IAI WORKING PAPERS 16 | 04 - FEBRUARY 2016 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-83-5 © 2016 IAI Religion Russia |Ukraine |Russia’s foreign policy |Public opinion |Massmedia | the Orthodox Church. society, themass media andacademia,thegeneral public and of Russian society: thepolitical andeconomic elites, civil analysing the discourse on Ukraine by the main stakeholders Russia perceives Ukraine? These questions are addressed by represent for Russia? Didtheevents inMaidanaffect how retaliation against Russia’s aggression. What does Ukraine relationship betweenMoscow andKiev andtheinternational Russian point of view bearinginmindthedeterioration of the This paper reflects on thecrisis over Ukraine from the ABSTRACT by Giovanna DeMaio Russia’s View of UkraineaftertheCrisis keywords IAI WORKING PAPERS 16 | 04 - FEBRUARY 2016 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-83-5 © 2016 IAI 2 * Orthodox Church. elites, civil society, themassmedia andacademia,thegeneral public andthe of the main stakeholders composing Russian society: the political and economic question byretracingthediscoursesurrounding Ukrainefrom thepoints of view to Putin’s years. Afterwards, thisdiscussion will trytoanswertheaforementioned policymakers’ perceptions of the“nearabroad” from theendof theColdWar up space ingeneral, thispaper will startbyproviding abrief overview of Russian of Ukrainecannotbedetachedfrom amore global consideration of thepost-Soviet its neighbour haschangedafterthecrisis.Bearinginmindthat theRussian view Ukraine? Theaimof thisanalysis istoexplore ifandhow theRussian perception of between Russia andtheWest. Didtheevents of Maidanaffect theway Russia sees the conflict have significantly damagedrelations between RussiaandUkraine, is preparedtopay for it. Thehuge number of victims andtheharshprolonging of demonstrated towhat extent Ukraine “matters” toMoscow, andthe“price” Russia separatists inEasternUkrainearetheclearest ways theRussian Federation actually The annexation of Crimea andthesupport for theso-called pro-Russian harsh reaction. composition of anewgovernment headedbyPetro Poroshenko, triggering its very the EU. Moscow’s opposition wasmetbytheoverthrow of Yanukovych andthe president Viktor Yanukovych’s refusal tosign theAssociation Agreement with each othersincetheendof 2013,when protests broke out inKiev following former end of theColdWar. Its mainactors, UkraineandRussia, have beenconfronting The crisisinUkraineisone of theworse criseson theEuropean continent sincethe Introduction by Giovanna DeMaio* Russia’s View of Ukraine aftertheCrisis Russia’s View of UkraineaftertheCrisis . L’Orientale. Paper prepared for the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), February 2016. February (IAI), Internazionali Affari Istituto for the prepared Paper Giovanna De Maio is PhD candidate in International Studies at the University of Naples University at the Studies International in candidate PhD is Maio De Giovanna IAI WORKING PAPERS 16 | 04 - FEBRUARY 2016 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-83-5 © 2016 IAI 3 RAND, 1995, p. 21, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR512.html. 21, p. 1995, RAND, Ambartsumov wasone of themainsupporters of “enlightened imperialism.” insisting on theimportance of theRussian role inthe “near abroad.” Evgeniy From ageopolitical point of view, thereweremany membersof theYeltsin coalition crucial importance. would have substantially softened theimpact of theeconomic collapse wasof vital suppliers of raw materials. Thus, preservingacommon economic spacethat crashed, while many enterprises dependedon monopolistic producers andother break-up of the USSR, the whole economic system based on a centralised economy of thosewho wanted Russia tokeep closer ties with its neighbourhood. After the Economic interests andgeopolitical reasons werebasically themainarguments space, especially at thebeginning. However, therewasnogeneral consensus over theapproach toadopt towards this interests andsecurity hasbeenon thetop of thepolitical agendasince1991. Yeltsin Leaders as 1 the approach towards the near abroad foreign anddomestic policy, national identity andstrategic orientation. Defining Reciprocally, therelations with thosestates have deeply influenced Russia’s relations with thenewly-independent states soon aftertheUSSR’s collapse. The Russian imperial tradition played asignificant role indetermining Russian 1. The“nearabroad” aftertheColdWar Russia’s View of UkraineaftertheCrisis 4 3 2 citizens living there. justified tointervene in its “nearabroad” in order toprotect therights of Russian former advisor to Yeltsin on interethnic issues: she argued that Russia was morally slightly different andpossibly sharpervision wasthat of Galina Starovoytova, the granting subsidies andensuringsecurity andhuman rights intheregion. the US.He maintained that Russia hadtoplay therole of an“Eurasian gendarme,” stability inthe“nearabroad” andfor anassertive challenge tothehegemony of political analyst Andranik Migranyan referred totheRussian needfor geopolitical and thedangerof Turkish historical revisionism. Onthesamewave length, the border of theRussian Federation due to thegeopolitical vacuum inTranscaucasia a violation of their sovereignty. He expressedgreat concern over thesouthern newly-independent states toweaken theirties with Russia would have justified borders of theUSSRasRussian sphereof influence, sothat any attempt of the Arising from a mix of tradition and prestige, his theory considered the former

The idea of the double citizenship was quietly dropped. See George W. and Gorbachev George Breslauer, See quietly dropped. was double citizenship of the idea The Ibid., p. 24. p. Ibid., Russian National Security and in Policy Foreign Transition Security National Rumer, Russian Eugene B. Ibid., p. 24-25. p. Ibid., , Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002. Press, University Cambridge , Cambridge, 4 1 and its importance for Russian national , Santa Monica, Monica, , Santa 3 A 2

IAI WORKING PAPERS 16 | 04 - FEBRUARY 2016 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-83-5 © 2016 IAI 4 those states aseries of economic concessions inreturnfor theirpolitical loyalty. integration with Ukraine and Belarus, maintaining that Russia should have granted aforementioned Mygranian wasvery doubtful about theeconomic benefits of of the Eurasian Economic Union: http://eaeunion.org. Union: Economic Eurasian the of Russia’s annexation of Crimea. as adivided people hasbeenpulled out of atop hat andused asjustification for foreign policy prevailed. But astheevents of 2014have shown, theideaof Russians first years aspresident, thoseissues weremarginalised andacertainpragmatism in http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/The-Russian-World-Boundaries-16707. 5 Gennady Zyuganov, Yuri Luzhkov, and Sergei Baburin. discourse in2007),highly supported Zhirinovsky, bypoliticians such asVladimir the ideaof the“Russian world” and“adivided Russian people” (firstusedinpolitical his presidency, Russian political thinkers on the“nearabroad” starteddeveloping and waseagertoregainwhat it seemedtohave lost along with theColdWar. Under When herose topower, Russia hadjuststartedrecovering from thetroubled 1990s a pivotal actor inamultipolar Putin’s world coincides with Vladimir presidency. Nevertheless, themoment inwhich Russia concretely startedclaimingits role as more than2.17trillion dollars. that seekstointegrate 179.4 million people into asingle market andreachaGDP of renamed theCustom Union, it hasnow evolved into aEurasian economic union and thefreedom of circulation of goods, capital, services andpeople. Recently binding Russia, BelarusandKazakhstanthrough anumber of economic policies economic integration –theEurasian Economic Community –madeits firststeps Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan andTajikistan. In March 1996,aparallel project for alternative toNATO of which themembersarecurrently Russia, Armenia, Belarus, a military alliance called theCollective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO),an 1993, Russia declaredits intentions andconducted negotiations aimedat building assertive role intheregion didmake theirvoice heardmore thantheothers. In Nevertheless, despite acertainamount of criticism, thosesupporting amore Union, Putin referred totheCISasaframework for a“civilised divorce.” Republics played since the end of the 1990s in the final break-up of the Soviet not realistic. In fact,due totherole theturmoil andpopular fronts of theSoviet Even Mr.Putin saidat that timethat theoutlook for integration with theCISwas and thus called on Russia tostop beingthe“milk cow” andgetridof theburden. maintained that theCISstates werethereason why theSoviet Union collapsed importance of theCISspaceaswell asits economic andhuman costs.They In opposition to these political views, there were those who questioned the Russia’s View of UkraineaftertheCrisis 8 7 6 2005, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22883.

