No. 115 y October 2006

he European Union thinks of Russia’s Soft Power Ambitions itself as a ‘soft power’, which is Tdefined by Joseph Nye as the Nicu Popescu “ability to get what you want through attraction rather than through coercion” redressed both inside as well as outside distinct from what the West understands and which can “be cultivated through Russia. as democracy. Thus, Russia’s relations with allies, economic democracy should not necessarily assistance, and cultural exchanges.”1 The first front for Russia’s new soft correspond to Western standards of Few would think that Russia has ‘soft power ambition is domestic. Putin’s democracy. As Sergei Ivanov, Russia’s power’ ambitions, but the truth is that administration, represented by its defence minister puts it, “if there is Russia has started to invest in the deputy chief Vladislav Surkov, has been western democracy, there should be an infrastructure of a soft power. working on the development of eastern democracy as well”.7 ‘sovereign democracy’5 as a concept The moment of truth for Russia came that should be the backbone of Russia’s On paper, the ideology of ‘sovereign with the ‘Orange Revolution’ in ‘national idea’. It is not easy to grasp democracy’ is presented as if it were not Ukraine, when the power of ideas was what ‘sovereign democracy’ means that different from what is understood revealed by events. Konstantin exactly. The concept is deliberately in the West by democracy. But the Kosachev, Chairman of the foreign vague, and the debate still ongoing.6 reality is different. The rule of law, affairs committee of the Russian Duma Nevertheless, this notion is centred protection of minorities, a free press, a was puzzled by such developments. For around two core ideas. First is the idea viable political opposition, or legally him, “the situation is absurd” when of sovereignty. This concept is guaranteed property rights are not part post-Soviet states enjoy more benefits understood as non-interference from the of the reality of the ‘sovereign from cooperating with Russia and still West. The emphasis on ‘sovereign democracy’. From the jailing of they want to “enter into the straitjacket democracy’ is meant as a counter- Khodorkovsky, to the assassination of of European institutions and to fall example to post-revolutionary Ukraine Politkovskaya, from the witch hunts under the diktat of Brussels.”2 This and Georgia, which in Moscow’s view against Georgians or North Caucasians happens because Russia “cannot explain are ruled from the outside. Second, is (after Beslan), to problems with the purpose of its presence in the post- the idea that Russia has its own set of Western businesses over, for example, Soviet Union… The West is doing this values. These values are democratic, but oil and gas development on Sakhalin under the banner of democratisation, they emerge from Russia’s unique Island, the actual functioning of this and one gets the impression we are historical experience, and they are ‘sovereign democracy’ raises many doing it only for the sake of ourselves… questions. Nikolai Petrov, a Russian Our activeness is following too openly expert, argues that sovereign democracy Russian interests. This is patriotic but Political Studies and Public Administration in is “simply a new brand name for not competitive.”3 Thus, Russia realised Bucharest, has suggested this term. managed and centralised political that its policy suffers from an 5 See for example Vladislav Surkov, development and can be considered to ‘ideological emptiness’.4 This had to be “Suverenitet eto politicheskii sinonim be the highest (and last?) stage of konkurentnosposobnosti”, Moskovskie 8 Novosti, 10 March 2006 managed democracy” Vladimir Ryzhkov, a Russian MP with liberal 1 (http://www.mn.ru/issue.php?2006-8-1). Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to 6 Success in World Politics, New York, NY: There is a certain debate in Russia whether ‘sovereign democracy’ is a proper way to Public Affairs, 2004. 7 “Ministr Oborony Soobshil Inostrannym 2 describe Russia’s direction. For example, See Konstantin Kosachev, “Neftegazovaia Deputy Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev Jurnalistam chto Sushchestvuet Osobaya Diplomatia kak Ugroza Marginalizatsii”, opposes the term because it leaves a “weird Vostochnaya Demokratia”, Newsru.com, 12 Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 28 December 2004 aftertaste”. However, these discussions refer to July 2004 (http://www.newsru.com/arch/ (http://www.ng.ru/world/2004-12- the proper packaging of Russia’s development, russia/12jul2004/democracy.html). 28/5_uspeh.html). rather than the essence and the direction of it. 8 Nikolai Petrov, “From Managed Democracy 3 Ibid. See interview by Dmitri Medvedev, Ekspert to Sovereign Democracy: Putin’s regime 4 Stanislav Secrieru, a specialist on Russian journal, 24 July 2006 (http://www.expert.ru/ evolution in 2005”, PONARS Policy Memo foreign policy at the National School of politics/2006/07/interview_medvedev/). 396, December 2005.

