Disarmament and International Security Committee

BACKGROUND GUIDE

Vancouver Model United Nations The Twentieth Annual Session | January 29–31, 2021

Dear Delegates, William Tsai Secretary-General My name is Emily Ni, and it is my utmost pleasure to welcome you to the Disarmament and International Security Committee at Vancouver Model United Nations 2021.

Five years ago, I stumbled into the esoteric world of Model UN with the intent of seeking Vivian Gu academic enrichment. Twenty conferences later, at the end of this long journey, I can Director-General confidently say that the impact that Model UN has had on my life extends far beyond any intellectual benefit. Now, I can only hope to instill the same passion in you, the delegate, Derek Wu as my directors did for me. Cherish the memories you make as a delegate, and learn today Chief of Staff so that you may lead tomorrow.

Tyler Rosenzweig Composing the rest of your Dais are Leo Li, Michelle Zhai, and David Xia. Leo is a senior Director of Logistics at Steveston- Secondary, Michelle is a senior at York House School, and David is a sophomore at St George’s School. Together, we look forward to welcoming you virtually come January!

Joyce Chen VMUN prides itself on its high level of educational discourse and professionalism. In the USG General Assemblies Disarmament and International Security Committee, delegates should come prepared with a comprehensive understanding of their committee’s mandate, the topic at hand, and Ethan Jasny their country’s foreign policy. These topics require thorough research and knowledge to USG Specialized Agencies allow for constructive debate; your work as a delegate will not only benefit yourself, but the committee as a whole. Vivian Liang USG Conference The entire dais team welcomes you to the Disarmament and International Security Committee at VMUN 2021. Please do not hesitate to contact any of us at [email protected] Jonah Ezekiel if you have any questions or concerns; I look forward to a weekend of rewarding debate. USG Finance Godspeed, Laura Choi USG Communications Emily Ni DISEC Director Armaan Jaffer USG Delegate Affairs

Mia Tsao USG Delegate Affairs

Position Paper Policy

What is a Position Paper?

A position paper is a brief overview of a country’s stance on the topics being discussed by a particular committee. Though there is no specific format the position paper must follow, it should include a description of your positions your country holds on the issues on the agenda, relevant actions that your country has taken, and potential solutions that your country would support.

At Vancouver Model United Nations, delegates should write a position paper for each of the committee’s topics. Each position paper should not exceed one page, and should all be combined into a single document per delegate.

For the Disarmament and International Security Committee, position papers are not mandatory but highly recommended, especially for a delegate to be considered for an award.

Formatting

Position papers should:

— Include the name of the delegate, his/her country, and the committee

— Be in a standard font (e.g. Times New Roman) with a 12-point font size and 1-inch document margins

— Not include illustrations, diagrams, decorations, national symbols, watermarks, or page borders

— Include citations and a bibliography, in any format, giving due credit to the sources used in research (not included in the 1-page limit)

Due Dates and Submission Procedure

Position papers for this committee must be submitted by midnight on January 22nd, 2021. Once your position paper is complete, please save the file as your last name, your first name and send it as an attachment in an email, to your committee’s email address, with the subject heading as your last name, your first name — Position Paper. Please do not add any other attachments to the email or write anything else in the body.

Both your position papers should be combined into a single PDF or Word document file; position papers submitted in another format will not be accepted.

Each position paper will be manually reviewed and considered for the Best Position Paper award.

The email address for this committee is [email protected].

Anglophone Crisis in Cameroon ...... 4 Overview ...... 4 Timeline ...... 5 Historical Analysis ...... 7 Colonial Rule and Independence...... 7 Cameroon under ...... 9 Past UN/International Involvement ...... 9 Western Liberal Democracies ...... 10

China ...... 11

United Nations Involvement ...... 11 Current Situation ...... 11 Origins of the Crisis ...... 12

Stalemate ...... 13

Economic Impact ...... 14 Humanitarian Impact ...... 14

Peace Talks ...... 15 Possible Solutions and Controversies ...... 16 Government Restructuring ...... 16

Reviving Peace Talks ...... 17

International Involvement and ...... 18 Bloc Positions ...... 19 Cameroon ...... 19

Nigeria ...... 19

United States ...... 20

France ...... 20

European Union ...... 20

Russia, China, and the African Union ...... 21 Discussion Questions...... 21 Additional Resources ...... 22

Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 1 Bibliography...... 23 Combating Global Piracy ...... 27 Overview ...... 27 Timeline ...... 28 Historical Analysis ...... 29 Past UN/International Involvement ...... 30 INTERPOL Involvement ...... 30

UNODC Involvement ...... 30

NATO and EU Involvement ...... 31 Current Situation ...... 31 Methods of Piracy ...... 31

Accessibility of Maritime Piracy ...... 32

Challenges Faced by Legal Bodies ...... 33

Piracy Financing ...... 34 Blurred Territory ...... 34

Case Study: and the Gulf of Aden ...... 35

Case Study: Gulf of Guinea ...... 37

Case Study: Straits of Singapore and Malacca ...... 38 Possible Solutions and Controversies ...... 39 Naval Anti-Piracy Operations ...... 40

Strengthening Ships' Onboard Defence Capabilities ...... 40

Targeting Corruption and Strengthening Judicial Systems ...... 41

International Cooperation ...... 42

Negotiations over Amnesty ...... 42 Bloc Positions ...... 43 Coastal Developing Nations ...... 43

North America, Europe, and Australasia ...... 43

South America and the Caribbean ...... 44

Asia ...... 44

Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 2 Discussion Questions ...... 44 Bibliography ...... 46

Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 3 in Cameroon

Overview

Since 2016, Cameroon has been locked in a sectarian conflict between the country's French-speaking majority and English-speaking minority. The origins of the conflict lie in deep historic, economic, and cultural divides between the Southern Cameroons region of the British Cameroons, a British mandate territory from 1916 to 1961, and French Cameroun, a French mandate territory from 1916 to 1960.1 After the two regions united to form Cameroon in 1961, the country became a unitary state ruled by a dominant central government in 1972, stripping Southern Cameroons—the former British territory—of its autonomous status and giving increased power to the President. 2 Since then, Anglophone regions have historically been underfunded and underrepresented in government. Moreover, the shift of control over the former Southern Cameroons' economy to the central government in Yaoundé has left Anglophone regions economically vulnerable compared to their Francophone counterparts. 3 Subsequently, a vocal but politically unpopular demand for an independent Anglophone state known as has plagued the Francophone-dominated Cameroonian central government.

The present crisis stems from protests that erupted in October 2016, during which lawyers and teachers began striking against the imposition of French civil law systems and the appointment of Francophone judges in Cameroon's Northwest and Southwest districts—the administrative divisions that now comprise the former British Southern Cameroons—that are primarily Anglophone. 4 The initially peaceful protests have since escalated into a devastating armed civil conflict. Throughout demonstrations in 2016 and 2017, government forces fired live rounds, used tear gas, and violently attacked scores of protestors.5 Both sides have committed atrocious actions in order to further their interests; Anglophone militants and separatists have frequently carried out violent attacks against government institutions, Francophone civilians, and even Francophone schools, including teachers and students.6 Consequently, the country has faced international condemnation from the U.S. State Department, the United Nations (UN) Centre for Human Rights and Democracy in Central , and the African Union Commission, among other international bodies.7 Over the course of the conflict, there have

1 "British Cameroons (1916–61) and French Cameroun (1916–60)," Encyclopædia Britannica, n.d., https://www.britannica.com/place/Cameroon/British-Cameroons-1916-61-and-French-Cameroun-1916-60. 2 Verkijika G. Fanso, "History explains why Cameroon is at war with itself over language and culture," The Conversation, October 15, 2017, https://theconversation.com/history-explains-why-cameroon-is-at-war-with-itself-over-language-and-culture-85401. 3 Piet Konings and Francis B. Nyamnjoh, "The Anglophone Problem in Cameroon," The Journal of Modern African Studies 35, no. 2 (1997): 214. 4 "Cameroon’s Anglophone Crisis: How to Get to Talks?" International Crisis Group, May 2, 2019, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon/272-crise-anglophone-au-cameroun-comment-arriver-aux- pourparlers. 5 "Cameroon Events of 2018," Human Rights Watch, n.d., https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/cameroon. 6 Ibid. 7 "UN shocked and outraged over horrific attack on school in Cameroon," UN News, October 26, 2020, https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/10/1076112.

Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 4 been an estimated 3,000 casualties and over 900,000 displaced civilians,8 with over 60,000 fleeing to neighbouring Nigeria. 9 In Anglophone regions themselves, 800,000 children are no longer in schools, and a third of the population requires aid.10

The greatest barrier to successful negotiations remains the conflicting opinions of Anglophone opposition groups. Opposition groups encompass both separatists—who demand complete secession and independence— and federalists—who favour regional autonomous government within Cameroon. To move forward and resolve the conflict, Cameroon and the international community must address the humanitarian crisis that has resulted from prolonged violence and determine how to best reconcile the goals of federalists, separatists, and the Francophone central government.

Timeline

1922 — A League of Nations mandate divides the former German colony of Kamerun into two separate regions controlled by Britain and France. The British mandate is split between two areas: Northern Cameroons and Southern Cameroons. With the dissolution of the League of Nations in 1946, the territories are reclassified as UN trust territories.

1961 — A United Nations referendum held in the British Cameroons determines that Northern Cameroons will join a newly independent Nigeria, while Southern Cameroons will be integrated with the Republic of Cameroon—the former French colony—to form the Federal Republic of Cameroon.

1972 — A constitutional amendment replaces the federal republic with a unitary state named the United Republic of Cameroon. The former Southern Cameroons lose their autonomous status within Cameroon in a change seen as a breach of the constitution by Anglophone groups.11

1982 — Cameroonian President Ahmadou Ahidjo resigns and is replaced by Paul Biya. Biya’s presidency is marked by electoral corruption, consolidation of power, and close ties with France.

April 2–3, 1993 — Activists introduce the Buea Declaration at an assembly of Anglophone groups known as the All Anglophone Conference (AAC), calling for the restoration of the 1961 federal state. The subsequent 1994 Bamenda Declaration threatens the declaration of Anglophone independence if a federal state is not restored.

January 9, 2003 — The pro-independence Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC) and Southern Cameroons Peoples Organisation (SCAPO) file a joint complaint against the Republic of Cameroon to the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR).

8 R. Maxwell Bone, "Ahead of peace talks, a who’s who of Cameroon’s separatist movements," , July 8, 2020, https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2020/07/08/Cameroon-Ambazonia-conflict-peace-whos-who. 9 "More Cameroonian refugees flee to Nigeria, bringing total arrivals close to 60,000 mark," UNHCR, February 13, 2020, https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2020/2/5e452d2b4/cameroonian-refugees-flee-nigeria-bringing-total-arrivals-close-60000- mark.html. 10 "Cameroon," International Crisis Group, n.d., https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon. 11 Konings and Nyamnjoh, "The Anglophone Problem in Cameroon," 210-211.

Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 5 May 27, 2009 — The ACHPR rules that, in the country's treatment of the people of South Cameroon, the Republic of Cameroon has violated Articles 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7.1, 10, 11, 19, and 26 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.12

October 6, 2016 — An organization formed by lawyer and teacher trade unions in the Anglophone regions named the Cameroon Anglophone Civil Society Consortium (CACSC) begin strikes and protests to defend Anglophone legal systems after the installment of Francophone judges in Anglophone regions. 100 protestors are arrested and six are later killed by Cameroonian government security forces.

January 2017 — Lawyer activists from CACSC reject joining a committee for dialogue with the Cameroonian government, demanding all arrested activists are released prior to negotiation. Upon the organization preparing written schemes for a federal state, the government bans CACSC activist activities, labels related actions as security threats, and places internet blockades in certain cities. The crisis in Cameroon begins to garner international attention.

September 9, 2017 — The Ambazonia Governing Council (AGovC) directs its military arm, the (ADF), to initiate military actions against the Cameroonian government; the ADF strikes a military base in Besongabang, Manyu, killing three people. The separatists arranged two additional bombings, targeting police and security forces.

October 1, 2017 — The Southern Cameroons Ambazonia Consortium United Front (SCACUF), consists of various pro-independence groups, unilaterally proclaims the independence of Ambazonia and forms the Interim Government of Ambazonia (IG).

May 2, 2019 — Imprisoned by the Biya government, , the first President of Ambazonia, declares the dissolution of the interim Ambazonian cabinet of Samuel Ikome Sako—worsening the fragile relationships between IG factions.

September 30, 2019 — Biya's government opens the —negotiations aiming to resolve the crisis. Upon its conclusion in October, the Cameroonian government declares the Dialogue a success, offering new autonomous powers and demilitarization efforts to Anglophone; opposition leaders dismiss the Dialogue as a mere publicity stunt, with many opposition leaders left out of the Dialogue entirely.13

January 2020 — Internal separatist Anglophone conflicts rise to an extreme when the Southern Cameroons Restoration Forces (SCRF) threatens to attack Anglophone militias in opposition to the group. The SCRF abducts 40 soldiers from the ADF—later murdering six of them.

