ra people live outside of the region and are being gage in political maneuvers and repressive behavior persecuted. Areas that Amhara actors have vested to keep the region in check. Although Abiy initially interest in because of high numbers of ethnic Am- rode a wave of Oromo mobilization into office, his hara residents, include (in part or in whole) Wolkait, popularity has plummeted following the arrest of Tegede, Telemt, and Raya of Tigray region, as well several popular Oromo opposition leaders and a se- as Metekel zone of Benishangul/Gumz region, where ries of violent incidents in 2019 that left the Oromia large numbers of ethnic Amhara are living in fear region engulfed in unrest (Al Jazeera, 19 September after a spate of violent attacks on civilians (National 2019). Even more seriously, splinter factions of the Movement of the Amhara, 11 November 2020). Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) are actively engaged in an insurgency across remote areas of the Oromia Over the past year, Metekel zone has been one of region, launching violent operations against local the most violent locations in the state. Since 2018, government representatives and federal troops. ACLED has recorded more than 500 fatalities (like- These splinter faction (Shane) militants have been ly a conservative estimate) among mostly ethnic accused of committing violence against civilians, Amhara who have been attacked by Gumuz ethnic including massacres, killings, and intimidation. militias and other unidentified armed groups as they attempt to engage in agricultural work. A recent While information in remote areas of the Oromia massacre in the zone left 207 dead (Africa News, 26 region is extremely difficult to access, reports of con- December 2020). Abere Adamu, Commissioner of the tinued police violence, displacement, and insecurity Amhara Regional State Police Commission, recently suggest that the issue has continued far beyond the requested that his force be made responsible for capacity of a local law enforcement operation. Major solving the crisis in Benishangul regional state, or military efforts will be required to gain full control that the federal government intervene (Amhara over areas dominated by the OLF/Shane. Wide- Mass Media Agency, 7 December 2020). The gov- spread political unrest is to be expected throughout ernment declared the area an ‘emergency zone’ in the Oromia region during the election period as January, allowing them to overtake administration opposition party members denounce the jailing of and security. potential candidates (Addis Standard, December 2020). While the powerful Amhara militias may succeed in stopping violence directed at Amhara civilians in the The dynamics discussed above are also present in state, federal allowance of ethnic-based militias to conflicts occurring in the SNNPR. Although more operate outside of their own regional boundaries localized, the overall issues of ethnic federalism and creates a dangerous precedent for the rest of the attempts by Abiy at reining in violence across the re- country. Violence occurring as a result of bound- gion are likely to play out in a similar fashion of elite ary demarcation disagreements could worsen and positioning and conflict. spread. Rifts already visible between the Oromo and Amhara regional administrators could deepen, In the run-up to the first national elections follow- throwing the country into a spiral of violence. ing a major change in government, Ethiopia is in the midst of several concurrent political struggles.

ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 4 Armed groups are challenging federal government troops across areas of the country, while ethnic vio- lence and killing occurs on a weekly basis. Although Prime Minister Abiy proved that the central govern- ment possesses considerable capacity through the defeat of the TPLF in the latter half of 2020, addition- al challenges that remain in the state are likely to contribute to a volatile year. Ethiopia’s position as a linchpin for security in the region means that vio- lence occurring in the state will have consequences beyond domestic implications, affecting policy and conflicts across the Horn of Africa. FURTHER READING:

Ethiopia: TPLF Overview Red Lines: Upheaval and Containment in the Horn of Africa Bad Blood: Violence in Ethiopia Reveals the Strain of Ethno-Federalism Under Prime Minister Abiy Change and Continuity in Protests and Political Violence in PM Abiy’s Ethiopia

ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 5 ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 6 ANALYSIS ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 7 ACLEDDATA.COM | ANALYSIS ACLED Besides cross-border tensions, Indian security forces forces security Indian tensions, cross-border Besides mili- Islamist of threat the face to continued have the used reportedly forces J&K. Security in tancy intelligence better obtain to lockdown coronavirus region the in militancy on crackdown to and inputs to addition 2020). In 7 May Express, Indian (New targeted several authorities, with clashes militant ruling Bharatiya the of members against attacks Laskhar- by out carried were (BJP) Party Janata nine least at of death the to leading (LeT), e-Taiba Affairs Home of Ministry Indian The politicians. organizations militant 10 Islamist of list a issued including eliminated, be to state the in operating Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (JeM), Jaish-e-Mohammed LeT, Her- (National among others Al-Badr, (HM), and expressed 2020). Authorities India, 6 October ald across infiltrated groups militant that concerns preoccupied was government the while border the the While pandemic. coronavirus the handling with to attributed largely been has militancy in rise steady LeT, and JeM as such groups, jihadist Pakistan-based in- fueled also are region the in movements militant ). 2020 5 August Group, Crisis (International ternally revoca- the by caused anger and Disillusionment 2019 has August J&K in of status special the of tion recruit to groups foreign and domestic both enabled young Kashmiris. al- law new a tension, preexisting the to add To claim to states other from citizens lowing Indian sparked has J&K in land purchase and residency changes demographic potential over concerns a majority Muslim Kashmiri the render would that Assembly of redrawing the Furthermore, minority. political shift to expected is 2021 in constituencies and Jammu division Hindu-majority the to power Washington (The Kashmiris Muslim the from away the ruling BJP, the to 2020). According 5 August Post, Kash- thus and increased Jammu has in population As- of share larger disproportionately a holds mir increased increased Kashmir risk of in At Bozhinova violence violence Pakistan: and India focused on deflecting opportunities for for opportunities deflecting on focused India 1

Danyal Kamal and Katerina Danyal Kamal and 1. While ACLED coverage of India spans back to and 2016, is therefore the date used here, ACLED coverage of Pakistan extends back to 2010. 2020 was another tumultuous year for India and and India for year tumultuous another 2020 was increased amid plummeted relations as Pakistan Kashmir Jammu and disputed along the clashes the 2020 made fighting in spike The border. (J&K) and India between conflict for year violent most in coverage ACLED of beginning the since Pakistan 2016. Meanwhile, the first deadly clash after more than than more after clash deadly first the Meanwhile, and Indian the between place took decades four in region Ladakh neighboring the in armies Chinese 20 Indian of death the in resulted 2020, which June two The soldier. Chinese one least at and soldiers encroach- cross-border of other each accused states military threatening shots, warning firing and ments disput- 2020). The News, (AP 11 September conflict demar- poorly a has Ladakh of region Kashmir ed shift can which (LAC), Control Actual of Line cated snowcaps and lakes, rivers, of abundance the to due China accused has 2020). India (BBC News, 16 June and valley Galwan Ladakh's into sending troops of 2020). (BBC News, 16 June territory its occupying relations Sino-Indian exacerbating tensions Fresh to 2019 move August Delhi’s New from stemmed Ladakh centrally-administered separate a establish 2020). After 18 December (Anadolu Agency, region bor- the year, last talks diplomatic of rounds several (Al resolved officially been yet not has standoff der 2020). 10 December Jazeera, negotiation and tightening control of Kashmir, while while Kashmir, of control tightening and negotiation Pakistan region. the in politics pro-Indian promoting bi- the on doubt casting continuously by responded highlight- by India with agreement ceasefire lateral in abuses rights human and ing violations Indian well as forums, diplomatic international at Kashmir (LoC) Control of Line the near inciting violence as 2020). 5 August Peace, of Institute States (United

