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Athens' Domain Athens’ Domain: The Loss of Naval Supremacy and an Empire Keegan Laycock Acknowledgements This paper has a lot to owe to the support of Dr. John Walsh. Without his encouragement, guid- ance, and urging to come on a theoretically educational trip to Greece, this paper would be vastly diminished in quality, and perhaps even in existence. I am grateful for the opportunity I have had to present it and the insight I have gained from the process. Special thanks to the editors and or- ganizers of Canta/ἄειδε for their own patience and persistence. %1 For the Athenians, the sea has been a key component of culture, economics, and especial- ly warfare. The Peloponnesian War (431-404 BC) displayed how control of the waves was vital for victory. This was not wholly apparent at the start of the conflict. The Peloponnesian League was militarily led by Sparta who was the greatest land power in Greece; to them naval warfare was excessive. Athens, as the head of the Delian League, was the greatest sea power in Greece whose strengths lay in their navy. However, through a combination of factors, Athens lost control of the sea and lost the war despite being the superior naval power at the war’s outset. Ultimately, Athens lost because they were unable to maintain strong naval authority. The geographic position of Athens and many of its key resources ensured land-based threats made them vulnerable de- spite their naval advantage. Athens also failed to exploit their naval supremacy as they focused on land-based wars in Sicily while the Peloponnesian League built up a rivaling navy of its own. Worst of all, Athenian leadership was fragmented; resources were squandered, and their navy’s experience and capability were not maintained in the face of improved opposition. These factors ultimately proved the end of the Athenian Empire. While Athens operated as a thalassocracy, it was located on the mainland. Other insular maritime civilizations were removed from mainland threats. This is what enabled the ancient Minoans to maintain safety and prosperity on Crete.1 The more warlike Mycenaeans were unable to overthrow Minoan hegemony until the latter collapsed in the 14th century BC.2 Conversely, Athens could still be threatened by a land based power that put their whole empire at risk, both in terms of economic and physical vulnerabilities such as interrupting the flow of vital continental goods and attacking Athens itself. Without a body of water that acted as a defensive barrier, Athens was at an immediate disadvantage despite having a powerful navy. To combat this problem, the Athenians had built a wall around Athens and the port poleis of Piraeus and Phalerum in 457 BC.3 When the first phase of the Peloponnesian War began, known as the Archidamian War (431-421 BC), and the Spartans marched on Athens in 431 BC led by Archidamus, the rural Athenians took refugee within the Long Walls. Rebuffed and un- equipped for a siege, the Spartan infantry could only pillage the countryside.4 However, this de- fence brought on new problems in the form of disease and civil discord. Athens could not sup- 1 Thuc.1.4; 1.8. 2 Denis Doxey, “Causes and Effects of the Fall of Knossos in 1375 B.C.,” Oxford Journal of Ar- chaeology 6, no. 3 (November 1987): 301-2, 306-7, 312. 3 Thuc.1.107. 4 Debra Hamel, The Battle of Arginusae: Victory at Sea and its Tragic Aftermath in the Final Years of the Peloponnesian War (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2015), 25, and Diod.12.45.1-2, and John Nash, “Sea Power in the Peloponnesian War,” Naval War Col- lege Review 71, no. 1 (2018): 123, and Thuc.2.13-4; 2.23. It is debated as to how effective the Spartans were at pillaging and razing, as the countryside, crops, and tools available to the Spar- tan warriors did not lend themselves well to easy destruction. However, it is still likely that the sight of foreign soldiers destroying homes would have a psychological effect on the populace of Athens, especially for those who had lived outside the Long Walls. %2 port the increased population, leaving many homeless. Along with the psychological effect of seeing Athenian land being ravaged by the Spartans, many Athenians became discontented with Pericles, who was Athens’ de facto leader.5 It is a testament to his leadership abilities, or the peo- ple’s desperation, that he was able to retain his position as general and gain power in the face of extreme disquiet.6 Under his leadership the Athenians adopted the ‘Periclean Strategy’. It was a military doctrine that focused on hit-and-run tactics behind enemy lines utilizing their navy to ferry their military unmolested.7 Furthermore, the Athenians were to avoid facing the superior Spartans in direct combat. While