Pearl Harbor By John T. Correll he smoke had barely cleared His report to President Franklin D. A second investigation within the along Battleship Row follow- Roosevelt faulted Adm. Husband E. month, headed by Supreme Court ing the attack on Pearl Harbor Kimmel, commander of the US Pacific Justice Owen Roberts, accused Kimmel when the questions began. Fleet, and Lt. Gen. Walter C. Short, and Short of dereliction of duty. Both of TWhy were the US Navy and Army caught commander of the Army’s Hawaiian them were shuffled off into retirement by surprise and almost totally unprepared Department, for lack of readiness to in their reduced grades—Short on Feb on Dec. 7, 1941? Who was to blame? The meet the attack. Kimmel and Short 28, 1942, and Kimmel on March 1. next day, Secretary of the Navy Frank were relieved from command Dec. 16 “Remember Pearl Harbor!” became Knox flew in from Washington to find and reverted to their permanent two- an instant rallying cry for the nation. out what had gone wrong. star ranks. It was the most enduring slogan of 22 NOVEMBER / DECEMBER 2016 H WWW.AIRFORCEMAG.COM Battleship Row on Dec. 7, 1941. USS Arizona is in the center, burning after an explosion that killed more than 1,100 sea- men. To the left are USS Tennessee and USS West Virginia. Tennessee survived the attack. West Virginia was sunk but later salvaged and repaired. US Naval History and Heritage Command photo World War II and a fixture in the popu- ian islands were on a relaxed weekend Fourteen US pilots, acting on their lar culture for many years. However, schedule. own, got their P-40 and P-36 fighters not everybody would remember Pearl The Japanese aircraft struck Pearl into the air and shot down 10 of the Harbor the same way. Harbor and Hickam and Wheeler Fields Japanese attackers. The basic facts are well known. A in two waves. Eight battleships and Losses would have been worse ex- Japanese task force with six aircraft 10 other ships were sunk, capsized, cept that the US carriers were at sea. carriers arrived undetected 220 miles or severely damaged. Seventy-six US Nine hours later, US forces were sur- north of Oahu. When the attack began aircraft were destroyed. The casualty prised again in the Philippines, where at 7:55 a.m. on Sunday morning Dec. total was 2,403 killed, missing, or died the Air Force was caught on the ground 7, the US Navy and Army in the Hawai- of wounds and 1,178 wounded. and flat-footed. About 100 aircraft NOVEMBER / DECEMBER 2016 H WWW.AIRFORCEMAG.COM 23 In the interim, the Navy and the Army conducted six more investigations and inquiries, citing mistakes and failures on a broad front but with each service placing the larger share of the blame on the other. Accusations first arose during the 1944 election campaign that secret information, withheld for political pur- poses, would prove that responsibility for Pearl Harbor “extended into high places in Washington.” This was mostly the doing of minor partisan players and Thomas E. Dewey, the Republican presidential candidate, would have nothing to do with it. US Naval History and Heritage Command photo US Army photo Nevertheless, the clamor for fur- ther explanation led to a massive were destroyed or damaged, with 225 investigation by a joint congressional casualties sustained. (No action was committee with hearings that lasted Above: Adm. Husband Kimmel (l) com- manded the US Fleet and Pacific Fleet ever taken to hold commanders in the from November 1945 to May 1946. during the attack on Pearl Harbor. Lt. Gen. Philippines accountable.) The mountain of data and testimony Walter Short (r) commanded the US Army Roosevelt released the report of accumulated by this committee still Hawaiian Department. Both were roundly blamed for lack of preparation and were the Roberts inquiry to the newspapers remains the fundamental source for forced to retire. Below: A B-17 at Hickam in January 1942 and many of them most of what is known and said about Airfield that arrived during the Japanese printed it in full. Later on, it would the Pearl Harbor attack. attack on Pearl Harbor, seen smoking in the background. This aircraft was prob- be generally agreed that the finding of The joint committee said that “the ably piloted by 1st Lt. Karl Barthelmess, “dereliction of duty” was too harsh, errors made by the Hawaiian commands who would later receive a Silver Star for but because of wartime secrecy, Kim- were errors of judgment and not der- gallantry during his service in the Mediter- ranean Theater. mel and Short had no opportunity for elictions of duty.” It also acknowledged rebuttal until 1945. that the Army and Navy in Washington Army Signal Corps photo via National Archives 24 NOVEMBER / DECEMBER 2016 H WWW.AIRFORCEMAG.COM could have and should have provided that Roosevelt knew in advance about “General Short Sees Danger of Oahu more information. the