cross-border cross-border India sembly constituencies (Indian Express, 18 February where Baloch separatists were thought to be weak. 2020). With the first State Assembly elections since The resurgence of Baloch separatist violence was J&K became a Union Territory likely to be conducted preceded by greater unity among Baloch separatist in 2021, the marginalized Muslim community in the groups, including the formation of trans-province al- region could become even more disenfranchised, liances between separatist groups, as well as repres- which could in turn spur militant activity in the re- sion of Baloch civilians by the Pakistani army during gion (One India, 9 December 2020). security operations. In India’s ‘Red Corridor’, ACLED records a reduction WHAT TO WATCH FOR IN 2021: in Naxal-Maoist violence in 2020 compared to 2019. This reduction is particularly notable between the Cross-border violence between India and Pakistan months of March and June, coinciding with the in the Kashmir region is expected to continue in- onset of coronavirus lockdown restrictions, when creasing in 2021. With both sides adopting non-co- Naxal-Maoist rebels have historically carried out operative militarized strategies, bilateral attempts at their annual tactical counter-offensive campaign resolving the Kashmir conflict remain unlikely in the (TCOC). Lockdown restrictions, coupled with an near future. Tension between Indian and Chinese increased counterinsurgency focus against militancy forces in Ladakh further compounds the conflict across India, have reportedly weakened the Nax- dynamic in the Kashmir region. Diplomatic negotia- al-Maoist operational capacity (Economic Times, 28 tions between India and China aimed at de-escalat- June 2020; The Diplomat, 31 August 2020). However, ing the conflict remain inconclusive. Failure to reach the reported number of Naxal-Maoist related violent a peaceful settlement of the LAC dispute with China events in the final quarter of 2020 are comparable would leave India to contend with both Pakistan to the same period in 2019. The impending TCOC and China — regional allies — along both borders in offensive in the summer months will be indicative of Kashmir. Additionally, recent policy shifts fueling the the insurgency’s vigor in 2021. increased marginalization of J&K’s Muslim poplula- tion may aggravate the persistent threat of domestic A year after the controversial 2019 Citizenship and foreign militancy in Kashmir. (Amendment) Act (CAA) was passed, mass demon- strations were reported across India, culminating in Elsewhere in India, discontent surrounding the pas- deadly riots and clashes between Muslims and Hin- sage of the CAA continues to be a cause for concern. dus in Delhi. The CAA aims to fast-track the citizen- While deadly religious clashes and violent demon- ship of Buddhists, Christians, Hindus, Jains, Parsis, strations surrounding the CAA subsided following and Sikhs who fled Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and the initial coronavirus lockdown, organizations in Pakistan before 2015, excluding Muslims (Deutsche northeastern states have announced plans to re- Welle, 11 December 2020). It has been criticized for sume the anti-CAA movement. The Indian Home being discriminatory toward Muslims and undermin- Ministry missed a deadline in June to finalize the Act ing India’s secularism. Although anti-CAA demon- and it is still unclear when the CAA will be carried strations decreased in the second half of 2020 due out. Once implementation begins, demonstrations to the imposition of coronavirus restrictions and the and violence are likely to renew and escalate. Addi- ensuing state crackdown, 18 organizations, includ- tionally, a wave of nationwide demonstrations by ing All Assam Students' Union (AASU), have resumed farmers demanding the repeal of three agricultural mass demonstrations in January 2021. acts passed by the central government in September has continued into 2021. Demonstrating farmers In Pakistan, militancy targeting security forces and fear losing market protections, including a minimum civilians was on the rise in the provinces of Khyber guaranteed price for their produce, due to the new Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Balochistan. Balochistan acts (BBC News, 27 November 2020). While most is the country’s least urbanized and most impov- of the demonstrations have been peaceful, some erished province, while KP has historically been a clashes have been reported between police and site of Taliban and sectarian violence (Gandhara, 15 demonstrators. Although India’s supreme court sus- June 2019). In KP, security forces have conducted pended the implementation of the agricultural acts major operations against militant groups for the past in January, farmers have continued demonstrating few years, yet Taliban-linked militants, as well as (Foreign Policy, 13 January 2021). A tenth round of the Islamic State, have carried out sporadic attacks. talks is scheduled to take place between farmer's Taliban groups, including Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan unions and the government in January 2021 (Busi- (TTP), consistently targeted security forces in 2020, ness Insider, 19 January 2021). If a compromise is causing over 100 total fatalities. Political violence not reached, a surge in nationwide demonstrations also increased in Balochistan, particularly in regions can be expected.

ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 8 In Pakistan, an increase in militant violence tar- COVID-19 and Political Unrest In Northeast India geting state forces in KP and Balochistan indicates a resurgence of the TTP network and the Baloch CDT Spotlight: Pakistan separatist movement in each province, respectively. While militancy was largely thought to have been CDT Spotlight: Continuing Conflict in India defeated in KP, the TTP network continued to re- group and strengthen their presence in 2020, reveal- Rising Organized Political Violence in Balochistan: ing gaps in the effectiveness of the National Action A Resurgence of Baloch Separatism? Plan against terrorism (Asian International News, 4 January 2020). In Balochistan, despite increased attempts to renew the separatist movement, Baloch militants continue to suffer from a lack of resources and international support. The Pakistani govern- ment demonstrated its ability to constrain insurgen- cies and carry on with its projects and plans for the province, including the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) (Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, Fall 2020). Deprived of opportunities for prosperity and repressed by the Pakistani state, the Baloch popula- tion may become increasingly marginalized, fuelling further separatist tensions. It remains to be seen how the Pakistani government will respond to the threat of domestic militancy in 2021, given its overt focus on the Kashmir conflict. Besides militant struggles, a new alliance of oppo- sition parties, the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM), aims to oust Prime Minister Imran Khan, accusing the army of installing him during the 2018 elections (The Guardian, 16 October 2020). Anti-gov- ernment demonstrations gained mass support, as the country has been struggling with unemployment and the highest inflation rates in Asia (The Guardian, 16 October 2020; Indian Express, 25 October). With a national march planned in February 2021, culmi- nating in Islamabad, anti-government discontent is set to continue, and may escalate (Dawn, 1 January 2021). The upcoming 2021 Senate Elections may stir anti-government tensions, especially considering the PDM’s intention to resign from the national and provincial assemblies, thus disrupting the election process. However, it remains unlikely that this move will destabilize the government, as Prime Minister Khan has stated that the government will hold elec- tions for any vacated national assembly seats (The Diplomat, 11 December 2020). While PDM may not immediately succeed in overthrowing the govern- ment, their tactics may generate increasing opposi- tion to the current political and military establish- ment, influencing future elections in Pakistan.

FURTHER READING:

CDT Spotlight: Continuing Conflict in Jammu & Kashmir

ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 9 ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 10 ANALYSIS Aside from the increased fighting in Kayin state, the the state, Kayin in fighting increased the Aside from have that checkpoints to forces its deployed military Guard Border Kayin the by manned been previously formed BGF was Kayin The December. (BGF) in Force Bud- Karen Democratic the of members 2010 after in KNU/ the from away broken had which Army, dhist guard border military’s the to 1994, acceded in KNLA BGF Kayin the by run businesses Illicit scheme. force Kokko Shwe in border Thailand-Myanmar along the the though military, the with tensions created have pre- a likely is businesses such on crackdown recent the over control more assert to military the for tense (Frontier state the in fighting increased amid region 2020). 30 December Myanmar, between tensions while state, Shan in Meanwhile, State State/Shan Shan of Council Restoration the Lib- State Palaung and (RCSS/SSA-S) Army-South Army Liberation National Front/Ta'ang eration year, the in earlier subsided largely had (PSLF/TNLA) increased groups rebel two the between fighting the into continued has 2020 and of end the towards as RCSS/SSA-S the views PSLF/TNLA The year. new state Shan northern in territory its on encroaching the to 2021). Prior 26 January Myanmar, (Frontier the conflict, group armed inter-ethnic of outbreak the with clashes in engaged been had RCSS/SSA-S past. years in than level higher a at military in demonstrations anti-war backdrop, this Against repres- state with met were activists youth 2020 by demonstra- held activists youth and sion. Student region, Mandalay in also and state Rakhine in tions student current for hotbed a become has which of Federation Burma All the of Members activism. umbrella national-level a (ABFSU), Unions Student impris- face and detained been have union, student around leaflets anti-war distributing for onment ). 2021 12 January Rights, (Fortify year last Mandalay Myanmar in youth among sentiment the Anti-war conflicts conflicts ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 11 ACLEDDATA.COM | ANALYSIS ACLED dormant dormant risk of At Bynum

Elliott As conflict in the west abated, clashes between between clashes abated, west the in As conflict Union/Karen National Karen the and military the increased (KNU/KNLA) Army Liberation National The state. Kayin in east the 2020 in December during eastern in year new the into continued have clashes between animosity growing is There region. Bago road its with continues military the as sides two the KNU/ the by controlled areas in project construction vio- as intrusions these views KNU/KNLA KNLA. The Agreement Ceasefire 2015 Nationwide the of lations Kay- in people by demonstrations (NCA). Large-scale have area the leave to military the for calling state in 8 Center, Information (Karen reported been also state Kayin in fighting increased 2021). The January monitoring of breakdown the and region, Bago and conflict, de-escalate to place in put mechanisms enjoyed has region the calm relative the threaten 2021). 18 January Myanmar, 2012 (Frontier since Prior to the current cessation of fighting in Rakhine Rakhine in fighting of cessation current the to Prior in conflict township, Paletwa state’s Chin and state the notably, Most rise. the on been had region the during both shelling and airstrikes of use military’s rel- increasing been had areas civilian in and combat and injured been have civilians 2019. Many to ative years. two past the over conflict the during killed no stable stopped, temporarily has fighting While achieved. been has conflict the to solution Following the general elections on 8 November 2020 November 8 on elections general the Following southern and state Rakhine in fighting Myanmar, in League United halt. The sudden a to came state Chin Rakhine ethnic an (ULA/AA), Army Arakan/Arakan of a announced autonomy, greater for fighting group recipro- then military the which ceasefire, unilateral to held been since have meetings Subsequent cated. be- ceasefire bilateral a of possibility the discuss under- coup military current The groups. the tween talks. such derail likely will Myanmar in way

