DOCSLIB.ORG

History of the Peloponnesian War Books Vii and Viii

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
History of the Peloponnesian War Books Vii and Viii THE LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY FOUNDED BY" JAMES LOEB, LL.D. EDITED BY fT. E. PAGE, C.H., LiTT.D. tE. CAPPS, PH.D., LL.D. tW. H. D. ROUSE, litt.d. L. A. POST, M.A. E. H. WARMINGTON, m.a., f.r.hist.soc. THUCYDIDES IV ALCIBIADES MUSeO CHIARAMONTI ROME THUCYDIDES WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY CHARLES FORSTER SMITH OF THB UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN IN FOUR VOLUMES IV HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR BOOKS VII AND VIII CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS LONDON WILLIAM HEINEMANN LTD MCMLVIU First printed 1923 Reprinted 1935, 1953, 1958 ->^ iLigRARv); Printed in Great Britain CONTENTS PAOE Frontispiece: Alcibiades .... Facing Title BOOK VII 1 BOOK VIII 133 INDEX 395 MAPS : Retreat of the Athenians : At end Siege of Sjracuse „ Aegean Sea „ Peiraeus „ Battle of Cynossema , THUCYDIDES BOOK VII . 7709 teal € - , eVel ? <;, €<? •^]. •€- /^ ecaiv, ' en re ? ? €> eaeXOeiv, etV ev he^ia , , etV iv e? / € - , &9 , yP]V . 2 eSo^ev evl ', € '^'^/, , . , - '' /^; , .^ 3 ,8 - THUCYDIDES BOOK VII I. Gylippus and Pythen, after refitting their ships, sailed from Tarentuin along the coast to Epizephy- rian Locri ; and receiving more positive informa- tion that Syracuse Avas not yet completely invested, but that it was still possible to come with an army and enter it by way of Epipolae, they deliberated whether they should risk sailing into the harbour, keeping Sicily on the right, or, keeping it on the left, should first sail to Himera and then, after having added to their forces the Himeraeans themselves and such others as they might persuade, should proceed overland. They decided to sail to Himera, especially since the four Athenian ships —which Nicias did after all ^ despatch when he learned that the enemy's shij)s were at Locri — had not yet arrived at Rhegium. They succeeded in crossing the strait before the arrival of this watch-squadron, and after touching at Rhegium and Messene, arrived at Himera. While there they persuaded the Hime- raeans to help them in the war, not only by going on the expedition themselves, but also by furnishing ' Nicias had paid little attention to the first reports of the approach of Gylippus, thinking tliat he was on a privateering mission rather than on one of war (vi. civ. 3). 3 THUCYDIDES vavrac^ el^^ov (? vaii<i iv ), ^^€\<; '•^€<; cKeXevov - 4 e? '^. -^ ' , - € € ^€\ , '] 9 ? , € 5 '<; €. 6 € ^ re ,€<;'€<;'^8e <{ €/? ,<, € € <; , ,? ' II. € ^ . € Toyy6Xo<;, el? ^, 2 ^, oXiyov ' aXXay - , Xyv € 3 '^. ' € - yap )? ' BOOK VII. I. 3-11. 3 arms for such of the crews of their ships as had none (for their ships they had beached at Himera), and also sent a request to the Selinuntians to meet them at a certain place with all their forces. A small body of troops was also promised them by the Geloans and some of the Sicels, who were now ready to join them with far greater alacrity, both because of the recent death of Archonidas, who, being king of certain Sicel tribes of that region and a man of influence, had been a friend of the Athenians, and also because Gylippus liad apparently come from Lacedaemon full of zeal. So Gylippus, taking of his own seamen and of the marines those that were equipped with arms, about seven hundred, of Hime- raean hoplites and light-armed troops together one thousand and one hundred cavalry, of the Selinun- tians some light-armed troops and cavalry, a few Geloans, and of the Sicels about one thousand in all, advanced against Syracuse. II. Meanwhile the Corinthians had put to sea from Leucas with the rest of their ships and were bring- ing aid as fast as they could ; indeed, Gongylus, one of the Corinthian commanders, though he had set out last with a single ship, was the first to arrive at Syracuse, being a little ahead of Gylippus. Finding the Syracusans on the point of holding an assembly to discuss the abandonment of the war, he prevented the meeting and encouraged them, saying that not only were still other ships about to arrive, but also Gylippus son of Cleandridas, who had been sent by the Lacedaemonians to assume the command. The Syracusans were encouraged, and at once went out with their whole army to meet Gylippus ; for they were informed that he was already near. He, after THUCYDIDES , ^ ^ €^<; ev ^ .