Online Russia, today.

How is Russia Today framing the events of the Ukrainian crisis of 2013 and what this framing says about the Russian regime’s legitimation strategies?

The case of the Russian-language online platform of RT

Margarita Kurdalanova

24th of June 2016

Graduate School of Social Sciences Authoritarianism in a Global Age Adele Del Sordi Dr. Andrey Demidov

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Word count: 14 886 1 Table of Contents Abstract ...... 3 1.Introduction ...... 4 2.Literature Review ...... 5 2.1 Legitimacy and legitimation ...... 5 2.2. Legitimation in authoritarian regimes ...... 7 2.3 Media and authoritarianism ...... 9 2.4 Propaganda and information warfare ...... 11 3.Case study ...... 13 3.1 The Russian-Ukrainian conflict of 2013 ...... 13 3.2 The power of RT ...... 16 4. Research design ...... 18 4.1 Methodology ...... 18 4.2 Data collection ...... 19 4.3 Frames ...... 20 4.4 Qualitative analysis ...... 21 4.5 Validity of results ...... 22 5. Findings ...... 23 5.1 Security ...... 23 5.2 Duty ...... 24 5.3 Anti-Ukraine ...... 26 5.4 Anti-West ...... 27 5.5 Moral ...... 28 5.6 History ...... 29 5.7 Nationalism ...... 30 5.8 Information warfare ...... 31 5.9 Frames count ...... 32 6.0 The presidential Crimean speech ...... 33 7. Discussion of Findings ...... 36 8. Theoretical implications ...... 38 9. Conclusion ...... 40 10. RT articles cited ...... 42 11. Bibliography ...... 46

Word count: 14 886 2

Abstract

Since the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis in 2013, the Russian government has increasingly been engaging in media manipulation strategies. Often referred to as the greatest propaganda blitzkrieg in the history of information warfare, the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian conflict brings forward the importance of online information in a globalising world. The following thesis aims to answer the question of how Russia Today is framing the events of the Ukrainian crisis, and further speculates about what such framing can say about Russia’s legitimation strategies. The data source for the analysis performed is the Russian-language version of RT, where the main audience targeted is the domestic one. Having prime focus on theories of legitimation, the thesis aims to understand the exact practices of legitimation rather than its outcome. The analysis of four events, including the official Crimean address of Vladimir Putin, confirmed the importance of nationalism as a frame popular within RT news reports. Furthermore, the thesis yields seven more categories further observing the legitimation strategies of the Russian-language online platform of RT.

The first casualty when war comes is Truth

— U.S. Senator Hiram Johnson, 1917

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1. Introduction

The Russian annexation of Crimea and any subsequent events have led to civil unrest and mass protests all over Ukraine. Furthermore, the Russian Federation was strongly criticised by most of the Western world for the infringement of state sovereignty and unlawful actions against Ukraine. However, the importance of this conflict goes beyond Russia’s militaristic operations and the subsequent backlash from the Ukrainian and international community. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict of 2013 can be seen as an instance in which the concept of legitimation played a crucial role. It marked the role of media as a tool in legitimising Russia’s actions and presenting those actions as a brave countermeasure against “Ukronazis” and oppressors of the Russian people. For Russia, such legitimation practices were of great importance since no government or international law could have justified Russia’s actions against Ukraine.

Russia’s propensity to seek legitimation is strongly underlined within Kremlin’s media. Despite the fact that the Kremlin’s media channels argued in favour of anti-fascism and ensuring the security of Russians as the main reasons behind the Crimean annexation, most international observers harbour significant doubts regarding the idea of Russian protection as a motive behind the conflict of 2013. A closer look at the narratives of the conflict suggests the presence of economic, political and foreign policy goals as more likely causes of the conflict. However, if media legitimation practices were used in order to justify Russia’s policy implementation, this raises questions about the role of legitimation within authoritarian regimes.

In order to approach these questions, the current research takes a closer look at the Crimean crisis as presented by Russia’s official media channel. With the help of content analysis and category-based data observation, the research addresses the debate of how legitimacy affects authoritarian regimes. As the thesis will further illustrate, legitimacy and legitimation are concepts of great importance for the stability of regimes. The focus of the current thesis is the Russian-language version of RT where the practices of legitimation are targeted towards the domestic audience of Russia Today. As the thesis will later on discuss the fact that the audience of the Russian language RT is primarily the domestic one is in close correlation with the ways through which messages were framed by the media. This is most

Word count: 14 886 4 visible in the performed comparison between RT articles and the Presidential official Crimean address where variance in between audiences targeted is present. In addition, the fact that only articles in Russian language have been analysed could provide further information about the exact nature of messages broadcasted to the educated, internet-literate audience of the online Russian RT.

Moreover, the act of legitimation provides feasible information for the measurement of the effects legitimacy has on regimes’ stability. In this paper’s analysis of the research, such legitimation practices will be derived from RT’s online articles, further exploring the importance of media manipulation and propaganda in the 21st century. Prior to that, a theoretical reflection of the relevant concepts will be provided, where the importance of legitimation is further explored. This theoretical section is followed by summary of the specific narratives of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. The same narratives will be further discussed in the following chapter, which is concerned with the factual background of the conflict. After presenting the methodology and operationalisation sections, the research will outline the findings of the analysis and return to answer the principal research question: How has the online Russia Today framed events in front of its domestic audience during the Ukrainian conflict of 2013-2016 and what such framing says about Russia’s legitimation practices?

2. Literature Review

2.1 Legitimacy and legitimation

The concept and theorisation of legitimacy has long perplexed politicians, rulers, psychologists and scholars within various humanitarian fields. Scholars have, over the course of centuries, discussed the phenomenon of how leaders “deduce their legitimacy, no matter with what right, from the will of the governed” (Weber, 1921, p. 4). The concept of legitimacy and its definition have significantly changed throughout the years, especially after the emergence of democratic regimes (Hawkesworth & Kogan, 2004, p. 110). A widely accepted definition is the one of Lipset stating legitimacy as “the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for the society” (1959, p. 77). Alagappa (1995), in addition,

Word count: 14 886 5 believes there are cases where “the concern is less with the use of power within the law and more with its effective use for the promotion of the collective welfare.” (p. 31). The author further argues that “the emphasis in political legitimation shifts to the normative and performance elements.” (: ibid). An example of such performance elements could be the use of soft power, where in the current state of globalisation, “factors of technology, education and economic growth are becoming more in international power” (p. 154), since “If a state can make its power seem legitimate in the eyes of others, it will encounter less resistance to its wishes.” (Nye, 1990, p. 167). This, therefore, leads to the belief that authoritarian regimes retain a set of practices in order to ensure the legitimacy of rule.

Without engaging in the debate of whether the above critiques are justified or not, this literature review focuses on the argument that one should not discard any area of study, especially in cases where the study clearly spurs debate in a particular field. In line with this argument, Barker (2001) states that, despite being important, normative discussions of legitimacy suffer from certain drawbacks (pp. 21-24). The author further argues that the judgemental nature of normative discussions limits the debate to a restricted conclusion of whether one regime is legitimate or not, without any descriptive or explanatory content (: ibid). On the other hand, profound study of the ways in which regimes legitimate themselves and the ways through which they resist counter-legitimations can reveal political practices which both constitute and cause particular outcomes for the existence of that regime. Barker (2001) debates that the only way to focus on legitimation is to distinguish “the terms ‘legitimacy’ and ‘legitimate’ as respectively descriptive of an object and the property of an object, to normative enquiry, and to use the term ‘legitimation’ for the discussion of observable human activity” (p. 23)

Leibfried and Zürn (2005) conducted a study examining legitimation practices, and, more specifically, how official political statements affect the state’s legitimacy. Their study led to the conclusion that there is “no doubt that the transformations of the modern Western state through globalisation and transnational integration affect processes of legitimation”. (p. 135) This transformation, however, is not only visible within Western states. Despite addressing the connection between globalisation and authoritarian (in)stability, Hayoz (2012) extensively discusses the need for legitimation practices within authoritarian regimes. (pp. 19- 22) Presenting Russia as a representative of authoritarian regimes, the author argues that facing the challenges of globalisation “the regime may become more repressive or will need to find an alternative source of legitimacy”. (Hayoz, 2012, p. 20) Having all of the criticism in

Word count: 14 886 6 mind, one should take note of the argument that “legitimation is a distinct and valuable concept, and that once it has been distinguished from other concepts, which do different work, a theory of legitimation is possible to solve problems which have held up the study of politics and government, and which facilitates more fruitful investigation in the future” (Barker, 2001, p. 23).

The above discussion has shown that studying legitimacy is a difficult enterprise in any political regime. In particular, it is extremely hard to measure the actual level of regime acceptance in authoritarian contexts. This drawback comes not only from the restrictions in possible methodology, but also the fact that authoritarian regimes often do not provide a free enough political environment to permit the expression of opinion. This, therefore, is the reason why one should turn to the practices and strategies of legitimacy-seeking, that is legitimation, in order to better understand the process of maintaining political beliefs.

2.2. Legitimation in authoritarian regimes

Legitimation is relevant for all types of regime. The studies of Graf Kielmansegg, (1971) and Schmidt (2003), have led Von Soest and Grauvogel to the argument that “Every political system – irrespective of whether it is democratic or authoritarian – must attain a certain level of legitimacy in order to ensure its persistence in the long term”. (von Soest & Grauvogel, 2015, p. 19). There is, however, a great difference in the approaches to democratic and authoritarian legitimation. By representing regime stability in three pillars, namely repression, co-optation and legitimation, Gerschewski (2013) calls for a greater amount of research on legitimation in autocratic regimes. Referring to the work of Linz (1976) and O’Donnell (1979), Gerschewski points out that “while the research on democracy and democratization has produced an abundance of theories and empirical results, the research on autocratic political regimes as the “counterpart” to democracies has not moved beyond the classics of the 1960s and 1970s” (p. 13). Gerschweski enumerates the normative, substantive and methodical contemporary critiques as the reasons behind the neglect of legitimation as a factor of regime stability (: ibid). In other words, the author debates that scholars tend to overlook the causal factors when discussing legitimation. In his definition, legitimation is seen as the process of gaining support through an empirical form of legitimacy belief. By

Word count: 14 886 7 introducing this alternative, empirical approach to studying the process of gaining support, Gerschewski attempted to give a new perspective to the existing normative traditions. He debates that “research efforts have gradually lost sight of the legitimation dimensions” (p. 18). By discussing the empirical dimensions, Gerschewski presents a more feasible set of practices for studying legitimation with the core assumption that no ruler can maintain ultimate power without a certain degree of legitimacy(: ibid). After applying this assumption to authoritarian cases, the author debates that “Today’s autocracies cannot rely (at least in the long term) entirely on their abuse of power” (2013, p. 18).

