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BRIEFING PAPER Number 9205, 26 April 2021

Crisis averted in ? By Claire Mills

Since March 2021 has been building up significant military forces in and along the borders of Eastern Ukraine, prompting fears of further military action in the region. On 22 April 2021 the Kremlin announced, however, that those additional troops, which it said had been deployed on exercise, would be withdrawn by 1 May 2021. Russia’s justification for the build-up has been questioned and it remains to be seen whether Russia will fully implement its commitment to withdrawal. 1. What has been happening in Ukraine since 2014?

Russian-backed separatists took control of Crimea and parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of eastern Ukraine (the ) in 2014. The 2014 and 2015 Minsk agreements remain the basis for the negotiation of a political solution to the conflict. In July 2020 additional measures were agreed by the Minsk Trilateral Contact Group, intended to strengthen, and ensure compliance with, the ceasefire. However, Russia has continued to integrate Crimea within Russian territory and to destabilise Ukraine. The Donbas is mainly Russian speaking and many of the population now have Russian passports after a concerted campaign by the Kremlin since 2019 to issue passports to Ukrainian nationals living in the separatist controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk.1

1 Since 2019 a reported 650,000 Russian passports have been issued, resulting in what some analysts have called a “passport protectorate”. See for example, “Russian passports: Putin’s secret weapon in the war against Ukraine”, Atlantic Council, 13 April 2021 www.parliament.uk/commons-library | intranet.parliament.uk/commons-library | [email protected] | @commonslibrary 2 Crisis averted in Ukraine?

Source: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, April 2019 Fighting between Russian-supported separatists and Ukrainian government forces has continued in the Donbas, even though it has rarely been in the headlines. Russia describes the Donbas as a “domestic conflict” for Ukraine, despite the widespread allegations that it is behind the separatist unrest. The Kremlin has consistently denied its involvement, suggesting that any Russian fighters in eastern Ukraine are “volunteers”.2 Many people doubt whether Russian President genuinely wants to resolve the conflict, however, preferring to set up a ‘’ where the breakaway regions are maintained and supported by Russia, weakening the Kiev government and giving Russia strong leverage over its actions, including any future attempts to formalise Ukraine’s relationship with the EU and NATO. More recently President Putin said that Russia will defend Russian citizens abroad if they are seen to be at risk.

Box 1: Further reading • Eastern Ukraine – dashed hopes?, House of Commons Library, June 2020 • Cool conflicts in Russia’s neighbourhood, House of Commons Library, January 2019 • Ukraine – summary of developments in 2015 and 2016, House of Commons Library, January 2016 • Ukraine: towards a frozen conflict?, House of Commons Library, September 2014

2. On the precipice of a new crisis?

The Minsk Agreements, including the additional measures agreed in July 2020, remain largely unimplemented by both sides. Tensions have been rising over the last few months in the Donbas region between pro-Russian separatists and Ukrainian government forces. Ceasefire violations have become increasingly commonplace and casualties are on the rise. In 2021, 27 Ukrainian military personnel have been killed thus far. Several commentators have suggested that the imposition of sanctions early in 2021 on pro-Russian Ukrainian politician and businessman , and the ban

2 “Ukraine conflict: could ‘defend’ Russia-backed rebels”, BBC News Online, 9 April 2021 3 Commons Library Briefing, 26 April 2021

imposed on three pro-Russian TV stations, have played a part in the deterioration of relations. As Sarah Lain of RUSI has observed: This deterioration was perhaps inevitable due to the lack of progress in the political and security dimensions of the peace process. Simply put, there has been little incentive for things to remain calm.3

2.1 The build-up of Russian military forces There have been growing fears that Russia is planning further military action in the region following several weeks of a military build-up in Crimea and along the eastern Ukrainian border.4 Russia has amassed an estimated 100,000 troops on the ground, a greater number than the force involved in the annexation of Crimea in 2014.5 Airborne troops, reconnaissance assets, infantry fighting vehicles, air defence systems, attack helicopters and a significant number of fast jet aircraft, including Su-30, have recently been stationed in Crimea and elsewhere in the region. Unconfirmed reports of Iskander short-range missiles being deployed to the region have been circulating in the media. The Ukrainian government has also asserted that Russia has been prepositioning fuel, ammunition and supplies in separatist held areas in the Donbas.6 Russia’s fleet has also been reinforced with the addition of a number of small vessels, including and artillery boats, from Russia’s Caspian Sea Flotilla. On 14 April 2021 the Russian Ministry of Defence reported that the Black Sea Fleet, together with and helicopters, would be taking part in live-fire exercises. The Russian government has since confirmed that the exercises will continue until the end of October 2021, with several sections of the Black Sea being closed to foreign vessels during this time. The Ukrainian Government has accused Russia of contravening the right to freedom of navigation under international law and described the move as an attempt to “usurp the sovereign rights of Ukraine as a coastal state”.7 By unilaterally closing access to the eastern Black Sea and the through the Kerch Strait, it further prevents the Ukrainian from entering the Sea of Azov and accessing its ports.