Source: Worl Bank data, 2014 (http://data.worldbank.org). For more information, see the website website the (http://data.worldbank.org). 2014 see data, For Worl more information, Source: Bank Press Conference Following Russian-Armenian Conference Talks Press Presidency, Russian Russian National Security and in Policy Foreign Transition Security National Rumer, Russian Eugene B. Russia in Global Affairs in Global Russia in World Boundaries”, Russian Igor Zevelev, “The 7 8 However, during Mr. Putin’s , No. 2(April-June 2014), , Yerevan, 25 March March 25 , Yerevan, , cit., p. 29. p. , cit., 5 Even the 6 IAI WORKING PAPERS 16 | 04 - FEBRUARY 2016 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-83-5 © 2016 IAI 5 the basisof international law andeffective bilateral agreements” “rights andlegitimate interests of [its] citizens andcompatriots living abroad on the post-Soviet space.To thisaim,therhetoric on thecommitment toprotect the rules andgeopolitical veto rights inwhat it considers asits sphereof influence: in international relations, meaningthat Moscow wants tohave asay insettingthe has now recovered from theterrible 1990simplies theclaimfor amore “equal” role way, Putin puts into question thepost-Cold War world order. Theideathat Russia abroad.” Dugin, who played asignificant role inshaping Russian perceptions of its “near theoretical basisprovided bytwo key ideologues, Surkov Vladislav andAlexander states andbyasubstantial concern over NATO expansion. Thiswassupported bya and prestige of theRussian Federation, accompanied bykey relations with CIS Putin, themainprioritiesby Vladimir listedconcerned theinternational projection 4cdb-93d8-3f4377cd65ba. Liberalism 2014, http://www.euractiv.com/?p=846215. 2014, 10 9 and evolution. In theRussian Foreign Policy Concept of 2000, regarding thesecurity andunity of theRussian world, found boththeirsynthesis With Putin, all Vladimir theprevious ways of interpreting thenearabroad, mainly Russia’s View of UkraineaftertheCrisis 12 11 Medvedev on 12 July 2008, http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/2008/07/204750.shtml. July on 2008, 12 Medvedev Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation of Policy theForeign Russian of the Concept the also See http://fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/econcept.htm. June 2000, 28 02b1c38!OpenDocument. mid.ru//bdomp/ns-osndoc.nsf/1e5f0de28fe77fdcc32575d900298676/869c9d2b87ad8014c32575d90 valuable tooltogainpublic support. USSR tointervene inthecaseof threats of regimechangeinits satellite states. new version of Leonid Brezhnev’s doctrine of “limited sovereignty,” entitling the bases, Putin’s political doctrine towards the“nearabroad” canbecategorised asa a more culturally-centred and identity approach. Departingfrom thesetheoretical boundaries. Instead of recalling Soviet memories, thisexpression wascharged with on the “Russian world” (russkiy mir), more or less coinciding with Russian imperial Russia wascalled on toperform ahegemonic role through restoring its influence analogous inscope tothe Atlanticist world represented bytheWest. In thisspace, as Neo-Eurasianism, aimedat providing Eurasia with agreat space(Grossraum) world. Alexander Dugin, incontrast, elaborated acomplex political theory known towards guaranteeing Russia’s sovereignty from external threats inaglobalised from theWestern one, while, on theotherhand,calling for aforeign policy oriented Russian autonomy in determining its own democratic model, necessarily different

The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation of the Russian Concept Policy Foreign The Presidency, Russian “Barroso tells Putin to abandon Brezhnev doctrine on limited sovereignty”, in EurActiv in sovereignty”, on limited doctrine Brezhnev to abandon Putin tells “Barroso The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation of the Russian Concept Policy Foreign The Presidency, Russian Russian State Visions of World State Visions and the Order Limits Russian to Silvius, Universal Ray for example, See, 10 , PhD thesis, Carleton University, Ottawa, 2012, https://curve.carleton.ca/412bf126-3cf0- 2012, University, Carleton Ottawa, thesis, , PhD Surkov theorised the“sovereign democracy,” stressingon theone hand , approved by Putin on 12 February 2013, http://archive. 2013, February on 12 Putin by , approved 9 thefirst one signed , approved by Putin on Putin by , approved , approved by by , approved 12 represented a , 14 May , 14 May 11 This IAI WORKING PAPERS 16 | 04 - FEBRUARY 2016 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-83-5 © 2016 IAI 6 russian-24928. UK March 2014, http://wpo.st/w_cG1. 2014, March 14 13 foreign military baseson theirterritory. Usually referred toasabrother country expansion because theNATO charterexplicitly forbids memberstates tohost Mediterranean SeaandtheSouthern Caucasus; second, it wasadeterrent to NATO for two reasons: first,from there Moscow could shape its projection over the hosting theRussian SeaFleet sincethe18thcentury, wasof crucial importance eastwards. In addition, thenaval baseof Sevastopol inUkraine,which hadbeen geographic position makes it abuffer state, able tocontain NATO andEUexpansion extended toits nearabroad. In thisregard,Ukraineplays avery important role: its of people andterritory have notalways coincided with its borders but rather are characteristics definingastate. For the Russian Federation, however, theconcepts To beable todefend aterritory and the people within it iscertainly one of the 2.1 Ukraine asabuffer state tocontain the West abroad”. living inUkraine,and3)asadangertermsof spill-over effects inthe“near eastwards, 2)Russia’s responsibility toprotect theRussian-speaking population involve Ukraine: 1) its importance as a buffer state to contain Western expansion There areat least threemainissues of concern for theRussian government that 2. Perceptions of Ukraineintheestablishment discourse Russia’s View of UkraineaftertheCrisis 15 the attempts of theRussian federation toensurea“Finlandisation” of Ukraine this perception of Ukraine as a buffer state: both the annexation of Crimea and In addition, what happened afterEuromaidan wasclear evidencesupporting Union must beinterpreted inthislight. president. Russian attempts tomake Kiev join theCSTO alliance andtheEurasian militarily andeconomically, especially in2010,when Yulia Tymoshenko ranfor ttnews[backPid]=485. http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35123&tx_ June 2009), (12 Vol. No. 113 6, Monitor Daily Eurasia in Ukraine”, Against Crusade Ideological Kuzio, “Russia’s Taras See 2008. West. illustrate Russia’s attempts toforge Ukraineasabuffer zone between itself andthe or sometimes asanartificial entity,