Von Soest and Grauvogel (2015) develop the concept further, stating “A regime’s claim to legitimacy is important for explaining its means of rule and, in turn, its durability (Easton, 1965; Brady, 2009), because relying on repression alone is too costly as a means of sustaining authoritarian rule.”(pp. 18-46). The issue with power politics and repression as conditions for preserving authoritarian rule is mainly their short term effect. Von Soest and Grauvogel (2015) further argue that political leaders can only sustain their rule in the long term by seeking certain levels of legitimacy. Relying on repression alone would mean that no leader could guarantee the stability of rule since the regime would appear vulnerable to anyone more powerful. In contrast, by introducing the concept of legitimacy, rulers can influence “elite cohesion, opposition activity, and potential regime popularity” (Grauvogel and von Soest, 2014). By introducing certain dimensions of legitimation strategy ranging from ideology to performance, Von Soest and Grauvogel (2015) conclude that such legitimation strategies can influence not only regimes’ persistence but also their breakdown. It is, therefore, worth noting that deeper understanding of the aforementioned practices could also enhance the creation of counter strategies

Despite being called “observable human activity” (: ibid), Gerschewski underlines the difficulties in studying legitimation practices within authoritarian regimes (2013, p. 20). One of the strategies to evaluate legitimation practices proposed by Gerschewski (2013) is focused on official legitimacy claims, which can be classified and studied through content analysis techniques (p. 21). In addition, Hayoz (2012) underlines the importance of the command of language, arguing that “modernization remains at the level of rhetoric since under non- democratic conditions it cannot mean serious economic and political reforms” (p. 21). It is therefore safe to say that political messages are indeed an important feature of authoritarian legitimation practices. This hypothesis will be explored within the current thesis, which

Word count: 14 886 8 examines both direct messages from the authorities and public discourse as transmitted by official online media.

2.3 Media and authoritarianism

The end of the 20th century also marked the collapse of 85 authoritarian regimes, bringing forward the idea of global democratisation (Geddes, 1999). Since then, the field of comparative politics has spent significant time in explaining the rules of democratic transition around the world. Beginning with O’Donnell and Schmitter (2013 [1986]), many academics have developed political models discussing the paradigm of democratisation. There was, however, an interesting change in the focus of those models. In its early years, democratic transition theories were rather state centred with little or no attention paid to international influence and factors (Kern & Hainmueller, 2009). In the wake of globalisation studies, however, inter- and supranational environment became a topic greatly explored by politicians and scholars (Linz, 2000; Linz & Stepan, 1996; Starr, 1991; Huntington, 1991). As part of this theoretical shift, mass media was noted as an important element of soft power used by both democratic and authoritarian regimes (Nye, 2004; Giddens, 1981). The significance of media use and abuse has been central in several theoretical works (Giddens, 1981; Nye, 2004; Kern & Hainmueller, 2009; Gunitsky, 2015).

Many scholars have studied the Western use of media in terms of soft power weapon against authoritarianism (Pool, 1973; Quester, 1990; Lisann, 1975; Nelson, 1997; Puddington, 2000). Such studies focus on the idea that access to free media can trigger pro-democratic values and the need of change within masses. The above academic discourse consists of two well-maintained theories. The first one claims that Western media had a snowballing effect on the countries behind the Iron Curtain and played a major role in the collapse of the Soviet Union. This snowballing effect consisted of cross border inspiration, where a revolution in one country would essentially lead to civil unrest in another. Such inspiration, however, would have been impossible without the means of Western media broadcasting (Schmitter; 1996, O’Neil; 1998, Pridham 1997). The second theorisation claims that Western media can have rather long term effect over authoritarian regimes, since it reassures people that the free, democratic world has not forgotten them. Free media does so by exposing propaganda,

Word count: 14 886 9 undermining the authoritarian sources of information and most importantly weakening the credibility of regimes rulers (Kern & Hainmueller, 2009) (See also: Diamond; 1993, Whitehead; 1996, Sukosd; 2000, Bennett; 1998, Buhl; 1990, Rustow; 1990, Roberts; 1999).

The effect, however, is not so straightforward. In fact, the adaptation of authoritarian practices, which will be described in the following paragraphs, can be juxtaposed against the aforementioned Western practices of using media against oppressive states. According to Kalathil and Boas (2001), authoritarian states can respond to the influential challenges of Internet in two ways: proactive and reactive. (Kalathil & Boas, 2001) (pp. 3-5). Proactive responses are of a somewhat guiding nature, where the state is aiming, instead of prohibiting, Internet usage to “build state-controlled national Intranets that serve as a substitute for the global Internet” (Kalathil & Boas, 2001, p. 3). This proactive use can be seen as a strong legitimation practice, imposed by authoritarian regimes in order to reassure its legitimacy both, domestically and internationally. Some scholars believe that with the development of Internet media, authoritarian regimes are in fact strengthening rather than declining. Morozov (2011) states that people “in their refusal to see the downside of the new digital environment, cyber-utopians ended up belittling the role of the Internet, refusing to see that it penetrates and reshapes all walks of political life, not just the ones conducive to democratisation” (p. 3). Continuing, Morozov (2011) argues that “Failing to anticipate how authoritarian governments would respond to the Internet, cyber-utopians did not predict how useful it would prove for propaganda purposes” (p. 3), where online propaganda appears to be a strong legitimation practice for authoritarian regimes.

Finally, Gunitsky explores the transition authoritarian regimes have undergone in proactively using social and online media rather than supressing it. Moving away from the negative outcomes social media might have on authoritarianism, state rulers effectively adopted the new concept in order to promote “chosen traumas” (Volkan, 2001) to undermine democratic values, indicate achievements of political officials and divert public attention. Gunitsky then argues, “The opposite of internet freedom, therefore, is not necessarily internet censorship but a deceptive blend of control, co-option, and manipulation.’’ (Gunitsky, 2015, p. 1). This change, spurred by Internet media, is also reshaping the ways in which scholars approach the idea of media practices and influence. As already shown, scholars have put a lot of effort in studying the influence of Western media domestically and internationally. Now, more attention should be devoted to the ways in which authoritarian regimes make use of online media.

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2.4 Propaganda and information warfare

The connection between propaganda, legitimation and authoritarian stability has not been explored in depth. The literature on propaganda offers some insights in this sense (Bernays, 1933; Doob, 1935; Ellul, 1965; Jowett & O’Donnell, 1986; Rushkoff, 1999). As observed in the media debate, there are proponents arguing in favour of the democratising effect of the Internet (Castells, 2010; Coleman, 2005; Kline & Burstein, 2005; Kahn & Kellner, 2004) and critics arguing the opposite. (Murdock, 2002; Graber, 2004; Morozov, 2011)

Curran (2012) for example, argues that states can always legitimate themselves with the help of various means other than the practices of Internet control and manipulation (pp. 49-51). The above statement, however, undermines the importance of propaganda and neglects the argument that propaganda is not only evolving but also expanding. Doob (1989) for example states that “the growth of propaganda and propaganda organisations in the twentieth century has been exponential” (p. 375).

In their study about propaganda and persuasion, Jowett and O’Donnell (2014) argue that the “development of new technologies affect the nature of propaganda and has been seen to be the major factor in the increasing use of propaganda” (p. 393). This comes to show that internet politics are far from being predominantly democratic. “The internet is not democratic by nature. Both democratic and authoritarian governments try to control the Internet” (van Dijk, 2012, p. 136). It can be argued, however, that authoritarian regimes need to control the internet in order to maintain their rule. Jan van Dijk (2012) argues there are three predominant ways in which authoritarian regimes make use of online media. One of those is the “counter- information campaign” method, where “authoritarian regimes themselves use social media to distribute their own propaganda” (van Dijk, 2012, p. 111). However, to understand the impact of internet on authoritarian regimes, one should “look beyond the Web’s obvious uses by opponents of the government and study how it has affected legitimacy-boosting aspects of modern authoritarian rule as well” (Morozov, 2011, p. 86).

Another useful lens through which to look at the matter is that provided by literature on information warfare. According to Singh (2014), “Information warfare may include giving

Word count: 14 886 11 the enemy propaganda to convince them to give up, and denying them information that might lead to their resistance. It is the strategy for undermining an enemy’s data and information systems, while defending and leveraging one’s own information edge.” The key objective of information warfare is to modify the facts concerned with current affairs through user- generated content in order to gain control over the narrative and essentially to influence and manipulate the population (Fokin, 2016, p.9).

In the case of Russia, the war is aiming at shielding the regime from international criticism and internal opposition alike. Despite the fact such tactics of leveraging information are nothing new to Russia, since the 2013 Ukrainian crisis we have witnessed “the most amazing information warfare blitzkrieg we have ever seen in the history of information warfare”. (Hoyle, 2014) The reason behind the increased intensity of information disparity is Russia’s objective to isolate its internal population from any international influence. However, the question of whether the objective is met is not necessarily the right one. As Pomerantsev (2015) argues, “the Soviet bloc was not sustained by fervent belief in the system, but by acquiescence in a common discourse that co-opted the population—a case of propaganda signalling what was “correct” behaviour rather than achieving ideological indoctrination“(p.42).

It is therefore worth observing the official and public discourse and seeing whether a deeper understanding of the Russian narratives can provide further information about the regime as a whole. The following research will make a step in this direction and will try to answer the question of how the Russian state has used online media towards its domestic audience to legitimise its policies in relation to the Ukrainian conflict of 2013. Having a prime focus on the core aspects of the narrative, the research is aiming to read between the lines of media framing and understand more about Russia’s media legitimation strategies.

Word count: 14 886 12 3. Case study

3.1 The Russian-Ukrainian conflict of 2013

The Russian-Ukrainian conflict is by no means an issue recently emerged. The geopolitical significance of Ukraine dates as far back as the collapse of the Soviet Union, a notion later reinforced by the Orange Revolution. The independence of Ukraine and its integrity, however, were taken for granted. Despite being formally independent, Ukraine is still de facto strongly influenced by the Russian state.

Political observers often discuss Viktor Yanukovich’s policies and the annexation of Crimea as an expression of Russia’s long lasting imperialist politics (Kuzio, 2015; Grant, 2015). Such imperialistic politics, however, are often defined by oppression and violence (Cohen; 1998, 78-80). The case was no different in the instance of the Ukrainian crisis of 2013-2014 (Kuzniar, 2014). In November 2013, the then-Ukrainian President faced a choice which served as a catalyst for the upcoming events in the region. Victor Yanukovych was in the position to either tighten the EU-Ukrainian relationship or to move forward to a planned Eurasian Union together with Russian, Kazakhstan and Belarus. By choosing the latter, the Ukrainian President rejected the European Association Agreement act and became the reason for the most violent civic unrest in the history of Ukraine. The Maidan protest resulted in hundreds of casualties later named as the Heavenly Hundred. The Maidan protest, in turn, led to Yanukovych’s ousting, who secretly fled to Russia and was granted a Russian citizenship (RFE, 2014). The conflict escalated rapidly in the following months, leading to the annexation of Crimea on the 18th of March 2014, bringing forward “the first formal annexation of territory in Europe since 1945” (Wilson, 2014, p. vi). The impeachment of President Viktor Yanukovych and covert invasion of, at the very least Russian-backed, military forces led to open conflict and political unrest all over the country (Yuhas, 2014). The principal actors throughout the Crimean Crisis were the Russian and Ukrainian government, whilst non-state, pro-Russian forces and separatist movements in Crimea were actively fighting for the independence of their region (Biersack & O'Lear, 2014, p. 248).

