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Comparative Table on Proportional Electoral Systems

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Strasbourg, 28 November 2014 CDL(2014)058 Study No. 764/2014 Or. bil. EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW (VENICE COMMISSION) COMPARATIVE TABLE ON PROPORTIONAL ELECTORAL SYSTEMS: THE ALLOCATION OF SEATS INSIDE THE LISTS (OPEN/CLOSED LISTS) This document will not be distributed at the meeting. Please bring this copy. www.venice.coe.int CDL(2014)058 - 2 - Proportional systems, Proportional systems: Electoral systems, Proportional systems, methods of allocation of Country Legal basis System of representation closed or open party main relevant provision(s) methods of allocation of seats seats list system? inside the lists Constitution Proportional system: Constitution Largest remainder Closed Party List No preference Article 64 All the 140 members of the Article 64 (amended by Law no. d'Hondt, then Sainte-Laguë system Not indicated in the law but Parliament are elected through 9904, dated 21.04.2008) formulas No preference implicitly clear that there is Electoral Code a proportional representation 1. The Assembly consists of 140 no preference. (approved by Law system within constituencies deputies, elected by a proportional See the separate document for no. 10 019, dated 29 corresponding to the 12 system with multi-member electoral Articles 162-163. December 2008, administrative regions. zones. and amended by The threshold to win 2. A multi-member electoral zone According to the stipulations in Law no. 74/2012, parliamentary representation is coincides with the administrative Articles 162 and 163 of the Electoral dated 19 July 2012) 3 percent for political parties division of one of the levels of Code, the number of seats is Articles 162 & 163 and 5 per cent for pre-election administrative-territorial calculated for each of the coalitions coalitions. organisation. in each of the districts by counting, Vacancies arising between 3. Criteria and rules for the on the one hand, the votes won by general elections are filled by implementation of the proportional each of the parties in the coalition in the "next-in-line" candidate of electoral system for allocating their respective electoral districts the same party. constituencies and the number of and, on the other, the number of seats for each area defined by the seats won by each coalition in its law on elections. district. Firstly, the seats are Albania assigned to the coalitions in each electoral district using the D’Hondt formula (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, etc.). After that, the seats are distributed among the political parties that form part of a coalition using the Sainte-Laguë formula (1, 3, 5, 7, 9, etc.). Article 106 6 Voting 1. On receipt of the ballot paper, the voter proceeds alone to the voting booth and votes on the ballot paper by marking next to the name of the electoral subject or of the party which is member of a coalition with the sign “x” or “+” or another sign that clearly indicates the voter’s choice. (...) - 3 - CDL(2014)058 Proportional systems, Proportional systems: Electoral systems, Proportional systems, methods of allocation of Country Legal basis System of representation closed or open party main relevant provision(s) methods of allocation of seats seats list system? inside the lists Constitution Council of the Nation (Majlis Constitution Largest remainder For proportional No preference Articles 98, 101-102 al-Oumma): Articles 98, 101-102 d'Hondt formula component: Indirect election Closed Party List Organic Law No. 12-01 (in Loi organique n° 12- Indirect election by simple Organic Law No. 12-01 (in Organic Law No. 12-01 (in French) system French) 01 du 2 janvier 2012 majority vote by electoral French) Article 85 No preference Article 88 relative au régime college composed of members Article 84 Le mode de scrutin fixé à l'article Les sièges sont attribués électoral of local councils: each wilaya's L’Assemblée Populaire Nationale 84 ci-dessus donne lieu à une aux candidats dans l'ordre Articles 84-88 people's assembly and est élue pour un mandat de cinq répartition des sièges figurant sur chaque liste. communal people's (5) ans au scrutin de liste proportionnelle au nombre de voix assemblies; these altogether proportionnel. obtenues par chaque liste avec number 15,003. Dans chaque circonscription application de la règle du plus fort 48 multi-member (2 seats) électorale, les candidats sont reste. Les listes qui n’ont pas obtenu corresponding to country's inscrits, selon un ordre de au moins cinq pour cent (5%) des wilayas (administrative classement, sur des listes suffrages exprimés ne sont pas districts). comprenant autant de candidats admises à la répartition des sièges. Vacancies arising between que de sièges à pourvoir, auxquels general elections are filled sont ajoutés trois (3) candidats Article 86 through by-elections. suppléants. Pour chaque circonscription Les élections ont lieu dans les trois électorale, le quotient électoral pris National People's Assembly (3) mois qui précèdent l’expiration en compte pour la répartition des (Al-Majlis Ech-Chaabi Al- du mandat en cours. sièges à pourvoir est le résultat du Algeria Watani): La circonscription électorale de rapport entre le nombre des Proportional system base pour l’élection des membres suffrages exprimés, diminué, le 48 multi-member, de l’Assemblée Populaire cas échéant, des suffrages corresponding to country's Nationale est fixée aux limites recueillis par les listes n’ayant pas wilayas (administrative districts) territoriales de la wilaya. atteint le seuil visé à l’alinéa 2 de with seats allotted according to Toutefois, une wilaya peut faire l'article 85 ci-dessus, et le nombre population: one seat for every l’objet d’un découpage en deux ou de sièges à pourvoir. 