Athens’ Domain: The Loss of Naval Supremacy and an Empire

Keegan Laycock Acknowledgements

This paper has a lot to owe to the support of Dr. John Walsh. Without his encouragement, guid- ance, and urging to come on a theoretically educational trip to Greece, this paper would be vastly diminished in quality, and perhaps even in existence. I am grateful for the opportunity I have had to present it and the insight I have gained from the process. Special thanks to the editors and or- ganizers of Canta/ἄειδε for their own patience and persistence. 1

For the Athenians, the sea has been a key component of culture, economics, and especial- ly warfare. The Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC) displayed how control of the waves was vital for victory. This was not wholly apparent at the start of the conflict. The Peloponnesian League was militarily led by Sparta who was the greatest land power in Greece; to them naval warfare was excessive. Athens, as the head of the Delian League, was the greatest sea power in Greece whose strengths lay in their navy. However, through a combination of factors, Athens lost control of the sea and lost the war despite being the superior naval power at the war’s outset. Ultimately, Athens lost because they were unable to maintain strong naval authority. The geographic position of Athens and many of its key resources ensured land-based threats made them vulnerable de- spite their naval advantage. Athens also failed to exploit their naval supremacy as they focused on land-based wars in Sicily while the Peloponnesian League built up a rivaling navy of its own. Worst of all, Athenian leadership was fragmented; resources were squandered, and their navy’s experience and capability were not maintained in the face of improved opposition. These factors ultimately proved the end of the Athenian Empire. While Athens operated as a thalassocracy, it was located on the mainland. Other insular maritime civilizations were removed from mainland threats. This is what enabled the ancient Minoans to maintain safety and prosperity on Crete.1 The more warlike Mycenaeans were unable to overthrow Minoan hegemony until the latter collapsed in the 14th century BC.2 Conversely, Athens could still be threatened by a land based power that put their whole empire at risk, both in terms of economic and physical vulnerabilities such as interrupting the flow of vital continental goods and attacking Athens itself. Without a body of water that acted as a defensive barrier, Athens was at an immediate disadvantage despite having a powerful navy. To combat this problem, the Athenians had built a wall around Athens and the port poleis of Piraeus and Phalerum in 457 BC.3 When the first phase of the Peloponnesian War began, known as the Archidamian War (431-421 BC), and the Spartans marched on Athens in 431 BC led by Archidamus, the rural Athenians took refugee within the Long Walls. Rebuffed and un- equipped for a siege, the Spartan infantry could only pillage the countryside.4 However, this de- fence brought on new problems in the form of disease and civil discord. Athens could not sup-

1 Thuc.1.4; 1.8.

2 Denis Doxey, “Causes and Effects of the Fall of Knossos in 1375 B.C.,” Oxford Journal of Ar- chaeology 6, no. 3 (November 1987): 301-2, 306-7, 312.

3 Thuc.1.107.

4 Debra Hamel, The Battle of Arginusae: Victory at Sea and its Tragic Aftermath in the Final Years of the Peloponnesian War (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015), 25, and Diod.12.45.1-2, and John Nash, “Sea Power in the Peloponnesian War,” Naval War Col- lege Review 71, no. 1 (2018): 123, and Thuc.2.13-4; 2.23. It is debated as to how effective the Spartans were at pillaging and razing, as the countryside, crops, and tools available to the Spar- tan warriors did not lend themselves well to easy destruction. However, it is still likely that the sight of foreign soldiers destroying homes would have a psychological effect on the populace of Athens, especially for those who had lived outside the Long Walls. 2 port the increased population, leaving many homeless. Along with the psychological effect of seeing Athenian land being ravaged by the Spartans, many Athenians became discontented with Pericles, who was Athens’ de facto leader.5 It is a testament to his leadership abilities, or the peo- ple’s desperation, that he was able to retain his position as general and gain power in the face of extreme disquiet.6 Under his leadership the Athenians adopted the ‘Periclean Strategy’. It was a military doctrine that focused on hit-and-run tactics behind enemy lines utilizing their navy to ferry their military unmolested.7 Furthermore, the Athenians were to avoid facing the superior Spartans in direct combat. While it was an unconventional strategy for its time, Pericles believed that through attrition the Peloponnesian League could be weakened enough to allow Athens sur- vival.8 The polis’ unity was challenged again when the Plague of Athens struck (429 BC) and decimated a third of the population.9 Had Pericles not rallied the Athenians during this stressful period, the Athenians may have decided to abandon their defensive strategy and to meet Sparta in the field: a popular idea at the time.10 However, the same plague ultimately claimed Pericles’ life.11 His leadership had been crucial for the Athenian war effort, and while he was not popular among the people, future leaders lacked his long-term strategic skills. Athens’ geographic posi- tioning forced the Athenians to live under siege-like conditions; Athens lost men and their most important leader, leaving behind long term consequences to their naval authority. Athens was also at great risk economically. The Athenians were trapped within the city limits, and could not access the surrounding countryside, making them dependent on the port po- lis Piraeus to enable allied poleis to supply them by sea.12 Athens required its allies to remain loyal to maintain the stability, health, and defence of the Athenian Empire.13 All member poleis

