The Air Force was taken by surprise in the attack on Pearl Harbor. Nine hours later, it happened again in the Philippines. Caught on the Ground By John T. Correll earl Harbor is remembered as the greatest naval disaster in American history, and Prightly so. The main target of the Japa- nese surprise attack on Dec. 7, 1941 was the US Pacific Fleet. At 7:55 that Sunday morning, sailors on ships moored in the harbor looked up to see Japanese airplanes sweeping in low from the sea. They met virtually no resistance as they dropped their bombs and torpedoes into the midst of the vulnerable fleet. When it was over, eight battleships, three light cruisers, three destroyers, and four auxiliary ships had been sunk, capsized, or se- verely damaged. Navy casualties were more than 2,000 killed and hundreds wounded. “Remember Pearl Harbor” became an instant and lasting motto. The USS Arizona Memorial, where the remains of one of the battleships can still be seen, draws 1.5 million visitors a year. The story of the Navy debacle at Pearl Harbor has been told many times and will not be recounted here. The Navy was not the only service caught by surprise, though. Nor did open to attack. The Japanese attackers What happened in the Philippines it take all the casualties. Army Air caught them on the ground. nine hours after Pearl Harbor defies Forces bases in Hawaii were struck at The Hawaiian Air Force, the Army’s belief. Japanese attackers once again the same time. US Army forces on the Hawaiian air arm, took 690 casualties caught the US Army Air Forces flat- island belonged to the Hawaiian Army that day, including 244 killed. Seventy- footed on the ground. Despite clear and Department. On its orders, the only alert six of its aircraft were destroyed out- timely warning, about 100 aircraft were in effect was for potential sabotage. The right and many others were damaged. destroyed at Clark Field and other bases pursuit wing at Wheeler Field had the In contrast to the fumbling reaction on Luzon. Casualties were 77 killed weekend off. The fighters were parked at command levels, 14 fighter pilots, and 148 wounded. The first day of the wingtip to wingtip in precise rows on acting on their own, got their P-40s war for the United States reflected no the ramp. At Hickam Field, the bomb- and P-36s into the air and shot down credit on those in command in Hawaii ers were similarly clustered and wide 10 of the Japanese aircraft. or in the Philippines. 62 AIR FORCE Magazine / December 2007 Washington had expected an aggres- Pearl Harbor—on orders of President had the largest concentration of Army sive move by Tokyo somewhere in the Roosevelt and over the objections of the aircraft outside the continental United Pacific. The Japanese empire was in fleet commander—rather than returning States. Hawaii was reinforced as well. its 10th year of conquest and the only to California. This was intended to have The best US airplanes available, includ- obstacle to its further expansion was a deterrent effect on Japan. ing B-17 bombers and P-40 fighters, the presence of the United States. In 1941, the United States reinforced were sent to the Pacific. Up to 1940, the US Fleet was based the Philippines, still a US possession, Japanese forces were preparing to at San Pedro, Calif. In May 1940, after with airpower. By December 1941, the strike southward to seize Malaya, the exercises at sea, the fleet remained at Far East Air Force in the Philippines Philippines, and the oil-rich Nether- lands East Indies. In October 1941, after studying the issue for most of the year, the Japanese Navy committed to an attack on Pearl Harbor. US air bases in the Philippines were also targeted. The objective was to keep US forces off the Japanese flank in the Pacific for six months or so, until the first critical phase of the “Southern Operation” was completed. No Great Secret The United States had broken the Japanese diplomatic code and had been intercepting and reading the message traffic since the summer of 1940. The diplomatic correspondence did not have much detail on military or naval matters, but anticipation of war did not depend on secret information. Everybody knew that war was coming. The question was not if, only when and where. The Philip- pines was regarded as the most likely point of attack, but Hawaii was seen as a possible target as well. “Japanese May Strike Over Weekend,” said the Honolulu Advertiser headline, Nov. 30, 1941. “Pacific Zero Hour Near,” the Dec. 5 headline said. Official messages and warnings flowed from Washington to the Pacific. There was ambiguity in them because Washington did not know exactly what was going to happen. There