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Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-02542-4 - Electoral Systems and Political Context: How the Effects of Rules Vary Across New and Established Democracies Robert G. Moser and Ethan Scheiner Index More information

Index

additional member system, in Germany, PR system in, 14 62 SF-ratios in, 158 Albania, 48 women’s representation in, 218 as new democracy, 81 Bowler, Shaun, 8, 20 women’s representation in, 218 Brancati, Dawn, 238 alternative vote (AV), xv Brazauskus Social Democratic Coalition, 143 in Australia, 4 Brazil, open-list PR system in, 4, 43 Alvarez, R. Michael, 152 Bulgaria, 48 Armenia, 48 as new democracy, 81 disproportionality in, 108 women’s representation in, 218 as new democracy, 81 non-institutionalized party system in, Canada, 52 82 Carey, John, 238 party identification in, 82 Carroll, Royce, 106 SMDs in, 79, 82 Cheibub, Jose, 238 women’s representation in, 218 Chhibber, Pradeep, 26 Australia, AV in, 4 Clark, William, 20, 150, 181, 246 AV. See alternative vote closed-list PR systems, xv, 4 minority representation under, 24 Bawn, Kathleen, 122 women as candidates in, 24, 33–34, 208, bias 209, 211 in contamination critique, 52–54, 59–61 compensation seats, xv in controlled comparison of electoral contamination critique, 50–61, 240 systems, 59–61 basics of, 50–51 male leader, 223–224 biased samples in, 52–54, 59–61 against women in electoral systems, countervailing evidence and, 54–58 222–223, 224 limitations of, 51–54 Blais, Andre, 8, 20 linkage systems and, 55 Boehmke, Frederick, 152 longitudinal analysis and, 60–61 Bolivia of mixed-member electoral systems, 91 disproportionality in, 108 principal functions of, 59–60 mixed-member in, SMDs and, 51–52 48 systematic cross-national analysis and, as new democracy, 81 56–58, 60–61 overhang seats in, 65 context conditionality, 20

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274 Index

controlled comparison, xv.Seealso in , 108 contamination critique number of political parties and, 77–79 bias in, 59–61 over time, 96 criticism of, 45 as psychological effect, 72 cross-national analysis in, 60–61 in Russian elections, 2, 93–94, 108 Duverger’s law under, 49 in Scottish elections, 108 female representation in, 47–49 SMDs and, 92–93 longitudinal analysis and, 60–61 in Ukraine elections, 108 mixed-member electoral systems and, 5–6, in U.S. elections, 80, 87 37, 44–46, 239–240 in Venezuelan elections, 108 research applications for, 45–46 in Welsh elections, 108 social context and, 51 district magnitude, xv, 3 validity of, 51 disproportionality and, 87–88 Cox, Gary, 8, 20, 151, 183, 245, 246, 255 Duverger’s law and, 71 Croatia in mixed-member electoral systems, 65–66 disproportionality in, 108 number of candidates and, 72, 96–100 mixed-member electoral system in, 48 SMDs and, 71 as new democracy, 81 social cleavage theory of party origins and, PR system in, 66 29–30 women’s representation in, 218 social/ethnic diversity and, 183 women as candidates and, 209, 211–212 decoy party PR lists, 63 diversity. See ethnic diversity; social diversity democracies. See also established democracies; Duch, Raymond, 152 new democracies Duverger, Maurice, 25 differences among/within, 17–19 on social/ethnic diversity, 181–182, 183 party system institutionalization and, Duvergerian, xv 18–19, 81–85 equilibrium in new democracies, 75–77, political context and, 20–21 153, 154, 247–249 disproportionality, xv Duverger’s Hypothesis, 71 in Armenian elections, 108 two-round majority electoral systems and, in Bolivian elections, 108 71 in Croatian elections, 108 Duverger’s law, xv, 25–27, 37–38, 70–77 democratic context and, 113 assumption of information under, 73–77 district magnitude and, 87–88 controlled comparison and, 49 Duverger’s law and, 71–72 criticism of, 26–27 effective number of candidates and, disproportionality and, 71–72 92 at the district level, 25 electoral expectations and, 80 district magnitude and, 71 FPTP system and, 73 FPTP system and, 25–27, 73, 245–246 in French elections, 87 limitations of, 244–249 in German elections, 108 mechanical effects and, 70–71 in Hungarian elections, 108 in new democracies, 73–77, 245–246 in Israeli elections, 79 as parsimonious theory, 256–257 in Italian elections, 108 party system institutionalization and, in Japanese elections, 108 83–84 legal thresholds and, 87–88 projection and, 72 LSq measure for, 78, 112–114 psychological effects of, 71 in Macedonian elections, 108 revisions to, 247 as mechanical effect, 71, 72, 91–92, 93, 96, SMDs and, 71 113 social/ethnic diversity and, 188, 189, in mixed-member electoral systems, 77, 246–247 79–80, 91–96 strategic defections and, 38, 151, 242 in new democracies, 76–77 strategic and, 27, 130

