Russia and China: Axis of Revisionists? Angela Stent
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The Russia You Never Met
The Russia You Never Met MATT BIVENS AND JONAS BERNSTEIN fter staggering to reelection in summer 1996, President Boris Yeltsin A announced what had long been obvious: that he had a bad heart and needed surgery. Then he disappeared from view, leaving his prime minister, Viktor Cher- nomyrdin, and his chief of staff, Anatoly Chubais, to mind the Kremlin. For the next few months, Russians would tune in the morning news to learn if the presi- dent was still alive. Evenings they would tune in Chubais and Chernomyrdin to hear about a national emergency—no one was paying their taxes. Summer turned to autumn, but as Yeltsin’s by-pass operation approached, strange things began to happen. Chubais and Chernomyrdin suddenly announced the creation of a new body, the Cheka, to help the government collect taxes. In Lenin’s day, the Cheka was the secret police force—the forerunner of the KGB— that, among other things, forcibly wrested food and money from the peasantry and drove some of them into collective farms or concentration camps. Chubais made no apologies, saying that he had chosen such a historically weighted name to communicate the seriousness of the tax emergency.1 Western governments nod- ded their collective heads in solemn agreement. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank both confirmed that Russia was experiencing a tax collec- tion emergency and insisted that serious steps be taken.2 Never mind that the Russian government had been granting enormous tax breaks to the politically connected, including billions to Chernomyrdin’s favorite, Gazprom, the natural gas monopoly,3 and around $1 billion to Chubais’s favorite, Uneximbank,4 never mind the horrendous corruption that had been bleeding the treasury dry for years, or the nihilistic and pointless (and expensive) destruction of Chechnya. -
The Origins of United Russia and the Putin Presidency: the Role of Contingency in Party-System Development
The Origins of United Russia and the Putin Presidency: The Role of Contingency in Party-System Development HENRY E. HALE ocial science has generated an enormous amount of literature on the origins S of political party systems. In explaining the particular constellation of parties present in a given country, almost all theoretical work stresses the importance of systemic, structural, or deeply-rooted historical factors.1 While the development of social science theory certainly benefits from the focus on such enduring influ- ences, a smaller set of literature indicates that we must not lose sight of the crit- ical role that chance plays in politics.2 The same is true for the origins of politi- cal party systems. This claim is illustrated by the case of the United Russia Party, which burst onto the political scene with a strong second-place showing in the late 1999 elec- tions to Russia’s parliament (Duma), and then won a stunning majority in the 2003 elections. Most accounts have treated United Russia as simply the next in a succession of Kremlin-based “parties of power,” including Russia’s Choice (1993) and Our Home is Russia (1995), both groomed from the start primarily to win large delegations that provide support for the president to pass legislation.3 The present analysis, focusing on United Russia’s origin as the Unity Bloc in 1999, casts the party in a somewhat different light. When we train our attention on the party’s beginnings rather than on what it wound up becoming, we find that Unity was a profoundly different animal from Our Home and Russia’s Choice. -
Annual Report
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS ANNUAL REPORT July 1,1996-June 30,1997 Main Office Washington Office The Harold Pratt House 1779 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. 58 East 68th Street, New York, NY 10021 Washington, DC 20036 Tel. (212) 434-9400; Fax (212) 861-1789 Tel. (202) 518-3400; Fax (202) 986-2984 Website www. foreignrela tions. org e-mail publicaffairs@email. cfr. org OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS, 1997-98 Officers Directors Charlayne Hunter-Gault Peter G. Peterson Term Expiring 1998 Frank Savage* Chairman of the Board Peggy Dulany Laura D'Andrea Tyson Maurice R. Greenberg Robert F Erburu Leslie H. Gelb Vice Chairman Karen Elliott House ex officio Leslie H. Gelb Joshua Lederberg President Vincent A. Mai Honorary Officers Michael P Peters Garrick Utley and Directors Emeriti Senior Vice President Term Expiring 1999 Douglas Dillon and Chief Operating Officer Carla A. Hills Caryl R Haskins Alton Frye Robert D. Hormats Grayson Kirk Senior Vice President William J. McDonough Charles McC. Mathias, Jr. Paula J. Dobriansky Theodore C. Sorensen James A. Perkins Vice President, Washington Program George Soros David Rockefeller Gary C. Hufbauer Paul A. Volcker Honorary Chairman Vice President, Director of Studies Robert A. Scalapino Term Expiring 2000 David Kellogg Cyrus R. Vance Jessica R Einhorn Vice President, Communications Glenn E. Watts and Corporate Affairs Louis V Gerstner, Jr. Abraham F. Lowenthal Hanna Holborn Gray Vice President and Maurice R. Greenberg Deputy National Director George J. Mitchell Janice L. Murray Warren B. Rudman Vice President and Treasurer Term Expiring 2001 Karen M. Sughrue Lee Cullum Vice President, Programs Mario L. Baeza and Media Projects Thomas R. -
Comparing and Contrasting Vladimir Putin to Adolf Hitler, Domestically and Internationally, Through the Use of Mass Media by Roshan R
