December 2016

EXPERT COMMENT Issue #1

What Does the Russian-Armenian Joint Military Force Mean for Security in the South ?

Russian President signed a decree on Nov. 14, 2016 approving the creation of a joint Russian-Armenian military force. The degree allows for creation of a joint military unit made up of Russian and Armenian forces. It contains the following provisions:

• The joint military unit will patrol ’s land borders with , , , and . • There is a mutual defense clause, so an attack on Armenia will be treated as an attack on , and vice versa. The joint military force will be commanded in peacetime by Armenia’s General Staff and in wartime by Russia’s Southern Military District Command. • Armenia will be able to purchase Russian military equipment at domestic prices. • The agreement doesn’t provide any protections to Nagorno-Karabakh.

The new defense policy has implications for the entire South Caucasus. That includes Georgia, which maintains positive ties with Armenia despite having no formal diplomatic relations with Russia. At the request of the Georgian Institute of Politics, a selection of experts from Armenia, Italy, Georgia, and the United Kingdom commented on the joint military force and its implications for security in the South Caucasus.

RICHARD GIRAGOSIAN, Director of the The first factor driving these concerns came in Regional Studies Center, an independent think April, when a large-scale Azerbaijani military tank in . offensive against Armenia succeeded in seizing territory in the first military victory Since the 2008 war with Russia, Georgia has for Azerbaijan since a ceasefire agreement monitored the Armenian-Russian security was first reached in 1994. The broader relationship with careful concern. Armenia ramifications of that military offensive are has, for its part, consistently reassured significant for Georgia, despite its neutral that its security partnership with Russia status in the conflict. More specifically, the would not threaten Georgia’s security. Two April fighting not only confirmed that the recent developments have cast doubts on the “frozen” conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh value of those assurances. had entered a new, more serious combat

WWW.GIP.GE phase, but also that it posed new risks for the volatile region and is yet another delicate state of security and stability in the demonstration that Russia is determined to region, with Georgia caught in the middle. reassert its influence, both within its “zone of privileged interest’ and on the world stage,” The second development impacting security and to protect its allies. The proposal reflects in Georgia and the wider region came in mid- Russia’s agreements with Georgia’s separatist November, when Russia announced plans to territories South Ossetia and Abkhazia: in the form a joint Armenian-Russian military latter a Joint Group of Forces comprising command unit. After years of steadily Abkhaz and Russian forces has been mortgaging Armenia’s independence in established, while the 2015 on Alliance exchange for security guarantees from Russia, and Integration between Russia and South this move posed a new challenge to Armenian Ossetia envisaged the incorporation of South and statehood. Ossetia’s armed forces, security agencies and customs authorities into those of Russia, Although the joint military unit could in itself referring to the formation of a ‘single space be viewed as benign--and appears to be a for defence and security.’ logical component of both the Armenian- Russian security relationship and Armenia’s One of the most significant provisions to be membership in the Russian-led Collective found in both the Russian-Armenian joint Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)--it force proposal and the treaty with South poses a deeper danger. Ossetia is a clause stating that any aggression or armed attack against one party will be Russia’s plans for the joint military unit could considered an attack against both, reflecting lead to a potentially disastrous outcome, the charter of the Russian-led Collective allowing it to leverage its new role both to Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), which threaten Georgia and pressure Armenia. Such considers an attack on one member-state to be a scenario would involve attempts by an attack on all and guarantees mutual Moscow to use this new command structure military assistance if a member is attacked. to interfere or intervene in Armenia’s defense Russia is Armenia’s staunchest ally and reform and self-sufficiency and/or eventually Yerevan has sought a close relationship with use it as a vehicle for deploying peacekeepers Moscow to counterbalance what it perceives in Nagorno-Karabakh, which would have to be its vulnerable position between two devastating effects on the security of both hostile countries: Turkey and Azerbaijan. Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. Moscow is determined to retain its influence in the South Caucasus and by maintaining weak states in its neighborhood that are dependent on it for political, economic and military support, Russia seeks to keep them DR. TRACEY GERMAN, King’s College, within its geopolitical orbit and London counterbalance the growing presence of Western actors. This latest development President Vladimir Putin’s approval of the should act as a stark reminder of the need for proposal to establish a joint Russian- greater international attention paid to the Armenian military force is a further step region and the imperative of negotiated towards the consolidation of Russian power settlements to its unresolved conflicts. across the Caucasus. The move is likely to trigger a shift in the balance of power in the