The Washington Post End”, at The the in Start Crisis, Ukraine the Settle “To Kissinger, A. Henry The Conversation Conversation The in of ‘Russian’”, meaning the changed has Putin Vladimir “How Nuray Aridici, Putin called Ukraine an artificial entity during his speech at NATO-Russia Council in April in April Council at NATO-Russia speech his during entity artificial an Ukraine called Putin , 9 April 2014, http://theconversation.com/how-vladimir-putin-has-changed-the-meaning-of- 2014, , 9April 14 Moscow didfear Ukraineturningwestward, , 5 , 13 15

IAI WORKING PAPERS 16 | 04 - FEBRUARY 2016 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-83-5 © 2016 IAI 7 by president Boris Yeltsin. 1995 theideaof aresponsibility toensuresecurity for theCISmemberswasvoiced previously exposedideaof theRussian world asasingle cultural space.Already in human rights. Whenapplied toRussian politics, thisconcept intertwines with the citizens, but asastate’s responsibility toprotect its people from major violations of sovereignty. It was no longer conceived as the absolute power of the state over its biggest, ifnotthebiggest ethnic group intheworld tobedivided byborders.” minorities informer Union republics, while theRussian nation becameone of the and awoke indifferent ones [after theUSSR’s collapse], overnight becoming ethnic simply robbed, it wasplundered. […]Millions of people went tobedinone country Crimea endedup aspartof adifferent country that Russia realised that it wasnot what happened toSoviet citizens afterthecollapse of theUSSR:“It wasonly when actually compared what transpiredaftertheUkrainianchoice toturnwestwards abroad. Taking into account thefate of people inCrimea,theRussian president crisis, but wasmore focused on theprotection of therights of Russian citizens In aslightly different way, theidea of R2Pwaspicked up again during theUkraine tool toreinforce its political andstrategic goals. to intervene incaseof perceived dangertoRussian citizens abroad andtousethis interpretation of R2Pisthat Russia considers thisspaceasits own: it feels entitled org/features/how-putin-distorts-r2p-in-ukraine. news]=5283&tx_ttnews[backPid]=217. Prism in Status”, repression: “theresidents of CrimeaandSevastopol turnedtoRussia for help in 19 18 17 16 International State Sovereignty in2001, I amborrowing thetitle of areport issued bytheInternational Commission on When speakingabout theresponsibility toprotect (currently referred toasR2P), 2.2 Responsibility toprotect: securitisation of theRussian world Russia’s View of UkraineaftertheCrisis 21 20 the right tointervene. going on inthe break-away Republic of Ossetiawasgenocide,andthus Russia had appealed toR2Pinorder tojustifythewarinGeorgia, maintaining that what was to protect wasmadein 2008byRussian Foreign MinisterSergeyLavrov: hedirectly 2008, http://fw.to/E2wS9qN. 2008, (ICRtoP): http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/publications/core-rtop-documents. April 2014, http://www.brownpoliticalreview.org/?p=13945. 2014, April protect Consequently, what Putin stressedinhisspeechwasRussia’s responsibility to from themannerinwhich R2Pwasconceived, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603.

Kathleen Mihalisko, “Yeltsin’s CIS Decree: An Instrument for Regaining Russia’s Superpower Superpower Russia’s for Regaining Instrument An “Yeltsin’s Decree: CIS Mihalisko, Kathleen Brown Political Review Political Brown in Invokes R2P”, Putin President Crimea: “Justifying Sullivan, Meg The text is available in the website of the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect to Protect Responsibility for the Coalition International of the website the in available is text The How Putin distorts R2P in Ukraine P. R2P James distorts How Putin Rudolph, The Los Angels Times Angels Los The in to Protect’”, ‘Responsibility the and “Russia Evans, Gareth Address by President of the Russian Federation of the Russian byPresident Address Presidency, Russian 21 Russians andRussian-speaking Ukrainiansfrom alleged threats and , Vol. 1, No. 21 (6 October 1995), http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_ 1995), No. (6, Vol. 21 October 1, 18 Even though theseclaimsarefarfetched andfar-removed 17 However, amore specific reference totheresponsibility 16 which reformulated themeaningof state , 7 March 2014, https://www.opencanada. 2014, , 7March 19 what isworth deducing from this , Moscow, 18 March 2014, 2014, , Moscow, March 18 , 31 August , 31 August , 11 , 11 20

IAI WORKING PAPERS 16 | 04 - FEBRUARY 2016 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-83-5 © 2016 IAI 8 a nation-state. of responsibility from thenation-state level tothelevel of acommunity largerthan world, which reflects afundamental shiftinthe official idea oftheKremlin’s zone world isthesignal of anewconcept of security: thesecuritisation of theRussian Russian world. According toIgor Zevelev, theconstant referral madetotheRussian and culture because hemanagedtobringCrimea“backhome” andtosecurethe 2015. regard, it isworth mentioning thedocumentaryVladimir Putin issued film in on 22 of ademocratic modelon its borders isinterpreted asathreat totheregime’s subjects, andhostsanethnically- andreligiously-diverse community. Thespread twelve timezones, accounts for eighty-three (with Crimeaeighty-four) federal abroad, but also within the Russian Federation itself. Thiscountry encompasses fear that theevents of Maidancould produce spill-over effects not only on the near conflict. One of themainconcerns of the Russian government isthereasonable It isnotsodifficult toextendthese conclusions tothecase ofthe Russian-Ukrainian an enemy rather thanamodel. citizens from acquiringinformation on South Korean democracyanddescribe it as democracy such asSouth Korea. Thus, North Korean dictators trytoprevent their citizens aremore prone topushfor changewhen inspiredbyaculturally-similar One of the examples the author makes is that of the two Koreas: North Korean about theothercountry’s atmosphere or environment. simultaneously call for more democratisation, or provide negative propaganda democracy inorder toavoid its citizens seeingtheirbrothers empowered and case undemocratic regimestypically either useforce againsttheculturally-similar culturally-similar country that hasempowered democratic institutions. In that in domestic political institutions; arepressive regimeisterribly threatened bya shared identity andcultural similarities canlead towarwhen there aredifferences Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Dispute dataset (1816-2008), toshow that A study from Akos Ladausesanewdataset on cultural similarity, coupled with the 2.3 Fear of spill-over effects and its residents indistress.Thiswould have beenbetrayal on ourpart.” Naturally, wecould notleave thisplea unheeded;wecould notabandon Crimea and arestill underway inKiev, Donetsk, Kharkov andotherUkrainiancities. defending theirrights andlives, inpreventing theevents that wereunfolding Russia’s View of UkraineaftertheCrisis 25 24 23 Washington, 28-31 August 2014, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2452776. 2014, 28-31 August Washington,

