Electoral Systems Used Around the World
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Strategic Behavior in Exhaustive Ballot Voting: What Can We Learn from the Fifa World Cup 2018 and 2022 Host Elections?
Daniel Karabekyan STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR IN EXHAUSTIVE BALLOT VOTING: WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM THE FIFA WORLD CUP 2018 AND 2022 HOST ELECTIONS? BASIC RESEARCH PROGRAM WORKING PAPERS SERIES: ECONOMICS WP BRP 130/EC/2016 This Working Paper is an output of a research project implemented at the National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE). Any opinions or claims contained in this Working Paper do not necessarily reflect the views of HSE SERIES: ECONOMICS Daniel Karabekyan2 STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR IN EXHAUSTIVE BALLOT VOTING: WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM THE FIFA WORLD CUP 2018 AND 2022 HOST ELECTIONS?*3 There are many allegations about whether FIFA world cup host countries were chosen honestly or not. We analyse the results of the FIFA Executive Committee voting and reconstruct the set of possible voting situations compatible with the results of each stage. In both elections, we identify strategic behaviour and then analyse the results for honest voting under all compatible voting situations. For the 2018 FIFA world cup election Russia is chosen for all profiles. For the 2022 elections the result depends on the preferences of the FIFA president Sepp Blatter who served as a tie-breaker. If Sepp Blatter prefers Qatar over South Korea and Japan, then Qatar would have been chosen for all profiles. Otherwise there are the possibility that South Korea or Japan would have been chosen as the 2022 host country. Another fact is that if we consider possible vote buying, then it is shown, that the bribery of at least 2 committee members would have been required to guarantee winning of Russia bid and at least 1 member for Qatar. -
Exhaustive Ballot By-Law
Exhaustive Ballot By-law AUSTRALIAN WEIGHTLIFTING FEDERATION LIMITED BY-LAW 4 EXHAUSTIVE BALLOT This By-law is made by the Australian Weightlifting Federation (AWF) Board under Clause 20 of the AWF Constitution. It is binding on AWF and all members of AWF. Approved by the AWF Board on 12th June, 2014 12 June 2014 Page 1 Exhaustive Ballot By-law 1. EXHAUSTIVE BALLOT BY-LAW This By-law sets out the procedure for voting at elections of Elected Directors. This By- law is made by Australian Weightlifting Federation (AWF) pursuant to clause 7.2.1.3 of the Australian Weightlifting Federation Constitution. 2. DEFINITIONS AND INTERPRETATION In this By-law, unless the context otherwise requires, the following terms and expressions shall have the following meanings: Board means the Board of AWF as constituted from time to time. Elected Director means a Director elected to the Board of the AWF in accordance with clause 13 of the AWF Constitution. Member means a member for the time being under clause 5 of the AWF Constitution. All other defined terms and expressions shall have the same meaning as in the AWF Constitution. In the event of any conflict, the definition in the AWF Constitution shall prevail. 2. ELECTION BY EXHAUSTIVE BALLOT 2.1 In accordance with clause 13.2.2.4 of the AWF Constitution, voting at elections of Elected Directors shall be conducted by exhaustive ballot. 2.2. Members shall be advised of nominees for election prior to the commencement of each round of the election process. 3. NOMINATION EQUALS VACANCIES OR NUMBER OF NOMINATIONS LESS THAN VACANCIES 3.1 If the number of nominations received for the Board is equal to the number of vacancies to be filled or if there are insufficient nominations received to fill all vacancies on the Board, then those nominated shall only be elected if they are elected by the Members by secret ballot (Clause 13.7.3 of the AWF Constitution). -
Theoretical Comparisons of Electoral Systems Roger B
European Economic Review 43 (1999) 671—697 Joseph Schumpeter Lecture Theoretical comparisons of electoral systems Roger B. Myerson Kellog Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208-2009, USA Abstract Elements of an economic theory of political institutions are introduced. A variety of electoral systems are reviewed. Cox’s threshold is shown to measure incentives for diversity and specialization of candidates’ positions, when the number of serious candi- dates is given. Duverger’s law and its generalizations are discussed, to predict the number of serious candidates. Duverger’s law is interpreted as a statement about electoral barriers to entry, and this idea is linked to the question of the effectiveness of democratic competition as a deterrent to political corruption. The impact of post-electoral bargain- ing on party structure in presidential and parliamentary systems is discussed. ( 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: D72 Keywords: Electoral systems; Constitution; Election game; Incentives 1. Invitation to political economics To honor Joseph Schumpeter, I should try to begin as he might, from a long view of the history of economic theory, observing that the scope of economics has changed. With an initial goal of explaining the production and allocation of material goods, economic theorists developed analytical tools to predict how changes in market structure may affect rational behavior of producers and consumers. As the principles of rational choice were first developed in this context of price-theoretic decision-making, it seemed sensible to separate the study of markets from the study of other great institutions of society, because 0014-2921/99/$ — see front matter ( 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. -
