Engineering Electoral Systems: Possibilities and Pitfalls
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Free Movement and the Right to Protest
statewatch monitoring the state and civil liberties in the UK and Europe vol 13 no 1 January-February 2003 Free movement and the right to protest Information, intelligence and "personal data" is to be gathered on: potential demonstrators and other groupings expected to travel to the event and deemed to pose a potential threat to the maintenance of public law and order The freedom of movement for all EU citizens, one of its four by the unaccountable EU Police Chiefs Task Force, and the basic freedoms of the EU, is under attack when it comes to Security Office of the General Secretariat of the Council of the people exercising their right to protest. European Union (the 15 EU governments) is to "advise" on The "freedom of movement" of people is held to mean the operational plans to combat protests (see Viewpoint, page 21). right of citizens to move freely between the 15 countries of the Information, intelligence and "personal data" on: EU without being checked or controlled or having to say why potential demonstrators and other groupings expected to travel to the they are travelling. Martin Bangemann, then the EC event and deemed to pose a potential threat to the maintenance of Commissioner for the Internal Market, told the European public law and order Parliament in 1992: "We want any EC citizen to go from are to be supplied by each national police and security agency to Hamburg to London without a passport" (Statewatch, vol 2 no 6). the state where the protest is planned - on a monthly, then weekly This "freedom" was never uniformly implemented but today it and finally daily basis up to the event. -
Candidate Ranking Strategies Under Closed List Proportional Representation
The Best at the Top? Candidate Ranking Strategies Under Closed List Proportional Representation Benoit S Y Crutzen Hideo Konishi Erasmus School of Economics Boston College Nicolas Sahuguet HEC Montreal April 21, 2021 Abstract Under closed-list proportional representation, a party’selectoral list determines the order in which legislative seats are allocated to candidates. When candidates differ in their ability, parties face a trade-off between competence and incentives. Ranking candidates in decreasing order of competence ensures that elected politicians are most competent. Yet, party list create incentives for candidates that may push parties not to rank candidates in decreasing competence order. We examine this trade-off in a game- theoretical model in which parties rank their candidate on a list, candidates choose their campaign effort, and the election is a team contest for multiple prizes. We show that the trade-off between competence and incentives depends on candidates’objective and the electoral environment. In particular, parties rank candidates in decreasing order of competence if candidates value enough post-electoral high offi ces or media coverage focuses on candidates at the top of the list. 1 1 Introduction Competent politicians are key for government and democracy to function well. In most democracies, political parties select the candidates who can run for offi ce. Parties’decision on which candidates to let run under their banner is therefore of fundamental importance. When they select candidates, parties have to worry not only about the competence of candidates but also about incentives, about their candidates’motivation to engage with voters and work hard for their party’selectoral success. -
Who Gains from Apparentments Under D'hondt?
CIS Working Paper No 48, 2009 Published by the Center for Comparative and International Studies (ETH Zurich and University of Zurich) Who gains from apparentments under D’Hondt? Dr. Daniel Bochsler University of Zurich Universität Zürich Who gains from apparentments under D’Hondt? Daniel Bochsler post-doctoral research fellow Center for Comparative and International Studies Universität Zürich Seilergraben 53 CH-8001 Zürich Switzerland Centre for the Study of Imperfections in Democracies Central European University Nador utca 9 H-1051 Budapest Hungary [email protected] phone: +41 44 634 50 28 http://www.bochsler.eu Acknowledgements I am in dept to Sebastian Maier, Friedrich Pukelsheim, Peter Leutgäb, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Alex Fischer, who provided very insightful comments on earlier versions of this paper. Manuscript Who gains from apparentments under D’Hondt? Apparentments – or coalitions of several electoral lists – are a widely neglected aspect of the study of proportional electoral systems. This paper proposes a formal model that explains the benefits political parties derive from apparentments, based on their alliance strategies and relative size. In doing so, it reveals that apparentments are most beneficial for highly fractionalised political blocs. However, it also emerges that large parties stand to gain much more from apparentments than small parties do. Because of this, small parties are likely to join in apparentments with other small parties, excluding large parties where possible. These arguments are tested empirically, using a new dataset from the Swiss national parliamentary elections covering a period from 1995 to 2007. Keywords: Electoral systems; apparentments; mechanical effect; PR; D’Hondt. Apparentments, a neglected feature of electoral systems Seat allocation rules in proportional representation (PR) systems have been subject to widespread political debate, and one particularly under-analysed subject in this area is list apparentments. -