5 Diod.12.45.4, Hamel, The Battle of Arginusae, 25, Nash, “Sea Power,” 125, and Thuc.2.23; 2.52.

6 Thuc.2.65.1-5.

7 Thuc.2.65.7.

8 Thuc.2.65.7.

9 Diod.12.45.2, Hamel, The Battle of Arginusae, 25, and Thuc.2.49.

10 Thuc.2.23-24.

11 Thuc.2.65.

12 Athanassios Platias, “Grand Strategies Clashing: Athenian and Spartan Strategies in Thucy- dides’ “History of the Peloponnesian War”,” Comparative Strategy 21, no. 5 (October 2002): 380, and Brian Rutishauser, Athens and the Cyclades: Economic Strategies 540-314 BCE (Ox- ford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 117-8, 120.

13 It should also be noted that many of these allied poleis became more like subjects to the Athe- nians as their navies were put under direct Athenian control and they were forced to give mone- tary tribute to Athens instead. This led to the idea of an Athenian “Empire” despite technically remaining as part of the Delian League. 3 of the Delian League were obliged to contribute a military fleet or monetary tribute to the League, but the Athenians increasingly dominated the League through their control of the trea- sury and the levying of heavy taxes and tributes, leaving many supposed allies dissatisfied and willing to revolt.14 Rebelling poleis posed a significant threat, as such defections deprived Athens of vital resources and presented a potential threat should the rebels ever side with the Pelopon- nesian League, such as the attempted rebellion on Lesbos by Mytilene in 428 whose navy could threaten the Athenians.15 Due to their geographic positioning, Athens could not afford to have unwilling allies as they were the lifeline of Athens and its navy. Relying on shipped goods had its advantages. It was practically impossible for the Pelo- ponnesian League to blockade Athens, as they lacked a significant naval force to challenge Athens, meaning that Athens was able to remain supplied uninterrupted.16 However, there were several locations on the mainland that supplied Athens with vital material. This meant that Athens could still be threatened by a land power in spite of the naval force that Athens had at its disposal.17 The polis Amphipolis is one such example, as it was valued for its timber needed for shipbuilding, silver mines to pay the army and navy, and it occupied a strategic geographic posi- tion that would allow Sparta to threaten other Delian League poleis.18 Following the Athenian victory at Sphacteria in 425 BC, Spartan general Brasidas marched on and captured Amphipolis in 424 BC.19 This was a devastating blow to the Athenians. In a single stroke, Athens’ whole war effort was at risk. Despite their victory at Sphacteria, the capture of Amphipolis meant the Athe- nians no longer had access to the valuable silver mines or wood supply, without which the in- tegrity of their army and navy was threatened. The Spartans had effectively exploited Athenian dependency on geographically vulnerable resources. This was a great weakness and it played a role in the ultimate demise of the Athenian Empire and their naval dominance. After ten years of ceaseless war, the losses of Sphacteria, Amphipolois, generals, and sol- diers added to the mounting exhaustion that both sides faced. Following the battle to retake Am- phipolis in 422 BC, a tenuous peace was created known as the Peace of Nicias. Named after the eponymous Athenian general, the peace treaty concluded the Archidamian War in 421 BC.20 De-

