The Nagorno Karabakh Tension

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THE NAGORNO - KARABAKH TENSION

by Ilgar VELIZADE Head of Political Scientists Club “South Caucasus”

VIENNA 2020

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION ...... 3

II. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE CONFLICT DEVELOPMENT ...... 5

III. SITUATION PRIOR TO MILITARY ACTIONS IN SEPTEMBER 2020 ...... 10

IV. CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE AND MILITARY TENSION ...... 15

V. CONCLUSION ...... 18

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Ilgar Velizade, Azerbaijani political scientist. His professional interests include the study of political and economic processes in the Caucasus region, the Caspian Sea and Central and

Western Asia. In 2009 he founded the "South Caucasus" club of political scientists based in

Baku. In 2009-2014, he was an expert of a number of international organizations involved in peacekeeping activities, members of EPNK (European Partnership for Nagorno

Karabakh). He is the author of a number of books on conflict management, regional geopolitics, and economics and also hundreds of articles in various scientific and popular science journals in Europe and Asia.

I. INTRODUCTION

Such a severe aggravation of the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh has not been observed since

1994 the time when the conflicting parties reached an agreement on a ceasefire. The main reasons of the tension were the continuing provocations of the Armenian troops against

Azerbaijan for a long time and the lack of progress in the negotiation process, which have been going on for a quarter of a century.

Unfortunately, the negotiations, which lasted more than two decades, only contributed to the preservation of the status quo that had developed by the mid-1990s. At the same time, the real situation in and around the conflict zone was changing rapidly. The economy of

Azerbaijan, largely due to the implementation of large-scale energy and transport projects, was developing in a short time, while the economy of Armenia significantly lagged behind it in terms of volume and level of income. This gives an opportunity to Baku for significantly strengthening its military budget and raising the level of combat readiness of the

Azerbaijani army. Against this background, the Armenian side continued to ignore the demands contained in four resolutions of the UN General Assembly, which demanded that the Armenian armed forces unconditionally liberate the occupied Azerbaijani territories and created conditions for the implementation of the peace process.1 In contrast to the negotiation process, where no progress was observed, in the military-political plane, the situation became tenser every year. The first serious aggravation occurred in April 2016, when the Azerbaijani army, responded to another provocation by the Armenian side,

1 Resolutions adopted by the Security Council in 1993: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-adopted-security-council-1993

launched a counteroffensive on the front line and recaptured 2,000 hectares of its own territories.

The negotiation process resumed after that, primarily because of the unwillingness of the

Armenian side to change the current state of affairs, again did not give any results. In contrast, in the military plane, the parties were preparing for war. The Armenian side, in view of the complicated internal political situation, carried out frequent provocations on the border and on the front line.

By September 27, 2020, the situation in the military-political plane has reached its peak. On the morning of September 27, in response to another shelling of Azerbaijani positions by the Armenian armed forces, the Azerbaijani side took large-scale actions along the entire front line in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone, thereby resuming full-scale military operations, pursuing the goal of militarily liberating the remaining Azerbaijani territories which were under occupation over 26 years. The negotiation process was completely suspended (disrupted).

In the context of the offensive operations of the Azerbaijani troops and the reconquest of the territories seized from Armenia more than 26 years ago, negotiations with Yerevan on the return of the occupied territories lost their practical meaning.

II. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE CONFLICT DEVELOPMENT

The origins of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh date back to 1987. During this period, the

Armenian ethnocrats began to most actively raise the issue of the annexation Nagorno-

Karabakh to Armenia. The activities of the Armenian ethnocrats have been supported by

A.Aganbekyan, the academician and Soviet leader M. Gorbachev’s adviser in his scandalous interview given to L’Humanite newspaper in November 1987. Aganbegyan openly said in that interview that he would like to see the return of Karabakh to Armenia.2

2 Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War. New York University Press. 2003. ISBN 0814719449. С 39.

Following this, began the processes of mass expulsion and beating of more than 200 thousand Azerbaijanis, who had lived on the lands for centuries that are now part of

Armenia. It was accompanied by a large-scale process of changing the names of settlements from their historically established Azerbaijani names to newly introduced Armenian names. This was the stage of "ethnic cleansing" within Armenia itself.

On February 20, 1988, the Soviet of People's Deputies of the NKAO – regarded as the stronghold of ethnocrats and criminals has voted for its attachment to Armenia. The special public structure called “The Committee for Reunification of NKAO with the Armenian

Soviet Socialist Republic” created on March 2 and registered on March 5 under the name of

‘Groong’. The irredentist nature of the conflict has been reflected in the establishment of the

“Karabakh Committee” in Yerevan later on.