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Index 275

Eckstein, Harry, 59 psychological effects and, 100–103 ecological inference (EI) analysis, 203, 254 quantitative analysis of, 203–205 effective number of candidates, xvi SF-ratios influenced and, 157–158 disproportionality and, 92 sincere behavior and, 23 district magnitude and, 96–100 SMDs and, 13 electoral rules as influence on, 98–120 social/ethnic diversity influenced by, 23–24, in established democracies, 97, 98–99 195–196, 204 in Germany, per SMD, 96 strategic behavior under, 23, 24–25, 32 in , per SMD, 96–97, 105–106 strategic defection and, 150–152 in Japan, per SMD, 96 strategic voting and, 150 margin of victory and, 142 theories of, 23–24 in new democracies, 97 underrepresented groups and, 24 in SMDs, 96–100, 114–115, 117 women candidates and, 214–216 in Ukraine, per SMD, 96–97 electoral systems, 2, 3–5.Seealsocontrolled in unlinked tiers system, 97 comparison; democracies; minorities, and effective number of ethnic groups (ENEG), electoral systems; mixed-member electoral xvi systems; proportional representation in New Zealand, 191 system; women, of social/ethnic diversity measures and, assumptions about, 22–25 191–192 centralized governments and, 238 effective number of parties (ENEP), xvi conditionality and, 20–22 quantitative analysis of, 203–205 context conditionality and, 20, 35–37 social/ethnic diversity measures and, decentralized governments and, 238 191–192, 204 district-level analysis of, 7, 37–39, 250–251 effective threshold, xvi effective number of candidates and, EI analysis. See ecological inference analysis 98–120 electoral college, in U.S., 78 election of women and, 33–35 electoral engineering, 257–258 engineering of, 257–258 electoral formulas expectations for, 241 for FPTP system, 65 institutionalized party system and, xvi in mixed-member electoral systems, 65 in Japan, 1–3 for SMDs, 65, 86–87 non-Duvergian equilibrium within, 75–77 electoral rules. See also Duverger’s law; non-institutionalized party system and, strategic behavior, under electoral rules xvii assumptions and, 21–22 outcomes for, 241 candidate type influenced by, 23 party system institutionalization and, xvii, democratic experience and, 24 18–19 disproportionality and, 72, 91–92, 93, permissive, xvii, 4, 29 113 political context and, 20–21 effective number of candidates influenced pure, xviii by, 98–120 restrictive, xviii, 4 in established democracies, 8–9 in Russia, 1–3 under FPTP system, 9, 13 social/ethnic diversity and, 29–32, 181–184 mechanical effects of, 22–23 strategic voting and, 25–29 in mixed-member electoral systems, 43–44, study of, 15 85–88, 108, 243–244 STV, xviii, 4 in new democracies, expected effects of, theories about, 22–25 73–74 women’s representation and, 210–214 non-mechanical effects of, 22, 23 Elster, Jon, 238 number of political parties and, 23–24, endogeneity, and party institutionalization, 25 83–84 party institutionalization and, 24, 94 ENEG. See effective number of ethnic groups personal voting and, 127 ENEP. See effective number of parties