12 "266/03 Kevin Mgwanga Gunme et al / Cameroon," African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, May 27, 2009, https://www.achpr.org/sessions/descions?id=189. 13 Moki Edwin Kindzeka, "Separatist Fighting Continues in Cameroon a Year After Major National Dialogue," Voice of America News, October 4, 2020, https://www.voanews.com/africa/separatist-fighting-continues-cameroon-year-after-major-national- dialogue.

Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 6 July 2020 — After international calls for a global ceasefire to combat the COVID-19 pandemic, officials of the Cameroonian government meet with the imprisoned Ayuk Tabe and other imprisoned IG leaders to negotiate a ceasefire. Other IG factions and Anglophone groups reject Ayuk Tabe’s authority to negotiate.

Historical Analysis

Colonial Rule and Independence

Like many African nations, Cameroon fell under colonial rule—specifically, German rule—from 1884 to 1916 during the "Scramble for Africa" era.14 After Germany’s defeat in World War I, the British and French quickly occupied and claimed the territory. Cameroon was designated a League of Nations mandate and control of the territory was divided between the United Kingdom and France. The British mandate encompassed a strip of land along the present-day Nigerian border that consisted of the Northern and Southern Cameroons—together known as British Cameroons. 15 The British were largely neglectful in their colonial rule, and the territory experienced limited development. The main economic activity at the time took place on plantations—based on resources like rubber or cocoa—started by the Germans, but living conditions remained harsh for those in the British territory compared to their French counterparts.16 French Cameroun encompassed the remaining larger portion of former German territory and experienced similar development with regards to agricultural production. However, French Cameroun experienced considerably better living conditions, with a higher gross domestic product (GDP) and stronger infrastructure, education, and healthcare in comparison to the British mandate. 17 This historical disparity in economic development foreshadows the later inequalities between Anglophone and Francophone regions of modern Cameroon, and offers reasoning as to why the bulk of economic development during future periods of rapid industrialization took place in Francophone rather than Anglophone areas. Nevertheless, both the British and French territories were subject to harsh mercantilist policy under colonial rule and formed fragile economies dependent on imperialist powers, with agricultural development or other industries limited to a primary level.18

14 "German Kamerun (1884–1916)," Encyclopædia Britannica, n.d., https://www.britannica.com/place/Cameroon/German- Kamerun-1884-1916. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid.

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Figure 1: The division of British Cameroons, 1961.19

After World War II, global decolonization efforts ensued rapidly, and Cameroon was no exception. Independence movements gained traction in both British Cameroons and French Cameroun during this time; following a rebellion in French Cameroun by the Union of the Peoples of Cameroon (UPC), independence was granted to French Cameroun.20 Meanwhile, the British territory split along its Northern and Southern boundary lines. Citizens of Southern Cameroons elected to unite with French Cameroun, while North Cameroons united with Nigeria following a plebiscite held in 1961.21 On October 1, 1961, the British Southern Cameroons and the newly-independent French Cameroun became the Federal Republic of Cameroon.22 The merger resulted in a federal structure, which stipulated that both states—and their distinct linguistic groups—should have had equal rights under the new constitution. 23 Under this arrangement, the regions formerly known as Southern Cameroons—now generally referred to as West Cameroon—claimed jurisdiction over internal trade, primary education, agriculture, and local government. 24 Nevertheless, the federal government claimed most major sources of revenue and controlled national finances, meaning that the federal state became largely symbolic rather than practical. 25 From independence until 1972, the federalist Cameroon gradually became a unitary state—a state controlled by a dominant central government. The adoption of Francophone Cameroon's Communauté Financière Africaine (CFA) franc in West Cameroon, where the pound sterling had been previously used, established Francophone control economically.26 Fiscal policies adopted in the first five years of independence by the federal government undermined development in West Cameroon and resulted in reliance

19 "British Cameroons," GlobalSecurity.org, n.d., https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/africa/cm-history-06.htm. 20 "Moving towards independence," Encyclopædia Britannica, n.d., https://www.britannica.com/place/Cameroon/Moving-toward- independence. 21 Ibid. 22 "40. Cameroon (1961-present)," University of Central Arkansas Political Science, n.d., https://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm- project/sub-saharan-africa-region/cameroon-1961-present/. 23 "From West Cameroon Statehood to Anglophone Cameroon Minorityhood," Minority Rights Group International, March 23, 2016, https://minorityrights.org/2016/03/23/from-west-cameroon-statehood-to-anglophone-cameroon-minorityhood/. 24 Bongfen Chem-Langhëë, "The Road to the Unitary State of Cameroon 1959-1972," Paideuma 41 (1995): 17-25. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid.

Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 8 on federal subsidies.27 Finally, the federalist structure of the country was abolished and replaced with a unitary republic following a referendum in 1972.28

Cameroon under Paul Biya

In 1982, President Paul Biya, Cameroon’s current president, took office. Two years after coming to power, Biya renamed the country the "Republic of Cameroon," the former name of independent French Cameroun before unification in 1961.29 This symbolic gesture sparked anger from Anglophone regions. Soon after, Fongum Gorji Dinka, a notable Anglophone lawyer, produced and distributed a publication advocating for Anglophone secession and the formation of an independent state for West Cameroonians: Ambazonia.30 Although Gorji Dinka was subsequently arrested, the incident was representative of simmering Anglophone resentment that continued to plague the Francophone central government. In the 1990s, Cameroon began to offer greater civil liberties, allowing a multi-party system for the first time in the country's history.31 During this time, calls emerged among Anglophone federalists and separatists calling for devolution of power and Ambazonian secession respectively. In 1993, following the announcement of an upcoming national debate on constitutional reform by President Biya, Anglophone activists convened the All Anglophone Conference (AAC) in Buea—the former capital of West Cameroon—and presented the Buea Declaration. 32 The declaration outlined Anglophone critiques of Francophone governance, and advocated for devolution of power and a return to federalist structures. In the same year, the Anglophone Standing Committee, part of the AAC, submitted a proposal for a federalist constitution that outlined clear devolution of power between both federated states.33 Upon the government’s staunch refusal to discuss the proposals, the AAC’s aim shifted from supporting federalism to secession, and the organization was renamed as the Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC). 34 Tensions between Anglophone supporters and the Biya presidency have continued well into the 21st century. Up until 2016, the situation remained largely unchanged; Anglophones continued to protest increased centralization of power and the degradation of Anglophone rights under Biya’s presidency—albeit with no significant progress.

Past UN/International Involvement

The Anglophone crisis in Cameroon has garnered little international involvement due to an unwillingness to interfere in sovereign domestic affairs. Generally, states have taken an ambivalent approach to commenting on the conflict, condemning atrocities committed on both sides, but refraining from harsh sanctions or other penalties. There has also been limited discourse among African nations themselves, given a general distaste for infringing on what is perceived as a solely internal conflict. Similarly, responses from supranational

27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 29 Nolan Quinn, "Anglophone Crisis in Cameroon was Decades in the Making," Council on Foreign Relations, August 16, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/blog/anglophone-crisis-cameroon-was-decades-making. 30 Konings and Nyamnjoh, "The Anglophone Problem in Cameroon." 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid.

Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 9 organizations have varied in severity, but UN organs, like the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and other bodies, like the African Union (AU), have refrained from unilaterally criticizing Biya.

Western Liberal Democracies

Of the Western states’ overall responses, the ’ has been the most notable. In December 2016, the United States issued a condemnation concerning human rights violations occurring in the region, and in May 2018, criticized the burning of Anglophone villages.35 The U.S. Congress has held two hearings on the Cameroon issue, in 2018 and February 2019. Consequently, the Trump administration reduced military aid to Cameroon.36 In January 2020, Cameroon was removed from the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), an economic agreement aimed at increasing trade between the U.S. and various African countries.37 Similarly, several other Western countries have entertained largely symbolic discussion on the crisis. Germany has faced internal pressure to instigate harsher economic actions like sanctions, instead of limited debate and condemnation in the Bundestag. and the United Kingdom have also condemned human rights breaches and advocated for increased dialogue; both national parliaments have also discussed the situation in Cameroon. The United Kingdom also provided an additional GDP 2.5 million donation to Cameroon through the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) in 2018.38

As a former French colony, France’s relationship with Cameroon is especially noteworthy. French businesses have major stakes in the Cameroonian economy, with French foreign direct investment in Cameroon numbering nearly EUR 800 million.39 France also partners with the Cameroonian government on military training and counterterrorism military operations.40 Recent condemnations in February 2020 by French President Emmanuel Macron over human rights violations in Cameroon sparked public outcry in the country, accusing France of meddling in another country’s domestic affairs.41 This backlash explains France’s initial reluctance to take a harsher stance in condemning the conflict and Biya's actions. In light of France’s continued military support for Cameroon, Anglophone groups have criticized the country's former colonial power for fighting alongside the Biya government.42 Ultimately, French involvement in the conflict has remained largely symbolic rather than substantial, in part due to perceptual fears of overstepping sovereign boundaries.

35 Ibid. 36 Matthew Lee and Lolita C. Baldor, "US cuts military aid to Cameroon over human rights concerns," , February 6, 2019, https://apnews.com/article/d2f384feacc74b9d8ab854de4575a5b7. 37 Danielle Paquette, "Trump ends trade benefits for Cameroon over ‘persistent human rights violations,'" Washington Post, November 1, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/trump-ends-trade-benefits-for-cameroon-over-persistent- human-rights-violations/2019/11/01/529bb568-fca7-11e9-9e02-1d45cb3dfa8f_story.html. 38 UK aid for children caught up in Cameroon conflict," Gov.uk, December 13, 2018, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk- aid-for-children-caught-up-in-cameroon-conflict. 39 "Cameroon," Ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires étrangères—France Diplomacy, n.d., https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/cameroon/. 40 "France says to continue military cooperation with Cameroon," , February 7, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us- france-cameroon-idUSKCN1PW1RA. 41 Franck Foute, "Emmanuel Macron remarks spark public outcry in Cameroon," The Africa Report, February 26, 2020, https://www.theafricareport.com/23912/emmanuel-macron-remarks-spark-public-outcry-in-cameroon/. 42 Reuters, "France says to continue military cooperation with Cameroon."

Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 10 China

As part of China’s dramatic economic investment and expansion within Africa at large, China has invested heavily into infrastructure projects and foreign direct investment with Cameroonian companies.43 Cameroon is a significant debtor country; according to the International Monetary Fund, it owes a total of CFA 5.8 trillion, or USD 10 trillion—a third of which is to China.44 Given this clear interest in Cameroon, China has been notably silent in offering any condemnation of the Biya regime and has even supplied USD 8 million to the government for military funding.45

United Nations Involvement

As discussed later, the United Nations has largely failed to take conclusive action on Cameroon, especially given the restricted nature of the conflict within domestic borders. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet, advised Biya to end the conflict in 2019.46 As well, representatives from the African Union, La Francophonie, and the Commonwealth have travelled to Cameroon to meet with Biya in November 2019. The United Nations Security Council, at the ’s request, also held an informal discussion on the conflict in May of 2019. However, this meeting was largely inconclusive, and resulted only in condemnations from select member states.47 Finally, the UN has also taken a significant role in organizing the collection and distribution of humanitarian aid, notably through sending USD 184 million to Cameroon through the Commissioner for Refugees in March 2019.48

Current Situation

The situation in Cameroon is complex, especially with regards to the various names of regions and groups involved in the crisis. The term "West Cameroon," "South Cameroons," and "Southern Cameroons" are often used interchangeably and may cause confusion. In summary, "West Cameroon" generally refers to the geographic territory in modern Cameroon, comprising the majority-Anglophone Northwest and Southwest regions located in the western part of the country. "Southern Cameroons" is a term often used by Anglophone secessionist or federalist groups to refer to themselves; these terms refer to the original name of the British mandate territory which joined the Federal Republic of Cameroon in 1961.

43 Roxana Willis et al., "‘We Remain Their Slaves’ Voices from the Cameroon Conflict," University of Oxford Faculty of Law, April 2020, https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/oxlaw/ssrn-id3576732-1.pdf. 44 Ibid. 45 Ibid. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid.

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Figure 2: Map of Cameroon and English-speaking regions.49

Origins of the Crisis

The current crisis began in late 2016, when lawyers and teachers from the Anglophone Northwest and Southwest regions of Cameroon went on strike to protest against the imposition of French civil law systems in Anglophone common law areas, as well as the appointment of Francophone judges within these regions.50 The strikes quickly grew in number and in popularity but were met with brutal crackdowns and clashes with the police. Throughout demonstrations in 2016 and 2017, government forces fired live rounds, used tear gas, and violently attacked scores of protestors. Hundreds of protestors, students, and activists were arrested and tortured.51 In his annual 2016 year-end speech, Biya labelled Anglophone protestors as "extremist rioters," vowed to crush opposition, and vehemently opposed federalism in Cameroon.52 In early 2017, an internet blockade was even implemented

49 International Crisis Group, "Cameroon’s Anglophone Crisis: How to Get to Talks?" 50 C. Nna-Emeka Okereke, "Analysing Cameroon’s Anglophone Crisis," Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 10, no. 3 (2018): 8- 12. 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid.

Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 12 for three months in the Anglophone regions, supposedly to stop the influence social media was having on growing unrest among the population.53 During late 2016 and early 2017, the country began facing international condemnation from the U.S. State Department, the UN Centre for Human Rights and Democracy in Central Africa, and the African Union Commission.

In the latter half of 2017, armed resistance against the Cameroonian government began. During this period, two major political organizations have come to the forefront of the Anglophone secessionist movement: the Interim Government of Ambazonia (IG) and the Ambazonia Governing Council (AGovC).

The AGovC, led by Ayaba Cho Lucas, is considered to be more hard-line, supportive of secession, and unwilling to support negotiations with the Biya government. In September 2017, the AGovC began utilizing its military wing, the Ambazonia Defence Forces (ADF) to attack the Cameroonian government and military. The ADF is presently one of the largest militia groups in the Ambazonia region. The origins of the IG lie in another alliance of pro-independence groups, the Southern Cameroons Ambazonia Consortium United Front (SCACUF), which declared independence of the Northwest and Southwest regions of Cameroon and the formation of the independent Federal Republic of Ambazonia on October 1, 2017.54 Subsequently, SCACUF formed the Interim Government of Ambazonia, naming the SCACUF leader, Sisiku Julius Ayuk Tabe, the first President of Ambazonia. The IG has expressed willingness to negotiate with Cameroon and the international community.55

In November 2017, Francophone President Biya declared war on the separatists, and the severity and frequency of clashes between the army and separatist militias increased accordingly into 2018.56 Across 2017 and 2018, Anglophone protests continued to be violently suppressed, while government forces were accused of raiding, occupying, and burning down villages. The separatists responded by ambushing and attacking Cameroonian security forces, which attracted condemnation for targeting state-run schools that continue to teach French.

Stalemate

The Anglophone opposition faced a major setback when IG leader Ayuk Tabe and numerous other Ambazonian leadership figures were arrested in Nigeria and subsequently extradited to Yaoundé in January 2018. As a result of Ayuk Tabe's detention, Samuel Ikome Sako was named Interim President. Ikome Sako would be criticized as incompetent and accused of misusing funds, sparking a leadership dispute in which Ayuk Tabe declared the dissolution of Ikome Sako's cabinet—which the latter did not recognize. The internal power struggle of the IG symbolizes the descent of Anglophone secessionist political efforts into tumult and disorganization. The numerous organizations and militia groups fighting nominally for Anglophone rights do not agree on whether to pursue federalist reform or outright independence. Thus, any negotiations by an Anglophone group with the Biya government may immediately be deemed illegitimate by other groups. While the leaders of these groups may be hardline supporters of federalism or independence respectively, lower-level combatants and the broader

53 Mbom Sixtus, "Cameroon's descent into crisis: the long history of anglophone discord," The New Humanitarian, October 4, 2017, https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/fr/node/259850. 54 Okereke, "Analysing Cameroon’s Anglophone Crisis." 55 International Crisis Group, "Cameroon’s Anglophone Crisis: How to Get to Talks?" 56 Mbom Sixtus, "Cameroon government ‘declares war’ on secessionist rebels," The New Humanitarian, December 4, 2017, https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2017/12/04/cameroon-government-declares-war-secessionist-rebels.

Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 13 populace are much more open to accepting potential negotiations and agreements with the Francophone Cameroon government.57 Additionally, the leadership of Ambazonian political groups is often based abroad— for example, AGovC leader Ayaba Cho is exiled in , while Ikome Sako is based in Baltimore, Maryland— and are unable to secure necessary funding for activities in Cameroon, forcing secessionist militant groups on the ground to utilizing extortion, torture, and kidnappings to fund their operations.58 These divides complicate negotiation efforts between the skeptical Biya government, the multitude of opposition and rebel groups, and a fairly passive international community.

Economic Impact

A critical reason why the Cameroonian central government is keen to retain control over Anglophone West Cameroon is the economic importance of the region. The Northwest and Southwest regions of Cameroon are the site of 42,000 hectares of agricultural land which produces bananas, palm oil, and rubber for export under Cameroon's second-largest employer, the Cameroon Development Corporation (CDC).59 Of Cameroon's 14 oil and gas pipelines, 12 are located in West Cameroon, making the region vital to controlling the country's oil and gas industry.60 Some Anglophone Ambazonian secessionist leaders have even claimed that up to 60 percent of Cameroon's GDP originates from West Cameroon oil and gas revenues.61 These industries are major sources of revenue for Cameroon's central government, much to the chagrin of Anglophone separatists who perceive the use of West Cameroon's natural wealth profit by the Francophone Yaoundé government as unjust.

The value of these industries to the central government has also made them a target for secessionist rebels, who threaten and attack CDC plantation workers or burn down CDC plantations and buildings.62 Anglophone rebel leaders also use potential oil revenues as a bargaining tactic for receiving foreign support by promising lucrative contracts in the case of Ambazonian independence.63 The crisis and violence that has ravaged West Cameroon has deeply impacted the economy in the region. By July 2018, the Cameroon Employers’ Association estimated financial losses due to conflict to be valued at CFA 269 billion—approximately USD 500 million—and over 6,000 jobs being lost, with thousands more under threat.64

Humanitarian Impact

The Anglophone crisis has displaced over 900,000 civilians, many of whom leave unstable towns and cities to live in rural areas and the bush.65 Estimates of the number of people displaced by the conflict are generally

57 International Crisis Group, "Cameroon’s Anglophone Crisis: How to Get to Talks?" 58 Ibid. 59 Yoletta Nyange, "The restive region taking teetering steps to statehood," The New European, April 24, 2020, https://www.theneweuropean.co.uk/brexit-news/ambazonia-links-with-cameroon-78682. 60 Ibid. 61 Ekah Robert Ekah, "The Anglophone Crisis in Cameroon: A Geopolitical Analysis," European Scientific Journal 15, no. 35 (December 2019): 141-166. 62 Ibid. 63 Ibid. 64 International Crisis Group, "Cameroon’s Anglophone Crisis: How to Get to Talks?" 65 Ngala Killian Chimtom, "Cameroon's deadly mix of war and coronavirus," BBC, May 10, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-52551848.

Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 14 believed to be underestimated, as international organizations lack proper access to the area. 66 Many of the locations to which displaced civilians move lack running water, sanitation equipment or hygiene goods, medical care, and shelter.67 Substance abuse and mental health troubles also plague former combatants who have become displaced in the conflict; these individuals face the additional threat of shoot-to-kill orders issued by the Biya government targeting Anglophone militia.68

For the over 60,000 displaced persons who have crossed the border into neighbouring Nigeria, humanitarian support is also far from adequate. The refugee registration process under the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has been delayed in implementation in Nigeria, restricting Anglophone refugees' access to necessary goods and services.69 While about half of the Cameroonian refugees in Nigeria live in UNHCR refugee settlements, the remainder live in host communities with limited access to healthcare, education, and other needs.70 Cash-based interventions (CBI) have been offered for Cameroonian refugees in Nigeria to purchase necessary basic goods, but the amount of money offered has decreased to NGN 4,600 (approximately USD 12) and the money itself has been delayed in distribution to refugees.71

One of the specific challenges faced by civilians in the West Cameroon region is the restricted access to education. Over 800,000 schoolchildren have been forced out of school due to the crisis.72 Anglophone separatist groups and militias have declared boycotts of the state-run education system over the use of the in schools, with over 90 percent of schools in the Anglophone Northwest and Southwest regions being closed in 2020—numbers exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic.73 At re-opened schools, attacks by militia groups on teachers and students alike have led to kidnappings, casualties, and murder; forces aligned with both the Cameroonian government and Anglophone separatists have been accused of being responsible for these attacks.74 For displaced persons and refugees, access to education is even more lacking.

Peace Talks

The Biya government has conducted on-and-off peace talks with Anglophone opposition groups for the past few years of the conflict. One of the first major peace initiatives was the Major National Dialogue, for which Biya called in September 2019. The Dialogue discussed a variety of provisions for restoring special autonomy for the Anglophone regions, reintegration of combatants into society, allowing for the election of local governors, and

66 Laura Angela Bagnetto, "Cameroon's Anglophone crisis, an unravelling catastrophe," Radio France Internationale, March 2, 2020, https://www.rfi.fr/en/international/20200302-cameroons-anglophone-crisis-unraveling-catastrophe. 67 Ibid. 68 Eromo Egbejule, "Death, displacement, trauma: Human cost of the Anglophone crisis," Al Jazeera, October 6, 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2018/10/6/death-displacement-trauma-human-cost-of-the-anglophone-crisis. 69 Linus Unah, "Cameroon refugees struggle to cope with life of need in Nigeria," Al Jazeera, March 8, 2020, https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2020/3/8/cameroon-refugees-struggle-to-cope-with-life-of-need-in-nigeria. 70 Ibid. 71 Ibid. 72 "Schools under attack in Anglophone Cameroon," Ideas for Development, July 15, 2020, https://ideas4development.org/en/schools-under-attack-anglophone-cameroon/. 73 Ibid. 74 Ineke Mules and Jean Marie Ngong Song, "Cameroon: Schools targeted in Anglophone crisis," Deutsche Welle, November 6, 2020, https://www.dw.com/en/cameroon-schools-targeted-in-anglophone-crisis/a-55521637.

Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 15 funding for the reconstruction of the region in the post-conflict period.75 Although the Dialogue was supported by many Francophone opposition groups, it was dismissed by many separatist groups—including both the IG and AGovC—who cited the government's continued detention of Anglophone leaders. The Dialogue events themselves were criticized as being staged by the Biya government and limiting any discussion on Anglophone secession.76 Talks between the IG faction of Ikome Sako and the Biya government, mediated by a Swiss non- governmental organization, also occurred, but were suspended in late 2019.77 Both the Ayuk Tabe-led IG faction and the AGovC have rejected these negotiations as illegitimate.

In March 2020, calls for a ceasefire emerged amid the COVID-19 pandemic. Some militia groups, like the Southern Cameroons Defence Forces, agreed to implement ceasefires, but others —including the ADF and some factions of the ID—refused due to concerns over the possibility the Cameroonian government would use the opportunity to seize control over West Cameroon.78 Later, in July 2020, the Biya government entered talks with the imprisoned Ayuk Tabe's faction of the IG; the latter issued demands, including demilitarization of the Anglophone regions, the release of detainees, and ceasefires. The Ikome Sako faction of the IG declared the negotiations invalid, as it did not recognize Ayuk Tabe as a legitimate leader of Ambazonia. The AGovC did support Ayuk Tabe's negotiations, but the divide between Anglophone separatist groups continues to prevent comprehensive negotiations from being achieved. Even if separatist groups can unite and compromise, whether the Biya government will act upon dialogue efforts remains to be seen. The latter half of 2020 has continued to see skirmishes between government-aligned forces and Anglophone rebels, with events like the Kumba school massacre—the killing of seven schoolchildren by unknown militia—fuelling greater frustration across the region.

Possible Solutions and Controversies

Government Restructuring

Anglophones have always advocated for increased devolution of power and greater autonomy. Enshrining language, equality, and regional rights in a majority Francophone government would ensure that Anglophone rights are better protected and represented in Cameroon. Biya has already attempted to do this in the past, through the establishment of a ministry for Decentralisation and Local Development, as well as increasing the budget for spending in Anglophone areas.79 An agreement to protect common law and Anglophone education systems should also be reached in order to appease federalist demands. Aside from devolution of power, Biya’s government may also wish to begin genuine investigations into alleged abuses from the military during clashes, provide reparations for victims, and begin reconstructing affected areas ravaged by fighting. These are all solutions that, with proper dialogue and consultation with Anglophone regions, could go a long way in easing

75 Ngala Killian Chimtom, "Cameroon's conflict: Will the National Dialogue make any difference?" BBC, October 5, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-49931662. 76 Ibid. 77 Bone, "Ahead of peace talks, a who’s who of Cameroon’s separatist movements." 78 Chimtom, "Cameroon's deadly mix of war and coronavirus." 79 Emmanuel, "Decentralisation and Local Development: Special Recommendations to Enhance Development," Cameroon Tribune, October 8, 2019, https://www.cameroon-tribune.cm/article.html/28351/fr.html/decentralisation-local-development- special-recommendations-enhance.

Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 16 tensions and appeasing federalist supporters who call for fair economic, linguistic, and political representation in Cameroon.