Currently ongoing, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine goes far beyond military interventions and further complicates Russian- European diplomacy. Previously based on international agreements and mediation, the EU and US relationship with Russia is now underlined by open information war, sanctions and strategic military campaigns. Each one of

Word count: 14 886 13 the above policies holds a different role and significance within the conflict. The information warfare implemented by the Russian state aims to influence the way in which current affairs are perceived domestically and internationally in order to then act upon its means, bringing opposition to a minimum degree (Darczewska, 2015, p. 13-14).

The current research has turned to four instances present in Russia’s media and political life during the Ukrainian crisis. The selection criteria for the events included the conditions that first both Russia and Ukraine had to be objects discussed in the articles. In addition, the events had to be greatly publicised in Western media as well, since this is often a precondition for a strong Russian media response. The third condition defined only events with long-term effect over the Russian-Ukrainian relationship where further discussions of the subject could influence Russia’s policies towards Ukraine. Last but not least, all of the news events were selected primarily based on the exact time frame of the Russian-Ukraine conflict, and specifically the Russian-language online platform of RT.

To start with, the Crimean Status referendum was held on the 16th of March 2014. The question of the referendum was whether the Crimean people wanted to join the Russian Federation or if they wanted to remain under Ukrainian governance (BBC, 2014). Highly criticized by the international community, the referendum was dismissed by the West as illegal and was labeled as a referendum at gunpoint. Russia, on the other hand, discharged such allegations, claiming no international laws were disregarded. With a remarkable result of 96.77% in favor of succession, the referendum led to the declaration of independence of the Republic of Crimea and its acceptance to join the Russian Federation (Clegg, 2014). The annexation of Crimea is not only the first formal annexation since 1945, but also the greatest contemporary issue defining the struggle between Russia and the West. The significance of the event brought forward the official presidential address of Vladimir Putin welcoming Crimea into the Federation (Wilson, 2014, p. vi).

The third event present in the current research is the tragedy of the MH17 plane crash. The Malaysian Airline flight MH17 was an international flight scheduled for the 17th of July 2014. This is the exact date when the plane was shot down near the Russian-Ukrainian border and crashed in the Donetsk region (BBC, 2015). The crash occurred during a battle in the ongoing war in Donbass. Resulting in nearly three-hundred casualties, the MH17 crash reinforced the Russian-Ukrainian information warfare and brought forth constant accusations and blame from both sides. The tragedy once more underlined the importance of deeper understanding and quick resolution of a conflict which has led to thousands of casualties

Word count: 14 886 14 including the MH17 victims. The plane crash appeared as an important scene in the information warfare between Russian and Ukraine, since the victims of the tragedy were primarily Dutch citizens and the disaster was instantly depicted by the international community and media.

The last event discussed within the current research is concerned with the Ukrainian pilot Nadiya Savchenko. Currently a member of the Ukrainian parliament, Savchenko is a former pilot of the Ukrainian Army air force. During the Donbass war in 2014 Savchenko was captured by pro-Russian forces in Eastern Ukraine and was later deported to Russia. The Ukrainian pilot was accused of illegal border crossing and the murder of two Russian journalists (BBC, 2016). The significance of the case comes from the great importance Savchenko played in the media war between Russia and Ukraine. While still imprisoned, Savchenko was elected deputy in the Ukrainian parliament and was awarded the title of “Hero of Ukraine”. Russia, on the other hand, held a strong position against Savchenko’s actions and argued against the politicisation of the trial. On 21st of March the Donetsk court found Nadiya Savchenko guilty of charge and sentenced the pilot to 22 years in prison (: ibid). The media attention to the above case, together with the strong Ukrainian and Western pressure over the Russian Federation, led to a prisoner swap in 2016 when Savchenko was released through a pardon granted by Vladimir Putin. The above case was specifically selected for this study due to the attention given by the Russian media and the fact that Nadyia Savchenko appeared to be a personification of the power politics of Russian and Ukraine.

The presidential speech was held on the 18th of March 2014, in which Vladimir Putin addressed State Duma deputies, Federation Council members, heads of Russian regions and civil society representatives in the Kremlin (Kremlin, 2014). This is the second event discussed within the research, in which the official presidential discourse is juxtaposed against the RT narratives of all other events. During the speech President Putin discusses the Crimean referendum, Western media, the common Ukrainian-Russian history, and the policies of the EU and US. During the same event, the treaty of accession of the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol in the Russian Federation was signed. In a similar manner to the referendum, the Crimean speech was greatly criticized and many believe the event was the turning point for the war in Donbass (Piontkovsky, 2014).

Word count: 14 886 15 3.2 The power of RT

The above events have led to the research of articles published on the online platform of the Russian-language Russia Today media outlet. The data source was chosen based on the history and nature of RT, the specifics of the online platform, and the focus on a Russian- speaking audience. Initially created in 2005, RT openly broadcasts its connection with the Kremlin. During an interview with RT journalists, Putin calls the media outlet a personal project stressing that: “When we designed this project back in 2005, we intended to introduce another strong player on the world’s scene, a player that wouldn’t just provide an unbiased coverage of the events in Russia but also try, let me stress, I mean – try to break the Anglo- Saxon monopoly on the global information streams.” (RT, 2013)

The history of Russia Today serves as evidence of the close ties the media has with the Russian government. According to a recent EU report “RT chief editor Magarita Simonyan admits to having a hotline to the Kremlin, and she echoes Dmitry Kiselev's disregard for 'objective reality'” (Bentzen & Russell, 2015, p. 3). The arguments for RT being a puppet media outlet were further reinforced during the Ukrainian crisis when the channel experienced major reforms.

In 2013, only a month after the protests in Kiev began, the Russian president ordered the liquidation of Russia’s leading news agency RIA Novosti, along with the 1929-launched radio station, The Voice of Russia. After 72 years of news reporting and no signs of decreasing popularity, Putin urged the liquidation of RIA Novosti giving a three-month deadline for the closure. The replacement, proposed by Vladimir Putin, introduced a new international RT information agency, intending “To highlight abroad the state policy of the Russian Federation and its public life” (Putin, Presidential Decree No:894, 2013). The title of the decree in itself says a lot about the nature of the media channel. Named a decree “on some measures for improving the effectiveness of State media” (: ibid), the document treats RT as an instrument for policy-making rather than a news-reporting agency. Such attempts to reach a wider audience have been visible since 2009, when the channel was renamed from Russia Today to simply RT (: ibid). The above developments show Russia’s attempt to end RT’s isolation from the world and rather adopt an expansionist model of development in order to increase its popularity and, more importantly, its influence.

Word count: 14 886 16 In addition to the newly conceptualised RT, in 2013 the media outlet introduced a Russian-language online portal targeting Russian-speaking internet users. Based on recent surveys, RT claimed Russia’s internet usage has risen significantly and now more than 60% of Russians rely on internet updates (RussiaToday, 2016). The demographics behind the above 60% show that half of the internet users in Russia are under the age of 34 (RussianSearchMarkeing, 2016). It is interesting, therefore, to look at the online RT and to what extent its published content is targeting the aforementioned majority of 18 to 34 year-old users. Such a focus on the online RT materials can give a new insight into the practices of media use in Russia. In addition, it is worth mentioning that a great proportion of Russia’s online users are people living in the Western parts of the country, often based in Moscow or other large cities (: ibid).

As mentioned, the Russian-language RT is the prime focus of the current research. Despite having free access to any internet sources, it can be argued that the main source of information for the domestic Russian audience is the one written in Russian. The reason for that is the high level of foreign language illiteracy in Russia since, according to a Levada (2014) poll, only 11% of Russians speak English to a level high enough to enable them to read the news comfortably (LevadaCenter, 2014). The second most-spoken language reported was German (at 2%), which leads to the belief that the majority of the Russian audience is relying on Russian-language news outlets (: ibid). The above arguments, together with the World Bank claims of rising internet popularity in Russia (from 4.1 % in 2002 to 53% in 2013), are underlining the importance of online RT for the Federation (Fredheim, 2014, pp. 41-42). The above surveys, together with RT’s information page, show that at least 70 million Russians turn to RT for news updates to a certain extent. This number does not include other Russian-speaking nationalities or Russian emigrants. It is, therefore, important that further studies concerned with RT and its publications be undertaken, especially within the environment of such conflicts as the Ukrainian crisis where direct influence over the domestic audience of RT can, in fact, contribute to Russia’s regime legitimation.

Word count: 14 886 17 4. Research design

4.1 Methodology

The unit of analysis in this research is online news articles. The articles were retrieved from the online platform of the Russian RT website in March 2016. The platform provided a search engine, giving the opportunity to search for articles based on a certain time period. This option, however, was removed by RT in April 2016 giving less opportunity for replication of the analysis. The articles, nevertheless, are fully accessible on the RT website with their specific dates and unique URLs.

The performed qualitative content analysis has examined the (non)existence of different narratives. Content analysis is the preferred method of analysis for many due to the possibility of producing systematic results through qualitative analysis. When in 1927, Harold Lasswell introduced the Theory of Political propaganda, he also introduced media content analysis as a systematic way to observe mass media channels (Lasswell, 1927). Later on he presented a great definitive model underlining the importance of four factors:

Who says what

Through which channel

To whom

With what effect? (Lasswell, 1948, p. 38)

Answers to the above questions can be regarded as an important basis for an insightful analysis. It is important to note, however, that the current research looks only at the intended effect. This paper does not aim to assess the levels of success of propaganda. The intended effect is of greater importance, since the research is interested in what it was aimed at rather than what was achieved. Qualitative analysis is different in its interpretive capacity, which enables researchers to discuss their analysis in depth. In choosing qualitative content analysis as a preferred methodology for this research, I am preferably looking for an explanatory meaning of given data. One of the most important benefits of qualitative content analysis is the possibility to perform “continuous, iterative analysis” and systematically discuss the meaning of your data (Matthew, Huberman, & Saldana, 2013, p. 14).

Word count: 14 886 18 In order to further validate the results, a numerical count of words is performed. This word count serves as a complementary set of data which further justifies the selection of categories drawn from the qualitative analysis.

4.2 Data collection

The source chosen for the data collection is the Russian written online platform of RT. As mentioned before, RT is state owned media outlet with strong ties with the ruling government. This, and the fact that RT was voted most influential media channel in Russia, brought forward the belief that RT would serve as a great basis for data collection (RussiaToday, 2015).

The units of analysis are news articles concerned with events connected to the Russian-Ukrainian crisis. As already shown, media and news outlets can have a serious impact on their audience and thus they provide an important platform for studying news content. Secondly, the close ties of RT with the Russian state mean that the news articles give a representation of what the state stands for.

