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A Canadian Model of Proportional Representation by Robert S. Ring A Proportional-first-past-the-post: A Canadian model of Proportional Representation by Robert S. Ring A thesis submitted to the School of Graduate Studies in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Department of Political Science Memorial University St. John’s, Newfoundland and Labrador May 2014 ii Abstract For more than a decade a majority of Canadians have consistently supported the idea of proportional representation when asked, yet all attempts at electoral reform thus far have failed. Even though a majority of Canadians support proportional representation, a majority also report they are satisfied with the current electoral system (even indicating support for both in the same survey). The author seeks to reconcile these potentially conflicting desires by designing a uniquely Canadian electoral system that keeps the positive and familiar features of first-past-the- post while creating a proportional election result. The author touches on the theory of representative democracy and its relationship with proportional representation before delving into the mechanics of electoral systems. He surveys some of the major electoral system proposals and options for Canada before finally presenting his made-in-Canada solution that he believes stands a better chance at gaining approval from Canadians than past proposals. iii Acknowledgements First of foremost, I would like to express my sincerest gratitude to my brilliant supervisor, Dr. Amanda Bittner, whose continuous guidance, support, and advice over the past few years has been invaluable. I am especially grateful to you for encouraging me to pursue my Master’s and write about my electoral system idea. Without you, this would not have materialized. I would like to thank the Faculty, students, and support staff of the Political Science Department at Memorial University. I would like to thank my family for your unconditional love and support. I would especially like to thank my parents, Elizabeth and Paul, for your unwavering belief in me in all my endeavours. I would also like to thank my ‘second family’ and employer, 37 Combat Engineer Regiment. Chimo! Above all, I am deeply grateful to my loving wife, Amanda. Thank you for standing by me and for your patience which has certainly been tested. I am especially thankful to you for being a wonderful and caring mother to our son, Auron. And to coffee growers everywhere, thanks a million! For my son, Auron James Ring And to‘One and All’ "They've all got the vote, so they all pretty much assume that the government they've voted in more or less approximates to the government they want." "You mean they actually vote for the lizards?" "Oh yes," said Ford with a shrug, "of course." "But," said Arthur, going for the big one again, "why?" "Because if they didn't vote for a lizard," said Ford, "the wrong lizard might get in. Got any gin?" Douglas Adams, So Long, and Thanks for All the Fish (Chapter 36) vi Proportional-first-past-the-post: a Canadian model of Proportional Representation Table of Contents Abstract..........................................................................................................................................ii Acknowledgements.......................................................................................................................iv List of Tables.................................................................................................................................xi List of Figures ............................................................................................................................ xii Chapter I: Introduction: the state of representative democracy in Canada............................1 1.1 Canada has a democratic deficit..............................................................................................1 1.2 Disproportional election results and manufactured majority governments...........................3 1.3 Canadians support proportional representation and the current electoral system................5 Chapter II: Representative Democracy.......................................................................................8 2.1 Why democracy?.......................................................................................................................8 2.2 Democracy’s uneasy relationship with representation..........................................................10 2.3 Representative democracy: What exactly should it look like?..............................................12 2.3.1 Majority rule.............................................................................................................15 2.3.2 Representation of all.................................................................................................18 2.3.3 Political equality.......................................................................................................23 2.4 Why not direct democracy?.....................................................................................................25 2.5 Why not sortition?...................................................................................................................29 2.6 Descriptive and substantive representation............................................................................32 2.7 Authorization and Accountability...........................................................................................37 2.8 Theory of proportional representation...................................................................................39 vii Chapter III: Features of Electoral Systems...............................................................................44 3.1 Constituency structure: defining how seats are structured...................................................45 3.1.1 District magnitude....................................................................................................45 3.1.2 Complex districting: multiple ‘tiers’.........................................................................46 3.2 Ballot structure: defining how votes are cast.........................................................................47 3.2.1 Categoric versus ordinal ballot................................................................................47 3.2.2 Number of votes........................................................................................................48 3.2.3 ‘Blank’ ballots...........................................................................................................49 3.2.4 Choice of candidate (or lack thereof) within parties................................................50 3.3 Formulae: defining how votes translate into seats................................................................51 3.3.1 Plurality....................................................................................................................51 3.3.2 Majority.....................................................................................................................52 3.3.3 ‘Proportional’ formulae............................................................................................53 3.3.3.1 Largest remainder methods........................................................................54 3.3.3.2 Highest average methods...........................................................................56 3.3.3.3 Largest remainder versus highest average methods...................................58 3.3.3.4 Lists............................................................................................................59 3.3.3.4.1 Closed lists..................................................................................59 3.3.3.4.2 Fully open lists............................................................................59 3.3.3.4.3 Semi-open lists............................................................................60 3.3.3.5 Best candidates method..............................................................................60 3.3.3.6 Thresholds: limiting proportionality..........................................................61 viii Chapter IV: First-Past-the-Post..................................................................................................64 4.1 Minimizing needless change (Criterion 1: Palatability)........................................................64 4.2 Pros of first-past-the-post........................................................................................................66 4.2.1 Simplicity (Criterion 2).............................................................................................66 4.2.2 Local geographic representation (Criterion 3).........................................................68 4.2.3 Accountable members (Criterion 4)..........................................................................69 4.2.4 Accountable government? (Criterion 5)...................................................................71 4.3 Cons of first-past-the-post.......................................................................................................74 4.3.1 Meaningless votes (Criterion 6: Meaningful votes)..................................................74 4.3.2 Can create a ‘weak’ or ‘ineffective’ opposition (Criterion 7: Effective opposition).77 4.3.3 Distorted election results (Criterion 8: Proportional representation of parties).....78 4.3.4 Exaggerates regional differences (Criterion 9: Regionally balanced governments)..................................................................................................................................80
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