Crisis Averted in Ukraine? by Claire Mills
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
Online Russia, Today
Online Russia, today. How is Russia Today framing the events of the Ukrainian crisis of 2013 and what this framing says about the Russian regime’s legitimation strategies? The case of the Russian-language online platform of RT Margarita Kurdalanova 24th of June 2016 Graduate School of Social Sciences Authoritarianism in a Global Age Adele Del Sordi Dr. Andrey Demidov This page intentionally left blank Word count: 14 886 1 Table of Contents Abstract ...................................................................................................................................... 3 1.Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 4 2.Literature Review .................................................................................................................... 5 2.1 Legitimacy and legitimation ............................................................................................. 5 2.2. Legitimation in authoritarian regimes ............................................................................. 7 2.3 Media and authoritarianism .............................................................................................. 9 2.4 Propaganda and information warfare ............................................................................. 11 3.Case study ............................................................................................................................. 13 3.1 The Russian-Ukrainian conflict of 2013 ....................................................................... -
Launching an Effective Anti- Corruption Court: Lessons from Ukraine
U4 Practice Insight 2021:1 Launching an effective anti- corruption court: Lessons from Ukraine By David Vaughn and Olha Nikolaieva Series editor: Sofie Arjon Schütte Disclaimer All views in this text are the author(s)’, and may differ from the U4 partner agencies’ policies. Partner agencies German Corporation for International Cooperation – GIZ German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development – BMZ Global Affairs Canada Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark / Danish International Development Assistance – Danida Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency – Sida Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation – SDC The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation – Norad UK Aid – Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office About U4 U4 is a team of anti-corruption advisers working to share research and evidence to help international development actors get sustainable results. The work involves dialogue, publications, online training, workshops, helpdesk, and innovation. U4 is a permanent centre at the Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI) in Norway. CMI is a non-profit, multi-disciplinary research institute with social scientists specialising in development studies. www.U4.no [email protected] Cover photo High Anti-Corruption Court (CC copyrighted) Keywords justice sector - anti-corruption courts - judges - vetting - Ukraine - Eastern Europe Publication type U4 Practice Insight Creative commons This work is licenced under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International licence (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) Ukraine’s High Anti-Corruption Court was created in response to immense public demand to hold government officials and judges accountable for corruption. Making the court operational, however, required more than adopting legislation. It meant selecting and preparing judges, recruiting qualified court personnel, and setting up administrative and organisational structures, including courthouse facilities, security, IT infrastructure, and communications systems. -
The Russia You Never Met
The Russia You Never Met MATT BIVENS AND JONAS BERNSTEIN fter staggering to reelection in summer 1996, President Boris Yeltsin A announced what had long been obvious: that he had a bad heart and needed surgery. Then he disappeared from view, leaving his prime minister, Viktor Cher- nomyrdin, and his chief of staff, Anatoly Chubais, to mind the Kremlin. For the next few months, Russians would tune in the morning news to learn if the presi- dent was still alive. Evenings they would tune in Chubais and Chernomyrdin to hear about a national emergency—no one was paying their taxes. Summer turned to autumn, but as Yeltsin’s by-pass operation approached, strange things began to happen. Chubais and Chernomyrdin suddenly announced the creation of a new body, the Cheka, to help the government collect taxes. In Lenin’s day, the Cheka was the secret police force—the forerunner of the KGB— that, among other things, forcibly wrested food and money from the peasantry and drove some of them into collective farms or concentration camps. Chubais made no apologies, saying that he had chosen such a historically weighted name to communicate the seriousness of the tax emergency.1 Western governments nod- ded their collective heads in solemn agreement. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank both confirmed that Russia was experiencing a tax collec- tion emergency and insisted that serious steps be taken.2 Never mind that the Russian government had been granting enormous tax breaks to the politically connected, including billions to Chernomyrdin’s favorite, Gazprom, the natural gas monopoly,3 and around $1 billion to Chubais’s favorite, Uneximbank,4 never mind the horrendous corruption that had been bleeding the treasury dry for years, or the nihilistic and pointless (and expensive) destruction of Chechnya. -