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276 Index

established democracies, xvi, 81 Filippov, Mikhail, 245 average effective number of candidates in, first-past-the-post (FPTP) system, xvi 97, 98–99 disproportionality under, 73 categorization of, 85 Duverger’s law and, 25–27, 73, 245–246 new democracies compared to, 17–18 electoral formula and, 65 psychological effect in, 101–102 electoral rules and, 9, 13 SF-ratios and, 159–161 LSq calculations and, 80 social/ethnic diversity in, 32 mechanical effect of, 26 strategic defection in, 28, 165 mixed-member electoral systems compared, strategic voting in, 27–28, 150 56–58 women as candidates in, 35, 209, 213–214, in New Zealand, 55 215–216 number of political parties under, 29 ethnic diversity psychological effect of, 26 curvilinear models for, 204 social/ethnic diversity and, 21, 184–185, district magnitude and, 183 192–197 district-level analysis of, 180–181, 187–190 strategic behavior under, 23 Duverger on, 181–182, 183 strategic voting under, 30–32, 123 Duverger’s law and, 188, 189, 246–247 in U.S., 54 Ecological Inference analysis and, 203, 254 FPTP system. See first-past-the-post system economic cleavages and, 202 fragmentation. See party system fragmentation electoral rules as influence on, 23–24, France 195–196, 204 disproportionality in, 87 electoral systems and, 29–32, 181–184 electoral system in, 87 ENEG and, 191–192 Franzese, Robert, 20 ENEP and, 191–192, 204 in established democracies, 32 gender. See also women, election of under FPTP system, 21, 184–185, 192–197 postcommunist states and, 215 fractionalization measures for, 191 Germany in Japan, electoral results from, 190–191 additional member system in, 62 in new democracies, 32 average effective number of candidates, per in New Zealand, electoral results from, SMD, 96 190–191, 197–199, 206–207 compensation seats in, 127 number of parties influenced by, 39–40, disproportionality in, 108 181–184, 190–191, 204 as established democracy, 81 party fragmentation and, 32, 34–35, 181, mixed-member electoral system in, 44, 48, 185–190, 192–197 53–54 political entrepreneurship and, 186–187 MMP system in, 62–63 presidential elections and, 189 overhang seats in, 64–65 quantitative analysis of, 203–205 personal voting in, 126, 128–129, 140 in Russia, electoral results from, 190–191 PR tier and, 13, 62 in SMDs, 183, 197–199 SF-ratios in, 154, 155, 158 social cleavage and, 180 strategic defection in, 126, 128, 133–134 strategic behavior influenced by, 24–25, strategic voting in, 135 30–32, 203 ticket splitting in, 122, 140 strategic voting and, 30–32, 185 women’s representation in, 218 in Ukraine, electoral results from, 190–191 Golder, Matt, 20, 181, 246 urbanization levels as measure of, in Japan, Grofman, Bernard, 8, 20 191 in , electoral results from, 190–191 Herron, Erik, 50 European Union. See specific nations Hicken, Allen, 250 Hungary females. See women average effective number of candidates, per Ferrara, Federico, 50 SMD, 96–97, 105–106

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Index 277

disproportionality in, 108 least-squares index (LSq), xvi mixed-member electoral system in, 48 for disproportionality, 78, 112–114 as new democracy, 81 FPTP systems and, 80 party system institutionalization in, 18–19 leftist political parties, women as candidates unlinked tiers system in, 62–64 in, 213 women’s representation in, 218 legal thresholds, xvi disproportionality and, 87–88 incumbency, 212 in mixed-member electoral systems, 65–66 institutionalized party system, xvi in PR systems, 4 political context and, 236–239 women’s representation and, 212, 229 Israel, disproportionality in, 79 Lesotho, 48 Italy women’s representation in, 218 controlled comparison of electoral system Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, 94 in, 45–46 Lijphart, Arend, 16, 183 decoy party PR lists in, 63 linked tiers, xvi, 62–63.Seealso disproportionality in, 108 mixed-member proportional system as established democracy, 81 election of women and, 229 mixed-member electoral system in, 48, 52 in mixed-member electoral systems, 61–65 PR tier and, 13 PR and, xvi, 77–78 system in, 63 SF-ratios and, 158 SF-ratios in, 158 strategic behavior and, 167 unlinked tiers in, 63–64 Lipset, Seymour Martin, 183 women’s representation in, 218 Lithuania, 48 Brazauskus Social Democratic Coalition in, Jackman, Robert, 16 143 Japan as new democracy, 81, 97 average effective number of candidates, per personal voting in, 126, 128–129 SMD, 96 SF-ratios in, 159 disproportionality in, 108 strategic defection in, 126 electoral systems in, 1–3 women’s representation in, 218 mixed-member electoral system in, 1, 48, low district magnitude, 72 52–53 LSq. See least-squares index MMM system in, 1 party fragmentation in, from social/ethnic M + 1 rule, xvi diversity, 192–195 Macedonia, 48 personal voting in, 126, 128–129, 134–135 disproportionality in, 108 PR tier and, 13 as new democracy, 81 SF-ratios in, 158 SF-ratios in, 159 SMDs in, 2 women’s representation in, 218 SNTV system in, 128 Maeda, Ko, 54 social/ethnic diversity in, electoral results Mainwaring, Scott, 238, 251, 253 with, 190–191 male leader bias, 223–224 strategic defection in, 126 margin of victory strategic voting in, 135 candidate identity and, 142 ticket splitting in, 122, 124 control variables for, 142–143 unlinked tiers in, 61, 64 in established democracies, SF ratios and, women’s representation in, 218 161, 165–166 Jones, Mark, 188 independent variables for, 141–143 models for, in mixed-member electoral Karp, Jeffrey, 55 systems, 141–148 Keohane, Robert, 59 in new democracies, SF ratios and, 161, King, Gary, 59 165–166 Kollman, Ken, 26, 150 personal voting as influence on, 131–137