Electoral System Change in Europe Since 1945
Electoral reform in Europe since 1945 Article Supplemental Material online supplement Renwick, A. (2011) Electoral reform in Europe since 1945. West European Politics, 34 (3). pp. 456-477. ISSN 1743-9655 doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2011.555975 Available at http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/21318/ It is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from the work. See Guidance on citing . Published version at: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402382.2011.555975 To link to this article DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2011.555975 Publisher: Routledge All outputs in CentAUR are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, including copyright law. Copyright and IPR is retained by the creators or other copyright holders. Terms and conditions for use of this material are defined in the End User Agreement . www.reading.ac.uk/centaur CentAUR Central Archive at the University of Reading Reading’s research outputs online Electoral System Change in Europe since 1945 West European Politics 34:?, ??–?? Online Supplement: Details of Categorizations Used in and Sources Used For Tables This supplement provides additional details regarding the criteria for including and classifying cases of electoral system change and lists the principal sources used for each country. Contents Abbreviations 2 Criteria Used to Identify and Classify Cases 3 Sources Used to Identify and Classify Cases 16 1 Abbreviations MMM mixed-member majoritarian MMP mixed-member proportional PR proportional representation SMP single-member plurality STV single transferable vote 2 Criteria Used to Identify and Categorize Cases Countries Included The sample used for this article includes European countries since 1945. -
Sequential Elimination Vs. Instantaneous Voting∗
Sequential Elimination vs. Instantaneous Voting∗ Parimal Kanti Bag† Hamid Sabourian‡ Eyal Winter§ April 22, 2007 Abstract A class of sequential elimination voting eliminating candidates one-at-a- time based on repeated ballots is superior to well-known single-round and semi-sequential elimination voting rules: if voters are strategic the former will induce the Condorcet winner in unique equilibrium, whereas the latter may fail to select it. In addition, when there is no Condorcet winner the outcome of sequential elimination voting always belongs to the ‘top cycle’. The proposed sequential family includes an appropriate adaptation of almost all standard single-round voting procedures. The importance of one-by-one elimination and repeated ballots for Condorcet consistency are further em- phasized by its failure for voting rules such as plurality runoff rule, exhaus- tive ballot method, and a variant of instant runoff voting. JEL Classification Numbers: P16, D71, C72. Key Words: Sequential elimination voting, Con- dorcet winner, top cycle, weakest link voting, scoring rule, exhaustive ballot, instant runoff voting, Markov equilibrium, complexity aversion. ∗At various stages this work has been presented at the 2003 Econometric Society European Meetings, 2005 Wallis Political Economy Conference, 2005 Conference at the Indian Statistical Institute, 2006 Econometric Society Far Eastern Meetings, and seminars at Birmingham, Keele, LSE, NUS (Singapore), Oxford and York universities. We thank the conference and seminar participants for important feedbacks. For errors or omissions, we remain responsible. †Department of Economics, University of Surrey, Guildford, Surrey, GU2 7XH, U.K.; E-mail: [email protected] ‡Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, Sidgwick Avenue, Cambridge CB39 DD, U.K.; E-mail: [email protected] §Economics Department, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem 91905, Israel; E-mail: [email protected] 1 Introduction Any assessment of a voting rule is likely to be based on the extent it aggregates individual preferences. -
The Many Faces of Strategic Voting
Revised Pages The Many Faces of Strategic Voting Strategic voting is classically defined as voting for one’s second pre- ferred option to prevent one’s least preferred option from winning when one’s first preference has no chance. Voters want their votes to be effective, and casting a ballot that will have no influence on an election is undesirable. Thus, some voters cast strategic ballots when they decide that doing so is useful. This edited volume includes case studies of strategic voting behavior in Israel, Germany, Japan, Belgium, Spain, Switzerland, Canada, and the United Kingdom, providing a conceptual framework for understanding strategic voting behavior in all types of electoral systems. The classic definition explicitly considers strategic voting in a single race with at least three candidates and a single winner. This situation is more com- mon in electoral systems that have single- member districts that employ plurality or majoritarian electoral rules and have multiparty systems. Indeed, much of the literature on strategic voting to date has considered elections in Canada and the United Kingdom. This book contributes to a more general understanding of strategic voting behavior by tak- ing into account a wide variety of institutional contexts, such as single transferable vote rules, proportional representation, two- round elec- tions, and mixed electoral systems. Laura B. Stephenson is Professor of Political Science at the University of Western Ontario. John Aldrich is Pfizer- Pratt University Professor of Political Science at Duke University. André Blais is Professor of Political Science at the Université de Montréal. Revised Pages Revised Pages THE MANY FACES OF STRATEGIC VOTING Tactical Behavior in Electoral Systems Around the World Edited by Laura B. -
