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Electoral Rules and Democratic Electoral Rules, and Governance Democratic Governance Edited by Mala Htun and G Report of the Political Science, Task Force on Electoral Rules and Democratic Electoral Rules, and Governance Democratic Governance Edited by Mala Htun and G. Bingham Powell, Jr. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE AssOCIATION n TasK FORCE REPORT, SEPTEMBER 2013 Political Science, Electoral Rules, and Democratic Governance Report of the Task Force on Electoral Rules and Democratic Governance Edited by Mala Htun and G. Bingham Powell, Jr. SEPTEMBER 2013 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE AssOCIATION 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036-1206 Copyright © 2013 by the American Political Science Association. All rights reserved. ISBN: 978-1-878147-41-7 Task Force on Electoral Rules and Democratic Governance Task Force Members Mala Htun, University of New Mexico, Chair G. Bingham Powell, Jr., University of Rochester; President, APSA, 2011–12 John Carey, Dartmouth College Karen E. Ferree, University of California, San Diego Simon Hix, London School of Economics Mona Lena Krook, Rutgers University Robert G. Moser, University of Texas, Austin Shaheen Mozaffar, Bridgewater State University Andrew Rehfeld, Washington University in St. Louis Andrew Reynolds, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill Ethan Scheiner, University of California, Davis Melissa Schwartzberg, Columbia University Matthew S. Shugart, University of California, Davis ii American Political Science Assocation Table of Contents TASK FORCE MEMBERS ............................................................................................................................. ii LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES ................................................................................................................v ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................................................. vi EXECUTIVE SUmmARY ............................................................................................................................. vii LIST OF ACRONYMS .................................................................................................................................ix 1. BETWEEN SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING: POLITICAL SCIENCE, ELECTORAL RULES, AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE .................................................................................... 1 Mala Htun and G. Bingham Powell, Jr. 2. HOW CONTEXT SHAPES thE EffECTS OF ELECTORAL RULES .......................................... 14 Karen E. Ferree, G. Bingham Powell, Jr., and Ethan Scheiner 3. ELECTORAL RULES AND POLITICAL INCLUSION ....................................................................... 31 Mona Lena Krook and Robert G. Moser 4. WHY BAllOT STRUCTURE MAttERS ........................................................................................... 38 Matthew S. Shugart 5. POLICY CONSEQUENCES OF ELECTORAL RULES.......................................................................46 John Carey and Simon Hix 6. DESIGNING ELECTORAL SYSTEMS: NORMATIVE TRADEOffS AND INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS ............................................................................................. 56 Andrew Rehfeld and Melissa Schwartzberg 7. REPORT FROM thE FIELD: TWO SURVEYS OF POLITICAL SCIENTISTS ........................... 62 John Carey, Simon Hix, Shaheen Mozaffar, and Andrew Reynolds REFERENCES .............................................................................................................................74 AppENDIX A: INTERVIEW WIth ANDREW REYNOLDS ................................................................84 Mala Htun and Betsy Super Task Force on Electoral Rules and Democratic Governance iii AppENDIX B: INTERVIEW WIth PIppA NORRIS .............................................................................90 Betsy Super and Mala Htun AppENDIX C: CASE STUDIES: POLITICAL SCIENTISTS AS ELECTORAL ENGINEERS ................................................................................................................................................... 97 Compiled by Andrew Reynolds AppENDIX D: GLOSSARY OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS TERMINOLOGY ...................................105 AppENDIX E: APSA-WIDE SURVEY ................................................................................................... 113 AppENDIX F: INVITATION LEttER TO CONSUltANTS’ SURVEY ........................................... 117 NOTES ............................................................................................................................................................123 iv American Political Science Assocation List of Tables and Figures TABLES Table 4.1: Two Dimensions of Ballot Structure .................................................................................... 38 Table 7.1: Relationship between Representational Goals and Evaluation of Different Electoral Systems .................................................................................................... 65 FIGURES 2.1: Mechanical, Behavioral, and Contextual Effects ....................................................................... 16 2.2: Disproportionality ............................................................................................................................. 17 2.3: Number of Electoral Parties............................................................................................................. 18 2.4: Governance in Parlimentary Systems ............................................................................................ 23 2.5: Governance in Presidential Systems .............................................................................................. 24 2.6: Representation—Ideological Congruence of Voters and the Government ........................... 27 3.1: Electoral Systems and Descriptive Representation .................................................................... 32 3.2: Context, Electoral Systems, and the Election of Women .......................................................... 34 3.3: Electoral Systems and the Election of Ethnic Minorities ......................................................... 35 4.1: The Differential Effect of District Magnitude on the Intraparty Dimension .................... 41 7.1: Mean Value Assigned to Electoral System Goals ........................................................................ 63 7.2: Mean Rating Assigned to Electoral Systems................................................................................64 7.3: Year of Consulting Mission (or first year, if multiyear) ............................................................. 67 7.4: Consultant Prior Knowledge of Country ..................................................................................... 68 7.5: Time Spent in Country ..................................................................................................................... 68 7.6: Points of Contact ................................................................................................................................ 69 7.7: Content of Consultant’s Advice ...................................................................................................... 70 7.8: Consulting Agenda ............................................................................................................................. 70 7.9: Relative Weight Given by Local Actors to Various Potential Reform Priorities .................. 71 7.10: Reaction by Political Actors to Consultant’s Advice .................................................................. 72 7.11: How Much of Consultant’s Advice Implemented? ..................................................................... 72 Task Force on Electoral Rules and Democratic Governance v Acknowledgements Betsy Super, APSA task force liaison, was crucial to the success of this project. Pippa Norris, Bernard Grofman, David Farrell, and Jørgen Elklit offered constructive comments. Ulrike Theuerkauf helped with research assistance, and the Bridgewater State University Center for Legislative Studies provided support. The Committee on the Protection of Human Subjects of Dartmouth College reviewed and approved our survey of APSA members. We are grateful to Michael Brintnall, Jennifer Segal Diascro, Betsy Schroeder, and APSA for administering the survey, supporting our workshop, and publishing this report. vi American Political Science Assocation Executive Summary Electoral rules are one of the important forces that make democracy work. Small variations in them can influence the type of democracy that develops. Political science is essential to the study of why and how this happens: hundreds of political scientists develop and test theories about the consequences of electoral rules and regulations for party systems, representation, governance, and other aspects of democratic politics. In addition, political scientists have worked as electoral system engineers, educating and advising policy makers around the world by authoring reports, delivering presentations at global and regional meetings, traveling on consulting missions, and training democracy promotion officers. By sharing scientific knowledge about the consequences of electoral rules and global trends in electoral reform, political scientists make their work relevant to the world. The report shows how political scientists have contributed to the world of electoral systems as scientists and as engineers. Its separate essays and appendices take stock of their work. Its principal findings include the following. n A great deal of recent
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