The Effect of Mixed Member Electoral Systems on the Development of Representational Styles: the Case of the Scottish Parliament

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The Effect of Mixed Member Electoral Systems on the Development of Representational Styles: The Case of the Scottish Parliament

David C.W. Parker, Associate Professor Caitlyn M. Richter, Undergraduate Student Department of Political Science Montana State University 2-139 Wilson Hall Bozeman, MT 59717 Corresponding Author (Parker) Phone: (+1) (406) 600-0907 Corresponding Author (Parker) E-mail: [email protected]

Abstract: Research on Mixed Member Proportional Representation (MMPR) legislatures demonstrates that members face different incentive structures when cultivating a personal vote. In particular, members who represent single member districts and who are directly elected most likely will adopt representational styles centered on providing quality constituent service. Much of the literature uses surveys of legislators accounting for the time spent on activities or reporting which activities are more or less important. In this paper, we examine the consequences of Scotland’s adoption of MMPR for their Parliament. Utilizing a range of measures of legislative behavior, we find that MSPs representing constituencies spend less time legislating and more time engaged in constituent service work. Regional members, conversely, lodge more parliamentary motions and sponsor more private members’ bills than constituency-based colleagues. We conclude by suggesting that how legislators are elected provides critical incentive structures for MSPs which directly affect the representational styles they chose to adopt.

Prepared for presentation at the Political Studies Association Annual Conference, Brighton, UK, March 2016.

Keywords: Legislatures, Scottish Parliament, Mixed Member Proportional Representation, casework, home style, representational style, policy expertise, personal vote The fact that legislators seek to develop a personal vote or reputation to enhance their electoral prospects is well-accepted.1 From Richard Fenno’s pioneering observational studies of home styles in the U.S. House (1978) and the U.S. Senate (1992; 1996) to more sophisticated and recent textual analysis of House and Senate press releases (Grimmer 2013; Grimmer,

Westwood, and Messing 2014), the representational styles adopted by legislators clearly is both a function of personal taste and constituency need. The development of this so-called “personal vote” is not a uniquely American legislative phenomenon, but also a feature of the British (Cain,

Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987), German, New Zealand, Russian, Japanese, and Lithuanian (Moser and Scheiner 2005) legislative landscapes.

How to represent a constituency and build a personal vote depends upon several factors.

First, how a representative choses to spend her time is a zero-sum game, as the time spent trying to cultivate a reputation as a constituency servant is time that cannot be spent writing legislation, and vice versa. Although all members must do constituency casework, write legislation, and participate in chamber business, the zero-sum nature of representation pushes members to prioritize some activities over others in the creation of a personal vote and reputation. Second, there are other resource constraints representatives must consider, including money and the mixed needs of citizens within a given constituency. These are shaped, in part, by cultural and

1 The authors would like to thank MSPs Linda Fabiani and Annabel Goldie for conversations which generated the inspiriation for the project, as well as Arthur Spirling for his help in locating data on rebellions. The staff at the Scottish Parliament’s Public Information Office kindly answered multiple inquiries via e-mail and their wonderful online chat service. Claire Turnbull, Head of Information Governance at the Scottish Parliament, also answered multiple questions we had about databases stored at the Open Information Portal.We are grateful to the Political Studies Association’s Travel Grant, which allowed Parker to attend the conference and gave the opportunity to present this project. Dean of Letters and Science Nicol Rae, Vice President for Research and Economic Development Renee Reijo Pera, Provost Martha Potvin, and the Undergraduate Research Scholars Travel Grant program at Montana State University were instrumental in defraying the expenses of Richter’s travel to Brighton. As always, any errors remaining in the article are the sole responsibility of the authors. 1 institutional norms dictating which representational roles members have available to them.

According to Searing (1994), there are four informal roles a representative can take on in the

British House of Commons: policy advocates, ministerial aspirants, constituency members, and parliament men. These roles are not wholly dissimilar to those members of Congress may assume, but the institutional features and cultural norms of Westminster and Holyrood make adopting some roles more likely than others. Different people with different life experiences are also going to be inclined toward different styles. Finally, a member’s career stage and place within the party structure also shape the representational choices a member might make.

Most important, however, are incentive structures embedded in electoral rules that steer members of a legislature to prioritize certain representational styles. The Mixed Member

Proportional Representation (MMPR) system is a case in point. Because representatives under an

MMPR system are elected in two distinct ways, it stands to reason that how they are elected affects the representational style adopted. The Scottish Parliament, which elects some members in First Past the Post elections to represent constituencies and other members who are selected from party lists to represent the party vote obtained in a region, provides an important opportunity to examine how the incentive structures established by electoral systems affect the representational choices legislators make. We create measures of the policy-expertise and constituency-service propensities of Members of Scottish Parliament (MSPs), specifically their willingness to revolt against their party on floor votes, to engage in the policy-making process by sponsoring private members’ bills, to lodge parliamentary motions, and to advertise constituent surgeries. We find that members directly elected to represent single-member constituencies are far less likely to adopt a policy expert home style than their colleagues selected from party lists, representing multi-member regional constituencies. Constituency-based members, alternatively,

2 appear to devote more of their resources to casework and surgeries. Collectively, we find strong support for the notion that electoral rules affect how members of the Scottish Parliament allocate their time and the personal vote they aim to establish.

Representational Styles

According to Fenno (1978), representatives assist their own electoral fortunes if they present their self to their constituency in a distinctive way and develop a unique home style communicating their Washington work to the folks back home. In watching members of

Congress as they travelled back home to their districts, Fenno noted that they tend to adopt policy-expert, constituent service, or “one of us” styles to reflect not only the needs of their constituents, but their own personal talents and proclivities as politicians. Parker and Goodman

(2009) further elaborate on Fenno, saying that in order to cultivate a personal vote, a representative allocates their resources in different ways in order to reinforce their home style, such as hiring a large Washington, DC-centered staff to focus on policy, or frequently traveling back to their constituency to seek casework opportunities. Most importantly, these resource allocation decisions made by members of Congress create positive impressions among constituents.

