^ Claasiral ^nits^ ( 10 THUCYDIDES BOOK VI THUCYDIDES BOOK VI EDITED BY E. C. MAECHANT, M.A. TRINITY COLLEGE, OXFORD ASSISTANT-MASTER IN ST. PAUL'S SCHOOL FELLOW AND LATE ASSISTANT-TUTOR OF PETEBHOUSE, CAMBRIDGE LATE PROFESSOR OF GREEK AND ANCIENT HISTORY IN QUEEN'S COLLEGE, \ LONDON fLontron MACMILLAN AND CO., Lt NEW YORK : THE MACMILLAN CO. 1897 ftd>c • FRIDERICO • GVLIELMO WALKER VI RO NVLLA EGENTI LAVDATIONE ET IVVBNTVTI FIDE ET LITERARVM STVDI08AE I CONTENTS PAQK Introduction— I. The Sicilian Expedition ix II. The MSS. and Text of the Sixth Book . iviii III. Some Graces xxx IV. Criticism of the Book in detail . xli Text 1 Notes US Appendix—On the Speech of Alcibiades, cc. 89-92 . 255 Index—Greek 259 English 294 INTRODUCTION I. Remarks on the Sicilian Expedition Intervention in —It is to § 1. Athenian Sicily. usual classify the states of antiquity according to the character of their government, and for Greek history down to the Peloponnesian War (431-404) this classification, derived from the teaching of Aristotle, is essential. But during the war the essential dis- tinction is not between oligarchy and democracy : it is much more between Ionian and Dorian. What is held to draw states into united action is the natural bond of common origin. In practice the artificial bond of common interest may prove as strong or stronger than the natural bond, and may lead to alliance between aliens or enmity between kinsmen. In order to understand the transactions between the independent states, we have to banish from our minds the elaborate rules that constitute modern Inter- national Law. The right of intervention in disputes between independent states is now hemmed round with many restrictions. But in the Greek world the right to intervene on behalf of kinsmen was never called in ^ and intervention on behalf of question ; ^ Cf. Lawrence Prhieiples ofInternational Laio p. 27. X INTRODUCTION allies, even when the alliance was concluded after the outbreak of hostilities, was held to \ye at least technically justifiable. The intervention of Athens on behalf of Leontini in 427 B.C., being an interven- tion on behalf of kinsmen and allies, was accordingly justifiable. But if, even after the growth of modern International Law, we scarcely look for straight- forward dealing in the intercourse of states, still less can it be supposed that the Greeks were really guided in their resolutions by the abstract principles that they professed. Thucydides keeps constantly before us the contrast between Athenian professions and Athenian intentions. Their real excuse, he tells us, though least voiced at the time, was the desire to add Sicily to their empire. Hitherto the expansion of the Athenian P^mpire had been the natural result of naval supremacy. But it was one of the unhappy effects of the Peloponnesian War that it raised in the minds of a powerful party at Athens what we call 'imperial aspirations' — the desire to e.xtend the empire without regard to its natural limitations. A war had broken out between Leontini and Syracuse, and in 428 Leontini sent the orator Gorgias with others to Athens to solicit help. In response to this request a few ships were sent to Sicily under Laches, the political supjx)rter of Nicias. The only solid work Laches accomplished—solid with mischief, as it turned out—was the conclusion of alliance with the old alien city Segesta. A larger force sent in in to a fresh did 425, response appeal, nothing ; and in 424 the war in Sicily, that had threatened to become general, was stayed by the Pacification of Gela, the work of the Syracusan patriot Hcrmocrates. The Athenians, though little pleased with the inter- SICILIAN EXPEDITION xi ruption of their designs, were constrained to with- draw from the island. But in 422 fresh troubles between Leontini and Syracuse were reported at Athens. The Leontines, in order to increase their security against Syracuse, had enrolled new citizens, and proposed to provide them with land at the expense of the rich aristocrats. These latter protested, and obtained help from Syracuse. This gave Athens a pretext for sending out Phaeax, who was to attempt the formation of an anti-Syracusan party in Sicily, ostensibly with the of Leontini. his efforts failed purpose saving But ; and Syracuse actually appropriated Leontini and divided its land. In the winter of 416 B.C. Segesta took advantage of the alliance concluded in 426 to ask for Athenian help against her neighbour Selinus, with whom she was at war. Selinus had already received the support of Syracuse. The result of this request was the great Sicilian Expedition, which was opened with the most brilliant splendour in June 415, and came to its awful close in September 413. § 2. The Athenian Forces. —The expedition, under- taken with the avowed object of helping Segesta and Leontini, quickly resolved itself into a war between Athens and Syracuse ; and the states that took an active part on one side or the other were not much fewer in number than the whole of those that fought in the Peloponnesian War. But it was not so much the natural bond of kinship that united them as the artificial connexion of obligation resulting from treaties.