Nicu Popescu is a CEPS Research Fellow in the European Neighbourhood programme. He thanks Michael Emerson, Stanislav Secrieru and Elena Gnedina for their useful comments on earlier drafts. The views expressed are those of the author alone.

Available for free downloading from the CEPS website (http://www.ceps.be) y © Nicu Popescu 2006 views, states that “constitutional the historical destiny of Russia… It is Russia-friendly and Russia-financed principle of the people as sovereign is not only a positive fact but also a NGOs and think-tanks have emerged in being replaced by the unconstitutional burden because under the wings of many CIS states and even in the notion of sovereign democracy. This countries with maximum sovereignty, secessionist entities. For example, in term implies just the opposite of other countries and peoples are Ukraine, Russian political technologists democracy. It means limiting gathering. And we become responsible are busy advancing the idea of a democracy and political competition for them.”11 Thus, Russia’s ‘sovereign ‘sovereign Ukraine’,14 which should not and indulging the ruling elite's desire to democracy’ is not just about deflecting “sacrifice its long struggle for preserve its power by any means criticism from the West, but also about independence and national revival” and necessary”.9 extending this ‘sovereignty’ to Russia’s should not “give away its national neighbours. Nikolai Patrushev, Russia’s sovereignty to the European The idea of ‘sovereign democracy’ has head of Federal Security Service (FSB) bureaucracy”.15 In the South Caucasus, a number of functions. The first is to is even more outspoken. He states: a so-called ‘Caucasus Institute for provide Putin’s authoritarianism with “Non-governmental organisations must Democracy’ with branches in Abkhazia respectable ‘democratic’ clothes in not be allowed to engage in any activity and South Ossetia, as well as in order to strengthen it internally and they like…We are interested in unifying Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia has insulate it from international criticism. the respective laws of the Community been very active recently.16 The The second is to challenge the West’s of Independent States into clear institute organises regular roundtables, idea of democracy and human rights as legislation on the activity of NGOs. The supports cultural activities, and has a set of universal values and practices. NGOs must be told what problems they even launched a FM radio station in As a result of the ‘colour revolutions’ in should tackle and for what purpose and South Ossetia (Aizald-FM) and a Ukraine and Georgia, Russia’s leaders they should engage in activity of that newspaper in Abkhazia (Gudok- learned that crude manipulation might kind… The Constitution and laws must Abkhazia). In Moldova, a Free Europe- not be enough to remain in power, that be changed before the wave of orange Moldova Foundation was created ideas matter and that NGOs can make revolutions spread to the leaders of the recently and its links to Russia have revolutions. They have also learned that Commonwealth of Independent been obvious. The Russian authorities a ‘legitimacy deficit’ can undermine the States.”12 have been boosting a CIS election elites. Thus the Kremlin had to develop monitoring organisation (CIS-EMO) its tools for ideological manipulation, Russia’s way to consolidate its political whose verdicts for elections conducted enhance control of the circulation of regime and strengthen its dominance in in the CIS have always been ideas and the NGOs in a more pro- its neighbours is increasingly creative diametrically opposed to OSCE active manner. Even the Russian and pro-active. Gas prices and trade opinions on the elections. Orthodox Church is involved in the embargoes are not the only tools to project. The central question of a high- extend Russian influence. In Ivan Inside Russia, these ‘soft power’ profile and much-publicised congress of Krastev words, the major objective of weapons are older and better developed. the Russian Church was: “Are Western the Russian policy “is to develop an They comprise media outlets, youth standards of human happiness efficient infrastructure of ideas, movements, internet websites, expert applicable to all countries and institutions, networks and media outlets networks (www.kreml.org), regular cultures?” The answer is a clear no. In that can use the predictable crisis of the conferences and even publishing the words of the Church’s main current orange-type regimes to regain houses. It is not difficult to see that such ideologue Miropolit Kiril, Russia influence not simply at the level of outlets are part of the same network. should develop its own version of what government but at the level of society as They have links to each other, and the human rights are and promote it well. Russia will not fight democracy in same faces, commentaries and ideas are internationally in order to oppose the these countries. Russia will fight for simultaneously advanced by such West’s “dictatorial stance” that all other democracy – its kind of democracy.”13 outlets. traditions “must be silenced and Russia invests in the development of They look like a network, but they are subdued.”10 NGO infrastructure, and enhancing its vertically integrated in a huge ‘public A second front for Russia’s new channels to bring across the Kremlin’s relations’ machine. They often lead to a ideological drive is external. Vitalii message at all levels. Various Kremlin restricted group of political Tretyakov, a well-known Russian supported organisations are technologists close to or inside the journalist close to the Kremlin, is blunt mushrooming. The scope of their Kremlin, such as Gleb Pavlovski or in stating that “Sovereign democracy is activity is truly all-encompassing. Modest Kolerov. The latter is head of

