Greek Declamation

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Greek Declamation GREEK DECLAMATION D. A. RUSSELL READER IN CLASSICAL LITERATURE AND FELLOW Of ST JOHN’S COLLEGE, OXFORD CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS CAMBRIDGE LONDON NEW YORK NEW ROCHELLE MELBOURNE SYDNEY Published by the Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge C32 IRP 32 East 57th Street, New York, NY 10022, USA Contents 296 Beaconsfield Parade, Middle Park, Melbourne 3206, Australia © Cambridge University Press 1983 First published 1983 Preface vii Printed in Great Britain by the University Press, Cambridge i Evidence, definitions, origins i Library of Congress catalogue 83—7270 card number: 2 Sophistopolis, or the world of the British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Aristeus 21 Russell, D. A. Teachers and theories 40 Greek declamation. 3 I. Greek orations—History and criticism 4 Performers and occasions 74 I. Title Character and characters 87 888’. 0108 PA3263 ISBN 0 521 25780 8 6 Declamation and history io6 Bibliography 129 /iL Indexes 133 7r3 j UP v origins 20 Evidence, dfinitions, 2 Polybius,8’ when he criticizes the historian Timaeus for putting speeches into the mouths of his characters as though he was Sophistopolis, or the world of the ‘arguing a set case in a lesson’ and following text—book rules like his Aristeus a schoolboy. finally, there is the critic Demetrius: whatever and date, his examples reflect special knowledge of fourth— third-century writing, and nothing later. So the few quotations the that sound like declamation may tentatively be added here: at It ideo ego adulescentulos existimo in scholis stultissimos fieri quia man who accuses Aristides of absence from the naval battle his nihil cx his quae in usu habemus aut audiunt aut vident. Salamis; the man who said that ‘Xerxes came down with all King Alexander ‘The reason why young men become such idiots in school is, I think, people’; and the ingenious punster who bade that they neither hear nor see any of the things of our ordinary life.’ Olympia, ‘run his mother’s name’ — in other words, compete at Petronius the name of which recalls that of his mother Olympias.82 Fragmentary and vague as our knowledge is, meletë, we may be sure, was familiar in the Hellenistic age. Synesius’ treatise On Dreams, written ‘in a single night’ in A.D. 403 or 404, contains an entertaining satire on declaimers at work: 81 Polyb. 12.25a3, 8; 25k8. fairweather (1981) io8. 82 i8, 236. The date of Demetrius is Demetrius 238 (cf Kohl I9I5 53), It seems to me that it is inappropriate to exercise one’s skill on Miltiades much later than 270 B.C.’, uncertain. Grube (1961) 6 argues for ‘Alexandria, not amount of early (i.e. and Cimon and an assortment of anonymous characters, or on the but there is no convincing evidence for this. However, the considerable, and there I fourth— and early third—century) material in the book is political enmities of Rich Man and Poor Man, over which saw two early. is therefore a probability that these examples also are relatively elderly gentlemen disputing in the public theatre. Both of them were very serious about their philosophy, and each carried, by my estimate, a talent’s weight of beard. But all this seriousness didn’t stop them from abusing one another and waxing indignant, waving their arms about uncontrollably in the process of delivering lengthy speeches on behalf of— well, at the time I thought it was friends of theirs, but actually, as people lost no time in pointing out to me, it was persons who, far from being their friends, never existed then, or earlier, or indeed in the natural world at all. for where can there be a form of government that allows the war hero as his reward the right to kill a fellow citizen who is his political rival? And when a man of ninety debates a fiction, how long is he putting off study of the truth?’ Synesius, as the last sentence shows, speaks as a philosopher, for whom rhetoric is a frivolous hindrance to salvation. The ninety-year-old is Libanius, who was born in 314. The subject was identified by Synesius’ commentator2 as one in which a rich man promises to supply food to the citizens if he is allowed to 1 Synesius, Dr insomniis zo, pp. 187—8 Terzaghi. 