Comparing and Contrasting Vladimir Putin to Adolf Hitler, Domestically and Internationally, through the Use of Mass Media by Roshan R. Varghese, 2014 CTI Fellow David W. Butler High School This curriculum unit is recommended for: Grade 12: American History II-Honors and Standard Grade 11 & 12: United States History-Honors & Standard Keywords: American History, United States History, World History, European History, Vladimir Putin, Russia, Adolf Hitler, Germany Teaching Standards: See Appendix for Common Core Standards addressed in this unit. Synopsis: In this Curriculum Unit, the life and reign of Vladimir Putin of Russia will be compared and contrasted to Adolf Hitler of Germany, domestically and internationally, through the use of mass media. As the events involving Vladimir Putin have unfolded in 2014, many Americans and other Westerners may have harkened back to a time when the world witnessed constant territorial expansion and blatant disregard for the rights of a sovereign nation. In the periods between World War I and World War II (1919-1939), and often known as “the Interwar Era”, the world witnessed much changing of borders, not by popular choice or nationalistic fervor, but rather by will and expedience of a few powerful men. The world witnessed as Chancellor Adolf Hitler’s German troops marched into Austria and the subsequent appeasement of Hitler with the German-speaking Sudetenland of sovereign Czechoslovakia, prior to the Germans steamrolling over much of the European continent. Now today, one such individual is causing the world the same type of alarm and his desires and ambitions do not translate to that tension be reduced as the days pass. -
Mammadov Azerbaijan's Geopolitical Identity.Indd
# 62 VALDAI PAPERS February 2017 www.valdaiclub.com AZERBAIJAN’S GEOPOLITICAL IDENTITY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE 21ST CENTURY CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS Farhad Mammadov About the author: Farhad Mammadov PhD in Philosophy, Director, Center for Strategic Studies under the President of Azerbaijan The views and opinions expressed in this Paper are those of the author and do not represent the views of the Valdai Discussion Club, unless explicitly stated otherwise. AZERBAIJAN’S GEOPOLITICAL IDENTITY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE 21ST CENTURY CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS The 21st century began with chaos in international relations, the growing multipolarity of the once unipolar world, and geographic determinism giving prominence to regional leaders, who are resisting unipolar projects and competing with each other in their geographical region. However, nation states have shown that they are still to be reckoned with. International organizations and transnational law enforcement agencies, which were created to fi ght transnational threats such as international terrorism, drug cartels and criminal organizations, have not increased their effi ciency. Nation states continue to shoulder the biggest burden of fi ghting the above threats. Globalization has stimulated integration and accelerated various global processes, but it has not made this world safer or more stable. The connection between national, regional and global security is growing stronger. The fact that transnational threats operate as a network has highlighted the importance of interaction between nation states in fi ghting these threats. But strained relations between the geopolitical power centers, contradictions between regional states and the revival of bloc mentality are hindering the civilized world from consolidating its resources. -
2019 China Military Power Report
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019 Office of the Secretary of Defense Preparation of this report cost the Department of Defense a total of approximately $181,000 in Fiscal Years 2018-2019. This includes $12,000 in expenses and $169,000 in DoD labor. Generated on 2019May02 RefID: E-1F4B924 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019 A Report to Congress Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, as Amended Section 1260, “Annual Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Public Law 115-232, which amends the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Section 1202, Public Law 106-65, provides that the Secretary of Defense shall submit a report “in both classified and unclassified form, on military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China. The report shall address the current and probable future course of military-technological development of the People’s Liberation Army and the tenets and probable development of Chinese security strategy and military strategy, and of the military organizations and operational concepts supporting such development over the next 20 years. -
Flora and Mary Beard Travel to China to Teach in the Peking Area. Flora Is 45 Years Old and Mary Is 32
1914 August -Flora and Mary Beard travel to China to teach in the Peking area. Flora is 45 years old and Mary is 32. Rise of Japanese power in China (through 1918) WWI begins Panama Canal opens Ernest Shackleton begins his Antarctic expedition and does not return until 1917. Willard is living in Foochow, China while Ellen and the children remain in the U.S. and live in Putnam, CT Willard is 49 years old, Ellen- 46, Phebe- 19, Gould- 18, Geraldine- 16, Dorothy- 13, Marjorie- 8, Kathleen- 6. 50th Wedding Anniversary invitation for Oliver Gould and Nancy Maria Beard. [From the collection of Virginia Beard Van Andel.] Oliver Gould Beard and Nancy Maria Nichols 50th Wedding anniversary 1914 [Photos from the collection of John and Nancy Butte.] ***** [This letter dated March 15, 1914 was written from Foochow, China by Willard to his 8 year old daughter, Marjorie. He tells about a Chinese family that lost their 2 daughters to a sudden illness and how Mr. and Mrs. Christian has to be quarantined in Willard’s house because of it. He will have a Mrs. and Miss Pitcher as boarders in his mountain house this summer. Letter donated to Yale by family in 2006.] American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions Foochow College President‟s Office Foochow, China March 15th 1914. Dear- to whom shall I address this- nothing came from Putnam this last week-let me see whose turn it is to have the letter according to my correspondence register.- it‟s Marjorie‟s turn so here it goes. -
How Dangerous Is Vladimir Putin?