Electoral Rules and Democratic Electoral Rules, and Governance Democratic Governance Edited by Mala Htun and G
Report of the Political Science, Task Force on Electoral Rules and Democratic Electoral Rules, and Governance Democratic Governance Edited by Mala Htun and G. Bingham Powell, Jr. AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE AssOCIATION n TasK FORCE REPORT, SEPTEMBER 2013 Political Science, Electoral Rules, and Democratic Governance Report of the Task Force on Electoral Rules and Democratic Governance Edited by Mala Htun and G. Bingham Powell, Jr. SEPTEMBER 2013 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE AssOCIATION 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036-1206 Copyright © 2013 by the American Political Science Association. All rights reserved. ISBN: 978-1-878147-41-7 Task Force on Electoral Rules and Democratic Governance Task Force Members Mala Htun, University of New Mexico, Chair G. Bingham Powell, Jr., University of Rochester; President, APSA, 2011–12 John Carey, Dartmouth College Karen E. Ferree, University of California, San Diego Simon Hix, London School of Economics Mona Lena Krook, Rutgers University Robert G. Moser, University of Texas, Austin Shaheen Mozaffar, Bridgewater State University Andrew Rehfeld, Washington University in St. Louis Andrew Reynolds, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill Ethan Scheiner, University of California, Davis Melissa Schwartzberg, Columbia University Matthew S. Shugart, University of California, Davis ii American Political Science Assocation Table of Contents TASK FORCE MEMBERS ............................................................................................................................. ii LIST OF -
UCLA Electronic Theses and Dissertations
UCLA UCLA Electronic Theses and Dissertations Title The Party Politics of Political Decentralization Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6jw6f00k Author Wainfan, Kathryn Tanya Publication Date 2018 Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA Los Angeles The Party Politics of Political Decentralization A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science by Kathryn Tanya Wainfan 2018 c Copyright by Kathryn Tanya Wainfan 2018 ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION The Party Politics of Political Decentralization by Kathryn Tanya Wainfan Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science University of California, Los Angeles, 2018 Professor Michael F. Thies, Chair In this dissertation, I ask why certain types of parties would agree to support creating or empowering sub-national governments. In particular, I focus on nationalized parties { those that gain support from throughout a country. Political decentralization can negatively impact nationalized parties in at least two ways. First, it reduces the amount of power a party can enjoy should it win control of the national-level government. Second, previous studies show that political decentralization can increase party denationalization, meaning regional parties gain more support, even during national-level elections. I argue that nationalized parties may support decentralization when doing so reduces the ideological conflicts over national-level policy among voters whose support they seek. By altering political institutions, a party may be able to accommodate differing policy prefer- ences in different parts of the country, or limit the damage to the party's electoral fortunes such differences could create. -
LWV”) Has Been a Leader in the Fight for Fair and Transparent Elections and Good Governance
How Alaska Ballot Measure 2 advances the goals of the League of Women Voters Shea Siegert Yes on 2 Campaign Manager July 10, 2020 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Since its founding in 1920, the League of Women Voters (“LWV”) has been a leader in the fight for fair and transparent elections and good governance. As part of that effort, its chapters have taken positions on legislation and ballot initiatives across the country on a range of reforms. In June of 2020, LWV held a vote of concurrence on a position regarding “Voter Representation and Electoral Systems.” This action established eight criteria for assessing whether a proposed electoral reform should be endorsed by local LWV chapters. Those criteria are: Whether for single or multiple winner contests, the League supports electoral methods that: Encourage voter participation and voter engagement Encourage those with minority opinions to participate, including under-represented communities Are verifiable and auditable Promote access to voting Maximize effective votes/minimize wasted votes Promote sincere voting over strategic voting Implement alternatives to plurality voting Are compatible with acceptable ballot-casting methods, including vote-by-mail The 2020 vote of concurrence was taken by 1,400 delegates from LWV Chapters from across the country and was approved by 93% of delegates, far exceeding the two-thirds threshold required to establish a position of concurrence. This document seeks to demonstrate that Alaska Ballot Measure 2 is fully aligned with the eight criteria established in June. We reviewed 30 studies, statements and positions from LWV chapters along with supporting academic studies and research from organizations like Represent Women, Representation2020, Fairvote, and others. -