Utilizing office resources and particular emphases on distinctive representation roles help incumbent legislators generate a personal vote. Defined as “that portion of a candidate’s electoral support which originates in his or her personal qualities, qualifications, activities and record” (9),

Cain, Fiorina, and Ferejohn (1987) focus their seminal study on how members of the House of

Representatives and House of Commons use constituent service and citizen contact to create an electoral advantage that protects them from national tides running against their party. But the need to create a personal vote varies, depending on whether “voters chose among individual

3 candidates” (214) and the ability of legislators to act independently to create credit-claiming opportunities. This is largely a function of “the electoral and legislative rules” which together, they write, encourage the development of the personal vote among U.S. House members. In the

United Kingdom, however, “some of the electoral rules [encourage credit-claiming], but the legislative institutions do not” (215). Notably, the strength of party discipline within the British

Parliament and the ability of parties to control the nomination process were seen as factors discouraging the creation of a personal vote among MPs when the book was written. Although

British parties still maintain a solid grip on ballot access, the strength of the Labour and

Conservative parties has waned considerably so that, if anything, there are more reasons than ever to focus on crafting a personal vote by adopting a particular representational style. In many respects, this is exactly the path taken by Liberal Democrat MPs—a path reaping electoral rewards (at least until the recent 2015 general election).

Notably, the Scottish Parliament features a party system discouraging the development of a personal vote. It also, however, features an electoral system which in some alternative instances can encourage members to develop a personal vote. When we apply these ideas to the

Scottish Parliament, theoretically, regional MSPs (whose names do not appear on the ballot) are far less apt to develop a personal vote than their constituency counterparts (whose names do appear on the ballot). This creates an interesting difference between constituency MSPs and regional MSPs, since it is more valuable for constituency MSPs to develop a particular home style and personal vote in order to be reelected, whereas regional MSPs can choose to spend their time in different ways with fewer immediate electoral repercussions.

Mixed Member Proportional Representation Elsewhere

Research into other MMPR systems have confirmed empirically the expectations laid out by Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina (1987). Heitshusen, Young, and Wood (2005) found that representatives in Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom have strong incentives to engage in constituency work because they cannot distinguish themselves on policy by voting against the party line without facing serious consequences. MPs selected from a list, they find, also facing those same consequences, are nevertheless less likely to attend to constituency matters because they are more insulated from electoral pressures. Mcleay and

Vowles (2007) hypothesize that list MPs in New Zealand would have less contact with their constituents, and that list MPs would more strongly represent minority groups and special interest groups than constituency MPs. Utilizing surveys of MPs, they find strong support for their hypotheses. In the German Bundestag, which also features a mixed member electoral system, “MPs elected from districts engage in more constituency service work than those elected from lists” (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987: 220) and are more likely to choose committee assignments allowing them to credit-claim for pork barrel projects aiding their constituencies

(Stratmann and Baur 2002). These examples provide solid evidence that electoral rules play an important role in incentivizing how legislators opt to represent their constituencies.

The Scottish Representational Experience

Scholarship on the Scottish Parliament has also examined the difference between constituency and list MSPs. Battle (2010) found that constituency MSPs prioritize constituency work over committee work, and list MSPs are more likely to spend their time working on committees, trying to develop policy expertise with which to impress party leaders in order to raise their position on the list, gaining more electoral security. Bradbury and Mitchell (2007) used surveys of MSPs to determine which of the aspects of their jobs they found the most

5 important, as well as how much time they spend on the different parts of their job. They found that constituency MSPs both rate the importance of engaging with constituents more highly, as well as spend a half day more a week on average doing constituency work as compared to their regional colleagues. They also spend more time on surgeries.

Currently, what is known about how MSPs represent their constituents—and the relationship between representational choices and the type of seat the MSP represents—is based upon surveys or interviews of MSPs self-reporting time spent on various activities (Heitshusen,

Young, and Wood 2005; Lundberg 2006; Lundberg 2007; Russell and Bradley 2007). Although these studies are important, they assume members and their assistants have an accurate recall of time spent on various representational activities. It is also possible, however, to observe the actual representational choices members make. MSPs participate in legislative debate by lodging motions, making speeches, and sponsoring legislation. Given that the amount of time during each session is finite, it can be assumed that the more time devoted to crafting legislation or making motions during debate, the less time that member has to attend personally to constituency casework and surgeries back in the district. Put differently, MSPs more engaged in the process of making legislation are more interested in developing a reputation for policy expertise, whilst those choosing to devote more time and resources to casework and surgeries aim to craft a constituent servant reputation. But as much freedom as MSPs have to build a personal vote, the choice to cultivate a reputation as a policy expert or constituent servant, we claim, is constrained by how MSPs are selected and the type of seat they hold. Our contribution is to test this claim with direct measures of legislative behavior.

Measuring Representational Styles

Within the institution of the Scottish Parliament, the decision of how to represent a constituency or a region is largely left to individual members. Although there is an unstated expectation that members representing single-member constituencies should do more casework and are not required to share home offices as regional members from the same party must, it is still largely the province of members to carve out distinctive representational styles as they see fit. How members chose to allocate their time among various parliamentary duties, such as holding government to account, participating in the legislative process, or travelling back home to address constituent concerns, are important indicators of the representational styles Scottish parliamentarians adopt and communicate to the folks back home to build a personal vote.

To better understand the relationship between MSP representational style and seat type, we develop three indicators of legislative activity and one measure of constituency service. Our unit of analyses are individual MSPs in each of the four sessions conducted to date. The Scottish

Parliament, in contrast to Westminster, has readily made available a variety of databases and online search engines allowing the public to better understand and evaluate the activities of

MSPs.2 Using these resources, we created two measures of MSP engagement in the legislative process. The first is simply whether an MSP proposed initiation of a private members’ bill. The second is the total number of parliamentary motions made during each parliamentary session.

Each is discussed in turn.

Unlike members of the U.S. House or Senate, MSPs rarely sponsor their own legislative proposals given that the government in power initiates nearly all bills. Nevertheless, there is a process by which MSPs, if they choose, can craft a private members’ bill. MSPs first propose a

2 Writes Mitchell (2014), “As Presiding Officer, David Steel outlined twelve key differences with Westminster” during the first session (254). One of these was “an open and inclusive Parliament” (Ibid). The principle of openness extends to data transparency. 7 draft bill and engage in consultation with the Non-Government Bills Unit. That consultation allows the bill to be refined into a final bill, which is then reported in the Business Bulletin for one month. If the member receives 18 co-sponsors from half the political parties represented in the chamber, the member then receives the right to formerly introduce the bill for parliamentary consideration. Information on bill proposals initiated in each parliamentary session, including whether the member introduced the bill and the final disposition of the bill at the end of the session, are available on the Scottish Parliament’s website.3 We simply summed the number of private member bill proposals made by each member in each parliamentary session.4 For the fourth session, we captured every proposal introduced through the end of January 2016. The total number of bill proposals for each member is an indicator of policy entrepreneurship, and one way to capture an MSPs desire to signal policy legislative expertise to constituents.