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278 Index

margin of victory (cont.) number of parties and, 90–105 previous elections as influence on, 136–137, personal voting and, 123–124 147 PR tier and, 66 SF-ratios and, 161, 165–166 psychological effects and, 100–103, strategic voting as influence on, 125, 117–120 131–137 in Russia, 1, 48, 53 Matland, Richard, 20, 212, 255 SF-ratios and, 155–157 mechanical effects, xvi SMD tier and, 44, 66, 68 of disproportionality, 71, 72, 91–92, 93, SMDs and, 44, 66, 68 113 sociopolitical contexts and, 6–7 of Duverger’s law, 70–71 strategic voting in, 122–124 of electoral rules, 22–23 subtypes of, 61 of FPTP systems, 26 ticket splitting in, 151 in mixed-member electoral systems, 91–96 in Ukraine, 48, 53 non-mechanical effects compared to, 22, 23 unlinked tiers and, 43–44 media, in new democracies, 73 in Venezuela, 48 minorities, and electoral systems. See also women and, 240–243 ethnic diversity; social diversity; women, mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system, election of xvii, 1, 61 closed-list PR systems and, 24 in Japan, 1 representation of, electoral rules as influence in Russia, 1 on, 24, 254–255 mixed-member proportional (MMP) system, mixed electoral systems. See mixed-member xvii, 62–63 electoral systems in Germany, 62–63 mixed-member electoral systems, xvi–xvii, in New Zealand, 62–63 3–7 overhang seats in, 64–65 basics of, 42–44 MMM. See mixed-member majoritarian in Bolivia, 48 system in Canada, 52 MMP system. See mixed-member proportional classifications of, 61–66 system contamination effect and, 91 Moser, Robert, 245 controlled comparison and, 5–6, 37, 44–46, multi-member districts, xvii 239–240 SNTV electoral systems and, xviii in Croatia, 48 STV electoral systems and, xviii definitions of, 43 multiparty electoral systems, xvii disproportionality and, 77, 79–80, 91–96 district magnitude and, 65–66 N, 78–79 electoral formula and, 65 Nagler, Jonathan, 152 electoral rules and, 43–44, 85–88, 108, Ncands, 79–80 243–244 Neto, Octavio Amorim, 183, 246 electoral rules in, 43–44, 85–88, 108, new democracies, xvii, 81 243–244 average effective number of candidates in, FPTP systems compared to, 56–58 97 in Germany, 44, 48, 53–54 categorization of, 85 in Hungary, 48 definition of, 81 international expansion of, 5, 44–45, 48 development of, over time, 76–77, 108, in Italy, 48, 52 252–253 in Japan, 1, 48, 52–53 disproportionality and, 76–77 legal threshold and, 65–66 Duverger’s law and, 73–77, 245–246 linked tiers and, 61–65 electoral volatility and, 18, 73–74 MMM, xvii endogeneity and, 83–84 MMP, xvii, 1 established democracies compared to, in New Zealand, 48, 52 17–18