€\ is i €<; ^?' € rjirep , -^, ivl ^ ', ^ Be ev 8 - p^yav SlttXouv , 5 ' ' ^. '^ .., III.,' - , . -/-/ XeyovTa, 2 ^, . 3 , 6 ' .^- ' ,',.' // ^ '6, Goeller's correction from Steph. Byz. of uncertain MS, readings. BOOK VII. II. 3-III. 3 taking on his way the Sicel fort of letae and marshalling his men in readiness for battle, reached Epipolae ; and ascending it by way of Euryelus, where the Athenians also had made their ascent at first,^ he formed a junction \vith the Syracusans and advanced against the wall of the Athenians. And he ha])pened to have come at the critical moment when the double wall ^ of seven or eight stadia in extent had already been completed by the Athenians down to the Great Harbour, except for a short stretch next to the sea, where they were still building. As for the rest of the encircling line, stones had already been dumped along the greater part of the stretch which ran to Trogilus and the outer sea, and it was left so, some parts half finished, other parts quite finished. So close had Syracuse come to destruction. III. The Athenians were at first thrown into a tumult by the sudden attack of Gylippus and the Syracusans, but drew up to meet them. But Gylip- pus halted near them under arms and sent forward a herald to say that if they were Avilling to quit Sicily within five days, taking what belonged to them, he was ready to make a truce. They, how- ever, treated the messenger with contempt and sent him back vithout any answer. After this they prepared for battle against one another. But Gylip- pus, seeing that the Syracusans Avere in a state of confusion and could not readily get into line, led his troops back into the more open ground. And Nicias did not lead the Athenians against him, but kept ^ c/. VI. xcvii. 2. * c/. VI. ciii. 1, THUCYDIDES kavrov €«. €'^ - <;, ^ eVi ' 4 .<;} '^ ^€ - ^, aWoae, alpei, iv - eKTeivev' €7€ 5 ^. \€. , IV. 8 eyKUpaiov ,€ \\, el 8 2 , € . '^ ^ - { 'yap , ). ' 3 '( yap ,'^.)- , 8 - . ^ 4 'Nt/cta , ^ Hude writes >vith C. ; BOOK VII. III. 3-iv. 4 quiet near his own wall. When Gylippus saw that they were not coming up, he led his army offthe field to the height called Temenites, and they bivouacked there. But on the next day he led out the main body of his army and stationed it opposite the 38 of the Athenians, in order to prevent their sending reinforcements to any other point ; then, sending a detachment against the fort at Labdalum, he cap- tured it and put to death all whom he took in it for the place (it should be explained) was not within sight of the Athenians. On the same day, too, an Athenian trireme that was keeping watch at the mouth of tlie Great Harbour was captured by the Syracusans. IV. After this the Syracusans and their allies proceeded to build a single wall running upwards from the city across Epipolae at an angle with the Athenian wall, in order that the Athenians, if they could not prevent its completion, might no longer be able to wall them off. By this time the Athenians had finished their wall next to the sea and had come up to the high ground ; and Gylippus, since a certain part of the Athenian wall vas weak, took his army by night and advanced against this. But the Athe- nians, who happened to be bivouacking outside the walls, perceived this movement and advanced against him ; and he, on observing this, quickly led his men back again. The Athenians accordingly built this part of the wall higher and kept guard there them- selves ; but their allies they now disposed along the rest of the wall, at the points where they were each to keep guard. Nicias determined also to fortify the place called Plemmyrium, a headland opposite the city, which THUCYDIDES rjTTep /; €'€€ TTOiei, el €^€, ' ^ yap ,^ \- € ' - , .?irpoaeiy^e re € ' , , , 5 . ' ev 8 € ^ 6 . tow ^ eyeveTO' yap - iyyodev, €7 pyavov e^eXOoiev , y yap - . 