14 Thuc.2.80; 3.2; 3.3.1.

15 Diod.12.55.1-3; 13.34.2, J.F. Lazenby, The Peloponnesian War: A Military Study (London: Routledge, 2004), 171, Nash, “Sea Power,” 134-135, Rutishauser, Economic Strategies, 131, and Thuc.3.2; 3.3.1.

16 Thuc.1.141-1.143.

17 Nash, “Sea Power,” 124, 126, 132-3.

18 Lazenby, The Peloponnesian War, 93, and Souza, Peloponnesian War 431-404 BC, 48, and Thuc.4.108.

19 Diod.12.63; 12.68.1-4, Hamel, The Battle of Arginusae, 26, Nash, “Sea Power,” 127-8, Souza, Peloponnesian War 431-404 BC, 47, and Thuc.4.38; 4.102; 4.107.

20 Diod.12.74.1-2; 75, and Thuc.5.30-31. 4 spite many Athenian weaknesses, they were left in the better position compared to Sparta follow- ing the Peace. Athens controlled the sea with their vast navy and had shown the effectiveness of their sea raids on Peloponnesian territory. While they had not won every battle, they had main- tained equal footing against Sparta, a considerable feat given the latter’s renowned martial abili- ty. The Peloponnesian League itself was unstable due to internal grievances and revolt among the League members for not being consulted during the peace negotiations.21 Even though the Spar- tans had been able to attack Amphipolis, they were restrained when sending their troops abroad. There was constant concern that their enslaved Helot population would rebel. This in turn limited the number of hoplites that Sparta could field. Compared to the military reach and relative inter- nal stability of the Athenian Empire, the Spartans faced an opponent that challenged Sparta’s hegemony. However, the Athenians failed to take advantage of their strengths, and instead squandered their resources on other military campaigns, losing their sole naval supremacy. The ‘Periclean Strategy’ had enabled Athens to counter Sparta’s advantages. Pericles had dictated that the Athenians should never face the Spartans in open battle but were instead to harry the enemy along the coast. 22 This ensured that the only way to defeat Athens was with a rival navy.23 However, many expressed doubts with this strategy, believing that a decisive battle was required to ensure victory.24 Pericles’ immediate successor, Cleon, asserted a more aggressive strategy to win favour from the masses, such as when he hindered an attempted peace treaty with the Spartans and attempted to win back Amphipolis through force.25 While Cleon did find some limited success in expanding Athenian power and he did not totally depart from the ‘Periclean Strategy’, his actions signaled a shift away from it. This change is likely reflective of many Athenians inability to understand Athens’ strengths. In 415 BC Athens received word from their ally in Sicily, Egesta, that they were under attack by the Seliutines and Syracusans. The Egestans pleaded for aid and support, stating that if they were not assisted, it was likely that the Syracusans would later join the Peloponnesian League to destroy the Athenian Empire.26 It was key for the Athenians to show their client poleis that they would assist their allies and not abandon them, as Athens needed to ensure the stability

21 Diod.12.76.1-2, Lazenby, The Peloponnesian War, 106, and Thuc.5.57.

22 Thuc.1.141-1.143.

23 Diod.12.45.3, George Cawkwell, Thucydides and the Peloponnesian War (London: Routledge, 1997), 43, Nash, “Sea Power,” 120, 122, 124, Lazenby, The Peloponnesian War, 32, and Thuc. 1.141-1.143.

24 Platias, “Grand Strategies Clashing,” 387, and Thuc.2.23; 2.52.

25 Cawkwell, Thucydides, 58, and Thuc.4.21-22; 4.27-28; 5.2; 5.11. This attempt in 422 BC re- sulted in the death of both Cleon and Spartan general Brasidas as well as six-hundred Athenian and seven Spartan hoplite casualties.