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Index 279

expected effects of electoral rules in, 73–74, Ns, 78–79 77 Nv, 78–79 margin of victory and SF ratios in, 161, 165–166 open-list PR systems, xvii media infrastructure in, 73 in Brazil, 4, 43 non-Duvergian equilibrium and, 75–77 preference vote in, 4 non-institutionalized party systems and, opinion polling, in new democracies, 73 81–83 Ordeshook, Peter, 30, 183, 245, 246 opinion polling in, 73 overhang seats, 64–65 party system institutionalization and, 74–75, 251–253 Palmer, Harvey, 152 personal voting and, 127, 128–129, party fragmentation. See party system 135–136 fragmentation poorly developed party systems and, party magnitude, xvii 74–75 party system fragmentation, 240–243 preference voting in, 152 assumptions about, 186–187 presidentialism and, 106 in Japan, from social/ethnic diversity, projection and, 77 192–195 psychological effect in, 24, 101–102 in New Zealand, from social/ethnic SF-ratios and, 157–158, 159–161, 165 diversity, 192–195 social/ethnic diversity in, 32 political entrepreneurs and, 186–187 strategic defection in, 28, 152, 165 in postcommunist states, 216 strategic voting in, 152 in Russia, from social/ethnic diversity, third wave of democratization and, 81 192–195 voter information in, 73–74 social/ethnic diversity as influence on, 32, women as candidates in, 35, 209, 213–214 34–35, 181, 185–190, 192–197 new institutionalism, 21 in Ukraine, from social/ethnic diversity, New Zealand 192–195 compensation seats in, 127 in Wales, from social/ethnic diversity, 195 disproportionality in, 108 women as candidates and, 34–35, 214–215, ENEG in, 191 230 as established democracy, 81 party system institutionalization, xvii FPTP system in, 55 components of, 18 mixed-member electoral system in, 48, 52 within democracies, 18–19, 81–85 MMP system in, 62–63 Duverger’s law and, 83–84 overhang seats in, 64–65 electoral system effects and, 24, 94 personal voting in, 126, 128 in Hungary, 18–19 PR system in, 13 multivariable analyses for, 112 SF-ratios in, 158 in new democracies, 74–75, 251–253 SMDs in, 206 presidentialism and, 106 social/ethnic diversity and party in Russia, 19 fragmentation in, 190–191, 192–195, SF-ratios and, 157–158 197–199, 206–207 strategic defection and, 151–152 strategic defection in, 126, 129, 134 permissive electoral systems, xvii, 4, 72 strategic voting in, 134, 135 social cleavage theory of party origins and, ticket splitting in, 134 29 women’s representation in, 218 personal voting Nishikawa, Misa, 50 analysis of, 129–131 non-institutionalized party system, xvii, 82 electoral rules as influence on, 127 definition of, 81–83 expectations for, 126–128 endogeneity and, 83–84 in Germany, 126, 128–129, 140 SMDs and, 82 in Japan, 126, 128–129, 134–135 Nparties, 79–80 margin of victory and, 131–137