^ in his Thucydides says (ii. 65) that judgment the 1 Thuc. vii, 57, 1. xii INTRODUCTION forces sent out originally were adequate. Experience had shown that armed intervention in Sicily on a small scale was worse than useless, and Nicias was clearly right in requiring large numbers. The chief items were 5100 hoplites and 134 triremes. But it is computed that not less than 36,000 men in all sailed to Sicily. The absence of cavalry is remark- able, because Syracuse was particularly strong in this arm. But we must remember that when Nicias reckoned up the forces, he intended to attack Selinus and Syracuse immediately on arriving in Sicily. In an assault by land and sea cavalry would not be and if for further it necessary ; required operations could be obtained in Sicily. His original intention was frustrated (1) because Italy failed to give the he because broke support expected ; (2) Segesta her because the in promises ; (3) rising Sicily that Alcibiades confidently foretold did not take place. § 3. The Generals. — The generals chosen to command were Nicias, Alcibiades, and Lamachus. Nicias had been in constant employment both at home and abroad for twelve years. He was strongly opposed to the expedition, and when in spite of his protests it was decided upon, he hoped to limit the hostilities to the attainment of their declared object. At the conference held at Rhegium he practically advised the abandoning of the contemplated attack on Syracuse, and proposed only to coerce or persuade Selinus. Under the circumstances the proposal was reasonable but it ^vas little to find surely ; likely favour with Alcibiades, or indeed with the troops. It was only in 421 B.c. that Alcibiades began to exert influence on Athenian politics. He was opposed to the Peace of Nicias, and he attempted to SICILIAN EXPEDITION xiii counteract its effect by arranging a new confederacy in the Peloponnese. But the allies were defeated at Mantinea in 418. He had been strategus for the first time in 420-19, and again in 419-18, perhaps ;ilso in 417-16. He was an egoist and an opportunist. With his unbounded ambition, he looked upon the expedition as a means of rising to a predominant position at Athens. With his private life we are not recall concerned here ; but that his and banish- ment at the very beginning of the expedition was a grave error on the part of the government cannot be doubted. Thucydides himself says that the expedi-^ tion was ruined mainly through the ill-judged measures adopted by the Ecclesia after the departure/ of the forces. And of these measures the chief/ were the recall of Alcibiades in 415 and the reten- tion of Nicias in 413 after he had advised the| government that he was not in a j&t state of health to command an army. At the Ehegium Conference the advice of Alci- biades was guided by his own taste for diplomacy and his ambition to accomplish the objects of the expedition in spite of the disappointments with which he had met. They would make alliances first, and would then deal with Syracuse and Selinus. It is difficult to see what merit such a policy possessed. Either the Athenians should have attacked Syracuse at once, or they should have abandoned the intention of attacking her. To lose the advantage of surprising the enemy was to sacrifice the chief hope of success. But Alcibiades' experience in the Peloponnese was a bad preparation for dealing with Siceliot states that were at least as much afraid of Athens as of Syracuse. xiv INTRODUCTION Lamachus had gained great reputation as a brave soldier before he was elected strategus for the first time in 424—the year in which Thucydides himself attained the strategia. But he was a {wor man and devoid of political influence. He saw that the real business in hand was to attack Syracuse, and he accordingly urged that there should be no delay before making the attack. This spirited advice was rejected by Nicias, and Lamachus thereupon gave his vote for the plan of Alcibiades. After the recall of the latter he followed the wishes of Nicias im- plicitly. His death during the assault on the second Syracusan counterwork left Nicias sole commander. Lamachus had led a few of his men across a trench and found himself without supports in the presence of the enemy's cavalry.