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The Ukraine Crisis As Represented in the News: a Critical Discourse

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DEPARTMENT DE FILOLOGIA ANGLESA I DE GERMANĺSTICA The Ukraine Crisis as Represented in the News: A Critical Discourse Analysis By Hanna Klimava Supervisor: Dr. Melissa G. Moyer Master’s Dissertation MA in Advanced English Studies: Multilingualism and Acquisition of English June 2016 Abstract This thesis studies the role of language in the construction of ideological stances in newspapers from different countries representing the Ukraine political crisis. The events in Ukraine in 2013- 2014 resulted in a confrontation of world views on the crisis, mainly of the US and the EU, and Russia that are reflected in a selection of articles taken from four different online news portals. These news portals are The New York Times, Deustche Welle, The Moscow Times and Russia Today. The articles selected correspond to the three prominent events in the crisis: the annexation of Crimea, the Malaysian airplane crash and the sanctions introduced by the West against Russia. A Critical Discourse Analysis is adopted as a method of analyzing data. Discursive strategies as well as linguistic means that assist in framing texts of similar content into different ideological perspectives are identified and discussed. A comparison of the selected articles shows the different ways the news outlets set about to shape the public’s opinion. The main findings of the study are that political and economic power groups tend to have an impact on political decisions and that these decisions are also driven by the economy of a country. Also, the investigated news texts serve as a means of legitimization of these political decisions and actions. Finally, language plays a crucial role in constructing ideological perspectives on events, which may be later naturalized and, therefore, transformed into common sense ideas and beliefs. Keywords: Critical Discourse Analysis, news, Ukraine crisis, power, ideology 2 Acknowledgements I would like to express my gratitude and special thanks to my thesis supervisor Dr. Melissa G. Moyer who was always available to discuss the content of the project and give her expert opinion on ideas and writing style. I am very grateful for all the time she invested and I should admit I really appreciate the chance to learn from her. I am also very grateful to all my family and friends who supported me, at all stages of my work. 3 Contents 1. Introduction 5 2. Research Questions 8 3. Theoretical Framing 9 3.1 CDA Approaches 9 3.2 Power 12 3.3 Ideology 16 3.4 Language 21 4. The Context of the Study 24 4.1 Background to the First Event 25 4.2 The First Event 26 4.3 The Second Event 27 4.4 The Third Event 28 5. Methodology 31 5.1 Criteria for Selection of the Data 31 5.2 Information on the Newspapers 33 5.2.1 The New York Times 33 5.2.2 Russia Today 35 5.2.3 The Moscow Times 37 5.2.4 Deutsche Welle 38 5.3 Certain Methodological Issues 40 6. Analysis of the Events 42 6.1 Annexation 42 6.2 Plane Crash 55 6.3 Sanctions 69 7. Conclusions 81 General References 88 References for Web Pages 89 References for News Articles 90 Appendices 92 Appendix A Newspaper Articles 92 Appendix B Summary of the Analysis 129 4 1. Introduction The constant doses of news which most people receive each day are a significant factor in social control, and they account for a not insignificant proportion of a person's average daily involvement in discourse. (Fairclough, 1996: 37) The emergence of modern technologies and internet in particular has reshaped the world we live in. In our information-based society prominence is assigned accordingly to information, and internet actively participates in its successful distribution and consumption. Information circulates in media (radio, TV, printed press) and online media, which operate through sound, image and, most importantly, text. All of the three components are dependent on language, which in the news domain, is ideally supposed to be the means of delivering information. However, the idea of media simply giving information and impartiality of news in modernity seems problematic and unrealistic (Fairclough, 1995a: 44). Language is extensively used as a tool for exercising power, ideology, establishing discrimination and building inequality. In fact, language can be considered a secret weapon, for the hidden meanings and implications that might be intentionally embedded into texts are not always apparent to the public (Fairclough, 1996: 55). Mechanisms of mind control and manipulation applied through discourse contribute to the reproduction and reinforcement of power and control. Therefore, the role of language in these processes should not be underestimated. Analysis of discourse within social contexts aims at revealing features of power and bias, making them more visible and transparent, and, consequently, appears to be essential (Blommaert, 2005: 25). The present study is motivated by the events in Ukraine which resulted in an international