26 Diod.12.83.1-4, Lazenby, The Peloponnesian War, 133, and Thuc.6.6. It is questionable if this was likely, and Egesta probably made this assessment to play on Athens’ rivalry and paranoia. 5 and integrity of the Empire.27 However, the Archidamian War had ended with a tenuous peace that was akin to a ceasefire. While the Spartans had been weakened for the time being, they had not yet been neutralized as a threat. It was a crucial turning point in the long struggle between the rivals. Nicias, one of the generals leading the Athenian fleet, argued for a defensive strategy.28 Given how worn down the Athenians were, it was not a good time to go on the offensive, but to build up strength, and assert their hegemony over the seas. Opposite Nicias was Alcibiades, another general whose apposite arguments contradicted Nicias’. Alcibiades believed that the Syracusans’ military was miniscule, weak, and could be eas- ily beaten. Additionally, he reassured the Athenians by saying that the Athenian navy was so vast and powerful that even a portion of it left behind would be enough to deter Sparta. 29 He also stated that obtaining victory would ensure Athenian hegemony through direct control of new ter- ritory or the destruction of potential rivals.30 Nicias counter-argued that both Selinus and Syra- cuse were well prepared militarily, had large reserves of money, men, and resources, and would not be taken easily. He believed that a well-sized army would be needed for the poleis to be cap- tured. Furthermore, he argued that Sicily was such a great distance away that winter would be upon them and supply lines would be stretched across a vast distance, concluding that they would face nothing but hostile strangers.31 However, Alcibiades won over the Athenians, who were so caught up in their relative position of power over Sparta that they failed to see the warn- ings that Nicias laid bare to be true.32 As it was later realized, conquering Syracuse required a combined land and naval effort and constant control of the sea to ensure supplies could always reach the army. This tactic was contrary to the ‘Periclean Strategy’ which called for hit and run tactics; a slow strategy, but an effective one compared to the alternative of directly engaging the enemy.33 Alcibiades and many others following the Peace failed to grasp that Athens’ strength came not from expansion, but through control of the sea and its enemies inability to directly at- tack Athens. When the Athenian force under Nicias arrived in Sicily, they set in for an extended siege when they discovered that the Syracusans were not going to give up easily, violating the ‘Peri- clean Strategy’. However, while Athenian leadership seemed to have forgotten the importance of

27 Lazenby, The Peloponnesian War, 134, Lee L. Brice, “The Athenian Expedition to Sicily,” in The Oxford Handbook of Warfare in the Classical World, ed. by Brian Campbell, and Lawrence A. Tritle, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 2, and Nash, “Sea Power,” 129.