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280 Index

personal voting (cont.) Duverger’s law and, 72 in mixed-member electoral systems, in new democracies, 77 123–124 presidentialism and, 72 national variations in, 128–129 in SMDs, to national levels, 104–105, 119, in new democracies, 127, 128–129, 120 135–136 proportional representation (PR) system, 4. in New Zealand, 126, 128 See also closed-list PR systems; previous elections as influence on, 136–137, proportional representation tier 147 closed-list, 4, 24 in SMDs, 125 definition of, xviii under SNTV electoral system, 128 gender quotas and, 220–221 strategic voting and, 124–125 legal threshold of representation in, 4 ticket splitting and, 123–124 open-list, xvii, 4, 43 unlinked tiers and, 127–128 sincere behavior under, 23 placement mandate, xvii women as candidates under, 33–34, plurality electoral systems, xvii.Seealso 209–210, 211–213, 217–218, 221 first-past-the-post system proportional representation (PR) tier. See also political entrepreneurs, 186–187 mixed-member electoral systems; political parties. See also party system proportional representation system fragmentation in Bolivia, 14 in Armenia, party identification and, 82 compensation seats and, 43, 86, 127 disproportionality as influence on, 77–79 in Croatia, 66 electoral rules as influence on, 23–24, 25 decoy party lists in Italy and, 63 institutionalized party system and, xvi gender quotas and, 220–221 leftist, women as candidates in, 213 in Germany, 13, 62 in mixed-member electoral systems, 90–105 in Italy, 13 in new democracies, 74–75 in Japan, 13 party system institutionalization and, xvii, legal threshold of representation in, 4 18–19 linked tiers and, xvi, 77–78 rank-ordering preferences and, 75 in New Zealand, 13 in Russia, party identification and, 82 in Russia, 14 social cleavage theory, and origins of, 29 scorporo system and, 63 social/ethnic diversity as influence on, SF-ratios and, 165 39–40, 181–184 SMD–PR vote gap and, 144, 145, 146 strategic voting and, 25–29 in Ukraine, 14 in Ukraine, party identification and, 82 in Venezuela, 14 postcommunist states. See also specific nations women as candidates in, 33–34, 209–210, gender equality in, 215 211–213, 217–221 party system fragmentation in, 216 psychological effect women as candidates in, 215–216 of Duverger’s law, 71 PR system. See proportional representation of electoral rules, 100–103 system in established democracies, 101–102 preference revelation, 150 of FPTP system, 26 strategic voting and, 150 in mixed-member electoral systems, preference vote, xvii–xviii 100–103, 117–120 in new democracies, 152 variables for, 118 in open-list PR, 4 for voters, xviii presidential elections, social/ethnic diversity pure electoral systems, xviii and, 189 Putin, Vladimir, 163 presidentialism, 106 Putnam, Robert, 45 in new democracies, 106 party system institutionalization and, 106 Rae, Douglas, 183 projection, 72 Reed, Steven, 122

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Index 281

restrictive electoral systems, xviii, 4 margin of victory and, 161, 165–166 Riker, William, 15, 151 mixed-member electoral systems and, Rokkan, Stein, 183 155–157 Russia multivariate analysis of, 175–177, 179 campaign financing in, 94 in new democracies, 157–158, 159–161, disproportionality in elections, 2, 93–94, 165 108 in New Zealand, 158 electoral systems in, 1–3 party system institutionalization and, electoral volatility in, 82 157–158 extreme party proliferation in, 94 patterns in, 159 Liberal Democratic Party of Russia in, 94 PR systems and, 165 mixed-member electoral system in, 1, 48, 53 in Russia, 154–155, 161–164 MMM system in, 1 in , 158 as new democracy, 81 strategic behavior and, 155–157 non-Duvergian equilibrium in, 164 strategic defection and, 152–158 non-institutionalized party system in, 82 in Ukraine, 159 party identification in, 82 in unlinked tiers, 158 party system institutionalization in, 19 in Wales, 158 personal voting in, 126, 128–129 Shugart, Matthew, 15, 45, 238, 239 PR tier in, 14 Shvetsova, Olga, 30, 183, 245, 246 SF-ratios in, 154–155, 161–164 sincere behavior, under electoral rules, 23 SMDs in, 2, 79, 82 in PR systems, 23 social/ethnic diversity and party Singer, Matthew, 30, 67, 183, 246 fragmentation in, 190–191, 192–195 single nontransferable vote (SNTV) electoral strategic defection in, 126 system, xviii, 4 United Russia Party in, 163, 164 in Japan, 128 unlinked tiers and, 61 (STV) electoral system, Women of Russia Party in, 213 xviii, 4 women’s representation in, 218 single-member districts (SMDs) system, xviii. See also SF-ratios; single-member districts Sartori, Giovanni, 6, 21 (SMDs) tier scorporo system, 63 constraining effects of, 99–100, 101, 107 Scotland, 48 disproportionality and, 92–93 compensation seats in, 127 district magnitude and, 71 disproportionality in, 108 Duverger’s law and, 71 as established democracy, 81 electoral formula, 65, 86–87 personal voting in, 126, 128–129 electoral rules and, 13 SF-ratios in, 158 FPTP system and, xvi, 3–4, 9 strategic defection in, 126, 129 non-institutionalized party system and, 82 women’s representation in, 218 personal voting in, 125 SF-ratios, xviii, 152–164 projection to national levels for, 104–105, in Bolivia, 158 119, 120 Duvergerian equilibrium and, 153, 154 two-round majority electoral systems in, electoral experience as factor in, 158 xix, 4 electoral rules as influence on, 157–158 in U.S., 54 in established democracies, 159–161 women as candidates in, 33, 34–35, 208, explanatory variables for, 175–176 211, 217–221 in Germany, 154, 155, 158 single-member districts (SMDs) tier in Italy, 158 in Armenia, 79, 82 in Japan, 158 contamination critique and, 51–52 in linked tiers, 158 cross-national analysis of, 67–69 in Lithuania, 159 effective number of candidates in, 96–100, in Macedonia, 159 114–115, 117