The second measure, total number of parliamentary motions made, was obtained from the

Parliament’s open data portal.5 A downloadable JSON file contains each motion made, when it was made, and the originator of the motion. Motions are coded by the Parliament’s staff into one of eight different types: standard, member’s business, motion for debate, timetable, committee,

Scottish Parliamentary Corporate Body (SPCB), bill, and amendment. To develop a second measure of legislative expertise for each MSP, we summed only the number of standard, committee, bill, and amendment motions made by each member in each session. The decision on

3 The process for private members’ bills is outlined in detail in the section “About Members’ Bills” at the Scottish Parliament’s website here: http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/ parliamentarybusiness/Bills/30584.aspx . 4 During the 2nd session, Changes to the Standing Orders of the chamber were made concerning private members’ bills. According to our correspondence with Fraser Murray of the Scottish Parliament, “All Bills not introduced before 12 November 2004 (the point at which the new rules took effect) fell.” Many of the proposals were re-introduced after that date. We count each initiation of a proposal as a new bill regardless of whether the introduction was the result of the rule change in the Second Session or not. 5 The data portal is available at: https://data.parliament.scot/#/home . 8 which motions to exclude was based upon our consultation of the Parliament’s publication

“Guidance on Motions” (Scottish Parliament 2012). Member’s business motions, in particular, were dropped given that these motions “(a) must be explicitly of only local or regional relevance; or (b) must raise issues of policy in a local or regional context and have cross-party support; or

(c) must raise issue-commemorating anniversaries or mark national ‘weeks’ or special events and have cross-party support; and (d) must not ‘call on’ anyone or any organisation to do anything”

(Scottish Parliament 2012). Given that these motions represent a recognition of constituency concerns, they were excluded from the total motions measure.6 SPCB, timetable, and debate motions also were excluded as they are procedural rather than substantive motions tapping engagement with legislation per se. The resulting total motions variable indicates the extensiveness with which a member engages in legislative business on the chamber floor.

A third measure of a policy-centered representational style is the willingness to rebel against the party on a recorded vote. Less a measure of policy-making and more a measure of an individual MSP’s party unity, the rebellion score is simply the total number of votes in a given session on which the member voted against a majority of her fellow partisans. From 1999 through 11 March 2010, this information was culled from “The Public Whip”, a website cataloging divisions and rebellions in the Scottish Parliament and Westminster.7 This allowed us to create the total number of rebellious votes each member cast in the first two sessions of

Parliament. Unfortunately, the website is inactive after 11 March 2010; therefore, we scanned the

Scottish Parliament’s Official Reports for each division after 11 March 2010 through the end of

6 We intend to code member’s business motions in the future for issues of local, regional, and national concern, using these disaggregated measures as indicators of constituency engagement or policy entrepreneurship as appropriate. 7 The Public Whip is available at: http://www.publicwhip.org.uk/ . Arthur Spirling kindly pointed the authors to this wonderful resource. 9 the third session of Parliament to calculate rebellions during that time period and added each rebellion to the total number of rebellions calculated by “The Public Whip” from 2007 through

11 March 2010.8 As “The Public Whip” calculated an abstention or absence as a rebellion, we maintained their convention. The rebellion score is a measure of a member’s independence from their own party on policy. Expressing party independence may be helpful in developing a personal vote among their constituents while demonstrating responsiveness to the unique needs of a constituency—needs possibly at variance with the party’s official position. In this paper, we have rebellions for the first three sessions. As the fourth session has yet to conclude, we have yet to calculate rebellion scores for it. Finally, rebellion scores are calculated only for SNP, Labour,

Conservatives, and Liberal Democrats. The Green Party does not whip its members on votes, and a majority party stance is not sensible for independents and those in minor parties with less than a handful of members.9

Observing a member’s willingness to develop a constituent servant profile is more challenging. It is not possible to access the number of casework files opened by each MSP, and it is difficult to account for the number of surgeries each member attends—both of which would be the most ideal measures of a constituent servant representational style. It is possible, however, to

8 The Parliament changed how votes are reported, which is why The Public Whip’s data has not been updated past March of 2010. The Chamber’s Official Report for each day the Parliament is in session is analogous to the Congressional Record or Hansard for the UK’s House of Commons and the House of Lords. The Scottish Parliament’s Official Reports are uploaded daily and available at: http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/parliamentarybusiness/ReportSelectPage .aspx?type=plenary&year=2016&page=0&meeting=-1 .

9 We neither know which votes were whipped by the parties, nor the intensity of those efforts (e.g., single, double, or three line whips). We also do not know which votes were “free”. As noted on the Frequently Asked Questions section of “The Public Whip” website: “There is no official, public data about the party whip.” Stirling and Quinn (2010) note that “the great majority (approximately 99%) of divisions are whipped” in the House of Commons, and in a recent assessment of the Scottish Parliament, Cairney (2013) notes that the party whip “remains strong” in the chamber. 10 develop an indirect measure of constituency concern: the amount spent in a session on surgery advertisements. Each MSP receives a representational allowance from which they can deduct expenses related to their official duties, including office rent, furniture, salaries, and so forth.10

Every member receives a surgery advertisement expense line, which allows them to advertise constituency surgeries in the local newspaper. In 2014-2015, the surgery advertising allowance was set at a maximum of £1,720.11 Parliament has created an online database making it simple to search member expense reports by category for the current and preceding six fiscal years.12

Using this tool, we totaled the amount each MSP spent on surgery advertisements in each fiscal year. We have two years’ worth of surgery advertising data for the third parliament and four fiscal years for the fourth parliament.13 We use amounts spent by members on surgery advertising as one measure of their willingness to do and gain a reputation for constituent service work.