8 ev YiXyjp- , " aopyove e^ioiev, eVt tjj ev 7 -] ^. he - ' Trepirei € , irepi Yiiyiov. ^\. he ^, ^ 8 ' , he e^yv aiel )( BOOK VII. IV. 4-v. I juts out in front of the Great Harbour and makes its entrance narrow. If this were fortified^ it seemed to him that the bringing in of suppHes would be an easier matter ; for the Athenians could keep watch upon the harbour of the Syracusans at nearer range, and would not, as now, be obliged to j)ut out against the enemy from the inner bay of the Great Harbour, should they show any activity with their fleet. And in general from now on he gave his attention more to naval warfare, seeing that matters on land were less hopeful for themselves, now that Gylippus had come. Accordingly, taking over his ships and some troops he built three forts, in which most of the stores were deposited ; and the large boats and the ships of war were now moored there. And it was especially in consequence of this that the condition of the crews then first began to decline. For their water supply was scanty and not near at hand, and at the same time, whenever the sailors went out to fetch firewood they suffered heavily at the hands of the Syracusan horsemen, who overran the country. For the Syracusans had posted a third part of their cavalry at the hamlet near the Olympieum on account of the troops at Plemmyrium, that these might not go out and commit depredations.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Princeton/Stanford Working Papers in Classics
    Princeton/Stanford Working Papers in Classics The eighth-century revolution Version 1.0 December 2005 Ian Morris Stanford University Abstract: Through most of the 20th century classicists saw the 8th century BC as a period of major changes, which they characterized as “revolutionary,” but in the 1990s critics proposed more gradualist interpretations. In this paper I argue that while 30 years of fieldwork and new analyses inevitably require us to modify the framework established by Snodgrass in the 1970s (a profound social and economic depression in the Aegean c. 1100-800 BC; major population growth in the 8th century; social and cultural transformations that established the parameters of classical society), it nevertheless remains the most convincing interpretation of the evidence, and that the idea of an 8th-century revolution remains useful © Ian Morris. [email protected] 1 THE EIGHTH-CENTURY REVOLUTION Ian Morris Introduction In the eighth century BC the communities of central Aegean Greece (see figure 1) and their colonies overseas laid the foundations of the economic, social, and cultural framework that constrained and enabled Greek achievements for the next five hundred years. Rapid population growth promoted warfare, trade, and political centralization all around the Mediterranean. In most regions, the outcome was a concentration of power in the hands of kings, but Aegean Greeks created a new form of identity, the equal male citizen, living freely within a small polis. This vision of the good society was intensely contested throughout the late eighth century, but by the end of the archaic period it had defeated all rival models in the central Aegean, and was spreading through other Greek communities.
    [Show full text]
  • The Outbreak of the Rebellion of Cyrus the Younger Jeffrey Rop
    The Outbreak of the Rebellion of Cyrus the Younger Jeffrey Rop N THE ANABASIS, Xenophon asserts that the Persian prince Cyrus the Younger was falsely accused of plotting a coup I d’état against King Artaxerxes II shortly after his accession to the throne in 404 BCE. Spared from execution by the Queen Mother Parysatis, Cyrus returned to Lydia determined to seize the throne for himself. He secretly prepared his rebellion by securing access to thousands of Greek hoplites, winning over Persian officials and most of the Greek cities of Ionia, and continuing to send tribute and assurances of his loyalty to the unsuspecting King (1.1).1 In Xenophon’s timeline, the rebellion was not official until sometime between the muster of his army at Sardis in spring 401, which spurred his rival Tissaphernes to warn Artaxerxes (1.2.4–5), and his arrival several months later at Thapsacus on the Euphrates, where Cyrus first openly an- nounced his true intentions (1.4.11). Questioning the “strange blindness” of Artaxerxes in light of Cyrus’ seemingly obvious preparations for revolt, Pierre Briant proposed an alternative timeline placing the outbreak of the rebellion almost immediately after Cyrus’ return to Sardis in late 404 or early 403.2 In his reconstruction, the King allowed Cyrus 1 See also Ctesias FGrHist 688 F 16.59, Diod. 14.19, Plut. Artax. 3–4. 2 Pierre Briant, From Cyrus to Alexander (Winona Lake 2002) 617–620. J. K. Anderson, Xenophon (New York 1974) 80, expresses a similar skepticism. Briant concludes his discussion by stating that the rebellion officially (Briant does not define “official,” but I take it to mean when either the King or Cyrus declared it publicly) began in 401 with the muster of Cyrus’ army at Sardis, but it is nonetheless appropriate to characterize Briant’s position as dating the official outbreak of the revolt to 404/3.