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282 Index

single-member districts (SMDs) tier (cont.) number of parties influenced by, 39–40, in Germany, 96 181–184, 190–191, 204 in Hungary, 96–97 party fragmentation and, 32, 34–35, 181, in Japan, 2, 96 185–190, 192–197 in mixed-member electoral systems, 44, 66, political entrepreneurship and, 186–187 68 political expectations from, 191–192 in New Zealand, 206 presidential elections and, 189 non-institutionalized party system and, 82 quantitative analysis of, 203–205 personal voting in, 125 in Russia, electoral results and, 190–191 PR seats as compensation for, 43, 86 in SMDs, 183, 197–199 projection to national levels and, 104–105, social cleavages and, 180 119, 120 sociological school and, 182–183 in Russia, 2, 79, 82 strategic behavior influenced by, 24–25, SMD–PR vote gap and, 144, 145, 146 30–32, 203 social/ethnic diversity and party strategic voting and, 30–32, 185 fragmentation in, 183, 197–199 in Ukraine, electoral results and, strategic defection in, 124, 125–129 190–191 ticket splitting in, 123 urbanization levels as measure of, in Japan, two-round majority electoral systems in, 191 xix, 4 in Wales, electoral results and, 190–191 in Ukraine, 79, 82, 96–97 social norms, election of women influenced by, unlinked tiers system and, xix 214 women as candidates in, 218 social sciences, 15–17 SMD–PR vote gap, 144, 145, 146 assumptions within, 16 SMDs. See single-member districts goals of, 15–16 SNTV electoral system. See single Soviet Union. See Russia; specific nations nontransferable vote electoral system spoiler effect, 74–75 social cleavage theory of party origins, 29 Stephenson, Laura, 30, 183, 246 district magnitude and, 29–30 Stoll, Heather, 186, 250 permissive electoral systems and, 29 strategic behavior, under electoral rules, 23, social/ethnic diversity and, 180 24–25, 32 social diversity in FPTP system, 23 curvilinear models for, 204 in linked tiers, 167 district magnitude and, 183 SF-ratios and, 155–157 district-level analysis of, 180–181, 187–190 social/ethnic diversity as influence on, Duverger on, 181–182, 183 24–25, 203 Duverger’s law and, 188, 189, 246–247 strategic defection, xviii–xix, 240–243 ecological inference analysis and, 203, democratic experience as influence on, 254 167–170 economic cleavages and, 202 Duverger’s law and, 38, 151, 242 electoral rules as influence on, 23–24, electoral rules and, 150–152 195–196, 204 in established democracies, 28, 165 electoral systems and, 29–32, 181–184 in Germany, 126, 128, 133–134 ENEG and, 191–192 in Lithuania, 126 ENEP and, 191–192, 204 in new democracies, 28, 152, 165 in established democracies, 32 in New Zealand, 126, 129, 134 under FPTP system, 21, 184–185, 192–197 over time, 167 fractionalization measures for, 191 party system institutionalization and, institutional school and, 183 151–152 in Japan, electoral results and, 190–191 political context for, 139 in new democracies, 32 in Scotland, 126, 129 in New Zealand, electoral results from, SF-ratios and, 152–158 190–191, 197–199, 206–207 in SMDs, 124, 125–129