Myanmar: reigniting notably crosses ethnic boundaries, and the contin- troubling signs that conflict in Kayin state could ued repression of such activism is only likely to lead intensify while fighting between Shan and Ta’ang to further discontent. rebel groups continues in Shan state. The military’s decision to seize power has thrown any discussions WHAT TO WATCH FOR IN 2021: of peace into doubt. After the November elections, which the Nation- FURTHER READING: al League for Democracy (NLD) won handily, the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development 2020 Elections in Myanmar: Political Violence and Party (USDP) organized a series of demonstrations Demonstration Trends claiming irregularities in the voter lists used during the elections. These pro-military demonstrations CDT Spotlight: COVID-19 & Conflict in Myanmar have continued into 2021 with some becoming violent. Coronavirus Cover: Myanmar Civilians Under Fire On 1 February, the day the new parliament was scheduled to convene, the military — using the pre- tense of electoral fraud — carried out early morning raids detaining elected NLD officials, as well as a number of prominent political activists. A state of emergency was declared for one year and the mili- tary announced that it would reconstitute the Union Election Commission and eventually hold new elections. The military claims that its seizure of power is al- lowed under the 2008 military-drafted constitution in situations where the country’s sovereignty or national unity are threatened (Frontier Myanmar, 1 February 2021). The NLD has long sought to change the undemocratic charter while operating within its parameters. As the military-backed USDP is unable to win at the polls, the military — which is grant- ed a quarter of the seats in parliament under the constitution — has manufactured a crisis to justify reclaiming some of the power ceded to the civilian government. In detaining not just the NLD government, but also political activists, the military is attempting to undermine the ability of the public to organize in protest. Yet, it is likely that activist networks that had largely laid dormant in the hopes that the military might allow the NLD to govern according to the will of the people will be recharged by the threat of prolonged military dictatorship. Demonstrations by Burmese groups in the diaspora have already been reported in Thailand, Japan, and the United States. As 2021 progresses, in addition to the likelihood of increased disorder resulting from the military coup, the threat that dormant armed conflicts could reignite remains. No political solution to the conflict in Rakhine state has been achieved. Many ethnic Rakhine and Chin villagers remain displaced, not to mention the many thousands of Rohingya refugees still languishing in camps in Bangladesh. There are

ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 12 ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 13 ANALYSIS 2020 was marked by the deepening of Haiti’s politi- Haiti’s of deepening the by marked 2020 was has Moise Jovenel President of tenure The crisis. cal killings and scandals corruption by tarnished been approv- low in resulting activists, high-profile of The resignation. his for demands and ratings al the by impacted further was legitimacy president’s of organization the on vote to failure parliament’s January in dissolution its before elections legislative Haiti’s under parliament, dysfunctional a 2020. With se- a with rule to able been has Moise constitution, since ever decrees presidential controversial of ries 2020). 13 January Jazeera, (Al orga- society civil power, his consolidate to order In supported has Moise President that claim nizations be- collusion of Allegations coalition. gang G-9 the fueled were gang G-9 the and elites political tween travelling been have members G-9 that reports by arsenal their built have and vans armored police in (Loop, donations weapons state-sponsored through this of creation turn, the ). In 2019 15 December impacted has advantage material its and alliance sought to have members G-9 landscape. gang the wage to started have and influence their increase G-9 the join to refused who leaders gang on war a Presi- of rivals political supported who or alliance Belekou the of incursions violent July, Moise. In dent G-9 the of members both gangs, Boston Nan and neigh- Brooklyn Nan the in reported were coalition, Ti dissident the by controlled is which borhood, (RNDDH, 13 Au- Soleil Cité in leader gang Gabriel coalition G-9 the of members 2020). Similarly, gust and Tokyo Nan the in attacks coordinated launched (RNDDH, 23 June May in neighborhoods Rouge Pont of reminiscent are operations violent 2020). These the in place took that massacre Saline 2018 La the Petro the following protests anti-corruption of midst attribute some While scandal. embezzlement Caribe it that claim others warfare, gang to massacre the protest the quell to attempt government-led a was ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 14 ACLEDDATA.COM | ANALYSIS ACLED gang authoritarianism increased increased rising risk of amid High ellegrini P

The upsurge of violence in Haiti is largely tied to to tied largely is Haiti in violence of upsurge The are activities whose gangs local of operations the the in developments political to connected often against violence of majority 2020, the In country. un- and known both by perpetrated was civilians violence gang of rise The groups. criminal identified Jovenel President of end the to connected likely is 2021 7 February on mandate constitutional Moise’s Sep- for scheduled elections upcoming the to and have Haiti in power in elites 2021. Political tember and population the terrorize to gangs on long relied and intimidation through votes opposition suppress marginalized of residents against force of use the Haiti’s of hotbeds — capital the in neighborhoods 2020). 22 October Progres, (Haiti opposition political in support government receive gangs exchange, In that assurance the and funds, weapons, of form the 2020, October In unpunished. go will crimes their coalition a — alliance gang G-9 the of leader the the 2020 under June in formed gangs, several of Chérizier Jimmy officer police former of leadership threatened publicly he which video in a released — participat- from them dissuade to demonstrators, 17 Haiti, (Gazette march anti-government ing an in observed been also has trend 2020). This October threats radio similar with Port-au-Prince, of outside region Sud-Est the in leader gang a by July in made against demonstration a following country, the of insecurity. rising Amid a worsening political crisis, the security situa- security the crisis, political worsening a Amid of levels as deteriorate to continued has Haiti in tion 2020, vi- Throughout increased. have violence gang nearly by rose country the in civilians against olence concen- been has 2019. Violence to 35% compared of neighborhoods impoverished the in mostly trated by controlled and divided are which Port-au-Prince, lords. gang local Sandra Sandra

