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Support for Third Parties Under Plurality Rule Electoral Systems : a Public Choice Analysis of Britain, Canada, New Zealand and South Korea

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Support for Third Parties Under Plurality Rule Electoral Systems : a Public Choice Analysis of Britain, Canada, New Zealand and South Korea SUPPORT FOR THIRD PARTIES UNDER PLURALITY RULE ELECTORAL SYSTEMS : A PUBLIC CHOICE ANALYSIS OF BRITAIN, CANADA, NEW ZEALAND AND SOUTH KOREA WON-TAEK KANG Thesis presented for Ph.D. at London School of Economics and Political Science UMI Number: U105556 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI U105556 Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 Ti-w^s& S F 7 ^ 2 7 ABSTRACT Why do parties other than major parties survive or even flourish under plurality rule electoral systems, when according to Du verger’s law we should expect them to disappear? Why should rational voters support third parties, even though their chances of being successful are often low ? Using an institutional public choice approach, this study analyses third party voting as one amongst a continuum of choices faced by electors who pay attention both to the ideological proximity of parties, and to their perceived efficacy measured against a community-wide level of minimum efficacy. The approach is applied in detailed case study chapters examining four different third parties. Two of the cases cover long-established and relatively successful third parties - the British Liberal Democrats; the Canadian NDP. The other two cases cover shorter-lived third parties - the New Zealand Social Credit; and the UNP in South Korea. In each case the study examines the party’s specific history and dynamics, looks at the social base of its support and its ideological positioning, explores the party’s perceived efficacy, and analyses the articulation of the third party’s strategy. Two key themes emerge. First, plurality rule electoral systems impose severe constraints on third parties, but also create niches (such as one-party safe seats or regions, or unoccupied ideological space) within which a long-term third party can become established, flourish and develop strategies to partially overcome its lower perceived efficacy. Second, third party voting under plurality rule is not an isolated behaviour, but part of an integrated spectrum of choices (encompassing abstention, protest voting, tactical voting, and positive party support) which citizens make. People respond both to the ideological positioning and to the perceived efficacy of the competing political parties, within a specific voting context and using a collectively defined sense of what constitutes efficacious political behaviour. CONTENTS Abstract --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ii List of Tables --------------------------------------------------------------------------- viii List of Figures -------------------------------------------------------------------------- xi Preface------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ xiii t CHAPTER I PLURALITY RULE ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND NON-MAJOR PARTIES 1.1. Plurality rule and representation ----------------------------------------------------- 1 1.2. Political parties under plurality rule electoral systems ---------------------------- 5 • A typology of parties • Dunleavy’s group distinction and two types of third parties • Different front-lines: two types of third parties in election 1.3. Research scope and methods -------------------------------------------------------- 15 • Rational voters and third party voting : the public choice approach • Four third parties: a comparative approach • Comparison of the four cases 1.4. Third parties in other countries: the United States and Australia ----------------23 • Third parties in the United States • Third parties in Australia 1.5. Conclusion ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 29 CHAPTER II REVIEWING EXISTING ACCOUNTS OF PARTY COMPETITION AND THIRD PARTIES---------------------------------------------------------------------- 32 2.1. Existing public choice accounts of party competition ----------------------------- 34 • Downs and the proximity model • Distribution of voters’ preferences and third party support • Intensity of preference and partisan commitment • Prospective voting, retrospective voting and evaluation 2.2. Existing public choice accounts of abstention -----------------------------------51 2.3. Existing accounts of tactical voting --------------------------------------------------55 2.4. Conclusion -------------------------------------------------------------------------------61 CHAPTER IE AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: THE QUALITY-SATISFICING APPROACH AND THIRD PARTY VOTING -----------------------------------------------------------64 3.1. Hirschman’s approach ----------------------------------------------------------------- 65 3.2. ‘Quality’ levels, satisficing and voters’ decisions -----------------------------------70 • Efficacy and ideology • A pooled standard of quality • Simon’s approach and the quality-satisficing account • Protest voting and one-party dominant regions • Abstention and quality-satisficing approach • Variation of quality provision and voters’ decision 3.3. The quality-satisficing approach and tactical voting ------------------------------ 89 • ‘Inverse’ tactical voting • Variations in quality provision and tactical voting 3.4. Conclusion: protest voting, tactical voting and third party support -------------98 CHAPTER IV THIRD PARTY SUPPORT IN BRITAIN: THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY, 1983-1992 4.1. Third party politics in Britain ------------------------------------------------------- 102 • The Liberal Democrats and third party support 4.2. The characteristics of Liberal Democrat voters -----------------------------------108 • Soft voters and dispersed support • Dealignment and protest voting • Voters’ perception of the Liberal Democrats 4.3. Social base, issue positions and Liberal support ----------------------------------122 • The Conservative voters and Liberal Democrats • Issue positions and Liberal support 4.4. Image of party leader --------------------------------------------------------------- 135 4.5. By-elections and Liberal Democrats support -------------------- 140 4.6. Tactical voting and the Liberal Democrats -------------------------------------- 144 4.7. Liberal Democrat voting and abstention ------------------------------------------146 4.8. Conclusion -----------------------------------------------------------------------------149 CHAPTER V VOLATILE VOTERS AND THIRD PARTY SUPPORT: THE NEW DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN CANADA (1984-1988) 5.1. Party Politics in Canada ------------------------------------------------------------- 150 • Volatile voters and weak ideology • Party support and regional cleavages • The CCF and the NDP 5.2. Party Choice in the 1984 and 1988 Federal Elections : a logistic analysis — 161 5.3. Election issues and NDP voting ----------------------------------------------------166 • The NDP support and issues in the 1984 and 1988 elections • Competence, unemployment and NDP voting 5.4. Leadership effect and the NDP support -------------------------------------------174 5.5. The NDP support in Ontario ------------------------------------------------------- 178 • Regional support: Ontario and the West • The NDP voting and the trade unions 5.6. Tactical voting and the NDP support ----------------------------------------------184 5.7. Abstention and the NDP voting ---------------------------------------------------- 185 5.8. Conclusion -----------------------------------------------------------------------------187 CHAPTER VI THE RISE OF A THIRD PARTY IN SOUTH KOREA: THE UNIFICATION NATIONAL PARTY IN THE 1992 NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTION 191 6.1. Democratisation and the transformation of party politics ---------------------- 193 • Party politics under the authoritarian regime • Democratisation through compromise between conservative parties • Regionalism and the formation of the DLP v 6.2. Voting choice in the 1992 National Assembly Election -------------------------202 • Voters’ choice in the 1992 election : log-linear analysis 6.3. UNP support and the 1992 National Assembly Election ------------------------211 • The perceived image of the UNP • Election issues and the UNP support • Leadership effects 6.4. Tactical voting and the UNP’s support --------------------------------------------221 6.5. Abstention and the UNP -------------------------------------------------------------224 6.6. Conclusion ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 227 CHAPTER VII A THIRD PARTY IN NEW ZEALAND : SOCIAL CREDIT 7.1. The Party system in New Zealand --------------------------------------------------230 • Stable two-party politics • Third party politics in New Zealand 7.2. Social Credit and its support -------------------------------------------------------- 236 • The Revival of Social Credit • Patterns of Social Credit support 7.3. Voters’ choice and Social Credit --------------------------------------------------- 243 • Social Credit as a centrist party • Social Credit and protest voting • The efficacy of Social Credit 7.4. Tactical voting and the Social Credit support
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