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Rob Lee Why Did the Kremlin Mass Its Forces Near Ukraine? EURASIA PROGRAM WHY DID THE KREMLIN MASS ITS FORCES NEAR UKRAINE? ROB LEE All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Author: Rob Lee The views expressed in this report are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, a non-partisan organization that seeks to publish well-argued, policy-oriented articles on American foreign policy and national security priorities. Design: Natalia Kopytnik © 2021 by the Foreign Policy Research Institute August 2021 ABOUT US The Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) is a non-partisan think tank based in Philadelphia. Its founding principle is that a nation must think before it acts. FPRI is dedicated to producing the highest quality scholarship and nonpartisan policy analysis focused on crucial foreign policy and national security challenges facing the United States. We educate those who make and influence policy, as well as the public at large, through the lens of history, geography, and culture. OFFERING IDEAS In an increasingly polarized world, we pride ourselves on our tradition of nonpartisan scholarship. We count among our ranks over 100 affiliated scholars located throughout the nation and the world who appear regularly in national and international media, testify on Capitol Hill, and are consulted by U.S. government agencies. EDUCATING THE AMERICAN PUBLIC FPRI was founded on the premise that an informed and educated citizenry is paramount for the U.S. to conduct a coherent foreign policy. Through in-depth research and extensive public programming, FPRI offers insights to help the public understand our volatile world. CHAMPIONING CIVIC LITERACY We believe that a robust civic education is a national imperative. FPRI aims to provide teachers with the tools they need in developing civic literacy, and works to enrich young people’s understanding of the institutions and ideas that shape American political life and our role in the world. www.fpri.org FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE Introduction elsewhere near Ukraine’s borders.3 To put uring March and April 2021, the D this in perspective, the Russian military Russian military conducted a large-scale has approximately 850,000-900,000 buildup in its regions bordering Ukraine, servicemembers in total, and 168 constant including Crimea, which Russia annexed readiness BTGs, according to Russian in 2014. Scores of videos appeared on Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu.4 If these TikTok, Telegram, Twitter, and other social estimates were accurate, the Russian media sites showing Russian military military massed roughly 10-15% of its total equipment, including tanks, infantry manpower and approximately one third fighting vehicles, artillery, and air defense of its BTGs near Ukraine’s borders. systems, moving toward or appearing in the vicinity of Ukraine’s borders. The In response to the buildup, Chairman of United States Department of Defense’s the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark spokesperson John Kirby told reporters Milley, National Security Advisor Jake that the Russian buildup was even larger Sullivan, and President Joe Biden all than during the peak of the fighting called their Russian counterparts to in 2014.1 Ukrainian officials estimated discuss the situation. U.S. European that the Russian military buildup would Command (EUCOM) raised its alert status reach a total of 120,000 Russian troops to its highest level. The buildup also with more than fifty-six battalion tactical coincided with an increase in fighting groups (BTG).2 United States defense along the line of contact, with at least 36 officials gave a lower estimate that 48 Ukrainian servicemen killed thus far in BTGs had moved into the border area and 2021.5 The movement of Russian forces 80,000 Russian troops were in Crimea or led to intense speculation about Russia’s 1 “Russian military buildup near Ukraine larger than in 2014- Pentagon,” Reuters, April 19, 2021, https://www.reuters. com/world/middle-east/russian-military-buildup-near-ukraine-larger-than-2014-pentagon-2021-04-19/. 2 Matthias Williams and Robin Emmott,” Ukraine says Russia will soon have over 120,000 troops on its borders,” Reuters, April 20, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-reach-over-120000-troops-ukraines-bor- der-week-ukraine-says-2021-04-20/; “В Минобороны Украины оценили общую численность стягивающихся к украинской границе российских войск в 110 тыс. человек,” Interfax, April 14, 2021, https://www.militarynews.ru/story. asp?rid=1&nid=548437&lang=RU. 3 Michael R. Gordon and Georgi Kantchev, “Satellite Images Show Russia’s Expanding Ukraine Buildup,” Wall Street Journal, April 20, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/satellite-images-show-russias-expanding-ukraine-build- up-11618917238. 4 “Russian Army operates around 170 battalion tactical groups — defense chief,” TASS, August 10, 2021, https://tass. com/defense/1324461. 