2 Nicephorus Gregoras: see Foerster’s ed. of Libanius, V1I.183 n. I. 21 22 Sophistopolis, or the world of the Aristeus Sophistopolis, or the world of the Aristeus 23 kill his poor enemy; the agreement is made, but the rich man the Athenian ten, but some smaller number.8 And this divergence neglects to feed the poor man’s children, and is accused of murder from Athenian practice is interesting. Even in a variant of the when they die.3 Arginusae story,9 there is a single general against whom the Where indeed do such things happen? Only in a city of the charge of abandoning the dead and wounded is brought. Now imagination, from which there is less to be learned about the both in classical times and later there were many cities that had realities of ancient life than about its characteristic fantasies. It is executive stratfgoi, single or collegiate; and the declaimers no certainly possible to form a picture of this imaginary world; and doubt took this common situation, without troubling much this is, I think, both a legitimate and a useful exercise. In so far about historical niceties.10 The point is that the arrangements as declamation is an educational tool, the study ofits settings gives known from the Attic orators and historians were not taken into an idea of the values and prejudices that teachers assumed or the mise—en—scène of plasmata. Similarly with the judicial system: encouraged. In so far as it is literature, or at least ‘sub—literature’, largejury-courts are not regularly assumed, and in one of the few its characteristic scenarios and attitudes have the same sort of places where details are given, we hear of a court of seven judges interest as the world of the comic or the detective story — or, for that divides two, two, three in assessing a penalty: do the three that matter, the world of the epic. Let us at least make the constitute a majority?1’ attempt. The primary function of the strategos is of course to lead in 2 war. Sophistopolis is usually at war with her neighbours, and her Let us call the imaginary city ‘Sophistopolis’. It is of course a young men conscripted for service, illness grants exemption, but Greek city and worships Greek gods. Most important, it is (like does A father shows his boy the corpses, and the boy classical Athens) a democracy, where the rhetor — both politician dies of shock: has the father caused his death?’3 Yet for most and expert in oratory4 — is something of a hero. He persuades of the time when the rhetors were composing and teaching these an enemy to make peace: does he deserve the war hero’s exercises, real Greek cities were locally at peace; the only wars privilege ? He is so successful that they forbid him to speak and that might affect them were conducted by the Roman power, he teaches instead: has he broken the ban?6 His encomium on either against barbarian enemies or when it was at loggerheads death causes an epidemic of suicide; is he to blame?7 That with itself. This is of course less true of the Hellemstic age, but democracy is the right form of government, no one ever doubts. the constant campaigning — with its individual heroism and cruel Partisans of the demos are honest, the rich are cruel, potential sieges — is hardly a reflection of any direct experience. War, tyrants are a constant danger. There is a popular assembly, easily Single strategos: e.g. Liban. Dccl. 44, Sopatros, RG vol.198, 232. College: moved to tears or anger and even to riot. There is a council (boulë) e.g. Apsines 267.6ff Sp.—H. P. Dugit (Jander [1913] 63) = RG VIII.223 (Sopatros). — in particular, it hears requests which has somejudicial functions 1ff. bear on this is in the See in general W. Schwahn, RE vi.io8 Literary texts which for leave to commit suicide. The executive authority include Acts 16.20, Chion, Epist. 13, Chariton 4.5. hands of a single general (strategos) or of a college ofstratfgoi — not “ [Liban.] Dccl. 45, cf Dccl. 46. Dr Winterbottom draws my attention to [Quint.] Dccl. mm. 365, RLM 97.15—19 (Fortunatianus), Gellius 9.15.7. The Cf Liban. Dccl. 35 for the setting of this plasma. problem of what constitutes a majority is also in Heliodorus 1.14.1, where the used in This ambiguity of fri-tcap is easily exploited. The word was court is 2,700 strOng, with i,ooo for exile and the rest divided between two hence fifth-century Athens of’speakers’ who proposed measures to the assembly; different modes of execution. abuse. The 12 it often means ‘politicians’ and ot frropss in this sense incur comic Sopatros, RG vni.i85. This may be added to the literary evidence for the sense ‘teacher of rhetoric’ is later. topic of love’s sickness adduced by C. Miralles, in Erotica Antiqua, ed. B. P. Choncius, Or. 42. Reardon (Bangor 1976) 20f. V1II.407. 13 6 Anon., RG VI;I.408. Ibid. RC vol.185 (Sopatros). r 24 Sophistopolis, or the world of the Aristeus Sophistopolis, or the world of the Aristeus 25 however, was essential to the declaimers’ world.
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