28 Diod.12.83.5-6, Lazenby, The Peloponnesian War, 132, and Thuc.6.9-14; 6.20-23.

29 Thuc.6.16-18.

30 Thuc.6.16-18.

31 Thuc.6.20-23.

32 Diod.12.84, Hamel, The Battle of Arginusae, 27, Lazenby, The Peloponnesian War, 132, and Thuc.6.16-18.

33 Lazenby, The Peloponnesian War, 32, and Nash, “Sea Power,” 124, 129. 6 their naval strength, their enemies had not. Syracuse had witnessed the devastating effectiveness of a powerful navy and, given their own seafaring heritage, realized the opportunity they had to wrest control of the sea for themselves. As the Athenians committed themselves to land battles, their ships began to rot and crews grew weak, all the while Syracuse built up their navy.34 After several land battles the Athenians’ position on Sicily was precarious, and Nicias himself had foreseen the danger the expedition faced.35 With growing confidence at sea, Syracuse battled the Athenian fleet multiple times and eventually won a decisive sea battle in 413 BC that ended Athenian naval superiority and threatened the integrity of the Athenian land forces.36 With con- trol of the waves, the Syracusans could cut off Athenian supplies and easily flank their land forces. Syracuse and their allies had quickly learned the importance of naval superiority from the Athenian Empire, whose power was no longer so secure. Athenian reinforcements led by Demosthenes were appalled by the state of the land forces, stricken by disease and loss, and decided the path to victory lay with the quickest course of action; direct attack.37 Athens wanted to win the Sicilian campaign in a quick stroke, not real- izing that with a stronger opposing navy they were not at liberty to engage in such risky maneu- vers, and that when it came to land warfare the Athenians did not have any recognizable martial advantage like the Spartans. This mindset and their desperation led to a disastrous nighttime raid for the Athenians attempting to bypass Syracusan fortifications at Epipolae.38 Further Athenian defeats in the harbour and at sea cemented the fate of the expedition and removed any hope of the army making it back to Attica without surrender.39 It was a tremendous loss for the Athenians in manpower and naval capability, weakening the once superior power of Athens.40 Despite their previous victories during the Archidamian War, Athens had thrown away its advantage. In their hubris the Athenians believed that they were more than capable in executing distant land cam- paigns, forgetting the ‘Periclean Strategy’ that had made them so successful. All the while, Syra- cuse realized the key to defeating Athens was in neutralizing its navy. The Peloponnesian League too began to realize this as they found themselves once more ready for war. Without sole naval supremacy Athens had begun its decline.

34 Brice, “Athenian Expedition,” 12, Diod.13.8.5-6, Lazenby, The Peloponnesian War, 152, and Thuc.7.6; 7.21.

35 Thuc, 7.11-15.

36 Brice, “Athenian Expedition,” 12, 14, Diod.13.10.3-6, Lazenby, The Peloponnesian War, 152, 157, and Thuc.7.11-15; 7.41.

37 Brice, “Athenian Expedition,” 14, Diod.13.11.1-2, Lazenby, The Peloponnesian War, 157, and Thuc.7.42.

38 Thuc.7.43-45.

39 Brice, “Athenian Expedition,” 15, 17-8, Diod.13.11.3-6, Lazenby, The Peloponnesian War, 158-60, 162-6, and Thuc.75.

40 Brice, “Athenian Expedition,” 16, and Lazenby, The Peloponnesian War, 167-8. 7

During the Sicilian campaign, the Peloponnesian League had started constructing its own navy. With the outbreak of war once more in 413 BC they now pressed the Athenians upon the seas. Additionally, Sparta captured and fortified the strategically located polis of Decelea, which enabled the Spartans to threaten the Attica region and cut-off land trade routes.41 This maneuver forced the Athenians to rely purely on receiving supplies by sea, which was also at risk due to revolting allies.42 The Athenians were backed into a corner. It was because of this desperation that Athens considered the diplomatic offer from the long-maligned Alcibiades that the King of Persia was willing to support the Athenians if they reinstated Alcibiades and became an oli- garchy. Athenian politician Pisander argued that given the precarious position of Athens, turning away from democracy would be worthwhile if only to preserve the polis.43 A coup quickly estab- lished an Athenian oligarchy known as The Four Hundred in 411 BC.44 However, this resulted in great civil-strife in the city, as well as among the Athenian navy stationed at Samos who decided to remain democratic. In this chaos, the Athenians panicked when it was believed that a Pelo- ponnesian League invasion fleet was on the way to capture Salamis. This was not the case how- ever, and when Athens sent out many of its few remaining vessels from the polis to attack, they suffered grievous losses, losing twenty-two ships and their men.45 Athens was increasingly out- numbered upon the seas, its Empire was in disarray, and they had limited resources at hand. Athens could not afford to lose more of their navy for no gain. By failing to maintain unity and good leadership, the Athenians lessened what little naval power they still had. Alcibiades was eventually reinstated as a general for Athens in 407 BC and he proved to be an effective general in a time when Athens was suffering from devastating defeats.46 He man- aged to win several victories, putting up a thorough fight against Sparta. He was just the kind of commander that Athens needed. However, after a battle that resulted in the loss of fifteen ships, the Athenians deposed and replaced him in 406 BC. They believed he had failed to recapture Athenian ships due to neglect, despite the fact that the loss only occurred due to a commander of the Athenian fleet, Antiochus, disobeying direct orders from Alcibiades not to attack.47 The loss

41 Thuc.7.18-19; 27-28.

42 Brice, “Athenian Expedition,” 12, Diod.13.34.2-3; 13.79, Hamel, The Battle of Arginusae, 28, Nash, “Sea Power,” 121, 126, 129, Platias, “Grand Strategies Clashing,” 389, and Thuc.7.27-28.