I will look at 110 articles and review four events: the Crimean referendum, Putin’s Crimean speech, MH17 accident and the court battle of Ukrainian-labelled hero Nadya Savchenko. The time period for each event is exactly seven days, starting from the day of the event’s occurrence. By covering all articles over the period of one week for each event, the research aims to create reliability of results. I will study all articles presented by RT through both, qualitative and quantitative means. The selection criteria for the events included the conditions that both Russia and Ukraine had to be objects discussed in the articles. The reason for this is that the research emphasis is focused on Russia’s legitimation strategies within the Ukrainian crisis of 2013. The condition for having both countries in all events would ensure the consistency of the analysis. In addition, the events had to be greatly publicised in Western media as well, since this is often a precondition for a strong Russian media response. The third condition defined only events with a long-term effect over the Russia-Ukrainian relationship where further discussions of the subject could influence Russia’s policies towards Ukraine. Long-term in the above case is defined by the fact that all events brought forth international sanctions which will inevitably affect the Russian-Ukrainian relationship and

Word count: 14 886 19 future mutual policies. Last but not least, all of the news events were selected based on the exact time frame of the Russian-Ukraine conflict from 2013 to 2016, and specifically the Russian-language online platform of RT.

4.3 Frames

The study of framing is one of growing importance, especially within the fields of communication and media studies, in which nowadays one can hardly find studies completed without the use of a framing study. The reason why framing studies are so widely accepted is the ability to analyse the process of communicating text and messages. The text analysis can vary from novels to an official governmental decree and therefore provides a unified tool for studying scripts. According to Entman (1993), “frame is to select some aspect of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text” (p. 52). The process of framing is needed by authors in order to “promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and treatment recommendation” (: ibid). The above proposed definition underlines the importance of studying framing, since texts are always placed through the vision of authors, consciously and/or subconsciously.

Media framing in particular is even more important when discussing news articles and policy-making, as it is the case of the current research. In the process of news framing, frames reshape complex issues by communicating greater importance or weight to certain arguments and ideas. Moreover, news framing is aimed at creating connections between issues, objects or any concepts such that after exposure to the framed message the targeted audience accepts or is at least aware of the connections (Nisbet, 2010, p. 47). This use of media framing is an inseparable part of the previously discussed governmental propaganda and can serve as a powerful instrument in dictating public behaviour. As D’Angelo and Kuypers (2010) debate, the word “use” is of particular importance due to its dual meaning: “use as a conduct of information and use as a manipulated channel for information” (p. 1). The latter has been greatly exploited by Russian media, where the misuse of information channels is a reoccurring event. This and the previously mentioned high levels of Russian state-owned media influence placed RT as an object of analysis within the current research.

Word count: 14 886 20

4.4 Qualitative analysis

For my qualitative content analysis I have created a codebook which summarises the analysis performed. The analysis is performed by the extraction of paragraphs which carry specific legitimisation ideas and which are later on interpreted based on their specific context. In the codebook the possible legitimisation practices were operationalised based on eight major categories concerned with different RT narratives.

The above categories were derived from two sources: my preliminary analysis of articles and an extensive literature review. During my preliminary research, I studied small, random samples of RT articles acknowledging the range of reoccurring frames. The preliminary research underlined the importance of nationalism as a narrative often used by RT in their news articles. Moreover, in line with the literature provided, my sample analysis brought forward the categories of anti-Ukraine and anti-West as important frameworks within the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Securitisation as a category, on the other hand, was included solely based on previous research findings where scholars believed the Russian media was using securitisation frameworks in order to legitimise state actions in Ukraine (Gaufman, 2014).

As already mentioned, the importance of the above categories was underlined through numerical count of words. The main difference with the above qualitative analysis is that a numerical count does not treat data as a text which can be further interpreted, but rather as an information sample constructed of words (Laver & Garry, 2000). Words, however, often carry different meanings depending on their context. The concept of nationalism, for example, can be underlined not only by the use of the word ‘nationalism’ but also ‘our land’, ‘Russia’, ‘we’ and so on and so forth. I did, therefore, create a dictionary which takes the same main frameworks I used for my qualitative analysis and further on analysed each framework.

My selection of words is based on both empirical and theoretical reasoning similar to the one used for the qualitative analysis. Again, sample news articles were selected in order for words concerned with main frameworks to be detected.

Word count: 14 886 21 4.5 Validity of results

In order to assess the validity of the results of this research project, an intercoder reliability check has been used. Since one of the goals of content analysis is to interpret text and to identify underlying meanings, ensuring the reliability of the analysis is crucial (Neuendorf, 2002). When conducting content analysis, independent coders evaluate and interpret these texts to check if they can come up with the same findings. High intercoder reliability, expressed in a percentage, can, therefore, increase the validity of research design and eventual results.

For the purpose of this research design, two coders with a comparable academic background were asked to apply the codebook and dictionary for both the qualitative and numerical analysis to 20% of the data. The results of these coders were then compared to my own of the same 20%. As expected, the reliability for the quantitative key word search is 100% due to the minimal subjectivity involved in this kind of analysis. With regards to the qualitative frame analysis, some differences can be observed: coder 2 reached 76% and coder 3 reached 82%. This, again, is understandable; identifying and coding frames is more subjective than the mere counting of key words. Nevertheless, an inter-coder reliability rate of 79% represents a significant overlap between the three coders and adds to the validity of the overall results of the entire dataset.

The second type of validity test is the one of theoretical validity. In this category, I have compared to what extent my data findings fit categories found in the literature. There was a strongly defined confirmation of the use of the categories of nationalism, history and anti-Ukraine/West. In line with the literature reviewed, RT was greatly relying on the above narratives within all the articles studied. Nationalism appears to be of particular importance for RT, since as the literature debates nationalism has long been used by the Russian state as a tool for reinforcing state policies.

Word count: 14 886 22 5. Findings

5.1 Security

The security narrative within RT articles fluctuates within different sub-narratives. On the one hand, it describes the threatening internal Ukrainian instability and on the other hand, the external Ukrainian hostility towards Russia. The security narrative predominantly occurred within the articles about the Crimean referendum, less within the MH17 tragedy narrative, and close to non-existent in the Savchenko case. In total, 20% of all frames in the above events were concerned with security, 16% of which can be found in the Crimean referendum data.

Firstly, the Ukrainian instability is defined within the Crimean referendum, where RT claims “The extreme nationalists who control the power in Kiev have begun their discriminatory activities against Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine, defined by brutal violence against opposition”1. Such claims are accompanied by the repeatedly occurring statements that “in Ukraine there was a violent change of power” and that Yanukovych “was forced to leave Ukraine because of death threats”.2 Such narratives represent Ukrainians as the personification of a newly-emerged danger threatening the Russian people and the integrity of the Russian state. RT underlines the need for action against such external threats by claiming that “in Sevastopol there are nuclear submarines, which could fall into the hands of right wing Ukrainian groups”.3 Moreover, the media outlet speculates about direct actions against the Russian president, where “the purpose of the Ukrainian missile fired from the ground or a military aircraft might have been the presidential plane”.4 The narrative underlining Ukraine as an external hostile actor is also defined by the relationship of the country with its Western partners. Debating firstly, that “Ukraine is prepared to take over Russia’s place in G8” and secondly, that “Angela Merkel and Laurent Fabius discussed possible Russian exclusion from G8 with regards to the Crimean events” implies there is a

1 (RT, Head of the House of Romanov Maria Vladimirovna considered appropriate the Crimean return to Russia., 2014 a) 2 (RT, Crimea holds a referendum on its status of autonomy - Live Stream., 2014 c) 3 (RT, US places Russia against the EU to defend its economic interests., 2014 d) 4 (RT, A source in the Federal Air Transport Agency: The objective of the Ukrainian missiles were probably Vladimir Putin's plane., 2014 e)

Word count: 14 886 23 possibility of endangering affiliation between Ukraine and the West.5 According to RT, such a relationship could directly affect the Russian state since as “Vladimir Putin declares if the city falls into the hands of NATO, the main issue will be the protection of oil and gas pipelines” As mentioned, the RT statements are accompanied by constant war references towards Ukrainians naming those “Nazi activists” , “Nazis” 6, “fascists” with their “swastikas”7. Such rhetoric can be of great danger since it directly affects Russian people, thousands of whom decided to volunteer in the war against Ukraine. By publishing quotes such as this one “Volunteer from the Ukrainian National Guard: “I hope I won’t have to kill any Russian brothers. But I will kill them if they come here. I will not take any hostages, in this case they deserve to die” ”8 the Russian state owned RT has supposedly created strong tensions within both Russia and Ukraine. Such quotes with debatable credibility together with the reoccurring WWII rhetoric are part, not only of the securitisation narrative, but also in most other categories as the following paragraphs show.

5.2 Duty

The duty category is one of great importance, since the following paragraph aims to show RT’s arguments in favour of Russia’s obligation to act in Ukraine in order to protect vital governmental and societal interests. Similar to the previous category, here the narrative is also mostly defined within the Crimean referendum articles. With a total of 8%, the duty frames are the third least popular within the current research, where 6% of those were found in the Crimean referendum news articles.

As in the previous category, the focus of the narrative is distorted by the division of international and domestic emphasis. When talking about the Russian annexation of Crimea the international discussion of RT is concerned with supposedly similar cases of annexation used as precedents for legitimising the Ukrainian crisis. To start with Kosovo, according to RT in a conversation with the US president Vladimir Putin, they confirmed that “the Crimean

5 (RT, Yatsenyuk: Ukraine is ready to take Russia's place in the G8., 2014 f) 6 (RT, Sergei Shargunov: African vacation., 2016 g) 7 (RT, Zakhar Prilepin: Savchenko for the last time. , 2016 h) 8 (RT, Ukrainian volunteer: Russian prisoners will not be kept., 2014 i)

Word count: 14 886 24 referendum is fully consistent with the international law and the UN charter, and has taken into account the well-known Kosovo precedent”.9 Moreover, RT underlines that the “US criticizes Russian over Crimea, yet they forget about the independent state of Texas”10, where the media outlet is again touching upon historical precedents. Through such articles RT constantly emphasises the idea that “the residents of Crimea have done the same as the population of several other countries and regions, including the recent Scotland, Catalonia, and Venice” and that “self-determination is one of the basic principles of international law”.11 What appears to be important for RT is the need to justify the Crimean case by looking at allegedly similar international precedents. The justification of actions is primarily concentrated on the notion that the people of Crimea feel Russian and that Ukraine should be seen as an enemy. The media outlet debates familiarity with Crimean’s wants stating ““They [the Crimean people] want to be part of a great country. I think it was the answer to an important question: “Why you do not want to be a part of Ukraine?” Because Russia is a magnificent country, and they want to be part of something that big and great.”12 Similar statements are often part of the rhetoric of RT where the media is arguing for the legitimacy of Russia’s actions since “Russia protects its interests in Sevastopol, which is its legitimate right” In addition, as stated before, the Ukrainian state is repeatedly portrayed in a negative light, as RT accuses the country of illegitimate actions arguing that “Ukraine forcefully changed the governmental power”, “amended the constitution”, and forced the president to leave the country through “death threats” despite the fact he is the “legitimately elected head of state” The anti-Ukrainian narrative is thoroughly discussed in the following section. However, it should be noted that within the current analysis of RT articles, no information was found about the abuses of Ukrainian human rights reported by the UN or the count of over 190 thousand Ukrainians displaced from their homes. (OHCHR, 2014) In contrast, RT argued “There is no war [in Crimea], because the entire population as a whole wants to join Russia. There are no problems or any conflicts”13

