Pearl Harbor

By John T. Correll

he smoke had barely cleared His report to President Franklin D. A second investigation within the along Row follow- Roosevelt faulted Adm. Husband E. month, headed by Supreme Court ing the attack on Kimmel, commander of the US Pacific Justice , accused Kimmel when the questions began. Fleet, and Lt. Gen. Walter C. Short, and Short of dereliction of duty. Both of TWhy were the US Navy and Army caught commander of the Army’s Hawaiian them were shuffled off into retirement by surprise and almost totally unprepared Department, for lack of readiness to in their reduced grades—Short on Feb on Dec. 7, 1941? Who was to blame? The meet the attack. Kimmel and Short 28, 1942, and Kimmel on March 1. next day, Secretary of the Navy Frank were relieved from command Dec. 16 “Remember Pearl Harbor!” became Knox flew in from Washington to find and reverted to their permanent two- an instant rallying cry for the nation. out what had gone wrong. star ranks. It was the most enduring slogan of

22 NOVEMBER / DECEMBER 2016 H WWW.AIRFORCEMAG.COM on Dec. 7, 1941. USS is in the center, burning after an explosion that killed more than 1,100 sea- men. To the left are USS and USS West Virginia. Tennessee survived the attack. West Virginia was sunk but later salvaged and repaired.

US Naval History and Heritage Command photo

World War II and a fixture in the popu- ian islands were on a relaxed weekend Fourteen US pilots, acting on their lar culture for many years. However, schedule. own, got their P-40 and P-36 fighters not everybody would remember Pearl The Japanese aircraft struck Pearl into the air and shot down 10 of the Harbor the same way. Harbor and Hickam and Wheeler Fields Japanese attackers. The basic facts are well known. A in two waves. Eight and Losses would have been worse ex- Japanese task force with six aircraft 10 other ships were sunk, capsized, cept that the US carriers were at sea. carriers arrived undetected 220 miles or severely damaged. Seventy-six US Nine hours later, US forces were sur- north of . When the attack began aircraft were destroyed. The casualty prised again in the , where at 7:55 a.m. on Sunday morning Dec. total was 2,403 killed, missing, or died the Air Force was caught on the ground 7, the US Navy and Army in the Hawai- of wounds and 1,178 wounded. and flat-footed. About 100 aircraft

NOVEMBER / DECEMBER 2016 H WWW.AIRFORCEMAG.COM 23 In the interim, the Navy and the Army conducted six more investigations and inquiries, citing mistakes and failures on a broad front but with each service placing the larger share of the blame on the other. Accusations first arose during the 1944 election campaign that secret information, withheld for political pur- poses, would prove that responsibility for Pearl Harbor “extended into high places in Washington.” This was mostly the doing of minor partisan players and Thomas E. Dewey, the Republican presidential candidate, would have nothing to do with it. US Naval History and Heritage Command photo US Army photo Nevertheless, the clamor for fur- ther explanation led to a massive were destroyed or damaged, with 225 investigation by a joint congressional casualties sustained. (No action was committee with hearings that lasted Above: Adm. Husband Kimmel (l) com- manded the US Fleet and Pacific Fleet ever taken to hold commanders in the from November 1945 to May 1946. during the . Lt. Gen. Philippines accountable.) The mountain of data and testimony Walter Short (r) commanded the US Army Roosevelt released the report of accumulated by this committee still Hawaiian Department. Both were roundly blamed for lack of preparation and were the Roberts inquiry to the newspapers remains the fundamental source for forced to retire. Below: A B-17 at Hickam in January 1942 and many of them most of what is known and said about Airfield that arrived during the Japanese printed it in full. Later on, it would the Pearl Harbor attack. attack on Pearl Harbor, seen smoking in the background. This aircraft was prob- be generally agreed that the finding of The joint committee said that “the ably piloted by 1st Lt. Karl Barthelmess, “dereliction of duty” was too harsh, errors made by the Hawaiian commands who would later receive a Silver Star for but because of wartime secrecy, Kim- were errors of judgment and not der- gallantry during his service in the Mediter- ranean Theater. mel and Short had no opportunity for elictions of duty.” It also acknowledged rebuttal until 1945. that the Army and Navy in Washington