    [Show full text]
  • The Satrap of Western Anatolia and the Greeks
    University of Pennsylvania ScholarlyCommons Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations 2017 The aS trap Of Western Anatolia And The Greeks Eyal Meyer University of Pennsylvania, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations Part of the Ancient History, Greek and Roman through Late Antiquity Commons Recommended Citation Meyer, Eyal, "The aS trap Of Western Anatolia And The Greeks" (2017). Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 2473. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/2473 This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/2473 For more information, please contact [email protected]. The aS trap Of Western Anatolia And The Greeks Abstract This dissertation explores the extent to which Persian policies in the western satrapies originated from the provincial capitals in the Anatolian periphery rather than from the royal centers in the Persian heartland in the fifth ec ntury BC. I begin by establishing that the Persian administrative apparatus was a product of a grand reform initiated by Darius I, which was aimed at producing a more uniform and centralized administrative infrastructure. In the following chapter I show that the provincial administration was embedded with chancellors, scribes, secretaries and military personnel of royal status and that the satrapies were periodically inspected by the Persian King or his loyal agents, which allowed to central authorities to monitory the provinces. In chapter three I delineate the extent of satrapal authority, responsibility and resources, and conclude that the satraps were supplied with considerable resources which enabled to fulfill the duties of their office. After the power dynamic between the Great Persian King and his provincial governors and the nature of the office of satrap has been analyzed, I begin a diachronic scrutiny of Greco-Persian interactions in the fifth century BC.
    [Show full text]
  • Early Mycenaean Arkadia: Space and Place(S) of an Inland and Mountainous Region
    Early Mycenaean Arkadia: Space and Place(s) of an Inland and Mountainous Region Eleni Salavoura1 Abstract: The concept of space is an abstract and sometimes a conventional term, but places – where people dwell, (inter)act and gain experiences – contribute decisively to the formation of the main characteristics and the identity of its residents. Arkadia, in the heart of the Peloponnese, is a landlocked country with small valleys and basins surrounded by high mountains, which, according to the ancient literature, offered to its inhabitants a hard and laborious life. Its rough terrain made Arkadia always a less attractive area for archaeological investigation. However, due to its position in the centre of the Peloponnese, Arkadia is an inevitable passage for anyone moving along or across the peninsula. The long life of small and medium-sized agrarian communities undoubtedly owes more to their foundation at crossroads connecting the inland with the Peloponnesian coast, than to their potential for economic growth based on the resources of the land. However, sites such as Analipsis, on its east-southeastern borders, the cemetery at Palaiokastro and the ash altar on Mount Lykaion, both in the southwest part of Arkadia, indicate that the area had a Bronze Age past, and raise many new questions. In this paper, I discuss the role of Arkadia in early Mycenaean times based on settlement patterns and excavation data, and I investigate the relation of these inland communities with high-ranking central places. In other words, this is an attempt to set place(s) into space, supporting the idea that the central region of the Peloponnese was a separated, but not isolated part of it, comprising regions that are also diversified among themselves.
    [Show full text]
  • Herodotus, Xerxes and the Persian Wars IAN PLANT, DEPARTMENT of ANCIENT HISTORY
    Herodotus, Xerxes and the Persian Wars IAN PLANT, DEPARTMENT OF ANCIENT HISTORY Xerxes: Xerxes’ tomb at Naqsh-i-Rustam Herodotus: 2nd century AD: found in Egypt. A Roman copy of a Greek original from the first half of the 4th century BC. Met. Museum New York 91.8 History looking at the evidence • Our understanding of the past filtered through our present • What happened? • Why did it happen? • How can we know? • Key focus is on information • Critical collection of information (what is relevant?) • Critical evaluation of information (what is reliable?) • Critical questioning of information (what questions need to be asked?) • These are essential transferable skills in the Information Age • Let’s look at some examples from Herodotus’ history of the Persian invasion of Greece in 480 BC • Is the evidence from: ― Primary sources: original sources; close to origin of information. ― Secondary sources: sources which cite, comment on or build upon primary sources. ― Tertiary source: cites only secondary sources; does not look at primary sources. • Is it the evidence : ― Reliable; relevant ― Have I analysed it critically? Herodotus: the problem… Succession of Xerxes 7.3 While Darius delayed making his decision [about his successor], it chanced that at this time Demaratus son of Ariston had come up to Susa, in voluntary exile from Lacedaemonia after he had lost the kingship of Sparta. [2] Learning of the contention between the sons of Darius, this man, as the story goes, came and advised Xerxes to add this to what he said: that he had been born when Darius was already king and ruler of Persia, but Artobazanes when Darius was yet a subject; [3] therefore it was neither reasonable nor just that anyone should have the royal privilege before him.