Determining Representational Styles: A Multivariate Approach

To truly understand how seat and constituency type affects the representational choices of

MSPs, it is necessary to move beyond bivariate relationships to examine how other factors might

10 This is similar to the Members’ Representational Allowances (MRA) established for members of the U.S. House and Senate. See Parker and Goodman (2009) and (2013). In FY 2015, MSP allowances are capped at about £96,559 (approximately $135,000). This is a miniscule amount compared to the average MRA received by U.S. House members, which in FY 2014 was $1.25 million. But the average MSP represents only 72,000 people compared to 711,000 for the average U.S. House member. Looked this way, an MSP has a representational allowance of $1.86 per constituent—higher than the $1.76 per constituent for U.S. Representatives. 11 Members’ expenses schemes for the current, and previous, fiscal years can be found at: http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/msps/members-expenses-scheme.aspx . 12 We submitted a FOI request for information from previous fiscal years. Unfortunately, the Parliament keeps only six fiscal years of expenses data; after that, the information is literally destroyed. Further, we only have the dates expenses were claimed, so this measure is a rough proxy for the amount spent in each fiscal year because some expenses might have occurred in the previous year but claimed in the next fiscal year. 13 As the 2015-2016 fiscal year is still ongoing, we have not yet collected these data. 11 affect how MSPs decide to split their time between legislative and constituent service responsibilities. Generally speaking, we can conceive of three broad types of variables which impact the legislative decisions of MSPs: individual, constituency-need, and institutional responsibilities. We use several variables to control for each of these factors in our analyses. If we find that seat type remains an important factor influencing the representational choices made by MSPs once we control for these other variables, we have powerful evidence that the mixed member proportional representational system as enacted in 1998 Scotland Bill has had an enduring effect on how constituents are represented by their members at Holyrood.14

Institutional Independent Variables

The representational styles legislators chose to affect are a product of several factors, but perhaps the most important are institutional norms and conventions that impose particular constraints on the adoption of particular styles. For example, in the United States Congress, it is generally assumed that members of the House of Representatives are more likely to establish constituent service profiles as compared to their colleagues in the United States Senate. This is related to the greater institutional responsibilities of senators, the respective size of the chambers which give each senator more institutional power relative to individual Congressmen, and the size of their respective constituencies—although there is some evidence that much depends on the size of the states represented by individual senators (Lee and Oppenheimer 1999) and the reputations of established by the other senator in a state (Schiller 2000; Parker and Goodman

2013). In the case of the Scottish Parliament, the selection of constituency members by first past

14 The AMS electoral system was proposed by the Constitutional Commission appointed in the wake of the Scottish Constitutional Convention held in 1989. This feature, as well as others adopted by the Convention, became the template for the 1998 Scotland Bill creating the Scottish government. See Mitchell (2014). 12 the post (FPTP) and regional members by the Additional Member System (AMS) create the strong possibility of a similar division of responsibilities as seen in the U.S. Congress. And while there were no institutional norms in place given that the Scottish Parliament only reconvened in

1999 in an entirely different form, early guidance from the parliament’s Presiding Officer created a least a hint of a division of responsibilities between constituency and regional MSPs. Bradbury and Mitchell (2007) report that MSPs were expected to “represent themselves to the public clearly as a constituency or list member” and “for the second and subsequent list representatives elected for the same party in a region, allowances were reduced on the expectation that list members would pool resources in a shared regional office” (119). Lundberg (2012) also reports that “the MSP’s code of conduct more explicitly cited an ‘expectation’ that a constituency MSP would be the ‘usual point of contact’ for constituents” (356).15

We expect given both this guidance and evidence from the behavior of MPs in other mixed systems (e.g., New Zealand and Germany) that regional MSPs selected from party lists will be more apt to engage in legislative activities while leaving constituency casework and surgeries to their constituency-based colleagues. In short, constituency-based MSPs have a stronger incentive to create a personal vote than their regional colleagues; therefore, they will seek to build their own electoral brands with constituents to ensure not only reelection, but to make it potentially more difficult for the party to deselect them in the future in favor of another party member.

15 This language was removed from the Code in 2008, as noted by Lundberg (2012). The 2011 edition notes that “a constituent can approach any of the MSPs (whether a constituency MSP or one of the seven regional MSPs as the case may be) elected to represent them as all MSPs have equal formal and legal status” (Scottish Parliament 2011). 13

It is also important for MSPs to consider building a personal vote based not only on their constituent service, but by taking positions on issues at variance with their party if the party is out of step with constituency opinion. Although this is common in the United States even during the recent period of intense party polarization, we expect this to not be the case among MSPs for two reasons. First, partisan ties—even if they have weakened in the UK generally over the past forty years—seem far more robust among Scottish voters than American voters. This makes eschewing party positions more perilous for MSPs than for members of the US Congress. More important is the stranglehold parties hold over the access to the ballot in the UK and Scotland in particular. Quite simply, parliamentary parties can withhold the whip and local party committees can simply refuse to list a particularly nettlesome and “maverick-y” MSP at the next election regardless of whether they stand for a constituency or on the regional party lists. We expect, therefore, that there will be no differences between regional and constituency-based MSPs in their willingness to support their party on chamber divisions.

Unlike presidential systems, parliamentary systems have a fused executive-legislature, with members of government ministries drawn from members of the legislature. The Scottish

Government is no different. MSPs who serve as ministers are inevitably drawn into more legislative activities, such as preparing government bills, responding to oral and written questions from MSPs, and in general protecting government legislation from hostile floor amendments during floor consideration. One of the major advantages of any governing coalition is the ability to set the legislative agenda; therefore, even members of the governing party without specific ministerial responsibilities have a vested interest in advancing government sponsored bills as a means to advance many of their own legislative goals. We include instrumental variables indicating whether an MSP holds either a cabinet or a junior ministerial

14 position anytime during the parliamentary session and whether she is a member of the governing party (or coalition). In both instances, we expect members of the governing party, whether ministers (or not), will perform less casework. We also expect they will be less likely to make parliamentary motions given their control over the legislative agenda—while such motions are one of the few ways members of minority parties can influence and insert themselves into the legislative process. They should be also be far less likely to rebel on divisions. Finally, to control for any session-specific developments affecting representational behavior not captured in any of our other independent variables, we include indicator variables for the second, third, and fourth sessions with the first session as the base category.

Constituency-Need Variables

It has long been established that members of legislatures are interested foremost in reelection (Mayhew 1974). Given that pursuing institutional influence or a cabinet portfolio cannot be achieved without retaining one’s seat, a member’s electoral vulnerability should play an important role in their attention to legislative and constituency matters. Electoral vulnerability in the Scottish Parliament is not easily measured given how seats are allocated in the chamber.

We adopt the procedure employed by André, Depauw, and Martin (2015) in determining electoral vulnerability. If a member represents a single-member constituency, which are allocated to the winner of FPTP elections, we use the standard measure of electoral vulnerability: the vote percentage separating the member from the second place finisher in the last election.16

For members representing regions and selected from a party list, vulnerability is calculated as the member’s place on the party list divided by the total number of regional seats allocated to the

16 Key here is the last election, whether that is the last regularly scheduled election or a by- election in the instance where a seat is vacated due to the incumbent MSP’s resignation or death. 15 party in the last election subtracted from one. In both instances, the lower the value, the more vulnerable the member is to losing their seat. We anticipate that members who are more electorally vulnerable will shun legislative work in favor of developing a constituent service- based personal vote. We also expect, however, that the relationship between electoral vulnerability and parliamentary behavior will be stronger for constituency-based members for whom voters directly cast a ballot.