However, given the fracturing of Anglophones over separatist and federalist sentiments, it is unclear whether devolution would meaningfully end conflict, though it may result in easing of tensions. Following the September–October 2019 Major National Dialogue established by Biya, many separatists dismissed the government's efforts as disingenuous, while other efforts for talks have been declared illegitimate by various Anglophone groups. 80 For Biya himself, an octogenarian who has had complete control over the country for nearly 40 years, truly giving up significant state control may be a concession that he is unwilling to take. Divisions within the Cameroonian government between those open to greater autonomy for Anglophones and those who reject concessions may also stifle any efforts for reform.81

While the international community is unable to directly implement government reform in Cameroon, facilitating talks and placing pressure on parties involved in the conflict to encourage compromise between Anglophone opposition groups and the Biya government is the likeliest way to create lasting change.82

Reviving Peace Talks

In 2019, both the Major National Dialogue and the Swiss-mediated Ikome Sako–Biya peace talks utterly failed and the conflict continued without resolution. The failure of the Swiss-mediated talks can be mostly attributed to internal conflict within the IG—between the Ayuk Tabe and Ikome Sako-led factions—rather than an unwillingness to open dialogue and discuss solutions. The July 2020 talks between the Ayuk Tabe-led IG faction and some representatives of the Biya government appeared to be successful, with a ceasefire and an acceptance of the presence of Cameroonian security forces in Anglophone regions being agreed upon.83 However, both Cameroonian cabinet ministers and other Anglophones separatist leaders have decried the talks. Since these efforts, little progress has been made in the peace process.

International actors like the UN, AU, the Catholic Church, and non-governmental organizations are all viable intermediaries for these discussions; however, broadening the scope of the conflict to an international issue may not be a move welcomed by Biya, especially given that past peace talks efforts have been unsuccessful. Continued dissent within both the Biya government and Anglophone political groups will also limit the potential successes of internationally led peace talks. For the international community, implementing a means of pressuring parties involved in the conflict to enter comprehensive peace talks may be the only means of starting a peace process involving the Biya government and the majority of Anglophone groups.

80 Chimtom, "Cameroon's conflict: Will the National Dialogue make any difference?" 81 R. Maxwell Bone, "Political Infighting Could Obstruct a Nascent Peace Process in Cameroon," World Politics Review, September 22, 2020, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/29075/in-cameroon-conflict-could-heat-up-as-peace-talks-struggle-to- gain-traction. 82 Herman J. Cohen, "Lessons From the Past on Cameroon’s Crisis," Council on Foreign Relations, January 3, 2020, https://www.cfr.org/blog/lessons-past-cameroons-crisis. 83 Jeune Afrique, "Cameroon’s Anglophone crisis: Rivalries hamper peace talks," The Africa Report, August 11, 2020, https://www.theafricareport.com/37187/cameroons-anglophone-crisis-rivalries-hamper-peace-talks/.

Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 17 International Involvement and Humanitarian Aid

The reaction of the international community to the Anglophone crisis has been tepid, out of fear of infringing on Cameroon’s sovereignty. However, increased international involvement could increase pressure on both Biya’s government and Anglophone groups to address the conflict.

Thus far, the Cameroon crisis has been an isolated crisis that Biya has generally faced alone. Citing human rights abuses, countries like the United States have placed sanctions on and cut aid to Cameroon but have not been able to draw any meaningful concessions from Biya to initiate genuine reforms or resolution.84 As Anglophone regions and Cameroon as a whole are heavily reliant on the export of raw materials and natural resources—like oil, cocoa, or lumber—harsher sanctions on the country could offer incentives for negotiation. In tandem with increased economic pressure, countries could also offer funds to rebuild affected regions of Cameroon, resettle displaced population resettlement, and offer humanitarian assistance at large. The United Kingdom has previously donated GBP 2.5 million humanitarian aid to Anglophone areas. 85 This is not an uncommon approach and would offer much-needed assistance to displaced and affected civilians. Some existing programs, like the UNOCHA's Cameroon Humanitarian Response Plan, have received an insufficient amount of funding and would benefit from international contributions. 86 Increased international funding and support for the growing number of Cameroonian refugees living across the border in Nigeria will also ensure that refugees have necessary access to basic goods, medical care, and education.

An investigation from the International Criminal Court (ICC) to examine abuses on both sides would send a strong signal not only to Biya’s government, but also to violent separatist groups like the ADF. Both the Cameroonian government and Anglophone militia groups have been accused of actions considered war crimes—including the targeting of schools, hospitals, and civilians—which fall under ICC jurisdiction. 87 However, as Cameroon has not ratified the Statute, the founding treaty of the ICC, the country does not automatically fall under the court's jurisdiction.88 The power to refer the situation in Cameroon to the ICC lies with the United Nations Security Council; this committee could request action from the Security Council to have the crisis referred to international legal institutions. Alternatively, a third party, non-state entity—such as an AU entity—could be requested to conduct an investigation into human rights and international law violations in Cameroon, but past foreign access to the region has consistently been limited and will pose a problem for the international community.

Moreover, as many of the leadership figures of the various Anglophone political groups live abroad, targeting the sources of funding for these individuals internationally may make them more willing to compromise and negotiate. For example, AGovC leader Ayaba Cho Lucas lives in Norway; Ayaba Cho's AGovC is linked to the

84 Daniel Ekonde and Bukola Adebayo, "US removes Cameroon from trade pact over alleged ‘persistent’ human rights violations," CNN, November 1, 2019, https://www.cnn.com/2019/11/01/africa/cameroon-trump-trade-pact/index.html. 85 Gov.uk, "UK aid for children caught up in Cameroon conflict." 86 "Cameroon," United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, n.d., https://www.unocha.org/cameroon. 87 Ephrem Rugiririza, "Could ICC intervention deter conflict in Cameroon?" JusticeInfo.net—Fondation Hirondelle, May 17, 2019, https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/tribunals/icc/41453-could-icc-intervention-deter-conflict-in-cameroon.html. 88 Ibid.

Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 18 ADF, one of the largest militia groups.89 Placing pressure on Anglophone leaders abroad may drive political will to negotiate but will have a limited direct effect on combatants and militia groups in Cameroon. Further starving militia groups of funding may also fuel greater conflict in the Anglophone regions, as these groups will be forced to continue utilizing extortion and kidnapping as means of income.90

Bloc Positions

The Anglophone crisis is highly regional and contained to Cameroon. As a result, there has been little involvement from other states in relation to this topic.

Cameroon

The government of Cameroon plays a central role in this conflict. Paul Biya’s government, though still strongly Francophone-oriented, has already undergone several rounds of negotiations with Anglophone separatists— with varying degrees of success. The Cameroonian government will likely never recognize an independent Ambazonia, but increased decentralization and devolution to Anglophone regions may be a concession Yaoundé is willing to make in order to ensure peace. Government security forces and state-associated militias continue to clash with separatists, with civilians, schools, and hospitals often coming into the crossfire. The actions of Biya’s government will determine whether any peace talks amount to any meaningful de-escalation of conflict, or if political reforms are implemented. Although Cameroon has expressed opposition to significant foreign intervention—seeing international involvement as an infringement on internal political affairs—the reliance Cameroon has on foreign investment and exports may limit the extent to which the country can resist external political pressure.91 Cameroon would likely favour increased humanitarian support to the region, while limiting international political involvement to mediation between parties in the conflict.

Nigeria

Since the 1980s, Nigeria has been a haven for Cameroonian political dissidents. The crisis in Cameroon has repeatedly spilled over into Nigeria, with supply lines, weapons, mercenaries, and army support crossing over the Nigerian border.92 The Nigerian government of Muhammadu Buhari has maintained close ties with Biya’s government and opposes Anglophone secession. However, Nigerian officials in the army have facilitated arms deals, training, and supplies for Cameroonian separatists and many Nigerians in the eastern part of the country are sympathetic to Anglophone Cameroonians. Most notably, Nigeria was responsible for the arrest and extradition of high-profile leaders of the IG to Cameroon. A Nigerian court later ruled that the extradition of the IG leaders had been unconstitutional; the ruling had no impact. Nigeria has also faced a large influx of Cameroonian refugees flooding into the country; consequently, the Nigerian government set aside approximately 100 hectares of land and USD 2.4 billion for Anglophone refugees in February 2020.93 Nigeria

89 International Crisis Group, "Cameroon’s Anglophone Crisis: How to Get to Talks?" 90 Ibid. 91 Foute, "Emmanuel Macron remarks spark public outcry in Cameroon." 92 International Crisis Group, "Cameroon’s Anglophone Crisis: How to Get to Talks?" 93 Ibid.

Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 19 would favour increased international support for refugee settlement and aid in the region but will also oppose significant international involvement in the crisis.

United States

The United States has been a vocal critic of the human rights abuses rampant in Cameroon and has repeatedly condemned Yaoundé for the conflict. Consequently, the U.S. has cut USD 17 million worth of military aid, rescinded an invitation to join the State Partnership Program, and removed Cameroon from the African Growth and Opportunity Act, a valuable trade deal facilitated by the United States.94 U.S. diplomats have also recognized the territorial integrity of Cameroon and rejected the prospect of Ambazonian independence.95 In a symbolic move, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a resolution in July 2019 calling for Cameroon to initiate dialogue with separatist leaders and implement measures such as reintroducing a federalist system.96 The United States will likely be one of the leading members of the international community supporting increased economic and political pressure on both the Cameroonian government and Anglophone rebels to begin peace talks, including implementing sanctions on the country and targeting the funding of Anglophone leadership abroad.

France

France, much like the vast majority of the international community, has remained rather silent on the Anglophone crisis in Cameroon. Nevertheless, the two countries enjoy strong relations, and France still holds significant political and economic sway over its former colony. The robust military and trade relations shared between France and Cameroon have limited the French government’s ability to criticize Biya, especially as a result of Cameroon’s ongoing fight against Boko Haram in the north. France has attempted to frame itself as a middle ground between the political efforts and economic sanctions supported by the United States or the European Union; the country has sought to protect Cameroon from international pressure and privately focused on utilizing its close relationship with Cameroon to encourage Biya to take internal steps towards peace—in fear of greater international scrutiny and sanctions. 97 France will continue to be a key supporter of the Biya government and will generally oppose major international pressures, including sanctions, on the Cameroonian government.

European Union

Initially, the member states of the European Union (EU) had a limited response to the situation in Cameroon. However, as the EU is Cameroon's main trading partner and contributor of foreign aid, the EU still holds significant sway in the country.98 The European Parliament has since called for the Cameroonian government to

94 Ekonde and Adebayo, "US removes Cameroon from trade pact over alleged ‘persistent’ human rights violations." 95 "Cameroon: US says Ambazonia not realistic option to solve Anglophone crisis," Journal du Cameroun, May 17, 2019, https://www.journalducameroun.com/en/cameroon-us-says-ambazonia-not-realistic-option-to-solve-anglophone-crisis/. 96 Karen Bass, "H.Res.358 - Calling on the Government of Cameroon and armed groups to respect the human rights of all Cameroonian citizens, to end all violence, and to pursue a broad-based dialogue without preconditions to resolve the conflict in the Northwest and Southwest regions," Congress.gov, May 7, 2019, https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house- resolution/358/text?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22cameroon%22%5D%7D&r=1&s=1. 97 International Crisis Group, "Cameroon’s Anglophone Crisis: How to Get to Talks?" 98 Ibid.

Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 20 release Anglophone activists and reform electoral laws, as well as suggesting member states re-evaluate continued trade and aid to Cameroon.99 Member states of the EU will likely focus on political efforts to sway the situation in Cameroon, including via the mediation of peace talks. Although a member state of the EU, France is broadly opposed to this bloc's intervention in the crisis.

Russia, China, and the African Union

Russia, China, and most African nations have limited involvement in the Anglophone crisis, but are opposed to strong international intervention in the Cameroon situation. In a Dutch and Norwegian-led effort to bring the Anglophone crisis forward for discussion in the United Nations Security Council, Ethiopia, Côte d’Ivoire, South Africa, China, and Russia all voted against a formal discussion of the issue. 100 Many African nations have declined UN involvement, opting to defer to the African Union (AU). Problematically, the African Union itself has taken limited action, omitting the conflict from discussion in its Peace and Security Council, the main organ in the AU dedicated to managing conflict.101 Stemming from colonial era borders drawn without recognition of existing ethnic divisions, a multitude of Cameroon's neighbours and AU members are home to their own secessionist movements—creating an attitude that opposes external separatist movements in fear of sparking uprisings in their own nations.102 Russia and China generally back these perspectives in opposition to what they perceive as Western meddling in domestic affairs. This bloc supports peace in principle but will oppose both secession for Ambazonia and international pressures on the Biya government.

Discussion Questions

1. Why has the situation regarding Anglophones in Cameroon deteriorated to its current extent?

2. What are the divisions between federalist and secessionist Anglophone groups in Cameroon? How might these groups come to a compromise?

3. What viable steps can the international community take to pressure both the Biya government and Anglophone groups to reduce violence and respect human rights?

4. How can successful peace talks between the Biya government and Anglophone groups be achieved? What role do foreign countries and international organizations play in this process?

5. What are the humanitarian impacts of the crisis on civilians? What measures can the United Nations take to support impacted civilians and refugees in sectors like education, healthcare, and basic goods and services?

