Contextual Determinants of Electoral System Choice

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Contextual Determinants of Electoral System Choice ÅA Lundell: Krister Why have countries in different parts of the world preferred different electoral systems? Does context matter when countries choose electoral systems? Specifically, which contextual factors Krister Lundell are decisive? In the present thesis, Krister Lundell explores these Contextual Determinants of Electoral System Choice of Electoral System Determinants Contextual questions from three theoretical perspectives: a rational, a cultural and historical, and an institutional perspective. Contextual Determinants of The results show that although some institutional choices may be influenced by other particular institutions, the overall Electoral System Choice constitutional framework does not determine the choice of electoral systems. The rational perspective also provides a rather A Macro-Comparative Study 1945–2003 weak explanatory model. However, party system transformation from authoritarian one-party rule to competitive politics often results in a replacement of majoritarian systems with proportional or mixed electoral systems. BALLOT Name X The impact of the cultural and historical setting is Name X BALLOT overwhelming. Electoral system choice is to a great extent a Name X Name X consequence of various processes of diffusion, particularly British Name X Name X colonialism and regional contacts. Specific temporal trends are also discernible – the popularity of mixed systems in recent times is a case in point. BALLOT Åbo Akademi University Press BALLOT ISBN 951-765-298-4 Party X Party X Party X Party X Party X Party X 2005 Krister Lundell Born 1972 in Hanko, Finland Master of Science 1998 Licentiate in Political Science 2000 Doctoral candidate at the National Graduate School for Political Science and International Relations (VAKAVA) since 2003 Cover: Tove Ahlbäck Åbo Akademi University Press Biskopsgatan 13, FIN-20500 ÅBO, Finland Tel. int. +358-2-215 3292 Fax int. +358-2-215 4490 E-mail: forlaget@abo.fi http://www.abo.fi/stiftelsen/forlag/ Distribution: Oy Tibo-Trading Ab P.O.Box 33, FIN-21601 PARGAS, Finland Tel. int. +358-2-454 9200 Fax int. +358-2-454 9220 E-mail: tibo@tibo.net http://www.tibo.net CONTEXTUAL DETERMINANTS OF ELECTORAL SYSTEM CHOICE Contextual Determinants of Electoral System Choice A Macro-Comparative Study 1945–2003 Krister Lundell ÅBO 2005 ÅBO AKADEMIS FÖRLAG – ÅBO AKADEMI UNIVERSITY PRESS CIP Cataloguing in Publication Lundell, Krister Contextual determinants of electoral system choice : a macro-comparative study 1945– 2003 / Krister Lundell. – Åbo : Åbo Akademi University Press, 2005. Diss.: Åbo Akademi University. ISBN 951-765-298-4 ISBN 951-765-298-4 ISBN 951-765-299-2 (digital) Åbo Akademi University Printing House Åbo 2005 FOREWORD “The long and winding road that leads to your door”, Paul McCartney sang on the last album that the Beatles released. He did not, of course, have research in mind, but this line might just as well describe the process of writing a doctoral thesis. The road is definitely long, it is filled with curves and sidetracks, and it marks the end of an era. Despite being a rather lonesome passage, it is nonetheless an interesting adventure with lots of challenges and plenty of joy. However, the journey would have been impossible to undertake without the help of many people. I have had the privilege of receiving continuous assistance from several scholars with expert knowledge. First of all, I would like to thank my supervisor throughout this project, Professor Dag Anckar, for providing valuable assistance and for being my chief source of inspiration and encouragement since the beginning of my career. I am deeply thankful to Professor Lauri Karvonen for contributing greatly to this work. Without his immense effort, the thesis would not have been written. I also want to express my gratitude to Professor Carsten Anckar for providing guidance during several phases of the project. I have benefited greatly from his advice, comments and insights. All other colleagues in political science and public administration deserve my gratitude as well. It has been a pleasure to work in such a stimulating and inspiring environment of research as Hus Lindman. The Finland-Swedish Research School has also been of appreciable help over the years. In addition, I would like to thank the pre-examiners of the thesis, Professor Mikko Mattila and Docent Yonhyok Choe. Their valuable and useful comments on the contents of the study facilitated a considerable improvement during the last phase of the project. In addition to intellectual stimulus, I have received financial support from several instances. The national graduate school VAKAVA has provided most of the