How an MSP chooses to represent her constituency or region depends, in part, on the needs and expectation of the constituency itself and the citizens residing there. In the American context, Adler and Lapinski (1997) suggest that the committee assignments requested by House members are influenced by the policy-specific demands generated by the demographic constitution of congressional districts. It is also the case that these same factors shape the representational styles members of Congress chose to adopt and the issues they champion when allocating scare time and resources (Fenno 1978; Parker 2015; Arnold 1990). In a similar vein, constituency and regional needs can pull MSPs into spending more time on casework and less on legislative concerns. Whilst there is debate on which factors precisely generate additional casework (McAdams and Johannes 1985; Parker and Parker 1985), some evidence points to older residents (Johannes 1980) and those facing economic distress as important constituent casework pull factors (Yiannakis 1981). Other work suggests that middle and upper-class citizens, having the informational and leisure resources to devote to advocacy and advancement of their interests, tend to contact their legislators for assistance more readily than those who are poorer and less educated (Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2013; Yiannakis 1982).

We adopt a multi-pronged approach to measuring constituency demand for representational attention via casework or parliamentary action by gathering constituency and

16 regional data on percent unemployed, 65 and older, and workers in L1 (“professional, white collar”) employ from the 2001 and 2011 Scottish Census.17 Generally, we believe higher levels of unemployment and older residents will generate more casework and, hence, a propensity for members to engage less in parliamentary action. Conversely, higher levels of white-collar professionals should generate additional demands for policy-type solutions rather than more casework, which should be associated with more parliamentary action by MSPs. Again, the pull of constituency factors should, all else being equal, be greater for members serving constituencies as opposed to regions given the need to be more sensitive to constituent demands for the sake of electoral security.

Individual

While MSPs have incredible freedom in how they chose to represent, it is important to consider how pre-political careers shape one’s legislative proclivities (Fenno 1996; Parker 2015;

Canon 1990). Previous political or relevant professional experience, for example, reduces the costs of entry into parliamentary debates and the drafting of amendments or private members’ bills. Seniority in the legislature not only familiarizes one with intricate parliamentary procedures, it also helps MSPs to understand the policy interests and personalities of other members, aiding in the possible creation of coalitions for the purposes of advancing collective policy goals. Members with additional seniority might also see their interests shift away from creating a personal vote with casework to engaging more in floor work and legislative detail as they become electorally safer in their constituencies (see Hibbing 1993) or advance higher on party regional lists.

17 Both the 2001 and 2011 Census data were accessed via the Area Profiles feature at http://www.scotlandscensus.gov.uk/ods-web/area.html . We gathered many other variables, but many were highly correlated. We settled on these three as best representing district-level processes generating constituent casework. 17

To capture how previous experiences in politics or a profession impacts representational choices, we include four experience variables. First, we include a simple dummy variable coded

1 if the MSP was either an academic or solicitor prior to entering the Parliament. Second, we include two variables indicating previous political experience in a MSP’s first term: the first

(“MP”) is coded one if the member served in the UK Parliament and the second (“Elected office”) is coded one if the member served in any other elected political office. In each case, we expect that solicitors, professors, former MPs, or those elected to some other political office

(typically, local councilor) are more likely to prefer legislating as a representational style owing to the lowered costs of entry enjoyed because of these previous political and professional experiences.18

If the MSP serves in the Scottish Parliament for one or more terms, we capture this experience in a seniority variable—coded zero if the member is in her first term, 1 if in her second term, and so forth. If a member served more than one term in the Scottish Parliament, the previous elected experience and MP variables (but not the professor/solicitor) revert to zero in those successive terms. Successive seniority in the chamber should become more important than previous elected office experience as a MSP learns chamber rules and norms, exerting greater influence on representational style over time. On the other hand, career training should have a continued pull over the course of a member’s career; hence, our decision to model the effect of career as a constant throughout an MSPs career while allowing previous political experience to exert an influence on member behavior only during their first parliamentary term. Again, we

18 We used a variety of biographical sources to shed light on the pre-political careers of MSPs, including the Scottish Parliament’s website for those currently serving, The Almanac of Scottish Politics, various iterations of Who’s Who, and Scottish newspapers as appropriate. In the rare instance when we found nothing from these sources (perhaps five to ten members), we used Wikipedia to fill the gaps. 18 expect members with additional seniority to spend more time engaging in parliamentary activity on the chamber floor and creating legislation than their junior colleagues, who are more apt to build a personal vote by undertaking constituent casework requests and attending surgeries back in their constituencies and regions. Finally, some members resign or die during their term, so we include a measure indicating whether an MSP served during the entire parliament.

Dependent Variables

We have four distinct dependent variables: the total number of private members’ bills proposed, parliamentary motions made, and the number of rebellion votes cast, as well as the total amount spent on advertising constituency surgeries, for each member by parliamentary session. Three variables are counts (bills, motions, and rebellion votes), and one is continuous

(surgery advertisements). Given the different data-generation processes yielding each variable, it is necessary to consider the appropriate statistical techniques yielding the least biased and most efficient coefficient estimates in each instance (King 1998). For count variables, the proper method of estimation is either a poisson or negative binomial depending on whether the count is over-dispersed. For rebellions and motions overdispersion is a concern; hence, we employ negative binomial for them and poisson for bills.19 For surgery advertisement expenses, we repair to standard OLS regression. Of course, OLS coefficients are directly interpretable whilst those produced by negative binomial or poisson require the generation of probabilities conditional on varying underlying variables of interest to realize the magnitude of effect of the independent variables on our measures of legislative representational styles. Given we have repeated individual level observations (i.e., MSPs often serve more than one term), we opt for clustered robust errors.

19 We were guided by goodness of fit tests in each instance. 19

Results and Discussion

We present our results in Tables 1 and 2, with poisson coefficients for private members’ bills, negative binomial coefficients for total parliamentary motions and total rebellions (Table

1), and OLS coefficients for surgery advertisement expenses (Table 2). Consider first the analysis of the poisson and negative binomial coefficients in the two left-hand columns of Table

1. We find, as hypothesized, that regional MSPs are more likely to propose private members’ bills and make motions on the chamber floor than their constituency-based colleagues. We also find that ministers and members of the governing party are less likely to propose private members’ bills. Ministers are also less likely to make parliamentary motions, while members of the governing party without ministerial responsibilities are no less likely to make parliamentary motions than members of the opposition. We also see that members who serve out their parliament term, unsurprisingly, sponsor more bills and make more parliamentary motions.