9 (RT, Vladimir Putin today, will address the adoption of Crimea and Sevastopol into the Russian Federation., 2014 j) 10 (RT, Media: US criticizes Russian over Crimea, yet they forget about the independent state of Texas., 2014 k) 11 (RT, American conservatives are sensitive to the situation with the Russian annexation of Crimea., 2014 l) 12 (RT, 96,77% of Crimean voters voted for joining Russia., 2014 m) 13 (RT, Deputy Prime Minister of Crimea: East of Ukraine will enter Russian without war., 2014 n)

Word count: 14 886 25 5.3 Anti-Ukraine

The Russian-Ukrainian crisis of 2013 served as the catalyst that helped the construction of a strong anti-Ukrainian narrative. The three main arguments debated by RT are the instability of Ukraine, the threat of Ukraine being favoured by the West and the belief that there are anti-Russian sentiments present in Ukraine. In contrast to the previous two categories, the Anti-Ukrainian frames were very much missing in the Crimean referendum data and were mostly present within the MH17 case. The total Anti- Ukraine frame count equals 10%.

RT debates the instability of the Ukrainian state as one of the reasons behind the MH17 crash in which 298 people lost their lives. According to the media outlet “there is a war within the airspace of Ukraine”14 and “the purpose of the Ukrainian missile fired from the ground or a military aircraft might have been the [Russian] presidential plane” Moreover, the media argues the “the plane received orders from the Ukrainian Air Traffic controllers to lower its altitude”15 and that even after the accident “Kiev cannot guarantee the safety of international experts who investigate the Boeing crash”. 16 It should be noted that the wording of the above articles is by no means unintentional. The fact that RT calls the missile Ukrainian and repetitively underlines that the crash occurred on Ukrainian governed territory is an example of an anti-Ukrainian narrative aiming to publicly undermine the credibility of the state and its capabilities to act in critical situations.

The threat of a strong Western-Ukrainian relationship is discussed throughout most of the events, calling out for possible endangerment of the Russian state. An example of such endangerment is the RT opinion piece, stating that “according to the West if you act against Russia you are innocent” and that Russians are “the wrong victims and since they are Russian they simple don’t count”. 17 Moreover, according to the media, the West is strongly influencing the politics of the Ukrainian state where “the US has particular interests, and Washington is aiming to have a pro-American government bordering Russia.”18 RT portrays

14 (RT, The Malaysian Trade Union stewards will check the information on the refusal of flight attendants flying over Ukraine., 2014 o) 15 (RT, Relatives of the victims in the Boeing 777 crash call for quick investigation of the tragedy., 2014 p) 16 (RT, Kiev does not guarantee the safety of experts investigating the Boeing crash., 2014 q) 17 (RT, Expert on the Savchenko case: From a Western perspective whoever acts against Russia is innocent., 2016 q) 18 (RT, Expert: Crimean has the full right of succession., 2014 r)

Word count: 14 886 26 the US as a perpetrator who aims “to completely pull Ukraine out Russia’s sphere of influence and tie it to the EU, which nowadays is almost a puppet of the United States”. (: ibid) Such statements directly target Ukraine’s intentions to sign the European Association Agreement, which caused the Ukrainian crisis to begin with. Such criticism portrays Ukraine as a puppet state of the West, by which RT implies that Ukraine was stolen away from Russia.

The statements used to debate anti-Russian sentiments in Ukraine could also be seen as a justification of Russia’s actions in Ukraine. RT’s opinion piece argues the Ukrainian government “has banned the Russian language and oppressed Russian-speaking citizens” and justifies any further actions by stating that “Russia saw what was happening. Since in Crimea there are 2.5 million Russians, Russia intervened.”19 The anti-Ukrainian narrative goes even further by arguing that Ukrainians in Donbass “are Nazi movement activists” who “killed thousands of civilians” The above WWII references in addition to the moral illustration of Russian suffering are used by RT in building anti-Ukrainian sentiment within the Russian- speaking audience of the media.

5.4 Anti-West

The Anti-West narrative did not seem to be the most popular one. With 13% total frame count, the category is not far ahead of the Anti-Ukrainian one. It is, however, interesting to note that the Anti-West narrative is evenly spread across all events. The count has shown consistency throughout all events where the Anti-West frames appear equally popular.

As mentioned, the previous category of anti-Ukrainian narrative is closely connected to the negative representation of the West served by RT. In addition, the media often juxtaposes the West-Ukraine relationship against the one Russia has with Asian countries, claiming any sanctions imposed on the Russian state are in fact harmful for Europe. One of those countries mentioned is China, where RT claims “The imposition of sanctions against Russia is not beneficial to the West, since that would lead to Russian convergence with China.”20 Even further, RT frequently argues against the European sanctions imposed on Russia claiming “the ultimate goal of the sanctions is to harm Russia”, which according to RT

19 (RT, Alexander Lukashenko: Belarus de facto recognized Crimea as part of Russia., 2014 s) 20 (RT, The imposition of sanctions against Russia is not beneficial to the West, since that would lead to Russian convergence with China., 2014 t)

Word count: 14 886 27 could “possibly turn against” the West.21 In the articles reviewed, RT presents a strong line of argument debating the idea of how harmless the sanctions are, as if the media outlet has to reassure its audience. An example of such reassurance is the RT’s claim that “everyone in the world understands that Ukraine’s faith is in the hands of Russia and therefore no sturdy sanctions should be expected”. (: ibid) This narrative of a strong Russian state is juxtaposed against the unlawful West and their blameful policies aiming to harm Russia. According to RT “The US has changed several governments of sovereign countries and bombed without asking a few beautiful cities” , yet they “accuse Russia of pressuring Crimea”.22 RT’s use of such statements could be seen as a tool for justifying Russia’s actions against Ukraine, since the media outlet argues the West is no different and therefore it is hypocritical to criticise Russia’s actions.

5.5 Moral

Despite being the least popular of all, with 2%, the moral category was well defined in the Crimean referendum articles. In contrast, as the research will later show, morality has notably higher presence in Putin’s speech.

The moral category is an important part of RT’s narrative, since the outlet narrates events by using powerful lexis, which could deeply influence the audience targeted. The difficulty of the situation with war prisoners, for example, is expressed by arguing Ukrainians “killed thousands of civilians” and imprisoned “pregnant women” . In addition, as a very conservative country, with 75% of its population being devoted Christians, Russia offers a great environment for the creation of a moral tension. RT makes use of that foundation and refers to claims about “explicit threats against the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate”. The above argument of endangerment of the Russian church in Ukraine is accompanied by remarks about the “detachment of Crimea from its Motherland- Russia” and how difficult it is for Crimeans to “restrain their tears” According to RT, the people of Crimea feel so attached to Russia that even homosexual Crimeans “voted for annexation to Russia, despite the ban on gay propaganda” since they see Kiev activists as “fascists”.23

21 (RT, European sanctions will last six months. , 2014 u) 22 (RT, US analyst: The relationship between Russian and US will improve soon., 2014 v) 23 (RT, Crimean homosexuals voted for Russia and now prepare for unbearable life., 2014 w)

Word count: 14 886 28 Touching upon the humane narrative, the outlet states that “We live in a bloody carnival world filled with hypocrisy, where some have lost all their shame in the political and human carousel, which is seen as an evidence of progress and world order.” This so called carnival world addresses Ukraine and the West, suggesting their high levels of immorality. What RT aims to achieve with the help of its moral narrative is to create this victim image of oppressed Crimeans, oppressed Russians, and an unlawfully scattered Russian state.

5.6 History

The historical narrative is the third most popular within the articles studied. In total, 15% of historical frames were found throughout the events. Within the MH17 case, however, not even one historical reference was found. The above is hardly surprising since the airplane tragedy is in no way concerned with any historical events. Nonetheless, the above only goes to show prevalence of historical references within the events of the Crimean referendum and the Nadya Savchenko court case. If analysed separately, historical references would count for 26% and 22% of the above two events respectively.

The historical narrative which was analysed appeared to be very consistent in its nature. The main focus is predominantly placed upon WWII referencing, often glorifying the vision of the great Russian soldier. For example, within the Savchenko case, RT stated that “Russian opposition commentators must necessarily equate fighters from the volunteer battalions, the National Guard, and any other punishers to the soldiers of the Red Army, fighting against the Nazis.” The above terminology, used to narrate the conflict, shows positive attitudes towards the Russian militarised groups fighting in Eastern Ukraine. In addition, the previously mentioned ‘swastika’, ‘fascism’, and ‘Victory day’ references are also supporting the positive image of Russians fighting against ‘ukronazis’. When discussing the “Nazi movement activists” , RT is referring to the opposition forces in Ukraine, thus further reinforcing the notion that these forces pose a real threat to Russia’s integrity. In addition to the narratives of Ukrainian “fascists” , RT is justifying the Crimean annexation by arguing that “Crimea has been Russian much longer than it has been Ukrainian”. According to the media channel “59% of Crimeans are ethnic Russians”24 and therefore see “the Crimean annexation to Russia as inevitable” , and argues the annexation could serve as

24 (RT, CNN: The Crimean referendum was organised as "referendum at gunpoint". , 2014 x)

Word count: 14 886 29 a “precedent for other Ukrainian regions and former Soviet republics.” (: ibid) The media channel often relies on Soviet Union references and creates the feeling of reminiscing about the “glorious” Soviet past. According to RT’s opinion piece, Vladimir Putin “wants to partially restore Soviet Russia”, which is “worth it, since he restores the greatness, which other Russian leaders have failed to recover”.25 As seen above, RT is recalling the great Russian past, and through references about the Soviet Union, creates a narrative that glorifies the USSR. This celebrated USSR past is juxtaposed against the “fascists”, unstable “Nazi Ukraine” leading to RT’s narrative arguing that countries which left Soviet Russia are in fact worse off now than before the dissolution. The Crimean annexation, therefore, is portrayed as the first step to regaining the previously lost Soviet glory. The above narrative is just another one of RT’s practices of legitimation, of which the aim is to justify Russia’s actions in Ukraine.

5.7 Nationalism

The nationalism category appeared to be the most popular of all within this research. In consistence with the literature reviewed, nationalism accounted for 28% of all frames present within the three events. Equally spread within all events, the nationalism narrative has been used by RT in order to identify certain arguments and to repeatedly underline those throughout all of the articles analysed.