    [Show full text]
  • Hamilakis Nation and Its Ruins.Pdf
    CLASSICAL PRESENCES General Editors Lorna Hardwick James I. Porter CLASSICAL PRESENCES The texts, ideas, images, and material culture of ancient Greece and Rome have always been crucial to attempts to appropriate the past in order to authenticate the present. They underlie the mapping of change and the assertion and challenging of values and identities, old and new. Classical Presences brings the latest scholarship to bear on the contexts, theory, and practice of such use, and abuse, of the classical past. The Nation and its Ruins: Antiquity, Archaeology, and National Imagination in Greece YANNIS HAMILAKIS 1 3 Great Clarendon Street, Oxford ox2 6dp Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With oYces in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York ß Yannis Hamilakis 2007 The moral rights of the author have been asserted Database right Oxford University Press (maker) First published 2007 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization.
    [Show full text]
  • Marathon 2,500 Years Edited by Christopher Carey & Michael Edwards
    MARATHON 2,500 YEARS EDITED BY CHRISTOPHER CAREY & MICHAEL EDWARDS INSTITUTE OF CLASSICAL STUDIES SCHOOL OF ADVANCED STUDY UNIVERSITY OF LONDON MARATHON – 2,500 YEARS BULLETIN OF THE INSTITUTE OF CLASSICAL STUDIES SUPPLEMENT 124 DIRECTOR & GENERAL EDITOR: JOHN NORTH DIRECTOR OF PUBLICATIONS: RICHARD SIMPSON MARATHON – 2,500 YEARS PROCEEDINGS OF THE MARATHON CONFERENCE 2010 EDITED BY CHRISTOPHER CAREY & MICHAEL EDWARDS INSTITUTE OF CLASSICAL STUDIES SCHOOL OF ADVANCED STUDY UNIVERSITY OF LONDON 2013 The cover image shows Persian warriors at Ishtar Gate, from before the fourth century BC. Pergamon Museum/Vorderasiatisches Museum, Berlin. Photo Mohammed Shamma (2003). Used under CC‐BY terms. All rights reserved. This PDF edition published in 2019 First published in print in 2013 This book is published under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial- NoDerivatives (CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0) license. More information regarding CC licenses is available at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ Available to download free at http://www.humanities-digital-library.org ISBN: 978-1-905670-81-9 (2019 PDF edition) DOI: 10.14296/1019.9781905670819 ISBN: 978-1-905670-52-9 (2013 paperback edition) ©2013 Institute of Classical Studies, University of London The right of contributors to be identified as the authors of the work published here has been asserted by them in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. Designed and typeset at the Institute of Classical Studies TABLE OF CONTENTS Introductory note 1 P. J. Rhodes The battle of Marathon and modern scholarship 3 Christopher Pelling Herodotus’ Marathon 23 Peter Krentz Marathon and the development of the exclusive hoplite phalanx 35 Andrej Petrovic The battle of Marathon in pre-Herodotean sources: on Marathon verse-inscriptions (IG I3 503/504; Seg Lvi 430) 45 V.