5 Yuras Karmanau, “Ukraine says 2 soldiers killed in east amid Russia tensions,” Associated Press, May 7, 2021, https:// apnews.com/article/ukraine-russia-europe-3f9f33dfafe0dbdef1beda466a514e5c. 2 RUSSIA’S COERCIVE DIPLOMACY intentions, including fears of a large- launch rocket systems and Iskander-M scale ground invasion. However, U.S. short-range ballistic missile systems and intelligence indicated that a large-scale other heavy equipment, would remain at ground invasion was unlikely because of the Pogonovo training area in Voronezh a lack of prepositioned spare parts, field near Ukraine’s border until the Zapad hospitals, ammunition, and other logistics 2021 strategic exercise in September.9 necessary for such an operation.6 Furthermore, Shoigu did not state clearly Likewise, EUCOM commander General whether all of the equipment and units Tod Wolters said on April 15 that there deployed near Ukraine’s borders outside was a “low to medium” risk of a Russian of Crimea would also return to their bases, ground invasion of Ukraine in the coming nor how those units were employed weeks.7 during the snap inspection. On April 22, after the end of a large- Two weeks after Shoigu’s announcement, scale exercise at the Opuk training area U.S. defense officials said that Russia had in Crimea, which included an amphibious removed only “a few thousand” troops landing, a helicopter air assault operation and that there were approximately 80,000 with two companies, and a multi-battalion servicemen near Ukraine’s borders, airborne operation with more than two despite Shoigu’s order for most of those thousand paratroopers and sixty vehicles units to return to their permanent bases parachuted from forty Il-76MD transport by May 1.10 Thus Russia can still escalate aircraft, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu rapidly in Ukraine in the future, though the announced that the winter verification immediate threat of a serious escalation tests for the Western and Southern of fighting in the Donbas appears to have Military Districts had been a success passed with Shoigu’s announcement. and the troops would return to their permanent bases.8 However, he indicated that equipment from Central Military District’s 41st Combined Arms Army, which included BM-27 Uragan multiple 6 Barbara Starr, Jennifer Hansler, and Oren Liebermann, “US and other NATO members pledge support to Ukraine while walking fine line with Russia,” CNN, April 14 2021, https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/14/politics/us-nato-ukraine-russia/ index.html. 7 John Grady, “EUCOM Commander: Russia Not Likely to Invade Ukraine Soon,” USNI News, April 15, 2021, https:// news.usni.org/2021/04/15/eucom-commander-russia-not-likely-to-invade-ukraine-soon. 8 “На учениях в Крыму десантировались более 2 тыс. военнослужащих ВДВ,” Interfax, April 22, 2021, https://www. interfax.ru/russia/762679. 9 Andrey Arkadiev, “Войска, задействованные в учениях на юге РФ, вернутся в пункты постоянной дислокации до 1 мая,” Zvezda, April 22, 2021, https://tvzvezda.ru/news/20214221457-nI2NT.html. 10 Helene Cooper and Julian E. Barnes, “80,000 Russian Troops Remain at Ukraine Border as U.S. and NATO Hold Exercises,” New York Times, May 5, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/05/us/politics/biden-putin-russia-ukraine. html#click=https://t.co/5wfRlh52T1. 3 FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE 4 Max Kukurudziak/Unsplash RUSSIA’S COERCIVE DIPLOMACY Explaining Russia’s Actions could have been the United States efore Shoigu’s announcement, there B and NATO instead of Ukraine. Shoigu’s were three explanations for Russia’s announcement that troops would return actions. First, that these movements were to their permanent bases a week after purely part of a training exercise designed President Biden called President Putin to test the Russian Armed Forces. Second, to request a summit led some analysts that they were the prelude to a significant to argue that this was a successful military escalation that would involve attempt at compellence. But Russian sending Russian forces beyond the line officials never provided a single, clear of contact in the Donbas or Crimea. Third, demand from Washington, and we would that Russia was building up its forces have expected to see other actions as near Ukraine for coercive or signaling part of a compellence campaign, such purposes. A Russian signaling action could as aggressive intercepts of American have had two main targets. First, it could aircraft and ships in neutral waters or have been aimed at Ukraine. In this case, renewed fighting in Idlib province in the buildup may have been undertaken to Syria or Libya. Instead, it appears Putin strengthen Russia’s deterrence capability accepted a “tactical victory” by agreeing against a potential Ukrainian offensive in to the summit with President Biden, but Crimea and the Donbas by demonstrating not that this was necessarily the aim of Russia’s ability to defend those regions the buildup.11 A better explanation is that and lending credibility that it would the buildup was aimed at deterring future move to protect them.
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