was also allowance for local discretion. On Nov. 27, “war warning” messages were sent to Army and Navy commanders in Hawaii, the Philippines, the Canal Zone, and on the West Coast. In one such message, Gen. George C. Marshall, the Chief of Staff of the Army, warned Lt. Gen. Walter C. Short, commander of the Army Hawaiian Department, “Hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities can- not—repeat, cannot—be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act.” Marshall said that “prior to hostile Japanese action, you are directed to undertake such recon- Facing page: USS Shaw explodes un- der Japanese fire. Top: USS California sinks into Pearl Harbor. Bottom: the burned carcass of a B-17C. AIR FORCE Magazine / December 2007 63 Though Kimmel was the senior US officer on Oahu, defense of Hawaii was not his job; it was Short’s. However, the shore-based 14th Naval District, subor- dinate to Kimmel, was responsible for long-range reconnaissance patrol. For the Navy, Pearl Harbor was essentially a forward base from which to operate. Survivors view the re- The Pacific Fleet was geared to the of- mains of destroyers USS Cassin and USS Downes fensive—that is, meeting and defeating after the attack on Pearl the Imperial Japanese fleet at sea. Harbor. USS Pennsylva- Short had been reminded repeatedly nia is behind them. All by Marshall and others that protecting three were in dry dock at the Pacific Fleet was his primary and the time of the attack. overriding mission, but it didn’t sink in. “In his heart, Short regarded the presence of the Pacific Fleet as a pro- tection for his Hawaiian Department rather than vice versa,” said Gordon W. Prange in At Dawn We Slept. He was focused on the threat of sabotage and on protecting the airplanes rather than using them to defend the fleet. Even though Short had on hand two infantry divisions to fulfill ground force naissance and other measures as you also a small training field at Haleiwa requirements, he ordered Hawaiian Air deem necessary.” on the northern shore. Force enlisted men to undergo basic The Navy Department message to The Army commanders were hand- infantry training and pull guard duty. Adm. Husband E. Kimmel, commander picked—Short by Marshall, Martin by At the time, the Air Force had an acute of the US Pacific Fleet, informed its Lt. Gen. H.H. “Hap” Arnold, Chief of shortage of trained technicians. Martin recipient “this dispatch is to be consid- the Army Air Forces. That Marshall, sent a single letter of protest but then ered a war warning” and told Kimmel who understood and appreciated air- fell into line with Short’s program. to “execute an appropriate defensive power, chose Short for this assignment In December 1941, on the eve of the deployment.” is inexplicable. Arnold’s selection of Japanese attack, Short and Martin were Both Kimmel and Short were fairly Martin is also difficult to understand. pulling crew members off bombers at new to their commands, having arrived Pacific Air Forces historians Leatrice Hickam Field to guard warehouses in within a few days of each other in Feb- R. Arakaki and John R. Kuborn have Honolulu. ruary 1941. From his headquarters at said, with careful understatement, that The assignment of modern aircraft to Ft. Shafter, Short commanded all Army the Short-Martin team was “not the best the Hawaiian Air Force did not begin ground and air forces in Hawaii. He combination of commanders.” was an infantry officer to the depths of his soul and he could not or would not Confused Priorities adjust his perspective beyond that. Martin was under orders from Arnold Short’s air component was the Ha- to establish better relations with the waiian Air Force, commanded by Maj. Navy and with Army ground forces. Gen. Frederick L. Martin. Its opera- “Unfortunately, in his role as peace- tional units were the 18th Bombard- maker, General Martin had a tendency ment Wing at Hickam Field, adjacent to place cooperation between the Army to Pearl Harbor, the 14th Pursuit Wing and the Navy and cooperation within the at Wheeler Field, next to Schofield Army over Hawaiian Air Force needs,” Barracks, and the 86th Observation said Arakaki and Kuborn. Martin’s ef- Squadron at Bellows Field, on the fectiveness was further complicated by southeast coast of the island. There was chronic health problems. Casualties at Pearl Harbor Killed, missing, died of wounds Wounded Navy 2,008 710 Marine Corps 109 69 Army 218 364 Civilians 68 35 President Roosevelt signs the declara- Total 2,403 1,178 tion of war against Japan on Dec. 8, 1941. 64 AIR FORCE Magazine / December 2007 commanded the Navy patrol wings, submitted a prescient report.