Haiti: violence violence movement (Le Nouvelliste, 25 May 2020). while exercising their duties, and are allowed to ac- cess all documents and locations necessary for the Civilians are often targeted and exploited by the fulfillment of their mandate. Furthermore, the ANI warring gangs. Gangs terrorize civilians as they win can carry out any action entrusted by the govern- rival territories and as a means to ensure the popu- ment and provide the latter with summaries of the lation’s allegiance. In 2020, sexual violence tripled information it gathers (RNDDH, 16 December 2020). compared to 2019, suggesting that gangs increas- ingly use rape as a weapon of war. The number of WHAT TO WATCH FOR IN 2021: kidnappings for ransom in 2020 also spiked com- pared to 2019, with at least 27 kidnappings recorded The beginning of 2021 will be crucial for the trajecto- by ACLED. While some observers argue that kidnap- ry of demonstration and political violence trends in ping is part of gangs’ ‘terror toolkit’, others claim Haiti (Haiti Libre, 4 Janvier 2021). Although the next that ransoms have been part of a strategy to secure elections are scheduled for September 2021, mem- alternative sources of revenue for gangs that are no bers of the opposition argue that President Moise’s longer sponsored by political elites (Le Nouvelliste, constitutional mandate should end in February 22 June 2020). 2021, while members of the government claim that his mandate extends to 2022. President Moise was The upsurge of violence in Haiti has sparked public elected in 2016 after a first election round held in outrage. Throughout 2020, over 30% of demonstra- 2015 that was suspended for fraud. He took office tions were centered around insecurity and the kill- for his five-year mandate in February 2017 (Europa ing of civilians. In November, the brutal kidnapping Press, 16 January 2021). This conflicting interpre- and killing of 22-year old student Evelyne Sincère tation of the electoral calendar sets the ground for by gang members triggered a wave of demonstra- political unrest. tions. In September, widespread mobilization was reported following the killing of Montferrier Dorval, Furthermore, Moise has announced that elections a prominent constitutional lawyer, by unidentified will be held only after constitutional reforms are armed men. Demonstrators have been questioning approved. Despite an overall consensus among the government’s ability to curb the violence as po- Haitian society of the necessity to reform the current lice forces appear to be either working with criminal governance system and to strengthen institutional groups or are too poorly equipped to face them. stability, the opposition has raised concerns with the Protesters have also denounced police abuses, es- constitutional reform process. In the absence of a pecially following the killing of a student by law en- functional parliament, the president intends to ratify forcement in October. Although fatalities decreased the new constitution with a referendum — a proce- compared to 2018 and 2019, at least four people lost dure strictly prohibited by the current constitution. their lives while demonstrating in 2020. In addition, the president has nominated members of the Independent Advisory Committee, a body The killing of Montferrier is not an isolated case. In in charge of drafting the new constitution (Consti- 2020, ACLED records at least 17 attacks targeting tutionnet, 12 December 2020). This raises further judges, lawyers, political activists, and current and doubts on the impartiality of the constitutional former civil servants. Targeted killings are facilitated reform process. by a weak judicial system and a culture of impunity. In an alleged attempt to address armed violence in In light of a heavy 2021 political agenda, clashes be- the country, President Moise signed two presiden- tween rival gangs and attacks targeting civilians are tial decrees on national security on 26 November, expected to increase as the G-9 alliance continues to establishing the National Intelligence Agency (ANI), fight for control of new voting constituencies and to an institution meant to curb terrorism. The presi- silence opposition ahead of the upcoming elections. dential decree widens the definition of “terrorism,” However, if the agreement between the govern- to include extortion, usually perpetrated by gangs, ment and the gang coalition breaks down, the G-9 but also the obstruction of traffic with barricades, a coalition’s growth into a dominant armed force may common practice used by demonstrators (CEPR, 14 pose a new kind of threat to Haiti’s political stabil- December 2020). The initiative has been criticized ity (Insight Crime, 24 July 2020). Following a clash by civil society organizations as a means to further between police forces and a gang affiliated with the crack down on opposition due to the vague descrip- G-9 coalition in December 2020, the Prime Minister tion of the ANI’s powers and wide authority over announced that further measures against the G-9 security matters. Key ruling positions of the security gang will be taken. This unprecedented direct decla- body are to be nominated by presidential decrees, ration against the G-9 alliance came after the United while agents of the ANI are dotted with immunity States issued sanctions against Jimmy Chérizier and

ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 15 Even if a rupture between the government and its armed wing is unlikely in the near future, this new official positioning against the gang reveals a crack in this alliance amidst mounting international pres- sure. Although the president tasked the newly created ANI with addressing rising insecurity in the coun- try, tackling violence and corruption will require long-term structural reforms of the criminal justice system. The president’s discretionary oversight over this new security instrument might be used to divert the ANI from deterring crime. As it stands, the pres- ident may use the ANI to suppress opposition and crack down on demonstration activity in the name of national stability, rather than targeting criminal groups. The government’s slide toward authoritari- anism risks generating further violence and unrest. FURTHER READING:

Gang Violence: Concepts, Benchmarks and Coding Rules Anti-Government Demonstrations in Latin America & the Caribbean: 2018-2020 Disorder in Latin America: 10 Crises in 2019

ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 16 ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 17 ANALYSIS lash c erests erests as has remained largely decentralized and political- and decentralized largely remained has Lukashen- opposing the than other — neutral ly have leaders time, key over However, regime. ko Tikhanovskaya, President-elect including emerged, been has and 2020 elections August the won who neighboring several by president as acknowledged fled she where overseas, is Tikhanovskaya states. self-imposed In August. in detention her following for support rally to attempting been has she exile, to and Belarus in movement pro-democracy the regime. his and Lukashenko on pressure increase from shifted have demonstrations months, recent In in thousands of involving hundreds events major provin- in events decentralized more to capital the effort an of part likely is This towns. and cities cial allocate to attempts regime’s the complicate to but demonstrations, the suppress to resources worsen- as such factors, other to due be also may months, winter the during conditions ing weather state’s the of fear and coronavirus, the over concerns to response violent regime’s the Despite response. near- remained have movement, demonstrators the peaceful. entirely ly Lukashenko, backs which government, Russian The Lukashen- Belarus. in crisis the in player key the is and Moscow in figure popular a been never has ko pro-Western, balancing game delicate a played has in forces pro-Russian and nationalist, Belarusian of frustration the to much decades, for country his the Lukashenko, for distaste its Despite Kremlin. the victory the of prospect the see ruling elite Russian Slav- another in movement democratic major a of legitimacy own its to threat direct a as nation ic backed has Moscow this, of Because Russia. within po- key provided has and government Lukashenko’s integra- the expand to working support, while litical So long forces. security Belarusian-Russian of tion unlikely is support, it Russian enjoys Lukashenko as ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 18 ACLEDDATA.COM | ANALYSIS ACLED Russian int Russian r, and destabilization destabilization risk of omb Holc

Throughout this time, the demonstration movement movement demonstration time, the this Throughout Demonstrations against Lukashenko’s government government Lukashenko’s against Demonstrations the surrounding surged 2020 and May in began efforts 2020. Regime August in elections presidential regis- to refusing by opposition the undermine to major in resulted and failed candidates certain ter the of support in Belarus across demonstrations Tikha- Svetlana candidate, opposition remaining mas- a won have to claimed Lukashenko novskaya. provoking elections, fraudulent the in victory sive for call to began who demonstrators from outrage authorities State elections. new and resignation his and force excessive with responded immediately the on effect immediate little with though torture, movement. the of strength Eight months into the demonstration movement movement demonstration the into Eight months ahead began that Lukashenko Alexander against demon- the neither 2020 elections, August the of down. Major backed have regime the nor strators continued have country the across demonstrations expressing demonstrators with election, the since de- results, election of falsification the over anger calling and Lukashenko, of resignation mandingthe likewise have They held. be to elections new for securi- the of members of prosecution the for called demon- against brutality for responsible services ty give to refused has regime Lukashenko The strators. superfi- floated instead has demands, and the to in demonstrators on down cracking while reforms cial regime movement. The the weaken to effort an in though power, maintain to support Russian on relies as Lukashenko undermine to attempt may Russia remains It Belarus. over control expand to tries it pursuing in is Russia endstate specific what unclear de- the both involve to likely is it though Belarus, power political current the of co-option or struction dis- the and government Belarusian the in structures demonstrations. pro-democracy the of persal

Franklin Franklin High Belarus: demonstrato regime, that either the Belarusian people or Western politi- pressure proves too destabilizing, or if Moscow turns cal pressure will be able to trigger a transition. on him, Lukashenko’s forces may increase their bru- tality in an effort to stabilize the country if they are WHAT TO WATCH FOR IN 2021: to suddenly and completely collapse. Demonstrations are likely to increase in size and FURTHER READING: number in the spring and summer of 2021, especial- ly as both the weather improves and demonstrators Lukashenko’s Last Legs? The 2020 Belarusian Presi- react to regime efforts to pass superficial reforms. dential Election Despite arbitrary detentions, brutality, and torture, demonstrators have not resorted to large-scale vio- Lukashenko versus Belarus: the State Against the lence to achieve their aims. This is unlikely to change People unless regime behavior worsens. Opposition lead- ers, including Tikhanovskaya, will work closely with European governments and the new Biden admin- istration in the US to put pressure on Lukashenko, though this will likely have minimal effect unless Russia cooperates. Russia may abandon Lukashenko in 2021. Not only has the Kremlin disliked Lukashenko for years, but after eight months of political and economic turmoil in Belarus, Lukashenko has lost much of whatever leverage he may have had as a guarantor of stabil- ity — something highly prized by Moscow. To that end, the Russian government has begun to lay the groundwork for the establishment of pro-Russian political parties in a post-Lukashenko Belarus (The Insider, 25 December 2020). It remains unclear if Russia, or its proxies in Minsk, would fully support the integration of Belarus into Russia through the Union State mechanism established between the two countries in the early 1990s. However, it is likely that Moscow would prefer a Belarusian government that is less actively autonomous than Lukashenko’s, and more in tune with Russia’s global, economic, and political interests. It is also important for the Kremlin that the demonstration movement fail, or be discredited. Moscow may intend to allow Lu- kashenko to take the blame for the brutal repression of demonstrators before turning on him. Lukashenko may attempt to increase political stabil- ity at home, and thereby improve his leverage with Moscow, through a series of sham reforms. These may include a referendum on some changes to the constitution and may include his resignation as president, and the assumption of an equivalent role (Tut.by, 8 December 2020). This could potentially be as leader of the All Belarusian People’s Assem- bly, which would ensure his continued control of the state (ISANS, 28 December 2020; Al Jazeera, 31 December 2020). He will likely attempt to return to his chosen political strategy of past decades and bal- ance pro-Western and pro-Russian forces off of each other in order to ensure his regime’s stability. How- ever, should this approach fail as public and Western

ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 19 ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 20 ANALYSIS target- territories. These groups often regard local lead- local regard often groups These territories. illicit their of development the to obstacles as ers commu- vulnerable of Members activities. economic and people, indigenous farmers, including — nities Other targets. frequent also are — Afro-descendants and members include attacks to exposed groups of including government, the of members former Acción de Junta (JAC: Boards Action Community the journalists; parties; political Spanish); in Comunal, In people. LGBT and students; and teachers women; and FARC former process, peace the of context the into reintegrate to decided who ELN combatants attack. of risk higher at also are society 24 on began lockdown coronavirus Colombia’s Since leaders Several intensified. have risks these March, homes, and communities their inside alone left were bodyguards. or protection without cases many in by intimidation facilitated has confinement The locations. leaders’ these know that groups armed and curfews implemented also have groups Armed sanitary of guise the under coercion of strategies exert to order in coronavirus the against measures September As of territories. disputed in control mea- lockdown and curfew enforced have they 2020, (Insight Colombia of departments 11 least at in sures with areas in 2020), including 3 September Crime, and Cauca, Antioquia, like conflict, of levels high departments. Nariño vio- in upsurge the amplified pandemic the While the to back traced be can increase current the lence, territories several 2016. With of Agreement Peace fragmented and new FARC, the by abandoned left ter- over control dispute to started groups armed criminal Local routes. drug and trafficking ritories FARC, the of factions dissident of dozens groups, cartels international and actors, paramilitary former illegal their expanding for opportunity an saw all strongholds. FARC former into economies ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 21 ACLEDDATA.COM | ANALYSIS ACLED violence violence rising vulnerable groups vulnerable and risk of High Castro social leaders social leaders

Bhavani Apart from being active at the local-level in promot- in local-level the at active being from Apart so- communities, their in projects ing development agree- peace the for advocates often are leaders cial puts activism This victims. conflict’s the and ment criminal by targeted being of risk higher at them relevant over control their extend to aim who groups A record number of attacks against civilians were were civilians against attacks of number record A 600 than more with Colombia, 2020 in in reported 2019 2018 and to compared recorded, fatalities were killed those of 450 Approximately data. ACLED groups, vulnerable of members or leaders social rising 2019. The 300 in approximately to compared increased the to attributed partially be can toll death historically in groups armed competing of presence Valle Cauca, the in as such areas, conflict-affected de Norte and Chocó, Antioquia, Nariño, Cauca, del has there Additionally, departments. Santander start the since killings in increase alarming an been re- killings more with pandemic, coronavirus the of 2020 compared December and April between ported 5 October 2019 (ACLED, in period time same the to been had 2020, there December of end the 2020). By to likely trend week, a per 11 killings of average an 2021. in continue In 2016, the five decades-long conflict between between conflict decades-long five 2016, the In Revolution- the and government Colombian the with ended (FARC) Colombia of Forces ary Armed Agreement. Peace comprehensive a of signing the gov- the milestone, a as celebrated initially Although guide- treaty’s the implement to inability ernment’s power The challenges. significant brought has lines to led FARC the dismantling of the by left vacuum National the as such groups, other of expansion the former Clan, a Gulf the (ELN) and Army Liberation Gaitanistas. the as known also group paramilitary civil- Colombia’s violence, of decades facing After of lack the to due risk further at put been have ians action. government

ing Colombia: Moreover, government operations to enforce coca and indigenous people, at risk of being targeted by eradication and military operations targeting ille- armed groups if they refuse to comply with their gal groups have increased the vulnerability of rural directives. communities. At the end of November, clashes in- tensified between military forces and armed groups Additionally, the pandemic has also put pressure on in Antioquia, Arauca, and Caquetá departments. As government institutions in Colombia, as guarantees no armed group is strong enough to take an offen- of protection for vulnerable groups have decreased sive approach and face state forces directly, they of- since the onset of the health crisis. The continued ten clash with one another — a trend that was on the inability of the government to implement the guide- rise at the end of the year — and attack civilians in lines of the Peace Agreement of 2016 will undoubt- retaliation and as a way to demonstrate their power edly have a negative impact on the security and (International Crisis Group, 6 October 2020). livelihoods of civilians in 2021. The increase in attacks against civilians also gener- FURTHER READING: ated protest activity throughout the country, with citizens taking to the streets to demand government Understanding the Killing of Social Leaders in Co- action. In October, nearly 7,000 members of several lombia during COVID-19 indigenous communities and farmers started a mo- torcade in rural areas of Cauca department to call CDT Spotlight: Attacks on Civilians in Colombia for more protection for their communities. Similarly, at the beginning of November, hundreds of demobi- lized FARC combatants took to the streets in Bogotá to call for government protection against the killings of former combatants. While many former FARC combatants have committed to integrating back into civil society by adhering to government pro- grams of training and reincorporation activities, the government has struggled to keep its promises to help the group. The temporary arrangement for the reintegration camps built for the demobilized rebels has already expired and the government has not yet announced plans to turn them into permanent facilities or villages. More broadly, there are also heightened risks of displacement for vulnerable communities, espe- cially indigenous groups and farmers, who are often caught in the crossfire in territorial disputes between armed groups. On 3 December, the killing of an indigenous leader led to the displacement of around 900 members of an indigenous reserve in the rural area of Bahia Solano municipality,Chocó de- partment, amid fears of escalating violence (InSight Crime, 10 December 2020). WHAT TO WATCH FOR IN 2021:

Due to the coronavirus pandemic, Colombia is experiencing a severe economic contraction and a sharp increase in unemployment, which is expected to continue in 2021. The decrease of employment opportunities can push workers into the informal sector and into illegal economies. Armed groups can take this opportunity to recruit more fighters and in- crease their presence in rural and remote areas with no state presence. This will continue to put social leaders and vulnerable groups, especially farmers

ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 22 ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 23 ANALYSIS ceasefire cross-border cross-border risk of due to restrictions on movement during the pan- the during movement on restrictions to due Azerbaijan and Armenia of economies The demic. restrictions. pandemic-related by hard hit also were mid-July in place took development drastic first The with — militaries Armenian and Azerbaijani the when in engaged — mortars and drones, tanks, of use the northeastern the in days several for clashes direct the from far frontline, Armenia-Azerbaijan the of part from period short the For Republic. Artsakh facto de of deaths the in resulted clashes the 16 July, 12 to soldiers, 16 Azerbaijani and soldiers Armenian five officers. Azerbaijani high-ranking two including forcing damaged, were region the across Buildings flee. to locals Azerbai- and Armenia both months, following the In provocation. of other each accuse to continued jan Azer- in demonstration a staged thousands of Tens large- for calling clashes, July the following baijan 2020). (BBC, 15 July region the in operations scale build- parliament the stormed demonstrators The demon- violent only the in police with ing, clashing the since Azerbaijan in ACLED by recorded stration Arme- in 2018. Meanwhile, in coverage of beginning reactions patriotic with filled was media social nia, clashes. the to reported authorities Artsakh September, 27 On and military attacked had army Azerbaijani the that the in including region, the in infrastructure civilian (Ministry Stepanakert capital, republic’s facto de 44 2020). After 27 September Artsakh, of Defence of most captured forces Azerbaijani fighting, of days De- Artsakh. of regions Kashatagh and Hadrut the in ceasefire a establish to attempts failed three spite only fighting the stop to agreed sides both October, agreement ceasefire a signing after November, 9 on Russia. by mediated ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 24 ACLEDDATA.COM | ANALYSIS ACLED under the control of the the of control the under 1 Nagorno-Karabakh despite Nagorno-Karabakh High Azerbaijan: and in Ghaplanyan the name by which the de facto territory refers to itself. For more on on more For itself. to refers territory facto de the which by name the . —