The Clash of Brothers Clash The Lada, Akos Crimea: The Way 2015 March Home, The Back Kondrashov, Crimea: Andrey Address by President of the Russian Federation of the Russian byPresident Address Presidency, Russian Igor Zevelev, “The Russian World Boundaries”, cit World Boundaries”, Russian Igor Zevelev, “The 23 It provides a description of the president as the defender of Russia’s identity 24 , paper presented at the APSA 2014 Annual Meeting, Meeting, Annual 2014 APSA at the presented , paper . , https://vimeo.com/123194285. 25 , Moscow, 18 March 2014, cit. 2014, , Moscow, March 18 22 In this IAI WORKING PAPERS 16 | 04 - FEBRUARY 2016 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-83-5 © 2016 IAI 9 entail a reduction of the hours dedicated to the Russian language. Russian to the dedicated hours of the areduction entail harmony, would and not unity for keeping essential languages, ethnic other of the preservation rouble crisis,andthede-offshorisation law, been damaged by EU sanctions over Ukraine, Russian counter-sanctions, the http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/en/figures/activities. 2015 in Figures Russia in Countries”, Foreign Selected with Federation Russian of the Imports and Ukraine is considered key to the realisation of Eurasian integration. Taking into account theopinion of Russian economist andpolitician SergeyGlazyev, in dependent territories, like acivilising mission of feeding andprotecting them. seems tobeatypical colonial discoursecalling on moral andmaterial investment In promoting Russian economic expansion, theRussian businesselite refers towhat one of acountry benefiting from Russian aidandbenevolence on theotherhand. 29 28 27 26 annexation of Crimea. advised himtoprofit from Ukrainiancentrifugal forces andto go aheadwith the and aspirations of power; thelatter, who isopenly pro-Putin, isbelieved tohave minimised theeffects of theUkrainiancrisis,enhancing Russian patriotism examples of theoligarchy’s convergence with theregimeon thisissue. Thefirst Two otheroligarchs, Oleg Deripaska andKonstantin Malofeev, provide further for 16.8billion dollars of Russian exports Ukraine still was the sixth country of destination for Russian goods and accounted the one hand Ukraine is an important market for Russian gas and goods – in 2014, Russian oligarchs’ point of view towards Ukraineisnotfreeof ambivalence. If on 3. Theeconomic perspective: Ukraineastheoligarchs seeit stability andsecurity. Russia’s View of UkraineaftertheCrisis 31 30 http://www.glazev.ru/sodr_ssn/319/. russian_oligarch_come_up_with_putin_s_ukraine_strategy.html. Magazine Slate Clifford Change Briefing Notes Briefing Change Clifford home!”, in back boys the law’: bring Ukraine. owner of Aeroflot and Novaya Gazetaand who harshly criticises corruption in investment inthe country. Ofasimilar mindisAlexander Lebedev, who ispart economic elite’s reaction wasmainly afeeling of ingratitude for theirwork and fact, when Ukrainedecidedtosign theAssociation Agreement with theEU, the and oil andRussia’s favourable export regimefor its agricultural production. In when speakingabout Ukrainebenefitting from very special prices for Russian gas depicts Ukrainemore like anobjectrather thanasubject of international relations

See Alexander Anichkin, Dmitry Tolkachev and Julia Pyaskorskaya, “Russian ‘deoffshorisation ‘deoffshorisation “Russian Pyaskorskaya, Julia and Tolkachev Dmitry Anichkin, Alexander See Russian Federal State Statistics Service, “External trade of the Russian Federation” and “Exports “Exports Federation” and Russian of the trade “External Service, Statistics State Federal Russian This is the reason behind the approval of a law defining Russian as a special subject so that the that so subject special as a Russian defining of approval alaw the behind reason the is This See the Alexander Lebedev’s blog: http://www.alebedev.org/tags/44.html. blog: Lebedev’s Alexander the See Joshua Keating, “Did This Russian Oligarch Come Up With Putin’s Ukraine Strategy?”, in in Strategy?”, Up Ukraine Come With Putin’s Oligarch Russian This “Did Keating, Joshua Sergey Glazyev blog Glazyev Sergey in nezavisimosti?”, god “Posledniy Glazyev, Sergey 29 , 26 February 2015, http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2015/02/26/did_this_ 2015, February , 26 26 30 In otherwords, despite Russian oligarchs’ businesshaving 27 –theyalso tendtogive about Ukraineis 31 thiselite remainsloyal totheregime, , November 2014, http://www. 2014, , November , 3 September 2013, 2013, , 3September 28 However, he , 10 IAI WORKING PAPERS 16 | 04 - FEBRUARY 2016 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-83-5 © 2016 IAI written), Moscow, Russian State University for the Humanities, 2011 Humanities, for the University State Moscow, Russian written), in EasternUkraine. like Novorossia TV, the TV channel of Russian-backed separatists broadcasting of Russian movies, TVseries andprograms which glorify the“aggressor state,” fact that UkrainianPresident Poroshenko signed a bill prohibiting thebroadcasting has adopted aneven more assertive role, whose intrusiveness ishighlighted bythe Following thecrisisover Ukraineandtheannexation of Crimea,theRussian media loyalty andbrotherhood andthefight against Nazism. myth that Ukrainians and Russians belong to thesame admitted, thepurposeof thefilm wastodisseminate themessageandpromote the Business Times Crimea”,in International and Ukraine about for movies funds state offers “Russia Nigel Wilson, See support. state and values family promoting movies with together glory military Russia’s as 33 32 cliffordchance.com/briefings/2014/11/russian_deoffshorisationlawbringtheboy.html. A true “warof memories” Viktor Yushchenko’s fuelling of “Ukrainiannationalism” aftertheOrange Revolution. centripetal trends.In thisregard,themediadeveloped acounter-discourse over maintain close relationships betweenRussia andUkrainewhile contrasting Both inSoviet timesandinthepost-ColdWar era,therole of themediawasto choices, or asachannelthrough which civil society expressesits views. account the media asagovernmental toolto promote campaigns andpolitical The imageof Ukraineasportrayed bythemediaslightly changesifwetake into 4. Ukraineaccording tothemediaandcivil society Putin’sVladimir political project. loyal tothesocial contract theymade with the Russian establishment, andthus to or at least understandsRussian involvement inUkraine.In particular, it remains Russia’s View of UkraineaftertheCrisis 34 aims todiscredit Ukrainianpolitical choices, namely its turnwestward. the handsof theWest andabetrayer of thehistorical friendship, themassmedia depicting theUkrainiangovernment asaNazi regime,comparable toapuppet in media afterMaidanhasanewgoal, fairly different from that of thepast.Through “Western enemies” anddying for “theOrthodox Russian land.” the Russian Ministryof Culture) thenewTaras Bulba isdepicted while fighting the Russian sympathies in2009.As Taras Kuzio remarks, inthe2009 film (sponsored by of Nikolai Gogol’s Cossackleader Taras Bulba, served asatoolfor increasingpro- over historical ties. For example, one of themainmyths of Ukrainianidentity, that ttnews[backPid]=485. http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=34955&tx_ No. (6 2009), 87 6, May