Turning to the fourth column in Table 1, as anticipated, ministers (but not members of the governing majority) are less likely to rebel on divisions than other MSPs. We also find, in keeping with our expectations, that regional MSPs rebel no more or less frequently than their constituency colleagues. In the third column, we ran an additional version of the rebellion model dropping the governing party variable and replacing it with party indicator variables for the

Liberal Democrats, Labour, and Conservatives. Again, regional MSPs are no more or less likely to rebel than constituent MPs. Liberal Democrats are more likely to rebel on divisions relative to members of SNP, whilst there is no difference for Labour or Conservative MSPs.

TABLES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE

In Table 2, we report the effect of our variables on the amount spent by MSPs on advertising surgeries. Given that we have only six years of expense reports (two years in the

20 third session and four in the fourth), the number of cases for our analysis drops by roughly 40 percent. Nevertheless, we again see a clear difference in the behavior of regional and constituent

MPs. All else being equal, regional members in the fourth parliament spent roughly £900 less on surgery advertisements than constituent MSPs. This provides additional evidence that the representational choices of MSPs are shaped by the different incentive structures facing those representing regions versus those representing constituencies. Combined with the evidence presented in Table 1, regional members are more active on the chamber floor and in sponsoring legislation while constituent members seem to seek more casework opportunities by spending more on surgery advertising.

The relationship between seat type, motions made, the number of private members’ bills proposed, and rebellions on divisions cannot be fully understood from simply glancing at the coefficients reported in Table 1 as they are not directly interpretable save for the sign and the reported level of significance. To better understand how regional members differ in their behavior from constituent members, we calculated the probabilistic outcomes for our dependent variables while allowing seat type to vary and holding other independent variables either at their mean values or zero. We report these in Tables 3 and 4. The upper half of table 3 shows the effect of representing a constituent versus a regional seat on the probability of an MSP making zero to the mean number (40) of parliamentary motions as compared to making more than the mean number of motions in the 2nd parliamentary session. The lower half shows the same effect on the proposal of members’ bills, except we look at the probability of proposing zero as compared to any number of private members’ bills.

TABLES 3 AND 4 ABOUT HERE

In both cases, regional members are more likely to be active on the chamber floor and opt for legislating via private member proposals than constituency members. Constituency members are 11 percentage points more likely to make parliamentary motions at or below the mean level

(47 versus 36 percent) than regional members, while regional members are 11 percentage points more likely to exhibit levels of motion activity above the mean (64 percent versus 53 percent).

We can be reasonably confident in this difference given that the confidence intervals barely overlap, as observed from the brackets listed underneath the point estimates. The same is true of sponsoring private members’ bills: While sponsoring a private members’ bill is rare (a 69 percent probability of not introducing a proposal for regional members and an 82 percent chance of not doing so for a constituency member), if a private members’ bill is to be proposed, odds are a regional member is the one doing it (see the lower half of Table 3). A regional member is 13 percentage points more likely (31 percent versus 18 percent) to suggest one or more private members’ bill than their constituency-based colleagues. While the confidence intervals overlap a bit, again, there is strong support for our hypothesis that seat type plays a role in dictating the representational style and choices made by MSPs.

We found, as expected, that seat type exerts no particular influence on a MSP’s propensity to cast votes against the majority position of her party. Table 4 confirms these findings: there is no clear difference between regional and constituency based members on the probability of none or any number of rebellious votes. Given that rebellious behavior can lead to loss of party support in the candidate selection process for both regional and constituency MSPs, this finding is not surprising in a system dominated by strong, responsible parties.

Referring back to our initial results, reported in Tables 1 and 2, it is notable that only once in 15 occasions do any of the measures of constituency casework need exhibit any

22 statistically significant relationship in our models. Neither, in fact, is there any particular relationship between electoral vulnerability and the behavior of MSPs. In thinking about electoral incentives, it is clear that regional members and constituency members should differ in their sensitivity to constituent and electoral concerns, which suggests an interactive effect. The non-effect seen in the aggregate results is likely the result of not modelling this interactive effect.

To examine further the possible intervening effect of seat type and responsiveness to electoral pressures and constituent demands for casework, we ran our initial parliamentary motion and private members’ bill sponsorship models again, but this time interacted the regional MSP variable with our constituency demand variables (percentage of voters 65 and older, percentage of voters employed in L1 positions, and percent unemployed) and our measure of electoral vulnerability.

Given that interaction terms are difficult to interpret directly regardless of the estimation technique, we forgo reporting the coefficients in a table in favor of tables of predicted probabilities.20 Holding electoral vulnerability at zero (meaning the MSP is at great electoral risk) and other variables at zero, we then set the constituency casework demand variables either to one standard deviation below or above the mean. This created two scenarios: a constituency that is younger, with fewer persons in professional jobs that enjoys greater employment versus a constituency that is older, with more unemployment, and additional higher salaried, white collar professionals. In the first scenario, theoretically, there is less constituency casework demand while in the second scenario there is more. Finally, we calculated the probability of making parliamentary motions at less than or greater than average levels of activity and making no

20 Results available from the authors upon request. 23 private members’ bill proposals versus at least one private members’ bill proposal in a session for regional and constituency-based MSPs. We report the results in Tables 5 and 6, respectively.

TABLES 5 AND 6 ABOUT HERE

The predicted probabilities provide strong support that an MSP’s responsiveness to constituents is conditioned by constituency need, but that responsiveness is tempered by the incentive structures MSPs face based upon the type of seat occupied. MSPs representing regions with younger constituents with less unemployment and fewer individuals working as professionals are nearly twice as likely to exhibit parliamentary motion-making behavior greater than the mean when compared to colleagues representing similar constituencies (44 versus 25 percent). Although the probability of motion making behavior above the mean increases slightly for members representing constituents, moving from 25 to 31 percent, it decreases substantially for regional MSPs (44 to 20 percent) when the representing older citizens facing higher unemployment but more white collar professionals. A similar pattern can be seen in policy entrepreneurship, with regional MSPs proposing one or more private members’ bills 70 percent of the time when representing a constituency with fewer constituent casework “pull factors”, while constituency-based MSPs only have a 31 percent chance of sponsoring the same number of bills. What if you change that constituency to make it older, more professional, and with higher rates of unemployment? The probability decreases for regional members by 24 percentage points in terms of high levels of bill sponsorship but increases by 16 percentage points for constituency

MSPs.