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NONA MIKHELIDZE, Senior Fellow at the lead to extensive military mobilization in the Istituto Affari Internazionali in Italy South Caucasus and eventually to escalation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Russia and Armenia have continually strengthened relations since Yerevan joined the Moscow-led Eurasian Customs Union in 2013. In October, 2016, Russian President DR. RICK FAWN, Professor of International Vladimir Putin submitted to the State Duma a Relations, University of St. Andrews. Russian-Armenian agreement on creation of the Caucasus Unified Air Defense System. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s 14 More recently, Russia and Armenia further November statement on creating a joint upgraded their security relationship by Russian-Armenian military force raises five establishing a combined Russian-Armenian primary points. First, despite renewed army group. reference in the US presidential election campaigns and in NATO actions in eastern This decision poses challenges for Georgia Europe to Russia’s current actions in and for security in the South Caucasus in and its invasion of Georgia in 2008, the move general. There are several reasons for regional received scant attention in the West. actors to be concerned: First, according to the agreement, Russia will patrol Armenia’s Second, the measure is hardly a surprise; borders with Turkey, Iran, Georgia, and rather, it’s consistent with past policy. Azerbaijan. In case of an attack on Armenia, Armenia has been the most enthusiastic the entire army of Russia’s Southern Military member of the otherwise atrophied 6- District will support its territorial defense. member CSTO--it has two extra-regional observers and has lost three signatories. Second, in peacetime, the joint force will be Armenia hosts the organization’s only commanded by Armenia’s General Staff. information office outside Russia. It enjoys However, during wartime, Armenian forces deep, existing military cooperation with will be subordinated to the Command of Moscow, most notably having subsumed its Russia's Southern Military District, in what air defences under those of Russia. A joint appears to be Armenia's total capitulation to anti-aircraft defense system was introduced Russia on military affairs. Third, this earlier in 2016. These actions have predictably agreement puts an end to Russia’s claim to be affected the tinderbox of Armenia’s long- impartial in the Nagorno-Karabakh standing conflict with Azerbaijan over process within the framework of the OSCE Nagorno-Karabakh. The CSTO itself is an Minsk Group. On the other hand, the Kremlin organization of questionable motives and claims that under the agreement Russian abilities. It is primarily a Russian initiative. troops cannot be used in conflict zones and This latest move is an attempt to make Russia Nagorno-Karabakh will be defended by (first) and the CSTO in general (second) more Armenian armed forces only. relevant in the former Soviet space.

In any case, the decision to establish a joint Third, though not a qualitative shift from Armenian-Russian military group could existing practice, the new Russian-Armenian motivate a counterreaction from Azerbaijan. military cooperation is ominous for Baku could abandon its balanced foreign Azerbaijan. It makes more clear what was policy and seek to upgrade military relations already known: that Russia supports with Ankara. All these developments would Armenia in its conflict against Azerbaijan.

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That speaks further about the questionable Fifth, and last: the implications for Georgia. nature of Russian intentions. It has long been Georgia cannot affect the pact and is not wondered how Russia can arm both Armenia directly affected by it. Counterintuitively, the and Azerbaijan and still present itself as a Russian-Armenian military initiative is neutral mediator. potentially beneficial to Georgia – it increases the need for a neutral mediary between Fourth, the measure poses a danger to Armenia and Azerbaijan. Georgia can also regional stability and is intended to confirm demonstrate to the region and to the Russia’s wider interest: military posturing, lamentably few around the world who follow including toward NATO and its allies in the the region, that it can act constructively as a post-Soviet space. The message will still be platform for dialogue and understanding. limited; as among CSTO members Armenia is Those attributes will grow even more the most logical country to accept such a important given recent developments in the measure. And spillover to Georgia South Caucasus. particularly remains unlikely. After all, Russia already exerts enough threat capacity there through its post-2008 expanded military presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

GEORGIAN INSTITUTE OF POLITICS (GIP)

Tbilisi-based non-profit, non-partisan, research and analysis organization. GIP works to strengthen the organizational backbone of democratic institutions and promote good governance and development through policy research and advocacy in Georgia.

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