Eurasia Daily Monitor Daily in Eurasia Conflict”, Cultural Ukrainian-Russian Kuzio, “The Taras G. Kasyanov and A. Miller, Rossiya-Ukraina. A. and Kak pishetsya Kasyanov istoriyaG. At the same time Russia is providing state funding for movies showcasing Ukraine and Crimea Crimea and Ukraine showcasing for movies funding state providing is Russia time same At the , 2 March 2015, http://ibt.uk/A006FeZ. 2015, , 2March 34 Nevertheless, theimageof Ukraine diffusedbythe Russian 32 hasbeenfought betweenRussian andUkrainianmedia narod, sharing the values of (Russia Ukraine. As history is is history As Ukraine. (Russia 33 As thefilm director , Vol. 11 IAI WORKING PAPERS 16 | 04 - FEBRUARY 2016 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-83-5 © 2016 IAI defence policy for their own interest andagainstRussia. EU andtheUScheating Kiev andforcing it toacceptandfollow EUeconomic and posts, what catches attention istheone entitled “Eurofascism,” which portrays the blog, envisaging terrible outlooks for its economic development. Among theother Putin’s advisor on Eurasian issues), summarises theUkrainiansituation on his 2014, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/496137.html. 2014, agricultural products andmanufacturers. worsening of the state budget and the negative effects of competition on Ukrainian Area (DCFTA): cuts tothewelfarestate, anincreasedrate of unemployment, the the mainrisksfor Ukraineadhering totheDeepandComprehensive Free Trade Last Day of Independence” andrefers to2013.In thisarticle, Glazyev highlights http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Forgetting-about-Ukraine-17530. ssn/361/. Russia Insider Russia news/582122. what Russia is actually doing isusingUkraineasaway tohurt USinterests andas criticism of Ukraine,which istheneighbourhood enemy andiseasytodemonise, Antonova from TheMoscow Times maintains that, besidestheRussian public’s 37 36 35 is over andsoon Russia will forget about theloss of this“phantom.” Bruter fromAs Vladimir Russia in Global Affairs argued, now the“brothers” rhetoric Ukraine but tryingtodiscussUkraineasatoolfor Russian interests andsecurity. a more moderate approach, refrainingfrom giving such adiscrediting imageof However, thegreat majority of people from academiaandthinktanksseemtoadopt of thepopulation. accuses Kiev’s regimeof beingillegitimate andnon-representative of themajority in the majority of newspapers. Sergey Markov’s analysis in Some representatives of civil society sharethesamediscrediting rhetoric used Ukraine). Ukrainian government) who subjugated theworking ones (people from Eastern war inUkraine,mainly referring totheopposition betweentheruling classes(the civil warasdescribed inOrwell’s essay “Looking Backon theSpanish War” andthe discrediting. In February 2015,heoutlines thesimilarities betweentheSpanish Golsteinfrom Russia InsiderVladimir provides aninteresting example of such Russia’s View of UkraineaftertheCrisis 40 39 38 credit toavoid default. “milk, honey and freedom of circulation,” though they did not receive the necessary and compares theUkrainianstonaive children because theybelieved inWestern country. Similarly, Oleg Bondarenko from scapegoat inorder todeviate citizens’ attention from thereal problems of the

The Moscow Times Moscow The in Ukraine”, in Expansion Stop U.S. Must Markov,Sergey “Russia Vladimir Golstein, “Orwell on Fighting Fascists: From the Spanish Civil War to Ukraine”, in in War to Civil Ukraine”, Spanish the From on Fascists: Fighting “Orwell Golstein, Vladimir Sergey Glazyev, “Posledniy god nezavisimosti?”, cit. nezavisimosti?”, god “Posledniy Glazyev, Sergey Oleg Bondarenko, “Ukraina -ne Evropa”, Izvestia in “Ukraina Bondarenko, Oleg Sergey Glazyev blog Glazyev Sergey in “Eurofascism”, Glazyev, Sergey Russia in Global Affairs in Global Russia in Ukraine?”, about Bruter, “Forgetting Vladimir 35 Moreover, hemaintains that thefascistsusedRussians asanenemy , 27 February 2015, http://russia-insider.com/en/2015/02/27/3945. 2015, , 27February 37 Oneof themaineconomists, SergeyGlazyev (who isalso 36 39 Izvestia labelsKiev’s authorities as Nazi , 22 January 2015, http://izvestia.ru/ 2015, January , 22 , 19 May 2014, http://www.glazev.ru/sodr_ 2014, May , 19 38 Another isentitled “The , No. 2 (April-June 2015), , No. 2(April-June 2015), The Moscow Times , 19 March March , 19 40 Natalia 12 IAI WORKING PAPERS 16 | 04 - FEBRUARY 2016 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-83-5 © 2016 IAI watch?v=7T0FHohsQao. Journal of Eurasian Studies Eurasian of Journal in Memories”, 42 41 the languageof which wasconsidered aRussian dialect. looked at it assomething artificial that would bereunited with Russia one day, majority of Russians did not recognise Ukraine as anequal partner. Instead, they After thecollapse of theUSSRandcreation of anindependent Ukraine,the many Russians questioned thevery existenceof Ukranians. that Georgians areGeorgian, Estonians areEstonian, andChechensChechen, Russia. In fact,asRoman Szporluk argued in1993,while few Russians would deny population andwasnever conceived of asanautonomous reality separated from the endof theColdWar. In Soviet timesUkrainehosted21percent of theSoviet necessary topresent anoverview of how its perception of Ukraineevolved since Before dealing with how theUkrainecrisisaffected Russian public opinion, it is 5.1 Public opinion and common roots. the difficulties of conceiving ofUkraineasaseparate reality due to itshistorical ties opinion andbytheOrthodox Church. Theyarecoupled togetherbecause bothshare This section provides adiscussion of theperception of UkraineinRussian public Church 5. Ukraine:Doesit really exist?Public opinion andtheOrthodox an effective great short-term tool for mobilising society againstanoutside threat. Russia’s View of UkraineaftertheCrisis 44 43 Russians wastheuseof theterm“little Russians” todesignate Ukrainians.Until to theterritory of modernUkraine.Interestingly, what wasalso common between Hetmanate afterits annexation bytheTsardom of Moscovy in1764andcorresponds was thehistorical termusedtorefer tothegeographical territory of theCossack Affairs for political confrontation over systemsof government andvalues. immediate dangerfor Russian interests. Instead, Ukraineisportrayed asaground Nevertheless, theimagethat thispartof civil society tries todepict isnotthat of an “rights on post-Soviet space,” along-standing issue on Moscow’s security agenda. Crimea andSouthern Ukrainebecause it isclosely connected toconcept of Russian remarked inaninterview that one must notbesurprisedbywhat happened in State University Russia anddirector of theInstitute of National Security (RAN), Andrey Kokoshin, president of theFaculty of International Politics at Lomonosov July 2015, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/525061.html. July 2015,