99 Ibid. 100 Ibid. 101 Cheryl Hendricks and Gabriel Ngah Kiven, "African Union needs a more robust response to conflict in Cameroon," The Conversation, March 2, 2020, https://theconversation.com/african-union-needs-a-more-robust-response-to-conflict-in- cameroon-132449. 102 Ibid.

Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 21 Additional Resources

Cameroon’s Anglophone Crisis: How to Get to Talks? https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon/272-crise-anglophone-au-cameroun-comment- arriver-aux-pourparlers.

The Anglophone Problem in Cameroon: https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/15592501.pdf.

‘We Remain Their Slaves’ Voices from the Cameroon Conflict: https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/oxlaw/ssrn-id3576732-1.pdf.

Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 22 Bibliography

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Foute, Franck. "Emmanuel Macron remarks spark public outcry in Cameroon." The Africa Report, February 26, 2020. https://www.theafricareport.com/23912/emmanuel-macron-remarks-spark-public-outcry-in- cameroon/.

"France says to continue military cooperation with Cameroon." Reuters, February 7, 2019. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-cameroon-idUSKCN1PW1RA.

"From West Cameroon Statehood to Anglophone Cameroon Minorityhood." Minority Rights Group International, March 23, 2016. https://minorityrights.org/2016/03/23/from-west-cameroon-statehood-to- anglophone-cameroon-minorityhood/.

"German Kamerun (1884–1916)." Encyclopædia Britannica, n.d. https://www.britannica.com/place/Cameroon/German-Kamerun-1884-1916.

Hendricks, Cheryl and Gabriel Ngah Kiven. "African Union needs a more robust response to conflict in Cameroon." The Conversation, March 2, 2020. https://theconversation.com/african-union-needs-a-more- robust-response-to-conflict-in-cameroon-132449.

Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 24 Jeune Afrique. "Cameroon’s Anglophone crisis: Rivalries hamper peace talks." The Africa Report, August 11, 2020. https://www.theafricareport.com/37187/cameroons-anglophone-crisis-rivalries-hamper-peace-talks/.

Kindzeka, Moki Edwin. "Separatist Fighting Continues in Cameroon a Year After Major National Dialogue." Voice of America News, October 4, 2020. https://www.voanews.com/africa/separatist-fighting-continues- cameroon-year-after-major-national-dialogue.

Konings, Piet and Francis B. Nyamnjoh. "The Anglophone Problem in Cameroon." The Journal of Modern African Studies 35, no. 2 (1997): 207-229.

Lee, Matthew and Lolita C. Baldor. "US cuts military aid to Cameroon over human rights concerns." Associated Press, February 6, 2019. https://apnews.com/article/d2f384feacc74b9d8ab854de4575a5b7.

"More Cameroonian refugees flee to Nigeria, bringing total arrivals close to 60,000 mark." UNHCR, February 13, 2020. https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2020/2/5e452d2b4/cameroonian-refugees-flee-nigeria- bringing-total-arrivals-close-60000-mark.html.

"Moving towards independence." Encyclopædia Britannica, n.d. https://www.britannica.com/place/Cameroon/Moving-toward-independence.

Mules, Ineke and Jean Marie Ngong Song. "Cameroon: Schools targeted in Anglophone crisis." Deutsche Welle, November 6, 2020. https://www.dw.com/en/cameroon-schools-targeted-in-anglophone-crisis/a-55521637.

Nyange. Yoletta. "The restive region taking teetering steps to statehood." The New European, April 24, 2020. https://www.theneweuropean.co.uk/brexit-news/ambazonia-links-with-cameroon-78682.

Okereke, C. Nna-Emeka. "Analysing Cameroon’s Anglophone Crisis." Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses 10, no. 3 (2018): 8-12.

Paquette, Danielle. "Trump ends trade benefits for Cameroon over ‘persistent human rights violations.'" Washington Post, November 1, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/trump-ends-trade- benefits-for-cameroon-over-persistent-human-rights-violations/2019/11/01/529bb568-fca7-11e9-9e02- 1d45cb3dfa8f_story.html.

Quinn, Nolan. "Anglophone Crisis in Cameroon was Decades in the Making." Council on Foreign Relations, August 16, 2018. https://www.cfr.org/blog/anglophone-crisis-cameroon-was-decades-making.

Rugiririza, Ephrem. "Could ICC intervention deter conflict in Cameroon?" JusticeInfo.net—Fondation Hirondelle, May 17, 2019. https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/tribunals/icc/41453-could-icc-intervention-deter- conflict-in-cameroon.html.

"Schools under attack in Anglophone Cameroon." Ideas for Development, July 15, 2020. https://ideas4development.org/en/schools-under-attack-anglophone-cameroon/.

Sixtus, Mbom. "Cameroon's descent into crisis: the long history of anglophone discord." The New Humanitarian, October 4, 2017. https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/fr/node/259850.

Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 25 Sixtus, Mbom. "Cameroon government ‘declares war’ on secessionist rebels." The New Humanitarian, December 4, 2017. https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2017/12/04/cameroon-government- declares-war-secessionist-rebels.

"UK aid for children caught up in Cameroon conflict." United Kingdom Department for International Development, December 13, 2018. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-aid-for-children-caught-up- in-cameroon-conflict.

"UN shocked and outraged over horrific attack on school in Cameroon." UN News, October 26, 2020. https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/10/1076112.

Unah, Linus. "Cameroon refugees struggle to cope with life of need in Nigeria." Al Jazeera, March 8, 2020. https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2020/3/8/cameroon-refugees-struggle-to-cope-with-life-of-need-in- nigeria.

Willis, Roxana, James Angove, Caroline Mbinkar, and Joseph McAuley. "‘We Remain Their Slaves’ Voices from the Cameroon Conflict." University of Oxford Faculty of Law, April 2020. https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/oxlaw/ssrn-id3576732-1.pdf.

Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 26 Combating Global Piracy

Overview

Since the dawn of maritime commerce, pirates and criminal organizations have sought to profit and plunder off of ships at sea. For centuries, piracy has posed a threat to the safety of seafarers, companies, and coastal regions. Despite its long history, piracy and the themes associated with it—including territorial sovereignty, socioeconomic development, international cooperation, and armed intervention—continue to be global issues that require immense discussion.

Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), piracy is defined as an "illegal act of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed [...] against [another] ship, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State."103 A similar action, maritime armed robbery against ships, is defined as "any illegal act of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, [...] committed for private ends and directed against a ship [...] within a State’s internal waters."104 However, the distinction between piracy and maritime armed robbery lies in the location of the attack; an attack in international waters is considered piracy, while an attack in a country's national waters is considered armed robbery. This topic encapsulates the challenges—both those defined as piracy and maritime armed robbery—that nations face in keeping oceans safe.

Contrary to the media and popular culture portrayal of pirates as savages who ransack towns or bury treasure, modern piracy is sophisticated and systematic. Piracy schemes are often run similarly to businesses, as large, well-structured criminal organizations with modern arms equipment. Popular strategies of pirating include the hijacking of ships, holding passengers and crew hostage, and stealing cargo or resources from vessels. Due to the unique nature of maritime crime, piracy falls outside the jurisdiction of any single state, but within the collective responsibility of all nations. Piracy forces countries to collaborate on incidents occurring in international waters—where no single nation wields ultimate authority—whereas maritime armed robbery requires a delicate balance of efficiency and coordination between nations due to the threat of pirates crossing national boundaries to evade capture.

Although the exact economic loss is difficult to quantify, billions in USD are lost every year due to delays and detours to avoid high-risk areas of piracy, seized ships and cargo, ransom payments, insurance premiums, and added security costs of maritime piracy.[105][106] In the region alone, an estimated USD 818.1 million was spent combating piracy. To adequately address the threats of global piracy, delegates will need to formulate

103 "Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Definitions and Actions," ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre, n.d., https://www.recaap.org/piracy_definitions_and_actions. 104 Ibid. 105 Vijay Sakhuja, "Sea Piracy: India Boosts Countermeasures," Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, March 15, 2003. http://www.ipcs.org/comm_select.php?articleNo=9872003. 106 Eric Ellis, "Piracy on the High Seas is on the Rise in South-East ," Fortune, 29 September 2003, http://www.singapore- window.org/sw03/030919fo.htm.

Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 27 resolutions that maintain international security, while taking into account the unique circumstances and the national interests of states involved.

Timeline

April 29, 1958 — The Convention on the High Seas treaty is signed in , . This convention codifies the rules of international law relating to the high seas.107

December 9, 1982 — The United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS) is signed in Montego Bay, Jamaica. The convention defines the rights and responsibilities of nations, and establishes guidelines for businesses, the environment, and the management of marine natural resources.108

July 8, 2005 — The International Maritime Organization (IMO) agrees to the new amendments of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA). The SUA convention is a treaty in which nations commit to prohibiting and punishing any behaviour which may threaten the safety of maritime navigation.109

June 2, 2008 — Aiming to fight piracy off the coast of Somalia, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) unanimously adopts Resolution 1816.110

November 15, 2008 — The MV Sirius Star is hijacked by Somali pirates off the coast of East Africa. At the time, the oil tanker was transporting crude oil for the company Saudi Aramco. After receiving a USD 3 million ransom, the ship was later released by the pirates. The Sirius Star is the largest ship ever captured by pirates.111

January 29, 2009 —The Djibouti Code of Conduct is established. This code of conduct allows all nation states to pursue pirates into the territorial waters of other states. The current signatories include Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Maldives, Seychelles, Somalia, Tanzania, , , Egypt, Eritrea, Jordan, , Mozambique, Oman, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, , and the United Arab Emirates.112

107 "Status of Treaties," United Nations Treaty Collection, last modified March 9, 2020, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI-2&chapter=21&clang=_en. 108 "United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea," United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, last modified February 11, 2020, http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm. 109 "Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf," International Maritime Organization, n.d., http://www.imo.org/en/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/SUA-Treaties.aspx. 110 "United Nations Security Council Resolution 1816, Piracy near Somalia," Council on Foreign Relations, n.d., http://www.cfr.org/piracy/united-nations-security-council-resolution-1816-piracy-near-somalia/p28519. 111 Xan Rice and Lee Glendinning, "Pirates Anchor Hijacked Supertanker Sirius Star off Somalia Coast," The Guardian, November 18, 2008, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/nov/18/somalia-oil. 112 "Djibouti Code of Conduct," International Maritime Organization, n.d., http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/PIU/Pages/DCoC.aspx.

Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 28 April 9, 2009 — The MV Maersk Alabama, a hijacked ship off the coast of Somalia, is sieged and recovered by the United States Navy. The Maersk Alabama is the first American ship to be successfully hijacked in over 150 years but is the sixth ship to be hijacked that week.113

March 25, 2013 — The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) begins a project titled “Supporting Regional States in Prosecuting Piracy.” The project seeks to enhance the institutional capacity of the criminal justice system in the East African region.114

June 2013 — Various Western and Central African nations sign the Yaoundé Code of Conduct—an initiative aiming to bring nations together to fight piracy, illegal fishing, and other illegal maritime activities in the region.115

January 1, 2014 — The Maritime Crime Programme in the Horn of Africa is created by the UNODC. The assistance provided under this project focuses on delivering equipment, as well as training or mentorship to relevant parties.116

2019 — The International Maritime Bureau reports that the Gulf of Guinea—the part of the Atlantic Ocean off the West African coast, stretching from Guinea to Angola—now accounts for 90 percent of the world's shipping crew kidnapping and piracy incidents.117

Historical Analysis

For centuries, pirates have occupied the Pacific, Atlantic, and Indian oceans. The “Golden Age” of piracy is generally considered to have occurred in the 17th and early 18th centuries, sparked by increasing international trade among European and Asian polities.118

Historically, pirates almost always served in merchant marine or on navy vessels prior to entering piracy activities. To many sailors, life as a pirate was far more attractive than life as a sailor. Aboard pirate vessels, there were often stricter regulations, rules, and punishments—thus, ensuring fair pay and equal work amongst the crew. These rules were strict, to the extent that breaking them could mean flogging or even death. If a pirate was found stealing from their comrades, taking more of the profits than their stipulated share, or deserting during conflicts, they could be marooned on remote islands. Despite these punishments, individuals could expect to make more than triple as a pirate than they did as legal sailors.119

113 David Axe, "8,000 Miles, 96 Hours, 3 Dead Pirates: Inside a Navy SEAL Rescue," Wired, October 17, 2012, https://www.wired.com/2012/10/navy-seals-pirates/. 114 "UNODC Maritime Crime Programme," United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, n.d., https://www.unodc.org/easternafrica/en/piracy/index.html. 115 "IMO reviews maritime security code of conduct," SAFETY4SEA, August 22, 2017, https://safety4sea.com/imo-reviews- maritime-security-code-of-conduct/. 116 Ibid. 117 Maisie Pigeon and Kelly Moss, "Why Piracy Is a Growing Threat in West Africa’s Gulf of Guinea," World Politics Review, June 9, 2020, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/28824/in-west-africa-s-gulf-of-guinea-piracy-is-a-growing-threat. 118 "The Golden Age of Piracy," Royal Museums Greenwich, n.d., https://www.rmg.co.uk/discover/explore/golden-age-piracy. 119 "The History of Piracy," New African Magazine, March 19, 2013, http://newafricanmagazine.com/the-history-of-piracy/.

Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 29 The main type of piracy during the Golden Age targeted merchant ships transporting valuable goods. Ships were often targeted for their silks, jewels and precious metals, spices, liquor, linen, money, or slaves. Once valuables were stolen, pirates would add the captured ship to their fleet or sink the vessel itself—destroying any evidence of their activities or whereabouts. Any surviving crew from seized vessels would be killed, ransomed, taken as slaves, or forced to join the pirate crew.120

At one point in history, state-sponsored piracy was condoned and legal, including in the United Kingdom and France. These pirates were known as "privateers"—a role which flourished until the early 19th century. Similar to a bounty hunter, privateers were meant to capture other pirate ships with their crew and return pirate ships to shore to be punished accordingly. Privateers were granted licenses by their government to attack the ships of enemy governments, usually during times of war. However, after witnessing the wealth that pirates could accumulate, privateers would often turn on their home government and become pirates themselves. Eventually, due to the unreliability of privateering and the Declaration of —which banned letters of marque (a form of privateering licenses) and therefore, outlawed privateering—states stopped hiring privateers altogether.121

Past UN/International Involvement

INTERPOL Involvement

The International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) is an intergovernmental organization devoted to combating transnational crime through police cooperation. Although not a body within the United Nations, INTERPOL often works closely with UN agencies. To combat maritime piracy, three key strategies are currently employed by the organization.

First, INTERPOL works to strengthen regional police forces through specialized training programs and by providing advanced policing equipment. Second, INTERPOL has focused its resources heavily on the improvement of data exchange. Through its police communication system, I-24/7, police are better able to share information on suspected pirates and piracy organizations. The organization has also created a Global Maritime Security Database, allowing INTERPOL to coordinate and share information with national governments and regional organizations, who then respond to crime and piracy threats. Finally, INTERPOL’s last area of focus is on improving evidence collection. INTERPOL's system of Notices and Diffusions—an arrangement of international security alerts—allows the organization to work with states to analyse and distribute evidence and data, helping to identify and arrest high-value individuals involved in acts of piracy.122

UNODC Involvement

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is a United Nations body focusing on issues pertaining to drugs, crime, corruption, and terrorism. The body has been devoted to combating piracy for over a decade. The UNODC's Global Maritime Crime Programme (GMCP) operates in the Atlantic, Pacific, western

120 Ibid. 121 Brian Whitenton, "The Difference Between Pirates, Privateers and Buccaneers," The Mariners' Museum and Park, October 4, 2013, http://www.marinersmuseum.org/blog/2012/10/the-difference-between-pirates-privateers-and-buccaneers-pt-2/. 122 "Maritime crime: Our Response," INTERPOL, n.d., https://www.interpol.int/en/Crimes/Maritime-crime/Our-response.

Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 30 and eastern Indian oceans, and in the Gulf of Aden, focusing on a variety of goals—building maritime law enforcement (MLE) capacity in regional governments, strengthening legal and criminal justice responses to piracy, and coordinating responses to maritime crime.123

For example, in the Gulf of Guinea, the GMCP has offered training for judges and prosecutors on maritime crime and piracy prosecutions.124 In addition, the GMCP directly places experts in MLE within government agencies in the region in order to advise on matters of MLE and assist in the planning of training exercises—all with the broader aim of establishing long-term self-sufficiency within these agencies.125 Similarly, in Somalia, the UNODC's Piracy Prisoner Transfer Program—established in 2013—has also worked to build the country's ability to provide secure and humane imprisonment for convicted pirates from both overseas and Somalia itself, in addition to developing legal framework when prosecuting pirates. 126 A multitude of similar efforts by the UNODC and the body's GMCP continue to aid national governments in dealing with piracy issues.

NATO and EU Involvement

Various international organizations have collaborated to combat piracy in the Eastern Indian Ocean off the Horn of Africa. Both the European Union (EU) and a United States-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) mission have worked to offer direct military and naval support to regional countries, as well as protect international aid transport to the East African region. First launched in 2008 but still in effect today, the European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) Somalia carries out patrols in the region, acts as a deterrent to piracy attacks, protects aid vessels from the World Food Programme (WFP) travelling to East Africa, and cooperates with local government to ensure piracy suspects are transferred properly to local authorities.127 Similarly, from 2009 to 2016, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)'s Operation Ocean Shield carried out intelligence and surveillance operations in the Gulf of Aden and off the Somali coast, escorting shipping vessels and aiding regional governments in building their capacity to fight piracy independently.128 As a result of these international efforts, piracy attacks off the Horn of Africa have fallen dramatically since their peak in 2011, although regional instability in Somalia means that continued international attention towards piracy in the region is required.129

Current Situation

Methods of Piracy

Modern-day piracy has evolved into a complex crime. Piracy and maritime armed robbery are no longer limited to crimes committed by a single crew; in fact, they often involve highly sophisticated criminal organizations with

123 "Atlantic Ocean," United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, n.d., https://www.unodc.org/unodc/piracy/atlantic-ocean.html. 124 Ibid. 125 Ibid. 126 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, "UNODC Maritime Crime Programme" 127 "Mission," EU Naval Force - Somalia, Operation ATALANTA, n.d., https://eunavfor.eu/mission/. 128 "Operation Ocean Shield - November 2014," North Atlantic Treaty Organization, November 2014, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_topics/141202a-Factsheet-OceanShield-en.pdf 129 Denys Reva, "Ten years on, is Somali piracy still a threat?" Institute for Security Studies Africa, November 7, 2018, https://issafrica.org/iss-today/ten-years-on-is-somali-piracy-still-a-threat.

Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 31 technology that far surpasses local police forces. Recently, terrorist organizations—such as Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines and al-Shabaab in Somalia—have also become involved in piracy activities, kidnapping crews and seizing cargo for both political aims and profit.130 Instead of merely hijacking small vessels, such as fishing boats, coastal freighters, and UN food aid ships, criminal groups and pirates will also target massive cargo ships, supertankers, and even passenger vessels. However, these large-scale crimes—though possible—are still rare occurrences. The most common forms of piracy continue to be kidnapping crews and passengers for ransom, stealing resources and cargo from industrial ships, or hijacking vessels. Modern piracy most commonly takes place in the Malacca Strait, the South China Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Gulf of Guinea, the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean, the Caribbean, and the Gulf of Mexico.131

Figure 1: Piracy and maritime armed robbery incidents by type, 2019.132

Accessibility of Maritime Piracy

As an easily accessible underground industry, piracy has become the occupation of choice for many people. Piracy is a relatively cheap endeavour to fund. Thus, impoverished individuals can easily become pirates at little cost. The most basic expeditions can cost a few hundred dollars for simple supplies—all that is necessary is a small, fast moving boat, as well as a ladder or rope to board a targeted ship. Larger expeditions, involving several vessels, may cost approximately USD 30,000 and require professional financing. According to The Economist, pirates can earn approximately USD 30,000-75,000 per raid of a large vessel, with a bonus of up to USD 10,000

130 Pigeon and Moss, "Why Piracy Is a Growing Threat in West Africa’s Gulf of Guinea." 131 "10 Maritime Piracy Affected Areas around the World," Marine Insight, October 7, 2019, http://www.marineinsight.com/marine-piracy-marine/10-maritime-piracy-affected-areas-around-the-world/. 132 "ICC-IMB Annual report: 2019 World-Wide incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships," Maritime Cyprus, April 2, 2020, https://www.maritimecyprus.com/2020/02/04/icc-imb-annual-report-2019-world-wide-incidents-of-piracy-and-armed- robbery-against-ships/.

Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 32 for the first person to board a ship, or for those bringing their own weapons or ladder. In fact, one raid alone can result in an average of USD 2.7 million gained from stolen resources and ransom money.133

Additionally, piracy is, in many cases, driven by political instability. For example, a modern piracy hotspot has been in the Gulf of Guinea, including off the Liberian coast. Liberia, located in West Africa, endured decades of civil conflict, resulting in a lack of functioning government for over a decade; the effects of this political instability have led to widespread poverty and a lack of social security. When so many impoverished communities reside next to a major sea route, this situation creates a breeding ground for piracy activity along the Liberian coast.134 Pirates use this political instability to their advantage, and strategically pick areas with underfunded and weak police forces because it is unlikely that police forces will be able to capture and prosecute them. Corruption and poor socioeconomic development are other factors that push communities and individuals towards piracy. In Nigeria, piracy is common in the Delta region, a petroleum-rich area in southeastern Nigeria. Political and militant groups in the region claim that Nigeria's central government and corrupt politicians fail to invest the region's petroleum wealth into the communities and people of the Niger Delta, and instead divert revenues toward development elsewhere in the country.135 As a consequence, residents of the Niger Delta region have disproportionately low socioeconomic statuses and experience slower rates of human development compared to the rest of Nigeria—all of which perpetuate the popularity of piracy.136

Challenges Faced by Legal Bodies

Although piracy does not always involve violence, most instances involve the kidnapping, torturing, and killing of passengers and crew. Unfortunately, merchant vessels are rarely able to avoid pirate attacks, as these vessels generally travel at slow speeds due to the sheer amount of cargo carried onboard. Additionally, pirates have developed many mechanisms to attack merchant ships. To slow down vessels for a successful hijacking, pirates will use high-speed skiffs (a flat-bottomed open boat with sharp bow and square stern) and fire rocket-propelled grenades. After seizing hijacked merchant vessels, pirates are then able to expand their operations and commit larger-scale crimes by utilizing hijacked large vessels as home bases for carrying out attacks. By using hijacked merchant ships, pirates can disguise themselves as legitimate sailors.137 Some pirates will even repaint ships and produce forged documentation. Under international law, government bodies are generally unable to search any industrial ships without a warning or permit beforehand. Thus, pirates are able to avoid law enforcement with relative ease and have advantages with regards to mobility, disguise, and intimidation.

Unfortunately, police corruption is a barrier in addressing maritime piracy. Although corruption within police forces is inevitable, it has been the goal of many nations over the past century to control the amount of corruption

133 "More Sophisticated than You Thought," The Economist, October 31, 2013, http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and- africa/21588942-new-study-reveals-how-somali-piracy-financed-more-sophisticated-you. 134 Jessica Dillinger, "Modern Day Pirates: Countries With The Most Maritime Piracy Today," World Atlas, January 9, 2018, http://www.worldatlas.com/articles/modern-day-pirates-countries-with-the-most-maritime-piracy-today.html. 135 Elliot Smith, "Pirates are expanding in West Africa, threatening offshore oil storage," CNBC, April 27, 2020, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/27/pirates-are-expanding-in-west-africa-threatening-offshore-oil-storage.html. 136 Kate Higgins, "Regional Inequality and the Niger Delta," Overseas Development Institute, 2009, https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/3383.pdf. 137 "Piracy," World Shipping Council, n.d., http://www.worldshipping.org/industry-issues/security/piracy

Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 33 within its borders. Despite these efforts, police officers and politicians will underreport or ignore attacks in return for a fraction of any piracy profits. This link can be seen when analysing the Corruptions Perception Index (CPI). The countries with some of the most instances of maritime piracy attacks generally receive low scores on the CPI. For example, Somalia, Egypt, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Benin have extremely high rates of maritime piracy; all received low scores in the Corruption Perceptions Index.138

Piracy Financing

Piracy is funded through many different means; pirates are often linked to drug cartels, criminal syndicates, and terrorist groups. Pirates will smuggle drugs and arms in return for money to fund piracy expeditions. For many terrorist groups, transport by sea is the most preferable method of transferring illegal goods, as sea borders are often less regulated than land, state borders. Pirate financiers, who generally receive 30 to 50 percent of an expedition's profits, invest their profits in setting up private militias, gaining political influence, or financing the activities of terrorist or criminal organizations.139 According to The Economist, Ciise Yulux, a prominent Somali pirate leader who is thought to command up to 70 individuals, provided money and equipment to fighters linked to the terrorist group al-Shabaab—a Somali organization linked to al-Qaeda—in 2012.140

Blurred Territory

Although countries are able to prosecute pirates who commit crimes within the country's territorial waters (regardless of nationality), no country has jurisdiction in international waters. Thus, pirates will often escape to areas where national law enforcement will not search for them, as it is beyond their operational jurisdiction. Instead, piracy is considered a crime which has "universal jurisdiction," a concept that allows a national court to prosecute an individual for a crime not committed within its national boundaries but considered a crime in violation of international law.141

Furthermore, pirates will often escape into a different country's national waters, leaving other nations' naval police forces unable to pursue them in fear of violating territorial boundaries and infringing upon national sovereignty. Rather than allowing foreign forces to pursue pirates freely across borders, many states would rather leave their waters underpatrolled. As a result, pirates and maritime criminals can easily flee from law enforcement. Alternatively, some nations have coordinated efforts to ensure that, during the pursuit of criminals and pirates, multiple countries' navies are aware and available to respond to threats once they enter their national

138 "Corruption Perceptions Index 2019," Transparency International, 2019, https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2019. 139 "Pirate Trails: Tracking the Illicit Financial Flows from Piracy off the Horn of Africa," World Bank, n.d., https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/financialsector/publication/pirate-trails-tracking-the-illicit-financial-flows-from-piracy-off- the-horn-of-africa. 140 The Economist, "More Sophisticated than You Thought.” 141 "Universal Jurisdiction," International Justice Resource Center, n.d., https://ijrcenter.org/cases-before-national-courts/domestic- exercise-of-universal-jurisdiction/.

Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 34 waters—for example, within Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand's Malacca Straits Patrol (MSP), and the west and central African Yaoundé Code of Conduct.142

Case Study: Somalia and the Gulf of Aden

At its peak in the 2000s and early 2010s, piracy off the Horn of Africa—a geographic region surrounding Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti—was widespread. Between 2010 and 2014, a total of 358 piracy attacks occurred off the Somali coast alone.143 Piracy in Somalia often provided income for many Somali citizens, to the extent it could be considered Somalia’s most successful industry. In fact, in many pirating organizations, the leaders were able to earn over USD 2 million per year.144 However, international cooperation and intervention in the area has successfully reduced pirate activity off the Horn of Africa.145 Reviewing the methods that were utilized by the international community in driving the decline of Somali piracy may be integral to responding to challenges faced in the world's other piracy hotspots—including in the Gulf of Guinea, the Straits of Malacca, the Bay of Bengal, and the Caribbean.

146 Figure 2: Actual and attempted piracy attacks, 2010 and 2014.

In the early 1990s, Somali fishermen and armed groups began attacking and hijacking commercial ships, turning the Gulf of Aden into one of the world's most dangerous waters. These armed groups would claim they were an

142 MINDEF, "Fact Sheet: The Malacca Straits Patrol," Government of Singapore, April 21, 2015, "https://www.mindef.gov.sg/web/portal/mindef/news-and-events/latest-releases/article-detail/2016/april/2016apr21-news- releases-00134/. 143 "Number of actual and attempted piracy attacks in Somalia between 2010 and 2019," Statista, January 2020, https://www.statista.com/statistics/250867/number-of-actual-and-attempted-piracy-attacks-in-somalia/. 144 David Axe, "10 Things You Didn't Know about Somali Pirates," Wall Street Journal, April 27, 2009, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB124060718735454125. 145 Statista, "Number of actual and attempted piracy attacks in Somalia between 2010 and 2019." 146 "The Ungoverned Seas," The Economist, November 27, 2014, http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and- africa/21635049-waters-around-somalia-are-calmer-piracy-west-africa-rising.

Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 35 “authorized coast guard” protecting Somalia's fishing resources. 147 Despite their criminal acts, these armed groups were occasionally seen as a legitimate response to illegal fishing and illegal dumping of toxic waste in Somali waters. In 2008 alone, Somali pirates captured more than 40 large vessels in the Gulf of Aden. The Gulf of Aden—which is the southern exit point of the Red Sea—is integral for international trade and the global economy, as it leads directly to the Suez Canal shortcut between Asia and Europe. 148 To provide an idea of how serious the Somali piracy issue was, in 2008, piracy in Somalia resulted in 815 people being taken hostage. Of 439 pirate attacks in 2011, 237 occurred in the Gulf of Aden. In the spring of 2012, there were over 51 attacks off the coast of Somalia and over 158 sailors taken hostage.149

Despite piracy being illegal, the government of Somalia is unable to enforce regulations and bring pirates to justice. Since the onset of the Somali Civil War in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Somalia has lacked a functional central government which controls the entirety of the country and its people; as such, pirates in Somalia are practically in a lawless territory. Even in regions of the country where law enforcement exists, police will often accept bribes in return for secrecy. Somali citizens will often take part in bribery as well. Due to corruption, a lack of government infrastructure, and the exploitation of resources, Somali citizens live in some of the worst conditions in the world. The vast majority of are malnourished and impoverished—unable to meet their basic necessities. Nearly half the population, 4 million citizens, depend on food donations for basic survival.150 Thus, in many instances, pirates contribute a percentage of their ransom money to nearby communities in exchange for confidentiality. Somalis accept this money with open arms, as funds will often go towards needed public services, such as healthcare, medicine, and education. Regardless, piracy in the country frequently hurts Somali citizens indirectly. Necessary foreign aid and food aid is not always received by those in need, as either UN and non-governmental agencies' (NGOs) aid vessels are intercepted and seized by Somali pirates, or corrupt officials and non-state actors misallocate resources.

Ever since armed protection—led by the UN, NATO, and the EU, as discussed in the Past International Involvement section—has begun accompanying large vessels in the Gulf of Aden, piracy in Somalia has decreased dramatically. In 2017, only nine vessels were hijacked off the Somali coast, compared to 237 attacks in 2011.151 However, the use of armed protection may only be a temporary solution, as political instability in the Horn of Africa persists. International cooperation is necessary to ensure greater stability in the country that discourages piracy; more robust, long-term efforts—namely introducing armed guards on vessels and guidelines for training merchant crews on anti-piracy measures—have also been implemented and are effective in helping reduce the occurrence of piracy off the Somali coast.152

147 James Kraska and Brian Wilson. "Maritime Piracy in East Africa," Journal of International Affairs 62, no. 2 (2009): 58. 148 Axe, "10 Things You Didn't Know about Somali Pirates." 149 World Shipping Council, "Piracy." 150 Axe, "10 Things You Didn't Know about Somali Pirates." 151 W.B., "What is happening to Africa’s pirates?" The Economist, January 16, 2018, https://www.economist.com/the-economist- explains/2018/01/16/what-is-happening-to--pirates. 152 Ibid.

Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 36 Case Study: Gulf of Guinea

Figure 3: Pirate attacks in the Gulf of Guinea, 2019.153

Merchant shipping in the Gulf of Guinea is a valuable industry. The region's massive petroleum sector fuels 40 percent of European oil imports, while major ports in the region—like Lagos, Nigeria—are vital economic hubs.154 As the region combines high-value shipping vessels and cargo with high rates of poverty and a number of regional armed militant groups, the Gulf of Guinea is a natural location for high numbers of piracy attacks.155

Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea can be more accurately described as armed robbery at sea, as opposed to piracy, as piracy generally occurs in international waters; in the Gulf of Guinea, the majority of hijacking attacks take place in waters governed by a specific nation.156 Many of these nations have major petroleum industries, thus making oil tankers a prominent target for pirates. In a process known as "oil bunkering," armed pirates in the region often board oil tankers with the intention of capturing the vessel's cargo, as opposed to holding the ship's crew for ransom. The valuable oil is then transferred to another vessel to be traded illegally on the black market.157 Bunkering is a particularly dangerous form of piracy because it does not involve holding people as hostages; thus, the lives of captured passengers and crew are easily disregarded by pirates. However, since the global oil pricing

153 "The Gulf of Guinea is now the world’s worst piracy hotspot," The Economist, June 29, 2019, https://www.economist.com/international/2019/06/29/the-gulf-of-guinea-is-now-the-worlds-worst-piracy-hotspot. 154 Pigeon and Moss, "Why Piracy Is a Growing Threat in West Africa’s Gulf of Guinea." 155 "Maritime Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea," United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, n.d., https://www.unodc.org/documents/toc/Reports/TOCTAWestAfrica/West_Africa_TOC_PIRACY.pdf. 156 Pigeon and Moss, "Why Piracy Is a Growing Threat in West Africa’s Gulf of Guinea." 157 Ibid.

Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 37 crash in 2014, pirates increasingly resort to other methods more commonly associated with piracy—namely, kidnapping for ransom.158

Militant groups and criminal organizations play a major role in piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. For example, in Nigeria's Niger Delta, political groups like the Movement for the Emancipation of the Delta (MEND) or Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) seek to disrupt and seize oil tanker traffic in order to fund themselves and draw attention to the Nigerian government's misuse and embezzlement of oil revenues.159 Other criminal organizations make use of similar tactics, although mainly in pursuit of profit rather than political change. Piracy organized by criminal and militant groups is a disturbing trend globally, with similar maritime kidnapping and hijacking attacks being launched in the Philippines by the Islamic State-associated terrorist group Abu Sayyaf, and in Somalia by the al-Qaeda affiliate al-Shabaab.160

Countries in the region surrounding the Gulf of Guinea have collaborated in an effort to reduce piracy in the waters off western Africa. In 2013, a variety of regional multinational bodies—including the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and the Gulf of Guinea Commission—partnered with the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to create the Yaoundé Code of Conduct. The Yaoundé Code established regional information-sharing centres and networks to jointly respond piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, while also addressing a variety of other maritime issues in the region—including marine terrorism and illegal fishing.161 A notable example of the efficacy of the Yaoundé Code was the MT Maximus, a Panamanian oil tanker hijacked off the Ivorian coast in 2016; a joint response from six members within the group allowed the Nigerian Navy to identify, locate, and board the vessel to free its hostages.162

As with Somalia, armed military responses to piracy are limited in long-term effectiveness. Addressing systemic issues of corruption, coastal economic development, and government or military accountability in the region will reduce the socioeconomic factors which contribute to piracy, as well as encourage greater government involvement in piracy issues.163 For example, the Nigerian government, headed by Muhammadu Buhari, was criticized for passing an anti-piracy bill in 2019 that focused exclusively on the prosecution of maritime criminals and compensation for hijacked vessels and companies, instead of the deeper problems of poverty and corruption that push individuals towards criminal activity.164

Case Study: Straits of Singapore and Malacca

Located between peninsular Malaysia and the Indonesian island of Sumatra, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are busy, critical shipping routes which connect the Pacific and China Seas to the Indian Ocean. Over 120,000

158 Ibid. 159 Ibid. 160 Ibid. 161 Ibid. 162 Ibid. 163 Ibid. 164 Ibid.

Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 38 vessels sail through the straits every year.165 Unlike in the Horn of Africa, pirates in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore generally rely on the profits of selling seized cargo instead of ransoming crew members.166 As a result, pirates in the region tend to target smaller vessels carrying scrap metal or petroleum—goods which are difficult for governments to track on the black market.167 Incidents in the straits and Asia in general are also primarily incidents of maritime armed robbery, as attacks occur within a specific country's waters, often when ships are docked at a port.168 In 2018, of 98 attacks in Asia as a whole, only 4 were defined as piracy; the remainder were labelled "armed robbery."169 Thus, ensuring coordination between national governments when responding to piracy and maritime armed robbery attacks is critical because of the threat of criminals and pirates traversing international boundaries to evade capture. Protecting vessels docked at or near ports is also an important consideration in the region due to the presence of major ports at which vessels congregate—such as the Port of Singapore and the Malaysian ports of Port Klang and Tanjung Pelepas.

In 2006, the governments of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand jointly created the Malacca Straits Patrol (MSP), a framework for ensuring maritime safety and combating piracy in the waterway. The member navies of the MSP collaborate on intelligence-sharing, coordinate responses, and hold training exercises, in addition to regular sea and air patrols of the strait.170 These initiatives in the strait have been credited with a net decrease in attacks within the strait over the mid-2010s.171 However, in 2019, the number of piracy and armed robbery incidents in the region increased to 30—tripling the number from 2018.172

Possible Solutions and Controversies

A multitude of factors must be considered when aiming to eradicate maritime piracy and armed robbery. The solutions expanded upon below each have positive and negative consequences that must be carefully weighed. Note that there are many other potential solutions not listed below. Delegates are encouraged to be creative and conduct additional research, as well as balance the countless viewpoints of stakeholders connected to the topic of piracy. Moreover, addressing the broader issues which contribute to piracy—such as poverty and systemic corruption in high-risk piracy regions—should be considered when formulating solutions, but should not become the primary focus of the committee.

165 Vinita Ramani, "Troubled waters: piracy and maritime security in ," Kontinentalist, August 22, 2019, https://kontinentalist.com/stories/troubled-waters-piracy-and-maritime-security-in-southeast-asia. 166 Ted Kemp, "Crime on the high seas: The world’s most pirated waters," CNBC, September 15, 2014, https://www.cnbc.com/2014/09/15/worlds-most-pirated-waters.html. 167 Ibid. 168 "How piracy affects Southeast Asia," Safety4Sea, August 26, 2019, https://safety4sea.com/how-piracy-affects-southeast-asia/. 169 Ibid. 170 MINDEF, "Fact Sheet: The Malacca Straits Patrol." 171 Safety4Sea, "How piracy affects Southeast Asia." 172 "Piracy incidents along Straits of Malacca and Singapore surge in 2019," South China Morning Post, December 28, 2019, https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/south-asia/article/3043744/piracy-incidents-along-straits-malacca-and-singapore-surge.

Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 39 Naval Anti-Piracy Operations

Anti-piracy operations by coast guards and naval forces help combat maritime piracy. These initiatives have already been implemented in many vulnerable regions. For example, many nations and international organizations, such as NATO and the EU, have sent warships and patrols to the Horn of Africa to deter and respond to pirate attacks—successfully leading to the reduction of piracy attacks in the region. However, local residents may be opposed to the presence of foreign vessels within their country's borders, often due to past instances of illegal foreign fishing and exploitation of ocean resources. Military-based anti-piracy operations may also be unsustainable and limited in long-term effectiveness; naval operations off Somalia have succeeded in reducing piracy attacks, but the Somali government remains unable to conduct these patrols independently— forcing the country to rely on a constant foreign presence.173 Thus, the international community must ensure that the countries in a specific region have the capacity to independently carry out anti-piracy naval operations— whether by holding training programs or sending advisors, as was the case with the UNODC's GMCP program in West Africa. The success of the joint Malacca Straits Patrol, organized by the four governments of Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand, in reducing piracy and maritime armed robbery in the Singapore and Malacca straits is an example of regional governments collaborating to successfully utilize armed responses to piracy.174

Strengthening Ships' Onboard Defence Capabilities

Arming the crews of merchant vessels with weapons, employing physical defence mechanisms onboard vessels, or hiring armed security personnel may serve as deterrence for increased piracy, in addition to defending vessels, their crews, and their cargo from attacks. Specifically, ship owners and corporations have increasingly turned to the use of privately-contracted armed security personnel (PCASP), trained armed guards who travel onboard merchant vessels while equipped with firearms and necessary security equipment.175 The use of PCASP remains controversial, as different nations maintain vastly different laws on the passage of individuals bearing firearms through their territorial waters and when docked at a country's ports.176 Often, firearms are not permitted to be carried onboard vessels under international law. If the employment of PCASP onboard merchant vessels is to continue, states should work to ensure transparency regarding national laws on PCASP or firearms in general. Additionally, guidelines for hiring and equipping PCASP could be recommended to private companies and governments.177

In the past decade, ships have increasingly been supplied with razor wire, electric fences, high-pressure water hoses, and long-range acoustic devices (LRADs)—which emit painful sound beams—to ward off pirates. 178

173 Wanjohi Kabukuru, "Somali piracy: in search of remedies for a global malady," African Renewal—United Nations, n.d., https://www.un.org/africarenewal/web-features/somali-piracy-search-remedies-global-malady. 174 MINDEF, "Fact Sheet: The Malacca Straits Patrol." 175 "Private-Armed-Security," International Maritime Organization, n.d., http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/PiracyArmedRobbery/Pages/Private-Armed-Security.aspx. 176 Ibid. 177 Ibid. 178 Raunek, "18 Anti-Piracy Weapons for Ships to Fight Pirates," Marine Insight, October 25, 2019, https://www.marineinsight.com/marine-piracy-marine/18-anti-piracy-weapons-for-ships-to-fight-pirates/.

Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 40 These strategies have been effective in preventing pirates from boarding vessels and providing crews with more time to adequately respond to pirate threats. Generally, hiring PCASP comes at greater monetary cost compared to other aforementioned security measures; thus, dependent on a nation or company's financial situation, arming vessels with defensive equipment may be of greater or lesser priority.

Targeting Corruption and Strengthening Judicial Systems

Implementing anti-corruption initiatives and strengthening national judicial systems in piracy-affected areas may aid in the fight against maritime piracy. At the international level, empowering transnational organizations to pursue anti-corruption measures within countries may prove beneficial in exposing networks of corruption. However, national governments may be hesitant to adopt measures seen as infringing on a country's sovereignty. Continued cooperation at the state-to-state level is also required to ensure that cross-border corruption and criminal networks are approached with sufficient intelligence-sharing and communication.179 At the national level, legal systems must focus on processing corrupt officials through the legal system; for example, in Nigeria, few convictions for corrupt officials are handed out due to law enforcement disproportionately prioritizing the recovery of funds and resources.180 Politicians themselves in some countries are often deeply involved in criminal activities, allowing them to influence government agencies, including law enforcement—which, in turn, blurs the boundaries of judicial independence.181

Strengthening national judicial systems to ensure that pirates are being properly processed through the justice system and that judges are familiar with maritime will be integral to alleviating the shortcomings of legal systems in dealing with piracy. In most cases, the pirates being tried in court are merely low-level pirates, who wield little influence within piracy and criminal groups; of the more than 1,200 pirates that have been prosecuted for piracy crimes, with the most being in Somalia, Yemen, Kenya, and the Seychelles, none of them could be considered high-level piracy financiers and leaders.182 Encouraging national law enforcement agencies to prioritize their resources on capturing higher-level pirate leaders and intermediaries involved in criminal activities will allow more effective reduction of piracy via legal channels. The creation of task groups at both the international, regional, and national scale to collaborate on prosecuting high-level piracy leaders may also strengthen governments' capacity to appropriately capture and try those at the top of criminal, pirate, or terrorist organizations.183 For example, the UNODC's Global Maritime Crime Programme (GMCP) has worked in West Africa to offer training programs for judges and prosecutors dealing with maritime crime prosecutions.184

179 Kyle Best, "The Development of Piracy Law in West Africa & the Institutions Underpinning Counter-Piracy Efforts," McGill University Faculty of Law, Spring 2015, https://www.mcgill.ca/humanrights/files/humanrights/ihri_wps_v3n10-kyle_best.pdf. 180 Ibid. 181 Ibid. 182 Kenneth Scott, "Prosecuting Pirates: Lessons Learned and Continuing Challenges," Oceans Beyond Piracy, n.d., http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/attachments/ProsecutingPiratesReportDigital.pdf. 183 Ibid. 184 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, "Atlantic Ocean."

Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 41 International Cooperation

Cross-border cooperation and international data sharing have proved vital to some of the most prominent anti- piracy efforts in the modern world, like in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore and the Gulf of Guinea. By sharing data on piracy activities, nations will be able to better regulate, identify, and track pirates. Additionally, establishing clear means of collaboration across national boundaries will allow naval forces to either pursue pirates in the waters of neighbouring nations or offer smoother transitions of jurisdiction between countries involved in apprehending pirates. For example, creating a command centre to coordinate the actions of two national navies may permit one to cease pursuing pirates at their ocean boundary, while transferring all relevant data to the country whose jurisdiction the pirates now fall under in order to allow the second navy to continue the effort. However, permitting naval forces to enter foreign waters may launch questions over the infringement of national sovereignty, and is especially flawed in regions where territorial disputes are already existent—such as in the South China Sea, where China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia, and other nations disagree on ocean boundaries.

Negotiations over Amnesty

Another potential solution would be for states to offer amnesty to pirates who offer credible and valuable information to law enforcement agencies. While oftentimes, low-level pirates may have little personal knowledge of piracy operations, they possess valuable information linking themselves to mid-level pirate managers leaders, who in turn will be closely linked to high-ranking pirate financiers.185

Although these solutions have the potential to grant immense amounts of information to law enforcement government bodies, these individuals may need to receive protection from state governments due to the sheer power and influence wielded by piracy groups and their backers—often large crime syndicates and terrorist groups.186 Additionally, providing amnesty to these pirates may be deeply controversial, as it allows some pirates to escape being held accountable for their actions.

185 Scott, "Prosecuting Pirates: Lessons Learned and Continuing Challenges." 186 Ibid.

Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 42 Bloc Positions

Figure 4: Concentration of piracy and armed robbery attacks, 2018.187

Coastal Developing Nations

Developing nations adjacent to bodies of water and major shipping routes are most susceptible to maritime piracy. These nations include, for example, Indonesia, India, Bangladesh, Yemen, Somalia, Cameroon, Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, and Peru—all of which have faced relatively high numbers of piracy incidents over recent years. These nations are severely impacted by maritime piracy and have lost millions of dollars due to piracy activities. These nations are among the world's most committed to fighting maritime piracy; however, each nation's economic and political status varies and thus, the anti-piracy measures they support differ. More politically stable countries—like India or Indonesia—may focus on strengthening the capacity of their judicial systems to prosecute pirates, as well as work with neighbouring countries to implement naval patrols; politically unstable nations—such as Somalia—may lack the outright capacity to adequately cope with piracy and its associated issues, thus necessitating greater international aid and cooperation.

North America, Europe, and Australasia

European nations, the United States, Canada, , and New Zealand have all, more or less, eradicated maritime piracy. Despite piracy not directly occurring in their waters, these nations are still interested in combating global piracy due to piracy's impacts on international shipping, trade, and commerce. Many large shipping and trading corporations are based in these countries; thus, ensuring the safety of shipping routes and merchant vessels remains a key priority for the bloc. Most of these nations provide some form of security and resources for high-risk piracy nations, including training for anti-piracy personnel and patrol forces. The bloc

187 Reality Check Team, "Piracy in West Africa: The world's most dangerous seas?" BBC, June 18, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48581197.

Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 43 would also encourage the strengthening of judicial systems and anti-corruption measures to prosecute and sentence pirates via legal means. In addition, it is important to note that in most European nations, corporations are legally allowed to hire privately contracted armed security personnel (PCASP).188

South America and the Caribbean

Nations in South America and the Caribbean are extremely susceptible to acts of piracy. Unfortunately, pirates strategically use the vast coastline and geography of the region to their benefit. Piracy in this region is becoming increasingly violent, as South American pirates are gaining access to arms through the South American arms trade. Links to organized crime and drugs groups in the region also pose a threat to any measures implemented in these countries. The bloc is deeply invested in continuing efforts to combat global piracy, although the connections between piracy and organized crime force these nations to take on a more careful approach—due to the possibility of falling into drawn-out conflicts with dangerous, well-armed, and influential criminal organizations.

Asia

Asia is home to some of the severest piracy hotspots in the world—most notably, the Straits of Malacca. A problem unique to Asia is that there are many territorial disputes, including in the South China Sea; thus, regional cooperation is essential to eradicating piracy in this region. Many of these nations are in the process of upgrading their coast guard, naval forces, and policing equipment, allowing them to better respond to piracy in their waters.

During the past decade, Asian nations have taken drastic steps in combating piracy through intelligence-sharing, training exercises, legal reforms, anti-corruption measures, and modernization of equipment and techniques. While most Asian nations remain open to regional and international cooperation, underlying tension due to geopolitical tensions may prevent some countries from forming beneficial, collaborative relationships.

Discussion Questions

1. Should nations be permitted to patrol another nation's waters with the intent of combating piracy?

2. Should ransoms be paid to pirates? Do states have a responsibility to save their captured citizens through ransoms, or is this outweighed by escalation of piracy fuelled by granting profits to pirates and criminal organizations?

3. How can nations at high-risk of piracy and require significant international support become more self- sufficient and build the capacity to suppress pirate activities in their waters?

4. What structures and programs can be implemented to ensure that law enforcement officers and judicial systems are transparent and able to adequately prosecute pirates?

188 Jessica Schechinger, “Responsibility For Human Rights Violations Arising From The Use Of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel Against Piracy. Re-Emphasizing The Primary Role And Obligations Of Flag States,” Amsterdam Center for International Law 30, no. 58 (November 2014): http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2528502.

Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 44 5. When confronting armed pirates, is diplomacy possible, or is violence the only solution?

6. What international programs or initiatives have been created to strengthen anti-piracy cooperation between nations? What positive outcomes can be drawn from these examples and applied elsewhere in the world? How can the shortcomings of these programs be remedied?

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"Operation Ocean Shield - November 2014." North Atlantic Treaty Organization, November 2014. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_topics/141202a-Factsheet-OceanShield-en.pdf.

"Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships Definitions and Actions." ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre, n.d. https://www.recaap.org/piracy_definitions_and_actions.

"Piracy incidents along Straits of Malacca and Singapore surge in 2019." South China Morning Post, December 28, 2019. https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/south-asia/article/3043744/piracy-incidents-along-straits- malacca-and-singapore-surge.

"Piracy." World Shipping Council, n.d. http://www.worldshipping.org/industry-issues/security/piracy.

"Private-Armed-Security." International Maritime Organization, n.d. http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/PiracyArmedRobbery/Pages/Private-Armed-Security.aspx.

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"The Golden Age of Piracy." Royal Museums Greenwich, n.d. https://www.rmg.co.uk/discover/explore/golden- age-piracy.

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Vancouver Model United Nations 2021 48 "The History of Piracy." New African Magazine, March 19, 2013. http://newafricanmagazine.com/the-history- of-piracy/.

"The Ungoverned Seas." The Economist, November 27, 2014. http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east- and-africa/21635049-waters-around-somalia-are-calmer-piracy-west-africa-rising.

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"Universal Jurisdiction." International Justice Resource Center, n.d. https://ijrcenter.org/cases-before-national- courts/domestic-exercise-of-universal-jurisdiction/.

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