On February 21, 1988, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union takes the decision on ‘The Events in Nagorno Karabakh’, which qualifies the decree of the

Oblast’s Soviet as the action ‘provoked by the nationalistic elements’. Moscow is adopting another decree “On Measures to speed up the Social and Economic Development of the

Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast of the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic in 1988

-1995” on March 24, 1988.

On February 27-29, events which became known as “Armenian pogroms” took place in the city of Sumgait. Subsequent investigations established that it was a pre-planned provocation, and one of the organizers of the pogroms was Eduard Grigoryan which was brought to the investigation and convicted. The goal for those who were behind the organization of these events was to inflame the conflict between the two people, to make the latter processes irreversible.

On June 14, 1988, the Supreme Soviet of Armenia gives its consent to include NKAO in the

Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic. Immediately, the Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan takes the opposite decision on June 17, 1988: NKAO remains within the Republic. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of USSR adopts the logical decision on the impossibility of changing the national and territorial compositions of the Azerbaijani SSR and the Armenian SSR on

July 18, 1988, taking into account the destructive character of any other step. In this case, the Supreme Soviet of USSR is guided by (the Article 78) of the Soviet Constitution which stipulates that the territory of the Union’s Republic cannot be changed without its own consent.

When the Soviet Union started to weaken, Armenians in Nagorno Karabakh demanded to create an independent state within the border of Nagorno Karabakh Autonomy Oblast and former Shaumyan region of Azerbaijan. On September 2, 1991, The Nagorno Karabakh

Republic (NKR) has been declared. The Azerbaijani population of the region did not take part in the so-called "referendum" on the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh acquired the character of interstate conflict.

One of the most inhuman acts against the Azerbaijani people was the genocide of the city of

Khojaly, captured by Armenian troops in February 1992. As a result of the barbaric act of vandalism, a startling 613 people were killed, 487 people were crippled, and 1275 old men, children and women were captured and subjected to torture and humiliation. The victims of Khojaly are vivid evidence of the policy of genocide and ethnic cleansing carried out by the Republic of Armenia against the Azerbaijani people.

Following the Khojaly events in May 1992, the Armenian occupation forces captured the last city inhabited by Azerbaijanis in Nagorno-Karabakh – Shusha. The "ethnic cleansing" of

Nagorno-Karabakh from the Azerbaijani population, which began in 1989, was fully completed by the Armenian separatists.

After the capture of the city of Shusha and the Shusha region, the Armenian armed forces from two directions - the territory of the Republic of Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan - occupied the Lachin region of the Republic of Azerbaijan. The undeclared war received a new quality, which is qualified by international normative acts as direct aggression.

In the summer of 1992, the CSCE intensified its efforts and began a negotiation process, which although did not lead to concrete results but made it possible to somewhat stabilize the situation. However, the weight of the efforts ended with another provocation of the

Armenian aggressor. In April 1993 the seizure of the Kalbajar region of Azerbaijan was besieged from two directions from the Agdere region and directly from the territory of

Armenia.

After the seizure of the Kalbajar region, the Armenian military, against the background of the hypocritical statements of the Armenian leadership about their commitment to a peaceful settlement of the conflict, occupied the Aghdam region of Azerbaijan.

In October-November 1993, the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia occupied the

Fizuli, Jebrail and Zangelan regions of the republic. The military forces of the neighbour country reached the state border of Azerbaijan and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Azerbaijanis were expelled from all territories occupied by the Armenian aggressor. Vast territories that

makeup 1/5 of the republic have been turned into a "dead zone" controlled by the military forces of Armenia.

On May 5, 1994, has been signed a ceasefire Bishkek Protocol. In the result of the Armenian aggression, the following seven regions have fallen under the occupation – Kelbajar, Lachin,

Kubatly, Zanghilan, Agdam and Fizuli. Almost one million people have become refugees and internally displaced.

III. SITUATION PRIOR TO MILITARY ACTIONS IN

SEPTEMBER 2020

One of the central themes that continued during the last years of the negotiations was the transfer of the regions "adjacent" to the Nagorno-Karabakh region under the control of

Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijani side, using the approaches adopted in international practice, insists on the transfer of the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh itself under the control of

Azerbaijan. At the same time, the Armenian side considers them as "liberated" territories, which reflect the differences in definitions as of differences in approaches to the settlement in general. According to the logic of the Armenian side, the transfer of the “liberated territories” is possible only for a certain “payment” in the form of the independence of

Nagorno-Karabakh.