1. The disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh is internationally recognized recognized internationally is Nagorno-Karabakh of territory disputed 1. The as institutions its and state facto de the to refers ACLED Azerbaijan. of part as Artsakh In 2020, renewed fighting broke out in the disputed disputed the in out broke fighting 2020, renewed In region, Nagorno-Karabakh this methodol- this see states, facto de around decisions coding and methodology primer ogy The coronavirus pandemic further complicated the the complicated further pandemic coronavirus The mon- International process. negotiation deadlocked Nagorno-Kara- the in violations ceasefire of itoring Se- for Organization the by conducted region, bakh (OSCE), stopped Europe in Co-operation and curity Starting from the beginning of 2020, parallel to the the to 2020, parallel of beginning the from Starting process, negotiation the of efficiency decreasing harsher adopt to began conflict the to parties the Aliyev Ilham President Azerbaijani July, In rhetoric. find to efforts international that declared repeatedly "meaning- were conflict the to solution peaceful a and Turkey August, 2020). In 7 July less" (Asbarez, of number a in drills military conducted Azerbaijan minister prime Armenian the Simultaneously, cities. government Artsakh facto de the bring to planned the to side separate a as negotiations peace into (Eur- Azerbaijan by welcomed not move a — conflict 2020). 6 April asianet, In 2018, following the election of Armenia's current current Armenia's of election the 2018, following In Arme- of leaders the Pashinyan, Nikol Minister Prime viola- ceasefire reduce to agreed Azerbaijan and nia after, Shortly (LoC). Contact of Line the along tions dropped violations ceasefire of number average the until remained they where day, 20 per 35 to from deteriorate to began countries the between relations 2020. mid-July de facto Arstakh Republic, as decades-long nego- decades-long as Republic, Arstakh facto de the over Azerbaijan and Armenia between tiations have tensions then, Since failed. area the of status Artsakh facto de the Armenia, between continued Azerbaijan. and Republic, Vardan

violence violence Armenia Armenia According to the joint agreement, Russia deployed Radio of Armenia, 11 January 2021). The status of over 2,000 peacekeepers in the region to prevent Nagorno-Karabakh will remain a key sticking point. further clashes. The deal also committed Arme- Azerbaijani President Aliev has already stated that nia to surrender the territories adjacent to those the region would not have any special status within Azerbaijan had already captured. The 44 days of Azerbaijan (APA, 10 November 2020). Meanwhile, for fighting resulted in a total of over 5,000 military the Armenian side, the priority is international rec- fatalities and 100 civilian fatalities on both sides, the ognition of the independence of the de facto Artsakh displacement of tens of thousands of people, and Republic (Sputnik Armenia, 14 December 2020). the destruction of significant urban infrastructure. These divergent positions will make talks challeng- Although the joint agreement and deployment of ing. peacekeepers has established a new status quo in the region, the president, the parliament, and the Another urgent issue is the demarcation of the final government of Artsakh continue to operate, try- borders between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the de ing to overcome the consequences of the war. At facto Artsakh Republic. The border determination the same time, the agreement ending the war has in the joint statement is vague, indicating that the created turmoil within Armenia. The territorial and sides should stay at the positions they occupied as military losses have exacerbated tensions, starting a of 9 November 2020. Since 26 November, five armed string of opposition demonstrations, demanding the clashes in Hadrut and Kashatagh regions have been resignation of the prime minister. reported, resulting in 20 fatalities. Continued un- certainty surrounding the borders may raise the WHAT TO WATCH FOR IN 2021: risk of new deadly cross-border clashes. Alongside the armed clashes, another deadly threat is that of The trilateral statement signed between Arme- landmines. After the recent war, the region is still nia, Azerbaijan, and Russia ended the war in covered by landmines planted by Azerbaijani and Nagorno-Karabakh, but major issues remain un- Artsakh forces, despite demining efforts. In January addressed. These include the demarcation of the 2021, ACLED records at least seven landmine explo- borders, mechanisms to prevent ceasefire viola- sions in the region (20% of all landmine explosions tions, the safe return of refugees, as well as the in the region since 2018). These numbers may rise in long-term presence and security of the Armenian the future as, according to specialists, the demining community in the region (Kremlin, 10 November process might last another 15 to 20 years (News.am, 2020; International Crisis Group, 10 November 2020). 3 January 2021). Meanwhile, the deployment of Russian peacekeep- Finally, the political crisis is likely to persist in Ar- ers has strengthened Russia's position in the region menia. The opposition Homeland Salvation Move- and has set Moscow as the only mediator between ment — led by Prosperous Armenia, Homeland Yerevan and Baku. The mandate of the Russian Party, Republican Party of Armenia, and Armenian peacekeepers will expire in five years, after which Revolutionary Federation — have organized over 50 both Azerbaijan and Armenia will be in a position to demonstrations across a number of cities calling for call for their withdrawal. This assumes that Russia the prime minister's resignation since 10 November. will try to bring the sides to the negotiation table This marks a significant increase in protest activity to resolve the conflict peacefully, rather than risk a since the 'Velvet Revolution' in 2018. In response to resumption of fighting. At the same time, after pro- the demonstrations, the prime minister has already viding significant military and diplomatic support announced extraordinary elections in 2021 (RFE/RL, for Azerbaijan during the war, Turkey expects a more 25 December 2020). However, as opposition protests active role in the regional processes of the South continue, it is possible that the political parties will Caucasus. The establishment of the Turkish-Russian not compromise, further destabilizing domestic pol- joint center for monitoring the ceasefire in Na- itics in Armenia, and jeopardizing potential peace gorno-Karabakh in 2021 is an attempt by Ankara to negotiations. strengthen its position in the region (Azernews, 18 December 2020). FURTHER READING: Despite the fact that on 11 January 2021, during Civilians Under Fire in Nagorno-Karabakh: Septem- the meeting in Moscow, the leaders of Armenia and ber - November 2020 Azerbaijan agreed to open the regional roads and railways between their two countries, still there is no ACLED Methodology and Coding Decisions around announced format or timetable for renewed nego- Political Conflict and Demonstrations in Central Asia tiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan (Public & the Caucasus

ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 25 ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 26 ANALYSIS amidst fallout amidst an extensive campaign of US drone strikes, strikes, drone US of campaign extensive an amidst ‘local’ of build-up the (i.e. operations coalition of phase heavy a and forces), counter-terrorism infighting. pro-Hadi and Houthis the between conflict The UN-brokered the 2020. While in escalated forces 2019, in fruit some borne had Agreement Stockholm had have to seems it Hodeidah, around especially up opened forces 2020. Houthi in effects adverse objective main the with year, last fronts new several and anchor the is Marib city. Marib of control gain to govern- internationally-recognized the of stronghold Houthis the enable might city losingment, the and and fields oil nearby the towards advance further to gover- Hadramawt and Shabwah of areas desert the norates. continu- Houthis 2020, the of beginning the Since north- west, the from Marib towards advanced ously writing, this of time the At southwest. and west, kilometers of dozens several only are frontlines the seems power of balance current The city. the from intensive an Despite Houthis. the of favor in tilt to the stop to coalition Saudi-led the by campaign air forces military and tribes pro-Hadi offensive, Houthi takeover a achieve Houthis the If losing ground. are be will fallout humanitarian 2021, the in city Marib of people 30,000 of city a from grew Marib devastating. pro- it as war, civil the during million two almost to governorates other from IDPs for haven safe a vided 2020). 17 April Group, Crisis (International STC the between time, negotiations same the At Riyadh the implement to government Hadi the and the 2019 under November in signed — Agreement con- the solve to order in Arabia, Saudi of auspices breakthrough a witnessed — Yemen southern in flict newly a join to agreed STC 2020. The December in allow- for exchange in government Hadi constituted ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 27 ACLEDDATA.COM | ANALYSIS ACLED humanitarian humanitarian risk of High J. Sulz offensive on Marib Marib on offensive