Further light is shed when including the same interactive terms in the model predicting surgery advertising expenses. Again, we utilize the same two scenarios: one where the constituency pull factors for casework are high and one where the constituency pull factors for

24 casework are low. Both regional and constituency MSPs are more responsive to constituency need in terms of advertising and (likely) holding surgeries when representing constituencies more likely to generate casework demand—but constituency-based members always spend more on surgery advertising when compared to regional MSPs. A constituency MSP representing a low-demand casework constituents spent £4,457. Her regional counterpart spent £3,144. Shifting to a high-demand casework constituency increased spending on surgery advertisements by 14 percentage points, or £5,090, for constituency based MSP and 16 percentage points, or £3,654, for regional members.

What to make of these findings collectively? Regional MSPs, absent factors pulling them to do casework and surgeries, prefer to adopt legislative and policy entrepreneur representational styles given an incentive structure pushing responsiveness to the party first. Constituency-based members, even when the demand from constituents for casework is tempered by less “need”, do not simply change their behavior to become policy-makers. Indeed, there is some evidence that constituencies with higher constituent need pull factors—older, more white collar yet with higher unemployment rates—pull members to engage slightly more in parliamentary motion making and higher rates of bill sponsorship. This may indicate that constituency-based members adopt a wider range of representational approaches when representing these high-need constituencies.

The same might be said of regional members facing similar representational circumstances: they drift from legislative activities to do more traditional constituent service type work. In both cases, adopting a more varied representational style may be a reflection of the more complicated needs generated by such constituencies and regions. It may also suggest that both regional and constituency-based members face more electoral vulnerability when hailing from constituencies or regions demographically conducive to the production of casework. This, added to the general

25 risk-aversion of legislators, push both regional and constituency MSPs to develop a “jack of all trades” reputation in order to build their personal vote. They try a little of everything. The hope of so doing is protection from constituents who very well may be more electorally fickle at the ballot box given the challenges they face—challenges which may compel them to abandon voting strictly along party lines if they feel that their needs are not being addressed by their constituency and regional MSPs.

Conclusion

When the Scottish Parliament first met after the May elections in 1999, SNP MSP

Winnie Ewing had the honor of officially opening the first session. She did so with these words:

“I want to start with the words that I have always wanted either to say or to hear someone else say—the Scottish Parliament, which adjourned on March 25, 1707, is hereby reconvened.”21 But in reconvening, the Scottish Parliament was most emphatically not picking up where it left off.

When the institution adjourned in 1707 after adopting the Act of Union, it did so with most of its members hailing from the Scottish aristocracy and the clergy. The few elected members “were chosen by a small electorate . . . .consist[ing] of the lesser landed, enabled as candidates or voters by an ancient property qualification” (Mann 2013). The newly constituted Parliament of nearly three hundred years later was still unicameral, but designed to be a vastly more democratic, representative, and arguably, more deliberative body. The very fact it had been consciously constructed rather than evolving (or institutionalizing) over time was itself a significant departure from the historical Scottish Parliament and Westminster.

21 “12 May 1999: Winnie Ewing reconvenes the Scottish Parliament.” BBC: Democracy Live. http://news.bbc.co.uk/democracylive/hi/historic_moments/newsid_8187000/8187312.stm 26

Members of the British Parliament and the United States Congress have a wide degree of latitude when establishing their own representational paths and communicating their legislative work to constituents. Nonetheless, there are distinctive representational roles members gravitate toward, with the policy expert and constituent servant two of the most ubiquitous. Perhaps the fundamental reason incumbents enjoy such high reelection rates in the United States is due to their ability to set the standards by which they are judged by voters. That said, expectations of how representatives and senators should do their job are based upon institutional norms and the political culture of place, which serve to shape what citizens come to expect from their legislators. House members and small state senators are more apt to adopt roles as constituency members, while large state senators are more likely to aspire to the presidency or work as policy advocates (Lee and Oppenheimer 1999, Parker and Goodman 2009; Parker and Goodman 2013;

Schiller 2000).

At first blush, those MSPs first elected to the new Scottish Parliament in 1999 seemed to have complete freedom to establish their own representational roles. The institution had neither an established political culture nor any institutional norms. But as James Mitchell (2014) notes,

“The politicians who designed it had experience of Westminster and consciously set out to be different or unconsciously copied it. Westminster loomed large in its creation ensuring that the

Scottish Parliament would belong to the Westminster family of legislatures” (254). Those who had served as MPs had experienced firsthand the freedom of representational choice and the lack of clear guidance in the Scottish Parliament’s Code of Conduct on how to represent (save for an expectation expressed until 2008 that constituency-based MSPs should serve as the first point of contact for citizens) seems to replicate that freedom for MSPs at Holyrood.

One of those features consciously similar and yet different was the adoption of the mixed member proportional representation whereby seats are allocated by first past the post elections for constituencies and proportional representation for the eight regions. The first retains the strong sense of local, geographically based representation found in the House of Commons, while the second dispenses with localism in favor of representatives more responsive and accountable to the parties and national concerns. It is therefore, not surprising, that the freedom of MSPs to adopt a particular representational role would be constrained by this important institutional feature as we find in this paper.

The end result of the Scottish experience with its mixed member electoral system is

MSPs who are equal in statutory authority but unequal in the representational incentives they face. Constituency based members are more likely to hold surgeries and less likely to attend to legislative affairs, while the obverse is true for regional members. While both appear to shift their representational activities based upon constituent pull factors demanding more casework, the effect seems strongest for regional members because constituency based members are already more likely to provide casework and attend more surgeries back home. Perhaps the under- appreciated accomplishment of the mixed member system is how the delegates at the Scottish

Constitutional Convention, in consciously rejecting the bicameral Westminster system in favor of unicameralism, also adopted one of the best and perhaps most distinctive feature of the

American bicameral system: legislators who are incentivized to respond directly to constituency needs and those who are allowed to engage in policy creation, debate, and deliberation because they are more insulated from the whims of a fickle electorate.22 In this fashion, the creators of the

Scottish Parliament did not abandon the question of how to represent to the vagaries of MSP

22 An insulation which was even greater prior to the adoption of the 17th Amendment, providing for the direct election of U.S. Senators. 28 choice; rather, they ensured that both types of representation would emerge naturally from the differing incentives regional and constituency MSPs face electorally as a result of the Mixed

Member Proportional System.