A SYMPOSIUM OF VIEWS THE MAGAZINE OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY 220 I Street, N.E., Suite 200 Washington, D.C. 20002 Phone: 202-861-0791 Fax: 202-861-0790 www.international-economy.com [email protected] How Dangerous Is Vladimir Putin? estern experts have offered various explanations for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s actions in recent years. Some sug- gest Putin has been merely reacting to NATO and EU enlarge- Wment. Others suggest the Russian leader has succumbed to a bout of irrationality, spawned by a desire to return to the “good old days” of the Soviet Union. After all, according to historian Stephen Kotkin, traditional Soviet geopolitical thinking always assumed that Western capitalism would eventually disintegrate. Princeton Professor Harold James suggests Putin’s actions are based on the rational assumption that in the wake of the global financial crisis and subsequent eurozone debt crisis, the West would lack the ability to take decisive action. This would provide Russia with a window to pursue a strategy of expanding its influence. Putin’s bet was that Western policymakers and politicians would stumble in the effort to repair their economic and financial sys- tems in the wake of the crisis. By deliberately exacerbating geo- political tensions, Putin reasoned, the preoccupied West would look even more indecisive and weak. Of course, the Russian leader’s actions have already risked a recession back home with the plummeting of the global price of oil, not to men- tion the economic bite of Western sanctions. On a scale of one to ten—with one suggesting Putin is merely a delirious fool and ten a serious threat—how dangerous is Vladimir Putin to the West? More than thirty noted observers offer their assessment on a scale of one to ten. -
Russia's “Pivot to Asia”
Russia’s “Pivot to Asia”: The Multilateral Dimension Stephen Blank STEPHEN BLANK is a Senior Fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council. He can be reached at <[email protected]>. NOTE: Sections of this working paper draw on Stephen Blank, “Russian Writers on the Decline of Russia in the Far East and the Rise of China,” Jamestown Foundation, Russia in Decline Project, September 13, 2016. Working Paper, June 28, 2017 – Stephen Blank EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This paper explores the opportunities and challenges that Russia has faced in its economic pivot to Asia and examines the potential roadblocks to its future integration with the region with special regard to multilateral Asian institutions. Main Argument Despite the challenges Russia faces, many Russian writers and officials continue to insist that the country is making visible strides forward in its so-called pivot to Asia. Russia’s ability to influence the many multilateral projects that pervade Asia from the Arctic to Southeast Asia and increase its role in them represents an “acid test” of whether or not proclamations of the correctness of Russian policy can stand up to scrutiny. Such scrutiny shows that Russia is failing to benefit from or participate in these projects. The one exception, the Eurasian Union, has become an economic disappointment to both Russia and its other members. Russia is actually steadily losing ground to China in the Arctic, Central Asia, and North Korea. Likewise, in Southeast Asia Moscow has promoted and signed many agreements with members of ASEAN, only to fail to implement them practically. Since Asia, as Moscow well knows, is the most dynamic sector of the global economy, this failure to reform at home and implement the developmental steps needed to compete in Asia can only presage negative geoeconomic and geopolitical consequences for Russia as it steadily becomes increasingly marginalized in the region despite its rhetoric and diplomatic activity. -
Treisman Silovarchs 9 10 06