Army Signal photo via National Archives

24 NOVEMBER / DECEMBER 2016 H WWW.AIRFORCEMAG.COM could have and should have provided that Roosevelt knew in advance about “General Short Sees Danger of Oahu more information. the attack but let it happen to serve Air Raid,” said an Aug. 14, 1941 That did not let Kimmel and Short his objective of carrying the United headline in the Honolulu Advertiser. off the hook. The inquiry found that States into the war. At the extreme were Follow-up headlines took a more ur- they had failed “to discharge their the conspiracy theorists who accused gent tone: on Nov. 30, “Japanese May responsibilities in light of the warn- Roosevelt of deliberately provoking Strike Over Weekend,” and on Dec. 5, ings received from Washington, other the attack. “Pacific Zero Hour Near.” information possessed by them, and Historian Gordon W. Prange studied In 1940, the US had broken the the principle of command by mutual the Pearl Harbor attack for almost 40 Japanese diplomatic code, designated cooperation.” years. The gist of his work, published “Purple” by the Americans. The de- The committee report faulted the Ha- posthumously as At Dawn We Slept coded Purple code intercepts were waiian commands for failure to integrate in 1982, is basically consistent with called “Magic.” their efforts and work together, conduct the findings of the joint congressional The diplomatic messages revealed effective reconnaissance “within the lim- committee in 1946. Prange’s research a great deal about ’s strategic its of their equipment,” maintain a “state is widely regarded as definitive. intentions but they did not contain of readiness,” and use their resources to Arguments about Pearl Harbor much real military information. Still, repel the Japanese raiders or reduce the mainly follow two broad tracks: what the Army and Navy intelligence shops effects of the successful attack. information officials in Washington in Washington guarded their secrets Kimmel and Short continued their and had before the attack, and jealously. Kimmel and Short were not efforts to salvage their reputations. what actions they took as a result of on distribution for Magic intercepts. Short died in 1949, Kimmel in 1968, but that knowledge. All of the advance information was their families—especially the Kimmel ambiguous. At no point did any US of- family—have kept up the campaign. PORTENTS AND WARNINGS ficials have definite knowledge of the The government has periodically con- In one sense the Japanese strike on coming attack. Kimmel and Short—es- sidered whether Kimmel and Short Dec. 7 was a surprise. In another sense it pecially Kimmel, as senior commander should be advanced on the retired list was not. Air attack on Pearl Harbor had in the Pacific—had almost as much to their highest wartime ranks, but nine been a standard scenario in annual US of the directly relevant information times between 1957 and 2015 decided fleet exercises since 1928, and Japan’s extracted from the intercepts as Wash- against doing so. aggression on the Pacific rim and its ington did. In the postwar period, a “revision- hostility toward the were Both of them were aware that Japa- ist” movement emerged, contending widespread knowledge. nese embassies and consulates had

National Park Service photo

Sailors at Naval Air Station watch USS Shaw explode in the distance.