The power and glory of the Russian state is also greatly underlined in the nationalist category. RT’s articles are overwhelmed with debates outlining the superiority of the Russian state. The claim that Russia is “a magnificent country and they [Crimeans] want to be part of something that big and great” is outlined as one of the main reasons behind the Crimean annexation. According to RT, in Crimea there are “60% ethnic Russians” , who were so heavily “oppressed” that Russia could not ignore their suffering and “intervened” . Moreover, the media outlet sees the annexation as a return to “Motherland Russia” , that not only “brought tears” to Crimeans’ eyes, but was “only the first step which other regions in Ukraine will follow soon” .

The Western world, however, did not see the Crimean annexation as a joyful restoration of the Soviet Union and imposed sanctions to the Russian state. As a response to

25 (RT, Nina Khrushchev: Putin chokes on Crimea., 2014 y)

Word count: 14 886 30 those actions, RT argued the firm stability of the Russian nation and weakness of the West to act against it. The media states “the Russian president has already proved he is not afraid of the sanctions” and since “Ukraine’s faith is in the hands of Russia no sturdy sanctions should be expected”. Moreover, RT argues “Moscow will respond to possible sanctions” and since Europe “has no time or money” to diversify its gas supplies “the possible sanctions could be turned against them” .

The military power of Russia is also present within the RT nationalistic narrative. The media outlet underlines the fact Russia took hold of “the only Ukrainian Naval Force submarine”, which is now part of the Russian “Black Sea fleet”. 26 The narrative goes even further stating, “Russia holds nuclear weapons and cannot be attacked militarily” , where RT strongly debates how secure and powerful the Russian state is. This appears to be a priority for the Russian government, since the country paraded their nuclear warheads in the middle of Moscow during Victory Day celebrations. This also comes to show that RT is a clear representation of Russia’s national policies and that the media outlet simply voices governmental strategies.

5.8 Information warfare

The qualitative analysis of articles underlined RT’s engagement in information war practices. In this way, the Information warfare category was created, in which this trends were analysed in order to better understand their narrative. Representing 4% of all frames found, the Information warfare appears most popular within the Savchenko articles.

One of the specifics concerning the Russian-Ukrainian conflict that was analysed within the current research is the substantial international response given by Western media. RT, being the biggest Russian media, took part in what appeared to be cyber warfare with the explicit aim of blaming Western media of misinformation through propaganda. RT talks about “well planned information campaigns”, which are part of the Western “media and propaganda campaign that was built inside the Ukrainian information war”.27 In addition, RT argues that “Russia is in a state of information war with the Anglo-Saxon media”, even more so the

26 (RT, The only Ukrainian submarine its now under the Russian Navy Ensign. , 2014 z) 27 (RT, ЭкспертыRT expert on the Savchenko case: politicized process diverts attention from accusations. , 2016 aa)

Word count: 14 886 31 media admits to be engaging in “propaganda and counter-propaganda in the good sense of the word” within a strategy “for improving Russia’s image in the eyes of the world”.28

The “whataboutism” propaganda technique used by the Soviet Union is also present in current RT narratives. As a response to Western media criticism for unjust annexation of Crimea, RT launched a series of articles about “Scotland, Catalonia, and Venice”. When Western media called for release of the illegally detained Ukrainian pilot, Nadezda Savchenko, RT took hold of the situation by calling the pilot “fascist” and argued the Western countries are the ones “dropping bombs and imprisoning”. The above cases serve as an example of RT’s lack of factual background, where the media even refers to events dating as far back as the 19th century in order to justify Russia’s present actions.

5.9 Frames count

Frames Crimean Referendum MH17 tragedy Savchenko Crimean

Speech

Security 36 2 6 21

Duty 14 2 2 13

Anti-Ukraine 2 16 6 1

Anti-West 8 8 12 18

Nationalism 30 14 16 24

Moral 6 2 2 13

Information war 8 2 6 6

History 22 0 12 20

Total 126 48 62 111

Table 1

28 (RT, Dmitry Peskov: Russia is in information war with the Anglo-Saxon media. , 2016 ab)

Word count: 14 886 32 The above table shows the number of frames found per each event. Based on the fact that for all events the same period of time was analysed, it is notable that the number of frames strongly differs in between events. The reason for the significant difference is first the variance of the number of articles per event. As already discussed, the Crimean events gained prevailing popularity since the event is of great political, economic and social significance. Second, the Crimean events have also provided a more elaborate environment for the creation of frames since the Crimean annexation and referendum are closely attached to Russia’s history, national belonging and military past. The above two factors, it can be argued, could explain the alteration in frames count visible in table 1. Further research of the correlation between events and number of articles is needed in order to better understand these fluctuations.

6.0 The presidential Crimean speech

After the Crimean referendum in 2014, Vladimir Putin addressed State Duma deputies and other governmental bodies in the Kremlin29. The speech was broadcasted live and the transcript was later on published by RT. The address is analysed separately and not as part of the already discussed Crimean referendum narrative due to the heavily loaded lexis of the speech, which requires a more thorough examination. The high level of similarity in frames’ occurrence between the Putin’s Crimean speech and all other events is expressed in the below table:

As shown in the table, there is a notable overlap between the general occurrences of all categories except two: Anti-Ukraine and Moral. The analysis has shown that Putin has put

29 (RT, Vladimir Putin's complete Crimean speech., 2014 ac)

Word count: 14 886 33 much more emphasis on the morality aspect of the Crimean annexation in comparison to RT’s narrative of events. At the same time the Anti-Ukrainian narrative is close to non-existent in the Presidential speech suggesting that Putin’s official discourse is also targeting Ukrainians. The lack of anti-Ukrainian narrative together with constant references about common history and future reveal Russia’s aim to gain Ukrainians’ support. One possible explanation for the variance in anti-Ukrainian frames is the fact that Putin’s speech was directed to not only Russians, but also the wide international community, including Ukraine. The Russian RT, on the other hand, has Russians as the biggest and most targeted audience, where the implication of anti-Ukrainian narrative is more likely to be well perceived.

Above all, based on the present analysis, this research argues the presence of a great overlap between Russia’s official dialogue and RT’s news articles. With 75% communality of results, RT has proven to be a close representation of Russia’s official discourse. As the following analysis of Putin’s speech will show, the lexis of the official discourse is similar to the previously analysed articles.

From the very beginning and throughout the whole speech, Vladimir Putin expressed instances of justification for the Crimean annexation. Well-structured, his speech is reminiscent of a research paper aiming to answer the question of “Why did Russia annex Crimea?”. The president refers to security, history, morality and nationalism as reasons behind the Russian invasion. To start with security, Putin’s narrative is not far off from RT’s reporting of the annexation, but is notably more direct in expressing the idea of imminent external threat against Russia. According to Putin, the West has “lied” to Russians many times and even more so with “NATO’s expansion to the East, as well as the deployment of military infrastructures” and “with the deployment of a missile defence system”. Furthermore, Putin firmly underlines the idea that NATO’s expansion and close relationship with Ukraine endanger the integrity of the Russian state. This becomes visible through his argument “about Ukraine soon joining NATO” and “that NATO’s navy would be right there in this city of Russia’s military glory, and this would create not an illusory but a perfectly real threat to the whole of southern Russia”. The president believes Russians were “threatened with repression”, “threatened with sanctions” and “threatened […] by a fifth column” and “the residents of Crimea and Sevastopol turned to Russia for help in defending their rights and lives”, therefore Russia “could not abandon Crimea and its residents in distress”. Thus, by discussing the supposedly great danger in the face of NATO and Ukraine, Vladimir Putin lays

Word count: 14 886 34 down the straightforward argument that the Crimean annexation was provoked by the West and therefore justified any further Russian actions in the region.

Furthermore, Putin argues for the unstable and endangering nature of the Ukrainian state by calling the Maidan protesters “Nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes and anti- Semites”. According to him Maidan protesters were “heirs of Bandera, Hitler’s accomplice during World War II,” who “resorted to terror, murder and riots”. The World War II references are present in both RT’s narrative of the events and Putin’s speech, which further strengthens the argument that RT’s broadcasting is a direct representation of Kremlin’s rhetoric.

Putin’s historic references are by no means limited only to the WWII narrative. The Russian president goes as far as reminiscing about Soviet Russia stating that “Unfortunately, what seemed impossible became a reality. The USSR fell apart.” Calling upon the times when Ukraine was part of USSR, Putin stresses the idea that Crimea and Sevastopol are Russian territories and “this is their common home, their motherland”. By discussing Sevastopol as “the birthplace of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet” and stating “Crimea is historically Russian land and Sevastopol is a Russian city”, Putin firmly confirms the pro-Russian broadcasting of RT. Despite the similarities, however, between the RT’s broadcasting of the annexation and the presidential speech, Vladimir Putin goes one step further by discussing Crimean’s emotions. The Russian president expresses his “firm conviction” that “In people’s hearts and minds, Crimea has always been an inseparable part of Russia”. In contrast, RT avoids discussing individual’s emotions or at least merely refers to quotes. This, however, appears as evidence for Putin’s secured monologue tribune rather than RT’s journalism standards. From this Federal tribune, the Russian president can clearly express controversial arguments including the undermining of the forcible Tatar deportation where Putin claimed “primarily Russians” were the ones suffering.

The anti-West narrative is also present in the presidential Crimean speech. Putin discusses the morality of the topic calling upon international hypocrisy where the West shows “not even double standards but amazing, primitive, blunt cynicism.” In line with the anti- Western RT narrative, the Russian president refers to the Kosovo precedent, the American Declaration of independence and the independence of post-Soviet republics. According to Putin, the international community should “not try so crudely to make everything suit their interests, calling the same thing white today and black tomorrow”. Portraying Russia as a victim of the West, the presidential speech is aimed at enforcing nationalistic sentiments and

Word count: 14 886 35 tensions against the international community. Nationalistic feelings are strengthened by Putin’s repetitive remarks about “our shared history and pride”. The “our” lexis appears rather more important within Putin’s Crimean speech compared to RT’s articles. The presidential speech consists of remarks about “our hearts”, “our country”, “our minds”, “our neighbours”, “our forces”, ”our trust”, and others. The long list of “our” remarks, however, often does not clarify who belongs to that “our” group and leaves the text open for interpretations. While this rhetoric is avoided by RT, the president uses it in his speech in order to target greater audience and to create sense of inclusion for as many people as possible.

Overall, the narratives used in the speech presented by Vladimir Putin are in line with the RT analysis performed in the current research. Both, Putin and RT, underline history, nationalism and security as the biggest justifications behind Russia’s actions in Ukraine. Putin, nevertheless, appears less moderate in his statements, often leaving formality behind. However, it is worth noting the similarities in framing between the official governmental statement and national media outlet. In the case of Russia and RT, the above relationship is strong enough to serve as an evidence of homogeneity of the two entities.

7. Discussion of Findings

In order to better understand the above findings it is necessary to look at the general narratives discussed in political science literature.