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Index 283

voter information as influence on, 28–29 personal voting in, 126, 128–129 in Wales, 126, 129 PR tier, 14 strategic voting, xix SF-ratios in, 159 analysis of, 129–131 SMDs in, 79, 82 assumptions about, 27–28 social/ethnic diversity and party definition of, 150 fragmentation in, 190–191, 192–195 Duverger’s law and, 27, 130 strategic defection in, 126 electoral rules and, 150 women’s representation in, 218 electoral systems and, 25–29 United Russia Party, 163, 164 in established democracies, 27–28, 150 United States (U.S.) expectations for, 126–128 disproportionality in, 80, 87 under FPTP system, 30–32, 123 electoral college in, 78 in Germany, 135 FPTP rules in, 54 in Japan, 135 SMDs in, 54 margin of victory and, 125, 131–137 women as candidates in, 211 in mixed-member electoral systems, unlinked tiers, 61.Seealsomixed-member 122–124 majoritarian system in new democracies, 152 average effective number of candidates in, in New Zealand, 134, 135 97 number of political parties and, 25–29 in Hungary, 62–64 personal voting and, 124–125 in Italy, 63–64 preference revelation and, 150 in Japan, 61, 64 previous elections as influence on, 136–137, in mixed member electoral system, 43–44 147 personal voting in, 127–128 social/ethnic diversity and, 30–32, 185 in Russia, 61 Studlar, Dudley, 212 scorporo system and, 63 STV electoral system. See single transferable SF-ratios in, 158 vote electoral system SMDs and, xix

Taagepera, Rein, 15, 20 Venezuela threshold-beating voting, 130 disproportionality in, 108 ticket splitting mixed-member electoral system in, 48 in Germany, 122, 140 PR tier in, 14 in Japan, 122, 124 women’s representation in, 218 in mixed-member electoral systems, 151 Verba, Sidney, 59 in New Zealand, 134 voter defection. See strategic defection personal voting and, 123–124 voters. See strategic behavior, under electoral in SMDs, 123 rules threshold-beating voting and, 130 voting. See preference vote; strategic behavior, twinning, 231 under electoral rules; strategic defection; two-party systems, xix strategic voting two-round majority electoral systems, xix, 4 Duverger’s Hypothesis and, 71 Wales, 48 compensation seats in, 127 Ukraine disproportionality in, 108 average effective number of candidates, per as established democracy, 81 SMD, 96–97 personal voting in, 126, 128–129 disproportionality in, 108 SF-ratios in, 158 electoral volatility in, 82 social/ethnic diversity and party mixed-member electoral system in, 48, 53 fragmentation in, 190–191, 195 as new democracy, 81 strategic defection in, 126, 129 non-institutionalized party system in, 82 twinning in, 231 party identification in, 82 women’s representation in, 218

© in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-02542-4 - Electoral Systems and Political Context: How the Effects of Rules Vary Across New and Established Democracies Robert G. Moser and Ethan Scheiner Index More information

284 Index

Wattenberg, Martin, 239 number of parties as influence on, West Germany. See Germany 224–225 women, election of, 33–35 party fragmentation as advantage for, analysis of, 210–214 34–35, 214–215, 230 career experience and, 212 party ideology as influence on, 229 closed-list PR systems and, 24, 33–34, 208, party magnitude and, 212 209, 211 placement mandates and, xvii controlled comparison of, 47–49 in postcommunist states, 215–216 country-level analysis of, 230–231 under PR systems, as candidates, 33–34, cross-national studies of, 210–211 209–210, 211–213, 217–218, 221 developmental thresholds for, 229 quantitative analysis of, 230–235 differential correlates for, by nation, 232 representation of, electoral rules as influence district magnitude and, 209, 211–212 on, 24 electoral rules as influence on, 214–216 in SMDs, as candidates, 33, 34–35, 208, in established democracies, as candidates, 211, 217–218, 221 35, 209, 213–214, 215–216 social bias and, 222–223, 224 future research and, 254 social norms and, 214 gender quotas for, in elections, xvi, societal support and, 226–227 220–221, 229 twinning and, 231 incumbency reelection and, 212 in U.S., 211 leftist political parties and, 213 women’s parties and, 213 legislator-level analysis of, 231–235 World Values Survey (WVS) and, linked tiers and, 229 222 in mixed-member electoral systems, Women of Russia Party, 213 240–243 World Values Survey (WVS), 222 multilevel probit model for, 235 in new democracies, as candidates, 35, 209, Zhirinovsky, Vladimir, 94 213–214 Zoco, Edurne, 251

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