Table 1: The Effect of Sitting in a Regional Seat on a Member’s Legislative Behavior

Bills Total Total Sponsored Motions Rebellions Total Rebellions (2)

Unemployment 12.1246 3.9628 -0.0641 -3.4968

(5.5412) (3.3459) (2.8592) (2.8259)

Percent 65+ -1.543641 -3.4347 -4.1841 -3.8005

(5.9404) (2.7412) (3.2892) (3.6399)

Percent L1 Employ 4.9232 2.110436 -3.7770 -3.7491

(4.2484) (1.7410) (2.1371) (2.4278)

Serve Full Term? 1.0180 0.8518 0.9268 1.0510

(0.4460) (0.1595) (0.1758) (0.1675)

Seniority 0.0881 -0.1778 0.0999 0.0488

(0.1164) (0.0690) (0.1338) (0.1516)

Previous Elected Office? 0.2562 -0.0516 0.0864 0.2483

(0.2070) (0.1276) (0.1389) (0.1549)

Previous Westminster MP? -0.1081 0.0022 0.5144 0.4979

(0.3891) (0.2246) (0.2193) (0.2674)

Lawyer or Professor? -0.5108 -0.1321 -0.1323 -0.1405

(0.3823) (0.1829) (0.1701) (0.1983)

Electoral Vulnerability? 0.3484 -0.1407 -0.3844 -0.4873

(0.3268) (0.1910) (0.2547) (0.3116)

Regional MSP? 0.6110 0.2881 0.0101 -0.0697

(0.1956) (0.1161) (0.1858) (0.2074)

Member of Government? -1.3868 -0.6061 -0.9919 -0.8194

(0.4494) (0.1252) (0.1319) (0.1645)

Member of Governing Party? -0.5164 -0.0074 -- -0.2864

(0.2294) (0.1034) -- (0.1925)

Liberal Democrat? ------0.5765

------(0.2015)

Labour? ------0.2153

------(0.1510)

Conservative? ------0.2289

------(0.1555)

Session 2 0.6323 0.6520 -0.1398 -0.0696

(0.1919) (0.1088) (0.1584) (0.1551)

Session 3 -0.4698 1.3703 -1.6302 -1.5883

(0.2493) (0.1290) (0.2343) (0.2431)

Session 4 -0.6315 1.8783 -- (0.2793) (0.1495) --

Constant -2.9434 2.0733 2.8157 2.8941

(1.3322) (0.5792) (0.7130) (0.7886)

N 534 531 381 381

Wald χ2 89.11 364.08 379.02 384.52 Bolded (Significant at p<.05 or better); Standard errors beneath coefficients in parentheses.

Table 2: Effect of Sitting in a Regional Seat on a Member’s Constituent Service

Surgery Ad Expenses Constituency Unemployment 3243.31 (5967.71) Percent 65+ -3758.348 (5798.45) Percent L1 Employ -9645.521 (4609.52) Member Serve Full Term? 1794.89 (453.97) Seniority 103.07 (134.22) Previous Elected Office? 617.53 (370.19) Previous Westminster MP? -500.09 (677.03) Lawyer or Professor? 386.90 (411.30) Political Electoral Vulnerability? 218.16 (642.43) Regional MSP? -902.96 (284.07) Member of Government? 105.20 (323.11) Member of Governing Party? 307.26 (261.04) Miscellenaous Session 3 -2273.66 (223.56) Constant 3734.54 (1411.45) N 266 R2 0.42 Bolded (Significant at p<.05 or better); Standard errors beneath coefficients in parentheses.

Table 3: The Effect of Constituency Type on Legislative Behavior, 1999-2014

Total Parliamentary Motions Made Greater than the None to the Mean Mean Regional MSP 36% 64% [29%, 37%] [63%, 71%]

Constituency MSP 47% 53% [35%, 59%] [41%,65%]

Bills Introduced None One or more Regional MSP 69% 31% [57%, 79%] [21%, 43%]

Constituency MSP 82% 18% [71%, 89%] [11%, 29%] Caption: Probability estimates with confidence intervals in brackets obtained from Clarify. Estimates based upon third parliamentary session. Vulnerability and categorical variables set to zero with all other values set to their means.

Table 4: The Non-Effect of Constituency Type on Rebellions, 1999-2011

Rebellions Zero 1 to the Mean Greater than the Mean Regional MSP 4% 39% 57% [2%, 6%] [29%, 49%] [51%, 71%]

Constituency MSP 3% 37% 60% [1%, 6%] [23%, 51%] [49%, 77%] Caption: Probability estimates with confidence intervals in brackets obtained from Clarify. Estimates based upon second parliamentary session. Full term set to one. Vulnerability and all other categorical variables set to zero. Continuous variables set to their means.

Table 5: Parliamentary Motions and Responsiveness to Constituency Demand

Total Parliamentary Motions Made A. Younger, less Unemployed, and fewer professionals None to the Mean Greater than the Mean Regional MSP 56% 44% [40%, 73%] [27%, 61%]

Constituency MSP 75% 25% [54%, 95%] [5%, 46%]

B. Older, More unemployed, and more professionals None to the Mean Greater than the Mean Regional MSP 80% 20% [53%, 100%] [0%, 46%]

Constituency MSP 69% 31% [52%, 88%] [12%, 47%] Caption: Probability estimates with confidence intervals in brackets obtained from Clarify. Estimates based on Second Parliamentary Session. Percent 65+, Unemployment, and L1 Percent Employment set to one standard deviation above or below the mean, vulnerability set to zero, and full term set to one. All other variables set to zero.

Table 6: Policy Entrepreneurship and Responsiveness to Constituency Demand

Bills Introduced Younger, less unemployed, and fewer professionals None 1 or More Regional MSP 30% 70% [12%, 50%] [50%, 88%]

Constituency MSP 69% 31% [44%, 86%] [14%, 56%]

Older, more unemployed, and more professionals None 1 or More Regional MSP 43% 56% [13%, 72%] [26%, 95%]

Constituency MSP 52% 47% [27%, 74%] [26%, 74%] Caption: Probability estimates with confidence intervals in brackets obtained from Clarify. Estimates based on Second Parliamentary Session. Percent 65+, Unemployment, and L1 Percent Employment set to one standard deviation above or below the mean, vulnerability set to zero, and full term set to one. All other variables set to zero.

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