3 “Rising tensions in Ukraine are not necessarily a prelude to renewed “hot” war, RUSI Commentary, 29 March 2021 4 The movement of such extensive military forces has been undertaken without prior notification, in contravention of the principles set out in the OSCE’s Helsinki Final Act, to which Russia is a signatory. 5 Estimates suggest 90,000 Russian military personnel were deployed in support of local pro-Russian separatist groups in the Donbas region in 2014/15 (“Russian forces in Ukraine, RUSI Briefing Paper, March 2015 6 “Russian troop build-up continues on Ukrainian border”, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 14 April 2021 7 “Ukraine accuses Russia of shutting off Black Sea access, harassing ships”, The Moscow Times, 16 April 2021 4 Crisis averted in Ukraine?

Source: Wikipedia, User:NormanEinstein - Own work

In anticipation of the exercises, four Russian Ropucha-class landing ships recently joined the Black Sea Fleet from Russia’s Northern and Baltic Fleets, marking what has been regarded as “the largest concentration of Russian amphibious forces in recent history”.8

2.2 What has Russia said? The Russian Government’s official line is that the movement of military personnel and assets has been related to ongoing training exercises. At the beginning of April 2021 President Putin’s spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, called the movement of troops an “internal affair” and that they were “not threatening anyone”.9 A week later the Russian Defence Minister, Sergei Shoigu, accused NATO of provocative actions by amassing troops and equipment on Russia’s Baltic borders and in the Black Sea region and suggested that the movement of Russian forces was to test combat readiness in response to “threatening behaviour” by the Alliance.10 Separately the Russian Government also accused Ukraine of preparing an offensive of its own to re-take the Donbas and stated that Russia would be forced to come to the defence of Russian citizens in eastern Ukraine if the fighting escalated.11

2.3 International reaction The build-up comes at a low point in the West’s relations with Russia. The last few years have been dominated by sanctions, tit-for-tat expulsions of diplomats and widespread condemnation of Russia for its destabilising actions on the international stage, the detention of opposition leader and subsequent crackdown on protesters.

8 “Update: Russia amasses amphibious forces in Black Sea”, Jane’s Navy International, 20 April 2021 9 “Russia’s internal troop movements should not concern other states, Kremlin states”, TASS Russian News Agency, 1 April 2021 10 “Russia says troop build up near Ukraine is a response to NATO”, The Independent, 13 April 2021 11 “Donbas escalation would be beginning of the end for Ukraine”, The Moscow Times, 8 April 2021 5 Commons Library Briefing, 26 April 2021

Since the annexation of Crimea in 2014 the West has been unanimous in its support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine and, as a result, a number of countries have supplied military assistance to the country’s armed forces. This is examined in: • Military assistance to Ukraine, House of Commons Library, April 2021 Reacting to recent events the members of the G7 issued a statement calling on Russia to de-escalate tensions in line with its international obligations. It went on to state: we reaffirm our unwavering support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders. We support Ukraine’s posture of restraint. We underline our strong appreciation and continued support for France’s and Germany’s efforts through the Normandy Process to secure the full implementation of the Minsk agreements, which is the only way forward for a lasting political solution to the conflict. We call on all sides to engage constructively in the Trilateral Contact Group on the OSCE’s proposals to confirm and consolidate the ceasefire.12 Those sentiments were echoed by the NATO Secretary General during a press conference with the US Defense Secretary and US Secretary of State on 14 April 2021: This is the biggest massing of Russian troops since the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. And it is part of a broader pattern of Russian aggressive actions, which raises very serious concerns. Allies fully support Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. And we call on Russia to de-escalate immediately. Stop its pattern of aggressive provocations. And respect its international commitments. The EU High Representative also stated, on behalf of EU Foreign Ministers: With G7 partners, we have called on Russia to stop this dangerous escalation. In addition, Russia has announced the closure of certain parts of the Black Sea until October 2021, for military manoeuvres, which is another provocative move and violates the freedom of navigation as guaranteed by UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) […] We must commend Ukraine for its restrained response; we must continue to urge Russia to de-escalate and defuse tensions, and we should all push back on Russia’s attempts to portray itself as a mediator, rather than a party to the conflict. We reiterated our strong support to Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity and our insistence on the need for the full implementation of the Minsk agreements.13 On 20 April 2021 the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office set out its position in response to a Parliamentary Question on this issue: Russia's build-up of military forces near the Ukrainian border and within illegally annexed Crimea indicates a troubling escalation in its ongoing campaign of aggression towards Ukraine and its militarisation of the illegally annexed peninsula. There has been regular Ministerial and senior official level engagement with the and with our allies on this issue. The Foreign Secretary and the Defence Secretary spoke to their Ukrainian counterparts on 2 April and the Prime Minister had discussions with President Zelenskyy of Ukraine on 5 April to assure them