it was an unconventional strategy for its time, Pericles believed that through attrition the Peloponnesian League could be weakened enough to allow Athens sur- vival.8 The polis’ unity was challenged again when the Plague of Athens struck (429 BC) and decimated a third of the population.9 Had Pericles not rallied the Athenians during this stressful period, the Athenians may have decided to abandon their defensive strategy and to meet Sparta in the field: a popular idea at the time.10 However, the same plague ultimately claimed Pericles’ life.11 His leadership had been crucial for the Athenian war effort, and while he was not popular among the people, future leaders lacked his long-term strategic skills. Athens’ geographic posi- tioning forced the Athenians to live under siege-like conditions; Athens lost men and their most important leader, leaving behind long term consequences to their naval authority. Athens was also at great risk economically. The Athenians were trapped within the city limits, and could not access the surrounding countryside, making them dependent on the port po- lis Piraeus to enable allied poleis to supply them by sea.12 Athens required its allies to remain loyal to maintain the stability, health, and defence of the Athenian Empire.13 All member poleis 5 Diod.12.45.4, Hamel, The Battle of Arginusae, 25, Nash, “Sea Power,” 125, and Thuc.2.23; 2.52. 6 Thuc.2.65.1-5. 7 Thuc.2.65.7. 8 Thuc.2.65.7. 9 Diod.12.45.2, Hamel, The Battle of Arginusae, 25, and Thuc.2.49. 10 Thuc.2.23-24. 11 Thuc.2.65. 12 Athanassios Platias, “Grand Strategies Clashing: Athenian and Spartan Strategies in Thucy- dides’ “History of the Peloponnesian War”,” Comparative Strategy 21, no. 5 (October 2002): 380, and Brian Rutishauser, Athens and the Cyclades: Economic Strategies 540-314 BCE (Ox- ford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 117-8, 120. 13 It should also be noted that many of these allied poleis became more like subjects to the Athe- nians as their navies were put under direct Athenian control and they were forced to give mone- tary tribute to Athens instead. This led to the idea of an Athenian “Empire” despite technically remaining as part of the Delian League. %3 of the Delian League were obliged to contribute a military fleet or monetary tribute to the League, but the Athenians increasingly dominated the League through their control of the trea- sury and the levying of heavy taxes and tributes, leaving many supposed allies dissatisfied and willing to revolt.14 Rebelling poleis posed a significant threat, as such defections deprived Athens of vital resources and presented a potential threat should the rebels ever side with the Pelopon- nesian League, such as the attempted rebellion on Lesbos by Mytilene in 428 whose navy could threaten the Athenians.15 Due to their geographic positioning, Athens could not afford to have unwilling allies as they were the lifeline of Athens and its navy. Relying on shipped goods had its advantages. It was practically impossible for the Pelo- ponnesian League to blockade Athens, as they lacked a significant naval force to challenge Athens, meaning that Athens was able to remain supplied uninterrupted.16 However, there were several locations on the mainland that supplied Athens with vital material. This meant that Athens could still be threatened by a land power in spite of the naval force that Athens had at its disposal.17 The polis Amphipolis is one such example, as it was valued for its timber needed for shipbuilding, silver mines to pay the army and navy, and it occupied a strategic geographic posi- tion that would allow Sparta to threaten other Delian League poleis.18 Following the Athenian victory at Sphacteria in 425 BC, Spartan general Brasidas marched on and captured Amphipolis in 424 BC.19 This was a devastating blow to the Athenians. In a single stroke, Athens’ whole war effort was at risk. Despite their victory at Sphacteria, the capture of Amphipolis meant the Athe- nians no longer had access to the valuable silver mines or wood supply, without which the in- tegrity of their army and navy was threatened. The Spartans had effectively exploited Athenian dependency on geographically vulnerable resources. This was a great weakness and it played a role in the ultimate demise of the Athenian Empire and their naval dominance. After ten years of ceaseless war, the losses of Sphacteria, Amphipolois, generals, and sol- diers added to the mounting exhaustion that both sides faced. Following the battle to retake Am- phipolis in 422 BC, a tenuous peace was created known as the Peace of Nicias. Named after the eponymous Athenian general, the peace treaty concluded the Archidamian War in 421 BC.20 De- 14 Thuc.2.80; 3.2; 3.3.1.
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