43 Thuc.8.53-54. Alcibiades had fled Athens right before the Sicilian Expedition was to occur be- cause he was accused of vandalism. He sought refuge in Sparta before leaving for the royal Per- sian court.

44 Diod.13.34.2; 13.36.1-2, Lazenby, The Peloponnesian War, 188, and Thuc.8.63.

45 Diod.13.36.3-4, Lazenby, The Peloponnesian War, 171, Rutishauser, Economic Strategies, 126, and Thuc.8.72-76; 8.93-95.

46 Diod.13.42.1-2; 13.74, and Thuc.8.97.

47 Lazenby, The Peloponnesian War, 189-90, 221-4, and Xen.Hell.1.5. 8 was far smaller when compared to losses earlier in the war, but the Athenian leadership ostra- cized Alcibiades nonetheless. It was a poor move for Athens. Its tenuous position did not allow for many options, and getting rid of an experienced general despite his successes only weakened Athens’ naval capability further. While Athens had rid itself of Alcibiades, the Athenians replaced him with ten new gen- erals to lead the navy. Their command during the battle of Arginusae in 406 BC proved to be a great success. While the Athenians had lost twenty-five of their own ships, the Peloponnesian League had lost at least sixty-nine of their own.48 However, when six of the generals returned to Athens, they were quickly imprisoned to await trial. It was believed that the generals had not gone to rescue the men of the twenty-five ships. The generals explained that a storm had kept them at bay, and several other captains testified to this. Despite almost convincing the Athenian governing Assembly, along with a passionate and logical argument by Socrates in defence of the generals, the six generals were sentenced to death, and the Assembly put two others under the threat of death should they ever return.49 Even though they had achieved a great victory, the Athenian people believed it to be a defeat. In their dire position, they deprived themselves of the talent and skill that they desperately needed. The Athenians came to regret their decision, but the damage was done.50 Not long after, Spartan victory at the Battle of Aegospotami in 405 BC end- ed any chance of Athenian victory. Formal surrender negotiations ended the war in favor of the Peloponnesian League in 404 BC.51 The Athenians failed to account for the challenging position that they were in, and by failing to maintain the one advantage they had, naval skill and talent, they brought about their own end. There was nothing from the outset that guaranteed that Athens would lose the Pelopon- nesian War. Athens’ loss was due to a cascading effect. The polis was unable to become a strong thalassocratic power, as it was working from a position of geographic weakness. Too many of their key resources were located on the mainland; Athens itself was accessible by land, and it forced the Athenians to become dependent on their extended empire to supply them, which could be threatened by an opposing navy or by disrupting the flow of resources required to keep the navy running. Athens never truly took advantage of its superior naval force, as the Athenians in- stead deviated from their defensive strategy and squandered resources and lives attempting to take Sicily. Meanwhile, their enemies built up their own navy so that Athens no longer had an advantage. Finally, Athenian leadership failed to unite the crumbling empire, wasted resources, and failed to maintain their naval veterancy and skill, which was the last defence for Athens when they faced an equal naval force. Athens proved how powerful a navy could be when it dominated the waves with its fleet. However, through neglect, hubris, circumstance, and waste,

48 Diod.13.97-100, and Lazenby, The Peloponnesian War, 233-244, and Xen.Hell.1.6.

49 Diod.13.101-102, Hamel, The Battle of Arginusae, 80, 90, Lazenby, The Peloponnesian War, 234-6, and Xen.Hell.1.7.

50 Xen.Hell.1.7.

51 Diod.13.106-107, Lazenby, The Peloponnesian War, 241-2, and Xen.Hell.2.1. 9

Athens’ ultimate downfall came about when the Peloponnesian League took control of the same waters Athens had once claimed to be their domain. Bibliography

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