attack but let it happen to serve Air Raid,” said an Aug. 14, 1941 That did not let Kimmel and Short his objective of carrying the United headline in the Honolulu Advertiser. off the hook. The inquiry found that States into the war. At the extreme were Follow-up headlines took a more ur- they had failed “to discharge their the conspiracy theorists who accused gent tone: on Nov. 30, “Japanese May responsibilities in light of the warn- Roosevelt of deliberately provoking Strike Over Weekend,” and on Dec. 5, ings received from Washington, other the attack. “Pacific Zero Hour Near.” information possessed by them, and Historian Gordon W. Prange studied In 1940, the US had broken the the principle of command by mutual the Pearl Harbor attack for almost 40 Japanese diplomatic code, designated cooperation.” years. The gist of his work, published “Purple” by the Americans. The de- The committee report faulted the Ha- posthumously as At Dawn We Slept coded Purple code intercepts were waiian commands for failure to integrate in 1982, is basically consistent with called “Magic.” their efforts and work together, conduct the findings of the joint congressional The diplomatic messages revealed effective reconnaissance “within the lim- committee in 1946. Prange’s research a great deal about Japan’s strategic its of their equipment,” maintain a “state is widely regarded as definitive. intentions but they did not contain of readiness,” and use their resources to Arguments about Pearl Harbor much real military information. Still, repel the Japanese raiders or reduce the mainly follow two broad tracks: what the Army and Navy intelligence shops effects of the successful attack. information officials in Washington in Washington guarded their secrets Kimmel and Short continued their and Hawaii had before the attack, and jealously. Kimmel and Short were not efforts to salvage their reputations. what actions they took as a result of on distribution for Magic intercepts. Short died in 1949, Kimmel in 1968, but that knowledge. All of the advance information was their families—especially the Kimmel ambiguous. At no point did any US of- family—have kept up the campaign. PORTENTS AND WARNINGS ficials have definite knowledge of the The government has periodically con- In one sense the Japanese strike on coming attack. Kimmel and Short—es- sidered whether Kimmel and Short Dec. 7 was a surprise. In another sense it pecially Kimmel, as senior commander should be advanced on the retired list was not. Air attack on Pearl Harbor had in the Pacific—had almost as much to their highest wartime ranks, but nine been a standard scenario in annual US of the directly relevant information times between 1957 and 2015 decided fleet exercises since 1928, and Japan’s extracted from the intercepts as Wash- against doing so. aggression on the Pacific rim and its ington did. In the postwar period, a “revision- hostility toward the United States were Both of them were aware that Japa- ist” movement emerged, contending widespread knowledge. nese embassies and consulates had National Park Service photo Sailors at Ford Island Naval Air Station watch USS Shaw explode in the distance. NOVEMBER / DECEMBER 2016 H WWW.AIRFORCEMAG.COM 25 USN photo been instructed to destroy most of final piece sent Sunday morning. The stubbornly insisted on holding the intel- their codes and ciphers and burn their embassy was told to destroy its code ligence report within his own domain. secret papers. Both knew that the main machine and deliver the message to the Japanese carrier force had left home Americans at 1 p.m. Eastern Time (7:30 MYSTERIOUS INTERCEPTS waters in November. a.m. in Hawaii, half an hour before the The revisionists gained in credibility In addition, Kimmel was told that attack was supposed to begin). when John Toland joined their ranks there had been no radio traffic from The message did not disclose any- with the publication in 1982 of Infamy: the carriers in several weeks and that thing about the planned attack on Pearl Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath. Toland, Japanese navy forces afloat had changed Harbor, nor did it declare war or sever who had won a Pulitzer prize for previ- their call signs twice within a month. diplomatic relations. What it did was ous work, signed up to the theory that He did not share that knowledge with break off negotiations since “it is im- Roosevelt knew several days ahead of Short. possible to reach an agreement.” time that a Japanese fleet was headed On Nov. 27, Kimmel and Short Despite that, it was alarming enough for Hawaii. got specific “war warning” messages. for Marshall to send another war warn- “Toland has responded to criticism by “Negotiations with Japan appear to be ing to Army commands in the Pacific, conceding that as much as 50 percent terminated,” said the message from Gen.