confrontation of the two political powers: the USA, including the EU, and Russia, for the first time since the Cold War. The conflict started from the division of the spheres of influence and it grew into a real war in the territory of Ukraine, capturing the headlines of numerous newspapers and producing relevant discourse in media for 5 several years now. Research on this topic has so far been limited. The studies on the Ukraine crisis which also employ Critical Discourse Analysis as a method of research, pose a different set of questions, investigate into other events and take a different approach to data collection. In her study Discourse Strategies in Response to the Crimean Crisis Peschlova (2014) looks into Lithuanian and Slovakian ways of construction of identity and links them to the political stance of these countries and their response to given events. Jorge (2014) examines “discursive construction of the EuroMaidan protests and the Crimean annexation in two major transnational news outlets – The Guardian and Russia Today”. This particular study aims at revealing and analyzing instances of power and ideology embedded in the language of several major online newspapers/news portals: The New York Times, The Moscow Times, Russia Today and Deutsche Welle. Three events which took place at the beginning of the crisis and escalated it to an international level are chosen for this purpose. This thesis is divided into several sections, which follow this introduction. In the next section the research questions are raised. The Theoretical Framing section which comes after, explains how this study employs Critical Discourse Analysis. Also, it defines power and ideology in a way they are used in this study. The following section is dedicated to the contextualization of the crisis. Historical and economic outline of Ukraine is provided. In addition to this, the context of events which are later analyzed, is included. The Methodology section comes next. It describes methodological choices undertaken in this study. As well, it provides information on the news outlets which were chosen for the investigation. The Analysis section comprises three subsections. In each of them, four articles on one event are analyzed. The Conclusions section summarizes the main findings. The Appendices are divided into two parts. Appendix A 6 contains all the news articles. Appendix B has a table which summarizes the analysis in a compact comparative form. 7 2. Research Questions The questions I pose in this section rose after a careful consideration of the role of language in the media. Also, the events of the crisis were found to be stimulating, for they caused a contradiction in countries’ positions and their evaluation of the events. Thus, the following research questions are raised in the thesis: What are the main discursive and linguistic strategies used by the four news portals representing the Ukraine crisis? What ideologies get constructed through these discourses and how do they legitimize power and political actors in the case of each of the newspapers? The first research question aims at revealing certain linguistic structures employed for the portrayal of the events in Ukraine which are of worldwide significance. It is complemented by a broader question that intends to look into the main ideologies that get constructed through news texts of the four news portals, as well as the textual means through which political practices can be legitimized. In order to answer the second question, stakeholders need to be identified and their interests distinguished. Ideologies serve interests of certain social groups, therefore, they must represent the very definition of the group. Hence, social identities, actions, goals, norms and values, resources and interests of the four different, (presumably ideologically different) groups will be discussed and established (Van Dijk, 2015: 68). According to Berreby, 2008; Elliott, 1986, ideologies tend to be polarized between Us and Them (Van Dijk, 2015: 68). However, the present study sets a goal of uncovering different, not necessarily antipodal ideologies (groups) and displaying the ways in which each of the news portals portrays Others, not Them. Therefore, a more complete representation of the variety of ideologies and interests in the world is being established, which makes the study robust and well-founded. 8 3. Theoretical Framing This section introduces the main tenets of a Critical Discourse Analysis (henceforth, CDA) framework and its various methodological approaches, as well as the typologies of linguistic tools proposed by Wodak (2009) and Fairclough (2005) which will be incorporated into the analysis of the selected newspaper articles about the Ukraine crisis. Overarching notions of power, as an indirect way of exercising control, and ideology, as system of beliefs that serve certain interests, play a pivotal role in the understanding of discourses and printed news construction and therefore need to be taken as a basis in the present study.
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