“No One Whose Opinion Has Weight, Will Contend That Some Clumsy
“No one whose opinion has weight, will contend that some clumsy machine of primitive times, which served its day and generation, is for ever to be regarded with superstitious reverence” Sir Sandford Fleming on the need to change Canada’s first-past-the-post voting system, taken from On The Rectification of Parliament address delivered to the Canadian Institute, Toronto, 1892 ABOUT THE AUTHOR Nick Loenen is a sessional lecturer at the University of British Columbia teaching British Columbia Governance and Politics, a former Richmond City Councillor (1983-87), and former Member of the British Columbia Legislature (1986-91). He has written extensively on voting system reform. His book Citizenship and Democracy, a case for proportional representation, was published by Dundurn Press, Toronto in 1997. In 1998 he founded Fair Voting BC, a multi-partisan citizens group which since its inception lobbied for a referendum on voting system reform and helped shape the Citizens Assembly process in BC. RECOMMENDATION Replace Ontario’s current voting system with the Single Transferable Vote (STV) to elect candidates by preferential ballot in multi-seat ridings The Single Transferable Vote is uniquely suited to meet Ontario’s geography, diverse and polarized political culture, and British form of government. The submission starts by listing Five Goals, which it is submitted accurately capture what most Ontario citizens expect from their voting system. The Single Transferable Vote is designed to best meet those five goals. The Single Transferable Vote is not full proportional representation, it is an in- between system. Most proportional representation systems decrease local representation and increase the power of political parties. -
Voting Systems - the Alternatives
Voting Systems - The Alternatives Research Paper 97/26 13 February 1997 This Research Paper looks at the background to the current debate on electoral reform, and other alternative voting systems. It summarises the main arguments for and against change to the current First Past the Post (FPTP) system, and examines the main alternatives. The Paper also provides a glossary of terms. It replaces Library Background Paper No 299, Voting Systems, 7.9.1992. Oonagh Gay Home Affairs Section House of Commons Library Summary There has been a long debate in the United Kingdom about the merits or otherwise of the current First Past the Post system (FPTP). Nineteenth century reformers favoured the Single Transferable Vote, and in 1917/18 and 1930/31 Bills incorporating the Alternative Vote passed the Commons. There was a revival of interest in electoral reform in the 1970s and 1980s and the Labour Party policy is to hold a referendum on voting systems, if elected.1 The arguments for and against reform can be grouped into a number of categories; fairness, the constituency link, 'outcome' arguments, representation of women and ethnic minorities. The different systems used in other parts of the world are discussed, in particular, the Alternative Vote, Second Ballot, Supplementary Vote, Additional Member System, List systems and Single Transferable Vote, but with the arguments for and against each system summarised. 1 on which see Research Paper no 97/10 Referendum: recent proposals, 24.1.97 Contents page I Introduction 5 A. History 7 B. The current debate 9 II Arguments 14 Introduction and Summary 14 III Voting methods 31 1. -
CSD Center for the Study of Democracy an Organized Research Unit University of California, Irvine
CSD Center for the Study of Democracy An Organized Research Unit University of California, Irvine www.democ.uci.edu Scholars of political institutions debate the level by which different institutions help or impair the realization of various democratic principles. 1 There are stormy debates, for example, over which electoral systems and government systems better serve the principles of democracy. 2 But in the case of candidate selection methods there is no such discourse, probably due to the relative underdevelopment of this field of research (Hazan and Rahat, 2006a). Nevertheless, candidate selection methods are important for democracy in the same sense that electoral systems are. Both institutions are links in the chain of the electoral connection that stands at the center of modern representative democracy (Narud et al., 2002). In order to be elected to parliament, one should first (in almost all cases) be selected as a candidate of a specific party. Candidate selection is the “process by which a political party decides which of the persons legally eligible to hold an elective office will be designated on the ballot and in election communications as its recommended and supported candidate or list of candidates” (Ranney, 1981: 75). Candidate selection takes place almost entirely within particular parties. There are very few countries where the legal system specifies criteria for candidate selection and even fewer in which the legal system suggests more than central guidelines (Muller and Sieberer, 2006: 441; Rahat, 2007). The aim of this article is quite ambitious – to open the debate on the question, “Which candidate selection method is more democratic?” It does this by suggesting guidelines for identifying the ramifications of central elements of candidate selection methods for various democratic dimensions – participation, competition, representation and responsiveness – and by analyzing their possible role in supplying checks and balances.