80,000 inhabitants and one plusieurs circonscriptions supplementary seat for every électorales sur la base des critères Article 87 fraction of 40,000; no wilaya de la densité démographique et Dans le cadre des dispositions des has less than four seats. dans le respect de la continuité articles 84, 85 et 86 de la présente List proportional representation géographique. loi organique, les sièges à pourvoir system using highest Le nombre de sièges ne peut être par liste sont répartis selon les remainder formula. inférieur à quatre (4) sièges pour modalités suivantes: 1- dans Vacancies arising between les wilayas dont la population est chaque circonscription électorale, general elections are filled by inférieure à trois cent cinquante le quotient électoral est déterminé the "next-in-line" candidate of mille (350.000) habitants. dans les conditions fixées par the same list or through by- Pour l’élection des représentants l'article 86 de la présente loi election, according to de la communauté nationale organique, 2- chaque liste obtient circumstances; no établie à l’étranger, les autant de sièges qu’elle a recueilli replacements in last year of circonscriptions électorales de fois le quotient électoral, 3 - Assembly's term. consulaires ou diplomatiques et le après attribution des sièges aux CDL(2014)058 - 4 - Proportional systems, Proportional systems: Electoral systems, Proportional systems, methods of allocation of Country Legal basis System of representation closed or open party main relevant provision(s) methods of allocation of seats seats list system? inside the lists nombre de sièges sont définis par listes qui ont obtenu le quotient la loi portant découpage électoral. électoral dans les conditions fixées à l'alinéa précédent, les restes des voix des listes ayant obtenu des sièges sont classés par ordre d'importance de leur nombre de voix. Les sièges restants sont attribués en fonction de ce classement. Lorsque pour l’'attribution du dernier siège à pourvoir, deux ou plusieurs listes obtiennent un nombre égal de suffrages, le siège revient au candidat le plus âgé. Constitution Mixed system: Constitution Highest remainder formula For proportional No preference Article 52 Article 52 component: Parish Constituencies: The Consell General consists of a Qualified Law 28/2007 Closed Party List Qualified Law 28/2007 Qualified Law Majoritarian system- single minimum of twenty-eight and a Article 58. Councillors elected in system Article 56. Voting for no.28/2007 majority vote applies in the maximum of forty-two Consellers the national constituency No preference candidatures in the amending parishes- 7 multi-member (2 Generals, half of whom shall be 1. For the determination of the national constituency Qualified Law on seats) constituencies elected in an equal number by general councillors in the national The candidatures of the the Electoral corresponding to the country's each of the seven Parròquies and constituency, the proportional system national constituency System and parishes the other half elected on the basis called the “highest remainder” shall shall be voted in their Referendum of 22 of a national single constituency. be used. totality, with those that November 2007 National Constituency: 2. To this end, the number of seats somehow, indicate Articles 48, 55, 56, 57 Proportional system- Qualified Law 28/2007 shall correspond to each candidate alterations or & 58 proportional representation with as a result of dividing the number of preferences in the order rule of highest remainder Article 48. Number of General votes and the electoral quotient. of the lists being Andorra applies in the national CouncillorsThe General Council Once completed, if this operation has considered void. constituency- 1 national multi- consists of twenty eight general not filled the fourteen positions of member (14 seats) councillors, half of who is elected in general councillor, the remaining constituencyVacancies arising an equal number for each of the seats shall be allocated to those between general elections are seven parishes and the other half candidatures already represented, filled by substitutes elected is elected in a national and that have the higher remainder, together with titular members. constituency. according to the number of existing vacancies. In the event of a tie in the allocation of the remainders, it shall be resolved in favour of the candidature with the highest number of absolute votes.
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