Ukrainian Armed Forces
June 23, 2021 Ukrainian Armed Forces In 2014, the Ukrainian military, which observers noted had lower (around 2.5% of GDP). Ukraine’s 2021 defense been weakened by years of neglect and underfunding, faced budget is 117.6 billion hryvnia ($4.2 billion), 127 million Russia’s occupation of Ukraine’s Crimea region and hryvnia ($4.6 million) less than 2020’s budget. invasion of eastern Ukraine. Since that time, the Ukrainian Additionally, Ukraine’s defense budget allocations are split armed forces have made considerable improvements; they between funds necessary to maintain the military and funds have undertaken efforts to adopt NATO standards and to support its ambitious reform program. received significant NATO and U.S. assistance. Many of these reforms began out of the experience of defending Ukraine inherited a sprawling defense industry from the against Russian aggression. Reforms range from the tactical Soviet Union, producing a wide range of products, to the strategic levels and include both political measures including tanks and armored vehicles, aircraft, radars and (e.g., increasing transparency, countering corruption, and electronics, missiles, and ships. Defense conglomerate ensuring civilian control over the military) and military Ukroboronprom oversees the defense industry, which reforms (e.g., modernizing equipment, reforming command comprises over 130 state-run companies. In recent years, and control, and increasing professionalization). Ukrainian officials have made reforming Ukroboronprom and increasing transparency key goals, including passing a Significant hurdles remain, however, and the reform new law, On Defense Procurement, in July 2020 to process is complicated by Ukraine’s Soviet legacy, the implement NATO standards in defense procurement. -
Development Partnership Forum Joint Statement 8 October 2020
Development Partnership Forum Joint Statement 8 October 2020 Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal and Heads of Missions and Heads of Cooperation met 8 October 2020, in Kyiv, Ukraine, in the framework of the Development Partnership Forum, which was established as a part of the three-tier coordination mechanism between the Government of Ukraine (GOU) and the international Development Partners (DPs) in line with the Paris Declaration on Improving the Effectiveness of External Assistance. This meeting builds upon the successful Development Partnership Forum held in January 2020 and the Ukraine Reform Conferences (URC) held in London, Copenhagen, and Toronto. It is also a key milestone in preparing for the next URC expected to be held in Vilnius, Lithuania in 2021. Development cooperation takes place in Ukraine across multiple sectors and areas and is being provided by 24 countries, IFIs and the EU with total grant assistance of roughly USD 5.7 billion since the Revolution of Dignity. Cooperation between Ukraine and DPs is based on common interests and shared values and aims to support national reforms promoting an inclusive, independent, democratic, prosperous, and healthy Ukraine united around core European values. Both sides underscored that their shared aim is to achieve a tangible impact for all Ukrainian citizens, including its most vulnerable, based on the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. The GOU continues to be committed to reforms aimed at restoring economic growth and bringing the country closer to the European future. Development Partners stand ready to support the GOU to realise the potential of the Ukrainian economy through systemic changes to improve its business climate, increase investment attractiveness and to develop trade and human capital. -
The Origins of United Russia and the Putin Presidency: the Role of Contingency in Party-System Development
The Origins of United Russia and the Putin Presidency: The Role of Contingency in Party-System Development HENRY E. HALE ocial science has generated an enormous amount of literature on the origins S of political party systems. In explaining the particular constellation of parties present in a given country, almost all theoretical work stresses the importance of systemic, structural, or deeply-rooted historical factors.1 While the development of social science theory certainly benefits from the focus on such enduring influ- ences, a smaller set of literature indicates that we must not lose sight of the crit- ical role that chance plays in politics.2 The same is true for the origins of politi- cal party systems. This claim is illustrated by the case of the United Russia Party, which burst onto the political scene with a strong second-place showing in the late 1999 elec- tions to Russia’s parliament (Duma), and then won a stunning majority in the 2003 elections. Most accounts have treated United Russia as simply the next in a succession of Kremlin-based “parties of power,” including Russia’s Choice (1993) and Our Home is Russia (1995), both groomed from the start primarily to win large delegations that provide support for the president to pass legislation.3 The present analysis, focusing on United Russia’s origin as the Unity Bloc in 1999, casts the party in a somewhat different light. When we train our attention on the party’s beginnings rather than on what it wound up becoming, we find that Unity was a profoundly different animal from Our Home and Russia’s Choice. -