A Canadian Model of Proportional Representation by Robert S. Ring A
Proportional-first-past-the-post: A Canadian model of Proportional Representation by Robert S. Ring A thesis submitted to the School of Graduate Studies in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Department of Political Science Memorial University St. John’s, Newfoundland and Labrador May 2014 ii Abstract For more than a decade a majority of Canadians have consistently supported the idea of proportional representation when asked, yet all attempts at electoral reform thus far have failed. Even though a majority of Canadians support proportional representation, a majority also report they are satisfied with the current electoral system (even indicating support for both in the same survey). The author seeks to reconcile these potentially conflicting desires by designing a uniquely Canadian electoral system that keeps the positive and familiar features of first-past-the- post while creating a proportional election result. The author touches on the theory of representative democracy and its relationship with proportional representation before delving into the mechanics of electoral systems. He surveys some of the major electoral system proposals and options for Canada before finally presenting his made-in-Canada solution that he believes stands a better chance at gaining approval from Canadians than past proposals. iii Acknowledgements First of foremost, I would like to express my sincerest gratitude to my brilliant supervisor, Dr. Amanda Bittner, whose continuous guidance, support, and advice over the past few years has been invaluable. I am especially grateful to you for encouraging me to pursue my Master’s and write about my electoral system idea. -
Changing Party Electorates and Economic Realignment
Changing party electorates and economic realignment Explaining party positions on labor market policy in Western Europe Dominik Geering and Silja Häusermann, University of Zurich [email protected], [email protected] Abstract Socio-structural change has led to important shifts of voters, such as middle class voters increasingly voting for the left and working class voters increasingly voting for the populist right. These electoral shifts blur the voter-party alignments, which prevailed during the post- war period. Consequently, comparative politics scholars have started to question whether parties still represent the class interests of their voters. Most contributions answer this question negatively, arguing that parties have detached themselves from the class profile of their electorates. We argue that this conclusion is erroneous as it relies on assumptions on and measures of class structuration that are outdated. We show that the class profile of party electorates still predicts parties’ positions on labor market policies. However, these voter- party alignments become observable empirically only if we a) use a post-industrial schema of class stratification to characterize party constituencies and b) distinguish between different dimensions of labor market policy, notably redistribution and activation. For our analysis we explore the class profiles of electorates and party positions on labor market policies in Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the UK. We use two sources of data: Micro-level survey data (ISSP 2000 and 2006) and a newly compiled data set on party positions during electoral campaigns in the 2000s. We have three main findings. First, we show that the distinction between working class and middle-class parties does not explain party positions anymore, because the middle class has expanded and become heterogeneous. -
Appendix A: Electoral Rules
Appendix A: Electoral Rules Table A.1 Electoral Rules for Italy’s Lower House, 1948–present Time Period 1948–1993 1993–2005 2005–present Plurality PR with seat Valle d’Aosta “Overseas” Tier PR Tier bonus national tier SMD Constituencies No. of seats / 6301 / 32 475/475 155/26 617/1 1/1 12/4 districts Election rule PR2 Plurality PR3 PR with seat Plurality PR (FPTP) bonus4 (FPTP) District Size 1–54 1 1–11 617 1 1–6 (mean = 20) (mean = 6) (mean = 4) Note that the acronym FPTP refers to First Past the Post plurality electoral system. 1The number of seats became 630 after the 1962 constitutional reform. Note the period of office is always 5 years or less if the parliament is dissolved. 2Imperiali quota and LR; preferential vote; threshold: one quota and 300,000 votes at national level. 3Hare Quota and LR; closed list; threshold: 4% of valid votes at national level. 4Hare Quota and LR; closed list; thresholds: 4% for lists running independently; 10% for coalitions; 2% for lists joining a pre-electoral coalition, except for the best loser. Ballot structure • Under the PR system (1948–1993), each voter cast one vote for a party list and could express a variable number of preferential votes among candidates of that list. • Under the MMM system (1993–2005), each voter received two separate ballots (the plurality ballot and the PR one) and cast two votes: one for an individual candidate in a single-member district; one for a party in a multi-member PR district. • Under the PR-with-seat-bonus system (2005–present), each voter cast one vote for a party list. -