The Moscow Times Moscow More on IS”, The in on Ukraine, Less Focus Must “Russia Antonova, Natalia Roman Szporluk, “Belarus’, Ukraine and the Russian Question: A Comment”, in Post-Soviet in AComment”, Question: Russian the and Ukraine “Belarus’, Szporluk, Roman Andrey Kokoshin interviewed at Pozner show, 29 June 2015, https://www.youtube.com/ show, at Pozner June 2015, 29 interviewed Kokoshin Andrey Andreas Kappeler, “Ukraine and Russia: Legacies of the Imperial Past and Competing Competing and Past Imperial of the Legacies Russia: and “Ukraine Kappeler, Andreas , Vol. 9, No. 366-374. p. 4(1993), , Vol. No. 2(July 5, 2014), 107-115. p. 44 In fact,“Little Russia” 43 , 5 42 41

13 IAI WORKING PAPERS 16 | 04 - FEBRUARY 2016 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-83-5 © 2016 IAI HXlLbK9wVnhwGShNVPKIUP/story.html. 2014, https://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2014/03/15/the-long-war-over-ukrainian-language/ Igor Ivanov inlate 2004. the harshrhetoric usedinthedeclarations of Russian Ministerof Foreign Affairs time wastheWestern countries’ negative influence over Ukraine,asconfirmed by change significantly. Onthecontrary, what wasparticularly condemned inthat aforementioned opinion polls show that Russian attitudes towards Ukraine did not 47 46 45 information war, However, worth considering is theinfluence of two factors: 1)the Russian Russian economy. United States (77percent) and isnolonger considered avaluable partnerfor the that Ukraineisnow considered anunfriendly country (62percent) justafterthe percent. In addition, data collected bythePublic Opinion Fundation (FOM) shows then dropped below 20percent in2013,it peaked againin2014-2015, reaching64 Levada Centre’s polls, while in2008thenegative attitude reached62percent and Has thecrisischangedRussian public opinion regardingUkraine?Looking at the a few months between2008and2009). March 2014Russian perception of Ukrainewasvery positive (with theexception of country: Levada Centre’s opinion polls highlight that from December 1998 to Despite thisattitude of superiority, Russians didnotperceive Ukraineasahostile language, justilliterate peasant speakingLittle Russians.” quotes from imperial times, attributed to Tsar Nicholas II: “There isnoUkrainian claim isparticularly popular inRussian nationalist blogs, especially intheform of and whose culture wasnotconsidered assophisticated astheRussian one. This it indicated people that weremainly peasants, who spoke astrangeRussian dialect the 19thcentury theterm“little Russians” wasusedinapejorative sense,because Russia’s View of UkraineaftertheCrisis 49 48 between Russians andUkrainians. could eventually remove acentenary history of mixed marriagesandfamilies to theUkrainiansasapeople. In fact,it isdifficult toimaginethat theMaidan events and 2) that the negative attitude mainly refer to the Ukrainian government and not http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Geopolitics-and-Life-17406. Russia’s Friends and “Enemies”), 8 June 2015, http://www.levada.ru/?p=10197. 8June 2015, “Enemies”), and Friends Russia’s /0/030111D3B474A94CC3256F790042F6F9. and Uzbekistan in Ukraine Results on Election Conclusions Observers’ Regarding Question International Media Russian a Answers Affairs, Foreign Stratégique

Alexander Yakovenko, Alexander of Ministry of Russia’s the Spokesman Affairs, of Foreign Ministry Russian The Boston Globe Boston The in Language”, Ukrainian War the over Long “The Peterson, Britt Focus in Focus Ukraine”, en le conflit dans russe le web del’information: “Guerre Julien Nocetti, (International Relations: Relations: (International Rossii i“vragi” Center, druz’ya Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya: Levada Russia in Global Affairs in Global Life”, Russia in and “Geopolitics Pautova, Larissa , No. 62 (September 2015), https://www.ifri.org/fr/node/10613. 2015), , No. (September 62 49 which hasseriously prompted avery negative imageof Ukraine; 48 47 , 28 December 2004, http://archive.mid.ru//brp_4.nsf 2004, December , 28 46 Even during theOrangeRevolution, the , No. 1 (January-March 2015), 2015), , No. 1(January-March 45 , 16 March , 16 March 14 IAI WORKING PAPERS 16 | 04 - FEBRUARY 2016 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-83-5 © 2016 IAI 2007, http://www.eisa-net.org/be-bruga/eisa/files/events/turin/igor-turin2007final.pdf. Turin, 12-15 September Relations, on International Conference Pan-European 6th for the presented in Ukraine. instruments through which theRussian government tried toexert soft power not reshaped. Instead, it kept on influencing the UOC andbeing one of the main while remainingintheROC’s structure. Nevertheless, therole of theROC was the right toappoint bishops andmanageits own financial andeconomic affairs of the1990sROC granted theUOC autonomous status, which consisted of the unification of Ukrainianchurches under its authority. Thus, at thebeginning 1990, mainly because of theUOC’s aspirations toattain anautocephaly aswell as Despite theseties, relations betweentheROC andtheUOC have been strained since been born. Cyril andMethodius, thefounders of theOrthodox Church, arebelieved tohave milestone inRussian andUkrainianidentity. Also, Sebastopol istheplacewhere the Great, ruler of Kievan Rus, accepted Christianity through baptism, which isa Crimea areconsidered themythological cradle of theROC: therePrinceVladimir chathamhouse.org/node/6430. Ukraine”,Papers Briefing House in Chatham 50 Russian candidate in Ukraine; on the other, the ROC aimed at preventing the commitment: on theone hand,it wasatoolinMoscow’s hands topromote apro- Behind thepublic support expressed by theROC, therewasactually adouble in Ukrainepercapita isthreetimesasmuch asinRussia. practical andcultural reasons. Firstly, thenumber of UOC religious organisations In theROC system,UkraineandtheUOC wereconsidered one of themainpillars for the ROC’s influence over Ukrainianpolitics. retrace the links between the ROC and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) and of theUkrainecrisison theROC’s perception of Ukraine,it seemsappropriate to over theOrthodox world inthepost-Soviet space.Before discussingtheimpact for Moscow’s government; on theother,it aimstocontinue exerting its hegemony collapse of theUSSR.Onone hand,it isafundamental instrument of power influence on thepost-Soviet spaceactually remainedsignificant even afterthe The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) is avery important stakeholder because its 5.2 TheOrthodox Church Russia’s View of UkraineaftertheCrisis 52 51 intra-Orthodox linksand avoid thesplit in Ukraine. distributed: theydescribed himasan“Orthodox president,” able tostrengthenthe blessing, while intheROC’s cathedrals leaflets calling for Slavic brotherhood were for hiscampaign. BoththePatriarch of Moscow andKiev gave Yanukovych their after the Orange Revolution is undeniable, especially in terms of public support