    [Show full text]
  • Art and Royalty in Sparta of the 3Rd Century B.C
    HESPERIA 75 (2006) ART AND ROYALTY Pages 203?217 IN SPARTA OF THE 3RD CENTURY B.C. ABSTRACT a The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that revival of the arts in Sparta b.c. was during the 3rd century owed mainly to royal patronage, and that it was inspired by Alexander s successors, the Seleukids and the Ptolemies in particular. The tumultuous transition from the traditional Spartan dyarchy to a and to its dominance Hellenistic-style monarchy, Sparta's attempts regain in the P?loponn?se (lost since the battle of Leuktra in 371 b.c.), are reflected in the of the hero Herakles as a role model promotion pan-Peloponnesian at for the single king the expense of the Dioskouroi, who symbolized dual a kingship and had limited, regional appeal. INTRODUCTION was Spartan influence in the P?loponn?se dramatically reduced after the battle of Leuktra in 371 b.c.1 The history of Sparta in the 3rd century b.c. to ismarked by intermittent efforts reassert Lakedaimonian hegemony.2 A as a means to tendency toward absolutism that end intensified the latent power struggle between the Agiad and Eurypontid royal houses, leading to the virtual abolition of the traditional dyarchy in the reign of the Agiad Kleomenes III (ca. 235-222 b.c.), who appointed his brother Eukleides 1. For the battle of Leuktra and its am to and Ellen Millen 2005.1 grateful Graham Shipley Paul Cartledge and see me to am consequences, Cartledge 2002, and Ellen Millender for inviting der for historical advice. I also 251-259.
    [Show full text]
  • Socrates and Democratic Athens: the Story of the Trial in Its Historical and Legal Contexts
    Princeton/Stanford Working Papers in Classics Socrates and democratic Athens: The story of the trial in its historical and legal contexts. Version 1.0 July 2006 Josiah Ober Princeton University Abstract: Socrates was both a loyal citizen (by his own lights) and a critic of the democratic community’s way of doing things. This led to a crisis in 339 B.C. In order to understand Socrates’ and the Athenian community’s actions (as reported by Plato and Xenophon) it is necessary to understand the historical and legal contexts, the democratic state’s commitment to the notion that citizens are resonsible for the effects of their actions, and Socrates’ reasons for preferring to live in Athens rather than in states that might (by his lights) have had substantively better legal systems. Written for the Cambridge Companion to Socrates. © Josiah Ober. [email protected] Socrates and democratic Athens: The story of the trial in its historical and legal contexts. (for Cambridge Companion to Socrates) Josiah Ober, Princeton University Draft of August 2004 In 399 B.C. the Athenian citizen Socrates, son of Sophroniscus of the deme (township) Alopece, was tried by an Athenian court on the charge of impiety (asebeia). He was found guilty by a narrow majority of the empanelled judges and executed in the public prison a few days later. The trial and execution constitute the best documented events in Socrates’ life and a defining moment in the relationship between Greek philosophy and Athenian democracy. Ever since, philosophers and historians have sought to
    [Show full text]
  • Copyrighted Material
    Index Note : Geographical landmarks are listed under the proper name itself: for “Cape Sepias” or “Mt. Athos” see “Sepias” or “Athos.” When a people and a toponym share the same base, see under the toponym: for “Thessalians” see “Thessaly.” Romans are listed according to the nomen, i.e. C. Julius Caesar. With places or people mentioned once only, discretion has been used. Abdera 278 Aeaces II 110, 147 Abydus 222, 231 A egae 272–273 Acanthus 85, 207–208, 246 Aegina 101, 152, 157–158, 187–189, Acarnania 15, 189, 202, 204, 206, 251, 191, 200 347, 391, 393 Aegium 377, 389 Achaia 43, 54, 64 ; Peloponnesian Aegospotami 7, 220, 224, 228 Achaia, Achaian League 9–10, 12–13, Aemilius Paullus, L. 399, 404 54–56, 63, 70, 90, 250, 265, 283, 371, Aeolis 16–17, 55, 63, 145, 233 375–380, 388–390, 393, 397–399, 404, Aeschines 281, 285, 288 410 ; Phthiotic Achaia 16, 54, 279, Aeschylus 156, 163, 179 286 Aetoli Erxadieis 98–101 Achaian War 410 Aetolia, Aetolian League 12, 15, 70, Achaius 382–383, 385, 401 204, 250, 325, 329, 342, 347–348, Acilius Glabrio, M. 402 376, 378–380, 387, 390–391, 393, Acragas 119, COPYRIGHTED165, 259–261, 263, 266, 39MATERIAL6–397, 401–404 352–354, 358–359 Agariste 113, 117 Acrocorinth 377, 388–389 Agathocles (Lysimachus ’ son) 343, 345 ; Acrotatus 352, 355 (King of Sicily) 352–355, 358–359; Actium 410, 425 (King of Bactria) 413–414 Ada 297 Agelaus 391, 410 A History of Greece: 1300 to 30 BC, First Edition. Victor Parker.