Scholars, such as Marlene Laruelle, point out the emergence of a new narrative with the notable conservative turn in Russia’s nationalistic politics. (Laine, 2015) This turn constitutes nationalist rhetoric which was intensified by the Ukrainian crisis of 2013. (ibid, p.5) This rhetoric, however, is by no means static and it evolves with current and future developments of Russia’s political life. The presence of nationalistic rhetoric can be confirmed by the current research, where the “nationalism” frame appeared to be the most popular of all. In contrast, an analysis of the English-language online platform of RT has shown the rarity of nationalistic narratives (Wittfoth, 2016). The English version of RT appears to be using a less nationalistic rhetoric during the Ukrainian crisis (ibid). A possible explanation for the variance in results between the domestic and international platforms of RT could be the difference in the nature of the audience that is targeted. It can be argued that the

Word count: 14 886 36 international audience is less interested in Russia’s nationalistic narrative, especially compared to the Russian-speaking audience of Russian RT.

An observation made by the Finish Institute of Foreign Affairs, argues that Russia’s nationalistic narrative tends to focus on civic rather than ethnic nationalism, as there are more than 150 ethnicities in Russia. (Laine, 2015, p. 10) This discourse, however, has changed and even more so got ethnically intensified during and after the Ukrainian crisis. (Jarzyńska, 2014) In contrast, the nationalistic rhetoric found in this research was primarily concerned with WWII references and civic nationalism. One possible explanation could be Putin’s goal to restore the historically close Russian-Ukrainian relationship and increase the Ukrainian support for the Russian government. The presence of a strong ethnic-nationalistic narrative, however, could possibly harm the above intensions and might lead to a further breakdown of the Russian-Ukrainian diplomacy.

Security and threat are important concepts within the field of International Relations, whereby the sanctuary of states has driven a large proportion of countries’ foreign and domestic policies. The argument that “It is by labelling something a security issue that it becomes one” (Wæver, 2004, p. 13) debates the idea that simply by labelling an object or act as threating, a securitisation actor is claiming the right to act in any way possible to defeat that threat. An example mostly circulating within the field of security studies is the fact that most states are treating terrorism as a risk much more threatening than car crashes, for example, despite the fact the latter ends with a greater number of casualties. Within the current research, the narrative of security threat has been strongly underlined by the articles analysed. According to Gaufman (2014), the “Russian media framing of Ukraine can be viewed as an example of a “securitizing move”, that is, as an attempt to depict a given phenomenon as an existential threat, thereby enabling the legitimization of extraordinary measures ostensibly aimed at combatting this threat” (Gaufman, 2014, p. 143). This depiction phenomenon was strongly underlined within the observed RT articles and Putin’s speech.

Another general observation made is the highest number of narratives found within Putin’s Crimean speech. The speech presented narratives for all eight categories and offered the most data for analysis. Similarly, the RT articles concerned with the Crimean referendum were the ones filled with the most narratives compared to all other RT articles. The fact that the two Crimean events appeared filled with the highest number of narratives can be explained by the high international response of the event and the major significance of conflict for Russia.

Word count: 14 886 37 The Crimean address of Vladimir Putin brought forth the observation of a lack of anti- Ukrainian narrative. Being consistently present in all other events, the anti-Ukrainian narrative was strongly avoided within the official discourse of the Russian president. Probable explanation of the above finding is the difference in targeted audiences. The RT articles analysed are primarily aimed at Russian citizens, whereas Putin’s speech was a discourse targeting not only Russians, but also Ukrainians and the wide international community. The above dissimilarity of audiences targeted could then explain the lack of anti-Ukrainian lexis within the Crimean speech, since such narrative might be harmful for the Ukrainian and international levels of support towards Russia.

8. Theoretical implications

Going back to the theory previously discussed in this research is necessary in order to assess to what extent information about Russia’s media legitimation strategy can tell us about stability of regimes and authoritarianism.

The theory reflected in this thesis has first underlined the importance of legitimation for authoritarian regimes. The studies of Graf Kielmansegg, (1971) and Schmidt (2003), have led Von Soest and Grauvogel to the argument that “Every political system – irrespective of whether it is democratic or authoritarian – must attain a certain level of legitimacy in order to ensure its persistence in the long term”. (von Soest & Grauvogel, 2015, p. 19). The current thesis complements the above argument with a substantial amount of data debating the existence of legitimation practices within Russia’s state owned media channel of RT. The analysis performed yield 347 frames derived from four events which occurred during the Russian-Ukrainian conflict which began in 2013. The fact that the performed analysis underlined such great numbers of frames underlines the importance of news framing for RT. In most parts, the frames found were consistent throughout events and were in line with the specifics of their targeted audience. What this says about legitimation is the existence of legitimation itself, meaning that RT’s framing is by no means unintentional and is part of RT’s legitimation practices. The evidence behind the above argument is the result of the analysis performed, where 32 days explored presented 110 articles and a total of 347 frames used. There were no articles found where framing of events was not part of the RT’s

Word count: 14 886 38 narrative. In addition, the close relationship of RT and the Russian government, where Putin calls the media “his personal project” (RT, 2013), speculates about governmental involvement in the process of news framing. The current thesis, therefore, debates the existence of Russia’s involvement in RT’s practices of news framing as part of a governmental strategy for legitimation of actions.

Moreover, further evidence supporting the above speculation is the nature of frames used by RT. The frames used were created in constant consideration with the audience targeted. In the case of the observed RT articles the audience targeted was the domestic one since the thesis’ analysis was only focused on the Russian language version of the channel. In all RT articles observed the anti-Ukrainian narrative was consistently present throughout the days. In contrast, the anti-Ukrainian narrative was close to inexistent in the international address of Vladimir Putin. This comes to show that the nature of Russia’s discourse depends on whether the audience targeted is domestic or international. This intentional framing of events affects the way reality is perceived by viewers. The argument that the act is intentional suggests Russia’s involvement in legitimation practices where RT serves as a tool of projecting governmental messages.

One of the major findings within the research was the emergence of the Information war category. According to some of the theories discussed, Western media can have a long- term effect on authoritarian regimes by exposing propaganda, undermining the authoritarian sources of information and most importantly weakening the credibility of regimes rulers (Kern & Hainmueller, 2009). Despite the fact that this research has not assessed the levels of credibility of the Russian government, the analysis has shown the strong RT counteractions to any anti-Russian international broadcasting. This strong media response follows the same pattern as the one previously mentioned about Western media. The information war category has shown that RT’s articles are often aimed at exposing, supposedly, Western propaganda, compromising international sources of information, and targeting the credibility of Western broadcasting. Based on the above, this research speculates that the Russian state has adopted media practices similar to the Western ones in order to, not only enhance its own legitimacy of rule, but also to undermine the credibility of any opposing regimes. In line with Morozov (2011), this research argues the existence a “downside of new digital environment”, where authoritarian regimes could in fact adopt digitalisation practices in order to further strengthen the legitimacy of rule (p. 3).

Word count: 14 886 39 In addition, the analysis has shown RT’s constant references to duty and obligation of the Russian federation to get involved in the Ukrainian crisis of 2013. Such justification of actions is strengthened by the reoccurring RT narratives arguing that the safety of Russians citizens and the integrity of the Russian state are under threat. Looking back at the initial question of how Russia legitimises its actions during the Ukrainian crisis, this research argues that, at its core, such legitimation is based on the notions of obligation and duty. By doing so, the Russian media does not only excuse any governmental actions against Ukraine, but also aims to enhance the support for any subsequent engagements of the Russian state with regards to any international actor.

9. Conclusion

The goal of this paper was to analyse how the Russian regime seeks legitimation to its domestic audience. In order to better understand the Russian practices of legitimation a closer look was given to the Russian-language version of the state owned RT. The nature of the media channel and its close ties with the Federation suggested RT as a suitable source for studying Russia’s legitimation strategies. The interest in the subject was spurred by the ongoing Ukrainian crisis which began in November 2013. The conflict echoed the need for studies concerned with authoritarianism in a global age. In the case of Russia the effects of globalisation are seen by some scholars as not only a challenge but also an opportunity for the regime. The core of this research lies upon the infamous theoretical assumptions that authoritarian states are systematically engaging in new practices of legitimation in order to assure and increase their stability of rule. Such theories represent the idea that all regimes, including authoritarian ones, are in constant search for legitimation practices. Increasingly important, online media has provided a great environment for the implementation of such. The current research has underlined the increasing focus Russia has put into online legitimation and the ways through which online media can best serve as a tool of legitimation.

In order to better understand this development a content analysis of four events and a total of 110 articles has been performed. This analysis yield 347 frames divided into eight main categories. Both, the qualitative analysis and numerical count, highlighted the frame of nationalism as the most popular of all other categories. The nationalistic rhetoric underlined

Word count: 14 886 40 Russia’s superiority over Ukraine and the international community, where Russia is portrayed as a state indestructible despite all external threats against its integrity. The supremacy of the frame of nationalism is notable not only in the RT articles observed but also in the official discourse of Vladimir Putin. The performed comparison between RT articles and Putin’s Crimean speech could serve as an example of the close links between the rhetoric of the media and the Russian Federation.

The above categories are by no means complete or undoubtedly true. The initial question the research aimed to answer is: How is Russia Today framing the events of the Ukrainian crisis of 2013 and what this framing says about the Russian regime’s legitimation strategies? During the process of analysis, however, the study has acknowledged several drawbacks in the existing research. The analysis is solely concerned with the Russian language RT online channel. This fact brings forward the question of how other language platforms have portrayed the events. In addition, the research is limited to the online platform of RT meaning that the rhetoric and framing of news has been created in line with a targeted audience of young, educated and internet literate Russian speaking individuals. Therefore, further investigation of different language platforms and media channel is needed in order to achieve a more general conclusion about framing practices within the Russian media. Last, but not least, the objectivity of the analysis cannot be fully guaranteed since in its core content analysis is concerned with the interpretation. The methodology of analysis, however, was aimed at limiting the levels of subjectivity through inter-coder reliability test and references to existing literature.

The research has, nevertheless, achieved the goal to complement other researches concerned with legitimation practices in authoritarian regimes. Moreover, the study has underlined the importance of the connection between online technological advances and stability of rule where authoritarian regimes arguably adopt and develop legitimation practices. The most significant conclusion to be drawn from this research is the argument that RT is indeed engaging in news framing, aiming to legitimate certain actions. Further investigation of RT’s practices might answer the question to what extent those were successful, and even more captivatingly to what extent media legitimation practices can ensure the stability of authoritarian regimes.