NOVEMBER / DECEMBER 2016 H WWW.AIRFORCEMAG.COM 25 USN photo been instructed to destroy most of final piece sent Sunday morning. The stubbornly insisted on holding the intel- their codes and ciphers and burn their embassy was told to destroy its code ligence report within his own domain. secret papers. Both knew that the main machine and deliver the message to the Japanese carrier force had left home Americans at 1 p.m. Eastern Time (7:30 MYSTERIOUS INTERCEPTS waters in November. a.m. in Hawaii, half an hour before the The revisionists gained in credibility In addition, Kimmel was told that attack was supposed to begin). when John Toland joined their ranks there had been no radio traffic from The message did not disclose any- with the publication in 1982 of Infamy: the carriers in several weeks and that thing about the planned attack on Pearl Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath. Toland, Japanese navy forces afloat had changed Harbor, nor did it declare war or sever who had won a Pulitzer prize for previ- their call signs twice within a month. diplomatic relations. What it did was ous work, signed up to the theory that He did not share that knowledge with break off negotiations since “it is im- Roosevelt knew several days ahead of Short. possible to reach an agreement.” time that a Japanese fleet was headed On Nov. 27, Kimmel and Short Despite that, it was alarming enough for Hawaii. got specific “war warning” messages. for Marshall to send another war warn- “Toland has responded to criticism by “Negotiations with Japan appear to be ing to Army commands in the Pacific, conceding that as much as 50 percent terminated,” said the message from Gen. including Hawaii. Short did not get of the new information in his book, re- George C. Marshall, the Army Chief of his copy until after the attack, but it leased last April, may be proven false,” Staff, to Short. “Hostile action possible would have told him little more than a UPI wire dispatch said in December at any moment,” he already knew about Japanese plans. 1982. “But the evidence that Washing- “This dispatch is to be considered The most important information not ton knew of the approaching fleet is a war warning,” the Chief of Naval given to Kimmel and Short was the so- too overwhelming to ignore, he said.” Operations, Adm. Harold R. Stark, called “bomb plot” message decoded in He relied heavily on the word of a advised Kimmel. “An aggressive move early October. The Japanese consulate former seaman first class, identified by Japan is expected within the next in Honolulu was instructed to report only as “Z” in the book, who was per- few days.” the exact position of ships in specific suaded to talk to Toland by Kimmel’s Kimmel said later that the term “war locations in Pearl Harbor, essentially son. In December 1941, Seaman Z was warning” had no standing in official creating a grid of individual ships at a 20-year-old electronics technician Navy usage and that he did not know their anchorages. at the Twelfth Naval District in San exactly what to make of it. Kimmel had a point when he later Francisco. On Dec. 2, commercial cable Neither Kimmel nor Short knew of complained that this message was a companies reported detection of radio the intercepted Purple code message strong implication of a planned air at- signals they could not identify. Seaman from to Washington, transmit- tack. He had not been told because the Z made cross bearings of these and ted in 14 segments Dec. 6-7, with the chief of naval war plans in Washington calculated the likely point of origin.

26 NOVEMBER / DECEMBER 2016 H WWW.AIRFORCEMAG.COM USN photo via National Archives

USN photo via National Archives photo

According to Toland, Seaman Z specu- and no one was allowed near them. Ac- lated to his boss that the signals might cording to Minoru Genda, the officer Above l-r: USS burns in the harbor. The Tennessee-class battleship was sunk, be from the missing Japanese carrier who planned the attack, the pilots had but salvaged and repaired. / An almost force. It was “common knowledge,” agreed not to use their radios even if unrecognizable pile of aircraft wreckage at Wheeler Airfield. The wreckage includes at Toland said, that Z’s boss was a “per- their lives depended on it. least one P-40 and a twin-engine amphibious sonal friend” of Roosevelt’s and had aircraft. / A B-17 that arrived from California direct access to the White House. The WINDS EXECUTE during the attack was destroyed by a blister- ing strafing attack after landing. Pictured supposition was that Roosevelt had been Toland also revived the “Winds Ex- below is a heavily damaged P-40 at Bellows “promptly informed” of the signals. ecute” issue, which had been debunked Field. Fourteen pilots were able to get their The New York Times and others soon by the joint congressional committee P-40 and P-36 fighters into the air and shoot down 10 of the Japanese attackers. located Seaman Z, whose name was in 1946. Robert D. Ogg. He said that the tie to the In November 1941, US intelligence Japanese carriers was pure guesswork. learned from intercepts that Japan had He had no idea of how such signals were created a “Winds” notification system tracked or identified. that would kick in should regular dip- three code phrases was decoded Dec. For all that Ogg and his colleagues lomatic communications be disrupted. 4, 1941, a clue that the war was about knew, “the signals could have emanated Coded warnings and instructions would to begin. from a Liberian freighter, a commercial then be broadcast by regular short wave Questioned in the congressional hear- fishing fleet, or an off-course Lebanese radio. ings, he was unable to substantiate his taxi cab,” an analysis by the National Se- The words “East wind rain,” for ex- claim. A National Security Agency curity Agency said. Ogg’s boss was dead ample, would mean impending trouble recap noted that Safford “kept changing by then, but no record could be found with the United States. “North wind his story. His evidence was revealed as of any report from him to Roosevelt. cloudy” meant the Soviet Union. “West little more than a farrago of fabrication, Seaman Z’s story was one of several wind clear” would be Great Britain. speculation, poor memory, rumor gath- supposedly proving that the carrier To avoid mistakes, Winds messages ering, and plain error-filled opinion.” strike force had been detected. In fact, would be distinctively formatted with The story returned in the 1970s, when the Japanese fleet had maintained ab- prescribed forms and repetitions. Ralph Briggs, a former Navy Morse in- solute radio silence since its departure The ensuing furor was about a sup- tercept operator, said that he had picked Nov. 26 from its assembly point in the posed “Winds Execute” message, which up an “East wind rain” message on Kuril Islands. would have activated the procedure. In Dec. 4, 1941. His account was weak in The ships communicated by signal the 1940s, a naval intelligence officer, several places and he could not produce flags during the day and by blinkers at Capt. Laurance F. Safford, claimed that any evidence, but Toland cited him as night. Radio transmitters were disabled a Winds Execute message containing all a credible source anyway.