Alexander Bogomolov and Oleksandr Lytvynenko, “A Ghost in the Mirror: Russian Soft Power in in Power Soft Russian “AMirror: the in Ghost Lytvynenko, Oleksandr and Bogomolov Alexander The Orange Revolution: A Challenge for the Russian Orthodox Church Orthodox for the Revolution: Orange AChallenge Russian The Gretskiy, Igor The Orange Revolution: A Challenge for the Russian Orthodox Church Orthodox for the Revolution: Orange AChallenge Russian The Gretskiy, Igor 51 For instance,theROC’s support for Viktor Yanukovych during and , No. REP RSP BP 2012/01 (January 2012), https://www. 2012), (January BP 2012/01 RSP , No. REP 52 50 Secondly, Ukraineand , cit., p. 10. p. , cit., , Paper , Paper 15 IAI WORKING PAPERS 16 | 04 - FEBRUARY 2016 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-83-5 © 2016 IAI think about the fact that even the former Kiev Metropolitan Volodymyr, who was 53 supported the demandsof protesters in Maidan. department of External Church Relations, the majority of the churches in Ukraine of theUOC. According toReverend Cyril Hovorun, theformer chairof the UOC’s because heneededtokeep closer ties and notlose thetrustof therepresentatives However, hecould notavoid expressingsupport for Ukraine’s self-determination, through reuniting the other existing Churches in Ukraine. Ukrainian Church from splitting from theROC andthengainingmore power Russia’s View of UkraineaftertheCrisis 56 55 54 another;” remarked that “brothers of one faith andone blood never bringdestruction toone encourage dialogue andthe spirit of brotherhood. In thisregard,Patriarch Kirill the ROC tried todo while dealing with theUOC andtheUkrainianpeople wasto remained thesameor even beenfurtherstressedinthesetimesof crisis.What both theimportance of control andtheideaof asingle religious reality have perception andattitude towards Ukraine andtheUOC didnot changesignificantly: After thereferendum inCrimeaandfollowing theescalation of thecrisis,ROC’s jurisdiction. Church (which wasgranted administrative autonomy in1990)toreturnunderits were led with thepurposeof pressingthebishops of theUkrainianOrthodox diplomatic missions, aimed at gaining the support of the Ukrainian government, main challenges Kirill tried to envisage was more political rather than spiritual. His cooperation betweentheelites of theRussian World countries. However, one of the the mostcommon termswere“nation” and“group” aswell asacall for durable for spiritual unity of theEasternSlavic peoples of Russia, UkraineandBelarus: personality of Patriarch Kirill. Oneof theleitmotivs inhisspeechwasthecall the ROC adopted amore assertive approach on thisissue, mainly due tothestrong to their respective influences on the country and its Church. In fact, from 2009, very dangerous bybothMoscow andtheROC because theysaw asplit asathreat Orthodox world. Orthodox the by recognised notofficially are and times at ROS different the from splintered churches Both Macarius. Primate (UAOC), by headed Church Orthodox Autocephalous Ukrainian the and Filaret, Reporter the assembly topray inorder tostop theanimosity betweenthetwo peoples. presented thecelebration asacore moment, astheKiev Metropolitan Onofriy asked conversion wascelebrated bothinMoscow of PrinceVladimir andKiev. TheROC countries. In thisrespect, the July celebration of thebaptismal of theRus font andspreadingacross Eurasia, thus enhancingthecommon roots of brother conceived of asagreat Russian civilisation coming from theKievan baptismal approval for theannexation. Kirill tried topromote theideaof the“Russian world,” had given hishistorical speechabout Crimea,aswell asfrom exhibiting explicit

Ibid.

They are the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Kiev Patriarchate (UOC-KP), headed by Patriarch Patriarch by (UOC-KP), headed Patriarchate Kiev Church Orthodox Ukrainian the are They See the video in Channel One Russia, 28 July 2015, http://www.1tv.ru/news/social/288782. July 28 2015, Russia, One Channel in video the See National Catholic Catholic Church”, National in Orthodox Russian split may crisis “Ukrainian Kishkovsky, Sophia , 27 March 2014, http://ncronline.org/node/73316. 2014, , 27March 54 moreover, heabstainedfrom entering St.George’s Hall, where Putin 56 Thisisacrucial factor ifwe 53 This was considered afterthe 55 16 IAI WORKING PAPERS 16 | 04 - FEBRUARY 2016 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-83-5 © 2016 IAI those who insteadtrytounderstandUkraine intermsof its geopolitical function. • Civil society isdivided betweenthosesupporting theviews of thegovernment, and traditions of Russia andUkraine. thus thediscoursetheypromoted highlighted thecultural ties andcommon • Themediahave always beenatoolfor Russia toexert its soft power inUkraine; protect them. investment inthe dependent territories, akintoacivilising mission tofeed and but it ismainly expressedthrough colonial discoursecalling for moral andmaterial • Theoligarchy shares theideaof Ukraineasacountry Russia isresponsible for, effects on the Russian world ingeneral. Russian andRussian speakingpopulation; and3)Ukraineasathreat for spill-over 1) Ukraineasabuffer state to contain the West; 2)responsibility toprotect Ukraine’s this lies inthefactthat thegovernment considers Ukrainefrom threeperspectives: cannot bedetachedfrom abroader perception of thenearabroad. Thereason for • Theanalysis of thegovernment’s perception of Ukrainehasshown that, first, it between 2013-2015 have changedthisperception. affected Russian politics, aswell as whether theevents that occurred inUkraine explore theRussian vision of Ukraineinorder tounderstandwhether andhow it room for reflection over what Ukrainemeans for Russia. Thisanalysis aimedto demonstrated towhat extent Russia iswilling toactprotect its interests, providing in MaidanSquareandtotheoverthrow of theYanukovych presidencyhas relations between Russia and Ukraine. Moscow’s harsh reaction to the protests The events that occurred in Ukraine between 2013-2015 have seriously damaged Conclusions UOC, asmany priests andbishops arealready shiftingtotheUkrainianChurch. to Andrey Zubov, the Moscow Patriarchate is rapidly losing its influence on the However, despite theseattempts toreaffirm brotherhood and ties, according self-determination. considered pro-Russian, expressedhissupport for Ukrainianindependenceand Russia’s View of UkraineaftertheCrisis 57 news]=43933&tx_ttnews[backPid]=485. Monitor Daily churches inUkraine, thiswould redraw themap of Orthodoxy. the UkrainianOrthodox Church could beforeseeable. If reunited with the other the Patriarchate of Constantinople would eventually recognisetheautocephaly of If thetensions betweenRussia andUkrainecontinue rising,ascenario inwhich