Digital Government Factsheet Ukraine
Digital Government Factsheet 2019 Ukraine ISA2 Digital Government Factsheets - Ukraine Table of Contents Country Profile .................................................................................................. 3 Digital Government Highlights ............................................................................. 5 Digital Government Political Communications ........................................................ 6 Digital Government Legislation ............................................................................ 9 Digital Government Governance .........................................................................13 Digital Government Infrastructure ......................................................................16 Digital Government Services for Citizens .............................................................21 Digital Government Services for Businesses .........................................................24 2 2 Digital Government Factsheets - Ukraine Country Profile Basic data Population: 42 122 657 (2019) GDP at market prices: UAH 1 048 023 (2019) GDP per inhabitant in PPS (Purchasing Power Standard EU 28=100): N/A GDP growth rate: 3.4% (IV quarter of 2018 compared to IV quarter of 2017) Inflation rate: 9.8%* (2018) General government gross debt (Percentage of GDP): 63%* General government deficit/surplus (Percentage of GDP): 1.66%* Area: 603 628 km2 Capital city: Kyiv Official EU language: Ukrainian Currency: UAH 2 Source: UkrStat, *Ukrainian Ministry of Finance 3 Digital Government Factsheets -
Ukrainian Armed Forces
June 23, 2021 Ukrainian Armed Forces In 2014, the Ukrainian military, which observers noted had lower (around 2.5% of GDP). Ukraine’s 2021 defense been weakened by years of neglect and underfunding, faced budget is 117.6 billion hryvnia ($4.2 billion), 127 million Russia’s occupation of Ukraine’s Crimea region and hryvnia ($4.6 million) less than 2020’s budget. invasion of eastern Ukraine. Since that time, the Ukrainian Additionally, Ukraine’s defense budget allocations are split armed forces have made considerable improvements; they between funds necessary to maintain the military and funds have undertaken efforts to adopt NATO standards and to support its ambitious reform program. received significant NATO and U.S. assistance. Many of these reforms began out of the experience of defending Ukraine inherited a sprawling defense industry from the against Russian aggression. Reforms range from the tactical Soviet Union, producing a wide range of products, to the strategic levels and include both political measures including tanks and armored vehicles, aircraft, radars and (e.g., increasing transparency, countering corruption, and electronics, missiles, and ships. Defense conglomerate ensuring civilian control over the military) and military Ukroboronprom oversees the defense industry, which reforms (e.g., modernizing equipment, reforming command comprises over 130 state-run companies. In recent years, and control, and increasing professionalization). Ukrainian officials have made reforming Ukroboronprom and increasing transparency key goals, including passing a Significant hurdles remain, however, and the reform new law, On Defense Procurement, in July 2020 to process is complicated by Ukraine’s Soviet legacy, the implement NATO standards in defense procurement. -
Treisman Silovarchs 9 10 06
Putin’s Silovarchs Daniel Treisman October 2006, Forthcoming in Orbis, Winter 2007 In the late 1990s, many Russians believed their government had been captured by a small group of business magnates known as “the oligarchs”. The most flamboyant, Boris Berezovsky, claimed in 1996 that seven bankers controlled fifty percent of the Russian economy. Having acquired massive oil and metals enterprises in rigged privatizations, these tycoons exploited Yeltsin’s ill-health to meddle in politics and lobby their interests. Two served briefly in government. Another, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, summed up the conventional wisdom of the time in a 1997 interview: “Politics is the most lucrative field of business in Russia. And it will be that way forever.”1 A decade later, most of the original oligarchs have been tripping over each other in their haste to leave the political stage, jettisoning properties as they go. From exile in London, Berezovsky announced in February he was liquidating his last Russian assets. A 1 Quoted in Andrei Piontkovsky, “Modern-Day Rasputin,” The Moscow Times, 12 November, 1997. fellow media magnate, Vladimir Gusinsky, long ago surrendered his television station to the state-controlled gas company Gazprom and now divides his time between Israel and the US. Khodorkovsky is in a Siberian jail, serving an eight-year sentence for fraud and tax evasion. Roman Abramovich, Berezovsky’s former partner, spends much of his time in London, where he bought the Chelsea soccer club in 2003. Rather than exile him to Siberia, the Kremlin merely insists he serve as governor of the depressed Arctic outpost of Chukotka—a sign Russia’s leaders have a sense of humor, albeit of a dark kind. -