It is noteworthy that even for the co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, the question of how to identify those who surround the former territory of Nagorno-Karabakh is clearly not worth it. For example, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said at a press conference in Moscow in 2017: “The draft documents on the agenda to be a very important step in implementing the [United Nations] Security Council resolutions. This discomforts Armenia as Azerbaijan consistently refers to those resolutions, which call for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Armenian forces from the occupied districts.".3

Later in 2018, US Ambassador to Armenia R. Mills expressed bewilderment to Armenian media about the attitude of the Armenian side to the issue of returning the occupied territories to Azerbaijan. “When I first came here (to Armenia – I.V.), I was surprised that

3 https://tass.ru/politika/3946589

most of the Armenians I met with were categorically against the return of the occupied territories within the framework of the negotiation process. I am surprised that there are practically no discussions in Armenia about acceptable solutions or possible compromises.

For many years my government believed that these territories were taken for further use in the "territories for peace" formula. I was very surprised to learn that this option has no support”, said Richard Mills.4

At the same time, it is very important to refer to the basic international legal documents with the approaches and principles they contain, which define the framework of the negotiation process and play a decisive role in shaping its agenda.

These approaches formed the basis of the negotiation process after 2016. At the meetings held in 2016 in Vienna and St. Petersburg, the parties discussed specific topics. Apparently, the parties even reached preliminary agreements.

In early 2020, Armenian Prime Minister N. Pashinyan himself shed light on the discussions between Azerbaijan and Armenia during this period, pointing out specific issues that were on the agenda of the negotiation process. Speaking on January 25 this year at a press conference in the city of Kapan, he said that a document that he received from the Sargsyan government is on the negotiating table on the Karabakh settlement.

As he said, according to the document, the text which was leaked to the press, the ultimate goal of a comprehensive settlement of the Karabakh conflict is the transfer of seven regions

4 https://ru.armeniasputnik.am/columnists/20181016/15130558/amerikanskij-posol-mills-udivlyaetsya- chto-by-znachil-karabahskij-messedzh.html

to Azerbaijan - Aghdam, Fizuli, Jebrail, Zangelan, Kubatly, Kelbajar and Lachin, subject to the preservation of the corridor between Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh region.5

The versions that after the aggravation of the situation in the conflict zone in April 2016, the parties were negotiating on specific topics and even came to a certain agreement, were confirmed by the Armenian side at the highest level.6

Azerbaijan was offered to unblock the communication routes leading to Armenia, agree to the intermediate status of two regions outside the territory of the former Nagorno-Karabakh

Autonomous Region (Kelbajar and Lachin), and agree on the date of the referendum in the

Nagorno-Karabakh region. Nagorno-Karabakh, determining its future fate. At the same time, at the stage of the liberation of five regions in the conflict zone, peacekeeping operations should be deployed, the status of which should be previously agreed.

Pashinyan's statements may indicate that the Armenian side at times was close to agreeing on a phased settlement plan, which Azerbaijan has always insisted on and to which the OSCE

Minsk Group co-chairs treated with understanding. But, unfortunately, in the end, she could not overcome her own fears associated with the implementation of phased actions in the framework of de-escalation of the conflict and returned to the idea of simultaneous implementation of the entire plan as a whole (the so-called package agreement).

For Azerbaijan, such conditions are unacceptable, since they imply the granting independence to Nagorno-Karabakh simultaneously with the transfer of the occupied regions around the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region (NKAO) to the

5 https://www.aysor.am/ru/news/2020/01/25/%D0%9F%D0%B0%D1%88%D0%B8%D0%BD%D1%8F% D0%BD-%D0%A1%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%B3%D1%81%D1%8F%D0%BD/1652221 6 https://www.rbc.ru/politics/18/09/2017/59bfd9609a7947f8cd94dd3e

Azerbaijani side, with an uncertain future for these Azerbaijanis, who were forced to leave the regions located between Armenia and the territory of the former NKAO.

The return of five districts in such conditions is associated with the actual consent to the loss of sovereignty over the rest of the currently occupied territory, including the Lachin and

Kelbajar districts, for which determined a special status according to the package plan.

In turn, the Azerbaijani side, agreeing to a phased settlement plan, proposes a sequential transfer of all the occupied regions under the control of Azerbaijan according to the five-plus two formula (Aghdam, Fizuli, Jebrail, Zangelan and Kubatly regions at the first stage. And

Lachin and Kelbajar regions in the subsequent ( presumably in a few years) de-occupation of all occupied territories, including Nagorno-Karabakh, return of all refugees and displaced people, including the creation of conditions guaranteeing security for both the Armenian and Azerbaijani population. At the stage of ensuring security guarantees, the OSCE peacekeeping force may be brought into the region. The process of unblocking all communication lines will be carried out, granting Nagorno-Karabakh a special (temporary) status within the framework of the Republic of Azerbaijan until the final agreement of the political and legal status of the region by the free expression of the will of all citizens who lives on this territory. At the same time, the conditions and date of the plebiscite should be determined through a special political act agreed upon by both the Armenian and

Azerbaijani communities of Nagorno-Karabakh in the context of their coexistence in a temporary status. Defending its vision of the referendum, the Azerbaijani side proceeds from the fact that this referendum cannot question the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, but

determines the nature of the status of the region and the peculiarities of interaction between the two communities on an equal basis.7

7 https://az.sputniknews.ru/karabakh/20070605/41777005.html

IV. CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE AND MILITARY TENSION

It is more than obvious that for Yerevan any progress in the negotiations may mean a loss of control over the occupied territories without clear signs of a solution to the Nagorno-

Karabakh problem in the interests of the Armenian side.