Putin’s Silovarchs Daniel Treisman October 2006, Forthcoming in Orbis, Winter 2007 In the late 1990s, many Russians believed their government had been captured by a small group of business magnates known as “the oligarchs”. The most flamboyant, Boris Berezovsky, claimed in 1996 that seven bankers controlled fifty percent of the Russian economy. Having acquired massive oil and metals enterprises in rigged privatizations, these tycoons exploited Yeltsin’s ill-health to meddle in politics and lobby their interests. Two served briefly in government. Another, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, summed up the conventional wisdom of the time in a 1997 interview: “Politics is the most lucrative field of business in Russia. And it will be that way forever.”1 A decade later, most of the original oligarchs have been tripping over each other in their haste to leave the political stage, jettisoning properties as they go. From exile in London, Berezovsky announced in February he was liquidating his last Russian assets. A 1 Quoted in Andrei Piontkovsky, “Modern-Day Rasputin,” The Moscow Times, 12 November, 1997. fellow media magnate, Vladimir Gusinsky, long ago surrendered his television station to the state-controlled gas company Gazprom and now divides his time between Israel and the US. Khodorkovsky is in a Siberian jail, serving an eight-year sentence for fraud and tax evasion. Roman Abramovich, Berezovsky’s former partner, spends much of his time in London, where he bought the Chelsea soccer club in 2003. Rather than exile him to Siberia, the Kremlin merely insists he serve as governor of the depressed Arctic outpost of Chukotka—a sign Russia’s leaders have a sense of humor, albeit of a dark kind. -
Russia, China, and Usa in Central Asia.Indd
VALDAI DISCUSSION CLUB REPORT www.valdaiclub.com RUSSIA, CHINA, AND USA IN CENTRAL ASIA: A BALANCE OF INTERESTS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR COOPERATION Timofey Bordachev, Wan Qingsong, Andrew Small MOSCOW, SEPTEMBER 2016 Authors Timofey Bordachev Programme Director of the Foundation for Development and Support of the Valdai Discussion Club, Director of the Center for Comprehensive European and International Studies at the National Research University – Higher School of Economics, Ph.D. in Political Science Andrew Small Senior Transatlantic Fellow, Asia program, German Marshall Fund of the United States Wan Qingsong Research Fellow of the Center for Russian Studies (the National Key Research Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences under the Ministry of Education of PRC), School of Advanced International and Area Studies at East China Normal University; Research Fellow of the Center for Co-development with Neighboring Countries (University - Based Think Tank of Shanghai); holds a Doctorate in Political Science The authors express their gratitude for assistance in preparing the report and selection of reference materials to Kazakova Anastasia, Research Assistant, Center for Comprehensive European and International Studies at the National Research University – Higher School of Economics. The views and opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the Valdai Discussion Club, unless explicitly stated otherwise. Contents Introduction: The Challenge of Central Asia .........................................................................................................3 -
Shanghai, China Overview Introduction
Shanghai, China Overview Introduction The name Shanghai still conjures images of romance, mystery and adventure, but for decades it was an austere backwater. After the success of Mao Zedong's communist revolution in 1949, the authorities clamped down hard on Shanghai, castigating China's second city for its prewar status as a playground of gangsters and colonial adventurers. And so it was. In its heyday, the 1920s and '30s, cosmopolitan Shanghai was a dynamic melting pot for people, ideas and money from all over the planet. Business boomed, fortunes were made, and everything seemed possible. It was a time of breakneck industrial progress, swaggering confidence and smoky jazz venues. Thanks to economic reforms implemented in the 1980s by Deng Xiaoping, Shanghai's commercial potential has reemerged and is flourishing again. Stand today on the historic Bund and look across the Huangpu River. The soaring 1,614-ft/492-m Shanghai World Financial Center tower looms over the ambitious skyline of the Pudong financial district. Alongside it are other key landmarks: the glittering, 88- story Jinmao Building; the rocket-shaped Oriental Pearl TV Tower; and the Shanghai Stock Exchange. The 128-story Shanghai Tower is the tallest building in China (and, after the Burj Khalifa in Dubai, the second-tallest in the world). Glass-and-steel skyscrapers reach for the clouds, Mercedes sedans cruise the neon-lit streets, luxury- brand boutiques stock all the stylish trappings available in New York, and the restaurant, bar and clubbing scene pulsates with an energy all its own. Perhaps more than any other city in Asia, Shanghai has the confidence and sheer determination to forge a glittering future as one of the world's most important commercial centers.