Matthias The third main conflict is an Islamist insurgency insurgency Islamist an is conflict main third The Peninsula Arabian the in Qaeda Al by launched State Islamic the of branch Yemeni the and (AQAP) opera- limited possess currently groups (IS). Both crumbled have and country the in capacities tional The second conflict is linked to the secessionist secessionist the to linked is conflict second The political a (STC), Council Transitional Southern advocates 2017 that May in established organization southern in state independent an of creation the for across influence its extended has STC The Yemen. net- vast a through governorate southern Yemen’s by backed are which of most groups, armed of work fight- are forces pro-STC the of some While UAE. the Hadi against fight others Houthis, the ing against governorates. southern the in loyalists The war in Yemen consists of a variety of intercon- of variety a of consists Yemen in war The powers involving regional conflicts local nected conflicts these of first The influence. for competing movement revivalist Zaydi a — Houthis the pits seized that highlands northern Yemen’s from hailing interna- the against 2014 — in Sana’a, capital, the President by led government tionally-recognized support the enjoys Hadi. Hadi Mansour Abdrabbuh the like allies with together which, Arabia Saudi of of support intervention in military a launched UAE, prevent to order 2015 in March in government the city port southern the overtaking from Houthis the Aden. of Six years into the conflict, the scale of destruction in in destruction of scale the conflict, the into Six years es- ACLED levels: unprecedented reached has Yemen as died have 130,000 people approximately timates 13,000 over including violence, the of result direct a 19,000 than More attacks. targeted in killed civilians directly 2020 stemming in reported were fatalities reported total in 29% decrease a — conflict the from year deadliest third the still 2019, but from fatalities war. the of

the Yemen: ing the government to move back into Aden, the in- territories (ACAPS, 14 January 2021), and the desig- terim capital. How exactly the restructuring and re- nation may disrupt remittance flows, upon which as deployment of security units, foreseen in the Riyadh many as 10% of Yemenis rely (Reuters, 14 January Agreement, will be implemented is yet to be seen. 2021). The Biden administration decided to suspend Moreover, it is unclear how and why the STC would the designation for 30 days, however, there is no give up control over the de facto minimized south- indication of how fast and if the designation will be ern state under their control in Aden, Lahij, Socotra, reversed (Reuters, 22 January 2021; Twitter 26 Janu- and some parts of Abyan, Ad Dali, and Shabwah. ary 2021). As current US support for Saudi-led forces in Yemen is negligible, the new administration’s Nevertheless, first steps were achieved. Both forces indications that it will end military assistance to the retreated from the Abyan frontlines, while neutral coalition will likely fail to significantly affect the tra- elements of the Presidential Guard moved back into jectory of the war (Middle East Eye, 19 January 2021; the Presidential Palace in Aden. Earlier purported Reuters, 10 November 2018). breakthroughs in the implementation of the Riyadh Agreement throughout 2020 had failed to solve the Finally, the breakthrough in implementing the Ri- conflict on the ground. In all southern governorates, yadh Agreement to solve the southern issue opens the success in implementing the Riyadh Agreement a window of opportunity to unify the ranks of south- will be crucial in determining future patterns of ern secessionists and the Hadi government against violence. Houthi forces. This could provide the necessary manpower to fend off Houthi advances on Marib. WHAT TO WATCH FOR IN 2021: The ultimate success or failure of the Riyadh Agree- ment on the one hand, and the indirect negotiations While 2020 was met with a mixture of hope and between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis on the other, scepticism over the prospects for peace in Yemen, will be critical for the future of the war in Yemen in the actual trajectory of the conflict has dashed any 2021. hopes for an end to the fighting in 2021. Houthi forc- es continued advancing on several fronts, especially in Al Jawf and Marib governorates, while pro-Hadi FURTHER READING: forces barely registered any successes on the battle- field. This imbalance of power will make it unlikely The Wartime Transformation of AQAP in Yemen that Houthi forces will agree to a ceasefire or inclu- sive peace process in the short term. As long as one Little-Known Military Brigades and Armed Groups in side in the conflict believes it can overpower the Yemen: A Series other militarily — as Houthi forces currently do — the conflict will not end. Yemen’s Fractured South: ACLED’s Three-Part Series In the same vein, successes in negotiations between Inside Ibb: A Hotbed of Infighting in Houthi-Con- Saudi Arabia and the Houthis over border insecuri- trolled Yemen ty could lead to a significant decrease in the Saudi war effort. Saudi disengagement will also affect the Yemen Snapshots: 2015-2019 trajectory of the civil war in Yemen. Nevertheless, as long as neither of the Yemeni sides to the war come Yemen’s Urban Battlegrounds: Violence and Politics to an agreement between themselves, and in the in Sana’a, Aden, Ta’izz and Hodeidah absence of an enduring stalemate on the battlefield, violence will continue. ACLED Methodology and Coding Decisions around the Yemen Civil War The US government’s designation of the Houthis as a “terrorist organization,” which went into effect on 19 January, just before the Biden administra- tion took power, could also contribute to increased humanitarian fallout. While the designation includes exemptions for agricultural products and medical supplies, among other things, it nevertheless threat- ens to exacerbate the humanitarian and economic crises in the country. Companies and organizations may not want to risk the liability exposure that comes with shipping products to Houthi-controlled

ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 28 ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 29 ANALYSIS the for threat to Total’s LNG projects have remained consis- remained have LNG projects Total’s to threat exert to able been also have militants Islamist tent. posi- territorial strategic over control maintain and widespread The Praia. da Mocimboa tions, including to forces state of ability limited the show attacks roads. access and towns on hold their consolidate gov- the conflict, the by stretched forces state With pri- from support on relied increasingly has ernment Advisory Dyck the notably most forces, security vate While militias. self-defense local and (DAG), Group be- has DAG ground, the on boots providing not to support air providing partner important an come The Delgado. Cabo in operations during forces state their by evident made is forces DAG of importance 2020, in events 36 conflict least at in involvement insurgents. with engagements 25% of than more with signed been reportedly have contracts Further military a Group, Paramount with as well as DAG, for mechanisms support foremost the as supplier, 10 Intelligence, (Africa government Mozambican the support training provide will 2020). DAG December ongoing their to addition in troops government for will 2020). Paramount 16 July (Zitamar, support air Mozambican the of capacity the increasing on focus support, air vehicles, armored providing by military 10 Decem- Intelligence, (Africa pilots of training and 2020). ber acknowledged Nyusi Filipe President Additionally, inter- secure to out reaching is he that November in competency, and capacity build to support national assis- external require will fight the acknowledging 2020). 19 November Mozambique, (Club of tance general a maintained has Mozambique this, Despite to ground the on boots foreign deploy to reticence 17 Maverick, (Daily fighting actual the with assist capable are forces own its 2020), insisting December alone. insurgents the routing of ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 30 ACLEDDATA.COM | ANALYSIS ACLED in sight in Jasmine Opperman Jasmine Lay and Lay

Timothy In December, attacks were launched near Mute in in Mute near launched were attacks December, In liqui- flagship its close to Total forcing district, Palma time, the that Since (LNG) project. gas natural fied Insecurity deepened in Mozambique last year, with with year, last Mozambique in deepened Insecurity escalat- Delgado Cabo in insurgency Islamist the 2020, ACLED During levels. unprecedented ing to province, the in 1,600 fatalities than more records fatalities of number the times three than more an demonstrated also 2019. Insurgents in reported territory of expanse large a across operate to ability operation- an establishing province, the throughout northern- the from 11 districts, across presence al Metuge and Ancuabe to Nangade of district most have operations Militant south. the in districts undermined and infrastructure critical threatened control. territorial Mozambican The insurgency in Cabo Delgado, built on years of of years on built Delgado, Cabo in insurgency The governance effective of absence the with discontent 2017 October in itself announced first region, the in of capital district eponymous the in attacks with pre- are insurgents Though the Praia. da Mocimboa extremist an youth, local of comprised dominantly pollination cross in resulted has narrative Islamist 11 Au- African, East (The extremists Tanzanian with Congolese and Somali to exposure 2018), and gust Congo- and Ugandan the including influences, jihadi (Mail Forces Democratic Allied the group, rebel lese 2020). 4 May & Guardian, In Mozambique’s northern Cabo Delgado province, province, Delgado Cabo northern Mozambique’s In insurgency, Islamist sophisticated increasingly an cholera of outbreaks and IDPs, of numbers growing the expose to combined have COVID-19 as well as effectively in constraints capacity government’s constraints, These insecurity. worsening countering neighboring into incursions insurgent along with into conflict Delgado Cabo the pushing are Tanzania, theater. internationalized increasingly an

