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The* Moscow Time Them Moscow Time Received by NSD/FARA Registration Unit 08/05/2021 10:08:32 PM The* Moscow Time INDEPENDENT NEWS FROM RUS! Support The Moscow Times! Contribute today Them Moscow Time INDEPENDENT NEWS FROM RUS! • News • Opinion • Business • Meanwhile • Arts and Life • Podcasts • Videos • In-Depth Support The Moscow Times! Contribute today Putin, Merkel 'Satisfied' With Near Completion of Nord Stream 2 Bv AFP July 21,2021 Received by NSD/FARA Registration Unit 08/05/2021 10:08:32 PM Received by NSD/FARA Registration Unit 08/05/2021 10:08:32 PM w w ns Kremlin.ru a The Kremlin said Wednesday that Russian President Vladimir Putin and German Chancellor Angela Merkel had expressed their satisfaction with the near completion of the controversial Nord Stream 2 pipeline during phone talks. "The leaders are satisfied with the construction of Nord Stream 2 nearing completion," the Kremlin said in a statement after the talks, news UJS.. Germany Pipeline Deal Warns Russia. Seeks Ukraine Transit R Lany's "commitment" to the project, the Kremlin said, stressing that it is "purely commercial" and aimed at strengthening the >ean Union. unced it had reached an agreement with Germany on the Nord Stream 2 pipeline that would threaten Russia with sanctions and kraine. Received by NSD/FARA Registration Unit 08/05/2021 10:08:32 PM Received by NSD/FARA Registration Unit 08/05/2021 10:08:32 PM The nearly finished 10-billion-euro ($ 12-billion) pipeline is set to double Russian gas supplies to Germany, Europe's largest economy. But the project has been fiercely opposed by the United States and several European countries which argue that it will increase energy dependence on Russia and Moscow's geopolitical clout. The pipeline bypasses Ukraine's gas infrastructure, depriving the nation of around a billion euros annually in transit fees and, Kiev fears, removing a key check on potential Russian aggression in the region. The Kremlin said Wednesday that Putin and Merkel had discussed a possible extension of a gas transit agreement between Moscow and Kiev. "The Russian president and the German Chancellor touched upon a possibility of extending an agreement between Gazprom and Ukraine's Naftogaz on the transit of gas through Ukrainian territory beyond 2024," the Kremlin said without giving any other details. Victoria Nuland, the under secretary of state for political affairs, said that Germany had agreed to work alongside the United States to press Russia to extend by 10 years a transit agreement through Ukraine that is due to expire at the end of 2024. | Sign up ] for our free weekly newsletter covering News and Business. The best of The Moscow Times, delivered to your inbox. Read more about: Germany , Merkel , Nord Stream , Putin Most read Just in • 1 russia's response Coronavirus in Russia: The Latest News I August 5 seeking refuge IOC to Probe Belarus Officials Over Athlete's Forced Flight lees Country Over Death Threats This material is distributed by Yorktown Solutions, LLC on behalf of the All-Ukrainian Industry Association “Federation of EmPl0^ri^l^9lllf^ti?MRMi5iiM«WftavWlf«^epMW!syWi*3’ Washington, D.C..
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