Eurasia Beyond”, Eurasia in Ukraine–and in Out Rapidly Losing Patriarchate “Moscow Paul Goble, , Vol. 12, No. 94 (20 May 2015), http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_ 2015), May (20 No. 94 , Vol. 12, 57

17 IAI WORKING PAPERS 16 | 04 - FEBRUARY 2016 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-83-5 © 2016 IAI from Russia’s path. effective inproviding anegative example of what can befall on those who deviate economic costs. In addition, the narrative surrounding Ukraine has beenhighly and thus of theRussian world hasdriven Moscow towarandincursignificant strategic reasons, thefactthat Russia seesUkraineaspartof its sphereof influence to the point of incurring heavy international retaliation: besides security and demonstrated to what extent this perception can affect government decisions, the Russian perception of Ukraine,it isstill worth outlining that thiscrisishas In conclusion, even ifit isnotpossible tospeakabout asubstantial changein to ahigher level: the“Russian world.” the concept of security, once perceived at thenation-state level but now elevated NATO’s andtheEU’s eastwardexpansion. Its mainshiftdeals with abroadening of Putin’s doctrine, restoring Russian influence in the“nearabroad” in opposition to perception, seemstohave definitely put it into practice: aconcrete application of of relations between the two countries. The government, rather than changing its the crisis to reaffirm the unity of the Orthodox World and to call on the restoration ROC and the government did not actually change. The ROC continued throughout and its corruption. However, theperception of Ukrainefrom thepoint of view of the abandoned thecolonial rhetoric anddescribe Ukraine’s gloomy economic outlook governed byfascists,andapuppet inWestern hands;andtheoligarchs have mass mediaprovides adiscrediting imageof Ukraine,depicting thecountry as According tothepolls, Russians currently view Ukraineasanenemy of Russia: relations tosome extent produced aslight changeintheRussian vision of Ukraine. Nevertheless, thedamageUkrainiancrisismadetoRussian-Ukrainian Crimea andintheinstigation of separatist violence. the Russian sphereof influence have played asignificant role intheannexation of Putin’s challenge tothepost-Coldwarorder andtheconcept of Ukraineaspartof for thesoftening of thehostilities betweenthetwo countries. Theframework of Orthodox Church hasrepeatedly spent many words calling for Orthodox unity and intervention for thesake of “protecting” Russian citizens abroad, while theRussian is sharedbythemajority of thestakeholders, hasbeenusedtojustifyRussian In theaftermath of thecrisis,ideaof Ukraineaspartof theRussian world, which and for thesake of avoiding schismintheOrthodox World. inCrimea–boththenameof theSlavicbaptism of PrinceVladimir brotherhood, relations with theUkrainianOrthodox Church, stressedthehistorical linkof the • TheRussian Orthodox Church, which wasconstantly active instrengthening culture, considered less sophisticated thantheRussian culture. Ukrainians aspartof theRussian world, despite asenseof superiority towards their Ukrainians wereonce called “little Russians,” demonstrating Russia’s perception of reality from Russia, assuggested byits historical nameof Little Russia. Moreover, • Public opinion hasalways hadtrouble inconsidering Ukraineasadifferent Russia’s View of UkraineaftertheCrisis Updated 19February 2016 18 IAI WORKING PAPERS 16 | 04 - FEBRUARY 2016 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-83-5 © 2016 IAI Memories”, inJournal of Eurasian Studies, Vol. 5,No. 2(July 2014),p.107-115 Andreas Kappeler, “UkraineandRussia: Legacies of theImperial Past andCompeting single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=43933&tx_ttnews[backPid]=485 Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 12,No. 94(20May 2015),http://www.jamestown.org/ Paul Goble, “Moscow Patriarchate Rapidly LosingOut inUkraine–andBeyond”, in turin/igor-turin2007final.pdf Turin, 12-15 September2007, http://www.eisa-net.org/be-bruga/eisa/files/events/ Paper presented for the6thPan-European Conference on International Relations, Igor Gretskiy, TheOrange Revolution: AChallenge for theRussian Orthodox Church, en/2015/02/27/3945 to Ukraine”, inRussia Insider, 27February 2015,http://russia-insider.com/ Golstein, “Orwell on FightingVladimir Fascists: From theSpanish Civil War 31 August 2008,http://fw.to/E2wS9qN Gareth Evans, “Russia andthe‘Responsibility toProtect’”, inTheLosAngels Times, June 2015),http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Forgetting-about-Ukraine-17530 Bruter, “ForgettingVladimir about Ukraine?”, inRussia in Global Affairs , No. 2(April- University Press,2002 George W. Breslauer, Gorbachev and Yeltsin asLeaders, Cambridge, Cambridge izvestia.ru/news/582122 Oleg Bondarenko, “Ukraina -neEvropa”, inIzvestia, 22January 2015,http:// (January 2012),https://www.chathamhouse.org/node/6430 Soft Power inUkraine”, inChatham House Briefing Papers, No. REP RSP BP2012/01 Alexander Bogomolov andOleksandr Lytvynenko, “A GhostintheMirror: Russian has-changed-the-meaning-of-russian-24928. Conversation UK,9April 2014,http://theconversation.com/how-vladimir-putin- Nuray Aridici, “How Putin haschangedthemeaningof ‘Russian’”, Vladimir inThe Times, 5July 2015,http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/525061.html Natalia Antonova, “Russia Must Focus Lesson Ukraine,More on IS”, inTheMoscow russian_deoffshorisationlawbringtheboy.html Notes, November 2014, http://www.cliffordchance.com/briefings/2014/11/ ‘deoffshorisation law’: bringtheboys backhome!”, inClifford Change Briefing Alexander Anichkin, Dmitry Tolkachev andJulia Pyaskorskaya, “Russian References Russia’s View of UkraineaftertheCrisis 19 IAI WORKING PAPERS 16 | 04 - FEBRUARY 2016 ISSN 2280-4331 | ISBN 978-88-98650-83-5 © 2016 IAI opencanada.org/features/how-putin-distorts-r2p-in-ukraine James P. Rudolph, How Putin distorts R2Pin Ukraine, 7March 2014,https://www. over-ukrainian-language/HXlLbK9wVnhwGShNVPKIUP/story.html 16 March 2014, https://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2014/03/15/the-long-war- Britt Peterson, “TheLong War over theUkrainian Language”, inTheBoston Globe, March 2015),http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/Geopolitics-and-Life-17406 Larissa Pautova, “Geopolitics andLife”, inRussia in Global Affairs, No. 1(January- in Focus Stratégique, No. 62(September2015),https://www.ifri.org/fr/node/10613 Julien Nocetti, “Guerre del’information: le webrussedansle conflit en Ukraine”, org/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=5283&tx_ttnews[backPid]=217 Superpower Status”, inPrism,Vol. 1,No. 21(6October1995),http://www.jamestown. Kathleen Mihalisko, “Yeltsin’s CISDecree:An Instrument for Regaining Russia’s html Times, 19March 2014,http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/496137. 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