12 Statement of G7 Foreign Ministers, 12 April 2021 13 External Action Service, HRVP Blog: Why and how the EU is supporting Ukraine, 20 April 2021 6 Crisis averted in Ukraine?

of the UK's unwavering support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. As a fellow Permanent Member of the UN Security Council, we engage directly with Russia on matters of international peace and security, including Ukraine. We continue to raise our concerns with the Russian government at every opportunity. On 15 April, the National Security Adviser spoke to his Russian counterpart, and the FCDO Permanent Under Secretary reiterated our concerns to the Russian Ambassador in London on the same day. Our Ambassador in Moscow has spoken to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, mostly recently on 16 April, to express our deep concern about the build-up of Russian troops and the Ukrainian border, to reiterate our call for Russia to de-escalate, and to underline our support for Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity. We will continue working closely with partners to monitor the situation, and consider all options.14 In May 2021 the UK’s Carrier Strike Group is due to deploy on its first operational mission to the Indo-Pacific. It has been widely reported in the media that two warships deploying as part of that group, a Type 45 and a Type 23 , will stop off in the Black Sea en route, in a show of solidarity with Ukraine and regional NATO allies.15 3. Crisis averted?

On 22 April 2021 the Russian Defence Minister announced that Russian units and airborne divisions on exercise near the Ukrainian border would return back to their permanent bases by 1 May 2021, having completed what he called “snap checks”.16 Ukrainian President, , welcomed the move to defuse tensions, stating: The reduction of troops on our border proportionally reduces tension. Ukraine is always vigilant, yet welcomes any steps to decrease the military presence and deescalate the situation in Donbas. Ukraine seeks peace. Grateful to international partners for their support.17 Russia taking a step back begs the question of Putin’s intentions over the last month or so. While many had feared the Russian military build-up to be a precursor to a limited military intervention in eastern Ukraine, other commentators suggested that Russia’s intention was to test the political resolve of NATO and the new Biden administration in their support for Ukraine’s sovereignty, while demonstrating Russia’s capacity to act in the region if it feels its interests, or its citizens, are threatened.18 Russia’s announced redeployment of forces would suggest the latter. However, it remains to be seen whether the moves will be fully implemented by Russia or whether the Kremlin will surreptitiously keep elements of its recently deployed military forces in place. As Peter Dickinson at the Atlantic Council has observed: Amid the justifiable sense of relief in and other European capitals, it is critical to underline that Vladimir Putin’s campaign of aggression against Ukraine remains far

14 PQ181414, Ukraine: Russia, 20 April 2021 15 “UK warships to sail for Black Sea in May as Ukraine-Russia tensions rise”, , 20 April 2021 16 “Russia to withdraw troops from Ukraine border, Crimea”, The Moscow Times, 22 April 2021 17 Twitter, 22 April 2021 18 See for example Tim Ripley and Thomas Bullock “Russian troop build-up sparks concern in Ukraine”, Jane’s Intelligence Review, 9 April 2021; Elena Ostanina and Alex Kokcharov, “Russian military build-up on Ukraine’s borders: war risk scenarios”, Jane’s Intelligence Review, 8 April 2021. The use of “peacekeeping forces” to protect what the Kremlin considers Russian citizens in the post-Soviet space has also long been recognised as a tool of Russian foreign policy (see for example “Will they stay or will they go?: Russian peacekeepers in the post-Soviet space”, Radio Free Europe, 12 November 2020)

7 Commons Library Briefing, 26 April 2021

from over. While the potential catastrophe of a full-scale Russian spring offensive has been avoided, the threat of a dramatic escalation remains very real. Meanwhile, Crimea and large swathes of eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region are still under Russian occupation, and the death toll continues to climb in a conflict that has already claimed more than 14,000 Ukrainian lives.19 He goes on to state: The message to Kyiv and Ukraine’s Western partners could hardly have been clearer: Russia has not ruled out a military solution to the conflict and may yet resort to force if the necessary concessions are not forthcoming.20 Importantly, Russia’s redeployment of military forces does not include its naval assets in the Black Sea which are conducting exercises until the end of October 2021. As outlined above, the move by Russia to unliterally close off parts of the Black Sea to foreign vessels has prompted widespread criticism and allegations that Russia is in contravention of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Russia contends that the restrictions are in line with international agreements and that it is common practice to limit areas where military exercises are taking place.21 At the time of writing, it remains to be seen how the West will respond to this move.

19 “Putin withdraws troops but Russo-Ukrainian war continues”, Atlantic Council, 22 April 2021 20 Ibid 21 “Russia’s defence minister says US employing provocative actions in Black Sea”, Newsweek, 20 April 2021

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