The Allocation of Seats Inside the Lists (Open/Closed Lists)
Strasbourg, 28 November 2014 CDL(2014)051* Study No. 764/2014 Or. Engl. EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW (VENICE COMMISSION) DRAFT REPORT ON PROPORTIONAL ELECTORAL SYSTEMS: THE ALLOCATION OF SEATS INSIDE THE LISTS (OPEN/CLOSED LISTS) on the basis of comments by Mr Richard BARRETT (Member, Ireland) Mr Oliver KASK (Member, Estonia) Mr Ugo MIFSUD BONNICI (Former Member, Malta) Mr Kåre VOLLAN (Expert, Norway) *This document has been classified restricted on the date of issue. Unless the Venice Commission decides otherwise, it will be declassified a year after its issue according to the rules set up in Resolution CM/Res(2001)6 on access to Council of Europe documents. This document will not be distributed at the meeting. Please bring this copy. www.venice.coe.int CDL(2014)051 - 2 - Table of contents I. Introduction ................................................................................................................... 3 II. The electoral systems in Europe and beyond .................................................................... 4 A. Overview ................................................................................................................... 4 B. Closed-list systems.................................................................................................... 6 III. Open-list systems: seat allocation within lists, effects on the results ................................ 7 A. Open-list systems: typology ....................................................................................... 8 B. -
International Social Survey Program: Work Orientations II, 1997
ICPSR Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research International Social Survey Program: Work Orientations II, 1997 International Social Survey Program (ISSP) ICPSR 3032 INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SURVEY PROGRAM: WORK ORIENTATIONS II, 1997 (ICPSR 3032) Principal Investigator International Social Survey Program (ISSP) First ICPSR Version November 2000 Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research P.O. Box 1248 Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 BIBLIOGRAPHIC CITATION Publications based on ICPSR data collections should acknowledge those sources by means of bibliographic citations. To ensure that such source attributions are captured for social science bibliographic utilities, citations must appear in footnotes or in the reference section of publications. The bibliographic citation for this data collection is: International Social Survey Program (ISSP). INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SURVEY PROGRAM: WORK ORIENTATIONS II, 1997 [Computer file]. ICPSR version. Koeln, Germany: Zentralarchiv fuer Empirische Sozialforschung [producer], 1999. Koeln, Germany: Zentralarchiv fuer Empirische Sozialforschung/Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributors], 2000. REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON USE OF ICPSR RESOURCES To provide funding agencies with essential information about use of archival resources and to facilitate the exchange of information about ICPSR participants' research activities, users of ICPSR data are requested to send to ICPSR bibliographic citations for each completed manuscript or thesis abstract. Please indicate in a cover letter which data were used. DATA DISCLAIMER The original collector of the data, ICPSR, and the relevant funding agency bear no responsibility for uses of this collection or for interpretations or inferences based upon such uses. DATA COLLECTION DESCRIPTION International Social Survey Program (ISSP) INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SURVEY PROGRAM: WORK ORIENTATIONS II, 1997 (ICPSR 3032) SUMMARY: The International Social Survey Program (ISSP) is an ongoing program of crossnational collaboration. -
EU Electoral Law Memorandum.Pages
Memorandum on the Electoral Law of the European Union: Confederal and Federal Legitimacy and Turnout European Parliament Committee on Constitutional Affairs Hearing on Electoral Reform Brendan O’Leary, BA (Oxon), PhD (LSE) Lauder Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania Citizen of Ireland and Citizen of the USA1 submitted November 26 2014 hearing December 3 2014 Page !1 of !22 The European Parliament, on one view, is a direct descendant of its confederal precursor, which was indirectly elected from among the member-state parliaments of the ESCC and the EEC. In a very different view the Parliament is the incipient first chamber of the European federal demos, an integral component of a European federation in the making.2 These contrasting confederal and federal understandings imply very different approaches to the law(s) regulating the election of the European Parliament. 1. The Confederal Understanding In the confederal vision of Europe as a union of sovereign member-states, each member- state should pass its own electoral laws, execute its own electoral administration, and regulate the conduct of its representatives in European institutions, who should be accountable to member- state parties and citizens, and indeed function as their “mandatable” delegates. In the strongest confederal vision, in the conduct of EU law-making and policy MEPs should have less powers and status than the ministers of member-states, and their delegated authorities (e.g., ambassadors, or functionally specialized civil servants). In most confederal visions MEPs should be indirectly elected from and accountable to their home parliaments. Applied astringently, the confederal understanding would suggest that the current Parliament has been mis-designed, and operating beyond its appropriate functions at least since 1979. -