NOVEMBER / DECEMBER 2016 H WWW.AIRFORCEMAG.COM 27 Below: USS Arizona sinks in the harbor. There was in fact a Winds Execute Nevertheless, the Winds Execute There is now a memorial placed over the of the sunken ship. Bottom: President message. It was broadcast Dec. 7 at prediction of war—like the intercepted Roosevelt delivers his “Day of Infamy” 7:02 p.m. Washington time, more than radio signals and Roosevelt’s secret speech to a joint session of Congress on six hours after the Pearl Harbor attack schemes—lived on in revisionist lore. Dec. 8, 1941. Behind him are Vice President Henry Wallace and Speaker of the House and the code phrase was “West wind Sam Rayburn. To Roosevelt’s left is his clear,” meaning Japanese relations with AT DAWN THEY SLEPT eldest son, James, who would receive a Great Britain were in danger. It was not Defense of the Hawaiian islands was Navy Cross for heroism as a marine dur- ing the war. about Pearl Harbor or the United States. primarily Short’s job, and a corollary mission for Kimmel, as they shared responsibility for reconnaissance and patrol. Kimmel and Short said they would have taken stronger action if they had been better informed or if they had more resources. On the other hand, they had plenty of general warning and commanders at their levels were expected to maintain a proper alert and defense without de- tailed instructions from Washington. Also, they did not make full use of the resources they had. Kimmel and Short protested long and loud that they did not have enough aircraft for a 360-degree reconnaissance around Hawaii. Kimmel’s PBY Catalina seaplanes could cover only about a third of that area. His main interest for recon- naissance was to the south, where his carriers were. The fleet was geared to meet and defeat an enemy at sea, not to defending Pearl Harbor. Short pointed out that he had only a few long-range B-17s and said that the operating radius of his B-18s was 300 USN photo via National Archives miles. In fact, without a bomb load, the

National Archives photo B-18s had an operating radius of more than 500 miles. Unable to mount a complete patrol, Kimmel and Short elected to do almost nothing, especially toward the north- west, the most likely direction for a hostile approach. Japanese intelligence reported Nov. 22 that, “United States air patrols are very good in the area south and southwest of Oahu, but generally inadequate to the north of the island.” Short had been told repeatedly that protection of the Pacific Fleet was his primary and overriding mission, but he resisted the idea. “In his heart, Short regarded the presence of the Pacific Fleet as protection for his Hawaiian Department rather than vice versa,” Prange said. Furthermore, Short saw the main danger as sabotage, not an enemy at- tack. He pulled enlisted technicians of the Hawaiian Air Force away from