Russia Reform Monitor No. 2389 | American Foreign Policy Council
Russia Reform Monitor No. 2389 June 1, 2020 Matt Maldonado, Ilan I. Berman Related Categories: Democracy and Governance; Human Rights and Humanitarian Issues; Global Health; Russia; North Africa HOW RUSSIA IS HELPING LIBYA'S HAFTAR U.S. military officials and national security experts have accused Russia of fanning the flames in Libya's civil war by supplying strongman Khalifa Haftar with both warplanes and manpower while masking the origin of that assistance. The North African conflict has widened in recent months after Turkey began supporting the UN-recognized Government of National Accord in their fight against Haftar, the leader of the Russia-backed Libyan National Army. Haftar controls large swaths of eastern Libya and is trying to dislodge the GNA from the capital city, Tripoli. In addition to releasing images of what are being called disguised Russian MiG-29 warplanes and other aircraft in southern Libya, U.S. sources also claim that Wagner, a Russian mercenary outfit that has gained notoriety for its activities in Ukraine and Syria, has deployed personnel to assist Haftar and his forces. Russia also appears to be providing Haftar and his men with advanced anti-aircraft systems. When Turkish-backed Libyan forces recently captured the al-Watiyah airbase in the country's west, they discovered a disabled unit of the Pantsir-S1 anti-aircraft missile system. The Pantsir-S1, known by NATO forces as the SA-22 Greyhound, has been a staple of military forces loyal to President Bashar Assad in Syria for the past several years. The system is capable of shooting down drones, and has been a nuisance for Turkish planes over Libya. -
AN ANALYSIS of the CRISIS in UKRAINE, and ITS THREE CONFLICTS (21 of NOVEMBER 2013, THROUGH 23 of MAY 2014)* Cristián Faundes**
REVISTA - Bogotá (Colombia) Vol. 11 N.° 2 - Julio-diciembre 137 rev.relac.int.estrateg.segur.11(2):137-159,2016 AN ANALYSIS OF THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE, AND ITS THREE CONFLICTS (21 OF NOVEMBER 2013, THROUGH 23 OF MAY 2014)* Cristián Faundes** ABSTRACT This paper presents the results of a study of the crisis in Ukraine, guided by the following question: which is the intensity of the crisis in Ukraine between November 2013 and May 2014? The information collected for this research involves 293 events evaluated and translated into quantitative data by the author with the objective to elaborate a curve reflecting the intensity of the conflict. Considering that the situation under scrutiny involves several conflicts, Revista de one curve of intensity was not enough to follow the course of events, but three were needed to track the (2). pp.137-159. DOI: (2). pp.137-159. 11 * . This paper is the result of a research study on the Crisis in Ukraine held at the Center for Strategic Studies of the Chilean Army’s War College. Project number: CEEAG-01-2014. ** Investigador académico en temas de seguridad y defensa. Sus líneas de trabajo incluyen la teoría de conflictos y las relaciones entre los países del Cono Sur. Se ha especializado en la problemática de los recursos naturales y el estudio del agua dulce como factor de conflictos. Ha presentado sus investigaciones en congresos internacionales y cátedras de postgrado. Se desempeña como Investigador asociado en la Jefatura de Estudios de la Academia de Guerra del Ejército. Periodista, licenciado en información social. -
The Long Arm of Vladimir Putin: How the Kremlin Uses Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties to Target Its Opposition Abroad
The Long Arm of Vladimir Putin: How the Kremlin Uses Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties to Target its Opposition Abroad Russia Studies Centre Policy Paper No. 5 (2015) Dr Andrew Foxall The Henry Jackson Society June 2015 THE LONG ARM OF VLADIMIR PUTIN Summary Over the past 15 years, there has been – and continues to be – significant interchange between Western and Russian law-enforcement agencies, even in cases where Russia’s requests for legal assistance have been politicaLLy motivated. Though it is the Kremlin’s warfare that garners the West’s attention, its ‘lawfare’ poses just as significant a threat because it undermines the rule of law. One of the chief weapons in Russia’s ‘lawfare’ is the so-called ‘Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty’ (MLAT), a bilateral agreement that defines how countries co-operate on legal matters. TypicaLLy, the Kremlin will fabricate a criminaL case against an individual, and then request, through the MLAT system, the co-operation of Western countries in its attempts to persecute said person. Though Putin’s regime has been mounting, since 2012, an escalating campaign against opposition figures, the Kremlin’s use of ‘lawfare’ is nothing new. Long before then, Russia requested – and received – legal assistance from Western countries on a number of occasions, in its efforts to extradite opposition figures back to Russia. Western countries have complied with Russia’s requests for legal assistance in some of the most brazen and high-profile politicaLLy motivated cases in recent history, incLuding: individuals linked with Mikhail Khodorkovsky and the Yukos affair; Bill Browder and others connecteD to Hermitage Capital Management; and AnDrey Borodin and Bank of Moscow.