Cabo Delgado insurgency insurgency Cabo Delgado No end Mozambique: Notably, insurgents launched five attacks across the December 2020). The government has also report- border in Tanzania in October, clashing with security edly reached out to France, with a maritime co- forces, burning homes, looting goods, and killing operation agreement under discussion to provide civilians. The attacks — first at Kitaya, then at the training and to strengthen coastal security (Club border post at Kilambo, and then in the villages of of Mozambique, 17 July 2020). France is well posi- Nanyamba, Mihambwe, and Michenjele — constitute tioned to lend its support, with a naval base located the first major insurgent push into Tanzania. at its island territory of Mayotte in the Mozambique Channel. At the same time, militants have actively targeted civilian populations within Cabo Delgado, with FURTHER READING: violence against civilians amounting to nearly 70% of all organized violence recorded in the province Weekly infographics from ACLED’s Cabo Ligado con- in 2020. The attacks have caused increased civilian flict observatory displacement in the region. As of December 2020, more than 500,000 IDPs were reportedly resident in CDT Spotlight: Escalation in Mozambique Cabo Delgado (The New Humanitarian, 21 December 2020). The displacement of local communities has added ever increasing demands on limited local resourc- es. A warning by the World Food Programme (WFP) asserted that current budget allocations are insuffi- cient to sustain support for IDPs (Lusa, 24 November 2020). This lack of budgetary support has the po- tential to worsen insecurity, compounded by chol- era outbreaks and the highest rates of coronavirus outside of the capital, Maputo (UNICEF, 25 Novem- ber 2020). In November, a local leader was beaten to death at the Nangua IDP camp in Metuge, accused of being responsible for a deadly outbreak of cholera in the camp. WHAT TO WATCH FOR IN 2021:

In 2021, the absence of a sustained turnaround strategy suggests that a campaign of unrelenting at- tacks will continue and state forces will be limited to containing hot spots without eroding the insurgents’ capacity. Militants are likely to continue pushing the geographical bounds of their operations, including further incursions into Tanzania. The government, meanwhile, will continue to rely heavily on private security forces and increasingly on local self-defense militias to augment their limited capacities. Further international involvement in the conflict is also likely, including a potential shift in the reluc- tance of the Mozambican government to accept di- rect military support. The ongoing successes of the Cabo Delgado insurgency have left the Mozambican government under pressure from several countries, especially those interested in LNG developments, to press ahead with intensifying its security response. Several countries have publicly offered support, including Portugal — Mozambique’s former colonial power — and the United States (Daily Maverick, 17 December 2020).

ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 31 ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 32 ANALYSIS at operations and jihadi-on-jihadi fighting are concen- are fighting jihadi-on-jihadi and operations particular this region, border tri-state the in trated consolidation militant overshadow not should focus and region the of parts other in underway processes and JNIM Both impact. longer-term potential their and resilience demonstrated repeatedly ISGS have victories tactical so far, Hence, recover. to ability to leading not are forces local and international for play- whose militants, jihadi the for defeats strategic winning by logic of the on hinge to continues book changing are they Instead, losing (completely). not enemies its engaging increasingly JNIM is behaviors. fatal recent by evidenced as violence, using remote Multi- Nations United French, targeting IED attacks Mali in Mission Stabilization Integrated dimensional to resorts ISGS often forces. Malian and (MINUSMA), pop- civilian on pressure exerts and violence mass cattle and extortion tax excessive through ulations rustling. Politics Fragile August an up to leading and over boiling Unrest and complexity the underscored d’état 2020 coup within stakeholders Key crisis. Mali’s of uncertainty would Mali that feared community international the materialize. not did which chaos, into further slide escalating witnessed has country the Nevertheless, instance, For flashpoints. new and sub-conflicts re- southern the to operations its JNIM expanded 2020) and 20 November (Dakaractu, Kayes of gions Coun- “Dogon region’s Mopti central the In Sikasso. JNIM between increased, substantially conflict try,” Dogon-ma- the and side one on militias Fulani and other. the on movement Ambassagou Na Dan jority commu- local targeted incessantly also sides Both 2019 even with par on remained Fatalities nities. unprecedented of spate a 2019 experienced though Niono region’s Segou neighboring In atrocities. mass com- Fulani and Bambara between relations Cercle, ACLED ANALYSIS | ACLEDDATA.COM | 33 ACLEDDATA.COM | ANALYSIS ACLED fragile politics fragile crisis and unabated unabated an of Insurgency Insurgency Sahel: center Nsaibia

Héni A progressive change began when France, in ear- in France, when began change progressive A and surging troops by posture its 2020, shifted ly While forces. local alongside up operations scaling the accompanied abuses rights human widespread and 2020), international 20 May (ACLED, operations momentum. regained progressively forces local between war turf full-fledged a into descent The insurgency. the weakened ISGS further JNIM and count- and organizations two the Fighting between substantial a for accounts operations er-militancy recorded conflict and fatalities reported in increase 2019 comparing When Faso. Burkina and Mali in a as doubled fatalities militant 2020, estimated and JNIM and actions. military state offensive of result an causing 121 occasions, least at on ISGS clashed of number sheer The 2020. in fatalities 712 estimated cumulative the of indicative also are losses militant counter-militancy While insurgency. the of growth As the Sahel crisis nears a decade, numbers of of numbers decade, a nears crisis Sahel As the of acts armed, organized from fatalities and events full totals 2019’s 2020 surpassed in violence political escalating This Niger. and Faso, Burkina Mali, in How- year. consecutive fifth the for continued trend comparing when shift significant a was there ever, In years. two past the in violence of patterns conflict when apex its reached insurgency Sahelian the 2019, al-Islam Nusrat Jama'at Qaeda-affiliated Al the Greater the in State Islamic and (JNIM) wal-Muslimin tri-state “the overran (ISGS) simultaneously Sahara three all in forces Government border” region. border the from withdraw to forced were countries under territories disputed previously leave and areas in forces government left This control. militant jihadi offen- militant the and position, defensive highly a coordination effective of lack the underscored sive member affected the between interoperability and Force. G5 Sahel the of states Assessing the Insurgency

the The munities deteriorated into conflict. Consequently, ant activities including cross-border movements Donso hunters strengthened their hold of the urban are more frequently recorded across these states’ areas, causing many Fulani pastoralists to flee. At territories and bordering regions. While Mali, Burki- the same time, Katiba Macina militants (part of the na Faso, and Niger undoubtedly remain Sahelian JNIM alliance) control the surrounding rural areas militants’ primary focus, observed precursors, even and have imposed an embargo to subjugate Bamba- if transitory or for logistical purposes, in neighboring ra farmer communities along the river area (ACLED, states cannot be ignored. External pressure could 17 December 2020). potentially push militant encroachment into new areas and circumstantially alter jihadi militants’ The insecurity afflicting the region is accompanied tactical calculus. by a soaring humanitarian emergency with more than two million people displaced (Le Monde, 22 WHAT TO WATCH FOR IN 2021: January 2021) and rampant food insecurity (WFP, December 2020). Burkina Faso has shown to be Previous large-scale operations have only achieved particularly vulnerable, being the epicenter of the short-term gains and the military effort has yet to humanitarian crisis. Elections held in November translate into dividends for populations in the tar- proved the central government’s tenuous hold on geted areas. International and local forces need to the periphery, as no voting took place in numerous establish and provide security after ongoing opera- localities in the country’s north and east. Despite a tions have ended if these are to have any useful and continuously worsening security situation, with 14 lasting impact. provinces under a state of emergency for more than two years, incumbent President Roch Kabore was Fragile relations between states and communities re-elected for a second term in elections that took and armed groups instrumentalizing ethnic and place amid a relative calm (Sahelblog, 30 November communal cleavages have led to some of the dead- 2020). liest violence ever recorded in the Sahel. Recent attacks by Boko Haram (JAS) and ISGS underscore Neighboring Niger held its first presidential election that the region remains at imminent risk of experi- round in December, putting the country on course encing further mass atrocities at the hands of jihadi for its first democratic transition of power. Former militant groups, community and ethnic-based mili- Interior Minister Mohamed Bazoum, and protege of tias, and state forces. incumbent President Mahamadou Issoufou, is the favorite for the second round scheduled for February FURTHER READING: 2021. Niger has often been considered less overrun by armed groups compared to its neighbors Mali State Atrocities in the Sahel: The Impetus for Coun- and Burkina Faso. Yet, the country faces several terinsurgency Results is Fueling Government Attacks distinct threats: the Boko Haram insurgency in the on Civilians Lake Chad basin, the Sahelian insurgency driven by ISGS and JNIM in Tillaberi, and a criminal insurgency Mali: Any End to the Storm? raging along its border with Nigeria. Niger was also largely spared the trend of mass violence against ci- vilians troubling its neighbors, though this began to change in 2020. Recent attacks in Toumour by Boko Haram (Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Ji- had) — both a predecessor and offshoot of Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP) — and ISGS in Tchomabangou and Zaroumadarey demonstrate the conflict’s increasingly dangerous scope in Niger. Threatening Neighbors The lingering presence of Sahelian militant groups along the northernmost borders of the West African littoral states continues to pose a significant threat. Benin and Ivory Coast are especially susceptible to the risks of jihadi militant violence due to political instability, internal vulnerabilities, and social dy- namics in border communities. Clandestine mili-

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