Ukraine twenty years after independence ISBN 978-88-548-7765-8 DOI 10.4399/97888548776586 pag. 55–74 (febbraio 2015) ‘Traditional’ Churches In Independent Ukraine In Search of Common Identity F. Iwan Dacko, F. Oleh Turii It is general knowledge that the year 1989 marked a significant change in the public life of Eastern European countries. Ukraine was no exception. After the celebrations of the millennium of Baptism of Kyivan Rus’ (1988) one can even speak of a resurrection (Keleher 1993; 1997, Gudziak 1997, p. 49–72) of political, and particularly reli- gious life in Ukraine, which ultimately lead to the proclamation of its independence on 24 August 1991 and disintegration of Soviet Union. When we compare statistics they speak for themselves. In 1985 there were 16 religious confessions registered in the Ukrainian SSR, whereas in 2011 the number had risen to 120. In 1985, on the other hand, 6.2 thousand religious communities were oYcially recorded in Ukraine, whereas in 2011 they were 34.5 thousand, tendency increasing (Tserkva i suspil’stvo 2000–2001, p. 207)1. Objectively one has to admit that with such increase, there were tensions and conflict situations within these communities. This fact has been widely noted, especially among the Western mass media, frequently exaggerated and overestimated on all sides. Furthermore, there were and are tendencies to overemphasize these facts and politicize them. Today, however, after more than twenty years, we dare to express the opinion that basically it was, and still is the search towards self identification, or rather identity, of each religious community. This issue is particularly present within the so called ‘traditional’ Churches of Ukraine of diVerent jurisdictions, basically the Ukrainian Ortho- dox Church, Moscow Patriarchate (UOC–MP), Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC –KP), Ukrainian Autocephalous Or- 1. The newest statistics which I here present are given according to the data published by the US State Department of national and religious aVairs as of 1 January 2012. 55 56 F. Iwan Dacko, F. Oleh Turii thodox Church (UAOC), Ukrainian Greek–Catholic Church (UGCC). There are suYcient reasons for such a state of aVairs in the search of these Churches towards their self identity. Ukraine’s tumultuous and diYcult history connected with foreign occupation, persecutions and hardships, lack of an independent state, the absence of religious freedom and respect for basic human rights, the tragedies of the 20th century, such as the Holodomor and the two world wars, centralisa- tion of the economic and political life, the de facto non–existence of communication and information on such major events as the Second Vatican Council, ecumenical movement, the creation of the Com- mon Market and later European Union, created a new diYcult and challenging situation. The entire Soviet Union lived in a isolated world where only Soviet values, understanding, Weltanchauung were allowed and known. Fur- thermore, religion and its values were considered outdated, relics of the past, incongruous in what was perceived as a progressive, demo- cratic, ideal Soviet society. Such lack of self identity was particularly present within the Or- thodox communities of Ukraine during which time each of the three denominations tried to search and find their roots in the quest towards their place in the new realities of independent Ukraine. Historical continuation was an important concern. 1. Ukrainian Orthodox Church — Moscow Patriarchate (UOC–MP) For the sake of accuracy and correctness one should say that this Church does not like it when the adjunctive Moscow Patriarchate is supplied to its main title. It would prefer to be called just Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Nevertheless I feel compelled to add the Moscow Patriarchate description for the simple fact that today there are at least three orthodox Churches active in today’s Ukraine: the one which depends on the Moscow Patriarchate, the Kyivan Patriarchate, created in 1992 and still not recognized by world orthodoxy, and the autocephalous Church, which has about 600,000 faithful. This being the state of aVairs, we cannot assign the exclusivity of an Orthodox Church of Ukraine to any one of them. Therefore one is compelled to add the adjective Moscow Patriarchate to the Church ‘Traditional’ Churches in Independent Ukraine 57 we are now presenting. It is precisely this adjunctive which characterizes this Church, namely its dependence on Moscow. It is the Church which until 1990 was the Ukrainian Exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) headed by Metropolitan Filaret Denysenko, who after 1992 was denigrated and stripped by Moscow of all his titles and digni- ties. This Church was the heir of the ROC which co–liquidated the Greek–Catholic Church in 1946–1948 in Western and Carpatho–Ukraine together with Stalin’s