financing, including a visit to the University of Essex and attendance at the NOPSA conference in Reykjavik. Part of the work has been financed by a research grant from the Research Centre at the Åbo Akademi University Foundation. Other sources of financing are the Department of Political Science at Åbo Akademi University, the Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences at Åbo Akademi University, the Waldemar von Frenckell Foundation, and SNS (Center for Business and Policy Studies) in Sweden. I am very thankful for all the financial support that I have received. There is more to life than research. I would like to thank all my friends for a great private life. I especially thank the best of my friends, Jan-Eric, for (among other things) giving me the opportunity to fulfil myself as a musician, thereby maintaining a meaningful counterbalance to research. In this connection, I also thank Jari and Mikko, the other members of Olympos Mons. I am very grateful to my parents who have always encouraged and supported me in every aspect of life. Last but not least, I would like to thank Kaisa for filling my life with pleasure outside the fascinating world of music and research. Hus Lindman, November 23, 2005 Krister Lundell CONTENTS: 1. INTRODUCTION 1 1.1 Purpose of the Study 1 1.2 The Importance of Electoral Systems 6 2. CLASSIFYING ELECTORAL SYSTEMS 11 2.1 Elements of Electoral Systems 13 2.1.1 Ballot Structure 14 2.1.2 District Magnitude 14 2.1.3 Electoral Formula 15 2.1.4 Additional Elements of Electoral Systems 16 2.2 Electoral Formulas – A Presentation 19 2.2.1 Plurality Systems 20 2.2.1.1 Single-Member Plurality 20 2.2.1.2 Block Vote 21 2.2.1.3 Single-Member Plurality – Block Vote 22 2.2.1.4 Limited Vote and Single Non-Transferable Vote 22 2.2.1.5 Cumulative Vote 23 2.2.2 Majority Systems 24 2.2.2.1 One-Ballot Majority 24 2.2.2.2 Two-Ballot Majority 25 2.2.2.3 Alternative Vote 26 2.2.3 Proportional Systems 28 2.2.3.1 List PR 28 2.2.3.2 Single Transferable Vote 31 2.2.4 Mixed Electoral Systems 32 2.3 Earlier Classifications of Electoral Systems 39 2.4 A Typology of Electoral Systems 43 2.5 An Initial Survey of Electoral System Choice 46 3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 55 3.1 Choosing an Electoral System 56 3.1.1 Trade-Off Between Competing Values 56 3.1.2 Is There a Best System? 58 3.1.3 Reforming the Electoral System 59 i 3.2 Explanations of Electoral System Choice 62 3.2.1 Earlier Empirical Findings 62 3.2.2 A Frame of Reference 68 3.2.3 The Rational Perspective 70 3.2.3.1 Structurally Generated Problems 74 3.2.3.1.1 Electoral System Design in Plural Societies 76 3.2.3.1.2 Country Size 86 3.2.3.2 Actor-Related Problems 88 3.2.3.2.1 The Influence of Party System Structure 92 3.2.3.2.2 The Dynamic of the Democratization Process 96 3.2.4 Culture and History: Patterns of Diffusion 98 3.2.4.1 Colonial Legacy 103 3.2.4.2 Regional Influence 107 3.2.4.3 Epoch Phenomenon 110 3.2.5 The Institutional Perspective 111 3.3 Independent Variables 116 3.3.1 The Rational Perspective 116 3.3.1.1 Ethnic and Cultural Diversity 116 3.3.1.2 Population Size 120 3.3.1.3 Party System Structure 121 3.3.1.4 Party System Transformation 125 3.3.2 Culture and History: Patterns of Diffusion 127 3.3.2.1 Colonial Diffusion 127 3.3.2.2 Regional Diffusion 129 3.3.2.3 Temporal Diffusion 132 3.3.3 The Institutional Perspective 134 3.3.3.1 Form of Government 134 3.3.3.2 Territorial Organization 137 3.3.3.3 Chamber Structure 139 4. RESEARCH DESIGN 142 4.1 Method and Material 142 4.2 Population 146 5. THE RATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 154 5.1 Ethnic and Cultural Diversity 154 5.1.1 Ethnic and Cultural Diversity – All Countries 154 5.1.2 Ethnic and Cultural Diversity – Democratic Countries 156 5.2 Population Size 158 5.2.1 Population Size – All Countries 158 5.2.2 Population Size – Democratic Countries 161 ii 5.3 Party System Structure 163 5.3.1 Party System Structure – Democracies and Non-democracies 163 5.3.2 Party System Structure – Democracies 166 5.4 Party System Transformation 169 5.5 The Rational Perspective: Summary 172 6. CULTURE AND HISTORY: PATTERNS OF DIFFUSION 174 6.1 Colonial Diffusion 174 6.1.1 Colonial Diffusion – All Countries 174 6.1.2 Colonial Diffusion – Democratic Countries 177 6.2 Regional Diffusion 179 6.3 Temporal Diffusion 181 6.3.1 Temporal Diffusion – All Countries 181 6.3.2 Temporal Diffusion – Democratic Countries 184 6.3.3 Temporal Diffusion – On the Correlates 186 6.3.3.1 All Countries 187 6.3.3.2 Democratic Countries 193 6.4 Patterns of Diffusion: Summary 197 7. THE INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 200 7.1 Form of Government 200 7.2 Territorial Organization 201 7.3 Chamber Structure 202 7.4 The Institutional Perspective: Summary 204 8.
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