Open Access Version Via Utrecht University Repository
NATIONAL IDENTITY AND COSMOPOLITAN COMMUNITY AMONG DUTCH GREEN PARTY MEMBERS Written by Matthias Schmal and supervised by Luc Lauwers: A thesis part of the Master’s program Cultural Anthropology: Sustainable Citizenship at Utrecht University. August 2017 2 Green Communities National Identity and Cosmopolitan Community Among Dutch Green Party Members A thesis as part of the Master’s program Cultural Anthropology: Sustainable Citizenship at Utrecht University. Written by Matthias Schmal, supervised by Luc Lauwers. Cover by Matthias Schmal. August 4, 2017 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................................... 5 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................................... 6 METHODS .............................................................................................................................................. 11 Participant Observation .................................................................................................................... 11 Interviewing ...................................................................................................................................... 13 Online and Media Ethnography ........................................................................................................ 14 A LOST SENSE OF COMMUNITY ........................................................................................................... -
CHAPTER 9 Political Parties and Electoral Systems
CHAPTER 9 Political Parties and Electoral Systems MULTIPLE CHOICE 1. Political scientists call the attachment that an individual has to a specific political party a person’s a. party preference. b. party patronage. c. party identification. d. party dominance. e. dominant party. 2. Which best describes the difference between a one-party system and a one-party dominant system? a. In a one-party system, the party is ideological, coercive, and destructive of autonomous groups. In a one-party dominant system, it is less ideological and does not desire to destroy autonomous groups. b. In one-party dominant systems, only one party exists. In one-party systems, other political parties are not banned, and smaller parties may even receive a sizable percentage of the vote combined, but one party always wins elections and controls the government. c. In a one-party dominant system, the party is ideological, coercive, and destructive of autonomous groups. In a one-party system, it is less ideological and does not desire to destroy autonomous groups. d. In one-party systems, one large party controls the political system but small parties exist and may even compete in elections. In one-party dominant systems, different parties control the government at different times, but one party always controls all branches of government, i.e., there is never divided government. e. In one-party systems, only one party exists. In one-party dominant systems, other political parties are not banned, and smaller parties may even receive a sizable percentage of the vote combined, but one party always wins elections and controls the government. -
The Rise of Challenger Parties in the Aftermath of the Euro Crisis
Sara B. Hobolt, James Tilley Fleeing the centre: the rise of challenger parties in the aftermath of the Euro crisis Article (Accepted version) (Refereed) Original citation: Hobolt, Sara and Tilley, James (2016) Fleeing the centre: the rise of challenger parties in the aftermath of the Euro crisis. West European Politics, 39 (5). pp. 971-991. ISSN 1743-9655 DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2016.1181871 © 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/66032/ Available in LSE Research Online: July 2016 LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE Research Online website. This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be differences between this version and the published version. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. Fleeing the Centre: The Rise of Challenger Parties in the Aftermath of the Euro Crisis SARA B. HOBOLT Sutherland Chair in European Institutions European Institute London School of Economics and Political Science Houghton Street London WC2A 2AE Email: [email protected] JAMES TILLEY Professor of Politics Department of Politics and International Relations University of Oxford Email: [email protected] **ACCEPTED FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS (FORTHCOMING IN 2016)** The Eurozone crisis has altered the party political landscape across Europe.