Word count: 14 886 41 10. RT articles cited

RT. (2014 a, March 20). Head of the House of Romanov Maria Vladimirovna considered appropriate the Crimean return to Russia. [Глава Дома Романовых Мария Владимировна считает закономерным, что Крым вернулся в состав России]. Retrieved March 5, 2016, from Russian RT: https://russian.rt.com/article/24794 RT. (2014 b, March 22). Яценюк: Украина готова занять место России в «Большой восьмёрке». Retrieved March 5, 2016, from Russian RT: https://russian.rt.com/article/25037 RT. (2014 c, March 16). Crimea holds a referendum on its status of autonomy - Live Stream.[В Крыму проходит референдум о статусе автономии — прямая трансляция.]. Retrieved March 4, 2016, from Russian RT: https://russian.rt.com/article/24347 RT. (2014 d, March 17). US places Russia against the EU to defend its economic interests[США стравливают Россию с ЕС, защищая свои экономические интересы.]. Retrieved March 5, 2016, from Russian RT: https://russian.rt.com/article/24366 RT. (2014 e, July 17). A source in the Federal Air Transport Agency: The objective of the Ukrainian missiles were probably Vladimir Putin's plane.[Источник в Росавиации: Целью украинской ракеты мог быть борт Владимира Путина.]. Retrieved March 20, 2016, from Russian RT: https://russian.rt.com/article/41334 RT. (2014 f, March 22). Yatsenyuk: Ukraine is ready to take Russia's place in the G8.[Яценюк: Украина готова занять место России в «Большой восьмёрке».]. Retrieved March 6, 2016, from Russian RT: https://russian.rt.com/article/25037 RT. (2014 i, March 18). Ukrainian volunteer: Russian prisoners will not be kept. [Украинский доброволец: Русских в плен брать не будем.]. Retrieved March 5, 2016, from Russian RT: https://russian.rt.com/inotv/2014-03-18/Ukrainskij- dobrovolec-Russkih-v-plen RT. (2014 j, March 18). Vladimir Putin today, will address the adoption of Crimea and Sevastopol into the Russian Federation [Владимир Путин сегодня выступит с обращением по поводу принятия Крыма и Севастополя в состав РФ]. Retrieved March 5, 2016, from Russian RT: https://russian.rt.com/article/24501 RT. (2014 k, March 18). Media: US criticizes Russian over Crimea, yet they forget about the independent state of Texas [СМИ: США критикуют Россию за Крым, но забывают про независимое государство Техас]. Retrieved March 5, 2016, from Russian RT: https://russian.rt.com/article/24493 RT. (2014 l, March 19). American conservatives are sensitive to the situation with the Russian annexation of Crimea [Американские консерваторы с пониманием относятся к

Word count: 14 886 42 ситуации с присоединением Крыма к России]. Retrieved March 5, 2016, from Russian RT: https://russian.rt.com/article/24588 RT. (2014 m, March 17). 96,77% of Crimean voters voted for joining Russia [96,77% крымских избирателей проголосовали за присоединение к России]. Retrieved March 5, 2016, from Russian RT: https://russian.rt.com/article/24424 RT. (2014 n, March 17). Deputy Prime Minister of Crimea: East of Ukraine will enter Russian without war [Вице-премьер Крыма: Восток Украины войдет в Россию без войны.]. Retrieved March 5, 2016, from Russian RT: https://russian.rt.com/inotv/2014-03-17/Vice-premer-Krima-Vostok-Ukraini-vojdet RT. (2014 o, July 22). The Malaysian Trade Union stewards will check the information on the refusal of flight attendants flying over Ukraine. [Профсоюз бортпроводников Малайзии проверит информацию об отказе стюардесс летать над Украиной]. Retrieved March 5, 2016, from Russian RT: https://russian.rt.com/article/41984 RT. (2014 p, July 20). Relatives of the victims in the Boeing 777 crash call for quick investigation of the tragedy [Родственники погибших в авиакатастрофе Boeing 777 ждут скорейшего расследования трагедии]. Retrieved March 5, 2016, from Russian RT: https://russian.rt.com/article/41676 RT. (2014 q, July 20). Kiev does not guarantee the safety of experts investigating the Boeing crash [Киев не гарантирует безопасность работающим на месте крушения Boeing экспертам]. Retrieved March 5, 2016, from Russian RT: https://russian.rt.com/article/4172 RT. (2014 r, March 16). Expert: Crimean has the full right of succession. [Эксперт: Крым имеет полное право на отделение]. Retrieved March 5, 2016, from Russian RT: https://russian.rt.com/inotv/2014-03-16/Ekspert-Krim-imeet-polnoe-pravo RT. (2014, March 23). Russian RT. Retrieved March 5, 2016, from Александр Лукашенко: Белоруссия де-факто признала Крым частью России: https://russian.rt.com/article/25084 RT. (2014 s, March 23). Alexander Lukashenko: Belarus de facto recognized Crimea as part of Russia. [Александр Лукашенко: Белоруссия де-факто признала Крым частью России]. Retrieved March 5, 2016, from Russian RT: https://russian.rt.com/article/25084 RT. (2014 t, March 17). The imposition of sanctions against Russia is not beneficial to the West, since that would lead to Russian convergence with China.[Введение санкций против России не выгодно Западу, так как приведёт к сближению РФ с Китаем.]. Retrieved March 5, 2016, from Russian RT: https://russian.rt.com/article/24475 RT. (2014 u, March 17). European sanctions will last six months. [Европейские санкции продлятся полгода.]. Retrieved March 5, 2016, from Russian RT: https://russian.rt.com/article/24476

Word count: 14 886 43 RT. (2014 v, March 17). US analyst: The relationship between Russian and US will improve soon. [Американский аналитик: Отношения между Россией и США вскоре наладятся.]. Retrieved March 5, 2016, from Russian RT: https://russian.rt.com/article/24433 RT. (2014 w, March 19). Crimean homosexuals voted for Russia and now prepare for unbearable life.[Крымские геи голосуют за Россию и готовятся к «невыносимой жизни».]. Retrieved March 5, 2016, from Russian RT: https://russian.rt.com/inotv/2014-03-19/Krimskie-gei-golosuyut-za-Rossiyu RT. (2014 w, March 20). The Head of the House of Romanov Maria Vladimirovna considered the Crimean return to Russia lawful. [Глава Дома Романовых Мария Владимировна считает закономерным, что Крым вернулся в состав России.]. Retrieved March 5, 2016, from Russian RT: https://russian.rt.com/article/24794 RT. (2014 x, March 17). CNN: The Crimean referendum was organised as "referendum at gunpoint". [CNN: Крымский референдум был организован «под дулом пистолета».]. Retrieved March 5, 2016, from Russian RT: https://russian.rt.com/inotv/2014-03-17/CNN-Krimskij-referendum-bil-organizovan RT. (2014 y, March 17). Nina Khrushchev: Putin chokes on Crimea.[Нина Хрущева: «Путин подавится Крымом».]. Retrieved March 5, 2016, from Russian RT: https://russian.rt.com/inotv/.../Nina-Hrushheva-Putin-podavitsya-Krimom RT. (2014 z, March 22). The only Ukrainian submarine its now under the Russian Navy Ensign. [На единственной субмарине ВМС Украины поднят Андреевский флаг]. Retrieved March 5, 2016, from Russian RT: https://russian.rt.com/article/24991 RT. (2016 aa, March 21). ЭкспертыRT expert on the Savchenko case: politicized process diverts attention from accusations. [ RT о деле Надежды Савченко: Политизированность процесса отвлекает внимание от обвинений]. Retrieved March 5, 2016, from Russian RT: https://russian.rt.com/article/154724 RT. (2016, March 26). Dmitry Peskov: Russia is in information war with the Anglo-Saxon media. [Дмитрий Песков: Россия находится в состоянии информационной войны с англосаксонскими СМИ]. Retrieved March 5, 2016, from Russian RT: https://russian.rt.com/article/155612 RT. (2016 g, March 28). Sergei Shargunov: African vacation.[Сергей Шаргунов: Африканские каникулы.]. Retrieved April 4, 2016, from Russian RT: https://russian.rt.com/article/155888 RT. (2016 h, March 23). Zakhar Prilepin: Savchenko for the last time. [Захар Прилепин: Последний раз про Савченко.]. Retrieved April 4, 2016, from Russian RT: https://russian.rt.com/article/155101 RT. (2016 q, March 22). Expert on the Savchenko case: From a Western perspective whoever acts against Russia is innocent. [Эксперт о деле Савченко: С точки зрения Запада, если ты действуешь против России, то ты невиновен]. Retrieved March 5, 2016, from RT: https://russian.rt.com/article/154947

Word count: 14 886 44 Russels, M. (2015). Russian media – under state control. European Parliamentary Research Service, 1-2. Russia Today. (2014a, February 24). Will NATO annex Ukraine? Retrieved January 16, 2016, from Russia Today: https://www.rt.com/op-edge/will-nato-annex-ukraine-414/ Russia Today. (2014b, Feburary 27). Facts you need to know about Crimea and why it is in turmoil. Retrieved January 16, 2016, from Russia Today: Facts you need to know about Crimea and why it is in turmoil Russia Today. (2014c, March 20). Obama rules out US military involvement in Ukraine. Retrieved January 16, 2016, from Russia Today: https://www.rt.com/news/ukraine- diplomacy-obama-russia-949/ Russia Today. (2014d, March 21). ‘Russia is enemy of the Western global financial system’. Retrieved January 16, 2016, from Russia Today: https://www.rt.com/op-edge/russia- us-financial-system-473/ Russia Today. (2014e, March 27). ‘US foreign policy based purely on bullying smaller nations’. Retrieved January 16, 2016, from Russia Today: https://www.rt.com/op- edge/us-foreign-policy-bullying-493/ Russian Government. (2014, March 21). Dmitry Medvedev on the reunification of Crimea and Sevastopol with Russia. Retrieved January 16, 2016, from The Russian Government: http://government.ru/en/news/11242/ RussianSearchMarkeing. (2016, February 22). Russian Internet User Demographics: 25-34 year-old age group. Retrieved March 28, 2016, from Russian Search Marketing: http://russiansearchmarketing.com/russian-internet-user-demographics-25-34-year/ RussiaToday. (2015, September 25). Facts vs Fiction. Retrieved March 28, 2016, from RT: https://www.rt.com/facts-vs-fiction/ RussiaToday. (2016). About us. Retrieved March 28, 2016, from RT: https://www.rt.com/about-us/ RussiaToday. (2016, January 26). Опрос: В России интернет по популярности почти догнал телевидение. Retrieved March 14, 2016, from Russian RT: https://russian.rt.com/article/144227 RussiaToday. (n.d.). About us. Retrieved March 28, 2016, from RT: https://www.rt.com/about-us/ Putin, V. (2013, December 9). Presidential Decree No:894. Retrieved May 22, 2016, from Kremlin: http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/37871 Putin, V. (2014a, March 18). Address by President of the Russian Federation. Retrieved January 15, 2016, from President of Russia: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603

Word count: 14 886 45 Putin, V. (2014b, March 18). Meeting in support of Crimea’s accession to the Russian Federation “We are together!”. Retrieved January 15, 2016, from President of Russia: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20607 Putin, V. (2014c, March 19). Draft Federal Constitutional law on the accession of the Republic of Crimea to the Russian Federation and the creation of new constituent entities within Russia submitted to the State Duma. Retrieved January 15, 2016, from President of Russia: http://en.kremlin.ru/acts/news/20615

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