11 14 9 Vladimir Ryzhkov, “Sovereign Democracy Rossiiskaya Gazeta, “Suverennoe See interview by Gleb Pavlosvki in and the Usurper State”, The Moscow Times, 16 Gosudarstvo v Usloviiah Globalizatsii”, 6 Kazahstankaya Pravda, 27 July 2004 August 2005. September 2006 (http://kreml.org/media/61409251). 10 (http://www.rg.ru/2006/09/06/diskussia.html). 15 See interview with Modest Kolerov, Speech by Mitropolit Kirill of Smolensk and 12 Kaliningrad, chairman of the foreign affairs Newtimes.ru, “No Retreat from the Cold”, Kreml.org, 20 July 2004 (http://kreml.org/ department of the Moscow Patriarchate; July 2005 (http://www.newtimes.ru/eng/ interview/60835783); as quoted in Igor “Prava Cheloveka i Nravstvennaia detail.asp?art_id=1398). Torbakov, “Ukrainian Elections: Kremlin Otvetstvennost”, X Russkii Narodnyi Sobor, 4 13 Ivan Krastev, “Russia’s Post-Orange Agitprop at Work”, Jamestown Foundation, 29 April 2006 (http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/ Empire”, Opendemocracy.net, 20 October September 2004. 102261.html). 2005. 16 The website is http://www.caucasusid.com/.

2 | Nicu Popescu the directorate for interregional and cultural ties with foreign countries in the Presidential Administration of Russia which was created to coordinate this type of ‘soft power’ activities.17 A typical example of how these networks reproduce themselves is the Evropa publishing house, which was co- founded by the Russian Institute (www.russ.ru – a Pavlovski project), by Regnum.ru, a website set-up by Kolerov, and a respected economic journal Ekspert. The same group also organised a series of conferences and seminars under the banner of a European Forum (www.europeforum.info). And the above-mentioned Caucasus Institute for Democracy publishes its books at the Evropa publishing house. One need not go far to see where the traces of ‘independent’ outlets lead to. And that the heavy use of such words as democracy, Europe, freedom, etc. is simply an instance of ‘virtual politics’, designed to disguise a different reality.18 The challenge of these ‘soft power’ instruments is serious. Such enterprises are not Soviet-type propaganda. Nor are they true attempts to promote democracy and pluralism. They are designed to create an intellectual milieu of sophisticated, though tricked, ideological support for the current Russian authorities. They also serve as a source of ideology for the Kremlin’s pragmatists. The latter are driven by financial and power interests, not ideas or norms. But they seek to strengthen further their power by complementing it with a ‘soft’ dimension. It is the new face of ‘smart authoritarianism’ that speaks the language of Western norms and is very flexible, but has very little to do with the values of democracy, Eastern- or Western-style.

17 For an article on Modest Kolerov’s appointment in the Presidential Administration see “Putin Appoints Velvet Counterrevolutionary”, 23 March 2005, Kommersant (http://www.kommersant.com/ page.asp?id=556859). 18 Andrew Wilson, Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005.

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