regime. This Church, in the eyes of the faithful, cooperated hand in hand with the former Soviet regime, the KGB, and happily took over all the Greek–Catholic churches of those re- gions with the full approval of the atheist communist regime of the Ukrainian SSR. Today the Moscow Patriarchate, when confronted with this fact, claims that in the Stalinist years, they at least saved Christianity in those areas, and thus maintained the Christian faith amongst the faithful. Such a statement is a distortion of historical facts. History proves that the ROC was happy that finally the Catholic Church was prohibited in those areas and that the ROC took over whatever she could. It was only after Stalin’s death in 1953, and under Khrushchev, that the ROC was curtailed in her intentions, and a high number of her church buildings were destroyed. SuYce to read the Acts of the Synod of L’viv (Diannia Soboru 1946) or watch the documentary film on this pseudo–synod of 8–11 March 1946 to see with what exaltation did the ROC “accept the Greek–Catholic faithful in the womb of the ROC.” I frequently mention this to my Russian orthodox colleagues when we discuss this matter, and when they repeat their accusations of the Catholic Church proselytizing in present Ukraine and in the former USSR. After reading these Acts, and especially watching the documentary film, of this pseudo–synod, one sees that the behavior of the representatives of the ROC on that occasion was proselytism par excellence. The majority of bishops and clergy of the ROC did not enjoy moral authority among the people. They were looked upon as on those who collaborated “with the enemies of God.” History is magistra vitae, a teacher of life, and people of today, whose grandparents or parents were persecuted from 1946 until 1989, do not easily forget the injustices of the past. The ROC in the years 58 F. Iwan Dacko, F. Oleh Turii 1946–1989 simply did not want to believe that the UGCC existed in the underground. In fact today’s historians state that the 43 years of the catacomb and illegal life of the UGCC in the USSR was the longest period of underground existence of the Church since the early ages of Christianity. The changes that came with the Gorbachev era with its glasnost and perestroika was seen by these faithful that “justice won over injustice, and truth finally reigns again.” Suddenly, in 1989, it was a shame to be a member of the Russian Orthodox Church in Western. And after Gorbachev’s first historic audience with Pope John–Paul II on 1 December 1989, when it became a known fact that communities and faithful could register and get legalised as Greek–Catholics, the return to the “Church of their fathers” became a massive phenomenon throughout the following three years. Beyond doubt, this was a shock both for the KGB and the ROC. Furthermore, Rev. Volodymyr Yarema gave revival to the UAOC in August 1989, thus dividing the unity of orthodoxy in Ukraine. Even today Greek–Catholics consider this rebirth as a provocation thought out by the KGB in order to break the monolith of the UGCC in West- ern Ukraine. Some priests of the ROC turned to the newly reborn UAOC, but the absolute majority of faithful and priests returned to the UGCC. Events were proceeding with rapid speed. Archbishop Volodymyr Sterniuk, as the locum tenens of the UGCC, took over his residence in St. George’s Palace in L’viv. The cathedral itself was given back to the Greek–Catholics. Furthermore, Sterniuk and the civil authori- ties of L’viv oYcially invited the Head of the UGCC, Patriarch My- roslav–Ivan Cardinal Lubachivsky, to his See in L’viv, something that happened on 30 March 1991. And the faithful of the UAOC, although having their own bishop in the former hierarch of the ROC, Ivan Bodnarchuk, were witnessing the gradual home–coming of Mstyslav Skrypnyk from the USA, proclaimed patriarch in Kyiv in June 1990. All this came as a massive surprise, I would say, shock to the ROC. Even today this Church cannot cope with these facts. What was the State Church a few months ago, suddenly became the Church of a tiny minority in Western Ukraine. Moreover, even those who stayed orthodox broke their allegiance to Moscow and wanted full auto- cephaly and independence, i.e. to have nothing to do with Moscow. ‘Traditional’ Churches in Independent Ukraine 59 Further, even the Head of the UOC–MP now broke his loyalty to his former masters and demanded autocephaly to his entire flock and gave birth to the UOC–KP. Yes, there were abuses or violent acts in those days, but not to the dramatic extent as it was presented, and even today is still repeated, to the completely uninformed, and sometimes desinterested, Western mass media. Despite everything, the UGCC began to restore normal life, re- construct its infrastructures, found its seminaries and the L’viv Theo- logical Academy, which later was renamed as the Ukrainian Catholic University.