In July of this year, after the aggravation of the situation on the Azerbaijani-Armenian border in the Tovuz region, Russian Foreign Minister S. Lavrov actually accused Yerevan of provoking tensions, stating that the trigger was also a geographic factor: the decision to revive the old border checkpoint by the Armenian side, located 15 km from the Azerbaijani export pipelines, caused heightened concern among some, an unjustified reaction from others and, as a result, launched a flywheel of confrontation with the most unpredictable consequences. "

During the visit of the head of the Azerbaijani parliament S. Gafarova to Moscow on

September 23, the protocol of the parliament said that at a bilateral meeting with the speaker of Azerbaijan, the Russian minister said that, according to Moscow, 5 occupied regions should be transferred to the Azerbaijani side and communications leading to

Armenia should be unblocked. Subsequently, at the insistence of the Russian side, this information was deleted. However, it can be assumed that such a statement was made. In order not to provoke a negative reaction from Yerevan, which the latter could use to strengthen anti-Russian sentiments, the Russian side insisted on withdrawing the information. The Russian side was actively preparing a platform for negotiations and the next meeting of the foreign ministers of the conflicting parties. However, the practical steps

of the Armenian side showed that Armenia is not aiming at achieving real results and intends to drag out again.

These days, the press reported that N. Pashinyan, after coming to authority, was interested in reaching an agreement with Azerbaijan and suggested for President I. Aliyev to organize bilateral negotiations. The Azerbaijani side hoped that the new leadership of Armenia, not related to the "Karabakh clan" and not participating in the seizure of Azerbaijani lands, would take a different position from the previous leaders of Armenia. However, this did not happen. N. Pashinyan used the time and the negotiation process to strengthen his positions, as well as to strengthen his own political influence in Nagorno-Karabakh, bringing loyal people to the head of the local regime.

Over the past weeks and months, officially Baku has made it clear to the Armenian leadership that it has lost confidence both in it and in the negotiation process as a whole.

The turning point in Baku's position occurred after N. Pashinyan in September 2019 uttered the phrase "Karabakh is Armenia, period" in Nagorno-Karabakh. Subsequently, the challenge for Azerbaijan was the inauguration ceremony of the so-called president of the separatist regime in the city of Shusha, which is the political and cultural centre of the

Azerbaijani population in the region.

By September 27, the situation in the military-political plane has reached its peak. On the morning of September 27, in response to the next shelling of Azerbaijani positions by the armed forces of Armenia, the Azerbaijani side took large-scale actions along the entire front line in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone, thereby resuming full-scale hostilities pursuing the goal of military liberation of the occupied territories of Azerbaijan for more than 26 years.

The negotiation process was completely suspended. In the context of the offensive actions of Azerbaijani troops and the reconquest of territories seized by Armenia more than 26 years ago, negotiations with Yerevan on the return of the occupied territories are losing their practical significance. It also makes no sense to negotiate with the government of N.

Pashinyan, who showed that he is an unreliable negotiator, is not responsible for his words and actions.

Pashinyan also actually "framed" the OSCE Minsk Group, which hoped that with the implementation of the peace scenario, war could be avoided. The leadership of Armenia made it clear that it does not accept any plans that provide for the return of its lands to

Azerbaijan. The only thing that Yerevan is counting on in the negotiation process is the partial return of the occupied territories (without the Lachin and, possibly, the Kelbajar region), provided that Azerbaijan recognizes the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh. For

Azerbaijan, this scenario is categorically unacceptable.

V. CONCLUSION

At the present time, the Azerbaijani side is concentrating its efforts on liberating the lands around Nagorno-Karabakh and Nagorno-Karabakh itself.

Military actions create a new military-political situation in the region, influencing the design of the entire negotiation process. The negotiation process will be different. At the same time, it can be predicted that as the military situation develops, Azerbaijan will tighten its demands on Armenia. Yerevan in the conditions of constantly growing material and image costs will be forced to make concessions.

This scenario is fraught with aggravation of the internal political situation in Armenia with the prospect of a change of power. Moscow will not support Pashinyan and his team amid new internal political unrest in Armenia. Most likely, Baku will have to deal with the new political leadership of Armenia, which will conclude an agreement defining a new framework for normalization.