    [Show full text]
  • THE SANCTUARY at EPIDAUROS and CULT-BASED NETWORKING in the GREEK WORLD of the FOURTH CENTURY B.C. a Thesis Presented in Partial
    THE SANCTUARY AT EPIDAUROS AND CULT-BASED NETWORKING IN THE GREEK WORLD OF THE FOURTH CENTURY B.C. A Thesis Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the degree Master of Arts in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University by Pamela Makara, B.A. The Ohio State University 1992 Master's Examination Committee: Approved by Dr. Timothy Gregory Dr. Jack Ba I cer Dr. Sa u I Corne I I VITA March 13, 1931 Born - Lansing, Michigan 1952 ..... B.A. in Education, Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan 1952-1956, 1966-Present Teacher, Detroit, Michigan; Rochester, New York; Bowling Green, Ohio 1966-Present ............. University work in Education, Art History, and Ancient Greek and Roman History FIELDS OF STUDY Major Field: History Studies in Ancient Civi I izations: Dr. Timothy Gregory and Dr. Jack Balcer i i TABLE OF CONTENTS VITA i i LIST OF TABLES iv CHAPTER PAGE I. INTRODUCTION 1 I I. ANCIENT EPIDAUROS AND THE CULT OF ASKLEPIOS 3 I II. EPIDAURIAN THEARODOKOI DECREES 9 IV. EPIDAURIAN THEOROI 21 v. EPIDAURIAN THEARODOKOI INSCRIPTIONS 23 VI. AN ARGIVE THEARODOKOI INSCRIPTION 37 VII. A DELPHIC THEARODOKOI INSCRIPTION 42 VIII. SUMMARY 47 END NOTES 49 BIBLIOGRAPHY 55 APPENDICES A. EPIDAURIAN THEARODOKOI INSCRIPTIONS AND TRANSLATIONS 58 B. ARGIVE THEARODOKO I I NSCR I PT I ON 68 C. DELPHIC THEARODOKOI INSCRIPTION 69 D. THEARODOKO I I NSCR I PT IONS PARALLELS 86 iii LIST OF TABLES TABLE PAGE 1. Thearodoko i I nscr i pt ions Para I I e Is •••••••••••• 86 iv CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Any evidence of I inkage in the ancient world is valuable because it clarifies the relationships between the various peoples of antiquity and the dealings they had with one another.
    [Show full text]
  • Politics and Policy in Corinth 421-336 B.C. Dissertation
    POLITICS AND POLICY IN CORINTH 421-336 B.C. DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University by DONALD KAGAN, B.A., A.M. The Ohio State University 1958 Approved by: Adviser Department of History TABLE OF CONTENTS Page FOREWORD ................................................. 1 CHAPTER I THE LEGACY OF ARCHAIC C O R I N T H ....................7 II CORINTHIAN DIPLOMACY AFTER THE PEACE OF NICIAS . 31 III THE DECLINE OF CORINTHIAN P O W E R .................58 IV REVOLUTION AND UNION WITH ARGOS , ................ 78 V ARISTOCRACY, TYRANNY AND THE END OF CORINTHIAN INDEPENDENCE ............... 100 APPENDIXES .............................................. 135 INDEX OF PERSONAL N A M E S ................................. 143 BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................... 145 AUTOBIOGRAPHY ........................................... 149 11 FOREWORD When one considers the important role played by Corinth in Greek affairs from the earliest times to the end of Greek freedom it is remarkable to note the paucity of monographic literature on this key city. This is particular­ ly true for the classical period wnere the sources are few and scattered. For the archaic period the situation has been somewhat better. One of the first attempts toward the study of Corinthian 1 history was made in 1876 by Ernst Curtius. This brief art­ icle had no pretensions to a thorough investigation of the subject, merely suggesting lines of inquiry and stressing the importance of numisihatic evidence. A contribution of 2 similar score was undertaken by Erich Wilisch in a brief discussion suggesting some of the problems and possible solutions. This was followed by a second brief discussion 3 by the same author.
    [Show full text]