28 NOVEMBER / DECEMBER 2016 H WWW.AIRFORCEMAG.COM their regular duties, cross-trained them Who Knew What? as infantry, and put them on guard at airfields and at other locations. Washington Kimmel Short He had airplanes removed from their protective revetments and placed them Oct. 9 “Bomb Plot” message s close together in the middle of the field for easier guarding. Ammunition from Nov. 26-28 “Winds” message s s the aircraft was boxed and stored. On Dec. 7, the airplanes were parked wingtip Nov. 27 “War Warning” messages s s s to wingtip, easy targets for the Japanese, who also scored a direct hit on the hangar Dec. 1 Carrier call sign change s where the ammunition was kept. s had been key to the defeat of Dec. 2 “Lost carriers” s the Luftwaffe in the s the previous year, but that apparently Dec. 3-6 Code destruction s s made little impression on the Hawaii s commanders. The Army had six mobile Dec. 6-7 14-part message at Opana Point on the north shore s of Oahu, but on Short’s orders, they Dates for Japanese messages are when the decoded were active only from 4 a.m. to 7 a.m. though it recognized that responsibility information was available to US officials. On Dec. 7, the radar operator wanted for the disaster should not fall solely to get in some extra practice and thus, on Kimmel and Short, it said that they but conspiracy theorists have found at 7:02 a.m., picked up the first wave could not be absolved of accountability. a new forum ideal for their purposes of Japanese bombers 136 miles to the “The intelligence available to on the Internet. north. The information center at Fort Kimmel and General Short was sufficient A poll of college students at the Shafter was minimally manned and to justify a higher level of vigilance University of New Hampshire in 2014 ignored the radar operator’s report, than they chose to maintain,” the report found limited interest and knowledge figuring that it was a mistake. said. “Different choices might not have about Pearl Harbor among millennials. It did not make that much difference, discovered the carrier armada and might To them, the 9/11 attacks were of far since the pursuit wing at Wheeler Field not have prevented the attack, but dif- greater significance. had been given the weekend off. Naval ferent choices—a different allocation In 1994, Congress declared Dec. 7 personnel were likewise on routine lib- of resources—could have reduced the to be National Pearl Harbor Remem- erty ashore after a week of hard training magnitude of the disaster.” brance Day. The custom is to fly the and the anti-aircraft guns on ships in The Dorn report concluded that Kim- flag at half-staff, but it is not an official the harbor were not on effective alert. mel and Short had not been victims of holiday. Government offices, schools, unfair official actions and it did not and businesses do not close. THE TENTH REVIEW recommend their promotion on the The National Park Service visitor A considerable number of senior of- retired list. No change was made in center at Pearl Harbor draws 1.5 mil- ficers believe that Kimmel and Short did their status. lion visitors a year. Observance of the all they could under the circumstances In 1999, Senators William V. Roth Jr. anniversary at the historic site each and have been unfairly singled out for (R-Del.) and Joseph Biden (D-Del.), re- December still centers on the attack blame. Among their supporters have sponding to Kimmel supporters in their and the loss of American lives, but the been World War II Adm. William F. constituency, sponsored a nonbinding tone of the remembrance has evolved. Halsey, former Chief of Naval Opera- resolution to exonerate Kimmel and The theme for the upcoming 75th tions Adm. James L. Holloway, and Short. It passed the Senate, 52-47, but anniversary commemoration at Pearl former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of the Department of Defense declined Harbor will be the same as last year, Staff Adm. Thomas H. Moorer. to act on it. In 2015, the Navy turned “Pathway to Reconciliation: From In 1995, Sen. (R- down yet another appeal on behalf of Engagement to Peace,” which the Park S.C.), chairman of the Senate Armed Kimmel and Short. Service explains is “focused on the Services committee—acting at the rebuilding and solidification of the request of the Kimmel family in his THE MEMORY EVOLVES friendship between the United States state—demanded that the Department With the passage of time, the number and Japan.” J of Defense reopen the case. The inquiry, of people with personal memory of the 10th since 1941, was led by Edward Pearl Harbor and the reaction to it has L. Dorn, undersecretary of defense for dwindled. The sense of it is more distant John T. Correll was editor in chief of personnel and readiness. and less intense. Air Force Magazine for 18 years and is now a contributor. His most recent ar- The Dorn report in December 1995 Books and articles continue to appear. ticle, “Air and Space and Aerospace,” was not what Thurmond wanted. Al- The traditional interpretation prevails appeared in the October issue.

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